CAOIBES Vs Caoibes-Pantoja

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CAOIBES, JR., v.

CAOIBES-PANTOJA

FACTS: Petitioners Jose Caoibes, Jr and respondent Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja, as SECOND


PARTY, forged an agreement entitled "Renunciation and Transfer of Claims, Rights, and Interests"
(the agreement) covering a parcel of land. As reflected in agreement of the parties, petitioners, as
FIRST PARTY, renounced, relinquished, abandoned and transferred, ceded and conveyed whatever
rights "they may have" over Lot 2 in favor of respondent, as second party, and on account of the
renunciation and transfer, petitioners transferred "whatever rights . . . they may have in the
prosecution of the land registration proceeding.
-pending registration, Jose relinquished his rights to the property para maka bayad sya ng utang
-About 14 years after the execution of the parties, Caoibes-Pantoja filed a motion to intervene, she
wanted to be substituted as an applicant in lieu of the petitioners in the land registration proceeding
-Jose opposed and denied the authenticity and due execution of the agreement, they claiming that the
same was without the consent and conformity of their mother, the "usufructuary owner" of the land.
Petitioner contends that Corazon no longer has right of action on the ground of prescription. An action
founded upon a written contract must be brought WITHIN TEN (10) YEARS FROM THE TIME THE
RIGHT OF ACTION ACCRUES.
RTC: From the day immediately following the execution of the RENUNCIATION contract up to the
present, with the defendants still continuing the land registration proceedings without any substitution
of plaintiff, could only be interpreted as a clear manifestation of defendants’ willful violation of the
claimed RENUNCIATION contract. It is quite incorrect, therefore, to say that the violation happened
only when the defendants objected that they be substituted by plaintiff in an intervention proceedings
filed by the latter. What separates the execution of the contract and the filing of this case is a period of
almost EIGHTEEN (18) long years – way beyond the prescriptive period set by law.
CA: reversed RTC. It is not from the date of the instrument but from the date of the breach that the
period of prescription of action starts. Since, it was only in 1996 when plaintiff-appellant moved to
intervene and be substituted as the applicant in the land registration proceeding involving the subject
property that defendants-appellees’ raised the issue of genuineness and due execution of the
instrument, it is only from this date that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellant accrued. The period
should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the instrument on May 10, 1982 as
claimed by the defendants-appellees for at that time, there would be no way for the plaintiff-appellant
to know of the violation of her rights. Remanded to RTC.

Issue: WON an amendment of application is required to substitute respondent as the applicant for the
Land Registration Case
Ruling: NO. The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting
the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” be a party to the
case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of
the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given
to the parties to the case. The agreement of the parties is analogous to a deed of sale in favor of
Pantoja, it having transferred ownership for and in consideration of her payment of the loan. The
agreement having been made through public instrument, the execution was equivalent to the delivery
of the property to Pantoja. The agreement is of course in consonance with Sec. 22 of PD 1529. In
light of the law and jurisprudence, the substitution by Pantoja of Caoibes, Jr., et al. as applicant in the
land registration case over Lot 2 is not even necessary. All Pantoja has to do is to comply with the
requirements under Sec. 22 of PD 1529. It was unnecessary for Pantoja to file the case for specific
performance subject of the present petition against Caoibes, Jr., et al. to honor their agreement
allowing her to be substituted in their stead as applicant in the land registration proceeding.
-CA REVERSD. Case filed by Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja is Dismissed.

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