VOL.

193, JANUARY 18, 1991 57

People vs. Marti

*
G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-
appellant.

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Searches

and Seizures; Evidence; The constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person
from interference by government; it cannot be
extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.—
In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. As this Court held
in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
“1. This constitutional right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included
in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. xxx “xxx There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for
in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion
of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. xxx” (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US
757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US
616 [1886]; Italics supplied). In Bureau v.
McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 574; 65
L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that: “(t)he Fourth Amendment gives
protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental
agencies: as against such authority it was the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of
his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly
served.” The above ruling was reiterated in State
v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to
ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and
participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics. And again in the 1969 case of

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

58

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

P l M
 People vs. Marti

seizure clauses are restraints upon the

government and its agents, not upon private
individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal.
App. 2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr. 892 (1966): State v.
Brown, Mo., 391 S.W. 2d 903 (1965): State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957). x x x The
contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
trangressing appellant’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.

Same; Same; Same; Where the contraband

articles are identified without a trespass on the
part of the arresting officer, there is not a search
that is prohibited by the constitution.—Second,
the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed
by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no
tresspass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified
without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited
by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559., 71
L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374
US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State,
429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

Same; Same; Same; The Bill of Rights

embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against act of private individuals, it is
directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
—That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be
subject to protection. But protection against
whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query
which he himself posed, as follows: “First, the
general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of
Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in
the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.” (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner
Bernas; Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Italics
supplied) The constitu-

59

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 59

People vs. Marti

tional proscription against unlawful searches and

seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

Criminal Law; Evidence; Denials of

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative, self-serving evidence
which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.—Rather than give the
appearance of veracity, we find appellant’s
disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete
stranger struck in half an hour could not have
pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4)
parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose
and for appellant to readily accede to comply
with the undertaking without first ascertaining
its contents. As stated by the trial court, “(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and
of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of
P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the
Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would
not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so” (Decision,
p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed
to do the errand, appellant failed to explain.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 (1989): People v. Sariol, 174 SCRA
237 [1989]).
 Same; Same; Witnesses; Evidence to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself.—Evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing
Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also
People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v.
Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA,
92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael’s
full name, his complete address or passport
number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise,
appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. “B”, Original
Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and

60

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

People vs. Marti

which a person possesses, or exercises acts of

ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j],
Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49. Benipayo, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

Court.
 The Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E.
Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:
**
This is an appeal from a decision rendered
by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of
Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i),
Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of
the prosecution are as follows:

“On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00

a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders” in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to
Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland” (Decision, p. 6)
“Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she
could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.
The four (4)

_______________

** Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo.

61

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 61

People vs. Marti

packages were then placed inside a brown

corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2').
Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top
of the packages before the box was sealed with
masking tape, thus making the box ready for
shipment (Decision, p. 8).
“Before delivery of appellant’s box to the
Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.
When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing
gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one
of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of
the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6,
1987; Italics supplied).
“Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987). “He
brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the

( )
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about
1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e.,
August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the
Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed
the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3)
NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the
Reyes’ office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30,
October 6, 1987).
“Job Reyes brought out the box in which
appellant’s packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.
Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn,
p. 38, October 6, 1987; Italics supplied).
“The package which allegedly contained
books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package
which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana
leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
(tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
“The NBI agents made an inventory and took
charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody
of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate

appellant but to no avail. Appellant’s stated
address in his passport being the

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62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
People vs. Marti
Manila Cental Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter’s Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant,
while claiming his mail at the Central Post
Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light
on the attempted shipment of the seized
dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics
Section of the NBI submitted the dried
leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for
laboratory examination. It turned out that
the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
(Appellee’s Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-
134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed
against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the
assailed decision. In this appeal,
accused/appellant assigns the following
errors, to wit:

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN

ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS
CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION
OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR
PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence

subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec.
2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2),
Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the
Constitution provide:

“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination

63

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 63

People vs. Marti

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and

the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
“Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
“(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

Our present constitutional provision on the

guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter
which, worded as follows.:

“The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from

***
the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. As such, the Court may
turn to the pronouncements of the United
States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered
doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid
down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684,
6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]),
declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process
the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v.
People’s Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein
the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of its seizure.

_______________

*** It reads: “The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”

64

64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
People vs. Marti

The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)

constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly
adhered to the exclusionary rule and has
struck down the admissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches
and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v.
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v.
Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also
Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all
those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the
State acting through the medium of its law
enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar
assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure
has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an
act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant’s constitutional rights,
be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence
of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

“1. This constitutional right (against

unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included
in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. xxx
“xxx There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. xxx” (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966]
and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
Italics supplied).

65

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 65

People vs. Marti

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465

(1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the
Court there in construing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures declared
that:
()
“(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection
against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of
seizure by process duly served.”

The above ruling was reiterated in State v.

Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a
parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof
found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in
prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v.
State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the
search and seizure clauses are restraints
upon the government and its agents, not
upon private individuals, (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr,
892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317
P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas
v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court
there said:

“The search of which appellant complains,

however, was made by a private citizen—the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel
****
case containing the evidence complained of.
The search was made on the motel owner’s own
initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious,
called the local police, informed them of the
bag’s contents, and made it available to the
authorities.
“The fourth amendment and the case law
applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action.”

_______________

**** Forged checks.

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66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
People vs. Marti

The contraband in the case at bar having

come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant’s
rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court
to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on
used in prosecuting the case which resulted
in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by
accused/appellant needs to be clarified in
two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack
of it.
 First, the factual considerations of the
case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal search
and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it
was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said
inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN,
October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8;
Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes
opened the box containing the illicit cargo,
he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels
containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to
the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents
made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no
tresspass has been committed in aid thereof,
is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d
135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of
the arresting officer, there is not the search
that is prohibited by the constitution (US v.
Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker
v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d.
726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).

67

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People vs. Marti

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266

[1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the
police at the specific request of the manager
and where the search was initially made by
the owner there is no unreasonable search
and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:

“First, the general reflections. The protection of

fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of
Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in
the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.” (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner
 (
Bernas; Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Italics
supplied)

The constitutional proscription against

unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of
law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the
law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so

68

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
People vs. Marti

as to bring it within the ambit of alleged

unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found
in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters
not whether the evidence was procured by
police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one
thing, the constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does
not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications
introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re:
Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest
vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in
the issuance thereof (See Soliven v.
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular
No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No.
12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications
introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State
and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against
unreasonable search and seizure may only
be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual
in violation of the Bill of Rights should also
be construed as an act of the State would
result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the
evidence procured by an individual effected
through private seizure equally applies, in
pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-
governmental as it is, of appellant’s
constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error,
appellant contends that the lower court
erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit,
We have carefully examined the records of
the case and found nothing to indicate, as
an “undisputed fact”, that appellant was not
informed of his

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VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 69

People vs. Marti

constitutional rights or that he gave

statements without the assistance of
counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/ appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that
they have regularly performed their duties
(Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies
should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary.
What is clear from the records, on the other
hand, is that appellant refused to give any
written statement while under investigation
as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:

“Fiscal Formoso:

“You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job

Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
“WITNESS:

“Yes, we have interviewed the accused

together with the girl but the accused availed of
his constitutional right not to give any written
statement, sir.” (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the

prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination. As borne out
by the records, neither was there any proof
by the defense that appellant gave
uncounselled confession while being
investigated. What is more, we have
examined the assailed judgment of the trial
court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant’s second assignment of error is
therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant’s third
assignment of error, appellant would like us
to believe that he was not the owner of the
packages which contained prohibited drugs
but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub
along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of
their 30-minute conversation, Michael
requested him to ship the packages and
gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was
about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of
veracity, we find appellant’s disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to
human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance
 70

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
People vs. Marti

with a complete stranger struck in half an

hour could not have pushed a man to
entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and
shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with
the undertaking without first ascertaining
its contents. As stated by the trial court,
“(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that
as the marijuana flowering tops, and the
cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on
the other hand, would not simply accept
such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete
stranger on his mere say-so” (Decision, p.
19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily
agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to
explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight
in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174
SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant’s bare denial is even made
more suspect considering that, as per
records of the Interpol, he was previously
convicted of possession of hashish by the
Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the
consignee of the frustrated shipment,
Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just
about an hour’s drive from appellant’s
residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People
v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing
Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see
also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989];
People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As
records further show, appellant did not even
bother to ask Michael’s full name, his
complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise,
appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. “B”, Original
Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and ship-

71

VOL. 193, JANUARY 18, 1991 71

Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals

per thereof giving more weight to the

presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule
131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.
 Premises considered, we see no error
committed by the trial court in rendering
the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of
conviction finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr. and

Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Note.—A prohibited article falling under

the concept of malum prohibitum, such as a
pistol, may be seized, but only when the
search is valid. (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687.)

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