INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES PROJECT ON

INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

SUBMITTED TO: - Prof. DR. QAZI USMAN SIR

FACULTY, IOS LAW

SUBMITTED BY: Mohd Arshaan Afaq ROLL NO – 38

BA LLB (Hons)

SEMESTER VI

BATCH2017-22

1 | Page
INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

INTRODUCTION

In a penal law if there appears to be a reasonable dubiety or ambiguity, it shall be

decided in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalisation. If a penal
provision fairly be so construed as to avoid the punishment, it must be so interpreted. If
there can be two reasonable interpretations of a penal provision, the more lenient should
be made applicable.
Punishment can be meted to one only if the plain words extension of the meaning of the
word is allowable. A penalty cannot be imposed on the basis that the object of the
statute so desired. According to Maxwell, “the prerequisite of express language for the
creation of an offence, in interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an
offence in requiring the fulfilment to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the
infliction of punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions
concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction.”
Unless the words of a statute clearly made an act criminal, it shall not be construed as
criminal. If there is any ambiguity in the words which set out the elements of an act or
omission declared to be an offence, so that it is doubtful whether the act or omission
falls within the statutory words, the ambiguity will be resolved in favour of the person
charged.[2] The court will inflict punishment on a person only when the circumstances
of the case fall unambiguously fall under the letter of the law. Legislation which deals
with the jurisdiction and the procedure relation to imposition of the penalties will be
strictly construed. Where certain procedural requirements have been laid down by a
statute to be completed in a statute dealing with punishments, the court is duty bound to
see that all these requirements have been complied with before sentencing the accused.
In case of any doubt the benefit has to go to the accused even up to the extent of
acquitting him on some technical grounds.[3] Penal provision cannot be extended by
implication to a particular case or circumstances. The rule exhibits a preference for the
liberty of the subject and in a case of ambiguity enables the court to resolve the doubt in
favour of the subject and against the Legislature which has failed to express itself
clearly, but this rule is now-a-days of limited application.[4] The rule was originally
evolved to mitigate the rigours of monstrous sentences of trivial offences and although
the necessity and that strictness have now vanished, the difference in approach made to
penal statute as against any other statute still persists.[5]

GENERAL RULE
If a statute laid a mandatory duty but provided no mode for enforcing it, the presumption
in ancient days was that the person in breach of the duty could be made liable for the
offence of contempt of the statute.[6] This rule of construction is obsolete and now has
no application to a modern statute. Clear language is now needed to create a crime. “A
penal provision must be definite”[7]. It is a basic rule of legal jurisprudence that than an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.[8] Pollock,
CB said: “whether there be any difference left between a criminal statute and any other
statute not creating offence, I should say that in criminal statute you must be quite sure
that the offence charged is within the letter of the law.”[9]
In the case of Feroze N. Dotivalaz v. P.M Wadhwani and co.,[10] this court stated:
“Generally, ordinary meaning is to be assigned to any word or phrase used or defined in
a statute. Therefore, unless there is any vagueness or ambiguity, no occasion will arise
to interpret the term in a manner which may add something to the meaning of the word
which ordinarily does not so mean by the definition itself, more particularly, where it is
a restrictive definition. Unless there are compelling reasons to do so, meaning of a
restrictive and exhaustive definition would not be expanded or made extensive to
embrace things which are strictly not within the meaning of the word as defined.”
 In Anup Bhushan Vohra v. Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on
(16 September, 2011)[11] the Apex Court held that the contempt proceedings being
quasi-criminal in nature, burden and standard of proof is the same as required in
criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as per the statutory rules framed for the
purpose and proved beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged
contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law does not permit imposing any
punishment in contempt proceedings on mere probabilities; equally, the court cannot
punish the alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on conjectures and
surmises. As observed above, the contempt proceeding being quasi-criminal in nature
require strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under the rules applicable in such
proceedings.
A man should not be goaled on ambiguity. Lord Esher, MR in formulating “the settled
rule of construction of penal sections” observed “if there is a reasonable interpretation
which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt that construction. If
there are two reasonable constructions then we must give the lenient one.[12] The rule
has been stated by Mahajan, CJI in similar words: “If two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards the
construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes
penalty. It is not competent to the court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by
the legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature.”[13]
A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of The Assistant Commissioner,
Assessment-II, Bangalore and Ors. v. Valliappa Textiles Ltd. and Ors.[14], laid down:-
“...Though Javali (supra) also refers to the general principles of interpretation of statute
the rule of interpretation of criminal statutes is altogether a different cup of tea. It is not
open to the court to add something to or read something in the statute on the basis of
some supposed intendment of the statute. It is not the function of this Court to supply
the casus omissus, if there be one. As long as the presumption of innocence of the
accused prevails in this country, the benefit of any lacuna or casus omissus must be
given to the accused. The job of plugging the loopholes must strictly be left to the
legislature and not assumed by the court.
So when a statute dealing with criminal offence impinging upon the liberty of citizens, a
loophole is found, it is not for judges to cure it, for it is dangerous to derogate from the
principle that a citizen has a right to claim that howsoever his conduct may seem to
deserve punishment, he should not be convicted unless that conduct falls fairly within
definition of crime of which he is charged.[15] The fact that an enactment is a penal
provision is in itself a reason for hesitating before ascribing to phrases used in the
meaning broader than that they would ordinarily bear.[16]There is all the more reason to
construe strictly a drastic penal statute which deals with crimes of aggravated nature
which could not be effectively controlled under the ordinary criminal law[17].
While interpreting penal statutes, it is clear that any reasoning which is based on the
substance of the transaction has to be discarded.[18] It is the duty of the courts to apply
the purpose enshrined in the unambiguous language used by the Legislature irrespective
of the fact that the statute to be interpreted is a penal law.[19] The courts are not allowed
to give a wider meaning when the legislature has already provided a comprehensive
provision in the statute itself.
 In a very recent matter of State of Rajasthan v. Vinod Kumar(on 18 May, 2012)[20] the
Apex Court has observed: - “awarding punishment lesser than the minimum prescribed
under Section 376 IPC, is an exception to the general rule. Exception clause is to be
invoked only in exceptional circumstances where the conditions incorporated in the
exception clause itself exist. It is a settled legal proposition that exception clause is
always required to be strictly interpreted even if there is a hardship to any individual.
Exception is provided with the object of taking it out of the scope of the basic law and
what is included in it and what legislature desired to be excluded. The natural
presumption in law is that but for the proviso, the enacting part of the Section would
have included the subject matter of the proviso, the enacting part should be generally
given such a construction which would make the exceptions carved out by the proviso
necessary and a construction which would make the exceptions unnecessary and
redundant should be avoided. Proviso is used to remove special cases from the general
enactment and provide for them separately. Proviso may change the very concept of the
intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled
in order to make the enactment workable.[21]”
In this matter the sentence of the respondents was reduced by the Hon’ble Rajasthan
High Court to a lesser punishment than that prescribed under Section 376 as mandatory
unless the exception is strictly complied with. The Apex Court observed that awarding
punishment lesser than the minimum sentence of 7 years was permissible only for
adequate and special reasons. However, no such reasons have been recorded by the
court for doing so, and thus, the court failed to ensure compliance of such mandatory
requirement but awarded the punishment lesser than the minimum prescribed under the
IPC. Such an order is violative of the mandatory requirement of law and has defeated
the legislative mandate. Deciding the case in such a casual manner reduces the criminal
justice delivery system to mockery.
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION APPROACH
It is not necessary that courts must always favour the interpretation which is favourable
to the accused and not the prosecution but it may also chose to go for the interpretation
which is consistent with the object provided in the law. In State of Maharashtra v. Tapas
D. Neogy[22] the expression ‘any property’ in section 102 of Cr.P.C. was interpreted to
be inclusive of a ‘bank account’ and hence a police officer who was investigating the
matter was justified in seizing the same. This principle was first explained by James,
L.J. who stated: “No doubt all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say
that the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning
of the word used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip;
that there has been a casus omissus; that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it
must have been included if thought of.
In the case of Union of India v. Harsoli Devi[23], a Constitution Bench of this court laid
down: - “Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct
interpretation of Section 28- A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic
principles of interpretation of statute. The rule stated by Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage
case, (1844) 11 Cl & p.85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect: “If the
words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words
themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.””
It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is
plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute
and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground
that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd.[24], Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the
meaning of ‘ambiguous’ and held that – “a provision is not ambiguous merely because it
contains a word which in different context is capable of different meanings and it would
be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word.
A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in
that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning.” It is no doubt true
mat if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to
anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which
the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the
purpose of the statute.
Although, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within
the words, is not within the spirit of enactment. But where the thing is brought within
the words, and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any
other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and
the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of the penal
statute, where such a doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the
same language in any other enactment.”[25] Subbarao, J., has observed: “the Act
(Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947) was brought in to purify public administration.
When the legislature used the comprehensive terminology- to achieve the said purpose,
it would be appropriate not to limit the content by construction when particularly the
spirit of the statute is in accord with the words used there.”[26] On the same lines
Hon’ble Supreme Court had widely interpreted the Food Adulteration Act, 1954, while
expressing the strong disapproval of the narrow approach of construction to ensure that
the adulterators do not exploit the loopholes in the Act.[27]Similarly, such pedantic
interpretation has not been given in the cases relating to section 498A of Indian Penal
Code[28], section 12(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947[29] etc. The laws
which have been framed for supporting the cause of offences against women have to be
sternly implemented to set an example before the others which may deter the
prospective criminals.[30]

SUPPRESSION OF THE MISCHIEF

The language of the penal statute can also be interpreted in a manner which suppresses
the lacuna therein and to sabotage the mischief in consonance with the Heydon’s Case.
[31] For instance in Ganga Hire Purchase Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Punjab[32], while
interpreting the section 60(3) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
the word ‘owner’ was given a wider meaning for the purpose of confiscation of the
vehicle used in furtherance of the offence mentioned therein i.e. inclusive of the
registered owner where the vehicle was purchased under a hire purchase agreement
when all the instalments were not paid by him.
In the matter of Manjit Singh @ Mange vs C.B.I.[33]( 25 January 2011), Hon’ble
Supreme Court discussed the interpretation of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987 in light of the aforesaid principle. It was argued by Senior
Advocate Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, that prior approval was required to be taken from the
Superintendent of Police of the District, as required under Section 20-A[34] of the
TADA Act, to try the accused for the offences under the TADA Act and the
Superintendent of Police, CBI was not the competent authority to give such permission.
Learned senior counsel submitted that the confessional statement of the co- accused
because no prior approval from the prescribed authority, as required under Section 20A
of the TADA Act, had been obtained. He also submitted that the penal provisions
require to be strictly construed. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General,
submitted that when the investigation is transferred to the CBI, with the consent of the
State, the CBI takes over further investigation of the case. Therefore, Superintendent of
Police, CBI, was competent to record the confession made by a person and the same is
admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under the TADA Act. He further
submitted that the confessional statement of co-accused recorded before S.P., C.B.I.,
was admissible in evidence vide Section 15 of the TADA Act, which provides for the
recording of the confessional statements before the police officer, not lower in the rank
than Superintendent of Police, and it is made admissible even against co-accused,
abettor or conspirator and the bar under the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code
will not come into play.
The Hon’ble Court observed that confessional statement is a substantive piece of
evidence and can be used against the co- accused by following the interpretation
provided in S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir[35], where the Apex Court observed that “Section
15 of the TADA Act is an important departure from the ordinary law and must receive
that interpretation which would achieve the object of that provision and not frustrate or
truncate it and that correct legal position is that a confession recorded under Section 15
of the TADA Act is a substantive piece of evidence and can be used against a co-
accused also, if held to be admissible, voluntary and believable.”
Mr. Tulsi used various judgments of the Apex Court includingDadi Jagganadhan v.
Jammulu Ramulu and Ors.[36], where a Constitution Bench of this court observed: -
“...The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the
assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to
do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the
obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in
the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up
the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which
are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The
Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by
construction, make up deficiencies which are there. The learned counsel contended that
under Section 20A of the TADA, the sanction of the District Superintendent of Police is
required to be obtained before the police record any information about the commission
of an offence under the TADA. Since the same has not been obtained, the conviction of
the accused cannot be sustained. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel,
the sanction was obtained from the S.P., C.B.I.
But the Hon’ble Court held that the phrase “District SP” has been used in order to take
the sanction of a senior officer of the said district, when the prosecution wants to record
any commission of a offence under the Act, the reason appears to be that the
Superintendent of Police of the District is fully aware of necessity to initiate the
proceedings under the stringent criminal law like the TADA Act. In the instant case, the
State Government, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Delhi Police
Special Establishment Act, 1946, has handed over the investigation to CBI. The Hon’ble
Court was inclined to hold that in matters concerning national security, as is the case of
terrorist acts, the Centre and an autonomous body functioning under it would be better
equipped to handle such cases. Therefore, `prior approval' by the SP of CBI would
adequately satisfy the requirements under Section 20A (1).
Similarly in the leading matter of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam Aggarwal[37], a broader
meaning was attributed to the application of sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal
Code, in light of the broader purpose which was sought to be achieved through these
provisions and the mischief which was required to be cured. It was also made applicable
to the case where the legitimacy of the marriage itself was in question to bring the
accused within the purview of the word ‘husband’ as used in the said provisions.
In Abhay Singh Chautala vs C.B.I. (on 4 July, 2011)[38] the learned Senior Counsel
Shri Mukul Rohtagi as well as Shri U.U. Lalit arguing for the appellants, urged that on
the day when the charges were framed or on any date when the cognizance was taken,
both the appellants were admittedly public servants and, therefore, under the plain
language of Section 19 (1) of The Prevention of Corruption Act, the Court could not
have taken cognizance unless there was a sanction from the appropriate government.
The learned senior counsel analyzed the whole Section closely and urged that in the
absence of a sanction, the cognizance of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act could not have been taken. It was also urged that a literal interpretation is a must,
particularly, to sub- Section (1) of Section 19. But the Apex Court observed- : “...we,
therefore, reject the theory of litera regis while interpreting Section 19(1)... However, as
per the interpretation, it excludes a person who has abused some other office than the
one which he is holding on the date of taking cognizance, by necessary implication.
Once that is clear, the necessity of the literal interpretation would not be there in the
present case we specifically hold that giving the literal interpretation to the Section
would lead to absurdity and some unwanted results ...hold that the appellants in both the
appeals had abused entirely different office or offices than the one which they were
holding on the date on which cognizance was taken and, therefore, there was no
necessity of sanction under Section 19.”

CONCLUSION
After the detailed analysis of various methods of interpreting a penal statute in the paper
we can broadly categorize the method of interpretation by concluding that firstly the
basic rule of interpreting such laws is to strictly adhere to the language of the statute
since it is the will of the legislature and the court should restrain itself from stretching
the meaning of the words causing unnecessary hardships to the subjects. Secondly it
must be always kept in mind that what is the purpose for which the enactment seeks to
achieve and if a strict adherence is done will it be able to achieve that purpose or
object. Thirdly and lastly whether by such an interpretation the mischief which was
sought to be suppressed by the penal law was suppressed and if not then it is the duty of
the court to ensure that it is done and just because of the Legislature’s omission, the
injustice to the society should not be administered.

[34] Section 20-A: Cognizance of offence. - (1) notwithstanding anything contained in

the Code, no information about the commission of an offence under this Act shall be
recorded by the police without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of
Police.
(2)......No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous
sanction of the Inspector General of Police or as the case may be, the Commissioner of
Police