People v Baez

GR No. L-46000

The conviction of activist Carlos Celdran of the crime of Offending Religious Feelings made
people aware that there is such a crime contained in the Revised Penal Code. Some legal
luminaries explained that this crime is a remnant of the Spanish occupation in the Philippines
where Catholicism and the state were almost indistinguishable. It can be recalled that Mr.
Celdran entered the Manila Cathedral while in the middle of the mass with the name
“DAMASO” written on a placard. This was supposed to be his protest on the alleged meddling
of the Catholic Church on state affairs. This was not the only case to have reached our courts.
Sometime in 1937, an event at a local parish prompted the filling of a criminal complaint for
violation of the Revised Penal Code on Offending Religious Feelings. It may be time to take
another look at this law and the cases due to the recently passed “Anti-Profanity” Ordinance of
the City of Baguio. It can also be observed that there is “movement” of the world towards
“political correctness” with the ultimate purpose of not offending anyone.

People vs. Baez

The parish priest of the Municipality of Lumban filed a case under Article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code because the funeral cortege of a member of the religious sect “Church of Christ”
passed through the courtyard of the Roman Catholic Church and that such place was devoted
to worship. The parish priest also alleged that the cortege was made to pass through the
churchyard through intimidation and force upon his person. The case was filed because the act
offended the religious feelings of the members of the Roman Catholic Church. The fiscal upon
reevaluation of the facts of the case however moved for the dismissal of the case since
according to him, the acts complained for do not constitute the crime of offending religious
feelings. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court with the issue of whether the action
of the fiscal was correct.

The Fiscal was Wrong

The Court said that the fiscal was wrong in saying that the facts do not constitute the crime
described in Article 133. It was the contention of the fiscal that the churchyard was not a place
devoted to worship and that no religious activity of the Catholic Church was being held at the
time the cortege passed through it. In short, the fiscal did not believe that acts alleged by the
parish priest do not offend religious feelings. The Supreme Court ruled that: “As the fiscal was
discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of them, but
must admit them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a question of
law, not one of fact.” (G.R. No. L-46000, May 25, 1939) The fiscal cannot also make a judgment
that the acts are not offensive because the facts “must be judged only according to the feelings
of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may
offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith.” The SC then ordered the fiscal to comply with his
duty under the law. The then Justice Laurel (later Chief Justice) gave a strong dissent saying that
the facts indeed do not constitute the crime since the courtyard is not a place of worship. The
act of passing the corpse of a dead person through a portion of private property is not
notoriously offensive and that the case should not be judged according the feelings of the
members of a certain church but must pass through an unbiased judicial determination.

Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

Crispin Oben for appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ of
mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of
the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was filed of the
following tenor:

The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and municipality of
Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro
Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion committed as follows:

That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while
holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the
rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the churchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church and is devoted to the religious
worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned complainant who, through force
and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass
through the said churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open
disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.

(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES

(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)

The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement
regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts and of
the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal,
instead of filing the corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:

The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. The said
priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats, the
funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the Church.
Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the Church
of Christ.

The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not constitute
the offense complained of considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. At
most they might be chargeable with having threatened the parish priest, or with having passed
through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting on
the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of
the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma;
works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys
any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of
Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman
Catholic Church.

Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case,
reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another information for the crime found to
have been committed by the accused.

From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due
course by the court by virtue of an order of this court.

The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to wit,
that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said
church, and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish
priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of
the religious sect known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part,
he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the
crime defined and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the
accused had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act
complained of took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the
fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of
them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a
question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged
only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is
possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while
not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take
the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said
facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established,
the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that
of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section
29 of General Orders, No. 58.

The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law,
without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dispositive part on the ground that the lower court, without determining if the
churchyard of the Catholic Church is a place devoted to religious worship or not, held that the
passage through the said churchyard of a funeral conducted in accordance with the rites of
another religion is not offensive to the feelings of the Catholic. If that funeral with ceremonies
of another religion had been made to pass inside the church, it would without question be
offensive top the feelings of the Catholics. The lower court, through the provincial fiscal, is thus
under a duty to determine: (1) If the churchyard is a place devoted to the religious worship of
the Catholic Church, and (2) if the funeral held under the rites of another religion was made to
pass through the said churchyard.

If the churchyard of the Catholic Church is like some of those seen in Manila churches where
anyone can pass and where goods are even sold to the public, then it is not a place devoted to
religious worship, and the fact that a funeral to pass through it, does not constitute a violation
of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, but, at most, the offense of threats if it is true that the
parish priest was threatened when he prohibited the passage of the funeral.

LAUREL, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

It is an accepted doctrine of construction that criminal statutes must be strictly interpreted. In

ART. 133. Offending religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

As defined, two essential elements must be present under this article, to wit: (1) That the facts
complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration
of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. It is admitted that the whole incident happened in the "atrio" or "patio"
of the Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. There was no celebration of any religious ceremony
then. The "atrio" coming from the Latin "atrium" means, an open space, generally closed,
fronting a building or a church. In this case it is a churchyard. While occasional religious
ceremonies may be performed in the "atrio", nevertheless this does not make the "atrio" a
place devoted to religious worship under article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, any more than
a public plaza, a street or any other place occasionally used for religious purposes. But assuming
that the churchyard in this case is "a place devoted to religious worship" — contrary to what we
see and know (Justice Brown, in Hunter vs. New York O. & W. Ry. Co., 23 N.E., 9, 10; 116 N.Y.,
615) — is the act complained of "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful?" The
imputed dereliction consist in that "los acusados arriba nombrados, estando dirigiendo el
entierro segun el rito de una secta religiosa llamada "Iglesia de Cristo", del cadaver de uno que
en vida se llamada Antonio Macabigtas, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente hicieron que dicho
entierro pasase, como en efecto paso, por el a trio de la Iglesia Catholica Romana frente a dicha
Iglesia, el cual a trio es propiedad de dicha Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos de esta
Iglesia y esta dedicado a los cultos religiosos deesta Iglesia, contra la oposicion del infrascrito
denunciantea quien los acusados mediante fuerza y amenazas de maltrato obligaron a cederles
el paso del entierro por dicho atrio." (Emphasis is mine.) As I see it the only act which is alleged
to have offended the religious "feelings of the faithful" here is that of passing by the defendants
through the "atrio" of the church under the circumstances mentioned. I make no reference to
the alleged trespass committed by the defendants or the threats imputed to them because
these acts constitute different offenses (arts. 280, 281 and 282-285) and do not fall within the
purview of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. I believe that an act, in order to be considered
as notoriously offensive to the religious feelings, must be one directed against religious practice
or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule; the offender, for instance, mocks, scoffs at or
attempts to damage an object of religious veneration; it must be abusive, insulting and
obnoxious (Viada, Comentarios al Codigo Penal, 707, 708; vide also Pacheco, Codigo Penal, p.
359).

Why, may I ask, should the mere act of passing of the corpse or funeral cortege in or through a
private property be characterized as notoriously offensive to the feelings of any religion or of its
adherent or followers?

The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed by the name of the Lord. (Job. I. 21.)

In this case, the Lord has recalled the life of one of His creatures: and it must be His wish that
the remains shall have the right of way that they may be buried "somewhere, in desolate, wind-
swept space, in twilight land, in no man's land but in everybody's land.

Rather than too many religions that will make us hate one another because of religious
prejudices and intolerance, may I express the hope that we may grasp and imbibe the one
fundamental of all religions that should make us love one another!

I must decline to accept the statement made in the majority opinion that "whether or not the
act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact
which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other
faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a
certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith."
(Emphasis is mine.) I express the opinion that offense to religious feelings should not be made
to depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion,
but should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all
the facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial
criterion .Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective
characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and
in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution."
(Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.)

I think that the ruling of the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the case and in reserving to
the provincial fiscal the presentation of another complaint or complaints under other provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, is correct and should be upheld.

IMPERIAL, J.:

I concur in the preceding dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel.