People v. Binad Chua

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VOL.

396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 657


People vs. Chua
*
G.R. Nos. 136066-­67. February 4, 2003.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-­appellee, vs.


BINAD SY CHUA, accused-­appellant.

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Trial court’s evaluation of the


credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal—not a hard and fast
rule.—Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard
and fast one. It is a time-­honored rule that the assessment of the
trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge
has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the
demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The
only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected
the case.

Constitutional Law; Search and Seizures; Concepts of a “Stop-­


and-­Frisk” and of a Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
Distinguished.—In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, we distinguished
the concepts of a “stop-­and-­frisk” and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, to wit: At the outset, we note that the trial court
confused the concepts of a “stop-­and-­frisk” and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for con-­

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Chua

ducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which
the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee
with the means of escaping or committing violence. x x x x x x x x
x We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
“stop-­and-­frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons,” as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold today that
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a “stop-­and-­frisk,” it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-­and-­frisk.” A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-­and-­
frisk” serves a two-­fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-­preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly, and fatally
be used against the police officer. (Emphasis ours)

Same; Same; Same; In in flagrante delicto arrests, the law


requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.—In in
flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil
that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to

659

VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 659

People vs. Chua

commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

Same; Same; Same; “Reliable information” alone, absent any


overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.—There could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest
preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act
on the part of accused-­appellant that he had committed a crime,
was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As
applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that
“reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Hence, in People
v. Aminudin, we ruled that “the accused-­appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so.

Same; Same; Same; Court struck down with disbelief the


reliability of the identity of the confiscated items which were not
marked at the place where they were seized.—We entertain doubts
whether the items allegedly seized from accused-­appellant were
the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record
shows that the initial field test where the items seized were
identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters
of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place
where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down
with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated
items since they were not marked at the place where they were
seized, thus: The narcotics field test, which initially identified the
seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene
of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus
reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from
accused-­appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the
policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of


Angeles City, Br. 59.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-­appellee.
     Ola & Associates Law Offices for accused-­appellant.
660

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

YNARES-­SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-­appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with


violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended
by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in
two separate Informations which read as follows:
1
Criminal Case No. 96-­5 07

“That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of


Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-­named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
control two (2) plastic bags containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and
one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a
regulated drug, without any authority whatsoever.”
2
Criminal Case No. 96-­513

“That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City


of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-­named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions,
without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or
carry the same.”

Accused-­appellant pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment.


The two cases were then jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all
members of the police force of Angeles City. Their
testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening,
SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a
report from their confidential informant that accused-­
appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer
further reported that accused-­appellant distributes illegal
drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the
basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col.
Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of
operatives com-­

_______________

1 Records, Volume 1, p. 1.
2 Ibid., p. 12.

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VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 661


People vs. Chua

posed of Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel


Nunag, PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag, SPO1 Fernando Go, and
some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team
investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and
the civilian informer positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting
Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed
to a car driven by accused-­appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After
accused-­appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-­O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers.
As accused-­appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty
(20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left
back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents
of the Zest-­O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-­O juice box, the twenty
(20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by
accused-­appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other
police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez
3
at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-­O juice box,
he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo
Cruz at the PNP Headquarters
4
revealed that the siezed
items contained shabu. Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together
with accused-­appellant brought these items for further
laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing,
forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the
crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu.
The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while5 the two
big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms of shabu.

_______________

3 TSN, January 7, 1998, pp. 4-­10; TSN, April 21, 1998, pp. 5-­9.
4 TSN, April 21, 1998, pp. 9-­10.
5 Records, Vol. 2. p. 306.

662

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

Accused-­appellant vehemently denied the accusation


against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
Accused-­appellant alleged that on the night in question,
he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son
to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old
route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a
small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles
City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he
noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him
face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified
himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the
policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open
his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and
proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s
companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud,
who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car
in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station
and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes
until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call
the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez
opened the box and accused-­appellant 6
was made to hold the
box while pictures were being taken.
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-­
appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine
security check around the7
premises of the Guess Building,
near Thunder Inn Hotel.
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court 8
of
Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby
rendered as follows:

_______________

6 TSN, July 2, 1998, pp. 3-­8.


7 TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 5-­19.
8 Penned by Judge Eliezer R. De Los Santos now Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals.

663

VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 663


People vs. Chua

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-­513 for Illegal Possession of


Ammunitions, the accused is hereby acquitted of the crime
charged for insufficiency of evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-­507 for Illegal Possession of
1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
Pesos.
9
SO ORDERED.”

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-­appellant raised


the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING


FINDINGS:

A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-­APPELLANT BINAD SY


CHUA WAS LAWFUL;
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN
A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-­APPELLANT BEYOND
10
REAONABLE DOUBT.

Accused-­appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest


and search made by the police operatives was unlawful;
that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior
to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two years,
there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste
within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and
search him without a warrant; that the police officers had
sufficient information about him and could have easily
arrested him. Accused-­appellant further argues that since
his arrest was null and void, the drugs that were seized
should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-­appellant’s argument is impressed with merit.

_______________

9 Rollo, p. 26.
10 Ibid., pp. 40-­41.

664

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of


witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is
not a hard and fast one.

It is a time-­honored rule that the assessment of the trial court


with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor
of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only
exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of circumstance of weight
11
and substance that would have affected the case.

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of


weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which
casts doubt on the guilt of accused-­appellant. An appeal in
a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this
includes the review12
of the penalty and indemnity imposed
by the trial court. We are clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
disposition of the case. Every13
circumstance in favor of the
accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the
constitutional mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and
consequent search and seizure made upon accused-­
appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:

Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of


regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually being committed by
the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his per-­

_______________

11 People v. Alvarado, G.R. No. 145730, March 19, 2002, 379 SCRA 475 citing
People v. De Los Santos, 355 SCRA 301 (2001); People v. Osing, 349 SCRA 310
(2001).
12 People v. Leones, G.R. Nos. 128514 & 143856-­61, October 3, 2001, 366 SCRA
535.
13 People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344, 385-­386 (1997), citing Heirs of Crisanta
Y. Gabriel-­Almoradie v. CA, 229 SCRA 15 (1994) and People v. Villagracia, 226
SCRA 374, 381 (1993).

665

VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 665


People vs. Chua

sonal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful


arrest. x x x x
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal
affects (sic)of the accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
x x x     x x x     x x x
In the present case, the police received information that the
accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder
Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly
and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The
14
search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk.”

A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the


findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the
two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a 15“stop-­and-­frisk.”
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, we distinguished the
concepts of a “stop-­and-­frisk” and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, to wit:

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of
a “stop-­and-­frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
money or property found which was used in the commission of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
x x x     x x x     x x x

_______________

14 Rollo, pp. 470, 473-­474; RTC Decision, pp. 7, 10-­11.


15 283 SCRA 159 (1997).

666

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a


“stop-­and-­frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons,” as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual


conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is


not required to conduct a “stop-­and-­frisk,” it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-­and-­frisk.”
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
“stop-­and-­frisk” serves a two-­fold interest: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-­preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly, and fatally
16
be used against the police officer. (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the
“stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure
made by the police operatives on accused-­appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be
laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil
that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
and his

_______________

16 Ibid., pp. 175-­177.

667

VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 667


People vs. Chua
17
belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done 18
in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the
case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-­
appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he
merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the
entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-­O juice box.
Accused-­appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For
all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation
that accused-­appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act
strongly manifesting a violation of 19
the law, the group of
SPO2 Nulud “hurriedly accosted” accused-­appellant and 20
later on “introduced themselves as police officers.”
Accused-­appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-­off
of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more
imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in
flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the
lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-­
appellant that he had committed a crime, was committing
a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in
flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that “reliable
information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable
21
cause that would justify an 22in flagrante delicto
arrest. Hence, in People v. Aminudin, we ruled that “the
accused-­appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was

_______________

17 People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626, 643 (1998).


18 Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in People v.
Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 (1999).
19 TSN, January 7, 1998, p. 8.
20 Ibid.
21 People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, 183 (2001).
22 163 SCRA 402, 409-­410 (1988).

668

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all


appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension” (Emphasis supplied). 23
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben
to justify the police’s actions is misplaced. In the said case,
based on the information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those
who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At
9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person
carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously.
They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but
he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen
identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana
leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers
only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his
arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already
had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-­appellant’s activities. No less than SPO2 Mario
Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about
the activities of accused-­appellant for two years prior to his
actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the
testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the
arrest of accused-­appellant as follows:

Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the


name of this Chinese drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even
before September 21, 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling
you about the activities of this Chinese drug pusher
reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.

_______________

23 184 SCRA 220, 221-­222 (1990).

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VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 669


People vs. Chua

Q. Notwithstanding his two years personal knowledge


which you gained from the civilian informant that this
chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs
here in Angeles City, you did not think of applying for a
search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.
  x x x     x x x     x x x
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually
walking along the road near the Thunder Inn Hotel, is
that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is
the chinese drug pusher that will deliver to him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad
Chua the accused in this case he alighted with a Corolla
car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted
when you saw him?
A Yes, sir.
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked
towards near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel
but he was pinpointed already by the civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
  x x x     x x x     x x x
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag
pounced on him as you used pounced on him in your
affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
  x x x     x x x     x x x
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that
alleged small plastic bag, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?
A. Yes, sir.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline
substance is shabu?
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we
have been tailing the accused that he is really a drug
pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long
time that you are very sure that what was brought by
him was shabu?

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua
24
A. Yes, sir.

The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged


illegal activities of accused-­appellant. Considering that the
identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was
already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest,
there was indeed no reason why the police officers could
not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting
accused-­appellant and searching his person. Whatever
information their civilian asset relayed to them hours
before accused-­appellant’s arrest was not a product of an
“on-­the-­spot” tip which may excuse them from obtaining a
warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team’s
contention that their arrest of accused-­appellant was a
product of an “on-­the-­spot” tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid “stop-­and-­frisk”
in this case. A stop-­and-­frisk was defined as the act of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
25
25
and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check 26
the
latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person to be27
held has weapons (or contraband) concealed
about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a
search and seizure 28
should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.
This principle of “stop-­and-­frisk” search was
29
invoked by
the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case,
the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish
eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to
be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the
search as akin to a “stop-­and-­frisk.” In

_______________

24 TSN, January 27, 1998, pp. 8-­13.


25 Manalili v. CA, 280 SCRA 400, 411 (1997).
26 Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio Panganiban in People v.
Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 729 (1999).
27 Malacat v. CA, supra, p. 177.
28 Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288, 292 (1990).
29 280 SCRA 400 (1997).

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VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 671


People vs. Chua
30
People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to
“stop-­and-­frisk” the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and
his companions, the fact that his companions fled when
they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers
were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. There was no valid “stop-­and-­frisk” in the case of
accused-­appellant. To reiterate, accused-­appellant was first
arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal
items found in his possession. The apprehending police
operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-­
appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-­O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police
officers only introduced themselves when they already had
custody of accused-­appellant. Besides, at the time of his
arrest, accused-­appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual
and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with
the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There
was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of accused-­appellant’s arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly
depended on the information given to them by their
confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that
time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that accused-­appellant had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal
drugs actually occurred, accused-­appellant’s warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a
valid “stop-­and frisk.” For a valid “stop-­and-­frisk” the
search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so
in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the
information about the illegal activities of accused-­appellant
was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence, the
search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be
deemed as a valid “stop-­and-­frisk.”
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the
basis of the seized items found in accused-­appellant’s
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the plastic

_______________

30 262 SCRA 255 (1996).

672

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Chua

bags found in the Zest-­O juice box which contained


crystalline substances later on identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20
rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-­
appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked
into the sealed Zest-­O juice box before they were able to see
and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was
shabu. There was no clear showing that the sealed Zest-­O
juice box accused-­appellant carried contained prohibited
drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly
contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22
caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances
were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence,
inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a
search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search,
or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft
of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-­motive on the part of the
arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure,
the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless
search of accused-­appellant. Neither can the presumption
of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an
officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify
31
an encroachment32 of rights secured by the Constitution. In
People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty


cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-­appellant’s
conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that—a
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x
x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items


allegedly seized from accused-­appellant were the very same
items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows
that the initial field test

_______________

31 People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683, 702 (2001), citing Nolasco v.


Paño, 139 SCRA 152 (1985).
32 G.R. No. 129376, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 419 citing People v. Ruiz,
G.R. Nos. 135679 and 137375, October 10, 2001, 367 SCRA 37.

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VOL. 396, FEBRUARY 4, 2003 673


People vs. Chua

where the items seized were identified as shabu, was33 only


conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. The
items were therefore not marked at 34
the place where they
were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with
disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated
items since they were not marked at the place where they
were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item
as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the
crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-­
appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen
in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.

The government’s drive against illegal drugs needs the


support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the
fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous
police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the
constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions
will remain as such simply because they have blundered.
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, 35
or worse,
its disregard of the charter of its own existence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-­507 and 96-­513, convicting
accused-­appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-­
appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith
released from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for
another crime.

_______________

33 TSN, January 7, 1998, pp. 10-­12.


34 G.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002, 383 SCRA 390.
35 People v. Sagaysay, 308 SCRA 432, 454 (1999).

674

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Lilo

SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and


Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-­appellant


acquitted.

Note.—The arrest being illegal ab initio, the


accompanying search was likewise illegal. (People vs.
Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 [1999])
——o0o——

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