THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE ON

ADVOCATES IN TANZANIA

BY

ROSS E.J. KINEMO

and

ALFRED C. NYAMWANGI

P.O.Box 184, MZUMBE

TANZANIA
Phone 26043/80/4
Fax 2604382
Email idm@raha.com
Mobile 0744 310906

* Ross E.J. Kinemo is a Senior Lecturer (Law) at the Mzumbe University, and Alfred C.
Nyamwangi is a Lecturer of Faculty of Law. Tumaini University, Iringa University
College.

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ABSTRACT

This paper narrates the relationship between an Advocate and the client pointing out that an
Advocate may be held liable for a tort of negligence if he fails to exercise that due care skill
and diligence expected from him/her in the discharge of his/her duty to the client.

The standard of care required by the law of torts is not that of the most skilful man, but that
of a person reasonably skilled in legal profession. On the other hand, the standard is higher
than that of an ordinary person.

Although, there is few Tanzanian decisions on the question of professional negligence,

common law and East African cases show vividly the standard of care and skill which can
be demanded from an Advocate in Tanzania.

The author argues that the standard of care and skill which can be demanded from an
Advocate in Tanzania is similar to that of a Solicitor in England. Therefore, in order to
maintain an action for negligence an advocate as a professional adviser for the client, the
Advocate must be guilty of some misconduct or gross negligence.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Negligence may be defined as an act or omission which constitutes a breach of a duty of

care owed by another person by the person who acts or fails to act and which causes that
other person to suffer harm. There are three elements which the client (plaintiff) must
establish if he wants to succeed. Firstly, he must establish that there was a duty of care
owed by an Advocate. Secondly, the client must establish that there was a breach of that
duty by an Advocate (the defendant). Thirdly, the client must establish that the breach of
the Advocate's duty caused loss or damage to the client.

It is important to grasp at the outset that negligence is not a state of mind, but conduct that
falls below the standard regarded as normal or desirable for Advocates. Negligence is a
basis of liability; not a single protected nominate against negligent advocates.

The tort of negligence illustrate the purpose of the law of torts in relation to Advocates; to
adjust Advocates' losses and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by a client as a
result of the professional misconduct.

On the other hand the term Advocate has been defined as a person who supports or speaks
in favour of another; or a person who pleads for another. He is a professional pleader in a
Court of justice1 . However, the legislation2 goes further by pointing out that an Advocate
must be a duly qualified person. It means a person who is the holder of the professional
qualifications (eg. holder of degree) is dully entered as an advocate upon the Roll3 and he
has in force practicing certificate.

Thus, Advocates are people who are holding themselves out to the public as competent to
pursue their profession. However, they are required to conform to the standard of
reasonable skill and proficiency on pain of having to pay their clients for any harm resulting
from negligence.

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2.0 THE LAW REGULATING ADVOCATES PROFESSION

The law regulating the Advocates profession in Tanzania is not clearly defined and it is
difficult to say to what extent the English law applies, because the Advocates ordinance is
not exhaustive. However, a close look at the Tanzania Advocates Ordinance indicates that it
has borrowed quite extensively from the Kenya Advocates Ordinance of 19494 , and the
Legal Practitioners Ordinance of Nigeria5 . All these Acts have a common ancestry, the
English Solicitors Remuneration Acts of 1870 and 1881, and the Solicitors Act of 19326 .
The law governing advocates in Tanzania is of the kind which would be applicable to
solicitors in England.

The Advocates Ordinance of 1955 amended and consolidated the law relating to advocates
in Tanganyika. The Ordinance establishes a committee known as an Advocates Committee,
consisting of a Judge of the High Court, as chairman, the Attorney-General, and a practicing
advocate nominated by the Council of the Law Society7 . Decisions in the committee are
made by vote and the quorum must include the Attorney-General, who is the head of the
legal profession.

The powers of the committee include the ability to examine allegations of misconduct
against advocates and to discipline them by striking them from the Roll of Advocates,
suspending them or admonishing them. Advocates aggrieved by decisions of the committee
may appeal to the High Court which may affirm, vary, or reverse the decisions of the
committee.

Apart from the advocates committee, the High court has the power for reasonable cause to
admonish any Advocate or to suspend him from practising during any specified period8 .
Similarly, any Judge of the High Court may suspend an Advocate temporarily, pending
reference to and the confirmation or disallowance of such suspension by the High Court.
Orders of the High Court are to be noted on the Roll of Advocates and copies sent to other
East African countries under the reciprocal enforcement of suspensions arrangement 9 . The
advocate suspended or disbarred may apply to the high court for variation of the order,
nevertheless, this right is subject to a number of limitations. First, in case of an order of
suspension; no application can be made until two years from the date of such an order or
after half of the period of suspension, whichever is less. Secondly, in case of an order

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 removing or striking the advocate from the Roll of Advocates, no application can be made
until the expiration of two years.

When an application has been made and denied no further application can be made until two
years have elapsed. However, these limitations do not apply if new material facts have
come to light since the making of the original order of suspension or disbarment. In the
latter case, the advocate may apply to either the committee or the High Court for a
reconsideration of the original order at any time 10 . Proceedings before the advocates
committee can be initiated by either a member of the public or an advocate himself11 . An
application to remove the name of an advocate from the roll or to require an advocate to
answer allegations has to be made in writing by the applicant and then sent to the secretary
of the committee, together with an affidavit by the applicant stating the ground on which he
relies to support his application.

In any case in which, in the opinion of the committee, a prima facie case has been shown,
the committee then proceeds to fix the date of the hearing. Both the applicant and the
advocate are given ample notice and allowed to inspect documents and other relevant
information on which either of the parties wishes to rely12 . Similarly, where an application
is at the instigation of the advocate himself, the application and the affidavit are to be sent to
the secretary, and unless the committee otherwise directs, they must be accompanied by two
letters from two practising advocates who know the applicant 13 . All the committee's
hearings are held in camera and an application once sent to the committee cannot be
withdrawn except with the express consent of the committee.

2.1 Professional Misconduct

Neither the Advocates ordinance nor East African case law defines what constitutes
"professional misconduct." Any kind of enlightment on the matter is to be found in English
cases. Even in England the phrase has not rendered itself to an easy definition, as can be
inferred from the following cases. In the case of In Re Hill14 , an attorney acting as a clerk to
a firm of attorneys in completing the sale of certain property, received the balance of the

5
purchase money, which he appropriated to his own use. In an application to strike him from
the role, he admitted that he had indeed misappropriated the money. The issue which was
raised was whether Hill, through an attorney, could be removed from the Roll of Attorneys
since he was acting as a clerk at the time of the alleged impropriety. The court held that the
question was not whether the person was guilty of misconduct as an attorney, but whether
he was guilty of misconduct which could render him unfit was not committed in his
professional character, as long as it was a conduct which would have prevented him from
being admitted as an attorney, the court had the power to exercise summary jurisdiction and
punish the misconduct. This position was further reiterated by the judicial holding In Re
Weare a Solicitor15 . In this case Weare, a solicitor, had been convicted under the Criminal
Law Amendment Act of 1855, for allowing his houses to be used by tenants as brothels and
was consequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Subsequently the incorporated law
Society served him with notice of motion urging that his name be struck from the Roll of
Solicitors on the grounds of professional misconduct. The contention on behalf of the
solicitor was that this was an offence committed outside his professional capacity. Rejecting
this argument the court went to hold that:
"a solicitor may be struck off the roll for an offence which has no relation to his
character, the question being whether it is such an offence which makes a person
guilty of it unfit to the profession. Conviction for a criminal offence prima facie
makes the solicitor unfit to continue on the roll; but the court has a discretion and
will inquire into the nature of the crime and will not, as a matter of course, strike
him off the roll because he has been convicted."
The importance of these two judicial opinions lies in the fact that the court referred to make
a categorical definition of what professional misconduct means and preferred in order to lay
down broad parameters within which the court should operate16. Tanzanian courts will
probably resort to this kind of reasoning in determining wha t amounts to professional
misconduct for the purposes of invoking disciplinary measures under the Ordinance.
Further support for this view can be found in the case of In Re An Advocate17,in which the
court was faced with the question of whether rules deve loped in England for the sole
purpose of governing the conduct of solicitors with respect to remuneration and costs were
equally applicable to advocates in Tanzania who had been called to the bar in England. The
appellant, an advocate of the High Court of Tanganyika, had been paid sums of money on
the expectation that he would perform certain services. The Advocate took the money but
did not provide the services. The only point argued on appeal was the question of whether

6
 or not an action lay for the recovery of the fees paid since the appellant was a barrister of the
English bar, enrolled as an Advocate of the High Court. The appellant argued that although
he was enrolled to practice as an Advocate in the High court and subordinate courts, with
respect to the fees paid to him by a client for professional services, he was in exactly the
same position as if he was practicing in England, i.e., by virtue of this call to the bar, the
fees received by him for professional services were mere honoraria and he could neither sue
nor be sued for the recovery of such fees. The court rejected this line of argument and held
that all Advocates of the High Court were deemed to have the same liabilities and their costs
were governed by the Advocates Remuneration and Taxation of Costs Rules which
provided for their taxation on the general principles applicable to solicitors in England. An
Advocate of the High Court could not, therefore, plead that being a barrister of the English
bar, he was governed only by rules governing barristers in England. The most important
aspect to note about the attitude of the court is that it embraced English principles governing
solicitors. This was a reaffirmation that the advocates in Tanzania are governed by practices
and procedures which govern solicitors in England. The question is not merely whether
what an Advocate has done would be infamous for anyone else to do, but whether he has
done what is infamous for an advocate to do. Hence, there may be some acts which
although they would not be infamous for any other person, if they are done by an advocate
in relation to his profession, that is, in regard to his clients or professional brethren, they can
fairly be considered infamous in a professional respect.

Black’s law Dictionary, however, defines misconduct as a transgression of some established

and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour,
willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, delinquency, impropriety,
mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness. The term “misconduct” when
applied to an act of attorney implies “dishonest act or attempt to persuade the court by use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods18 . One can classify the various types of professional
misconduct or malpractices into two major groups, depending on which persons they
regulate: those which seek to control the character of Advocates and those that prohibit non
Advocates from doing certain things connected with legal practice. This paper focusses on
the behaviour of Advocates.

2.2 Disciplinary procedures:

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 The advocates committee, with the approval of the chief justice, can make regulations with
respect to the keeping of accounts by the advocates, practise, and etiquette of advocates.
The present Advocates (Accounts) Regulations 19 require that advocates keep their personal
accounts separate from their clients' accounts. In fact, the committee is vested with the
power to compel an advocate to produce his statements of accounts or his bank account for
the purposes of ascertaining whether he is complying with the regulations. Similarly, under
the Advocates (Conduct, Practise and Etiquette) Regulations of 1955, it is considered non
professional for an advocate to employ a person who has been convicted of larceny,
embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or any other criminal offense with respect to any
money or property belonging to or held by an Advocate, or who has been a party to any act
or default of any Advocate with respect to which an application has been made against such
Advocate to the committee. Also, rules of etiquette prohibit Advocates from advertising in
newspapers or other news media. In a relatively small profession where the demand for
professional services is inversely proportio nal to the supply of advocates, there is no need
for advocates to advertise. This may, however, not be true when advocates are concentrated
in a few selected towns and are dependent on a fairly constant pool of clientele. Yet the
most significant aspect of the regulations is their emulation of the English rules and practises
governing solicitors. It is no wonder, therefore, that some of the lawyers thought that some
of these regulations were "irrelevant" to the Tanzanian Advocates.

2.3 Remuneration of Advocates

The remuneration of Advocates in Tanzania is controlled by the Advocates Remuneration

and Taxation of Costs Rules20 . The power to make these rules is vested in the chief justice,
who exercises it in consultation with the Remuneration Committee set up under the
Advocates ordinance. The Remuneration Committee21 consists of Advocates elected by the
Law Society. The Remuneration Committee may together with the chief justice make
Orders as to the remuneration of Advocates. The Act distinguishes between non-
contentious business22 , i.e., any business connected with sales, purchases, leases, mortgage
settlements, and other business of conveyancing, and contentious business, referring to
business mainly done by an Advocate in his capacity as an advocate.

In any noncontentious business, an Advocate and his client may make an agreement
providing for the remuneration of the Advocates by a gross sum or by a commission or

8
 percentage and such agreement may be sued and recovered on or set aside in the same
manner just as any other agreement 23 . However, if on any taxation of costs the agreement
relied on by the Advocate is objected to by the client as unfair or unreasonable, the taxing
officer has the power to inquire into the facts and certify them to the High court. If on the
basis of that certificate it appears to the high court that the agreement is inequitable in some
material respects, the court may proceed to order that it be canceled or varied. Similarly, in
contentious proceedings an advocate and his client are free to agree on the amount of fees or
other relevant remuneration with respect to any contentious business done or to be done by
him. Such an agreement may even provide that the advocate be paid by a gross sum or by
salary or otherwise.

However, the agreement cannot affect the amount of any costs payable by the client to, or to
the client by, any person other than the advocate, and the client may, unless otherwise
agreed, require that such costs be taxed. At the same time, the client is not entitled to
recover from any other person, under an Order for payment of any costs to which the
agreement relates, more than the amount payable by him to his Advocate under the
agreement. In the same manner the agreement is always presumed to exclude any claim
other than a claim for the agreed costs and cannot be interpreted to include claims expressly
exempted from the agreement. To reinforce the protection of the client, any provision in the
agreement that the Advocate is not liable for negligence24 or that he is relieved from
responsibility to which he is otherwise subject as an Advocate is considered void and of no
legal consequence. This underscores an earlier observation that the profession is governed
by rules and principles similar to those governing solicitors in England. Under the English
practice, it is only solicitors who can be sued in negligence, barristers are free from tortious
liability founded on negligence25.

Therefore, Advocates’ profession in Tanzania is controlled and regulated by common law,

precedent/local legislation and regulations. Moreover, the profession is also controlled by
ethics which have been laid down by Tanganyika law society and other ethics which bind
the barristers within the common law. Any breach of these laws and/or ethics may amount
to a professional misconduct.

3. The duties of an advocate:

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There are several features that characterise the place of the legal practitioner in society.
These relate to the various duties that attach to advocacy: duty to his client, to the court, and
to society.Sir Edward Marshall Hall in his biography is quoted as saying26 :
“Now it is difficult for a man, however wise or eloquent to speak for himself, when
fortune, reputation, happiness, life itself, are in jeopardy and rest on the decision of
strangers, sworn before God to find an impartial verdict from the evidence brought
before them. Hence has arisen the honourable and necessary profession of the
advocate; it is indeed a high and responsible calling for into his keeping are
entrusted the dearest interests of other men. His responsibility is wider in its scope
than a physician’s and more direct and individual than that of a statesman; he must
be something of an actor not indeed playing a well-learned part before a painted
scenery, but fighting real battles on other men’s behalf in which at any moment,
surprises may render all rehearsal and preparation futile”.

Lord Macmillan, formerly of the House of Lords, Classified the duties of the Advocate as
five-five- fold: In the discharge of his office the advocate has a duty to his client, a duty to
his opponent, a duty to the court, a duty to himself and a duty to the state. Judge
Mwalusanya 27 argues that Lord Macmillan could and some say he should, have included
other duties in the already formidable list. In the circumstances, therefore, the advocate’s
position is far from enviable: “a good advocate must be histrionic crafty, courageous,
eloquent, quick-minded charming and a great hearted. He is not a mere mouthpiece of his
client. His office is a higher to consider him in that light is to degrade him. He gives to his
client the benefit of his learning, his talents, and his judgement28 .

Advocates are Officers of the court and their main duty is to assist the court in the
administration of justice. Their duty is to see that justice is administered fairly and
fearlessly in this country. Whenever they are instructed to represent a person say on a
criminal charge, their duty is first to the court and then to the accused person. Where they
believe that the client is innocent they must at their disposal see that he is not convicted for
an offence which he has not committed.

But it is also the duty of Advocates to advise their clients on what the laws of this country
are, so that if under the law their clients have committed offences, although he may not think
of so himself, Advocates are required to advise them to plead guilty. Moreover, where their

10
 clients confess to them that they have committed the offence in question but instructs
Advocates to conduct his defence as if he has not committed the offence, the Advocate's
duty is to advice him to plead guilty. Then they may after his plea of guilty produce before
the court such factors surrounding the commission of the offence including mitigating
circumstances as will enable the court to award a suitable sentence. If the client insists on
pleading not guilty the Advocate's duty is to withdraw from the defence. These views have
on various occasions been expressed by the Attorney General and also have been shared by
other officers in the Ministry of Justice, particularly the Chief Justice.

4. Advocate's liability on tort of Negligence:

An advocate may be responsible for negligence in the exercise of his/her expertise. He/She
impliedly undertakes and is bound to use skill and diligence in the conduct of the business in
which he is employed by the client. He is liable to his client for consequences of ignorance
and non-observance of the rules of practice of the Court. Such as refusal to turn up at the
time of hearing without substantial reason. If he is instructed to defend an action and allows
a judgment to be entered by default, he is guilty of negligence and can be liable to his client
for damages. It is no excuse for him to say that his client has no defence. When ignorance
in other respects is established, the Court will usually interfere and compel the advocate to
compensate his client. In general sense, therefore an advocate a an professional undertakes
to bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of skill.

Besides the judicial holding in Re an Advocate and few unreported Tanzanian cases, we can
also look at various decisions which were handed down by the East African Court of Appeal
for cases originating in Kenya and Uganda. The issue of professional negligence was raised
in the case of The Insurance Company of North America V Baeriem and James.29 In this
case the plaintiff sued the defendant advocates for damages for breach of contract, plus Shs.
8,933/15 representing costs incurred in unsuccessful suit.

The plaintiffs had consulted the defendants regarding a sum of money due to them from
their agent, one Howitt, at Kampala, Uganda. It was agreed that this sum which represented
premiums collected by Howitt for the plaintiff would be treated as a loan to him and its
repayment would be secured by a bill of sale, the assignment of two life insurance policies,
and a guarantee by Mrs. Howitt. The defendants were instructed to prepare the necessary

11
documents, which they did. A bill of sale was prepared embodying a list of chattels,
including a car, which was to be brought in a future date, and in the guarantee the bill of sale
was treated as the consideration.

Subsequently, the plaint iffs sued Mr. Howitt and when they failed to recover, sued Mrs.
Howitt under her guarantee. The action was dismissed, the High Court holding that the bill
of sale was void and that the guarantee was void for want of consideration. The bill of sale
was void for non-registration in time and it was not in the proper form as not all the chattels
set out in the schedule were capable of identification. Also it purported to assign the car in
the future. The plaintiff then sued the defendants, alleging negligence. The Court therefore,
had to consider the standard of care, which can be demanded of an advocate. The court
argued that:

"The standard of care and skill which can be demanded from a solicitor is that of a
reasonably competent and diligent solicitor. Lord Ellenborough has said: `An
attorney is responsible for crassa negligentia´ Again Lord campbell in discussing
the essential elements to sustain an action for negligence has said `what is necessary
to maintain such an action? Most undoubtedly that the professional adviser should
be guilty of some misconduct, some fraudulent proceeding or should be chargeable
with gross misconduct or gross ignorance. It is only upon one or the other of those
grounds that the client can maintain an action against the professional adviser.
This, however, does not mean that the standard of care impose on other professional
men; it only means that it is not enough to prove that the solicitor had made an error
of judgment or shown ignorance of some particular part of the law, but that it must
be shown that the error or ignorance was such that an ordinarily competent solicitor
would not have made it." 30

Having established the standard of care required of an Advocate, the court proceeded to hold
that the security by the bill of sale was not in proper form, and that the negligent drafting
and defects in the bill of sale and guarantee went beyond an error of judgment and
constituted professional negligence for which the appellants were liable to pay damages.
The same line of argument was reiterated in the case of Kirima Estates (U) Ltd. V.
Korde 31 , three years later. In this case the defendant, an advocate, advised the appellant
company to accept a mortgage which he valued at Shs. 120,000 in return for which the

12
 appellant company gave shs. 60,000. The mortgage, however, failed to pay and on selling
the mortgage the appellant could only recover shs. 45,000. They consequently filed an
action against the defendant advocate urging that he as an Advocate had been negligent in
his duty in advising them as to the value of the property. It was further argued, inter alia,
that the charge of negligence was vindicated by his failure to engage a qualified surveyor or
estate agent to assess the property and to make local inquiries as to the value of similar
properties in the area. The court held that the property was not adequate security for Shs.
60,000 at the time the loan was given. Consequently in assessing the value of property at
120,000, the defendant had failed to exercise that due care skills, and diligence expected of
him in the discharge of his duty to the plaintiff company as his client. He had failed to make
inquiries as to the value of the property and also failed to engage the services of a surveyor
or estate agent thereby failing to have a proper valuation of the property made before
advising the client. Therefore, upon the evidence, the defendant was not only negligent in
the discharge of his duty but also committed a breach of that duty.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

For a long time, the Tanzania legal profession did not have its own code of professional
conduct. The applicable rules, therefore, were those which applied in England. This
position was recoguised in a number of court decision. In Jaffe li and Another V Borrison
and Another32 Bramble J. Said:

“There has been no code of practice in Tanzania as far as I am aware and the
practice as laid down by the General council of the Bar in England has generally
been adopted as shown by certain cases.33”

However, the Tanganyika law society has recently adopted rules of conduct and ethics.
They are published as the Rules of Professional conduct and Etiquette of the Tanganyika
Law Society. These rules of ethics of a profession are supposed to regulate the behaviour of
advocates with the people they serve and the society generally. But there exists notable
omissions and short comings which include absence of clear-cut offences and sanctions,

13
absence of express sanctions on criminal convictions, inadequacy of remedies of the
remedies for the complainant, absence of obligatory professional insurance, absence of
regulations on fees in uncompleted work and absence of continuous inspection, to ensure
that advocates continue to adhere to professional ethics and admission conditions.

The only express exception to the above mentioned legal shortcoming is in respect of the
keeping of clients accounts. The law enjoins advocates to keep the clients money separate
from their own34 . According to the Advocates (Accounts) Regulations, it amounts to a
professional misconduct if a cheque drawn by an advocate on his client’s account is
dishonoured 35 .

Therefore, it is urged that the government and the Tanganyika law society should improve
the laws and ethics which control the behaviour of advocates. The current rules of
professional conduct and Etiquette are not explicit enough to point out an act or omission
that amount to misconduct.

However, advocates have the right of audience before courts of law above primary courts.
They may represent litigants in civil cases36 or accused persons in criminal cases37 . This is a
core function of the legal profession. Court advocacy stands out for public scrutiny more
than any other task on advocate’s long list of roles and duties. In carrying out this tasks in
court, the advocate has to evaluate the various available arguments, weed out the bad points
and retain the good ones. To be good enough, legal argument must be cogent and
compelling. Such systematic manner of persuasion keeps litigation within sensible bounds
and gives credibility to sound argument. The skills and the ability to argue cases in an
interesting and exciting fashion, can only be learnt and perfected through learning and
practice. This is one reason why the presence of a proficient and experienced person at the
side of the accused or litigant becomes so important.

Advocacy carries heavy responsibilities. An advocate has a duty not only to uphold justice,
but also to represent his client. It is a vocation, which is all absorbing and demands total
dedication, striving and commitment throughout the duration of the case or transaction.
This requires that an advocate plans his work “in such a way that he gives his best to his
clients without breaking down in process38 ”.

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He/she is required to attend at the court at the time of hearing and defend the client by using
his/her skills and dilligence. Where he believes that the client is innocent, the advocate has
to make sure that such a client is not convicted for an offence, which he/she has not
committed. Thus, an advocate is required to use his/her special competence, which is not
part of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but the result of aptitudes developed
by special training and experience.

An advocate is expected to show the average amount of competence normally possessed by

other advocates who also defend clients. If such competence falls short of the standard
required, the advocate as a professional adviser may be held guilty of some misconduct and
be liable for a tort of negligence.

15
 Endnotes

1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English, Eighth Edition, Edited by R.E. Allen.

2. Advocates Ordinance Cap 341.

3. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Eighth Edition, Edited by R.E. Allen.

4. Advocates Ordinances 1949, Ordinance No. 55 of 1949 (Kenya).

5. The Legal Practitioners Ordinance, Cap. 110 (Nigeria).

6. The Solicitors Act 1932 consolidated the Solicitors Acts 1839 to 1928 and other enactments
relating to solicitors of the supreme court. See 24 Halsbury's Statues of England p. 18.

7. Advocates ordinances, Cap. 341 of Tanzania Laws, as amended by Advocates ordinance

(Amendment) Act of 1969, Act No, 39 of 1969.

8. Act No. 39 of 1969, $ 4, 13, 24, 24A. The power of the high court is wide and includes
making the advocate liable for costs unnecessarily incurred. The court of appeal has given
valuable guidance as to how the inherent powers should be employed, see Lebo v. Saleh s.
Dhiyebi (1961) e.a. 223 ("a court if it considers that an advocate, in his conduct of the
client's case, has been guilty of some misconduct, should first find facts only insofar as is
necessary to dispose of the case before it. Remembering that it is the client's case and not
that of the advocate which it has heard and is called upon to decide, it should deal in the
judgement with the advocate's conduct only insofar as that is necessary to the case before it
and if the court is of the opinion that a prima facie case of professional misconduct is
disclosed should refer the matter to the appropriate professional body for report and if
necessary for adjudication by another court. The other court will be concerned with the
question of the advocate's conduct and not with the adjudication of the client's cause: and the

16
 advocate will then have an opportunity of explaining, if he wishes to do so, matters which
appear to be prejudical to him").
9. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Suspensions and Strikings Off (Kenya) Order 1955,
Government Notice No. 332 of 1955. Also Section 24 of the Advocates ordinance provides
that

(t) he Registrar shall send to the Supreme Court or High Court as the case may be, of
each East African territory and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa a certified
copy of every order (including orders made on appeal) made under or by virtue of
this advocate on the Roll or as to suspending an advocate from practise.

10. Advocates ordinance, $ 28.

11. Advocates (disciplinary) Rules 1955, Government Notice No. 135 of 1955.

12. Ibid Section 5.

13. Ibid Section 12

14. Re Hill, (1868) 3 Q.B. 543.

15. In Re Weare, A Solicitor, (1893) Q.B.D. 439.

16. Courts had earlier considered similar cases which involved other professions, particularly
the medical profession. Some of these cases have even gone further to hold that the court
would not as a rule question the committee's decision, adopting as a definition of
professional misconduct one laid down by the court of appeals for the medical profession in
Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 Q.B. 750. "If
it is shown that a medical man in the pursuit of his profession had done something with
regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonorable by his
professional brethren of good repute and competency then he is guilty of professional
misconduct." Quoted in Halssbury's Statutes of England, supra note 23, at 7 - 8. It is
interesting to observe that the term has also been a subject of controversy under American
law. See Botte, Ethics for Success at the Bar 14 - 36 (1928).

17. (1921 - 1952) Tanganyika Law Report 551.

18. Black, Henry Campbell (1983): Blacks Law Dictionary, abridged 5th edition, St Paul
Minn: West publishing Co. at P. 517.

19. Government Notice No. 207 of 1956.

20. Under the Tanganyika Order in Council 1920, the power to make rules for regulating the
practice and procedure of the high court and subordinate courts was vested in the high court

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 (art. 26). Immediately after independence, the Judicature and Application of Laws
Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1962 (Cap. 453) provided:

4(1) Subject to the provisions of any other written law the Chief Justice may make
rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court and of all other
courts established in Tanganyika.

(2) The power to make rules under this section shall include a power fix fees, and to
amend, revoke and replace rules made under Article 26 of the Tanganyika order in
Council 1920 to 1921.

The power vested in the chief justice is exercised subject to the provisions of the Advocates
ordinance cap. 431.

21. Advocates Ordinance Cap. 341, part VI.

22. Ibid Section 53

23. Ibid Section 55

24. Ibid. Section 55(2)

25. The rationale behind these barristers privilege would also seem to be based on public policy.
Lord Reid said: "It has long been established that judges, witnesses and barristers alike have
absolute privilege with regard to what is said by them in court: for the reasons similar to
those which apply to proceedings in Court." See Rondel V. Worsely (1967) 3 W.L.R. 1966.

26. Marjoribanks, E. Famous Trials of Marshall, London; Penguin at p. 9.

27. Kassim Manywele v R Criminal Application No. 39 of 1990 H.C.T Dodoma at p. 20 of

typed Judgement.

28. Khassim Manywele V. R. Criminal Application No. 39 of 1990 H.C.T Dodoma at p. 20

of typed Judgement.

29. (1960) EA 993

30. Charles Worth on Negligence (1968) 3rd edition.

31. Kirima Estates (U) Ltd V. Kode. (1962) EA22.

32. 1971 EA

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33. His Lordship cited the cases of Gandesha V. Kilingi Coffee & Another (1969) EA 299
and Safi seed Ltd. V. ECTA (Kenya) Ltd and ors, civil Revision No. 1 of 1967 H.C.T,
Dar es salaam.

34. Regulation 2 of the Advocates (Accounts Regulations) 1956.

35. Rule 13(b) of the rules of Professional conduct and Etiquette.

36. Order 111 rule 1 of the second schedule to the civil procedure Code 1966.

37. Section 310 of the criminal procedure Act, No. 9 of 1985.

38. Quoted in Oputa, C. J. (1981) Op. Cit. at p. 119.

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