Part Iii - Recommended Guidelines Section A - Layout & Boundaries

PART III – RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
SECTION A – LAYOUT & BOUNDARIES
“critical assets” and secured by ACAMS and CCTV systems in the same manner as other critical
airport facilities. When network cabling traverses public areas, metal conduit should be used to protect
the cabling.
9) In emergencies, having reliable, robust, and capable wireless communications for management,
operations, and public safety functions will be essential. Public safety departments will often have
their own trunked radio systems, which should also support airport operations and other departments.
Dependence on carrier cellular services should be minimized as these networks can be saturated by
traffic during emergencies. A standards-based wireless extension of the airport local area network
(LAN) can be valuable in emergencies provided that operating frequencies and access point coverage
have been properly designed and coordinated with all users including tenants.
10) Seismic Requirements
Seismic requirements, while not innately a security issue, are relevant to security guidelines in that the
continuity of operations of an airport is paramount to airport security.
This section provides information referencing various state and federal legislation addressing seismic
safety. While much seismic engineering and mitigation guidance exists in the form of state and local
codes, directives and ordinances, these requirements focus only on acts that are currently in effect, not
those being proposed for future planning and design needs.
The existence of these laws does not necessarily indicate that they fully meet their intent, or that they
necessarily accomplish their objectives. Some are considered more or less effective than others, and
even some weaker ones may be enforced to a greater extent than others. Architects, engineers and
contractors should refer to further resources for information or expert opinion about the
appropriateness and effectiveness of any specific seismic requirement as it affects their airport design.
It is also important to note that the burden of conformance may rest solely on the Architect, Engineer
and Contractor and to remember that the guidelines and regulations supporting the implementation of
individual acts often contain the most important detail.
In recent years enforcement of the earthquake protection requirements in the Model Codes for
nonstructural building components has also become commonplace. Model Codes provide for
nonstructural, infrastructure elements of the building design, such as electrical enclosures, control
consoles, conduits, cable trays, etc. Architects, Engineers and Contractors are relied upon to know,
understand, design and install earthquake protection in accordance with the requirements of these
Codes.
It is important to note that all of the Seismic Laws and the Executive Orders apply to virtually all new
construction that is federally owned, leased or regulated or other new construction that receives federal
financial assistance through loans, loan guarantees, grants or federal mortgage insurance.
Additionally, several states require seismic mitigation in the design of all projects.
When designing a project, it is important to meet the federal, state and local code and standard
elements applicable to the project location. Although the following list is not intended to be
comprehensive and complete, as an aid to the designer, the TSA recommends that the following
sources of information be checked to determine the requirements to be applied.
a) Public Laws 95-124 and 101-614 "The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 as Amended"
b) Executive Order 12699 of January 5, 1990 "Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted or
Regulated New Building Construction"
c) Executive Order 12941 of December 1, 1994 "Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or
Leased Buildings"
d) ICBO (International Conference of Building Officials) "Uniform Building Code (UBC)," 1994,
and amendments to include the 1994 NFPA-13 Standard for Building Fire Sprinkler Systems
e) BOCA (Building Officials Code Authority) "National Building Code"
f) SBCCI (Southern Building Code Congress International) "Standard Building Code"
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May 3, 2006 Recommended Security Guidelines for
20 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
g) Section 13080 of the Corps of Engineers Guide Specifications with Fire sprinkler Sections 15330,
15331, and 15332 revised in March 1995 to unequivocally require seismic bracing on the small
diameter piping.
h) Various State Building Codes, e.g., California, Washington, Alaska, Missouri, New York, etc.,
which may require mitigation elements in addition to the national standards.
Section III-A-3 - Vulnerable Areas Checklist:

Vulnerability Assessment (see Appendix A) Delays
Piggybacking
Consider all assets, targets, and their
Surveillance/CCTV
relative value/loss consequence
Aircraft Plan for breach control measures and
Communications procedures
Support Facilities Physical Barriers
Terminal Separation Distance
Public and Employees Reduce bombing/armed attack
Fuel Areas vulnerability
Utilities Blast Mitigation
Roadways and Access Way Separation Distance
Storage Areas Minimization of Large Congregations
Establish a security boundary between Placement of Screening Checkpoint
public and secured areas Minimize vulnerability from employees
Barriers Minimize numbers of employee access
Patrols points
Surveillance/CCTV Capability for Employee Screening
Sensors Consider vulnerability of adjacent areas
Minimize means of unauthorized access and paths of travel
Access Controls
Emergency Exits
4. Chemical and Biological Agents

When considering overall layout, it is prudent to take some precautions to prevent attacks by non-conventional
means, such as the use of chemical and biological agents, to attack civil aviation. The possibilities for such
attacks include the use of chemical or biological agents to attack persons in an aircraft in flight, as well as in
public areas of airports, (see Terminal on page 58) or persons in areas controlled for security purposes.
Some measures that should be considered to help mitigate a potential chemical/biological attack include:
Locate mailrooms and airport loading docks at the perimeter of the terminal or at a remote location with
“screening” devices in place that can detect explosives and chemical/biological contaminants.
If the mailroom and loading docks are in or near the terminal, consider having a dedicated ventilation system
for those rooms and dedicate an emergency shut-off device for the ventilation system.
Take measures to seal off these areas from the rest of the terminal to minimize the potential for contaminants
to migrate to other areas of the terminal. Maintain a slight negative pressure in these rooms to help prevent
the spread of the contaminants to other areas.
Locate air intakes to HVAC systems so they are not accessible to the public. Preferably, locate air intake as
high as practical on a wall or on the roof; if vents are ground level, they should be protected if possible with
screens or grates, and turned away from public exposure.
Coordinate the smoke control system and emergency power with the chemical/biological alarms and
ventilation system.
Consider installing special air filtration in critical ventilation systems that captures chemical/biological agents.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for May 3, 2006
Airport Planning, Design and Construction 21
Additionally, at the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate through the PROACT (Protective and Responsive Options for Airport Counter-Terrorism) program,
the Sandia National Laboratories issued “Guidelines to Improve Airport Preparedness Against Chemical and
Biological Terrorism,” co-authored with the Lawrence Berkeley National laboratories. These guidelines are
available for review from the TSA Federal Security Director at your airport or directly from Sandia National
Laboratories upon request. An extract of the Sandia National Laboratories document is available in Appendix G
of this document.
Section III-A-4 - Chemical & Biological Agent Checklist:

Sources of guidance may include TSA, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Center for Disease Control
(CDC) and Office for Domestic Preparedness Support.
The Bibliography lists several relevant chem.-bio documents.
Report Card for airport Chem-Bio Protection and Response
5. Boundaries and Access Points

To delineate and adequately protect the AOA, SIDA, and other security areas from unauthorized access, it is
important to consider boundary measures such as fencing, walls, or other physical barriers, electronic
boundaries (e.g. sensor lines, alarms), and natural barriers in the planning and design process of an airport.
Access points for personnel and vehicles through the boundary lines, such as gates, doors, guard stations, and
electronically controlled or monitored portals must also be considered. In addition, there are other security
measures which should be part of the design that enhance these boundaries and access points such as clear
zones on both sides of fences, security lighting, locks, monitoring systems such as CCTV, and signage.
The choice of an appropriate security boundary design is not only affected by the cost of equipment,
installation, and maintenance, but also by the more important aspects of effectiveness and functionality.
Certainly the highest consideration in an effective boundary measure is its ability to prevent unauthorized
penetration. Thus, any access points through a boundary line must not only be able to prevent access, but
differentiate between an authorized and an unauthorized user. At an airport, access through boundary lines can
be frequent, and must be quick to prevent unacceptable delays. In addition, if a boundary access point is not
user-friendly, it may be abused, disregarded, or subverted and thus, pose a security risk and possible financial
liability to the airport.
Regardless of boundary location or type, the number of access points should be minimized for both security and
cost efficiency. Proper planning and design can often create fewer, more functional and maintainable access
points that will benefit the airport in the long run.
Various boundary/barrier and access point types as well as security measures which can enhance them are
described below:
a. Physical Barriers
Physical barriers can be used to deter and delay the access of unauthorized persons into nonpublic areas of
airports. These are usually permanent barriers and designed to be an obvious visual barrier as well as a
physical one. They also serve to meet safety requirements in many cases. Where possible, security fencing
or other physical barriers should be aligned with security area boundaries.
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1) Fencing
Fencing is available in several designs that are difficult to climb or cut as well as those which are
provided with motion, tension or other electronic sensing means. For fences with sensors, either
mounted on the fencing or covering areas behind fencing, there are other elements to the security
system for monitoring of the sensors and response to intrusion alarms. Table III-A-1 below shows
some of the available types of fence fabrics.
Table III-A-1 - Fence Types and Fabric
ATTACHMENT
WT. / BREAK
PRODUCT APPLICATION SIZES MATERIAL SPACING
ROLL LENGTH
LOAD
AISI 430 6 - 16.67

RAZOR RIBBON Medium Security
18 13 lbs.
2800
Stainless Steel,
- Single Coil with Fence Topping 24 17 lbs. 9 - 25
21 lbs.
.098 dia. high lbs.
Core Wire 30 Tensile Wire 18 - 50
RAZOR RIBBON AISI 430
Ground Barrier 24 15 lbs.
12 - 15 2800
MAZE - Single Coil Stainless Steel,
Max. Security 30 19 lbs.
with Wire, .098 dia. high 16 - 20 lbs.
Fence Topping 36 23 lbs.
Concertina Style Tensile Wire
RAZOR RIBBON 24 AISI 430

Ground Barrier
MAZE - Concertina
inside
34 lbs. Stainless Steel, 12 - 15 2800
Max. Security 30
Style, Double Coil Fence Topping
.098 dia. high 16 - 20 lbs.
outside Tensile Wire
Ground Barrier 24 AISI 301 / 304

MIL-B-52775 B 2250
inside 35 lbs. Stainless Steel
Type II - Austenitic Max. Security 24 - 66
30 .047 dia. Stainless lbs.
Double Coil Fence Topping outside Wire Rope
MIL-B-52775 B Ground Barrier 24 AISI 316

inside 35 lbs. Stainless Steel 2250
Type IV - Austenitic Max. Security
30 24 - 66
Double Coil Fence Topping .047 dia. Stainless lbs.
outside Wire Rope
Min. Security 6 - 16.67
RAZOR RIBBON Fence Topping.
18 9 lbs. AISI 430 1260
- Single Coil 24 12 lbs. Stainless Steel 9 - 25 lbs.
Commercial Use 18 - 50
ASTM A 526
BAYONET BARB Ground Barrier
27 1/2 23 lbs. Zinc Galvanized 1300
- Concertina 37 1/2 34 lbs. .098 dia. high
20 - 50 lbs.
Tensile Wire
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Chain link fencing is a common type of fencing and is often the most cost-effective solution when
deterrence, as opposed to the prevention of forced entry, is the primary security objective. Chain link
fences are typically constructed with 7 feet of fabric plus one or more coils of stranded barbed wire on
top, which may be angled outward at a 45 degree incline from the airside. Fences configured in this
manner are shown in Figure III-A-1 below.
Figure III-A-1 - Chain Link Fence Barbed Wire Configurations
Chain link fencing is normally the most suitable and economic physical barrier for securing the airside,
although this may vary somewhat with airport-specific conditions and topography. It is also readily
available through a large variety of sources and is easily and inexpensively maintained. This type of
fence provides clear visibility for security patrols, and is available in varieties that can be installed in
almost any environment. Barbed wire, razor wire and other available toppings increase intrusion
difficulty. For locations with aesthetic concerns, there are also a large variety of decorative yet
functional styles available as well as opaque styles that limit public visibility of service, storage or
other non-aesthetic areas. On boundaries coinciding with property lines, locate the fence line should
be located inside the airport property line to prevent encroachment on adjacent property by the barbed
wire angled topping or its outriggers.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Another common type of fencing is constructed of vertical bars which have curved spiked tops as
shown in Figure III-A-2 below. Depending on the diameter and materials used for the bars, this design
can provide additional protection against forced entry.
Figure III-A-2 - Vertical Bar Fence
There are several means of constructing fences to provide a higher level of protection against forced
entry. Chain link fences, for example, can be reinforced with posts and rails, as shown in Figure III-A-
3 below, with rails being either solid material or stranded-steel cable encased in hollow pipe. The
posts and rails can also be designed to blend into the fence. This type of reinforced fencing has been
has successfully tested to the U.S. Department of State's K8 Anti-Ram rating, stopping a 15,000 pound
truck traveling at 40 mph within 3 feet of the fence line.
Figure III-A-3 - Fence Post and Rail Reinforcement
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When utilizing fencing as a security boundary, care must be taken to ensure that the provision of
fencing does not conflict with the operational requirements of the airport. Access points must permit
passage of authorized vehicles and persons with relative ease. While the number of access points
should be kept to a minimum, adequate access points must be planned for routine operations,
maintenance operations, and emergency operations. For further information on fencing access points
see Gates on page 29 or Guard Stations on page 31.
To assist in surveillance and security patrol inspection, keep fences as straight and uncomplicated as
possible. This will minimize installation and maintenance costs.
Wind is often an issue when designing chain link fencing to be instrumented with intrusion detection
sensors, including wind-induced fence motion caused by proximity of fencing to runways. A taut
fence fabric is often required under such circumstances.
Effectiveness of fencing in critical areas can be improved by anchoring or burying the bottom edge of
the fence fabric to prevent it from being pulled out or up to facilitate unauthorized entry. Use of
concrete mow strips below the fence line and/or burying the bottom of the fence fabric can also deter
tunneling underneath the fence by persons and animals. Mowing strips may also reduce security and
maintenance man-hours and costs.
For safety or operational reasons (e.g. presence of navigational systems) some sections of perimeter
fencing may not be able to meet standard security specifications. Special surveillance or detection
measures may need to be applied to improve the safeguarding of these areas.
More specific information on fencing materials and installation, including the use of barbed wire
outriggers, is available in FAA Advisory Circular 150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for
Airport Terminal Facilities; and Advisory Circular 150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying
Construction of Airports, among others.
In summary, fences are the most basic first line of deterrence and defense. There is excellent guidance
available from the Chain Link Manufacturers Institute, including detailed technical and procurement
guidelines and specifications such as the Security Fencing Recommendations..
2) Buildings
Buildings and other fixed structures may be used as a part of the physical barrier and be incorporated
into a fence line if access control or other measures to restrict unauthorized passage through the
buildings or structures are taken at all points of access. Whether those points are located on the airside
or landside boundaries, or perhaps through the middle of such buildings, may be dependent upon the
nature of the business being conducted inside, and the level of continuous access required by
personnel.
3) Walls
Walls are one of the most common types of physical barriers. Various types of walls are used for
interior as well as exterior security boundary separation. In addition, walls play an important part as
visual barriers and deterrents.
a) Interior Walls
When interior walls are to be used as security barriers, consideration should be made to the type,
construction material used, and their height. When possible, security walls should be full height,
reaching not just suspended ceilings, but complete floor to ceiling or slab.
Interior walls may be used as part of the security boundary, with appropriate attention paid to
maintaining the integrity of the boundary and the level of access control to a degree at least equal to
that of the rest of the boundary.
b) Exterior Walls
While typically not as economical as chain link fencing, the use of exterior walls as physical barriers
and security boundaries is frequently necessary. Walls provide less visibility of storage or secured
areas and can be matched to the surrounding architecture and buildings. In addition, some varieties
of exterior walls are less climbable and thus more secure than security fencing or other barriers that
offer hand-holds.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Walls of solid materials should not have hand or foot holds that can be used for climbing. The tops
of walls should be narrow to prevent perching, and should have barbed wire or other deterrent
materials. Blast walls are not necessarily good security fences, although appropriate design can aid
in incorporating features of both, spreading the cost over more than one budget.
As in the case of interior walls, exterior building walls may also be used as part of the security
boundary as long as the integrity of the secured area is maintained to at least the level maintained
elsewhere along the boundary.
b. Electronic Boundaries
In the case of boundaries which are monitored by electronic sensors, motion detectors, infrared or
microwave sensors, etc., it is clear that these are intended to serve essentially the same security functions as
other detectors, but are simply employing other technologies, usually with somewhat higher maintenance
costs. Typically they will be used in conjunction with other technologies such as alarms, CCTV, or other
reporting and assessment methods. Nonetheless, there are appropriate places for using such applications,
especially where normal conduit and cabling might be impractical, or where excessive trenching might be
required. In addition, new technologies involving existing FAA ground radar surveillance can be
incorporated for use in a security mode. See also Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA)
Document DO-221, “Guidance and Recommended Requirements for Airport Surface Movement Sensors.”
1) New Electronic Boundary Technologies
This document is focused on planning and design during the initial planning for current projects, even
though new facilities such as terminals may sometimes be 4 or 5 years from the drawing board to
processing the first aircraft and its passengers. When planning that terminal, and all other related
facilities requiring a security perspective, one must also take account of continuing developments
throughout the airport industry and the technologies that contribute to its secure well-being. While it
may not be possible, or even prudent, to adopt first-generation beta-version technologies (although
there may also be some corresponding advantages in such an approach), it is virtually certain that
technology developments in many areas will afford new security capabilities and new requirements in
the easily foreseeable future.
Among these is a rather broad concept called "data fusion", in which a wide array of sensors,
surveillance techniques, data analysis and communications capabilities and procedures are brought
together to enhance the ability of airport security to monitor and respond to a wide range of alarms,
including the use of automated system analyses and alerts, thereby expanding an operator's "vision"
and capability several fold.
Whether this is a necessary, immediate, or even desirable course of action for your airport,
nevertheless as new technology becomes tested and available, it may not only be useful but also very
cost-effective to consider such expansion early-on when designing infrastructure such as cabling to
perimeter locations, power sources, lighting, communications, and more, so as to avoid the need for
such costly things as re-trenching, replacing limited panels, relocating camera positions, etc.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
One such technology being tested in a major Category X environment is the adaptation of the existing
FAA ASDE ground surveillance radar signal to also monitor non-aircraft movement on the AOA as
well as along external boundaries of an airport. This concept is illustrated in Figure III-A-4 and
Figure III-A-5 below.
Figure III-A-4 - ASDE Radar
Figure III-A-5 - ASDE Radar & Its Adaptation for Surface Security and Intrusion Detection
Tests by TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory are designed to demonstrate that modified ASDE
radar could differentiate between "approved" and "unauthorized" targets, including persons and ground
vehicles as well as marine craft approaching a waterside perimeter. The radar is intended to determine
the origin and track the paths of movement of these targets. With further development, the system is
expected to classify an object, to predict its likely next movements or directions, and to assist the
______________________________________________________________________________________________
operator in providing an appropriate level of response. Some of these functions can also be automated
and applied to pre-programmed zones of priority to enhance security decision-making.
c. Natural Barriers
The use of natural barriers may be necessary or advantageous at an airport in areas that cannot structurally
support physical barriers or fencing, or where the use of fencing or physical barriers would cause conflict
with aircraft navigation, communications, or runway clear areas beneath approach paths. With TSA
approval, natural barriers may be incorporated into the security boundary of an airport in lieu of standard
physical barriers or in conjunction with and as a complement to additional security measures or
procedures.
Natural barriers may include bodies of water, expanses of trees, swampland, dense foliage areas, cliffs, and
other such areas.
Earthen material may also be used to create a visual barrier between any public road and the AOA. This
can be accomplished through various methods such as trenching or the stockpiling of earthed materials.
Trenching may be done below the grade of any adjacent airfield surface such as the perimeter road and at a
slope that would prevent an individual from achieving a visual reference of the airfield. The stockpiling of
material can also be used to create a visual barrier, but must not impact any protected surfaces or create an
impact to the safe and efficient operation of aircraft or any airport operation. It is in the interest of the
airport operator to have an above grade barrier on the airport property for ease of maintenance and control.
A fence may be constructed atop the barrier
Using “time and distance” from critical facilities to be protected is another optional natural barrier. This
concept suggests that if an unauthorized entry were to occur at a particular location, the amount of time and
distance, combined with a high level of visibility would significantly reduce the likelihood of the intruder
reaching the critical area without detection and/or intervention. "Time and distance” may be considered as
an enhancement to standard physical barriers/boundaries when barriers or boundaries are relatively
removed from the critical areas they are protecting.
Another common security design principle is known as “DDR: Detect, Delay, Respond”, in which
protection of a relatively remote perimeter or facility may require only moderate security measures if it is
sufficiently removed from the primary security-related areas to allow the airport to detect an intrusion, and
delay its progress until an appropriate security response can be implemented.
d. Access Points
Typically there are access points through fencing or other barriers for both vehicles and pedestrians.
Access points through buildings or walls are typically doors; guard points or electronic means or controls
may be also used. In all cases, the access point type and design may be the determining factor in the
effectiveness of the security boundary and control in that area. So, in all cases, the number of access points
should be minimized and their use and conditions closely monitored.
1) Gates
While the number of access points should be kept to a minimum, adequate pedestrian and vehicle
access points must be planned for routine operations, maintenance operations, and emergency
operations.
a) Routine Operations
Routine operational gates at an airport are typically those used by operations personnel, police
patrols and response teams, catering, fuel and belly cargo vehicles and tugs, scheduled delivery
vehicles, and ground service equipment and maintenance vehicles.
Most airport gates used for routine operations are typically high-throughput and should be
designed for high-activity and long-life. These gates will take the most wear and tear, and should
be designed to minimize delays to users, particularly where piggybacking may be a concern.
SIDA, secured area, AOA, and other security boundary gates that are high-throughput are the most
likely candidates for automation and electronic access control. See Electronic Access Points on
page 31 for further information
______________________________________________________________________________________________
b) Maintenance Operations
Maintenance operations gates at an airport are typically those used by the airport, tenant and FAA
personnel to perform regular and periodic maintenance to remote grounds or equipment. Typical
maintenance tasks include mowing, utility service, navigational and communications equipment
maintenance.
These gates, unless high-throughput or jointly used for routine operations, are typically non-
automated, non-electronic.
c) Emergency Operations
Emergency operations gates are gates used by on-airport and mutual aid emergency response
vehicles responding to emergency situations, especially those involving an aircraft, but may also
be used for regular operations
Airport emergency operations gate controls may be controlled from an emergency operations
center; or from the ARFF response vehicles themselves.
A capability for emergency response vehicles to crash through frangible mounts at emergency
operations gates should be considered during the gate design, as should alarms on those gates.
Consider special paint markings to identify the frangible fence or gate sections to approaching
response vehicles.
Gates should be constructed and installed to the same or greater standard of security as any adjacent
fencing to maintain the integrity of the area.
All gates should be equipped to be securely closed and locked, where enhanced security conditions
require it. Swing gate hinges should be of the non-liftoff type or provided with additional welding to
prevent the gates from being removed.
Security provided by gates can be improved if they are designed and installed with no more than 4’-6”
of ground clearance beneath the gate. Where cantilever (slide) and/or rolling gates are used,
consideration should be made during planning and design to curb heights, wheel paths, potential
obstructions, local weather/wind phenomena, and drainage issues throughout the full path of the gate
and in its adjacent areas. Proper drainage grading, planned gaps in curbs, installation of concrete
channels or mow strips below the gate path, and use of bollards to prevent obstructions within the gate
path and protect gate equipment are all design considerations which may prolong the efficient
operation of a slide gate.
If “tailgating” entry is a concern at un-staffed vehicle access points, the first response is usually
procedural rather than design, since it is the responsibility of the person authorized to use the gate to be
certain tailgating does not occur. However, if a fence design solution is desired, an automated two-
gate system (also known as a “vehicle entrapment gate”) is one method that could help prevent
“tailgate” entry. Such gates are separated one vehicle length apart and are sequenced so that the
second gate does not open until the first has fully closed. Time-delayed closures are a viable
alternative; sensor arrays have also been used to successfully monitor vehicle movement and assist in
detection of “tailgate” entries. “Tailgating” and “reverse tailgating” (where a vehicle enters a gate
opened by an exiting vehicle) at automated gates may also be reduced by use of a security equipment
layout that provides space for waiting vehicles to stop, which obstructs, or at least deters other vehicles
from passing through. CCTV may deter breaches at those facilities, and may provide an improved
response when breaches occur. Additionally, CCTV may provide a visual record that can be used to
document breaches that become the subject of investigations.
More specific information on gate materials and installation is available in FAA Advisory Circular
150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities, and Advisory Circular
150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying Construction of Airports, among others.
2) Doors
To prevent unauthorized access to the airside, doors leading from unsecured areas of the terminal to
the airside, and which are under visual control of authorized personnel, should be limited to the
operational minimum. Nevertheless, where they are necessary, electronic devices or closely controlled
lock and key procedures may best control these doors. It may, however, be preferable to include the
______________________________________________________________________________________________

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PART III – RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

SECTION A – LAYOUT & BOUNDARIES

Section III-A-3 - Vulnerable Areas Checklist:

4. Chemical and Biological Agents

Section III-A-4 - Chemical & Biological Agent Checklist:

The Bibliography lists several relevant chem.-bio documents.

Report Card for airport Chem-Bio Protection and Response

5. Boundaries and Access Points

Table III-A-1 - Fence Types and Fabric

AISI 430 6 - 16.67

RAZOR RIBBON 24 AISI 430

Ground Barrier 24 AISI 301 / 304

MIL-B-52775 B Ground Barrier 24 AISI 316

Figure III-A-1 - Chain Link Fence Barbed Wire Configurations

Figure III-A-2 - Vertical Bar Fence

Figure III-A-3 - Fence Post and Rail Reinforcement

Figure III-A-4 - ASDE Radar

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