Yngson v. Secretary

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3

Yngson v.

Secretary

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld
the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President
regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court
of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was
involved in the appeal.

Mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio
Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental has the potentialities and
possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes. In view of this, several persons filed their
applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant
was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio
Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said
area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond
purposes.

On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond
permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March
19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case,
said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said
purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the
attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding
the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-
appellees. Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of
Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were
docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A.

In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the
division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the
whole area covered by their respective applications. Appellant filed a petition for review dated July 6,
1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same
was dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955.

Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez. 

The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void
and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for
development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own
rules.

RULING:

No.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read: 

SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed: 
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto. 

xxx xxx xxx

(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the
Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been
certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL
NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area
applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes,
provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or
cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was
rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other
fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates: 

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947 

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952 

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953 

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953 

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.

After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course
to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason
given was Yngzon's priority of application. 

We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave
abuse of discretion.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right
over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so
close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of
one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this
case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not
covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area
for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year
period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the
latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent
Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the
same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the
66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray
that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the
officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling
weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The
records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner-
appellant.

You might also like