152351-1942-Jakosalem - v. - Rafols PDF

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 3

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 48372. July 24, 1942.]

GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM , plaintiff-appellant, vs . NICOLAS


RAFOLS, ET AL. , defendants-appellees.

Tomas Alonso and Silvano Jakosalem, for appellant.


Nicolas Rafols, for appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; VALIDITY OF THE SALE OF AN


INHERITANCE BY AN HEIR. — The sale made by S. M. in favor of P. C. was valid, but it
would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the
partition of the property left by her deceased father J. M. And as on December 12,
1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to S. M.,
the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of P. C. was entirely confirmed.
2. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE SALE OF A PROPERTY; PREFERENCE OF THE ONE FIRST
IN POSSESSION. — Upon the con rmation of the sale on December 12, 1920 in favor of
P. C., the conveyance by S. M. in favor of N. R. in 1921 could no longer be done. And
even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the
sale, the rst in possession, namely, P. C., should be preferred. When the sale made in
the latter's favor was con rmed on December 12, 1920, S. M. was in possession of the
land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of P. C. The
possession of N. R. commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is subsequent to that of P.
C.

DECISION

MORAN , J : p

The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to


Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his estate was
commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924, only. During the
pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of
the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui,
subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue
in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On December 12, 1920, the
partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in
question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of
professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant- appellee Nicolas
Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession
thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said
half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and
while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land
conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half by
express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part
of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar
could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia legis,
that is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinarily be
levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the
right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in
order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in
no wise stands in the way of such administration.
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property
is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason
states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner
of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated
to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the
estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his
part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of
the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of
the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased
father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the
sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be
allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui
was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the
vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And
as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in question was
adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor
of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.
Upon the con rmation of the sale on December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui,
the conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolas Rafols in 1921 could no longer be
done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has
registered the sale, the rst in possession, namely, Pedro Cui, should be preferred.
When the sale made in the latter's favor was con rmed on December 12, 1920, Susana
Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be
considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921
only, wherefore, it is subsequent to that of Pedro Cui. Nicolas Rafols may not allege
prescription of action, for Pedro Cui led the rst complaint in 1921, or the year
following the con rmation of the sale in his favor. And as Nicolas Rafols deprived
Pedro Cui of the possession and enjoyment of one-half of the land since 1921 to the
present, it is only just that he should pay an indemnity therefor. Six per cent of P1,500,
which is the price of one- half of the land, may be considered as the reasonable amount
of this indemnity.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed, and Nicolas Rafols is sentenced to
deliver to the plaintiff Generosa Teves de Jakosalem, one-half of the land conveyed to
him by Susana Melgar, and to pay, by way of damages, the sum of P90 a year from the
ling of the complaint, that is, from July 23, 1921, until the delivery of the land, with the
costs of both instances against him. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

You might also like