Hassenzahl - Book - Experience - Design - Sample (Arrastado)

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1.1.

A FIRST GLANCE ON EXPERIENCE 3


experience, we have to put them first, that is, before the products. Without a clear understanding of
experience, the interactive products we design will never be able to properly shape experiences, let
alone, to create novel experiences.
I close this chapter with further clarifying experience. In Chapter 2, I discuss the key aspects
of experience and its implications for the design and evaluation of products. Chapter 3 will expand
on reasons why we should bother with an experiential approach to interactive products. Chapter 4
presents a high-level model of experience and Chapter 5 takes a specific design perspective.

1.1 A FIRST GLANCE ON EXPERIENCE


In a seminal paper on emotions, James Russell (2003) advances the idea that emotional experience
is the consequence of self-perception and categorization, a construction. In other words, if you find
yourself being negatively aroused and running away from a bear, you may—unconsciously—integrate
all this into a coherent experience of fear. Russell actually calls it emotional meta-experience because
all its components produce low-level experiences in themselves—the felt arousal, the felt valence, the
sensation of running, the smell of the bear and so forth—but a process on top, a meta process, creates
a coherent whole. As Russell (2003, p. 165) puts it: "Emotional meta-experience is the construction
of a coherent narrative, interpreting, packaging, and labeling the episode—thereby integrating this
episode with general knowledge."
In the context of interactive products, we may use the same basic notion of experience as an
emergent story, packaged, labeled, and integrated into our general knowledge of the world. But from
what does experience emerge? What are the elements and underlying processes?
John McCarthy and Peter Wright (2004) offer the "emotional "as one of their four "threads
of experience." Referring to John Dewey, an American Philosopher of the last century, McCarthy
and Wright note that "emotions are qualities of particular experiences" (p. 83). To me, it is beyond
question that emotion is at the centre of experience. The most compelling argument for this is the
observation that emotion, cognition, motivation, and action are inextricably intertwined. Antonio
Damasio (1994) made a persuasive case by exposing the consequences of physical severances, through
accidents and so forth, of the affective and the cognitive system in the brain. Learning, decision-
making and many other higher order intellectual functions crucially depend on emotion. Damasio
(1994), for example, wrote about Elliot, one of his patients. Elliot suffered from a brain tumor.
Upon removal of the tumor, damage was done to the physiological structures, which connect the
cognitive with the affective. Elliot’s intelligence and memory remained intact after the operation;
however, he was suddenly unable to even make the simplest decisions. With the heritage of the
Cartesian separation of body and mind and the longstanding dismissal of emotions as lowly, savage,
and uncivilized, the central role of emotion in cognition was surprising, leading to a resurgence of
the interest in emotions in itself and their function.
Emotion is further closely linked to action and motivation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1989), two
aspects not explicitly addressed by McCarthy and Wright’s thread account. However, it permeates
their discussion of the emotional thread when they point out that emotions are best viewed from

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