Constitutional Law 309

X. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. The Judicial Power

1. Defined. Includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government [Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII].

a) The second clause effectively limits the “political question” area

which, heretofore, was forbidden territory for the courts.

b) The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes

and orders to as to make them conformable with law and justice includes the right
to reverse itself, especially when, in its honest opinion, it has committed an error
or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a
party litigant [Tocao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127405, September 20, 2001].
The Court is not precluded from examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality [De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182,
December 5, 2001].

2. Where vested: In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law [Sec. 1, Art. VIII].

3. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power to hear and decide a

case.

a) Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, Art. VIII [Sec. 2, Art. VIII],

b) No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence
[Sec. 30, Art. VI]. i)

i) Thus, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which authorizes an appeal to

the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases, was declared unconstitutional, because the provision
was passed without the advice and consent of the Supreme Court [Fabian
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Villavertv. Desierto,
G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000].

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B. Constitutional Safeguards to insure the independence of the Judciiary.

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by

the legislature.

2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.

3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and
appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice
and concurrence.

4. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts
and personnel.

5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/ justices
of inferior courts.

6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.

7. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency

performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal

autonomy.

a) In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and

Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 01- 1-04-SC-
Philja, 481 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court said that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of
the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law
or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. In
downgrading the positions and salary grades of two positions in the Philippine
Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the
fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over court
personnel, as enshrined in the Constitution. 9

9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of
Court.

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10. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.

11. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.

C. The Power of Judicial Review/lnquiry. [See: CHAPTER II.]

D. Appointment to the Judiciary.

1. Qualifications: Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence

[Sec. 7 (3), Art. VIII]. In addition:

a) Supreme Court: Natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40

years of age,.for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines [Sec. 7 (1), Art. VIII]..

b) Lower Collegiate Courts: Natural born citizen of the Philippines,

member of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications
[Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art. VIII].

c) Lower Courts: Citizen of the Philippines, member of the Philippine

Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications [Sec. 7 (1) and (2), Art. VIII]..

2. Procedure for Appointment.

a) Appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at

least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy;
the appointment shall need no confirmation [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]..

b) Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90)
days from the occurrence thereof [Sec. 4 (1). Art. VIII],

c) For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within
ninety (90) days from the submission by the JBC of such list [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]. i)

i) Relate this to the constitutional prohibition against

midnight appointments [Sec. 15, Art. W//which states that two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. In Re: Mateo
Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-

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SC, November 9, 1998, it was held that during this period (when appointments are
prohibited), the President is not required to make appointments to the courts, nor
allowed to do so. While the filling up of vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
issuance of the appointment during the period of the ban.

3. The Judicial and Bar Council.

a) Composition [Sec. 8 (1), Art. VIII]:

i) Ex-officio members: Chief Justice, as Chairman; the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of Congress.

ii) Regular members: A representative of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, a professor of law, a retired justice of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

iii) Secretary ex-officio: The Clerk of the Supreme Court.

b) Appointment: The regular members shall be appointed by the President for

a term of four [4] years, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
They shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court
[Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII].

c) Powers/Functions: Principal function of recommending appointees to

the Judiciary. May exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it [Sec. 8 (5), Art. VIII].

E. The Supreme Court.

1. Composition: A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof [Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII],

2. En Banc/Division Cases:

a) En Banc: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law; and all other cases which, under the
Rules of Court, are to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations. These cases are decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.

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b) Division: Other cases or matters may be heard in division, and decided

or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon, but in no case without
the concurrence of at least three (3) such members.

i) When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be

decided en banc. In Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999, the
Supreme Court interpreted the provision by drawing a distinction between “cases”
on the one hand, and “matters” on the other hand, such that cases are “decided”,
while matters are “resolved”. On the basis of this distinction, only “cases” are
referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the required number
of votes is not obtained.

ii) No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision

rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.

iii) The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Court is purely
an internal matter in which the petitioner has no business at all. With its new
membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a
party’s case when, after its re-examination, the rectification appears proper and
necessary [Limketkai Sbns Milling v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 464],

3. Powers [Sec. 5, Art. VIII]:

a) Original jurisdiction: over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus.

b) Appellate jurisdiction: Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on

appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in (i) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question; (ii) all cases
involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto; (iii) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue; (iv) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher; and (v) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. i)

i) Note that this power does not include the power of the
Supreme Court to review decisions of administrative bodies, but is limited
to “final judgments and orders of lower courts” [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,
supra.].

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ii) Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must
the trial court forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic
review of the conviction [People v. Redulosa, 255 SCRA 279]. Where the penalty
imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal the decision of
conviction, otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final and executory
[Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 106531, November' 18, 1999].

iii) Sec. 30, Art. VI, provides that no law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its concurrence. Thus, in
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770,
which provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, was declared unconstitutional, because it expands the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence. See also Namuhe v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 124965, October 29, 1998, and Tirol v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 135913, November 4, 1999; Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715,
February 13, 2000.

iv) In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135789, January 31,

2002, it was held that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

c) Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations as

public interest may require; but the assignment shall not exceed six months without
the consent of the judge concerned.

d} Order change of venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice.

See People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173.

e) Rule Making Power: Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. i)

i) Limitations on the rule-making power. The rules must

provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases; they must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and must
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. See Primicias v.
Ocampo, 93 Phil. 451,

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which is authority for the principle that trial by assessors is a substantive right and
may not be repealed by the Supreme Court. Likewise, in First Lepanto Ceramics
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 1994, it was held that Supreme Court
Circular No. 1-91, which orders that appeals from decisions of administrative
bodies shall now be filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal E.O. 226, and
did not diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely
transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of said agencies to the Court of
Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from notice), both of which are
merely procedural in character.

ii) In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1- 09-
SC, January 21, 2002, it was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement
and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which
will hear and decide the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.

iii) An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer

must belong, as distinguished from a bar association organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity
to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities, x x The integration of the Philippine Bar means
the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership
and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice
of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court
[In Re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22].

iiia) Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of

membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in [Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005].

iiib) The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to

deprivation of property without due process of law. The practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's

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public responsibilities [In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978],

iv) The writ of amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparo
has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of
constitutional rights [Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce
Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15 (1993)]. Amparo, literally “to protect”,
originated in Mexico and spread throughout the Western Hemisphere where it
gradually evolved into various forms, depending on the particular needs of each
country.

iva) By Resolution in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Supreme Court

promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, and it took effect on October 24,
2007. Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity ”

ivb) An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule which

allows the grant by the court of interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary
protection order, inspection order, production order or a witness protection order.

ivc) No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear

allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected. Petitioners right to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite
the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life,
liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo [Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5,
2008].

ivd) The writ of amparo shall not issue when applied for as a
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere
with these processes [Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, January 17, 2008].

v) The writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an

independent remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to
informational privacy. The essence of the constitutional right to informational
privacy goes to the very heart of a person’s individuality, an exclusive and personal
sphere upon which the State has no right to intrude without any legitimate public
concern. The basic attribute of an effective rightto informational privacy is the right
of the individual to control the flow of information concerning or describing them.

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vb) By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court

promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2, 2008.
Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. ”

vi) Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. In Echegaray v.

Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999, the Supreme Court
declared: “But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.”

vii) Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies

shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5 (5), Art.
VIII]..

f) Power of Appointment: The Supreme Court appoints all officials and

employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law [Sec. 5 (6),
Art. VIII]..

g) Power of Administrative Supervision: The Supreme Court shall have

administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof [Sec. 6, Art.
VIII].

i) The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or

administrative complaint before his office against a judge; he must first indorse the
case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action [Fuentes v. Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001]. In the absence of
any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with
regard to the former’s certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers [Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 469; Dolalas v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 265 SCRA 819].

ii) Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are

confidential in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out
to be innocent of the charges; it can take years to build a reputation and

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only a single accusation, although unfounded, to destroy it [Godinez v. Alano, A.M.

RTJ-98-1409, February 18, 1999],

h) Annual Report: Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from the

opening of each regular session of Congress, to the President and to Congress an
annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary [Sec. 16, Art. VIII].

4. Consultations/Decisions of Supreme Court [Secs. 13 & 14, Art. VIII].

a) Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached

in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall
be issued. This requirement is applicable also to lower collegiate courts.

i) But this requirement does not apply to administrative cases

[Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646],

ii) When the votes are equally divided and the majority vote is not
obtained, then pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition shall be dismissed [Cruz v. Secretary, DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December
6, 2000],

b) The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.

i) But this requirement does not apply to a minute resolution

dismissing a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, provided a legal
basis is given therein [Mendoza v. CFI, 66 SCRA 96; Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 1]. Neither will it apply to administrative cases [Prudential
Bank v. Castro, supra.].

ii) This constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of

“memorandum decisions”, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferiortribunals. “Memorandum
decisions” are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds
of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. But to be
valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the
lower court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by

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reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to
and made an indispensable part of the decision [Solid Homes v. Laserna, G.R. No.
166051, April 8, 2008].

iii) A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence

presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth
supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.
However, it is imperative that the decision not simply be limited to the dispositive
portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with reference
to the record, and contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and
the tribunal’s statement and conclusions on the case. Thus, in Dizon v. Judge
Lopez, AM. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997, the decision, which consisted
only of the dispositive portion (denominated a sin perjuicio judgment) was held
invalid.

iv) In People v. Baring, G.R. No. 137933, January 28, 2002, the
Supreme Court said that the trial court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of
the accused, not by the lack of direct evidence against the accused but by the trial
court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility
of the evidence, the assessments made from the evidence, and the conclusion
drawn therefrom, after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.
Likewise, in De Vera v. Judge Dames, A.M. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999, because
the respondent judge had precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory
without sufficiently explaining why, he was deemed to have violated Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, and although there was no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration, the Judge must still be sanctioned.

c) No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due

course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

i) In Fr. Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001,
the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in this wise:
“Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the
movants have been considered and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the same.” The Supreme Court
held that there was adequate compliance with the constitutional provision.

ii) In Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra., the Supreme Court ruled that
“lack of merit” is sufficient declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition for
review or motion for reconsideration. In Komatsu Industries v. Court of

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Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998, it was held that when the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments or motions, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states — in a
minute resolution — that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in
the respondent court’s decision is shown or some other legal basis stated in the
resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. This
is reiterated in Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629 June 30, 2004. ’

F. Tenure of Judges/Justices.

1. Supreme Court: Justices may be removed only by impeachment Sec

2, Art. XI].. '

a) In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-
4-5433, April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor
(Tanodbayan) is without authority to conduct an investigation on charges against
a member of the Supreme Court with the end in view of filing a criminal information
against him with the Sandiganbayan. This is so, because if convicted in the
criminal case, the Justice would be removed, and such removal would violate his
security of tenure.

2. Lower Courts: Judges shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office [Sec. 11, Art. VIII],

a) The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon [Sec. 11,
Art. VIII].

i) In People v. Judge Gacott, 246 SCRA 52, it was held that the
first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the disciplinary power
to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en
banc. It did not intend that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard
and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may order their dismissal by
a vote of a majority”. Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.

ii) In the absence of any administrative action taken against the

RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificate of service,

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Constitutional Law

the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the

Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers [Maceda v. Vasquez,
supra.]. In Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001, it was
held that because of Sec. 6, Art. VIII, vesting in the Supreme Court exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge or court employee involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is
duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it
referred to the Supreme Court. See also Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001.

iii) In Office of the Judicial Administrator v. Pascual, A.M. No. MT-

93-783, July 29, 1996, the Supreme Court, reiterating Raquiza v. Castaneda,
declared that the grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be established
beyond reasonable doubt, particularly where the charges on which the removal is
sought are misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetence, etc..
Thus, in De Vera v. Dames, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999, the Supreme
Court said that judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision
rendered in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith. This,
however, is not license forthem to be negligent or abusive in performing their
adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad faith or malice will not totally
exculpate them from charges of incompetence and ignorance of the law when they
render decisions that are totally bereft of factual and legal bases. This was
reiterated in Dayot v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282, March 1, 2001, where
the judge was nonetheless taken to task for issuing an order discrediting the period
served by the prisoner outside the jail without giving the prisoner a chance to be
heard, thus betraying his ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process. In De
Guzman v. Judge Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001, the Supreme
Court said that the respondent had shamed the judiciary by deliberately applying
not only patently inapplicable but also already repealed laws. The judge was
dismissed from the service, because according to the Court, when the law violated
is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. In Spouses Antonio & Elsa Fortuna v. Judge Penaco-Sitaca, A.M. No. RTJ-
01-1633, June 19, 2001, because the judge accepted at face value a mere
machine copy of the bail bond issued by another court, the judge was subjected
to administrative sanction, because it is highly imperative that judges should be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well- settled authoritative
doctrines. In Agulan v. Judge Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ- 01-1354, April 4, 2001,
for receiving the deposit of cash as bail and keeping the same in his office, the
judge was held administratively liable, even after the complainant executed an
affidavit of desistance.

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iv) However, in Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of

Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of A
Suspected Drug Queen, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001, the Supreme
Court said that although every office in government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a
seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be
maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable
in an orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary
for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.
Similarly, in Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC Branch 54, Manila, of an
Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense, A.M. No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001,
where the judge, despite opposition from the prosecution, simply issued an order
submitting for resolution the motion and the opposition without the same being
heard, and later, granting the motion for extension of medical confinement for two
months, the Supreme Court found the judge guilty of gross misconduct for being
utterly inefficient and for manifest partiality. And it is said that when the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and title he holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

b) No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines

the security of tenure of its members [Sec. 2, Art. VIII],

i) In De la Liana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294, it was held that B.P. 129
was a valid reorganization law, and that, therefore, the abolition of then existing
judicial offices did not violate security of tenure. [NOTE; In view of the clear
declaration of Sec. 2, Art. VIII, the ruling in De la Liana, as well as that in Ocampo
v. Secretary of Justice, L-7918, January 18, 1955, may be said to have been
modified accordingly.]

G. Salaries.Tixed by law; may not be decreased during their continuance in

office. In Nitafan v. Tan, 152 SCRA 284, it was held that imposition of income tax
on salaries of judges does not violate the constitutional prohibition against
decrease in salaries.

H. Periods for Decision [Sec. 15, Art. VIII].

1. All cases filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or
resolved, from date of submission, within: 24 months - Supreme Court; 12 months
- lower collegiate courts; and 3 months - all other lower courts; unless, in the two
latter cases, the period is reduced by the Supreme Court.

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A certification to be signed by the Chief Justice or Presiding Justice shall be

issued stating the reason for delay. -

a) While it is truly the duty of the Judge to decide cases with good
dispatch, he must not sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental
requirements of due process, nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor
each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the
controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every
party [Young v. Judge De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365, Febmary 18, 1999],

b) In Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997,

respondent Judge was held to have violated Sec. 15, Art. VIII, because although
she promulgated her decision within three months from submission, only the
dispositive portion was read at such promulgation, and it took one year and 8
months more before a copy of the complete decision was furnished the
complainant. What respondent did was to render a “sin perjuicio” judgment, which
is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusions, to be
later supplemented by the final judgment. As early as 1923, the Supreme Court
already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering “sin perjuicio”
judgments. What should be promulgated must be the complete decision.

c) Sec. 15, Art. VIII, is designed to prevent delay in the administration

of justice, and judges are repeatedly reminded that failure to decide cases within
the prescribed period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is
a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge [Report on the
Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 27 of Lapulapu City. A.M. Case No. 97-9-282-RTC,
April 22, 1998]. Thus, in Sanchez v. Judge Vestil, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419, October
13, 1998, the Supreme Court said that judges who cannot comply with this
mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for
the delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista, A.M. MTJ-98-1161, August 17, 1999,
the Supreme Court said that a judge cannot be allowed to blame her court
personnel for her own incompetence or negligence. She ought to know the cases
submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own record
of cases so that she may act on them promptly. Neither does delay in the
transcription of stenographic notes excuse such failure, nor do additional
assignments or designations make him less liable for the delay [Gonzales-Decano
v. Judge Siapno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279, March 1, 2001]. 2

2. Despite expiration of the mandatory period, the court, without

prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence
thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it without
further delay.

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a) The court does not lose jurisdiction over the case, despite the lapse
of the mandatory period, but the erring judge or justice may be subjected to
administrative sanctions for the delay.

3. Interpreting a similar provision in the 1973 Constitution, in Marcelino v.

Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, reiterated in New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502,
the Supreme Court held that the provision is merely directory, being procedural in
nature. However, in Bernardo v. Judge Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ- 99-1189, May 12,
1999, the Supreme Court said that the failure of the judge to decide a case within
the reglementary period constitutes gross dereliction of duty the gravity of which
depends on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on time,
the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of
other aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Other cases where administrative
sanctions were imposed by the Supreme Court on judges for failure to
decide/resolve cases/matters within the periods prescribed in the Constitution:
Pros. Robert Visbal v. Judge Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306, March 20m 2001;
Atty. Montes v. Judge Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ- 01-1627, April 17, 2001; Maquiran v.
Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1606; Canada v. Judge Montecillo, A.M. No. RTJ-
01-1664; In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Branch 69,
Silay City, Judge Arinday, respondent, A.M. No. 99-5-162-RTC, May 11, 2001;
Report on the Judicial Audit in the MTC’s of Calasiao, Binmaley, Sta. Barbara and
Mapandan and in the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas, all in Pangasinan, A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1375, November 13, 2001[Arap v. Judge Mustafa, A.M. No. SCC-01-7,
March 12 2002. ’

a) In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,

A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 08, 2001, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena was fined P20,000 and was relieved of his powers, functions
and duties as Presiding Justice, so that he may devote himself exclusively to
decision-writing. His motion for reconsideration was denied on January 31, 2002.

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