SWI Zondo Submission Gupta Enterprise Transnet

GUPTA
ENTERPRISE
AND THE
CAPTURE OF
TRANSNET
SUBMISSION TO
THE COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY INTO
ALLEGATIONS OF STATE
CAPTURE
Large text
The mission of Shadow World

Investigations is to detail and expose
the illicit and/or unethical corruption of
government by corporate actors and
their enablers. We do so by highlighting
the impact of the blurred line between
business and politics on democracy,
human rights, the rule of law, the
environment and just and equitable
development. This exposure serves to hold
the powerful to account, and to create
momentum for progressive change.
7 Cavendish Square,
Marylebone,
London
W1G 0PE
A submission by Shadow World Investigations

to the Zondo Commission in September 2020.
Editor and Researcher: Paul Holden

Design: Gaelen Pinnock | www.polygram.co.za
Copyright: Shadow World Investigations (2020)
www.shadowworldinvestigations.org
CONTENTS
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05
CNR, CSR, CRRC and ZPMC Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05
The First Laundromat: The Worlds Window Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06
The Second Laundromat: The Hong Kong Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07
The Third Laundromat: Habib Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08
Payments Made by Liebherr Cranes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08
Conclusion and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
List of Annexures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
About Shadow World Investigations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Section 1: Sources and Admissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Section 2: The Capture of Transnet and the

Gupta enterprise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1. Racketeering and the Gupta Family ‘Enterprise’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2. Understanding the Gupta enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3. Companies and Individuals Receiving Funds from the HSBC/Hong Kong
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4. The Connections between the Gupta enterprise and key Transnet
contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Section 3: Known Agency and/or Bribery/Kickback

Agreements in Relation to ZPMC and China
South Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1. ZPMC Agreement with JJ Trading FZE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2. Exclusive Agency Agreement between CNR (Hong Kong) and Century
General Trading: 14 April 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1
3.3. Exclusive Agency Agreement between CNR (Hong Kong) and Century
General Trading: 8 July 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4. Exclusive Agency Agreement between CNR (Hong Kong) and Tequesta
Group Limited: 20 May 2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5. Exclusive Agency Agreement between CNR Dalian Locomotive and
Rolling Stock Co. Ltd and Regiments Asia Limited: 20 May 2014/25 November
2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.6. Business Development Agreement between CSR and Regiments Asia
Limited: 10th February 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.7. Business Development Services Agreements between CNR Rolling Stock
South Africa and Bex Structured Products, 8 March 2015 and 25 April 2015. 31
3.8. The CSR-Tequesta Agreement: 18 May 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.9. The CSR-Regiments Asia Payment Agreement: 10 June 2015. . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.10. The CSR Payment Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.11. Addendum to Agreements between CRRC, Regiments Asia and Tequesta
Group: August 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.12. Addendum to the Agreement between CRRC Zhuzhou Locomotive and
Regiments Asia: August 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.13. Summary Table of Agreements and Anticipated Fund Flows. . . . . . . . . . . 40
Section 4: Payments Made to the Gupta Enterprise by

Liebherr Cranes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1. Payments Made to the Gupta Enterprise by Liebherr Cranes. . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.1. Source and Records from the #Guptaleaks Relating to Payments from
Liebherr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.2. Tracing the First Liebherr Payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1.2. Tracing the Second Liebherr Payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1.3. Tracing the Third Liebherr Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.4. Tracing the Fourth Liebherr Payment Tranche. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.4. Tracing the Fifth Liebherr Payment Tranche. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2. The Relationship between Accurate Investments and Liebherr Cranes. 55
Section 5: Transnet, the Gupta Enterprise and the Worlds

Window Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1. The Worlds Window Network: Relevant Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2. The Worlds Window Network: Key Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.3. The Worlds Window Front Companies: JJ Trading FZE and Century
General Trading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3.1. JJ Trading FZE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3.2. Century General Trading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4. The Nature and Development of the Relationship between Worlds
Window and the Gupta enterprise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

5.4.1. Earliest Direct Mentions of Piyoosh Goyal and Worlds Window Group.66
5.4.2. The Relationship Between the Gupta Enterprise and the Worlds
Window Network: Introducing the ‘hawala ledger.’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4.3. Investments Made by the Worlds Window Group into the Gupta
Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4.4. Prima Facie Evidence of the Involvement of Worlds Window and the
Gupta Enterprise in Money Laundering Activities: The Westdawn-Everest
Loan-Back Scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Gupta Enterprise in Money Laundering Activities: A Potential Arctos Loan-
Back Scheme?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Gupta Enterprise in Money Laundering Activities: Clean Laundry in Seven
Days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Gupta Enterprise in Money Laundering Activities: The South African Cycle. 79
5.5. The Receipt of Funds by the Worlds Window Network from ZPMC. . . . . . 80
5.6. Deposits Received by the Worlds Window Network/Century General
Trading from China South Rail Related to the 95 Locos Contract. . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.7. Circumstantial Evidence Regarding the Payment of Funds from CSR
Related to the 359 and 100 Locomotive Contracts to the Gupta Enterprise via
Worlds Window. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.8. The Difficulty of Tracing ZPMC and CSR Funds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Section 6: The Receipt and Dissipation of Funds from China

South Rail and China North Rail to Tequesta and
Regiments Asia via HSBC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1. Tequesta Group Limited and Regiments Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.2. The Hong Kong Banking Records: Payments Made by CSR, CNR, Da Lian
and CRRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.3. Tracking Payments to Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group against Known
Kickback Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.4. The Hong Kong Banking Records: The Dissipation of Kickbacks by
Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4.1. Payments to Individuals by Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group. . . . . . 90
6.4.2. Recipients of Over $1m from Tequesta Group or Regiments Asia. . . . . . 91
6.4.3. Companies Paid by Regiments Asia, Tequesta Group and Morningstar
International. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.4.4. The Use of Chinese Mainland Companies with Ties to South Africa. . . . 93
6.4.5. The Use of Hong Kong Shell Companies to Receive Payments from
Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4.6. The Plethora of Money Laundering Red Flags and the Role of HSBC. . . 98
6.5. Concluding Remarks: The Hong Kong Laundromat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.6. The Continuation of the Transnet Bribery Scheme in Dubai . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Contents – 3
This submission sets out
how the Gupta enterprise
secured billions of Rand in
illicit and unearned fees and
payments through large
Transnet contracts; and,
most importantly, the various
elaborate money laundering
systems that they employed
to hide their money aided by
major international enablers.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1. Between 2010 and at least 2016, the Gupta enterprise targeted Transnet
as a site through which it could steal vast sums of public money to which
it had no legitimate claim and for which it performed no legitimate
services.
2. The Gupta enterprise undertook this theft by acting in concert with

officials within Transnet and major multinational corporations, in
particular China South Rail (CSR), China North Rail (CSR), Shanghai
Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC) and Liebherr Cranes.
CNR, CSR, CRRC AND ZPMC CONTRACTS

3. Between the 13th of June 2011 and August 2016, ZPMC, CSR and CNR
(the latter two of which merged into a new company, CRRC) entered
into at least 11 contracts with front companies working in concert with
the Gupta enterprise.
4. The contracts entered into by ZPMC, CSR, CNR and CRRC with
Gupta enterprise fronts awarded percentage success fees to these front
companies in the event that ZPMC, CSR, CNR and CRRC were awarded
large Transnet contracts for the supply of locomotives and industrial
cranes.
05
5. Documents appearing in the #Guptaleaks, when read alongside these
contracts, show that the following commitments were made
a. In relation to the supply of 95 locomotives to Transnet, CNR agreed to
pay a 20% commission on the total contract value equal to R523.32m;
b. In relation to the supply of 232 diesel locomotives to Transnet, CNR
agreed to pay a commission of 21% on the contract value, equal to
R2.088bn;
c. In relation to the contract to relocate CNR facilities at Transnet’s
request, CNR Rolling Stock agreed to pay R67.2m;
d. In relation to the supply of 359 locomotives to Transnet, CSR Hong
Kong agreed to pay a 21% commission on the contract value, equal
to R3.787bn;
e. In relation to a 12-year maintenance plan, CSR agreed to pay a 21%
commission on the total contract value equal to R1.298bn;
f. In relation to a maintenance plan related to the supply of 232 diesel
locomotives to Transnet, CNR agreed to pay a one-off fee of $18.2m,
which appears to be equal to 2% of the total contract value.
6. In total, ZPMC, CSR, CNR and CRRC thus entered into contracts
through which they would pay the Gupta enterprise, through certain
front companies, a total of R7 763bn and a further $18.2m.
THE FIRST LAUNDROMAT: THE WORLDS WINDOW GROUP

7. The Gupta enterprise entered into a number of contractual agreements
with CSR, CNR, CRRC and ZPMCC through which it was paid billions
of Rand, for which it performed no services beyond exerting its political
influence to ensure that CSR and CNR were awarded lucrative contracts.
8. The Gupta enterprise entered into these contracts through front

companies and nominees across two phases of the scheme. In the first
phase, the Gupta enterprise teamed up with the Worlds Window Group
of companies, based in India. The ‘flagship’ of the Worlds Window Group
was majority controlled by the group Chairman, Piyoosh Goyal, while
International Metal and Steel BV (IMSBV) owned the remaining 49%.
IMSBV is a wholly-owned subsidiary of European Metals Recycling
based in Liverpool.
9. The #Guptaleaks show that from at least 2010, the Worlds Window
network of companies entered into a series of complex financial and
criminal arrangements with the Gupta enterprise. This included
engaging in numerous money laundering loan-back schemes, utilising a
company by the name of Arctos it formed in South Africa. Our research
shows that the South African branch of the Bank of Baroda had full
insight into the reality of certain loan-back schemes, and was totally
complicit in how it operated.
10. Our research shows that one of the companies that participated in the
Gupta enterprise-Worlds Window money laundering network was
Estina, which was used to funnel funds as part of a loan-back scheme.
Estina was famously used by the Gupta enterprise to steal government
funds from the Vrede Dairy Project. Estina was used in the Gupta
enterprise-Worlds Window Group money laundering scheme in 2011, a
year before it participated in the Vrede Dairy Project. This provides even
further proof that Estina was merely a front company controlled by the
Gupta enterprise that was used in multiple criminal endeavours.

11. When the Gupta enterprise secured the ZPMCC/CSR/CNR/CRRC
contracts, it made use of this existing Gupta enterprise-Worlds Window
network system to receive and launder the Transnet kickbacks. The
Worlds Window group controlled two Dubai-based companies,
Century General Trading FZE and JJ Trading FZE. It used these
companies to receive the kickbacks ‘owed’ to the Gupta enterprise,
and then distributed the funds to the Gupta enterprise. For this money
laundering service, the Worlds Window Group earned 15% of the total
kickbacks paid by CNR, CSR, CRRC and ZPMC.
THE SECOND LAUNDROMAT: THE HONG KONG MACHINE

12. For reasons unknown, the Gupta enterprise and Worlds Window Group
ceased collaborating on the Transnet kickbacks by 2015. As a result,
CNR, CSR and CRRC entered into new agreements with two Gupta
enterprise front companies, Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group based
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong records show that both of these companies
were formed in March 2015, and Gupta ally and partner, Salim Essa,
was the sole director. In November 2016, Salim Essa stepped down as
director to be replaced by Aashika Singh, who the #Guptaleaks show
had a financial relationship with the Gupta enterprise.
13. Banking documents show that Regiments Asia and Tequesta operated
bank accounts with HSBC in Hong Kong, into which over a hundred
million dollars were paid by CSR, CNR and CRRC. Our analysis of the
banking documents shows that Tequesta Group received funds totalling
$62 416 299, of which:
a. $11 288 092.75 was paid by CNR;
b. $2 704 159 was paid by CRRC;
c. $43 456 242 was paid by CSR; and
d. $1 021 650 was paid by unknown sources
14. Our analysis shows that Regiments Asia’s HSBC Hong Kong account
received a total of $83 783 437.41, of which:
a. $8 622 906 was paid by CNR
b. $14 757 788.75 was paid by CRRC; and
c. $45 750 456.75 was paid by CSR
d. $18 120 982.50 was paid by Da Lian [a China North Rail subsidiary]
15. Calculations by amaBhungane have shown that these amounts accorded
exactly with what was expected to be paid to the Gupta enterprise
through contracts it entered into with CSR, CNR and CRRC.
16. The payments made into the Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia
accounts were almost immediately dissipated in a huge flurry of
transactions to over 190 identifiable recipients and companies.
17. Our analysis shows that the majority of the funds were dissipated into
two different money laundering streams. In the first, the funds were
transferred to Hong Kong front companies that had been formed by
company formation agents in Hong Kong. In the second, funds were
paid to a range of textile, garment, furniture and other manufacturers in
mainland China. Customs records show that some of these companies
had reported exports to South Africa.
Executive S ummary – 07
18. The way in which Tequesta and Regiments Asia operated their Hong
Kong accounts should have raised serious red flags with HSBC, who
provided bank services to the companies. HSBC should have enquired
why two newly formed companies, with a sole politically exposed
director based in South Africa, and who had been publicly linked to
the Gupta enterprise, was receiving over a hundred million dollars from
two state-owned Chinese rail companies over a period of just under
two years. In addition, the way in which the payments were received
and dissipated almost immediately, many of them to Hong Kong front
companies with no known infrastructure or business history was clearly
indicative of money laundering.
THE THIRD LAUNDROMAT: HABIB BANK

19. Documents published by amaBhungane show that in 2016, the Gupta
enterprise ceased using its Hong Kong money laundering network.
From late 2016 onwards, Tequesta and Regiments Asia received funds
from CRRC through accounts held with Habib Bank in the UAE.
PAYMENTS MADE BY LIEBHERR CRANES

20. Documents emanating from the #Guptaleaks show that the Irish
subsidiary of the Swiss company Liebherr Cranes paid millions of dollars
directly to the Gupta enterprise. The payments related to contracts
Liehberr was awarded by Transnet in February 2014 for the supply of
cranes 22 cranes to Transnet.
21. Our analysis of the #Guptaleaks reveals that Liebherr Cranes paid $3 232
430.88 in five tranches directly into the account of Accurate Investments
based in Dubai between the 22nd of July 2013 and the 1st of December
2014, after which the accounts revealed by the #Guptaleaks go dark.
Accurate Investments was controlled by the Gupta enterprise through
the Dubai-based director, Sanjay Grover.
22. Using the internal accounting records revealed by the #Guptaleaks,

our analysis can now reveal how these funds were subject to further
internal laundering through the Gupta enterprise, before being paid out
to various beneficiaries.
23. In tranche 1, Liebherr paid $905 000.88 to Accurate Investments on the

22nd of July 2013. This was ultimately paid out to:
a. Sahara Computers, who received $499 500;
b. Star Engineering, who received $93 378.61. Star Engineering were
being paid for dairy processing equipment that was being purchased
by Estina for use in the Vrede Diary Project;
c. Wizcraft, who received AED475 620. Wizcraft was hired by the
Gupta family to provide entertainment services for the infamous Sun
City wedding of Aakash Jahajgarhia and Vega Gupta;
d. Vikas Chaturvedi, who was paid AED616 500. Vikas Chaturvedi was
an employee of the Gupta enterprise based in India and responsible
for day-to-day logistics for the enterprise.
08 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

17th of February 2014. This was ultimately paid out to:
a. Linkway Trading, a Gupta enterprise company based in South Africa,
which was paid $599 327, made up of the $212 006 from Liebherr
commingled with other money flows;
15th of April 2014, which was ultimately paid out to:
a. Oakbay Resources, which was paid $400 000 on the 29th of April
2014, made up of $371 105.83 from Liebherr commingled with other
money flows;
26. In tranche 4, Liebherr paid $1 105 368.16 to Accurate Investments in
three payments made in May 2014. This was ultimately paid out to:
a. Brookfield Consultants, who were paid $5m on the 28th of May 2014,
made up of $1 105 368.16 from Liebherr commingled with other
funds, including money from JJ Trading. Brookfield Consultants was
a US-based company controlled by relatives of the Gupta family.
27. In tranche 5, Liebherr paid $638 950 to Accurate Investments in two
payments in October and December 2014. The accounting records
revealed in the #Guptaleaks ended shortly after these payments were
made. Tracing the ultimate disposition of these payments is therefore
not possible based on documents in our possession.
28. In July 2017, after the payments from Liebherr to Accurate Investments
was disclosed, Liebherr announced that it was to appoint an internal
investigation into the matter. In October 2017, Liebherr announced that
it was satisfied, based on its internal investigation, that the transactions
were ‘legally sound’ and did not violate any applicable laws, although
it admitted that the company’s ‘due diligence process might have been
implemented in a more stringent manner.’ Liebherr further noted that
the use of agents such as Accurate Investments was ‘common in the sales
process for expenditure projects.’
29. Based on the information at our disposal, this explanation does not seem
sufficient. We urge the Commission to investigate this matter further. In
particular, we urge the Commission to seek Liebherr’s explanation for
the payments to Accurate in light of the fact that:
a. Liebherr was bidding for a large capital project from a State-owned
entity based on an open tender;
b. Accurate Investments was little more than a corporate shell based
in Dubai with a single Indian director, which had little to no
infrastructure, online presence or any obvious connections to South
Africa;
c. Accurate Investments was, at all times, ultimately controlled by the
Gupta enterprise;
d. The only payments recorded into Accurate Investments accounts for
the period under consideration were made by Liebherr Cranes and
an unknown company called VK Trading Hong Kong;
e. The only payments made out of Accurate Investments were made to
Gupta enterprise entities.
Executive S ummary – 09
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
30. Transnet was aggressively captured by the Gupta enterprise, which used
its political connectivity to ensure that tens of billions of Rands worth
of capital projects were awarded to CSR, CNR, CRRC, ZPMCC and
Liebherr Cranes.
31. The Gupta enterprise, as a result of this capture, was due to be paid R7
763bn and a further $18.2m by CSR, CNR, CRRC and ZMPC.
32. The Gupta enterprise was also paid a further $3 232 430.88 by Liebherr
Cranes between 2013 and 2014 in relation to Transnet crane contracts.
These amounts were laundered out of Gupta enterprise accounts to be
used for expenses such as entertainment for the infamous Sun City
wedding, and to pay for dilapidated dairy equipment to be used on the
Vrede Dairy Project.
33. The Gupta enterprise made use of three extensive money laundering
networks to receive and pay out the funds from CSR, CNR, CRRC
and ZMPC. The first money laundering network was run with the
help of the Worlds Window group based in India. The second money
laundering network was based in Hong Kong, and was implemented
through payments to dozens of front companies based in Hong Kong
and many more garment, textile and furniture manufacturers based in
mainline China. The third money laundering network was based in the
UAE, in which Gupta enterprise companies controlled bank accounts
at Habib Bank.
34. The laundering of funds by the Gupta enterprise from Transnet contracts
was enabled by some of the world’s biggest banks, including the Bank of
Baroda and HSBC.
35. The scale of the theft from Transnet is staggering, and must rank as one
of the largest corruption scandals to have ever been inflicted on the
South African tax payers.
1 0 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

WE URGE THE COMMISSION TO:
1: Confirm the extent of the Bank of

Baroda’s complicity in the extensive
money laundering networks established
by the Gupta enterprise and the Worlds
Window network;
2: Question HSBC to seek clarity on

whether HSBC informed any authorities
as to the nature of payments made into
and out of Tequesta and Regiments
Asia’s HSBC accounts in Hong Kong, all
of which should have raised major red
flags;
3: Urgently request that HSBC trace any

and all payments made by Tequesta and
Regiments Asia into any other accounts
held with HSBC;
4: Further investigate payments made

by Liebherr Cranes to the Gupta
enterprise, and, in particular, question
why Liebherr Cranes thought it fit to
make payments to a corporate shell in
Dubai with no infrastructure, no online
presence, a sole Indian director, and no
notable connections to South Africa.
Executive S ummary – 1 1
LIST OF ANNEXURES
Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of first payment tranche made by
Diagram 1: Liebherr Cranes to Accurate Investments
Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of second payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of third payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of fourth payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of fifth payment tranche made by

Dramatis Dramatis Personae of individuals and companies referred to in

Personae the following submission
A: Consultancy Agreement between ZPMC and JJ Trading FZE, 13th June 2011
B: Exclusive Agency Agreement Between China North Rail and Tequesta Group Limited,
20 May 2014
C: Exclusive Agency Agreement Between CNR Dalian Rolling Stock Co. Ltd and
Regiments Asia, 20 May 2014/25 November 2014
D: Business Development Agreement Between CNR Rolling Stock South Africa and Bex
Structured Products, 8 March 2015
E: Business Development Services Agreement Between CNR Rolling Stock South
Africa and Bex Structured Products, 25 April 2015
F: Business Development Services Agreement Between China South Rail and Tequesta
Group Limited, 18 May 2015
G: Hong Kong Company Registry Documents: Tequesta Group Limited
H: Consultancy Agreement Between CSR Zhouzhou Electric Locomotive Co Ltd and
Regiments Asia Limited, 10 June 2015
I: Hong Kong Company Registry Documents: Regiments Asia Limited
J: Transnet Kickback Agreement Excel Spread Sheet, 2015
K: CRRC Addendum to Existing Agreements Between CSR and Regiments Asia and
Tequesta Group Limited, August 2016
L: CRRC Addendum to Existing Agreement Between CSR and Regiments Asia Regarding
the 95 Locomotive Procurement, February 2015
M: Email correspondence between Ashu Chawla and Piyoosh Goyal attaching internal
Transnet documents related to the Ngqura RTG & STS Crane Tender
N: Dubai Statements Excel Spread Sheet Recording Banking Transactions by Gupta
Enterprise Companies in Dubai
O: ‘Scraped’ Dubai Ledger, 11 February 2014 – 6 August 2014
P: Email and attached invoice from Sanjay Grover to Ashu Chawla: Confirmation of
Payment from Global Corporation’s National Bank of Abu Dhabi Account to Wizcraft,
24 July 2013
1 2 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

Q: Email and attachment from Johan Van Schalkwyk to Ashu Chawla, 14 August 2013:
Wizcraft and Entertainment Services
R: Email from Ashu Chawla to Ugeshni Naidoo and Rana Kumar: ‘FW: Linkway’, 27
February 2014
S: Brookfield Consultants Tax Registration Information
T: Email correspondence related to Brookfield Consultants involving Ashu Chawla,
Tony Gupta and Ramesh Gupta, May 2014
U: Email and attachment from Suresh Tuteja to Sanjay Grover and Ashish Gupta
regarding Brookfield Consultants, 26 May 2014
V: All Documents Relevant to the Company Particulars of the Worlds Window Group
W: All Documents Relevant to Illustrating the Roles and Jobs Performed by Key
Personnel in the Worlds Window Network including Piyoosh Goyal
X: Worlds Window Group Brochure, archive version from www.archive.org
Y: All documents relevant to the company particulars of JJ Trading and Century
General Trading
Z: Earliest correspondence and other documents related to the initial business
relationship between the Gupta enterprise and the Worlds Window Network
AA: Hawala Ledger Showing Transactions Between Gupta enterprise and Worlds
Window Network
BB: Confirmation of Payment Notes or Correspondence According with the Hawala
Ledger
CC: Documents related to the Westdawn-Everest Loanback Scheme
DD: All Documents and Emails Related to Worlds Window Network’s Investment in Gupta
enterprise companies
EE: Email from Ugeshni Naidoo to Ashu Chawla Regarding Everest Global Metal’s Loan
Facility at Bank of Baroda, 2 November 2011
FF: Sample of Payment Confirmations Sent by Pooja Puri to Gupta Enterprise Related to
Everest Global Metal’s Loan Facility at Bank of Baroda
GG: Email from Keerthan (Everest Global Metals) to Rajiv Dabas (Arctos) regarding R15m
payment from Everest Global to Westdawn, 25 March 2011
HH: All payments related to payments between Everest Global and Gupta Enterprise
Companies
II: amaBhungane Calculations Related to the Transnet Kickback Agreements
JJ: Scraped and Extracted Payments in the Dubai Ledgers Showing Payments from all
JJT subsidiaries
KK. Emails showing that Aashika Singh was paid R20 905.76 on 24th of April by Infinity
Media
LL: Email correspondence related to bookings made for Aashika Singh at the Oberoi in
Dubai
MM:Correspondence related to Aashika Singh being considered as nominee for Dubai
company formations
NN: HSBC Banking Ledgers
OO: Sample of Documents from Hong Kong Business Registry Related to Hong Kong
Shell Companies Receiving Payments from Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group
PP: Bank Statements of Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group: Habib Bank, UAE, 2016
QQ: List of all recipients of payments to and from Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group as
Revealed by HSBC Bank Statements
13
SWI’s vision is of
a global political
environment in
which those most
responsible for grand
corruption are fully
held to account.
ABOUT SHADOW
WORLD
INVESTIGATIONS
Shadow World Investigations (hereafter SWI) is a not-for-
profit limited liability company registered in the United
Kingdom. SWI was formed by Andrew Feinstein and Paul
Holden.
SWI’s vision is of a global political environment in which those
most responsible for the economic despoliation of grand
corruption, including both perpetrators and enablers, are fully
held to account for their crimes. At the same time, SWI believes
that, with the right amount of political will, state institutions can
be reformed in ways that inoculate them from the corrupting
impacts of dirty money on democratic decision making.
SWI’s mission, which aims to achieve its vision, is to detail and

expose instances of corruption and its impact on democracy,
human rights and sustainable development across the world in
order to precipitate strong action against it.
SWI as an institution, and through its individual staff members,

has a long history of undertaking complex investigations into
politically sensitive issues of grand corruption. Both Paul Holden
and Andrew Feinstein have published widely on South Africa’s
political economy, democracy and the impact of corruption on
South Africa’s social and political fabric. This has included four
books written between Holden and Feinstein that have detailed
the endemic corruption that tainted the notorious 1999 “Arms
Deal.”
Andrew Feinstein and Paul Holden were also directors of

Corruption Watch UK, the predecessor organisation to SWI.
Corruption Watch undertook numerous investigations into grand
corruption related to the arms and extractive industries, with a
particular focus on exposing the blurring of lines between the
state and business.
While this submission is made by SWI, the lead author is

Paul Holden. His CV was attached as Annexure A to SWI’s first
submission on the Estina/Vrede Dairy Project and is thus not
attached here to avoid burdening the papers.
15
INTRODUCTION
1. This submission is made by Shadow World Investigations to the
Zondo Commission of Inquiry in terms of Rule 6 of the Rules of the
Commission. The submission is intended to provide information
to the Zondo Commission to assist the Commission in investigating
allegations of State Capture.
2. This submission follows, and should be read alongside, Shadow World

Investigation’s first submission to the Commission regarding the Gupta
enterprise and the Estina/Vrede Dairy Project. To avoid undue prolixity,
we do not repeat, here, content or concepts introduced in the earlier
submission. However, we do draw on concepts and content set out in
the original submission where appropriate, hence our recommendation
that both submissions should be considered jointly.
3. This submission consists of evidence-based findings regarding the flow

of funds in payments made by various contractors related to large-
scale contracts involving Transnet, and which were ultimately paid to
the benefit of the broader Gupta enterprise. These matters within the
ambit and scope of the Commission’s mandate detailed in its terms of
reference.
4. This submission, as reflected in the Index, is structured as follows:

a. Section 1: A brief preliminary discussion on the sources used and the
implications of these sources for the Commission’s work in addition
to ancillary matters of housekeeping;
b. Section 2: A brief note locating the capture of Transnet as part of the
criminal racketeering undertaken by the Gupta enterprise;
c. Section 3: A summary of the known kickback and bribery agreements
discovered to have been signed relating to large Transnet contracts
and that were ultimately paid to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise;
d. Section 4: An account of the payments made by Liebherr Cranes
to entities controlled by the Gupta enterprise, and their ultimate
dissipation;
e. Section 5: An account of the payments made to the Gupta enterprise
by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), China North Rail
and China South Rail, and the elaborate system of money laundering
that was used to facilitate these payments, which we refer to as the
‘Worlds Window’ network;
f. Section 5: An account of the second system of money laundering
used by the Gupta enterprise used to receive and dissipate funds paid
specifically by China South Rail, China North Rail and CRRC and
their associates related to Transnet locomotive contracts, which we
refer to as the HSBC network;
g. Section 6: Concluding remarks
1 6 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

SECTION 1:
SOURCES AND
ADMISSIBILITY
1. In compiling this submission, we have relied on a number of sources
and documents that we believe that the Commission already has
in its possession. While this indicates that the Commission will be
familiar with their content, we have nevertheless undertaken an in-
depth summary and discussion of these documents. We do this for the
sake of completeness. Doing so additionally provides cogency to this
submission and prevents the need to reference material evidence that is
not addressed in the body of the text.
2. We take this opportunity to highlight the High Court ruling in the

matter of Corruption Watch and Another v The Arms Procurement
Commission and Others.1 The ruling establishes that Commissions
of Inquiry are not courts of law and thus the rules of evidence and
pleadings are less strict than those of a court. A Commission can
therefore inform itself of facts in any way it sees fit, including hearsay
evidence, newspaper reports and other submissions. This is because a
Commission’s function is primarily designed to uncover the truth of a
matter, and discovering the truth of a matter can sometimes be better
achieved by a Commission by informing itself from a wide range of
sources.
3. The primary sources upon which we rely are:

a. The Fundudzi draft and final reports and supporting annexures;
b. The Wersksmans report and supporting annexures;
c. The MNS report and supporting annexures;
d. The #Guptaleaks archive of emails and supporting documents;
e. Leaked HSBC banking documentation;
f. Company search results and other miscellanea; and
g. Newspaper and media reports
4. As we believe that the majority of these documents (in particular

sources a to c above) are already available to the Commission, we do not
attach them here as appendices to this submission in order to reduce the
size of this submission. We are happy to furnish these documents to the
Commission should this be requested.
5. All remaining documents and sources are attached as annexures where

feasible and relevant. A list of annexures is provided pre-ante.
1 Corruption Watch and Another v Arms Procurement Commission and Others

(81368/2016) [2019] ZAGPPHC 351; [2019] 4 All SA 53 (GP); 2019 (10) BCLR
1218 (GP) (21 August 2019)
17
The enterprise consists of a wide
range of individuals, companies
and other associations, some
of which appear to be, on the
surface, separate and distinct
service providers but who were,
instead, employees or associates
of the racketeering enterprise
ultimately taking de facto direction
from the Gupta family or their
representatives and associates.

SECTION 2:
THE CAPTURE OF
TRANSNET AND THE
GUPTA ENTERPRISE
2.1. RACKETEERING AND THE GUPTA
FAMILY ‘ENTERPRISE’
1. In Section 2 of our first submission on the Estina/Vrede Dairy Project
case, we set out our reading of the Gupta State Capture project as a form
of racketeering undertaken by what we call the Gupta enterprise. We do
not repeat that discussion here, but humbly refer the Commission to it
so that this submission can be read in light of our arguments.
2.2. UNDERSTANDING THE GUPTA

ENTERPRISE
2. In Section 2 of our first submission on the Estina/Vrede Dairy Project
case, we outlined our understanding of the shape, nature and content of
the Gupta enterprise in general terms. We do not repeat it in detail here.
However, we humbly direct the Commission to the relevant section in
that submission so that the below can be understood in context.
19
3. Nevertheless, it is useful to reiterate certain key features of the Gupta
enterprise. In particular, we note that:
a. The Gupta family enterprise exists de facto not de jure;

b. The existence of the enterprise is inferred from observing a pattern
of racketeering activity;
c. The enterprise can (and does in this instance) engage in both
legitimate business activity and criminal endeavours;
d. The object of the enterprise was to generate the maximum benefit
for the enterprise itself, the Gupta family and its employees and
associates;
e. The legitimate businesses included in the Gupta enterprise were used,
inter alia, to facilitate racketeering activities, including disguising
criminal activities behind a veneer of respectability or absorbing and
distributing funds derived from criminal activity;
f. The enterprise consists of a wide range of individuals, companies and
other associations, some of which appear to be, on the surface, separate
and distinct service providers but who were, instead, employees
or associates of the racketeering enterprise ultimately taking de
facto direction from the Gupta family or their representatives and
associates;
g. These employees and associates must, by logical inference, include
those government officials and state employees we identify further
below, who were instrumental in awarding the Gupta enterprise
government contracts.
4. Based on the available evidence, we have identified a number of

individuals and companies, all part of the Gupta family enterprise, that
participated or were ‘activated’ in relation to the conceptualisation,
initiation, and management of the Transnet capture project, including
the process of laundering and integrating proceeds of crime. Short
biographies of each party are given in the dramatis personae attached as
an Annexure to this submission. We draw attention to them here, where
we have additionally bolded ‘key players.’
a. Individuals: Gupta Family
I. Gupta brothers (Ajay, Rajesh and Ashu)
II. Gupta, Ashish
III. Gupta, Amol
IV. Singhala, Kamal
b. Individuals: Gupta Enterprise Employees in South Africa
I. Chawla, Ashu
II. Essa, Salim
III. Singh, Aashika
c. Individuals: Gupta Enterprise Employees Based Abroad
I. Grover, Sanjay
d. Individuals: Transnet Officials
I. Molefe, Brian
II. Seleke, Mogokare Richard
III. Sharma, Iqbal
IV. Singh, Anoj
e. Individuals: Worlds Window Network
I. Agrawal, Amit
II. Agrawal, Naveen
III. Bansal, Rupesh
IV. Bansal, Shuchi
20 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

V. Goyal, Piyoosh
VI. Jagati, Ram Ratan
VII. Puri, Pooja
VIII. Tewari, Lalit
f. Companies: South African Companies Controlled Directly or
Through Factotums by the Gupta Enterprise
I. Idwala Coal (South Africa)
II. Islandsite (South Africa)
III. Micawber 480 (South Africa)
IV. Micawber 495 (South Africa)
V. Oakbay Investments (South Africa)
VI. Sahara Computers (South Africa)
VII. Tegeta Exploration (South Africa)
VIII. Westdawn Limited trading as JIC (South Africa)
g. Companies: Overseas Companies Controlled Directly or Through

Factotums by the Gupta Enterprise
I. Accurate Investments (UAE)
II. Brookfield Consultants (US)
III. Fidelity Enterprises (UAE)
IV. Gateway (UAE)
V. Global Corporation LLC (UAE)
VI. Regiments Asia (Hong Kong)
VII. SES Technologies (India)
VIII. Tequesta Group (Hong Kong)
h. Companies: Companies Controlled by the Worlds Window Network
Used to Launder Funds for the Gupta Enterprise
I. Arctos SA (South Africa)
II. Century General Trading (CGT) (UAE)
III. Everest Global Metals PTY Ltd (South Africa)
IV. Everest Metals FZE (UAE)
V. Golden Coast FZE (UAE)
VI. JJT Trading FZE (UAE)
VII. RR Energy (India)
VIII. Worlds Window Impex Private Limited including subsidiaries
Worlds Window Exim Private Limited and Worlds Window Urja
Private Limited (India)
IX. Vasudhamaa Resources PTE (Singapore)
2.3. COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS

RECEIVING FUNDS FROM THE
HSBC/HONG KONG NETWORK
5. In Section 5 below we describe how Regiments Asia and Tequesta
Group received hundreds of millions of dollars in payments from China
South Rail into HSBC bank accounts. We have been granted access to
HSBC banking documentation by the Organised Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project (OCCRP)2 on condition of retaining the anonymity
of the original source. These documents show hundreds of payments
2 https://www.occrp.org/en
S ection 2 – 21
from the Regiments Asia and Tequesta accounts. It is possible that the
majority of these payments formed the first step in an elaborate money
laundering exercise. We cannot, however, confirm this without further
documentation. Nevertheless, we provide, as Annexure QQ, a list of all
recipients of payments from the Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group
accounts, some of which may, upon further investigation, be considered
part of, or beneficiaries of, the Gupta enterprise:
2.4. THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN

THE GUPTA ENTERPRISE AND KEY
TRANSNET CONTRACTS
6. Extensive forensic investigations have been undertaken into a number
of major contracts placed by Transnet, in particular the constituent
contracts (and ancillary service contracts) that made up the 1064
locomotive contracts. Considerable evidence has also been led before the
Commission about irregularities in the award of contracts by Transnet.
We do not traverse that evidence here, suffice to note that there is
incredibly strong prima facie evidence showing that certain individuals
materially intervened in multiple Transnet contracts with the effect
that contracts were bedevilled by irregularities and were directed to
seemingly pre-chosen contractors. Moreover, these interventions were
made to the obvious and substantial prejudice of Transnet and public
finances in general, inflating costs and preventing a fair and honest
assessment of which contractors offered best value to the state.
7. A number of characters and committees were repeatedly implicated

in this process, including Anoj Singh, Brian Molefe, Siyabonga Gama,
Malusi Gigaba, Thamsanqa Jiyane, Mogokare Richard Seleke, Lindiwe
Mdletshe and Iqbal Sharma. The conduct of a number of these
individuals and the recommended criminal or other disciplinary action
appropriate to their behaviour is set out comprehensively in the MNS
Report.
8. The conduct of the individuals dealt with in the MNS report must be
read against the emails and documents emanating from the #Guptaleaks.
Indeed, the #Guptaleaks shows that many of these individuals had close
and material connections to, or engagements with, the broader Gupta
enterprise.
9. Considering that it was the Gupta enterprise that benefited handsomely

from kickbacks related to Transnet contracts, we submit that the
most plausible explanation was that these individuals had developed
relationships with the Gupta enterprise and, in so doing, abused their
official functions to benefit the Gupta enterprise. Properly understood,
these individuals were party to the broader racketeering activities of
the Gupta enterprise and can, indeed, be considered de facto members,
associates or partners of the Gupta enterprise.
10. The relationship between key Transnet employees and the Gupta
enterprise has been exhaustively articulated by media articles and
through investigations undertaken by the Public Protector and the
private audit firms (Werkmans, Fundudzi, MNS) that have completed
audits of the 1064 locomotive procurement. As such, we do not address
22 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

these relationships in detail here, as the Commission is already no doubt
aware of them, and of the underlying material upon which the extensive
reporting has been based to date.
11. In brief, however, it is useful to bear in mind, when considering the

materials related the money laundering systems used by the Gupta
enterprise, the following salient facts:
a. Brian Molefe was a ‘good friend’ of the Gupta family and visited the
Gupta’s Saxonwold compound on multiple occasions, and made and
received large number of phone calls from Ajay Gupta, and exchanged
small number of phone calls and texts with Ronica Ragavan, between
August 2015 and April 2016;
b. An extended chain of email correspondence shows that senior CSR
employees were writing to Brian Molefe about tendering for Transnet
contracts, and forwarding this correspondence to both Worlds
Window and Gupta enterprise employees. One of the individuals
copied into the email correspondence would later be involved in an
email exchange in which a ledger of kickbacks to be paid by CSR
related to three Transnet contracts was distributed;
c. Molefe, subsequent to his period at Transnet, was appointed the
CEO of Eskom, in which position he further intervened in internal
processes to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise;
d. Iqbal Sharma, who played a key role in managing and manipulating
the award of Transnet contracts, had numerous direct and clear
connections to the Gupta enterprise, including as the joint owner
of Elgasolve Pty Ltd alongside Salim Essa, through which both held
shares in numerous other companies such as VR Laser Services,
which has also been implicated in the capture of Denel;
e. Anoj Singh, who also played a key role in manipulating Transnet
processes to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise, stayed at the Oberoi
Hotel in Dubai on multiple occasions. The expenses were paid for
by the Gupta enterprise. Singh frequently travelled at the same time
as Tony Gupta and Salim Essa. #Guptaleaks records show that the
Guptas opened a shell company in UAE, Venus Limited, which was
transferred into Singh’s name by Vivek Sharma during a trip both
made to Dubai. Internal Gupta enterprise accounting ledgers suggest
that Singh was given AED200,000 by the Gupta enterprise during a
trip to Dubai.
f. Siyabonga Gama stayed at the Oberoi in Dubai for two nights
between the 22nd and 24th of January 2016, which was paid with
credits bought by Aakash Garg, an in-law to the Gupta family. During
the trip, Gama met with Salim Essa;
g. Mokgoro Richard Seleke served on the notorious Board Acquisitions
and Disposal Committee (BADC) that played a major role in
manipulating Transnet contracts to the benefit of the Gupta
enterprise and CSR. Seleke was subsequently appointed the Deputy
Director General at the Department of Public Enterprises after
forwarding his CV to Duduzane Zuma. Seleke, who had previously
held numerous civil service positions in the Free State, listed Peter
Thabethe and Mosebenzi Zwane, both of whom were implicated in
the Estina matter, as references on the CV he forwarded to Zuma.
S ection 2 – 23
In total, ZPMC, CSR, CNR
and CRRC thus entered
into contracts through
which they would pay the
Gupta enterprise, through
certain front companies,
a total of R7 763bn and
a further $18.2m.
24
SECTION 3:
KNOWN AGENCY
AND/OR BRIBERY/
KICKBACK
AGREEMENTS IN
RELATION TO ZPMC
AND CHINA SOUTH
RAIL
12. To date, a number of key documents have emerged that show that
ZPMC, CSR and CNR have entered into substantial agency and kickback
agreements to secure contracts from Transnet. These agreements or
documents are described in detail below.
3.1. ZPMC AGREEMENT WITH JJ

TRADING FZE
13. The first known agent/consultant agreement was entered into between
ZPMC and JJ Trading FZE and dated the 13th of June 2011. The
agreement as attached hereto as Annexure A. JJ Trading FZE is dealt
with in considerably more detail below, suffice to note here that it was
an entity controlled by individuals from the Worlds Window Network, a
major money laundering operation that acted for the Gupta enterprise.
JJ Trading acted as a conduit through which moneys were paid to the
Gupta enterprise by ZPMC and CSR in relation to Transnet contracts.
25
14. The agency agreement was entered into between the two parties in
relation to the ‘Contract for 2 Nos Ship to Shore Container Cranes (STS)
including Re-Positioning of existing NOELL Cranes and additional 5
Nos. STS Cranes for TRANSNET, South Africa.’ It further clarified that
this contract was given the designation iCLM HQ 0762 by Transnet,
and had recently been advertised through tender by Transnet, for which
ZPMC wished to submit a bid.
15. The contract envisaged that ZPMC (‘Party A’) and JJ Trading FZE
(‘Party B’) would appoint JJ Trading as a sales agent in relation to the
above contract. ZPMC would be responsible for drafting a bid for the
contract based on input from JJ Trading. JJ Trading, for its part, had to
fulfil the following obligations:
To provide information about the Project to Party A. To purchase the

tender documents and submit documents to Party A.
To provide copies of the local laws and safety codes related to the Project
and information pertaining to local customs.
To assist the personnel of Party A in said country for the duration of the
contract, including issuing invitation letters, communications with the
Buyer, hotel reservations, airport pick up and send-off.
To communicate with the Buyer on behalf of Party A and take part

in all necessary activities in relation to the Project. All declarations,
commitments and/or guarantee made by Party B to the Buyer or any
other act of Party B that might expose Party A to certain obligations
shall be approved in writing by Party A in advance.
To promote the Project in favour of Party A.
To provide an interpreter for Party A’s personnel in the non-English

speaking countries at the stage of bidding (not contract execution).
To ensure that Party A’s personnel can legally and uninterruptedly

execute this contract. In case of interruption, such as from union
problems, Party B shall make positive efforts to eliminate the disturbance
and make sure the contract can be executed smoothly.
To protect Party A’s interests.
16. Section 5 of the agreement between ZPMC and JJ Trading FZE

established what JJ Trading FZE would be paid under the terms of the
contract. The contract stipulated that there would be 3 relevant ‘prices’
against which JJ Trading’s compensation would be based:
a. Price A would refer to Party A’s offer to Transnet;
b. Price B would refer to any increase in price paid by Transnet over and
above the cost of Price A;
c. Price C would constitute the ‘contract price’ and would consist of
ZPMC’s offer and any increase in that price that JJ Trading succeeded
in securing from Transnet.
17. Should ZPMC secure the Transnet contract, JJ Trading would be paid
a success fee equal to 3% of Price A (ZPMC’s actual offer price), and a
further 85% of Price B. JJ Trading FZE was thus being incentivised to
seek as large an increase in the cost of contract as possible so as to secure
the largest fee.
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18. The implied prejudice to Transnet is obvious, as is the role the role
of JJ Trading in it. Simply, Transnet would, as a result of the agency
agreement between ZPMC and JJ Trading, be encouraged or induced
to pay more than the actual price of the equipment sold by ZPMC.
Without JJ Trading’s involvement, the cost of the contract to Transnet
would be considerably lower.
3.2. EXCLUSIVE AGENCY

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CNR (HONG
KONG) AND CENTURY GENERAL
TRADING: 14 APRIL 2012
19. The existence of this agreement is inferred from the text of a 2016
addendum to an agreement between CRRC and Regiments Asia, which
we attach as Annexure B. We return to the agreement between CRRC
and Regiments Asia, and the addendum, later in this section.
20. According to the August 2016 addendum, CSR had entered into
Consultancy Agreement with Century General Trading FZE (CGT) on
the 14th of April 2012. The consultancy agreement pertained to the sale
of 95 electric locomotives to Transnet (the 95 Locomotive Project).
21. The precise terms of the agreement between CSR and CGT are
unfortunately not disclosed in this agreement. However, a 2015
accounting spread sheet of payments due from CSR to various parties,
it is recorded that CGT was due to receive 20% of the total value of the
95 Project, equal to R523.32m. We return to this spread sheet in greater
detail below.

KONG) AND CENTURY GENERAL
TRADING: 8 JULY 2013
22. The existence of this agreement is inferred from the text of a later
agreement between CNR and Tequesta Group Limited, the latter of
which was a Hong Kong registered company controlled by Salim Essa,
and which we describe in greater detail below.
23. On the 20th of May 2014, CNR and Tequesta Group Limited entered
into an ‘Exclusive Agency Agreement’, attached as Annexure C. This
agreement appears to replace and supersede an earlier agreement
related to the same matters between CNR and Century General Trading.
Notably, the 20th of May 2014 agreement appears to be a simple cut-
and-paste operation replacing Century General Trading with Tequesta
Group Limited.
S ection 3 – 27
24. However, in certain instances, the original mention of Century General
Trading and the date of the underlying agreement were not changed,
most likely due to clerical error. Under clauses and definitions, the
‘agreement date’ is noted as the 8th of July 2013, just under a year prior
to the later agreement entered into with Tequesta Group.
25. Paragraph 7.4, meanwhile, notes that fees will be paid to Century
General Trading FZE. However, the address thereafter provided for
Century General Trading was, instead, the address used by Tequesta
Group Limited. We submit that the most plausible explanation of these
inconsistencies is that the latter agreement with Tequesta Group Limited
was amended through a simply cut-and-paste replacement that failed to
identify and erase all aspects of the previous agency agreement.
26. Returning to the underlying agreement: paragraph 1.1. defines the

‘project’ upon which the agreement was based as ‘the supply of 232
Diesel Locomotives for the General freight business issued by Transnet
Freight Rail in South Africa’, while ‘product’ was defined as ‘Diesel
Locomotives as awarded by Transnet Freight Rail for General Freight
Business after being successful in tender.’
27. In return for a series of services, including using its ‘best endeavour
to promote and increase the sale of the Company’s Product in the
territory’, Century General Trading was to be handsomely rewarded.
Paragraph 7, titled ‘remuneration, payment terms etc,’, stipulated that
Century General (and later Tequesta) would be entitled to a success
fee payment equal to 2% of the total value of the contract entered into
between Transnet and CNR. The success fee was to be paid immediately
upon CNR and Transnet formalising the agreement. Century General
Trading would be entitled to further 19% sales commission, which was
to be paid upon receipt by CNR of certain milestone payments from
Transnet.

KONG) AND TEQUESTA GROUP
LIMITED: 20 MAY 2014
28. On the 20th of May 2014, CNR (Hong Kong) and Tequesta Group
Limited [TGL] entered into an exclusive agency agreement. This
agreement appears to have replaced and superseded CNR’s prior
agreement with Century General Trading, as discussed above.
29. As the content of the agreement is the same as that noted above, we
do not repeat all of their terms. However, one aspects are worthy of
mention, namely, the complicated payment terms. Section 7 to the
agreement included the following stipulations:
7.1. The Agency commission of TGL shall be ascertained on deal to

deal basis.
7.2. For the Project (referred hereinabove), TGL shall be entitled for [sic]
a success fee of 2% of the Contract Value and an agency commission of
19% of the Contract value which shall invariably include the value of
all supplies made under the project.
7.3. TGL shall be entitled to agency commission irrespective of the fact
whether the supply is of main product or any spare part or ancillary
item thereto.
7.4. The success fee of 2% of the total value of the Project, as stated
above, will be paid by CNR Dalian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co.,
Ltd to [Century General Trading/TGL], which is duly incorporated and
existing under the Companies Ordinance of Hong Kong, and having its
registered offices at PO Box 17398, Hong Kong, UAE, duly authorised
and represented by Mr. Salim Aziz Essa.
7.5. The agency commission of 19% on the total project shall accrue
immediately on receipt of Purchase order or on securing of the bid by
the company and same shall become day for payment proportionately
as and when the payment to the Company is released by the ultimate
buyer, however it’s agreed that 19% of first payment will be paid by
company in second payment 50% (means half of 19%) along with 19%
of second payment amount and 50% (means balance of half of 19%) in
the third payment along with 19% of the third payment amount and
from the fourth payment onwards 19% in every payment. The amount
so getting due shall be transferred to the account of TGL through wire
transfer within 15 days of receipt of payment by the Company.
30. While tortuously worded, paragraph 7.5. thus stipulated that CNR
would retain at least 50% of one 19% payment on a rolling basis as
surety until all the payments had been made to CNR by Transnet.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CNR
DALIAN LOCOMOTIVE AND ROLLING
STOCK CO. LTD AND REGIMENTS
ASIA LIMITED: 20 MAY 2014/25
NOVEMBER 2014
31. The second known kickback agreement involving CNR took much the
same form as the agreement with Tequesta described above, although
Tequesta Group Limited was replaced in this instance by another Gupta
enterprise company nominally controlled by Salim Essa and registered
in Hong Kong: Regiments Asia Limited. The agreement is attached as
Annexure B.
32. The dating of the agreement is somewhat confused. In the preamble to

the agreement, the date of the agreement is stipulated as the 20th of
May 2014, the precise same day as the agreement between CNR and
Tequesta. However, the hand-written initialling of the contract records
the date of signing as the 25th of November 2014. This would strongly
suggest that the agreement only came into effect on the latter date, but
may also suggest an additional reason for this additional agreement, as
we note below.
S ection 3 – 29
33. Returning to the main body: the wording of the two agreements
entered into between CNR and Tequesta and Regiments Asia were
similar, although not exactly the same in every instance, in two notable
instances. First, the agreement with Regiments Asia simply described
the ‘Project’ as ‘the supply of locomotive and main spare parts in South
Africa’, while ‘Product’ was defined as ‘locomotive and main spare parts.’
34. Second, Section 7 of the Agreement varied the payment methodologies

and calculations markedly. Under the terms of this agreement,
Regiments Asia was to be paid a defined fee of $18.2m, which was to
be paid in five instalments within a month of CNR entering into its
contract with Transnet. Section 7 runs as follows:
7.1. The Agency commission of RAL [Regiments Asia Limited] shall be

ascertained on deal to deal basis.
7.2. For the Project (referred hereinabove), RAL shall be entitled for
an agency commission of USD18,120,000 shall invariably include the
value of all supplies made under the project.
7.3. RAL shall be entitled to agency commission irrespective of the fact

item thereto.
7.4. The agency commission which works out to US 18,200,000 as

stated above, shall get immediately due and payable in 5 instalments
within a month on the Project contract being signed, validated and
upon receiving advance deposit for the first batch from ultimate buyer
by the COMPANY.’
35. The confusion around dates and certain typographical errors suggests
that the agreement with Regiments Asia was based on the original
agreement between CNR and Tequesta, subject to a limited cut-and-
paste that replaced the beneficiary parties and certain contract terms.
36. Investigations by amaBhungane convincingly argued that the $18.2m

fee stipulated in the Regiments Asia contract was equal to the 2% success
fee that was anticipated under the terms of the early CNR/Tequesta
Group contract from the 20th of May 2014.3
37. It is thus plausible that, for an as yet unknown reason, CNR had failed,
or was otherwise unable, to make the 2% success fee payment to
Tequesta Group as anticipated by their original agreement. To resolve
this matter, CNR entered into the second agreement with Regiments
Asia in November 2014, through which the 2% success fee could be
paid.
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3.6. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CSR AND
REGIMENTS ASIA LIMITED: 10TH
FEBRUARY 2015
38. The existence of this agreement is inferred from an addendum to this
agreement signed between CRRC and Regiments Asia in August 2016.
39. According to the August 2016 addendum, CSR and Regiments Asia
entered into a Business Development Services Agreement on the 10th of
February 2015 in relation to the 95 Locomotive Project. The addendum
appears to indicate that Regiments Asia effectively displaced Century
General Trading, who had originally entered a consultancy agreement
with CSR in relation to the 95 project in 2012.
40. Based on the accounting spread sheet from later in 2015, it appears that
Regiments Asia were due to receive what CGT had originally been paid
on Project 95, namely, 20% of the total value of the 95 contract between
CSR and Transnet.
3.7. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

SERVICES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
CNR ROLLING STOCK SOUTH AFRICA
AND BEX STRUCTURED PRODUCTS,
8 MARCH 2015 AND 25 APRIL 2015
41. It is common cause that, as part of CNR’s contract with Transnet to
supply locomotives, Transnet requested that CNR relocate its production
facilities to Transnet Engineering’s Durban facilities. However, this
simple request appears to have also become a conduit for price gouging
and the payment of kickbacks, as codified by two separate agreements
between CNR and a South African entity by the name of Business
Expansion Structured Products [alternatively Bex].
42. Business Expansion Structured Products is a South African entity with

CIPC enterprise number M2009020420. According to CIPC records the
company was registered on the 22nd of October 2009, with its registered
office address being 1st Floor, 24 Crescent Drive, Melrose Arch, Gauteng,
2076. The company was originally registered with a sole director by the
name of Christian Gouws with the secretary Legal Frontiers (Corporate
Services). Christian Gouws is well-known as a company formation
agent, as is Legal Frontiers. It is typical that company formation agents
will register entities in advance that can be sold off-the-shelf as and
when required.
43. The company appears to have remained dormant, at least until CIPC
filings, until the 15th of April 2015, when two directors were appointed
to the company: Mark Shaw (ID: 7405275078081) and Taufique Shaukat
Hasware (ID: 8606056645084). The manner in which the company
was formed, its dormancy for a number of years, and the April 2015
S ection 3 – 31
appointments of Shaw and Hasware strongly suggests that the company
was purchased off-the-shelf from Legal Frontiers on or around the dates
in which it entered into its agreements with CNR, and that it was thus
little more than a shell through which kickbacks could be funnelled.
44. There is strong circumstantial evidence that Business Expansion

Products was connected to, or a direct part of, the Gupta enterprise.
Notably, Taufique Shaukat Hasware appears as a director in multiple
Gupta enterprise companies, all of which have been implicated in
receiving payments related to Transnet contracts:
a. Homix (Pty) Ltd, of which he was appointed a director on the 10th of
April 2014 before resigning on the 13th of November 2014;
b. Forsure Consultants, of which he was a director until at least
December 2015;
c. Hastauf, of which he was appointed a director in March 2015.
45. There is also strong evidence that funds paid to Bex were ultimately paid
to Regiments Asia in Hong Kong, as we discuss in detail later.
46. The first agreement between Bex and CNR was dated the 8th of March
2015, and is attached as Annexure D. The agreement is unsigned
and thus appears to have been a draft. The agreement centred on the
relocation agreement that CNR was seeking to strike with Transnet. In
Section 1 of the agreement, the ‘Project’ was defined as ‘the change in
scope whereby Transnet Engineering (TE) requires the Company to
change the location of the local manufacture programme from the TE
Spartan Pretoria facility to their Durban facility.’
47. The essence of the agreement was that Bex would endeavour, on CNR’s
behalf, to negotiate with Transnet in order to achieve the highest possible
price for the cost of relocation. Bex was to receive, under the terms of
the March 2015 agreement, any difference between the price paid by
Transnet and a ‘benchmark price’ set by CNR at R280m excluding VAT.
Section 2 of the Agreement thus read:
‘2.1. Whereas the TE [Transnet Engineering] requires the Company to

change the location of the local manufacture programme from the TE
Koedoespoort Gauteng Facility to their Bay-head Durban facility.
2.2. And whereas the Company has approached BEX to assess and
formulate the entire strategy and planning to quantify and benchmark
the costs associated with the relocation as per Clause 2.1.
2.3. And whereas BEX has agreed to undertake the work at their sole
risk and at no cost to the Company if the agreed benchmark costs are
not realized from Transnet Freight Rail [TRF]
2.4. After extensive research and negotiations with both the company
& TFR, BEX and the Company have agreed that the benchmark costs
for the Project will be fixed at R280 million (Rands Two hundred and
eighty million only) excluding VAT.
2.5. Since BEX has undertaken to negotiate and finalize the deal with
TFR on risk basis, it is agreed between both parties that BEX be entitled
to an agency commission equivalent to the difference between the
price excluding VAT awarded to the Company by TFR and the price
benchmark of R280 million excluding VAT as detailed in Clause 7.’

48. Documents provided to the Commission and emanating from Transnet
shows that on the 11th of March 2014, CNR had informed Transnet
Freight Rail that the cost of relocation would equal R9 755 600. The
dramatic increase in cost sought by CNR, in association with BEX,
almost certainly speaks to a considered effort to overcharge and defraud
Transnet, and to distribute the rewards of that process to CNR and the
beneficiaries of BEX.
49. Section 7 to the agreement further reiterated the terms of the

remuneration to be paid to BEX:
For the Project Scope deviation (referred herein above), BEX shall assist
the Company to negotiate the best possible price with TFR based on a
minimum price benchmark of R280 million (Rands Two Hundred and
Eighty million only) excluding VAT
7.2. The Company agrees that BEX will be entitled for an agency
commission equivalent to the difference between the price excluding
VAT awarded to the Company by TFR and the price benchmark of
R280 million excluding VAT. For example if the price awarded Is
R650 million, then BEX will be entitled to an agency commission
of R370million. The Company price will be fixed at R280 Million
irrespective of whether the total Project value is negotiated lower than
the R65O million by TFR.
7.3. BEX shall be entitled to agency commission irrespective of the fact

item thereto.
7.4. The agency commission as stated above shall get due and payable
in proportionate tranches as and when payment is received by the
Company.
7.5. The company shall pay BEX within 10 business days after receiving
the Invoice and the BEX banking details as per clause 12 from BEX.
50. On the 25th of April 2015, BEX and CNR Rolling Stock South Africa
drafted a second agreement that also revolved around the relocation of
CNR facilities to Durban at the behest of Transnet Engineering. The
agreement was signed by Mark Shaw on behalf of BEX and Gang Wang
on behalf of CNR Rolling Stock South Africa, and thus supersedes the
previous unsigned draft agreement. The second, signed agreement is
attached as Annexure E.
51. The 25th of April 2015 agreement was, to all intents and purposes, the
same as the preceding draft agreement, but with one notable difference:
the ‘benchmark price’ was increased from R280 to R580m. Thus, BEX
would have to ensure that Transnet agreed to pay an amount over
R580m in order to earn its expected agency fee.
52. Ultimately, Transnet agreed to pay CNR R647.2m in order to undertake

the relocation of its facilities to Durban. This was an increase of R638m
from CNR’s original cost estimate of just over R9m. BEX was thus due
to receive an agency commission of R67.2m.
53. A detailed analysis of banking data by amaBhungane suggests that, in

addition to the payment of R67.2m that was duly made by CNR to BEX,
CNR also transferred a further $8.6m to Regiment Asia’s Hong Kong
S ection 3 – 33
accounts at HSBC, which they persuasively argue is equal to what was
intended to be paid under the draft March agreement between CNR and
BEX. We address this in greater detail later in this submission.4
3.8. THE CSR-TEQUESTA

AGREEMENT: 18 MAY 2015
54. On the 18th of May 2015, CSR (Hong Kong) Co Ltd entered into a
‘Business Development Services Agreement’ with Tequesta Group
Limited. The agreement was signed on the 18th of May 2015 and given
an ‘Agreement No.: CSRHK20150102359.’ The agreement is attached
hereto as Annexure F.
55. Company records in Hong Kong show the sole director of Tequesta
Group at the time was Salim Essa. These records are attached hereto as
Annexure G. The agreement, too, indicated that all correspondence to
Tequesta should be marked ‘For the attention of: Mr. Salim Essa’, while
all correspondence directed to CSR should be marked ‘For the attention
of: Mr. Yao Xingzhong.’
56. The agreement revolved around ‘Project 359’, which the agreement
further clarified related to ‘any portion of the Tender of the supply of
359 Electric Locomotives (22E) to Transnet SOC Limited, South Africa.’
57. The contract envisaged that Tequesta would ‘provide advisory services
in respect of the Project and will assist the company to improve its
market share in the Territory and continue good relations and achieve
its milestones with its clients’ and ‘provide advice and assistance to the
Company on the process of the Contract and normal performance by the
Company to ensure the smooth execution and success of the project. And
especially, [sic] undertakes [sic] support and assist the Company for the
timely payments and/or return of bank guarantees released by the Client
until the fulfilment of all rights and obligations of the finished contract.’
58. Clause 3.3. of the agreement shows that Tequesta was effectively replacing
JJ Trading as the primary agent on the 359 locomotive contract. It is not
clear why JJ Trading was effectively removed from this role. Clause 3.3.
runs:
The Company has advised TEQUESTA that a previous Agreement had

been signed between CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co., Ltd and JJ
Trading FZE (hereinafter referred to as the “JJT”). However, the company
advises TEQUESTA that in the event that JJT disputes or contests the
cancellation or non-payment in a court of law and if the Court decrees
that the Agreement with JJT is valid or the mutual agreement is reached
between TEQUESTA and JJT, then the financial compensation to JJT,
(which will not exceed the retention amount, that is 15% of the total
payable to Tequesta under this agreement) will be deducted from the
amount retained from TEQUESTA as per clause 6.1.6 and the balance
(if there is) will then be paid to TEQUESTA within thirty (30) days
after the Company receipt of the last payment and/or return of all bank
guarantees released by the Client, whichever occurs later. Under this
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circumstance, the invoices with retention to the Company shall not be
claimable and returnable to TEQUESTA. TEQUESTA shall resolve
dispute with JJT through amicable consultation and ensure that there
is no further dispute with the Company from either side.’
59. With JJT removed from the picture, Tequesta was thus due to be paid
the remaining fees originally due to JJT related to Project 359, which
were stipulated as follows under clause 6.1.1:
For the Project-related Advisory Services provided by TEQUESTA, as

detailed in Annexure “A”, TEQUESTA shall be entitled to an Advisory
Fee of 21% (twenty percent 5) of the Contract value of Project 359
awarded to the Company, based on 2% (Two percent) of the Contract
value as the success fee and 19% (Nineteen percent) of pro-rata to the
milestone-based payments received by the Company from the Client.
The Company has already paid 3.9% of the Contract Value (R706 770
480) to JJT up to the Agreement date. The total payable to TEQUESTA
under this agreement is 17.1% of the Contract value (R3 098 916 720).
60. Banking records related to the accounts of two Essa-controlled Hong

Kong-based companies, Tequesta and Regiments Asia (both addressed
in more detail below), show that CSR did indeed make numerous large
payments to Tequesta from the date of the signature of the contract
onwards.
3.9. THE CSR-REGIMENTS ASIA

PAYMENT AGREEMENT: 10 JUNE
2015
61. On the 10th of June 2015, CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co Ltd
entered into an agreement with Regiments Asia Limited, a company
registered in Hong Kong. The agreement is attached as Annexure H.
62. Company registration documents, attached as Annexure I, show that

Salim Essa was the sole director of Regiments Asia when it entered into
the 10th of June 2015 agreement with CSR.
63. The agreement was signed by Salim Essa on behalf of Regiments Asia
and by Zhou Qinhe for CSR.
64. The agreement revolved around the anticipated award of a 12-year

maintenance contract by Transnet to service the locomotives purchased
from CSR and CNR. Section 1 to the agreement thus defined the ‘project’
under discussion as ‘the long term (expected 12 years) financial budget
for the “Railways Spares & Maintenance by Transnet SOC Limited,
South Africa.’
65. Regiments Asia was to perform much the same duties as those
performed by Tequesta in the agreement above, although, in this case,
only in relation to the finalisation of Transnet’s maintenance budget and
5 The rendering of 21% as ’20 percent, which is obviously erroneous, appears in

the contract.
S ection 3 – 35
the award of this to CSR. Regiments Asia was to be paid 21% of the
contract price as awarded to CSR by Transnet. Section 6 to the agreement
provided the details of how remuneration would be structured, and
read:
6.1.1. Provided that the Contract is awarded to the Company for any
part of the Project, the Company shall pay an amount equivalent to 21%
(twenty one percent) against the actually participated contract amount
of the Company, including variations and extensions to REGIMENTS
(the Service Fee).
6.1.2. The Service Fee will be paid to REGIMENTS as follows:
6.1.2.1. A percentage of the Contract amount will be treated as

- Success Fees and
- Certain other milestone payments and will become payable after
the signing of the Contract between the Company and the Client and
the receipt of the advance payment by the Company from the Client,
and on reaching the said milestones respectively. These amounts will
be determined closer to the time of finalization of the Contract and
will be detailed in an addendum to this agreement.
6.1.2.2. The remaining amount will be paid in proportion to the

payment received by the Company from the Client. The parties
agree that proportion and period is subject to the cash flow received
from the Client. The detailed mechanism for this arrangement will
be outlined in a separate addendum to this Agreement closer to the
time of finalisation.
6.1.2.3 Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the payment by the
Company from the Client; and
6.1.2.4. With the amount in the same currency as the payment

received by the Company but in a currency to be intimated by
REGIMENTS in each invoice that will be submitted by REGIMENTS
to the Company. The exchange rate will be fixed on the date payment
is received by the Company from the Client…’
3.10. THE CSR PAYMENT SCHEDULE

66. The documents/emails referred to hereunder are attached as Annexure J.
67. On the 22nd of August 2015, Ashu Chawla was forwarded an email
from the email address ‘infoportal@zoho.com’, which was given the
name ‘Business Man.’
68. The email from Seleke forwarded an email from the address
zhangmiyu5642@qq.com. It is acknowledged in the Fundudzi Report
that this email address was controlled by Zhang Minyu, an employee
of CSR who served as the director CSR’s Indian subsidiary. Minyu,
meanwhile, was forwarding an email from Rupesh Bansal (replyrb@
googlemail.com). As we discuss in more detail below, Rupesh Bansal was
a director of the Worlds Window Group, which facilitated the transfer
of funds from CSR and other sources to Gupta enterprise companies.

69. Bansal’s email attached a document with the filename ‘Final CSR 2015
workings.xlsx.’ The document is, quite plainly, a calculation of the
moneys that CSR had agreed to pay two Worlds Window controlled
entities, JJ Trading FZE and Century General Trading, related to the
359, 100 and 95 locomotive contracts entered into between CSR and
Transnet.
70. The calculations provided show that JJT was to be paid 21% of the total
contract value for the 359 and 100 locomotive projects. This was equal
to R3 805 687 200 (R3 805.6872m or R3.8bn) for the 359 locomotive
contract and R924m for the 100 locomotive contract. Century General
Trading was to be paid 20% of the contract value of the 95 locomotive
contract, which equalled R523.32m. In total, JJ Trading and Century
General Trading were due to receive R5 267 007 200 (R5.267bn) in
payments from CSR in relation to the 359, 100 and 95 locomotive
contracts. These calculations are set out below:
Table 1: Commissions Due to be Paid to JJ Trading and Century General Trading by CSR in
Relation to the 359, 100 and 95 Locomotive Contracts
Project Total Value Commission Percentage Amount
95 R2.686bn 20% R0.537bn
100 R4.4bn 21% R0.925bn
365 R18.122bn 21% R3.805bn
71. The document confirmed that CSR had already paid $107 203 912 to
JJ Trading in relation to the 359 and 100 locomotive contracts, and $16
699 902.89 to Century General Trading in relation to the 95 locomotive
contract.
72. The document also confirmed that JJ Trading and Century General
Trading were not due to retain the full fees paid to them by CSR. Instead,
JJ Trading and Century General Trading were due to retain 15% of the
total amount paid by CSR. While the document is silent on who was
to receive the remaining 85%, banking records from the #Guptaleaks,
addressed in more detail below, show that at least a portion of this 85%
was paid to companies controlled by the Gupta enterprise by JJ Trading
and the Worlds Window network.
3.11. ADDENDUM TO AGREEMENTS

BETWEEN CRRC, REGIMENTS ASIA
AND TEQUESTA GROUP: AUGUST
2016
73. In August 2016 (the exact date is unclear from the Agreement), CRRC
signed an addendum to existing agreements with Regiments Asia and
Tequesta Group. By August 2016, CSR had changed its name to CRRC
through a merger with CNR. The addendum is attached hereto as
Annexure K.
S ection 3 – 37
74. The addendum sought to vary to the terms of two prior agreements,
namely:
a. The Business Development Services Agreement dated the 2nd of
January 2015 between CSR and Regiments Asia in relation to the
100 electric locomotives supplied to Transnet (the “100 Project
Agreement”);
b. The Business Development Services Agreement dated the 18th of
May 2015 between CSR and Tequesta Group in relation to the 359
electric locomotives project (the “359 Project Agreement”)
75. The primary aim of the addendum was to modify the terms under which
Regiments Asia and Tequesta were to be paid, and, in particular, waived
CRRC’s right to withhold portions of payments made to Regiments and
Tequesta. As noted above, CRRC had retained 15% of all payments due
to Tequesta and Regiments as surety. The addendum stipulated that this
would no longer be the case, and that the withheld amounts to date
(equal to $15,144,610m) would be paid to Tequesta and Regiments.
76. There were, however, two caveats:

a. First, the entire agreement was contingent on Transnet awarding
CRRC contracts to provide maintenance services, as was
contemplated by the Business Development Agreement between
CSR and Regiments Asia dated the 10th of June 2015.
b. Second, ‘E-maintenance’ for either the 95 locomotive or 100
locomotive projects ‘have been effective and executed before October
2018 under the Maintenance Project as long as CRRC don’t delay
the Project.’ The wording of this second caveat is ambiguous, but a
reasonable interpretation is that CRRC would have delivered certain
services, and received payment from Transnet, by October 2018.
77. In the event that neither of these conditions was met, CRRC would be
entitled to recoup the 15% outlay against future payments that were due
to be made to CRRC to Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group. CRRC,
moreover, would be entitled to withhold all payments due to Tequesta
Group in relation to the provision of the final 95 locomotives in the
359 Locomotive Project. These withheld amounts would be released
within 90 days of the final payment being made by Transnet to CRRC.
However, if there were any claims or delays, CRRC would be entitled to
retain a 15% fee from the withheld funds to offset its own costs.
78. The effect of the agreement was thus to expedite a large payment to the
Gupta enterprise through Regiments Asia/Tequesta Group, indicating
that there was some degree of urgency on the part of the Gupta enterprise
to have immediate access to this particular pot of funding. The expedited
upfront payment would ultimately have the effect of delaying Tequesta’s
receipt of the full funds due to it from the 359 Project.
79. It is worth noting that this addendum is particularly useful in that it also
provides an accounting for all payments made by CRRC to Regiments
under the 100 Project Agreement and all payments made by CRRC to
Tequesta under the 359 Project Agreement. This accounting has allowed
investigators from amaBhungane to trace and track the funds paid to
Regiments and Tequesta against individual projects. We deal with this
in more detail in Section 6.3. below.
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3.12. ADDENDUM TO THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN CRRC
ZHUZHOU LOCOMOTIVE AND
REGIMENTS ASIA: AUGUST 2016
80. At the same time that CRRC varied its agreements with Tequesta and
Regiments in relation to the 100 and 359 projects, it also entered into
an addendum modifying its February 2015 agreement with Regiments
Asia in relation to the 95 project. The addendum, attached as Annexure
L, had the same effect as the preceding addendum by expediting a single
large payment to Regiments Asia, and terminating any claims on CRRC
by CGT.
81. The addendum appears to indicate that, for some unknown reason,
CSR/CRRC had been required to make ‘double payments’ to Regiments
Asia and CGT. This appears to be the result of a dispute between
Regiments, CRRC and CGT, and, in particular, the displacement of
CGT by Regiments Asia. The addendum required that this dispute
be resolved by Regiments Asia such that CGT would raise no further
claims against CRRC.
82. Paragraph 1.4 and a portion of Section 2 thus read:
As for the financial compensation due to Century General Trading

FZE (CGT) under the Consultancy Agreement dated 14 April 2012
(Consultancy Agreement), Regiments shall resolve dispute with CGT
through amicable consultation and ensure there is no further dispute
with CRRC ZELC from either side…
Up until now CRRC ZELC has been making fee payments in accordance
with the provisions of 95 Project Agreement and Consultancy
Agreement. Parties recognise that CRRC ZELC has been obligated thus
far to pay fees to both Regiments and CGT for the same 95 Electric
Locomotives Project, which results in double payment. After this
Addendum to Agreement becomes effective, CRRC ZELC will no longer
be obligated to make double payments, instead CRRC ZELC will make
future payments in accordance to the terms set forth in this Addendum
to Agreement.’
83. The agreement further stipulated that CRRC would no longer withhold
the 15% surety it had already retained and would pay this amount to
Regiments Asia immediately. The retained amount due to be paid to
Regiments Asia equalled $4 357 543.04. However, this agreement was
subject to the same caveats as appearing in the prior addendum, and, in
particular, that the release of funds were contingent on the maintenance
contracts being awarded by Transnet on the 95 or 100 locomotive
projects, and that CRRC would be allowed to recoup any portion of the
$4 357 543.04 from payments due to Tequesta under the 359 agreement.
S ection 3 – 39
3.13. SUMMARY TABLE OF
AGREEMENTS AND ANTICIPATED
FUND FLOWS
84. Based on the foregoing, and calculations performed by amaBhungane
(dealt with in Section 6.3 below), we have compiled the following
summary table of agreements entered into by CNR, CSR, CRRC and
ZPMC with JJT Trading, Century General Trading, Tequesta Group and
Regiments Asia.
Table 2: Summary of Known Kickback Agreements Related to the Capture of Transnet by the
Gupta Enterprise
Date of Agreement Chinese Party Gupta Enterprise

Party or Other
Counter Party
13 June 2011 ZPMC JJ Trading FZE
14 April 2012 CNR (Hong Kong) Century General

Trading
8 July 2013 CNR (Hong Kong) Century General

Trading
20 May 2014 CNR (Hong Kong) Tequesta Group

Limited
11 November 2014 CNR Da Lian Rolling Stock Co Tequesta Group

Limited
10 February 2015 CSR Regiments Asia
8 March 2015 [although unsigned] CNR Rolling Stock Business Expansion

Structured Projects
25 April 2015 CNR Rolling Stock Business Expansion

Structured Projects
18 May 2015 CSR Hong Kong Tequesta Group
10 June 2015 CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomo- Regiments Asia

tive Company
August 2016 CRRC Regiments Asia &

Tequesta Group
Addendum to original Business
Development Agreements
August 2016 CRRC Regiments Asia

Specific Transnet Project Payment Terms Total Payments
Due
iCLM HQ 0762 – 7 Cranes 3% success fee based on Price A Unknown

(total) for Transnet
85% of Price B
Price A = ZPMC’s original offer to Transnet
Price B = Any increase in price paid to
ZPMC by Transnet over and above Price B
95 Locomotive Project 20% commission on total contract value R523.32m
232 Diesel Locomotives Project 2% success fee R2.088bn

19% sales commission
232 Diesel Locomotives Project 2% success fee Remainder of

R2.088bn
19% sales commission
232 Diesel Locomotives Project One off fee of $18.2m in five instalments, $18.2m
(inferred but not explicitly which appears to equal 2% of contract
stated in contract) success fee
95 Locomotive Project 20% of total contract value Remainder of

R523.32m
CNR Relocation Costs Difference in price between ‘benchmark n/a

price’ of R280m and whatever Transnet
agreed to pay
CNR Relocation Costs Difference in price between ‘benchmark R67.2m

price’ of R580m and whatever Transnet
agreed to pay (ultimately R647.2m)
359 Locomotive Project 2% of contract value as success fee Remainder of

original R3.787bn
19% of contract value as sales commission
made as Transnet pays CSR
12 year maintenance plan 21% of contract value paid by Transnet R1.298bn
100 Locomotive Project & Immediate release of 15% surety held by $18.2m
CRRC for past payments and retention by
359 Locomotive Project CRRC of future payments for final 359 Loco-
motive Project until final payment received
from Transnet as surety
95 Locomotive Project Immediate release of 15% surety held by $4 357 543.04

CRRC for past payments and retention by
CRRC of future payments for final 359 Loco-
motive Project until final payment received
from Transnet as surety
S ection 3 – 4 1
Liebherr Cranes paid $3 232 430.88
in five tranches directly into the
account of Accurate Investments
based in Dubai between the 22nd of
July 2013 and the 1st of December
2014, after which the accounts
revealed by the #Guptaleaks go
dark. Accurate Investments was
controlled by the Gupta enterprise
through the Dubai-based director,
Sanjay Grover.
42
SECTION 4:
PAYMENTS MADE
TO THE GUPTA
ENTERPRISE BY
LIEBHERR CRANES
85. On the 4th of December 2011, Transnet advertised three separate
Requests for Proposals (RFP) related to the expansion of the Ngqura
Container Terminal. The first RFP called for proposals to supply
18 single-lift rubber tyre gantry cranes with an option to purchase a
further 10. The second RFP called for proposals to supply 4 twin lift
ship to shore cranes with the option for a further 3 single lift cranes
for the Ngqura Container Terminal and a further 2 single lift cranes
for a second container terminal. The third RFP solicited proposals for a
combination of the first two RFPs.
86. On the 17th of February 2014, Liebherr Cranes announced that it had
received the contract to supply 22 cranes to Transnet Port Terminals,
including 18 single-lift rubber gantry cranes and 4 twin lift ship to shore
cranes.6
6 https://container-mag.com/2014/02/17/liebherr-receive-order-for-22-
cranes-from-transnet/
43
87. Although SWI has not had insight into the procurement process that
led to the decision, it is common cause that Liebherr Africa, assisted by
Liebherr Ireland, were awarded the contract to supply the 18 rubbery
tyre gantry cranes as well as the 4 twin lift ship to share cranes.
88. SWI has not seen any evidence that would speak to irregularities in the
awarding of this contract such as internal Transnet minutes or forensic
reporting. However, it notable that, on the 21st of December 2011,
Ashu Chawla sent an email to Piyoosh Goyal (piyoosh@worldswindow.
cc). We attach this email and memorandum as Annexure M. As we
describe in more detail below, Piyoosh Goyal controlled the Worlds
Window network that was used by the Gupta enterprise to receive and
launder payments from China South Rail and ZPMC related to Transnet
contracts.
89. The email to Mr. Goyal was sent with the subject ‘Emailing: Update
on Tender iCLM HQ 0829)_RTG & STS Cranes Ngqura.’ The email
attached a Word document by the same name. The attached document
was an internal Transnet memorandum written by Transnet’s
Executive Manager of Capital Procurement (Mr. Denzil Pillay) to the
Chief Executive of Transnet Port Terminals (Mr. Karl Socikwa). The
memorandum is undated but the content of the memorandum would
suggest it was drafted sometime between the 4th of December and the
21st of December. The memorandum provided a detailed update of the
tender eventually won by Liebherr, including a step-by-step timeline of
when Transnet would perform certain activities leading to the selection
of the preferred supplier.
90. It is extremely concerning that Ashu Chawla was given access to such
a sensitive document. It is equally concerning that this document was
immediately forward to Piyoosh Goyal, a Gupta enterprise partner
in the capture of Transnet. This is especially true when seen against
payments made to Gupta enterprise companies by Liebherr.
4.1. PAYMENTS MADE TO THE GUPTA

ENTERPRISE BY LIEBHERR CRANES
91. Records emanating from the #Guptaleaks show that Liebherr made a
number of payments to Gupta enterprise companies from at least July
2013 onwards.
4.1.1. SOURCE AND RECORDS FROM THE #GUPTALEAKS

RELATING TO PAYMENTS FROM LIEBHERR
92. The payments from Liebherr are reflected in four different sources from
the #Guptaleaks. First, on the 11 of September 2013, Jesamine Cook
of Sahara emailed Ashu Chawla and Ugeshni Naidoo with the subject
‘RE: Dubai Statements 11/09/2013.’ The email and attached document
is attached as Annex N. The email attached an Excel spread sheet
titled Dubai Statements 1109013.xlsx. The document is self-evidently
a concatenation of bank statements for a number of Dubai-based bank
accounts held by key Gupta enterprise companies including Accurate
Investments, Global Corporation, Gateway Limited and Fidelity
Enterprises. These four companies were addressed in detail in SWI’s
second submission on the Estina matter, and are not explored in detail
here, suffice to note that they acted as the key nodes through which
the Gupta enterprise received, laundered and dissipated funds from
multiple sources, including from South African government programs
such as Estina.
93. Returning to the Excel workbook: one of the sheets in the workbook was
titled ‘Accurate 01204077701 USD’. Other contextual documents from
the #Guptaleaks show that this referred to Accurate Investments US
dollar denominated account held at Standard Chartered Bank in Dubai.
The excel sheet records that on the 22nd of July 2013, an amount of
$905 000.88 was paid into Accurate’s bank account. The transaction was
referred to as ‘INCOMING FUNDS LIEBHERR CONTAINERS.’
94. The second relevant document is described in detail in SWI’s second

submission to the Commission on Estina, and was attached to that
submission as Annexure LEDG1. We refer to this document as the
‘Dubai Ledger.’ To avoid burdening these papers, this document is not
reattached to this submission, but can be provided to the Commission
if required. The summary sheet appearing at the first page shows that
Liebherr paid $1 117 006.89 into the Gupta enterprise Dubai network
in the period covered by this ledger (the 1st of March 2013 to the 26th
of February 2014). The individual payments recorded in this ledger, and
their eventual dissipation, is described below.
95. The third relevant document is attached to this submission as Annexure

O. Annexure O is a document of our own creation. This document
is a concatenation of a number of records sent by Sanjay Grover to
Ashu Chawla. In particular, from the 11th of February 2014 until the
6th of August 2014, Sanjay Grover regularly forwarded Ashu Chawla
an updated spread sheet recording daily transactions of the Dubai
companies described in the Dubai Ledgers. A further three daily
transaction ledgers were sent in October and December 2014. To assist
the Commission with its work, the contents of all of these ledgers has
been extracted and placed into a single workbook, Annexure O. These
ledgers allow us to trace further payments from Liebherr into the Gupta
enterprise up until the end of 2014.
96. The fourth and final document was an email and attachment sent by
Ronica Ragavan from her Oakbay email address to Ashu Chawla’s
Sahara email address on the 14th of February 2015. The email attached
an Excel spread sheet titled ‘IS12.02.15.xlsx.’ From the spread sheet’s
contents, it is plausible that ‘IS 12.02.15’ was shorthand for ‘Income
Statement’ dated the 12th of February 2015. The Excel spread sheet’s
metadata suggests it was created by Ronica Ragavan.
97. The first sheet of the workbook was titled ‘Income’, and headed
‘Consolidated Books 7 February 2015.’ At row 14 of this spread sheet the
following appears:
A LCC001 OTHER INCOME LIEBHERR -11,888,956.13 4,125,350.08 1124073.591 4,110,585.36
98. The first column (under which ‘A’ was recorded) was titled ‘Co’,
most likely company. ‘A’ in this context could plausibly refer to
Accurate Investments, which, as we discuss below, Liebherr has
publicly acknowledged paying as part of a consultancy agreement.
The amounts recorded next to these columns referred to amounts
S ection 4 – 4 5
in dollars and AED respectively. It is also not entirely clear what the
second and third figures, which were recorded under the headings
‘difference’ and ‘comments’ may refer to. We submit that it is plausible
that this document showed that further payments were anticipated
to be made by Liebherr subsequent to the payments recorded in the
Dubai ledgers, or had already been made. However, further banking
documentation, including and especially bank statements related to
Accurate Investments, would be required to confirm this.
4.1.2. TRACING THE FIRST LIEBHERR PAYMENT

Amount: $905 000.88
Beneficiaries:
a. ‘Sahara’ (presumably Sahara Computers): $499 500
b. Star Engineering (Estina milk plant): $93 378.61
c. Wizcraft: AED 475 620 for costs related to the ‘Sun City’ wedding of
Aakash Jahajgarhia and Vega Gupta;
d. Vikas via JJT: AED 616 560
99. We refer the Commission to Annexure ‘Liebherr Diagram 1’. This
Annexure provides a diagrammatic representation of the receipt and
dissipation of the first payment made to Accurate Investments by
Liebherr.
100. On the 22nd of July 2013, Liebherr was recorded as paying $905 000.88
into Accurate’s USD account at Standard Chartered Bank. Prior to
this deposit, the account held a balance of $815.21. The payment by
Liebherr was recorded in both Annexures N and Annexure O.
101. This amount was ‘smurfed’ into three amounts almost immediately,
all paid into Global Corporation’s Standard Chartered Bank USD
account, each of which then created its own stream of recipients. The
first stream was initiated with the deposit of $700 000 into Global’s
Standard Chartered USD account on the 22nd of July 2013, which
increased the balance in this account from $24 948.68 to $724 948.68.
On the same day the amount was deposited into this account, $499 500
was paid to ‘Sahara’, almost certainly Sahara Computers.
102. The following day, on the 23rd of July 2013, the remaining balance
of the Liebherr payment was transferred from Accurate’s Standard
Chartered Account into Global’s Standard Chartered USD account
in two deposits valued at $130 000 and $60 000. These two deposits,
when commingled with what remained of the earlier $700 000 deposit,
increased the balance in this account from $225 448.68 to $415 448.68.
103. On the same day, the 23rd of July 2013, $100 000 of this amount was
transferred into Gateway’s US Dollar denominated account at Standard
Chartered. The following day, the 24th of July 2013, $93 378.61 was
paid to Star Engineering. As described in detail in our previous
submissions on Estina, Star Engineering supplied a dairy processing
plant for use on the Vrede Dairy Project through contracts with Gupta
enterprise companies.

Tracing the first
Below:
Tracing the first Liebherr payment
Liebherr
Liebherr payment
22 July 2013
$905 000.88
22/07/2013
22 July 2013
Accurate
SBC USD
$700 000 $130 000.88 $60 000
22/07/2013 23/07/2013 23/07/2013
Global
SBC USD
$168 845.32 $115 740
$100 000 (AED 620 000 (AED 425 000
23/07/2013 23/07/2013 24/07/2013
Gateway
Global SBC
SBC USD
AED 620 000 AED 425 000
23/07/2013 24/07/2013
Cash
$499 500 $92 378.61 AED 425 000 AED 616 560
22/07/2013 24/07/2013 24/07/2013 23/07/2013
Global
SBAD AED
AED 475 620
24/07/2013
Star Engineering
Sahara Wiz Craft Vikas via JJT
for Milk Plant
$499 500 $93 378.61 AED 475 620 AED 616 560
S ection 4 – 4 7
104. The remainder of Liebherr’s first payment was transferred into Global’s
AED denominated account at Standard Chartered bank in two
payments: $166 845.32 (AED 620 000) on the 23rd of July 2013 and
$115 740 (AED 425 000) on the 24th of July 2013. These amounts were
immediately withdrawn in cash (AED 620 000 on the 23rd of July and
AED 425 000 on the 24th of July 2013).
105. On the 23rd of July 2013, AED616 560 was recorded as being paid to
‘Vikas via JJT.’ This almost certainly referred to a payment made to
Vikas Chaturvedi, a Gupta enterprise employee in charge of logistics,
by JJ Trading FZE, the latter of which formed part of the Worlds
Window network and which we discuss in greater detail below.
106. Finally, on the 24th of July 2013, AED425 000 in cash was deposited
into Global’s National Bank of Abu Dhabi’s AED denominated account,
where it commingled with a small pot of existing funds. On the same
day, AED 475 620 was paid from this account to Wizcraft.
107. In addition to being recorded in the Dubai ledgers, the confirmation

of the final payment to Wizcraft was also saved by Sanjay Grover in
PDF form and emailed to Ashu Chawla. The email and invoice is
attached as Annexure Q. The confirmation of payment shows that
the AED 475 620 was paid into the account of Wizcraft International
Entertainment held at HSBC in Dubai with full account number
AE3402000000035471754100. The purpose of payment was recorded
as ‘Invoice WIZ/DUB04/2013.’
108. On the 14th of August 2013, Johan Schalkwyk, an attorney at Van

Der Merwe Associates, forwarded a draft letter to Ashu Chawla.
The email and attachment as appended hereto as Annexure R. The
substance of the letter was to contest certain charges raised by Wizcraft
against Fidelity Enterprises, which is not material here. However, the
letter records that in March 2013 Wizcraft were asked to provide
‘entertainment services’ to Fidelity Enterprises under the invoice WIZ/
DUB-04/2013. It further records that a payment worth $129 600 was
made to Wizcraft on the 24th of July 2013, which a simple calculation
shows was equivalent to the AED475 620 paid by Global to Wizcraft.
109. The #Guptaleaks records a vast number of emails between employees of

Wizcraft and the Gupta enterprise. The exchanges show that Wizcraft
provided event management and artist services for the now infamous
Sun City wedding of Aakash Jahajgarhia and Vega Gupta. It is thus
extremely likely that this portion of the payment made by Liebherr was
used to fund costs related to the Sun City wedding.
4.1.2. TRACING THE SECOND LIEBHERR PAYMENT

Amount: $212 006.01
Beneficiaries:
a. Linkway Trading: $599 327 (commingled funds from Liebherr and
other sources, of which the Liebherr payment contributed $212
006.01)
dissipation of the second payment made to Accurate Investments by
Liebherr.
Unlimited Electronic
Computer
Liebherr
$913 583 $212 006.01
25/02/2014 17/02/2014
$450 000
Glboal Mashreq USD 25/02/2014
Commingles with
Accurate Mahreq USD
Liebher Money
$599 327
25/02/2014
Tracing the second

Liebherr
Above: payment
Tracing the second Liebherr payment Linkway
17 February
17 February 2014 2014
111. On the 17th of February 2014, Liebherr deposited $212 006.01 into
Accurate Investment’s US Dollar account at Mashreq Bank. This
deposit is the first deposit we can locate into this account; the payment
thus increased the balance therein to $212 006.01.
112. The date of this deposit is notable. As recorded above, it was publicly
announced on the 17th of February 2014, the same day the payment
was made, that Liebherr Cranes had been awarded the Transnet Port
Terminals contract.7
113. On the 25th of February 2014, the Liebherr deposit was joined in
the account by a payment of $450 000 from Global Corporation’s
Mashreq Bank US dollar account. Our analysis shows that this amount
ultimately derived from a payment made by Unlimited Electronic
Computer, a Singapore-based company with close connections to the
Gupta enterprise. The $450 000 payment increased the balance in this
account to $655 000.94.
114. Finally, on the 25th of February 2014, $599 327.58 was transferred
from Accurate’s Mashreq US dollar account to Linkway Trading. This
amount would necessarily have drawn from part or all of the $212
006.21 payment made by Liebherr on the 17th of February 2014.
115. On the 27th of February 2014, Ashu Chawla forwarded an email

from an employee of Mashreq Bank (shyama@mashreq.com) to
Ugeshni Naidoo and Rana Kumar with the subject line ‘FW: Linkway.’
The email is attached hereto as Annexure R. The email forwarded
payment confirmation showing that the payment was indeed made to
Linkway by Accurate. Linkway received the deposit in its State Bank
of India account in Johannesburg and was described as ‘payment for
consultancy fees.’ The Rand value of the transfer was recorded as R6
545 581.
7 https://container-mag.com/2014/02/17/liebherr-receive-order-for-22-cranes-
from-transnet/
S ection 4 – 4 9
4.1.3. TRACING THE THIRD LIEBHERR PAYMENT
Amount: $371 105.83
Beneficiaries:
a. Oakbay: $400 000 of which $371 105.83 presumed from Liebherr
dissipation of the third payment made to Accurate Investments by
Liebherr.
117. This tranche was initiated with the payment of $371 105.83 from
Liebherr into Accurate Investment’s US dollar denominated account at
Mashreq Bank on the 15th of April 2014. The balance in the Mashreq
account prior to this deposit was $6 182; this deposit increase the
balance to $377 288.51
118. On the 28th of April 2014, $375 000, which drew on the full Liebherr
deposit, was transferred into Fidelity’s US dollar denominated account
at Mashreq Bank. The balance in the Mashreq account prior to the
deposit was $50 967.12.The Liebherr funds commingled with this
amount and increased the balance to $425 967.12.
119. Finally, on the following day, the 29th of April 2014, $400 000, drawing
from the majority if not all of the Liebherr payment, was transferred
from the Fidelity account at Mashreq to Oakbay. The precise Oakbay
account that received the funds is not specified and will need to be
verified against Oakbay banking records.
Tracing
Left:
the third
Tracing the third Liebherr payment
Liebherr Liebherr
15 April 2014
payment
$371 105.83
15/04/2014
15 April 2014
Accurate Mahreq USD
$375 000
28/04/2014
Fidelity Mahreq USD
$400 000
29/04/2014
Oakbay
$400 000 of which

$371k from Lieber

4.1.4. TRACING THE FOURTH LIEBHERR PAYMENT
TRANCHE
Amount: $1,105,368.16 in three payments of $405 598.52, $402
879.34 and $296 890.30
Beneficiaries:
a. Brookfield Consultants: $5m of which at least $1 105 368.16 from
Liebherr
dissipation of the fourth, fifth and six payments made to Accurate
Investments by Liebherr.
121. The hallmark of these payments was that they were commingled and
consolidated with other sources of funds to facilitate a single large
payment of $5m to Brookfield Consultants, a Gupta enterprise-linked
company based in the US. It is for this reason that these payments are
dealt with here as a single tranche.
122. Liebherr made three payments to Accurate Investment’s US dollar

denominated account at Mashreq Bank. The payments were made as
follows:
a. $405 598.52 on the 7th of May 2014, which increased the balance in
the account from $2 283.44 to $407 881.96;
b. $402 879.34 on the 9th of May 2014, which increased the balance in
the account from $407 876.23 to $810 756.23
c. $296 890.30 on the 26th of May 2014.
123. The $296 890.30 payment was made on the same day that $2.2m was
deposited into the same account from Global Corporation’s US dollar
denominated account at Mashreq Bank. The commingling of the
$2.2m deposit with the Liebherr deposits increased the balance in the
account to $3 307 641.46. An analysis of the Dubai ledger documents
show that the $2.2m derived from deposit of $4 499 836.44 from JJ
Trading on the 1st of May 2014 in to the Mashreq account of Reliable.
124. Two further payments were made into Accurate’s Mashreq account,
commingling with the Liebherr funds. An analysis of the Dubai ledgers
shows that these deposits were sourced from a range of mixed sources,
including JJ Trading Century, which, as we discuss below, most likely
derived from payments made to JJ Trading by China South Rail or
China North Rail pursuant to the award of contracts by Transnet.
The two deposits (AED1.7m on the 27th of May 2014 and AED4 545
800 on the 28th of May 2014) increased the available balance in the
Mashreq account to $5 007 636.38.
125. Finally, on the 28th of May 2014, $5m exactly was transferred from
Accurate Investment’s US dollar denominated Mashreq Bank account
to Brookfield Consultants. The payment is described in the Dubai
ledgers as ‘Brookfield Mr. Ashish.’
126. Tax records filed in the US state of Texas (attached as Annexure S)

show that Ashish and Amol Gupta signed tax return information on
behalf of Brookfield Consultants. The registered address provided
for Brookfield Consultants was 11811 North Freeway Suite 500 in
Houston, Texas. Ashish and Amol Gupta are relatives of the Gupta
brothers and are both US citizens.
S ection 4 – 5 1
Mixed sources Tracing the
JJT Force Exim
including JJT Century fourth Liebherr
$8 200 000 AED MIXED SOURCES
11/05/2014-15/05/2014
$4 499 836.44
01/05/2014
payment
tranche
Global Mahreq Reliable 07 May -
AED Mahreq USD
26 May 2014
$5 336 000 AED $2 500 000
19/05/2014 12/05/2014
Accurate Accurate
Mahreq AED Mahreq USD Liebherr
$462 710.94 $1 237 289.06 $2 200 000.00 $405 598.52 $402 879.34 $296 890.30
(1.7m AED) (4.545m AED) 26/05/2014 07/05/2014 19/05/2014 26/05/2014
27/05/2014 28/05/2014
Accurate Mahreq
USD
$5 000 000
28/05/2014
Commingled with other Enterprise
Funds including from JJT
$1 105 368.16 from Liebher
Brookfield
Consultants US
$5 000 000
$1 105 368.16 from Lieber
Above:
Tracing the fourth Liebherr payment tranche
07 May - 26 May 2014

127. The #Guptaleaks show, on the 5th of May 2014, Tony Gupta and Ashu
Chawla were sent Brookfield’s bank details at Chase Manhattan Bank
by Ramesh Gupta (rgupta6666@yahoo.com). Ramesh Gupta is the
father of Ashish and Amol Gupta. Tony Gupta forwarded these details
to Ronica Ragavan and Ajay Gupta on the 7th of May 2014. The email
chain is attached as Annexure T.
128. On the 26th of May 2014, three days before the payment to Brookfield
was completed, Suresh Tuteja sent an email to Sanjay Grover and
Ashish Gupta (ashishgupta@gmail.com). Tuteja commented that ‘I
am attaching herewith a letter which I request you please to sign and
return immediately so that payments are made tomorrow.’ The email
attached a MS Word document with the filename chase letter.docx.
The email and attachment are appended hereto as Annexure U. The
text of the letter ran:
From : Ashish Gupta

10914, Princeville CT Bakers Field CA 93111 USA
Dated 26-05-2014
Accurate Investments Ltd

D-45 12th Floor Tower 1 Amenity Centre
Ras Al Khaimah
U A E
Dear Sir
Re: Payment in terms of Clause no 6 of Agreement Dated 14th May

2014.
I refer to the clause no 6 of Agreement dated 14th May 2014 as per

which you as a second purchaser need to pay me , as a first purchaser,
an amount of US $ 10 Million paid by me to seller into my following
designated bank account:
Name Brookfield Consultants Inc

Bank Address for Wire 1, Chase Manhattan
New York
Account no 537557618
Swift Code CHASUS33
Yours faithfully
Ashish Gupta
129. On the same day, Ashish Gupta responded to Suresh Tuteja attaching
a signed copy of the letter. The only notable change was that Ashish
Gupta changed his address to 11811 North Freeway Suite 500, the
registered address as recorded in Brookfield Consultants’ tax returns
to the state of Texas. Shortly thereafter, the letter was forwarded by
Tuteja to Sanjay Grover and Ronica Ragavan with the explanation:
‘Please find attached a letter received from Mr Ashish Gupta to be
submitted to Bank alongside copy of agreement for making remittance
tomorrow.’
S ection 4 – 5 3
130. Unfortunately we have been unable to locate the agreement referred
to in the above correspondence. However, the above strongly suggests
that the payment to Brookfield was overseen and controlled by
the Gupta enterprise and to the benefit of a company controlled by
relatives of the Gupta brothers.
131. Although we have not been able to review the aforementioned

agreement related to Brookfield, we do note that the payment of $10m
to Brookfield from Gupta enterprise companies does seem to have been
made through two transactions valued at $5m. These two payments
include the payment from Accurate describe above, and an additional
$5m payment made to Brookfield from Accurate Investment’s US
dollar denominated account at Bank of Baroda. The Dubai ledgers
show that the sources of the $5m payment from Accurate Investment’s
Bank of Baroda account were mixed, but were largely drawn from
deposits into other Gupta enterprise accounts in Dubai by JJ Trading
and its affiliates.
4.1.4. TRACING THE FIFTH LIEBHERR PAYMENT TRANCHE

Amount: $638 950 in two payments of $386 110 and $270 840.
Beneficiaries:
a. Unclear as Dubai ledger records end shortly after deposits made
132. We refer the Commission to Annexure Liebherr Diagram 5. This
dissipation of the seventh and eighth payments made to Accurate
Investments by Liebherr.
133. On the 9th of October 2014, Liebherr deposited $368 110 into
Accurate Investment’s Mashreq US dollar denominated account. The
balance in the account prior to this deposit was $7619.94 and $375
729.94 thereafter.
134. There was no activity in the Accurate Mashreq account until the 1st
of December 2014, when Liebherr transferred a further $270 840 into
the same Mashreq account. This increased the balance in the account
to $646 564.86.
135. On the 9th and 10th of December 2014, two amounts of $20 000 were
transferred from the this Mashreq account drawing from the Liebherr
deposits to Fidelity Enterprises US dollar denominated Mashreq Bank
account. We are unable to trace the ultimate end-point of these funds
as the Gupta ledger records terminate shortly thereafter.
136. Also on the 10th of December 2014, $200 000 was transferred from
Accurate’s Mashreq account to Global Corporation’s US dollar
denominated account at the Bank of Baroda, where it commingled
with existent funds. The following day, $243 000, drawing on the $200
000 deposit ultimately from Liebherr, was transferred to Fidelity’s US
dollar denominated account at the Bank of Baroda. We are unable to
trace the ultimate end-point of these funds as the Gupta ledger records
terminate shortly thereafter.

Tracing can’t be completed
as records end 11/12/2014
Liebherr
$368 110 $270 840
09/10/2014 01/12/2014
Accurate SBC USD
$20 000 $20 000 $200 000

09/12/2014 10/12/2014 10/12/2014
Fidelity Mahreq USD Global Bank of Baroda

USD
$243 000
11/12/2014
Above:
Tracing the fifth Liebherr tranche
09 Oct to 01 Dec 2014.
(Tracing can’t be completed as
? Fidelity Bank of Baroda
USD
records end 11/12/2014)
4.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ACCURATE INVESTMENTS AND
LIEBHERR CRANES
137. In July 2017, Liebherr released a press statement in response to articles
in the South African media regarding the payments to Accurate
Investments. Liebherr stated that they took the allegations ‘very
seriously’ and committed to ‘fully investigate’ the matter internally.8
138. On the 16th of October 2017, Liebherr released a press statement,

which read:
In accordance with Group policies, the ultimate holding company of the

Liebherr Group — Liebherr-International AG — therefore conducted an
internal investigation into this matter. The results of this investigation
show that the transactions under investigation were legally sound and
not in violation of any applicable laws or regulations on the part of the
Liebherr entities and employees involved.
The selection of a sales agent such as Accurate Investments Ltd. to provide

interface services to the end user during the tender, procurement and
supply process is a practice, which is common in the sales process for
8 https://www.liebherr.com/en/int/latest-news/news-press-releases/detail/
allegations-in-connection-with-business-operations-in-south-africa-investi-
gation-initiated-news.html
S ection 4 – 5 5
capital expenditure projects. It is also common that such a sales agent
receives a nominal commission for the services provided in the event
the tender, procurement and supply process is successfully completed.
In the case in question, Accurate Investments Ltd. was the sales

representative selected by Liebherr Container Cranes Ltd. As required
by the Group’s due diligence process, Liebherr Container Cranes
Ltd. performed background checks prior to entering into the agency
agreement with Accurate Investments Ltd. These background checks
did not indicate any malpractice on the part of Accurate Investments
Ltd.
The internal investigation report did observe, however, that the Group’s
defined due diligence process might have been implemented in a more
stringent manner in this case by pushing the performed background
checks to an even higher level than the ones actually performed.
Being aware of the increased risks associated when agents are included
in any type of transaction, Group companies, management and
employees must strive to insure that the Group’s standards of scrutiny
and diligence are complied with in day-to-day business.
139. The gist of Liebherr’s response is that they admit to employing

Accurate Investments as a sales agent, but that they insist that their use
of Accurate Investments was legal.
140. It is perhaps trite to note that a company investigating itself cannot be

relied on entirely to form a full picture of events as they transformed.
In this regard, we submit that the Commission should, as far as
possible, seek further information from Liebherr AG, including the
underlying material that was assessed as part of Liebherr’s internal
investigation, and the final investigative report itself. These materials
should also be subject to critical examination, including enquiring
why Liebherr believed it appropriate to make such payments regarding
contracts issued by state entities, what led Liebherr to believe Accurate
Investments could offer any legitimate services related to the contract,
and whether these representations were subject to meaningful scrutiny.
141. Shadow World Investigations contacted Liebherr to ask if the company

wished to add to the statement by way of any further clarifying
statement. The company responded noting:
In 2017, we conducted an internal investigation into the role of Liebherr

Container Cranes Ltd. based in Killarney (Ireland) in the context of
the processes you mentioned. In doing so, we took into account all the
information available to us.
In a public statement on October 13 of the same year, we made available

the results of this investigation…
With the completion of the investigation report and the publication of

the results, we consider the case to be concluded for us. We ask for your
understanding in this regard.

142. We find Liebherr AG’s response to be most unsatisfying. We find it
hard to understand how Liebherr could legitimately have employed
a sales agent with no infrastructure of note, few if any employees, no
online presence, based in the UAE, and subject to the control of a lone
director (Sanjay Grover) who is an Indian national with no obvious
connections to South Africa, to facilitate its bids to win contracts in
South Africa. Any credible compliance investigation, and, indeed any
reasonable observer, must question what an entity of this nature could
offer to Liebherr to justify such large success fees.
143. The #Guptaleaks and the Dubai ledgers in particular paint a vivid
picture of the true nature of Accurate Investments. These show that
not only was Accurate Investments beneficially owned and controlled
by the Gupta enterprise, but that its function in the Gupta enterprise
was to act primarily as a cut-out through which money was laundered.
A review of the Dubai ledgers shows that in 2013, the only incoming
funds into Accurate that was not sourced from other Gupta enterprise
companies were funds paid by Liebherr. In 2014, Liebherr and an
unknown entity called VK Trading Hong Kong were the only non-
Gupta enterprise controlled companies that made payments to
Accurate Investments. Accurate Investments’ bank accounts in Dubai
were thus used exclusively to receive funds from Liebherr and VK
Trading Hong Kong, and to receive and transmit other funds from the
Gupta enterprise network.
144. We submit that it is difficult to understand how a company, incurring

no notable expenses - and incurring no expenses in South Africa -
could legitimately assist a multinational engineering firm secure a
contract in South Africa.
S ection 4 – 5 7
The Worlds Window group
controlled two Dubai-based
companies, Century General Trading
FZE and JJ Trading FZE. It used these
companies to receive the kickbacks
‘owed’ to the Gupta enterprise, and
then distributed the funds to the
Gupta enterprise. For this money
laundering service, the Worlds
Window Group earned 15% of the
total kickbacks paid by CNR, CSR,
CRRC and ZPMC.
58
SECTION 5:
TRANSNET, THE
GUPTA ENTERPRISE
AND THE WORLDS
WINDOW NETWORK
145. From at least 2010 onwards, the Gupta enterprise entered into an
extensive and complicated business relationship with the Worlds
Window Group, a so-called scrap metal recycling company based in
India with multiple subsidiaries in India and abroad. This relationship
included the adoption and creation of a sophisticated money
laundering network spanning multiple countries. This network was
used, inter alia, to receive, launder and dissipate payments made to
the benefit of the Gupta enterprise from China South Rail and ZPMC.
5.1. THE WORLDS WINDOW

NETWORK: RELEVANT COMPANIES
146. All documents referred to in this section are attached hereto as
Annexure V.
147. The heart of the Worlds Window network is the Worlds Window
Group, whose website is viewable at www.wwg.co.in. According to
the Group website, Worlds Window began its life in 1997 by ‘trading
ferrous and non-ferrous metals scrap.’
59
148. The Worlds Window Group encompasses a vast array of businesses.
We do not list every company here, but highlight those companies that
#Guptaleaks records show were involved in business with the Gupta
enterprise:
a. Worlds Window Impex India Private Limited, which is described
on the Worlds Window Group as the ‘flagship of the group and one
of the largest importers in North India.’ Indian company records
show that Worlds Window Impex Private Limited was established
in India on the 14th of February 1997 with the company number
U51109DL1997PTC085138 at the address 75 Khirki Village, New
Delhi. Worlds Window Impex India Private Limited is 49% owned
by International Metal and Steel BV (IMSBV). IMSBV is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of European Metals Recycling based in Liverpool.
b. Indian company records show that at least 13 other companies
featuring Worlds Window in their name were established in India and
share the same registered address as Worlds Window Impex. We list
these companies below as #Guptaleaks accounting records suggest
that some of these companies may have been used by Worlds Window
to launder funds to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise, especially the
Urja and Exim subsidiaries. The 13 additional companies are:
I. Worlds Window Agro Private Limited;
II. Worlds Window Cabs Indian Private Limited (now inactive);
III. Worlds Window Developers Private Limited;
IV. Worlds Window Ecotrade Private Limited;
V. Worlds Window Estate Private Limited;
VI. Worlds Window Exim Private Limited;
VII. Worlds Window Farming Private Limited;
VIII. Worlds Window Greenfield Private Limited;
IX. Worlds Window Holding Private Limited (now inactive);
X. Worlds Window Infrastructure and Logistics Pvt Ltd;
XI. Worlds Window Trading Private Limited;
XII. Worlds Window Urja Private Limited;
XIII. Worlds Window Wardha Infrastructure Private Limited.
c. Everest Metals FZE based in Dubai, which the Worlds Window

Group claims was established in 2008 as the ‘international trading
arm of the Group.’ The Worlds Window Group website lists Everest
Metal’s address as being in the Hamriyah Free Zone, Sharjah,
United Arab Emirates. Everest Metal’s company filings appearing
in the #Guptaleaks confirm this address, although they do not
provide a company number. As we show below, Everest Metals
FZE was involved in a seeming loan-back scheme with the Gupta
enterprise company Westdawn Investments in South Africa;
Arctos Trading (Pty) Ltd, a South African company with enterprise

number 2011/002541/07 that was incorporated in 2011. #Guptaleaks
records show that Arctos housed mining assets on behalf of Worlds
Window in South Africa, although there is little evidence that the
assets were ever formally transferred to Arctos, and shared a mining
contractor agreement with the Gupta enterprise company Idwala Coal.
The records also show that Arctos was used to transfer funds to and
from the Gupta enterprise network and the World’s Window network.
Arctos Trading was beneficially owned by Vasudhamaa Resources
PTE Ltd, a company incorporated in Singapore with the registration
number 201100949G. Company filings for Vasudhamaa Resources
appearing in the #Guptaleaks show that one of the two directors
was Anil Kumar Misra, a director in other Worlds Window group
companies and the CFO of the Worlds Window Group according to its
website. Closing the Worlds Window-Gupta enterprise circle, Arctos’
registered address was 144 Grayston Ridge, Katherine Street, Sandton,
an address shared by a number of other Gupta enterprise companies.
Arctos’ role in the Worlds Window Group has been extensively

scrubbed from the Worlds Window Group website since the
publication of stories linking Goyal to the Gupta enterprise. However,
the Worlds Window brochure, referred to previously and published
on the Worlds Window group website prior to the emergence of news
stories on Goyal and the Guptas, dedicated a full page to Arctos,
noting:
Arctos Trading Pty Ltd epitomizes what the Worlds Window Group
represents. It is the South African component of the Worlds Window
Group, with a portfolio comprising interests in the logistics, trading and
freight forwarding areas. The company is supported by a team of highly
experienced and talented individuals hailing from the mining industry.’
5.2. THE WORLDS WINDOW

NETWORK: KEY PERSONNEL
149. All documents relevant to this section are attached as Annexure W.
150. The Worlds Window Group website lists the following eight individuals
as the ‘Group mentors’ to Worlds Window Group and as the ‘key
individuals’ responsible for running the Group:
a. Mr. Mahesh Goyal, the ‘Group Mentor’;
b. Mr. Anil Misra, ‘Group CFO’, a chartered accountant who has been
‘associated with WWG since its early days’. Company records show
that Misra is a director of Worlds Window Impex Private Limited
(the Worlds Window flagship) and Vasudhamaa Resources, which
owned Arctos Pty Limited in South Africa
c. Mr Naveen Agrawal, the ‘Director of Manufacturing’ and a director
of Worlds Window Impex Private Limited.
d. Kapil Jain, the Group Vice President in charge of finance;
e. Captain Sanjeev Rishi, an ‘advisor’;
f. Mr. H.S Mann, the director and CEO of Coal Trading;
g. Ms. Aruma Sharma, an ‘advisor’
h. Mr Rajiv Kochhar, the ‘Vice President’ in charge of ‘Commercial and
Projects.’
151. Strangely, the person who appears to be the most central to the
entire group, Mr. Piyoosh Goyal, is not listed on the World’s
Window current website. Piyoosh Goyal is a director of Worlds
Window Impex Private Limited. The #Guptaleaks shows that
Goyal was central to establishing the relationship between the
Gupta enterprise and the World’s Window network. Goyal was
implicated in a corruption scandal and prosecution in India in 2013.
Archived copies of the Worlds Window Group website gave much more
prominence to Goyal. On a page entitled ‘Group Chairman Speaks’,
Goyal delivered four paragraphs of corporate boilerplate. A Worlds
Window Group brochure, also previously uploaded to the Worlds
S ection 5 – 6 1
Window website but no longer available, also prominently highlighted
the role of Goyal – ‘a true visionary’, according to the brochure - in
forming and running the group. The brochure is attached as Annexure
X.
152. Other notable Worlds Window employees appearing in the

#Guptaleaks records are:
a. Shuchi Bansal, the Executive Assistant to the Chairman’s Office;
b. Amit Agrawal, an accountant at Worlds Window who corresponded
with Ashu Chawla with regards to payments made by Everest Metals
FZE in South Africa;
c. Pooja Puri, a Worlds Window employee who corresponded
extensively with Ashu Chawla regarding payments made by Everest
Metals FZE;
d. Lalit Tewari, a Worlds Window employee who the #Guptaleaks
records show was involved in running Arctos and operating an
Arctos email account (lalit.tewari@arctos.co.za). Tewari appears to
have been integrated into the Gupta enterprise, operating an Oakbay
email address (lalit@oakbay.co.za) from at least March 2014 and an
Elgasolve email address from at least August 2014;
5.3. THE WORLDS WINDOW FRONT

COMPANIES: JJ TRADING FZE AND
CENTURY GENERAL TRADING
153. All documents relevant to this section are attached as Annexure Y
154. Two corporate vehicles were used to enter into agency agreements
with Chinese suppliers to Transnet, to receive payments therefrom,
and to distribute those payments to the Gupta enterprise: JJ Trading
FZE and Century General Trading FZE. Both of these entities were
controlled by the Worlds Window network.
5.3.1. JJ TRADING FZE

155. JJ Trading FZE is registered in the United Arab Emirates and runs
a website at http://www.jjtrading.co.in/. The website lists JJ Trading
FZE’s address as PO Box 51016, Hamriyah Free Zone – Sharjah U.A.E.
The JJ Trading FZE website claims that the company is involved in the
trading of scrap metal, rice, grains, pulses, edible oil and ‘chemical.’
Numerous business directories list Mr. Ramratan Jagati as the contact
person for JJ Trading FZE. A LinkedIn profile in Jagati’s name lists
Jagati as the ‘manager at J J TRADING FZE.’
156. Ramratan Jagati appears in the #Guptaleaks records on three occasions

using his Yahoo email address: ramratanjagati@yahoo.com. The emails
show that Jagati controlled JJ Trading FZE but did so at the behest and
direction of the Worlds Window Group.
157. The first correspondence involving Jagati was initiated on the 31st of
December 2011, when Adesh Vashishta, an employee of SES India (the
main Gupta enterprise company registered in India), emailed Ashu
Chawla’s Sahara and SES India email addresses, copying two further

SES employees Naresh Khosla and Piyush Shah. Vashishta forwarded
the banking details and how an amount of $3.5m was to be split and
paid to three Gupta enterprise companies, ITJ Retails Private Limited,
Sahara Computers and SES Technologies. On the 1st of January 2012,
Ashu Chawla forwarded the email to Ramratan Jagati’s Yahoo email
address, copying in Amit Agrawal, a Worlds Window accountant
(amit.accounts@worldswindow.cc). Chawla wrote: ‘Dr Mr. Ramratan,
Here is the final figures for rtgs.’
158. Guptaleaks accounting records, most notably the Worlds Window-

Gupta enterprise hawala ledger (described in more detail below)
record that payments roughly equal to the amounts described in the
abovementioned email were recorded as being transferred from JJ
Trading to the three recipients. Row 138 of the ‘Account 1’ sheet in the
hawala ledger, for example, shows that $1.1m was transferred from JJ
Trading to ITJ ‘Retial’ [sic] on the 2nd of January 2012: the day after
Ashu Chawla’s email and equal to the exact amount that was requested
to be paid. As we show in some detail below, the transfers requested
by Ashu Chawla would have drawn from funds that were commingled
with payments to JJ Trading by ZPMC.
159. The second Jagati-related correspondence began on the 2nd of June

2012, when one Ravi Gupta (junkyardscrap@gmail.com) emailed
Ramratan Jagati, copying pooja@everestmetals.ae. This latter address
was controlled by Pooja Puri, who the #Guptaleaks show was in
frequent contact with Ashu Chawla regarding payments from Everest
Metals. Ravi Gupta requested that Jagati ‘please provide USD 1,000,000
to Arctos.’
160. On the 3rd of June 2012, Jagati emailed Ravi Gupta and one Puneet
Gupta, copying Pooja Puri. The email included confirmation that
two SWIFT transfers had been made from IMR General Trading
FZE to Arctos; the first worth $150 000 and the second worth $1m.
Incidentally, both were recorded as being ‘against purchase of scrap
metal’, which was almost certainly fraudulent. IMR General Trading
FZE is beneficially owned by Piyoosh Goyal according to investigations
by amaBhungane.
161. The following day, Pooja Puri, now writing from his Worlds Window
email address, emailed a number of other Worlds Window staff
including Puneet Gupta and others, as well as Rajiv Dabas, an employee
of Arctos. Puri forwarded the SWIFT confirmations, describing them
as ‘Payment for BOB instalment, may please get it trfd from SBI to BOB
at the earliest.’ As we will show in more detail below, this interaction
referred to the repayment of a loan taken out by Everest Metals from
Bank of Baroda in South Africa, which was, in reality, a means of
recycling funds to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise.
162. The following day – the 5th of June 2012 – Rajiv Dabas forwarded
this chain of correspondence to Ashu Chawla, who shortly thereafter
forwarded it to Ugeshni Naidoo.
163. The final email chain from the #Guptaleaks involving Jagati was
initiated on the 13th of June 2013 when Jagati emailed Ronica Ragavan
at her JIC email address, Ashu Chawla and an email address styled
‘name1794@gmail.com.’ We do not know definitively who operated
the name1794@gmail.com address, but suspect that it could have been
Ronica Ragavan as the email address was saved against the contact
S ection 5 – 6 3
name ‘Ron.’ Additionally, this address received correspondence of the
type that was typically sent to Ronica Ragavan, Sahara cash accounting
spread sheets in particular.
164. The email from Jagati forwarded a SWIFT confirmation showing

two payments made from JJ Trading FZE. The first payment worth
$1 110 000 had been paid by JJ Trading FZE into ITJ Retails Private
Limited’s account at HDFC bank. The second payment was valued at
$2 146 686.46 and sent from JJ Trading FZE to the bank account of
Sahara Computer and Electronics at HDFC bank in New Delhi. Both
payments were given the payee reference ‘Channel Tech Deal.’ This
most likely refers to Channel Tech Distribution FZCO registered in
Dubai. The Worlds Window-Gupta enterprise hawala ledger shows
two payments to Channel Tech Distribution, a Gupta enterprise
company, in 2010. Numerous #Guptaleaks emails show a number of
transactions between Channel Tech and Gupta enterprise companies
including Sahara and SES Technologies.
165. Two additional facts further link JJ Trading FZE to the Worlds
Window network. First, investigations by amaBhungane have revealed
that Jagati’s Facebook page showed that he was friends with 41 Worlds
Window managers and employees at the time of the writing of the
article (January 2018).9
166. Second, customs data shows that JJ Trading FZE was recorded as the
‘shipper’ for two shipments of scrap metal to the United States in May
2015. The bill of lading records the customer as Worlds Window Imp &
Exp India Prvt Ltd. This further confirms that existence of a close and
supportive relationship between Worlds Window and JJ Trading.
5.3.2. CENTURY GENERAL TRADING

167. Like JJ Trading FZE, Century General Trading (CGT) is registered
in the UAE. CGT’s now-defunct website stated that CGT was ‘a UAE
based Metal Trading company dealing in all forms and grades of Non-
Ferrous Metals and Residues across the globe.’ The address provided
on the Century General website was PO Box 16423, Ras Al Khaimah,
UAE.
168. Domain Name Server (whois) records show that CGT’s website was
registered by Ramratan Jagati.
169. CGT appears in the #Guptaleaks on three occasions. First, on the

11th of February 2013, Jesamine Cook from Sahara emailed Ashu
Chawla with the subject ‘Statements.’ Attached to the email was an
Excel spread sheet into which the bank statements of various Gupta
enterprise companies in Dubai had been placed. The statements show
that the Guptas’ Global Corporation received a deposit of $463 216.88
from Century General Trading FZE on the 8th of January 2011.
170. On the 13th of November 2014, Ravindra Nath emailed Piyoosh

Goyal, Sapna Jain (a Worlds Window employee), Nitin Goyal (an
employee of Wone Management) and Ronica Ragavan. The substance
of Nath’s email was that Arctos Trading needed to complete an annual
9 https://amabhungane.org/stories/guptaleaks-meet-the-money-launderers/

audit, but that certain information was missing. One of the pieces of
information missing were ‘debtor statements and ledgers’ for, inter
alia, Century General Trading FZE. Thus Arctos Trading had taken
a loan from Century General Trading FZE, or, at the very least, was
reflecting that such a loan was taken.
171. On the 4th of December 2014, Nath emailed the same interlocutors
again, reminding them that certain information was still outstanding
that would allow Arctos Trading to complete its audit. Attached to
this email was an Excel spread sheet with the filename Updated Trial
Balance 31.12.13.xlsx. The spread sheet set out the balance sheet for
Arctos Trading. The balance sheet recorded an outstanding loan given
to Arctos by Century General Trading FZE, with an outstanding
balance of R8 998 704.62. Metadata information for the spread sheet
shows that it was created by Sapna Jain, an employee of Worlds
Window.
172. Together, these emails show that Century General Trading was used
to make payments to the Gupta enterprise, and was used as a vehicle
against which loans were granted to Arctos (whether genuine or not),
which was controlled by the Worlds Window network. In the context
of an extended and complicated business relationship, we submit that
the most reasonable inference to draw is that CGT was controlled by
the Worlds Window network, and was used by the Worlds Window
network to, inter alia, make payments to the benefit of the Gupta
enterprise. The contextual text included in the agreements between
CSR and Gupta enterprise companies, described above, appears to
confirm this reading.
5.4. THE NATURE AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORLDS
WINDOW AND THE GUPTA
ENTERPRISE
173. The #Guptaleaks records show that the Gupta enterprise and the
Worlds Window network developed extremely close ties in the years
between 2010 and at least 2016 when the #Guptaleaks records cease.
These business ties encompassed a large number of business deals and
a very large number of inter-company and inter-personal financial
transactions. The scale and extent of the relationship between the
Gupta enterprise and the Worlds Window network precludes it from
being described in full here. Instead, we focus on tracing the origins
of the relationship, notable business entanglements between the
two parties, including investments by Worlds Window in the Gupta
enterprise, and, most importantly, prima facie evidence showing that
both parties were party to elaborate money laundering schemes.
S ection 5 – 6 5
5.4.1. EARLIEST DIRECT MENTIONS OF PIYOOSH GOYAL
AND WORLDS WINDOW GROUP
174. All documents relevant to this section are attached as Annexure Z
175. The earliest mention of Piyoosh Goyal or Worlds Window directly in

the #Guptaleaks is from the 24th of July 2010. The correspondence
focused on the itinerary of Goyal’s travel to Johannesburg in late July.
Further correspondence shows that Goyal travelled to South Africa
again in November 2010.
176. By January 2011 the relationship was sufficiently advanced and Goyal
presumably considered influential enough that one of the twenty tables
curated for the prestigious New Age Dinner in January 2011 had been
set aside for him and described as ‘Piyoosh Table.’ The guests allocated
to Goyal’s table included Kgalema Mothlante, the ‘ex DG Labour’,
‘DDG DMR’, one Mike from Correctional Services, one Siyabonga an
‘Advisor to Min PE’, the ‘DG Public Enterprise’, ‘DG Transport’ and
‘DG Foreign Affairs.’
177. Correspondence from May 2011 onwards shows that Ashu Chawla
was involved in booking accommodation for Worlds Window staffers
at the Guptas’ luxury Clifftop Lodge. In June 2011, Beverlie Hardie
emailed Clifftop Lodge staff, copying Chawla, requesting a booking
for the ‘Honeymoon suite’, which would be paid for by Sahara. The
guests were Piyoosh Goyal, his wife and child, who would be arriving
via helicopter.
5.4.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GUPTA

ENTERPRISE AND THE WORLDS WINDOW NETWORK:
INTRODUCING THE ‘HAWALA LEDGER.’
178. It is likely, however, that a direct and material financial relationship
between the Worlds Window network and the Gupta enterprise began
prior to July 2010.
179. On the 19th of August 2013, Ronica Ragavan sent an email to Ashu
Chawla with the subject ‘SA1 (2) current account.xlsx’, and wrote ‘Is
this what u looking for / [sic]’. The email attached an Excel workbook
that shared the same name as the email subject. The workbook is
perhaps the most important document in understanding the financial
relationship between the Gupta enterprise and the Worlds Window
network. The workbook is attached hereto as Annexure AA and is
referred to as the ‘hawala ledger’ hereon.
180. Prior to moving onto the detailed content of the workbook, it is worth
highlighting that the sheets titled ‘Account 1’ and ‘Account1 (2)’ are
headed Worlds Window in a highlighted purple row.
181. The workbook has all the hallmarks of a ‘hawala’ ledger. Hawala is a
form of money transfer and currency exchange that is common and
popular in the Middle East and South Asia. Hawala transactions most
often involve two hawala brokers in different countries. The brokers
will solicit customers who ask to send or receive cash from abroad.
The first broker will accept the funds and inform the second broker
in the second country to pay out the amount. This amount is then
deducted from a shared ledger. The net result is that money is sent
across borders, often instantaneously, without any electronic transfers
taking place. In addition to being quick and efficient, hawala systems
leave no paper trail, making them susceptible to tax evasion and
money laundering. Using hawala systems also allows the participants
to avoid currency exchange or banking charges, which, in the South
African context, means effectively operating outside of the Reserve
Bank’s currency reporting and control regime.
182. Returning to the ledger: Column B lists all entities controlled by

Worlds Window. Column C lists all entities controlled by the Gupta
enterprise or otherwise entities receiving funds to the benefit of the
Gupta enterprise. Columns D described the method of payment or
transfer, such as cash or bank deposits into various accounts. Column
E recorded the country where the deposit was made. Columns F, G,
H and J recorded the amount of each individual transaction in its
appropriate currency, although all figures are ultimately turned into a
dollar equivalent in Column J through the application of the prevailing
exchange rate, which was recorded in column I. Column K provides
the running balance between the Worlds Window network and the
Gupta enterprise.
183. The ledger balance operated according to the amounts owed to the
Gupta enterprise by the Worlds Window network. Thus a payment
received by the Worlds Window network is deducted from the running
total, as this increases the amount that is owed to the Gupta enterprise
by the Worlds Window network. Conversely, payments to the Gupta
enterprise are added to the balance as a credit as this reduces the
amount the Worlds Window network owes to the Gupta enterprise.
184. The direction of the flow of funds for each transaction is thus
determined by whether the transaction is recorded as a credit or debit;
amounts that are recorded as a credit reflect payments out of the Worlds
Window network into Gupta enterprise companies, while amounts
recorded as debits are payments made by the Gupta enterprise to the
Worlds Window network.
185. To take one illustrative example, we have reproduced Row 8 in the

sheet ‘Account1’ below:
Mode of Payment Country Amount USD Balance
7-Jun-10 JJ Sahara Computer & HSBC Bank USD Dubai 1,000,000 -3,246,104
Electronics
186. This row records a payment made to Sahara Computers & Electronics
by JJ, almost certainly JJ Trading. The payment is made into a Sahara
US dollar denominated bank account at HSBC and is worth $1m. We
know that the payment is to Sahara from JJ Trading as the amount
(1,000,000) is recorded as a positive integer or credit, which effectively
means that the Worlds Window network has reduced what it owes to
the Gupta enterprise. The balance figure in the table above is made
up of the balance prior to this transfer (-4,246,104), against which
an amount of $1m has been credited, thus decreasing the balance to
-3,346,104. Or, more simply, the Worlds Window network owes the
Gupta enterprise network $1m less than it did prior to this transaction
(-4,246,104 versus -3,246,104). S ection 5 – 6 7
187. Our confidence in relying on the hawala ledger as an accurate
record of the financial flows between the Worlds Window network
and the Gupta enterprise is due to the fact that a large number of
the transactions recorded in the hawala ledger are also recorded in
correspondence between the two organisations in the #Guptaleaks
through the sharing of payment confirmation documents. An example
of this phenomenon is dealt with in more detail below when we
describe the ‘Everest-Westdawn’ loan-back scheme. We also attach, as
Annexure BB, a copy of every payment confirmation we have been
able to locate in the #Guptaleaks that corresponds to payments in the
hawala ledger.
188. A review of the hawala ledger shows that the transfer of funds between
the Worlds Window network and the Gupta enterprise began in at least
June 2010. The first recorded transaction involving an entity definitely
controlled by the Gupta enterprise was the transaction that took place
on the 7th of June 2010 described above for illustrative purposes.10
The ledger records over 300 payments to and from Gupta enterprise
companies and the Worlds Window network from this first payment
in June 2010 until the last date recorded in the ledger, the 22nd of
February 2013.
5.4.3. INVESTMENTS MADE BY THE WORLDS WINDOW

GROUP INTO THE GUPTA ENTERPRISE
189. In addition to recording the flow of actual funds between the two
organisations, the ledger also, at various points, includes details of
investments by the Worlds Window network into Gupta enterprise
companies. Row 33 of the sheet ‘Account1’, for example, records that
IMR General Trading, a Worlds Window controlled company, had
paid $5m to Global Corporation LLC (a Gupta enterprise company)
on the 29th of July 2010, and that this was described as a ‘mining
investment.’ Notably, the credits against amounts described as ‘mining
investment’ or ‘BoB loan’ do not appear to increase or decrease the
running ledger balance. We are not sure why these items were treated
differently to other transactions.
190. The hawala ledger includes five entries recorded as ‘mining

investments’:
a. 50 000 000 Indian rupees ($1 093 613) on the 7th of January 2010,
which is paid simply to ‘SA’ by ‘Piyoosh (KS);
b. $2.4m paid to Micawber (most likely Micawber 480 or 495 as we
describe below) on the 28th of July 2010 to an undisclosed South
African bank by WW Urja (almost certainly a reference to Worlds
Window Urja Private Limited, a subsidiary of Worlds Window
Impex)
10 It should be noted that there are two transactions recorded prior to the 7 June
payment involving Sahara. The first transaction was a payment of $1,246,105
from Travertine Trade Limited to JJ Trading into an HSBC account in Dubai on
the 3rd of June 2010. The second transaction was a transfer of $2 999 999
paid to JJ Trading by Leverco Holding on the 5th of June. We have been unable
to locate any further details of Travertine or Leverco Holdings. It is thus pos-
sible – although we believe unlikely – that these transactions were unrelated
to the Gupta enterprise. As such, we conservatively identify the 7th of June
2010 payment involving Sahara as the first transaction in the hawala ledger
that definitively involved both the Gupta enterprise and the Worlds Window
network as parties.

c. 50 000 000 Indian rupees ($1 063 830) paid by RR Energy11 to Oakbay
Investments on the 28th of July 2010;
d. $5m paid to Global Corporation LLC by IMR GT [IMR General
Trading12] on the 29th of July 2010 into a bank in Dubai;
e. $2 034 000 paid by WW Urja to Mica on the 18th of August 2010
into an unknown bank account in South Africa (the identity of Mica
is not clear but the context very strongly suggests that this was a
mistyping or truncation of Micawber);
f. 50 000 000 Indian rupees paid to SES Technologies by RR Energy on
the 2nd of November 2011
191. Correspondence from the Guptaleaks shows that the records of so-
called mining investments in the hawala ledger did indeed happen, at
least on paper.
192. On the 2nd of December 2014, Ravindra Nath emailed Tony Gupta
with the subject ‘Piyoosh Ji – Vierfontein mine.’ Vierfontein mine
referred to the mine controlled by the Gupta enterprise into which
Worlds Window had invested. The email attempted to recount or
recap the earliest investment arrangements made between the Gupta
enterprise and the Worlds Window network. Nath writes:
There was no formal agreement was [sic] with Piyoosh initially.

However, the deal was US$5 per ton of coal mined and for Vierfontein
the value of the Project was US$20m for 100%.
In August 2010, US$4,343,000 was transferred in Oakbay’s account as

purchase consideration for shares for Micawber 480 & 495 shares. The
exchange rate was US$1:R7.50.
193. Micawber 480 and 495 were two entities controlled by the Gupta
enterprise and which held coal mining rights. Internal Sahara company
documents from 2016 show that Micawber 480’s lone director was
Ravindra Nath and that the company was registered to the Guptas’
oft-used address at 144 Katherine Street. In the same documentation,
Micawber 495 listed Nath and Ronica Ragavan as sole directors and
also listed 144 Katherine Street as its registered address.
194. The hawala ledger records two transfers that (roughly) match the
description of the investment given by Nath: the $2.4m payment
to Micawber by WW Urja on the 28th of July 2010 and a further
$2 034 000 made to ‘Mica’ (in this context, almost certainly Micawber)
on the 18th of August 2010 by WW Urja. This amounts to $4 434 000,
which is approximate to the $4 343 000 described by Nath.
195. On the 9th of October 2012, Ankur Sharma, an employee of Tegeta,

wrote to the Department of Mineral Resources. Sharma attached a
copy of the mining rights issued to Idwala Coal by the Department.
11 This almost certainly an Indian-registered company by the name of RR Energy

based in Chatisgarh. This company ran a now defunct website (www.rrenergy.
in). Archived copies of the website available from www.archive.org show that
RR Energy listed Everest Metals FZE as a ‘Sister Company.’ RR Energy was
thus plausibly either controlled by Worlds Windows Group or shared strong
links with them.
12 IMG General Trading appears a number of times in the #Guptaleaks records.
In particular, Arctos financial records show that Arctos had taken out a loan
– or was reporting to have taken out a loan – from IMR General trading in its
2011 financial results. The loan was valued at R1 246 922.
S ection 5 – 6 9
Internal Sahara records show that Idwala Coal (previously Idwala
Crypts) was owned by Tegeta Resources, Mabengela Resources and
Oakbay Investments. The mining rights document confirmed that
Idwala Coal’s prospecting rights would commence on the 25th of
October 2010 until the 24th of October 2020. The rights were for
‘the remaining extension of Portion 31 and Portion 44 of the farm
Vierfontein 61 IS’ near Bethal in Mpumalanga.
196. On the 22nd of February 2011, an employee of Cliff Decker Hoffmeyr

emailed Shuchi Bansal, an employee of Worlds Window. The employee
attached a draft of a legal due diligence report on an intended deal
between Idwala and Micawber 480. The email chain shows that the
report was shared with, amongst others, Piyoosh Goyal, Ravindra
Nath, Ashu Chawla and Evan Tak. The due diligence report noted that
CDH:
… have been instructed by the Worlds Windows Group (“WWG”) to

conduct a legal due diligence investigation in respect of possible
investment by WWG in the proposed transaction between Idwala Coal
(Proprietary) Limited (“Idwala”) and Micawber 480 (Proprietary)
Limited (“Micawber”). The following legal due diligence report is based
on the information provided to us.
197. Unfortunately, the full legal due diligence document was not attached,
as this appears to be a working draft of an introduction. However,
it is possible that the full document remains in the hands of CDH,
which would shed light on the specifics of the arrangement that was
envisaged.
198. The above email correspondence thus shows that Idwala Coal held
the prospecting rights for Vierfontein, and the Worlds Window was
intending to invest in the mine through an investment in a transaction
between Idwala and Micawber 480.
199. The transaction was, moreover, recorded in Oakbay Resources audited

annual financial statements every year from 2011 to 2014. The reports
recorded the transaction as an ‘advance for subscription of shares’ in
Oakbay subsidiaries. However, it is highly unlikely that the shares
were ever transferred to the control of the Worlds Window network,
strongly suggesting that this transaction was most likely a cover for
money laundering.
200. In addition to the above, and most perhaps importantly, the Worlds
Window Group incorporated a bespoke entity that held its South
African assets in Gupta enterprise mines: Arctos Trading.
201. As noted above, Arctos Trading was incorporated in 2011 with

registration number 2011/002541/07. Arctos’ financial statements for
the year ended 31 December 2011 confirmed that Arctos had invested
in Gupta-controlled mining assets. Page 14 of the financial statements
show that Arctos had made ‘investment in mining rights’ into Idwala
Coal (valued at R165 000 000) and Tegeta Exploration and Resources
(Proprietary) Limited (valued at R197 852 050).
202. Incidentally, at page 17 of the same financial statements, Arctos

recorded an outstanding liability of R283 611 482. This was a Bank of
Baroda loan that was ‘secured by investments in Tegeta Exploration
and Idwala Coal.’ This was in addition to a further R96m unsecured

loan provided by Oakbay Investments. We suspect that these loans
may have been part of a loan-back scheme between Arctos, Idwala
and Oakbay. In order to limit the scope of this submission here, we do
not describe this in detail here, but can do so should the Commission
require.
203. Worlds Window’s marketing brochure, describe above, is effusive

about Arctos’ investment in what is clearly, from the context and
description, the Vierfontein colliery:
The company’s first venture into the Southern African continent was the
acquiring of a greenfield coal mine that is now fully operational. The
mine is situated in the Mpumalanga Province of Southern Africa and
is located in the Bethal district. It has since proven to be a mine with 11
million ton coal reserve, which is set to target both the local and export
markets. The project is located proximal to several coal-fired power
stations and has road, rail and power infrastructure running within
50 kilometers of the project. Together with the global demand for coal
rising by an annual average of 4%, this mine will help WWG touch
another milestone in growth.
204. The above thus shows that the Gupta enterprise and Worlds Window
network were engaged in a complex and long-standing criminal
relationship from at least mid-June 2010 onwards, which included
over 300 transactions between the two organisations as recorded in the
‘hawala ledgers,’ the incorporation of Arctos as a South African entity
to hold Worlds Window’s share of Gupta enterprise assets, including
the Vierfontein colliery, and a number of complicated inter-company
loans. Moreover, the hawala ledgers show that JJ Trading was central
to this system of money transfers, and was effectively controlled by the
Worlds Window network.
5.4.4. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE INVOLVEMENT

OF WORLDS WINDOW AND THE GUPTA ENTERPRISE IN
MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES: THE WESTDAWN-
EVEREST LOAN-BACK SCHEME
205. All documents relevant to this section are attached as Annexure CC.
206. The #Guptaleaks records shows that from March 2011 until at least
January 2013, the Worlds Window network and the Gupta enterprise
collaborated on a transaction that bears the hallmarks of a particularly
form of money laundering: loan-backs. As discussed in considerable
detail in our second submission to the Commission regarding the
Estina project, the Gupta enterprise made frequent use of loan-backs
and round-tripping to disguise the origin and dissipation of stolen
Estina funds.
207. At some point in early 2011, Everest Global Metals Pty Ltd was
granted an overdraft facility by the Bank of Baroda. Emails from the
#Guptaleaks show that the overdraft was worth R16m. For example,
on the 2nd of November 2011, Ugeshni Naidoo forwarded an email to
Ashu Chawla that had been sent to Naidoo by Ramesh Salian, a senior
manager at Bank of Baroda’s Sandton branch. The original email sent
S ection 5 – 71
to Naidoo was addressed to ‘the directors’ of ‘Everest Global Metals
(PTY) Ltd.’ The email requested that Everest make an interest payment
on its overdraft facility with Baroda. The account details were provided
as:
1 Name of the Account Everest Global Metals (Pty)Ltd.,
2 Type of facility Overdraft
3 Limit ZAR 16 Mn.
4 Applicable Rate of Interest Prime Rate i.e. @9% P.a.
5 Interest for the month of October 2011 ZAR 122,476.74

208. Everest Global Metals (Pty) Ltd was almost certainly a subsidiary of
Everest Metals FZE based in Dubai. Everest Metals FZE was, in turn,
a Worlds Window Group subsidiary company. The Worlds Window
website states that Everest Metals FZE is Everest Global Metals Pty Ltd
was controlled by Everest Metals FZE in Dubai:
…the international trading arm of the Worlds Window Group, engaged

in the trading of containerised metal scrap, with core competence in
steel scrap and related alloyed products including Heavy Melting Scrap
(HMS), Shredded, Light Melting Scrap (LMS), Plates & Structures
Grades (P&S grades) and other non-ferrous scrap. The company also
has a division which trades in teak wood.
Everest Metals FZE has a strong foothold in 22 countries in Europe,

South Africa, Latin America, Middle East, East Africa and West
Africa. It has been incorporated as a Free Zone Establishment with
limited liability at Hamriyah Free Zone, Sharjah, U.A.E since 2008.
Our global exports cater to leading recyclers, steel mills and trading
houses in India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
209. To avoid confusion, we hereafter refer to both entities with their

location in brackets.
210. Most importantly, the #Guptaleaks emails show that Everest Global
Metals (Pty) Ltd’s (South Africa) bank account at First National Bank
was controlled by members of the Worlds Window Group, Pooja Puri
in particular. A sample of the emails showing Pooja Puri forwarding
payment confirmations from this account is attached hereto as
Annexure FF.
211. The loan/overdraft facility offered to Everest Global (South Africa) by

Bank of Baroda is recorded in the hawala ledger. Rows 65 and 68 of the
hawala ledger record that Everest made two payments totalling R16m,
both on the 25th of March 2013: R15m and R1m. The first payment
(R15m) was recorded as being paid to Westdawn at a bank in South
Africa, and was recorded in Column K as ‘BOB Loan.’ The second
payment of R1m was also recorded as a ‘BOB Loan’ but the recipient
was identified as ‘New GX Advisory.’ We do not know who this might
refer. It will be necessary to review Everest Global’s (South Africa)
bank records to confirm.

212. The #Guptaleaks includes a confirmation of the R15m payment from
Everest Global (South Africa) to Westdawn. On the 25th of March
2011, one ‘Keerthan’ from Everest Metals FZE (Dubai) (keerthan@
everestmetals.ae) emailed Rajiv Dabas, a Worlds Window employee
who would later operate an Arctos email account. Keerthan attached
a document with filename 15 MILL.xps. The XPS document consisted
of a confirmation of an online banking payment made from Everest
Global Metal’s (South Africa) FNB account to Westdawn Investment’s
bank account (012316067 at branch number 012645). The confirmation
is attached hereto as Annexure GG.
213. On a seemingly monthly basis (the #Guptaleaks records show one or

two months where some correspondence is missing), an employee of
the Gupta enterprise, usually Ashu Chawla, would email Pooja Puri at
the Worlds Window Group to let them know the amount of interest
charged by the Bank of Baroda. This suggests that it was the Gupta
enterprise that was receiving correspondence meant for Everest Global
(South Africa) from Bank of Baroda, and forwarding it onto Worlds
Window employees to forward onto Everest Metals FZE (Dubai)
employees. Everest Global Metals (South Africa) would duly make the
payment to the Bank of Baroda’s pool account at Nedbank to settle the
interest charge. Simultaneously, Everest Global Metals (South Africa)
would be paid by Westdawn equal to the amount invoiced by the Bank
of Baroda (although usually rounded up or down to the nearest R10
000).
214. The #Guptaleaks records includes a large number of emails between

Gupta enterprise employees, Worlds Window employees and Everest
Metals FZE (Dubai) employees in which the payments required for
the scheme were completed. We have extracted the details and attach,
as Annexure HH, a spread sheet setting out all the transactions
identifiable through the #Guptaleaks. We also include copies of the
correspondence, invoices and proof of payment sheets.
215. The net effect of the transfers above was to (a) allow Westdawn to
secure a line of credit from Bank of Baroda against the accounts of
Everest Global Metals (South Africa) and (b) to create a circular flow
of funds that has all the hallmarks of money laundering and which
made little to no real or legitimate business sense. The circular flow of
funds is best understood visually, as shown on the next page.
216. The #Guptaleaks reveal a number of additional interesting facts or

features of this scheme that are worth noting. First, at various times
Everest Global (South Africa) was unable to make the requisite
payment to Bank of Baroda as it did not maintain a running/operating
balance. On the 7th of September 2012, for example, Ashu Chawla
wrote to Pooja Puri asking that Everest make its monthly payment
to the Bank of Baroda, and attaching proof that a payment of R170
000 had been made from Westdawn to Everest Global (South Africa).
Pooja Puri responded by saying that ‘we shall pay as soon as funds
received in our account as Everest donot [sic] maintain balance in
RSA.’ This strongly suggests that Everest Global Metals (South Africa)
retained no working funds in South Africa and only transacted from
its accounts in relation to these loan-back transactions, suggesting that
Everest Global Metals (South Africa) was merely a cut-out or front for
money laundering activities related to the Gupta enterprise.
S ection 5 – 73
Westdawn/JIC
Westdawn pays
Everest approx R120
000 per month
Everest pays
Westdawn R15m in
March 2011
Everest Global Metals Everest Global Metals

FNB Account FNB Account
Everest pays Bank of Baroda

approx R120 000 per month to
settle interest on overdraft
R15m overdraft
given to Everest
Bank of Baroda
Above:
A circular ‘loan-back’ scheme used by the Gupta
enterprise and Worlds Window to ‘wash’ a R15m loan
217. Second, on at least one occasion, Everest Global Metals (South Africa)
did not raise an invoice against Westdawn regarding the monthly
interest payment, but instead addressed the invoice (which was sent
to Ashu Chawla) to Estina. The Estina invoice was dated the 18th of
July 2011. Estina was charged R120 000 for ‘consultation charges’ and
further R16 800 in VAT. The total charged was thus R136 800.
218. This may not have been the only time that Estina was invoiced in this
manner. On the 3rd of May 2011, Satyajeet Pandey (satyajeet.pandey@
gmail.com) emailed Ashu Chawla. Pandey appears to have worked for
World Window, travelling to South Africa on one occasion with Rajiv
Dabas, a fellow employee. The #Guptaleaks shows that Pandey later
operated an Arctos email address. Pandey requested that Ashu Chawla
‘please get an invoice from Everest for the following’:
INVOICE TO:
ESTINA PTY LTD
11 ALICE LANE
SANDTON
VAT NUMBER: 4650257167
Project Scoping and Advisory fee – PROJECT NSINGA
Amount R : 110 000 + vat R15 400 =R125400
Kindly send me a copy of the invoice once done with your bank details
in order for us to make payment.

219. The invoice to Estina was most likely created after the underlying
transaction was completed: on the 28th of April 2011, Ashu Chawla
was sent an email by Satyajeet Pandey, forwarding a message originally
from one Nagendra Suresh Kumar at Everest Metals FZE (Dubai).
The email forwarded to Chawla listed the bank details for Everest
Global Metals PTY Ltd’s (South Africa) FNB bank account. Chawla
forwarded the email almost immediately to Ronica Ragavan. Two
hours later, Ashu Chawla was forwarded a second message by Satyajeet
Pandey, who was forwarding a message originally sent by Padumame
Keethan at Everest Metals FZE (Dubai) to himself and three Worlds
Window employees (Rajiv Dabas, Amit Kalra and Pooji Puri). The
email included a confirmation of payment, although our copy of the
email does not include the original attachment.
220. The timeline of the above (bank details and payment confirmation sent
at the end of April and a request for an invoice against Estina shortly
thereafter in May) suggests that this payment, too, was made to cover
the approximately R120 000 paid in interest by Everest Global Metals
(South Africa) each month, but which was ultimately paid back to
Everest Global Metals (South Africa) by a Gupta enterprise company
– in this case, Estina. An examination of the Estina bank records from
2011 would be able to confirm whether the transfers took place or not.
A further inference of this interaction is that Estina, by completing and
submitting this invoice, was in fact party to fraud and mis-invoicing by
misrepresenting that nature of the transaction, which was ultimately
designed to complete a loan-back loop rather than reflecting any
actual services delivered or received.
221. Third, in November 2012, Everest Global (South Africa) was unable to
make its usual payment to the Bank of Baroda as its online banking at
FNB was dysfunctional. Ranbir Singh of Everest Metals FZE (Dubai)
thus asked Pooja Puri to ‘kindly deposit the BOB payment directly or
route through Arctos.’ This email was shared with Ashu Chawla, who
instructed Ronica Ragavan and Ugeshni Naidoo to refrain from paying
Everest Global (South Africa) directly. Instead, just under a week later,
Tegeta Resources (PTY) Ltd paid R115 000 to Arctos Trading’s South
African accounts. The confirmation was shared with Pooja Puri. Later
that same day, one Himanshu Agarwal forwarded a confirmation of
payment to Ashu Chawla and Pooja Puri showing that Arctos had paid
R115 476.85 to the Bank of Baroda to settle the monthly interest.
222. The inability of Everest Global (South Africa) to make payments in

South Africa inadvertently exposed the true nature of the transaction.
At all times, Everest (South Africa) was reliant on Gupta enterprise
companies to make monthly payments to satisfy the interest charges.
At the same time, Everest Metals FZE (Dubai) considered Everest
Global (South Africa) and Arctos effectively interchangeable as a
means of routing funds in South Africa. Nevertheless, the Gupta
enterprise was still wary of breaking the usual chain and, for the first
and only time, paid the funds to Arctos from Tegeta rather than from
Westdawn: considering previous form, it would have been logical
for the funds to be transferred directly from Westdawn to Arctos as
it was Westdawn that was the recipient of the R15m loan pay-out
from Everest Global (South Africa) that started the transaction. It is
plausible that this caution was exercised in order to prevent Tegeta
from having to account for ad hoc payments to Everest (South Africa),
which may have raised audit or other concerns.
S ection 5 – 75
223. Finally, the trail of emails shows that the Bank of Baroda had insight
and knowledge of the true nature of the transaction, and the role of the
Gupta enterprise within it. Bank of Baroda generated a letter addressed
to the directors of Everest Global Metals (South Africa) on a monthly
basis that stipulated the monthly interest due and any additional bank
charges. However, this was not emailed to Everest Global Metals;
instead, the letter was sent to employees of the Gupta enterprise,
including Ronica Ragavan, and was subsequently forwarded to Worlds
Window employees. On one occasion Everest (South Africa) had failed
to make its interest payment to Bank of Baroda due to its failure to
access internet banking, as described above. Ramesh Salian, the Chief
Manager at Bank of Baroda, emailed Ronica Ragavan directly to let her
know that the payment had not been made.
224. It is not entirely clear how this loan-back system was wound up. The
last invoice monthly interest charge letter sent by the Bank of Baroda
in the #Guptaleaks was sent on the 5th of February 2013. The letter
reflected an outstanding balance on the facility of R6 907 660.39. The
previous letter, from December 2012, had shown a balance outstanding
of R16 115 476.93: thus just under R10m had been paid to settle this
facility in the time between both interest charge letters. But, from this
point, the #Guptaleaks are silent on this facility. Records from the
Bank of Baroda, in particular the transaction and statement record for
the loan facility, would shed light on this process.

MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES: A POTENTIAL ARCTOS
LOAN-BACK SCHEME?
225. At rows 125 and 126 of the sheet titled ‘Account 1’ in the hawala ledger
two extremely large transactions are recorded, both on the 7th of
December 2011. The first transaction involved the transfer of R128 480
000 (exactly $16m) from Arctos to Idwala Coal. The second transfer
involved the transfer of R152 570 000 ($19m) from Arctos to Tegeta
Exploration. Both were described in the ledger as ‘BOB Loan.’ These
entries thus suggest that Arctos had taken out loans valued at $35m
in total from the Bank of Baroda, and paid their proceeds to Gupta
226. #Guptaleaks emails show that loans were indeed taken out by Arctos
from the Bank of Baroda. They also show that these loans were
administered in the same way as the Westdawn-Everest loan-back
described above: the Bank of Baroda sent a monthly statement of the
amount due to the Gupta enterprise, which was then forwarded by
Ashu Chawla to employees of the Worlds Window network, Rajiv
Dabas in particular. Dabas was emailed at both his Arctos and Worlds
Window email addresses. Presumably payments were made by Arctos
to the Bank of Baroda to settle the interest and instalments on the
loans.
227. #Guptaleaks emails show that Arctos was granted a loan facility with
number 06/250. As seen in our second submission on the Estina/
Vrede Dairy Project, this shorthand would have referred to the Bank of
Baroda’s use of 06 as an identifier for loan facilities. If the loan account

was operated in the same way as other Baroda accounts held by the
Gupta enterprise at the time, the loan account most likely bore the
number 92020600000250.
228. In the first instalment demand letter sent by the Bank of Baroda to
Arctos, the loan was described as a ‘loan against fixed deposit.’ The
Gupta enterprise used the same system when laundering Estina funds:
loans were taken out against Fixed Deposit accounts, and, through an
elaborate system of round-tripping, eventually settled when the Fixed
Deposit accounts were closed and the funds had been recycled.
229. What is particularly curious about this loan-back scheme is the

shortness of the period in which the loan appears to have become
due. In total, three demand letters addressed by the Bank of Baroda
regarding this loan are recoverable from the #Guptaleaks archive. The
first was sent by Ashu Chawla on the 16th of February but was to be paid
against ‘interest for the month of January 2012.’ The first instalment –
for January 2012 - was calculated at $171 835.48. The second instalment
– for February 2012 – was calculated as $2 741 536.29, which was made
up of an ‘instalment’ (presumably to settle the capital) of $2.58m and
interest of $161 536.29. The final instalment – for March 2012 – was
for $32 574 186.68, of which $154 186.88 was interest.
230. If this final instalment letter was accurate, it would suggest that this
very large loan was taken out from the Bank of Baroda for a total of
three months before becoming due. Moreover, the loan was granted
against an existing fixed deposit account. It arguably defies logic that a
company would take out a loan and incur large interest payments for
a period of only three months, when it already had access to a Fixed
Deposit account with available capital.
231. The above development sits oddly with how Arctos Trading reported
these matters in its 2011 annual financial statements. At page 16, under
‘other financial liabilities’, it was reported that Arctos had taken out
a loan from the Bank of Baroda that held an outstanding balance of
R283 611 482. The loan was described as:
Secured by investments in Tegeta Exploration and Idwala Coal, interest

is charged at 9% linked to prime and repayable quarterly in 20 equal
instalments effective from 28 February 2012. Last payment is on 28
February 2016.
232. These facts sit oddly with the material emanating from the Bank of
Baroda in two ways. First, the timeline for the repayment seems to
have been massively reduced, with repayment accelerated to April 2012
rather than February 2016. Second, the Bank of Baroda statements
suggested that the loan was granted against a Fixed Deposit, which
would be an odd means through which Arctos would secure its sizeable
investments in Tegeta and Idwala Coal. The reason for disjuncture
between the Arctos annual financial statements and the #Guptaleaks
emails cannot be resolved on the basis of the evidence at our disposal;
however, it is possible and plausible that Arctos financial statements
misrepresented both the duration of the loan and what it was granted
against in order to avoid the scrutiny of auditors.
233. Taken as a whole, we submit that this loan was most plausibly a further
case of money laundering involving the Gupta enterprise and the
Worlds Window network, and one which fused the methodology of
S ection 5 – 77
the Westdawn-Everest loan-back scheme with other methods used by
the Gupta enterprise in laundering Estina funds. This methodology
would have been useful in helping to disguise the ultimate source –
and possible use – of the original funds that created the Fixed Deposit
holding and the loan granted against it. Moreover, if the Fixed Deposit
account was held with the Bank of Baroda offshore, it would have also
created a neat way of gaining access to this money in South Africa
without the need for international transfers, thus bypassing Reserve
Bank controls.

MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES: CLEAN LAUNDRY IN
SEVEN DAYS
234. Another case of suspicious money movements took place in seven days
between the 22nd of February 2012 and the 29th of February 2012.
235. In total, 11 transactions took place between JJ Trading and Global

Corporation during this period. Simply, Global transferred its funds
(held in Dubai) to JJ Trading’s banking facilities (also held in Dubai).
On the same day the funds were received, JJ Trading transferred the
funds to South Africa in ‘cash by exchange.’ This most likely referred
to the remittance of funds via the hawala network. The payments were
most plausibly designed to move funds held by Global to South Africa
to obscure that Global was the original source of the funds. The use of a
hawala exchange would have also bypassed Reserve Bank controls. The
table below, extracted from the hawala ledger, shows how this worked.
Date From To Method Amount Global Balance JJ Balance
22/02/2012 Global JJ Bank Transfer $50 000 $50 000 -$50 000
23/02/2012 JJ Global Cash to SA ‘by $200 000 $0 $0

exchange’
27/02/2012 JJ Global Cash to SA ‘by $160 000 $0 $0

exchange’
28/02/2012 JJ Global Cash to SA ‘by $142 954 -$142 954 $142 954
exchange’
exchange’
28/02/2012 Global JJ Cash in Dubai $142 954 $-102 110 $142 954
28/02/2012 Global JJ Cash in Dubai $102 110 $0 $0
exchange’
29/02/2012 Global JJ Cash $89 935 $0 $0

MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES: THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CYCLE
236. The final set of suspicious transactions addressed in this submission
(although by no means the final set of transactions between the
Gupta and Worlds Window networks) took place between the
30th of November 2011 and 5th of December 2011. In total sixteen
transactions took place in this period. In essence, Arctos acted as a
revolving door, receiving and distributing funds to five different
Gupta enterprise companies: Tegeta Exploration, JIC Mining Services
[Westdawn], Idwala Coal, Islandsite and Oakbay Investments. All
sixteen transactions balanced to zero: the amounts Arctos was paid
and subsequently paid out were exactly equal. The following table,
extracted from the hawala ledger, shows this clearly:
Date From To Amount Consolidated Arctos

Balance viz. Tegeta,
Islandsite, JIC, Idwala and
Oakbay
30/11/2011 Arctos Tegeta R9 900 000 R9 900 000
30/11/2011 JIC Arctos R10 000 000 -R100 000
30/11/2011 JIC Arctos R10 000 000 -R10 100 000
01/12/2011 Arctos Tegeta Exploration R200 000 -R9 900 000
01/12/2011 Arctos Tegeta Exploration R24 000 000 R14 100 000
01/12/2011 Arctos Tegeta Exploration R9 900 000 R24 000 000
01/12/2011 JIC Arctos R4 000 000 R20 000 000
01/12/2011 JIC Arctos R20 000 000 R0
05/12/2011 Arctos Idwala Coal R10 000 000 R10 000 000
05/12/2011 Islandsite Arctos R3 000 000 R29 000 000
05/12/2011 Oakbay Arctos R4 000 000 R4 000 000
05/12/2011 Oakbay Arctos R4 000 000 R0
237. The convoluted payment structure can most plausibly be understood as

a means of obscuring and washing funds and fraudulently increasing
the turnover of Gupta enterprise companies; it is certainly difficult to
see what other purpose these elaborate and self-balancing transactions
could have performed.
238. It is also worth noting that on many later occasions when the Gupta
enterprise paid funds to Arctos, it did so after bouncing payments
between various Gupta enterprise organisations, further suggesting
that the Gupta enterprise was frequently at pains to obscure the origin,
S ection 5 – 79
destination and route of funds. One such example took place on the
24th of April 2013. Ugeshni Naidoo of Sahara emailed Ashu Chawla
with the subject line ‘absa bis – pls app.’ The #Guptaleaks contain many
of these sorts of emails in which Ugeshni Naidoo regularly asked
Ashu Chawla and sometimes Evan Tak to approve transfers from the
Absa bank accounts of various Gupta enterprise entities. In this case,
Naidoo requested that R1 000 000 be transferred to Arctos, but only
after passing through a number of other companies first:
ANNEX TO COMPUTERS 500 000
COMPUTERS TO ISLANDSITE 1 000 000
ISLANDSITE TO OAKBAY 1 000 000
OAKBAY TO TEGETA 1 000 000
TEGETA TO ARCTOS STD 1 000 000
5.5. THE RECEIPT OF FUNDS BY THE

WORLDS WINDOW NETWORK FROM
ZPMC
239. The hawala ledgers show that four payments were paid into the Worlds
Window network, “JJ” in particular, between the 22nd of December
2011 and the 30th of January 2013, worth $4.25m.
240. The payments into the hawala ledger by ZPMC, which were recorded
by the full name Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, were matched
by an immediate payment of between 3.8% and 3.9% of the ZPMC
payment to a person simply recorded as ‘David.’ On certain occasions,
the payment method to ‘David’ was described as ‘Bank (Commission).’
On one occasion, ‘David’ appears to have been paid in cash, with the
cash given to one ‘Mr Anthony.’ Adding the amounts paid by ZPMC
to the amounts paid to ‘David’ gives a round number: $1m for the first
three payments and $1 250 000 for the final payment recorded.
241. The following payments are recorded in the hawala ledger:
Date To From Amount Method/

Description
22/12/2011 JJ Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy $969 086 Bank

Industries
31/12/2011 JJ David $38 764 Bank

Industries
14/05/2012 JJ David $38 764 Bank (Commis-

sion)
continued...

17/05/2012 JJ David $38 764 Bank (Commis-
sion)

Industries
28/01/2013 JJ Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy $1 245 974 Bank

Industries
30/01/2013 JJ David $49 837 Cash (paid to Mr

Anthony)
TOTAL $4 250 000
5.6. DEPOSITS RECEIVED BY THE

WORLDS WINDOW NETWORK/
CENTURY GENERAL TRADING FROM
CHINA SOUTH RAIL RELATED TO THE
95 LOCOS CONTRACT
242. The hawala ledgers record two payments made to ‘Century’ [almost
certainly Century General Trading based on the information contained
in the CSR kickback worksheet described above] by ‘CSR Loccomotive.’
The total value of the incoming payments was $6 284 876.
243. The first payment recorded in the hawala ledger was a deposit of $5
932 935 made on the 29th of December 2012. Unfortunately the ledger
does not record the location of the payment, simply recording that the
payment was made via a ‘bank.’
244. The second payment recorded in the hawala ledger was a deposit of
$351 941 paid to ‘Century’ on the 9th of February 2013. Again, no
record is provided of the location of the recipient bank account, only
that the amount was transferred via a ‘bank.’
245. In June 2020, amaBhungane published details of the underlying
contracts signed between CSR and CNR and numerous Gupta
enterprise companies related to Transnet contracts. amaBhungane also
published a detailed calculation of the flow of funds to and from CSR,
CRN and the Gupta enterprise, tying these specific flows to underlying
contracts. These calculations were published in spread sheet, which we
attach as Annexure II. This spread sheet, and amaBhungane’s analysis,
sheds light on further payments made to CGT emanating from 95
locomotives contract, of which two things are particularly notable.
246. First, it is apparent that by January 2015, shortly before CGT would
be replaced by Regiments Asia (discussed in greater detail below),
CGT had already been paid $16 699 903. This is confirmed by the 2015
workings document described in Section 3.10 above. According to
amaBhungane’s detailed calculations, this amount accords neatly with
the value of kickbacks that would have been due to that point based on
Transnet’s 10% prepayment on the 95 contract and Transnet’s payment
for the delivery of 25 locomotives by CNR.
247. Second, the two payments recorded in the hawala ledger (a total $6
284 876 made up two payments of $5 932 935 on 29 December 2012
S ection 5 – 8 1
and $351 941 on the 9th of February 2013) accord with the anticipated
kickbacks that CNR was due to pay to CGT based on the underlying
kickback agreements, and, in particular, the kickback due to CGT
based on Transnet’s advance payment of 10% of the contract value to
CSR. According to amaBhungane’s calculations, Transnet paid R268
679 000 to CSR on the 21st of December 2012. At the anticipated
20% kickback rate due to CGT, the kickback due to CGT would have
equalled R53 735 800, or $6 287 757. This almost exactly equal to the
$6 284 876 paid to CGT by CSR across the two payments in December
2012 and February 2013.
248. The Dubai ledgers provide further strong circumstantial evidence of
payments to the Gupta enterprise via Century General Trading. The
2014 Dubai ledgers record four payments made to Global Corporation’s
AED accounts held Mashreq Bank and the Bank of Baroda, which are
described as ‘jjt century.’ Considering the circumstantial context, these
payments were plausibly related to the payment of kickbacks by CSR
to Century General Trading.
249. The total value of the four payments was AED12 976 600.
Date Amount (AED) Description Recipient Account
13/05/2014 2 000 000 ‘jjt century’ Global Bank of Baroda AED Account
14/05/2014 2 400 000 ‘jjt century’ Global Mashreq Bank AED Account
TOTAL 8 795 400
250. It is notable that the payments were made between the 13th and 15th
of May 2014: amaBhungane’s calculations show that Transnet made
a R113 128 000 payment to CSR on the 15th of May 2014. At the
prevailing exchange rate at the time, the value of the payments made
by JJT Century to Global’s Mashreq account between the 13th and
15th of May equalled $3 895 953. It is plausible that at least a portion
of this payment derived from $2 191 384 that was due to be paid by
CSR to CGT following Transnet’s 15th of May 2014 payment to CSR.
251. The Global accounts that received funds from JJT Century were very
active, meaning that the deposits from JJT Century commingled
with other income streams. This makes tracing the disposition of
these funds somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, what is apparent from
the Dubai ledgers is that the JJT Century funds paid to Global’s AED
denominated account at Mashreq Bank were commingled with other
funds to facilitate two large and notable transactions: AED5 520 000
paid to Fidelity’s AED denominated account at Mashreq Bank on the
15th of May 2014 and AED5 336 000 paid to Accurate Investment’s
AED denominated account at Mashreq Bank. These funds were
commingled with further income streams, and then paid out in a vast
number of transactions.
252. We have not been able to trace the funds to an ultimate destination from
this point both because of the scale of the endeavour, and the difficulty
of tracing and disaggregating commingled funds. Nevertheless, the
Dubai ledgers provide further evidence that money paid by CSR to
Century General Trading in May 2014 was distributed to the benefit of
the Gupta enterprise.
5.7. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
REGARDING THE PAYMENT OF
FUNDS FROM CSR RELATED TO
THE 359 AND 100 LOCOMOTIVE
CONTRACTS TO THE GUPTA
ENTERPRISE VIA WORLDS WINDOW
253. While the hawala ledger does not provide evidence of funds paid
by CSR to JJ Trading in relation to the 359 and 100 contracts, other
sources show that this took place, in particular the Dubai ledgers and
the 2015 worksheet described in Section 3.10 above.
254. First, the 2015 worksheet is explicit in noting that JJT received
payments from CSR in relation to the 359 and 100 contracts. The
worksheet records that by the 6th of January 2015, JJT had been paid
$107 203 921 for the 359 and 100 contracts, which was, in turn, made
up of the 2% success fee for both contracts and kickbacks paid to JJT
as Transnet had made payments to CSR. Of this, 50% of the 2% success
fee and 85% of the milestone payments was due to be paid onward
from JJT to the Gupta enterprise. Thus, by the 6th of January 2015,
the worksheet shows that the Gupta enterprise had been paid $76 419
200.75 through JJT, of which $21 005 903 was paid as the 1% success
fee due to the Gupta enterprise the 359 and 100 contracts, and the
remaining $55 413 297.75 drawn from milestone payments made by
Transnet to CSR.
255. Second, the February to December 2014 Dubai ledgers, are more
detailed than previous Dubai ledgers in specifying the underlying
JJT entity used to pay funds to Gupta enterprise companies. These
are recorded in the ledgers as, for example, ‘jjt world vision.’ Some
of these descriptions – such as World Vision – match the names of
Worlds Window subsidiary companies in India noted above. Some
descriptions refer to entities we cannot identify or discern, such as ‘jjt
al sabt’ or ‘jjt force exim.’ Others refer to entities that can be linked
to the JJ Trading scrap metal laundering universe, such as ‘jjt golden
coast.’ 13
256. We have extracted all of these payments and attach them in a spread
sheet as Annexure JJ.
257. Our analysis of the ledgers shows that the following number and value
of payments were made:
a. 55 payments made into Global Corporation’s AED denominated
Bank of Baroda account, described variously as ‘jjt mangalam’, ‘jjt
13 This most likely refers to Golden Coast FZE registered in the UAE. Like JJ
Trading and other cut-outs used by the Worlds Window network, Golden Coast
is based in the Hamriyah Free Zone in the UAE. The Golden Coast website
(http://www.goldencoast.ae/) bears a striking resemblance to the Everest
Metals FZE and Century General Trading websites. The Golden Coast website
describes the company as ‘engaged in supplying a wide range of ferrous
and non-ferrous metal scrap.’ The Whois data for the Golden Coast website
shows that the domain was registered by Ranbir Singh. Ranbir Singh appears
frequently in the #Guptaleaks writing from an Everest Metals email address,
including sending proof of payments related to the Everest-Westdawn loan-
back scheme described previously.
S ection 5 – 8 3
bri’, ‘jjt force exim’, ‘jjt al sabt’, ‘jjt mahir gen trd’, ‘jjt world vision’, ‘jjt
xx’, ‘jjt golden coast’ and ‘jjt cash ex diff.’ The payments were all made
between the 23rd of April and the 12th of July, and totalled AED73
457 494.
b. 18 payments made into Global Corporation’s USD denominated
account at the Bank of Baroda between the 22nd of May 2014 and
the 29th of October 2014. The payments were described either as ‘jjt
world vision’ or ‘jjt golden coast.’ The payments totalled $11 118 926.
c. Two payments made into Fidelity’s USD denominated account at
the Bank of Baroda worth $2 480 000 and described as ‘jjt golden
coast.’ The two payments were made on the 12th of July and 29th
of October. It is worth noting that, prior to these two payments,
Fidelity transferred $1.8m to ‘jjt golden coast’, which was the precise
value of the first deposit on the 12th of July. This shows that money
flowed both ways between Gupta enterprise and Worlds Window/
JJT companies.
d. Five payments made into Reliable’s USD denominated account at
Mashreq bank, all made on the 1st of May 2014.The payments were
described as ‘jjt force exim’ or ‘jjt xx’ and totalled $4 499 836.44.
e. Eighteen cash payments made by ‘jjt’ between the 21st of April and
the 16th of July 2014. The total value of the cash transaction was
AED77 323 769
258. The total dollar value for the above transfers and cash deposits made
into Gupta enterprise accounts by JJT and its various subsidiaries was
$62 832 549.25.14
259. It is, of course, possible that the payments into Gupta enterprise
accounts by JJT related entities were funded by sources other than
CSR. This would have to be confirmed through an analysis of the
underlying JJT banking documentation. These could be compared
against the flow of funds to Gupta enterprise companies, taking into
account the 15% fee charged by Worlds Window for facilitation.
5.8. THE DIFFICULTY OF TRACING

ZPMC AND CSR FUNDS
260. It is difficult to trace exactly how the funds paid by ZPMC and CSR
to the Worlds Window network were directed and dissipated for two
reasons. First, we lack the requisite bank statements for the underlying
accounts held by the Worlds Window and Gupta enterprise accounts
in Dubai. Second, although the hawala ledger allows us to track
payments, the amounts paid by ZPMC and CSR were commingled
with other money laundered through the same network. Payments
into and out of various accounts makes a neat tracing of flows and
benefits very difficult, if not impossible.
261. One thing, however, is certain: while tracing the dissipation of the
funds is difficult, the payments made by ZPMC and CSR were all
paid to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise (minus Worlds Windows’
cut) as all commingled funds in the hawala ledger were paid to Gupta
14 The AED to USD exchange rate was 1AED = $0.2725 for much of this period

SECTION 6:
THE RECEIPT AND
DISSIPATION OF
FUNDS FROM CHINA
SOUTH RAIL AND
CHINA NORTH RAIL
TO TEQUESTA AND
REGIMENTS ASIA
VIA HSBC
262. In Section 3 above, we outlined the various contractual agreements
regulating the relationship between CSR, CNR, ZPMC, CRRC and
Gupta enterprise companies. These, when read in conjunction with
the calculations performed by amaBhungane in tracing payments from
Transnet to Gupta enterprise companies, show that, for some reason,
the Worlds Window network was effectively cut out of the kickback
arrangements from roughly January 2015 onwards. In its place were
inserted two Gupta-enterprise controlled companies: Tequesta Group
Limited and Regiments Asia.
85
6.1. TEQUESTA GROUP LIMITED AND
REGIMENTS ASIA
263. Hong Kong company registry documents (attached hereto as
Annexure K) show that Tequesta Group Limited was incorporated in
Hong Kong on the 20th of June 2014. Tequesta Group’s ‘Incorporation
Form’ indicates that the company’s registered email address was to be
abbylai@onlinecompanyregister.com. In our joint submission to the
Commission on the enablers of State Capture with Open Secrets, we
provided evidence that the use of this email address showed that the
company was formed by Stephen MS Lai, who specialised in forming
Hong Kong shell companies.
264. Most importantly, Tequesta Group’s ‘Incorporation Form’ listed Salim

Aziz Essa as the sole director. His address was given as 2 New Forest
Road, Forest Town, Johannesburg, 2193. The above indicates Tequesta
Group Limited was thus specifically incorporated for Essa’s nominal
use on behalf of the Gupta enterprise, which remained the true
controlling interest.
265. On the 17th of November 2016, Essa was replaced as the sole director
of Tequesta Group by Aashika Singh, an Indian national with passport
number L1999184. Aashika Singh was closely connected to the Gupta
enterprise.
266. According to the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA), Singh

was an employee of ANN7.15 Emails from the #Guptaleaks (attached
as Annexure KK) show that that Singh was paid R20 905.76 on the
24th of April 2015 by Infinity Media, the Gupta enterprise company
that housed ANN7.
267. The #Guptaleaks further show that Sanjay Grover made reservations
for Singh at the Oberoi in Dubai. We attach the related correspondence
as Annexure LL. Simultaneous with this booking process, Ashu Chawla
was emailed a copy of Singh’s tourist visa for Dubai, which had been
arranged by the travel agency used frequently by the Gupta enterprise,
Travel Excellence.
268. Finally, an email exchange from July 2015 involving KPMG’s

Muhammad Saloojee and Mackey O’Sullivan from KS Law (copying in
Ronica Ragavan), attached as Annexure MM, indicates that Singh was
identified as a potential sponsor to assist the creation of a company in
Dubai that was being established in the name of Varun Gupta.
269. A similar set of corporate arrangements prevailed for Regiments Asia.

Hong Kong company formation documents (attached as Annexure I)
show that Regiments Asia Limited was also incorporated on the 20th
of June 2014 using identical details used to establish Tequesta Group.
In particular:
a. The contact email address for Regiments Asia was abbylai@
onlinecompanyregister.com
b. The sole director was Salim Aziz Essa residing at 2 New Forest Road,
Forest Town, Johannesburg, 2193.
15 https://www.outa.co.za/projects/state-capture/gupta-associates/obe-
rio-guests

270. On the 16th of November 2016, as with Tequesta Group, Salim Essa
was replaced as the director of Regiments Asia by Aashika Singh.
271. We submit that the roles of Essa and Singh in the formation and control
of Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia provides further evidence
showing that these companies formed part of the Gupta enterprise,
and, moreover, that their explicit function was to receive and distribute
kickbacks from CSR and CNR to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise.
6.2. THE HONG KONG BANKING

RECORDS: PAYMENTS MADE BY
CSR, CNR, DA LIAN AND CRRC
272. We attach, as Annexure NN, banking documents related to the accounts
held by Tequesta Group Limited and Regiments Asia, which we refer
to as the ‘HSBC ledgers.’ The banking documents were provided to us
by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).
273. The HSBC ledgers are self-evidently the result of a series of keyword
searches conducted internally at HSBC. The keyword searches, in
turn, generated a list of all transactions that took place involving
entities related to the keywords.
274. The HSBC ledgers reveal that $187 054 355.77 was paid to Tequesta
Group and Regiments Asia by China South Rail, China North Rail, Da
Lian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Company (a subsidiary of China
North Rail) and CRRC. CRRC was formed on the 1st of June 2015
through the merger of CSR and CNR.
275. An analysis of the HSBC ledgers shows that Tequesta Group Limited’s
HSBC account in Hong Kong was paid:
a. $15 234 248 by CNR;
b. $2 704 159 by CRRC;
c. $43 456 242 by CSR; and
d. $1 021 650 from unknown sources
276. An analysis of the HSBC ledgers shows that Regiments Asia’s HSBC
account in Hong Kong was paid:
a. $8 622 906 by CNR
b. $11 288 092.75 by CRRC; and
c. $45 750 456.75 by CSR
d. $18 120 982.50 by Da Lian [China North Rail]
277. When considered jointly, Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group were
thus paid a total of:
a. $23 857 154 by CNR;
b. $13 992 251.75 by CRRC;
c. $89 206 698.16 by CSR;
d. $18 120 982.50 by Da Lian; and
e. $1 021 650 from unknown sources
278. The following table sets out all the payments made to Tequesta Group’s
Hong Kong HSBC account that are included in the HSBC ledgers:
S ection 6 – 8 7
Table 3: Payments Made to Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia at HSBC Hong Kong
Tequesta Group
Payor Amount Date
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $5 567 500 7-Aug-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co. Limited $4 717 500 26-Aug-15
CNR (Hong Kong) Corporation Limited $3 999 998 31-Aug-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $3 910 000 9-Sep-15
CNR (Hong Kong) Corporation Limited $11 234 250 25-Sep-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co. Limited $4 122 500 29-Sep-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co. Limited $4 228 748 20-Oct-15
CRRC (Hong Kong) Co Limited $2 704 159.50 1-Jun-16
TOTAL: $61 394 649.50
Regiments Asia
Payor Amount Date
DA LIAN Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co L $3 599 975 8-Dec-14
DA LIAN Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co L $3 575 530.75 9-Dec-14
DA LIAN Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co L $3 716 497 10-Dec-14
DA Lian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co L $3 650 240.75 11-Dec-14
DA Lian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co $3 578 739 12-Dec-14
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $2 720 578.75 2-Feb-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $2 550 079 6-Feb-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $4 929 984 10-Feb-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $1 870 291.50 13-Feb-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co $2 918 833.50 6-Mar-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co $660 392.69 6-Mar-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co $1 529 758.50 10-Mar-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $1 259 985 23-Mar-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $1 889 901 23-Mar-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $2 506 215.25 13-Apr-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $2 836 982.50 13-May-15
continued...

CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive $3 512 689.25 19-Jun-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $2 500 644.75 7-Aug-15
CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Co. $307 810.72 10-Aug-15
CNR (Hong Kong) Corporation Limited $8 622 906 30-Sep-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co. Limited $3 520 227.25 9-Oct-15
CSR (Hong Kong) Co. Limited $3 563 699.50 9-Nov-15
CRRC (Hong Kong) Co Limited $3 344 590.25 22-Dec-15
CRRC (Hong Kong) Co Limited $2 762 148 12-Jan-16
CRR (Hong Kong) Co Limited $5 181 354.50 1-Sep-16
TOTAL: $83 782 437.41
Total Payments Made to Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia by CNR, CSR,
CRRC and Da Lian
CNR (and Da Lian) $41 978 136.50
CSR $89 206 698.16
CRRC $13 992 251.75
TOTAL $145 177 086.91
6.3. TRACKING PAYMENTS TO REGIMENTS ASIA

AND TEQUESTA GROUP AGAINST KNOWN KICKBACK
AGREEMENTS
279. Calculations conducted by amaBhungane, recorded in the spread sheet
attached hereto as Annexure II, have brilliantly illustrated that the
payments made into the HSBC accounts of Tequesta and Regiments
Asia accorded directly with what was anticipated to be paid to them
under the various kickback arrangements signed in relation to the 95,
100, 359 and 232 contracts and related maintenance services.
280. In the interests of brevity, and as we believe the Commission has

already reviewed this material, we do not repeat these calculations
here. However, we record that our own review of the calculations
shows them to be extremely accurate, and we thus rely on them
without hesitation.
S ection 6 – 8 9
6.4. THE HONG KONG BANKING
RECORDS: THE DISSIPATION OF
KICKBACKS BY TEQUESTA GROUP
AND REGIMENTS ASIA
281. The HSBC ledgers show that the amounts paid into Tequesta and
Regiments Asia’s accounts by CSR, CRRC, CNR and Da Lian were
dissipated almost immediately after they were received. Indeed, the
HSBC ledgers record a very large number of payments out of the two
accounts to a range of recipients. In total, our analysis shows that
656 payments were made to 181 different recipients. The full list of
recipient companies is provided in section 2.3 above.
282. It is plausible that the payments recorded in the HSBC ledger made
from the Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group accounts were the first
step in an elaborate money laundering route. Indeed, as we show below,
the vast majority of the recipient accounts were either Hong Kong
shell companies or Chinese mainland garment, textile or furniture
manufacturers. It is implausible that the Gupta enterprise suddenly
and inexplicably became wholesale importers of textiles and furniture.
283. The lack of further documentation regarding the second ‘step’ of in the
money laundering route means that it is impossible for us to identify
who may have been the ultimate beneficiary of the vast majority of the
payments. Nevertheless, our analysis of the HSBC ledgers has raised a
number of noteworthy features.
6.4.1. PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS BY REGIMENTS ASIA

AND TEQUESTA GROUP
284. First, there are a small handful of payments made from the Tequesta
Group and Regiments Asia accounts to accounts held by individuals.
These individuals include:
a. Salim Essa, who received a payment of $99 985.13 on the 26th of
October 2015 into an account held at Habib Bank in Dubai;
b. Bartolomeu Dias Domingo, who was paid $665 257.87 in 8 payments
between the 24th of December 2014 and the 9th of February 2015
into an account at Banco PPI SA in Porto;
c. Antonio Palango Sangossango, who was paid $665 243.01 in 8
payments between the 23rd of December 2014 and the 9th of
February 2015 into an account at Banco PPI SA in Porto;
d. Prachi Desai, who was paid $21 214 on the 22nd of April 2016;
e. Faisal Rashid, who was paid $29 992.89 on the 2nd of November
2016;
f. Mark Wai Yeung, who was paid $70 000 on the 24th of January 2015;
g. Cheng Shuang, who was paid $99 985.14 on the 16th of April 2015;
285. Public records show that Bartolomeu Dias Domingo is an Angolan
entrepreneur the owner of an Angolan company by the name of Grupo
Bartolomeu Dias (GBD). GBD’s website indicates that it controls
$400m of assets in ‘Civil Aviation [sic], manufacturing, construction,
hotels and tourism, real estate, information technology, transportation,
logistics, Private Security and Trading [sic].’16
16 http://www.grupobd.com/en/group.1/the-holding.a2.html

286. Public records show that Antonio Sangossango was appointed to the
position of the Director of Administration and Budget in the Angolan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in at least 2011, although his own personal
LinkedIn page indicates that he held this position from at least 1998.
In any event, the payments made to Sangossango took place while he
held public office. We thus recommend that the Commission alert the
appropriate authorities in Angola so that they may conduct their own
investigations into the probity of the payments.
287. The remainder of the individuals listed in the HSBC ledgers

have common names. As such, it is difficult to make a definitive
identification. This would have to be done through discovery of the
banking details to which the amounts were paid.
6.4.2. RECIPIENTS OF OVER $1M FROM TEQUESTA GROUP

OR REGIMENTS ASIA
288. Second, while there were many hundreds of payments made to
a range of recipients, 27 recipients were paid over $1m. Should the
Commission endeavour to trace the flow of funds to further investigate
this laundromat, it might be wise to concentrate on a smaller collection
of companies that received larger amounts.
289. It is worth additionally noting that only three companies were

paid over $10m in total: Al Malaki Limited ($14 761 602.93 in 54
payments), Success Stand Limited ($13 368 815.30 in 44 payments)
and Honourway Garment Limited ($11 244 736.63 in 38 payments).
290. The following table sets outs the 27 recipients of over $1m, the number
of payments they received and over what period:
Table 4: Recipients of Over $1m from Regiments Asia and Tequesta Holding
Company/Person Name Dates Paid Range Total No Amount

of Pay-
ments
1 Al Malaki Limited 12/08/2015 -10/10/2015 54 $15 312 000
2 Success Stand Limited 19/05/2015 – 15/01/2016 44 $13 549 115.30
3 Honourway Garment Limited 18/08/2015 – 15/01/2016 38 $11 244 736.63
4 Shun Shi Limited 13/12/2015 – 13/01/2016 22 $7 198 747.16
5 CJ Logistics Ltd 10/12/2014 – 14/04/2015 22 $7 354 500
6 Fame Great Trade LTD 15/12/2014 – 20/05/2015 18 $4 699 500
7 Weiken Int’l Ltd 27/12/2014 – 02/11/2015 20 $4 671 000
8 United Swift Limited 25/02/2015 – 16/03/2015 17 $4 657 050
9 Zontian Int’l Co Ltd 11/08/2015 – 05/11/2015 17 $4 478 450
10 Glory Rich Technology Limited 10/09/2015 – 23/12/2015 8 $3 535 010
11 Meridian Warrior G L 12/08/2015 – 23/09/2015 13 $3 402 000
12 SZ Xht Tech Co Ltd 17/08/2015 – 16/09/2015 13 $3 374 000
continued...
S ection 6 – 9 1
... continued
13 Delight Forever Ltd 31/12/2014 – 25/03/2015 11 $2 984 050
14 Shangqiu Damingfa Plush 06/01/2015 – 16/03/2015 11 $2 098 795.42

Products Co. Ltd
15 Summut HK P H C L 14/05/2015 - 21/05/2014 7 $1 980 000
16 Gallenade Limited 14/05/2015 – 19/05/2015 5 $1 964 000
17 Flybridge International DMCC 31/03/2015 – 19/05/2015 11 $18 60 836.58
18 Kings Rich Worldwide Ltd 22/10/2015 – 12/11/2015 7 $17 499 64.42
19 Hangzhou Zhuoda Import and 26/01/2015 – 15/04/2015 9 $17 298 66.32

Export Co Ltd
20 Meezan Int’l Ltd 26/10/2015 – 29/12/2015 3 $1 421 150
21 Dragonli Co Ltd 22/10/2015 – 12/11/2015 5 $1 313 137
22 Rayk Trading Limited 15/04/2015 – 25/06/2015 7 $1 248 000
23 Celertus Co. Ltd 19/08/2015 – 04/11/2015 6 $1 195 309.68
24 Vast Wisdom E Ltd 24/09/2015 6 $1 889 957
25 Hong Kong Zhanyu Import and 19/01/2015 – 12/02/2015 4 $1 044 940.52

Export Co LTD
26 Changshu Yongli Imp and Expo 22/01/2015 – 10/06/2016 8 $1 013 895.97

Co Ltd Changs
6.4.3. COMPANIES PAID BY REGIMENTS ASIA, TEQUESTA

GROUP AND MORNINGSTAR INTERNATIONAL
291. Third, the HSBC ledgers also include details related to Morningstar
International. It is now common cause that Morningstar International,
a company registered in Hong Kong and controlled by the Gupta
enterprise, was used to receive payments from Homix Pty Ltd, also a
Gupta enterprise company. Homix, in turn, received large payments
from contractors who received contracts from Transnet. Homix Pty
was paid based on flimsy ‘consultancy agreements’ that saw Homix
earn a percentage success fee to assist large corporations secure
Transnet contracts.
292. The HSBC ledgers record 10 payments made to Morningstar

International Trade by Homix Pty Ltd. The payments were all made
between the 22nd and 29th of May 2015 from Homix’ Mercantile
Bank facility in South Africa. In total $393 965 was transferred to
Morningstar from Homix in the ten payments.
293. There are, notably, only five companies that received payments from
all of Regiments, Tequesta and Morningstar International. These
companies are:
a. Al Malaki Limited
b. Success Stand Limited;
c. Meridian Warrior GL;
d. Flybridge International DMCC;
e. Celertus Co. Ltd;

294. The existence of payments to these entities by all three Gupta enterprise
companies provides further evidence that the three companies were
making use of similar and related money laundering routes and
systems. Moreover, it is plausible that these five companies acted as
primary conduits into which laundered funds were consolidated
before being paid onwards to the benefit of the Gupta enterprise.
Further investigations into the fund flows to these companies and the
nature of the companies are clearly required.
295. As we discuss in greater detail below, bank statements made public by

amaBhungane have revealed that Tequesta Group Limited operated a
US dollar denominated bank account at Habib Bank in Dubai with
account number 2012-7771698603. This account was used to receive
three payments from CRRC between the 22nd of October and the
29th of October 2016 valued at $19 886 383.41. Importantly, here, this
account was also used to make payments to Flybridge International:
a. $198 876.33 (AED750 000) on the 28th of August 2016;
b. $200 238.35 (AED 735 000) on the 29th of August 2016;
6.4.4. THE USE OF CHINESE MAINLAND COMPANIES WITH

TIES TO SOUTH AFRICA
296. In conducting our analysis of the HSBC ledgers, it became apparent
that there was a striking commonality with regards to a large number of
recipient companies. In particular, these companies were registered in
mainland China, involved in the wholesale manufacture of consumer
goods (mostly textiles, clothing and domestic appliances), and are
shown, by public records held by Panjiva17, to export in large quantities
to South Africa.
297. We have identified the following companies that fit this profile:
Table 5: Companies Receiving Payments from Regiments and Tequesta Exporting to South
Africa
Company Number Total Value of Details

of Pay- Payments
ments
Shangqiu Damingfa Plush 11 $2 098 795 Customs records show that 37

Products Co. Ltd shipments were made to South Africa
and 7 to Zimbabwe
Hangzhou Zhuoda Imp. & 9 $1 729 866.32 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

Exp. Co., Ltd. records show that it has made 324
shipments to South Africa.
Changshu Yongli Imp and 8 $1 013 895.97 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

Exp Co Ltd. records reflect 504 shipments to
South Africa and 170 shipments to
Nigeria.
Changle City Jinhe Wool 6 $849 910.83 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

Co Ltd records reflect 253 shipments to
South Africa.
continued...
17 www.panjiva.com
S ection 6 – 9 3
... continued
Vogen Industry (Shanghai) 6 $799 910.83 A Chinese-registered company

Co Ltd specialising in the manufacture and
export of children’s clothes. Trade
records reflect 860 shipments to
South Africa.
Nantong Tengfan Home 4 $654 940.55 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

Textile Co Ltd records reflect 47 shipments to South
Africa.
Taizhou Shunkang Imp & 7 $574 859.92 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

Exp Co Ltd records reflect 98 shipments to South
Africa.
Shaoxing Shenhua Textile 3 $329 955.41 A Chinese-registered company

Co Ltd (and one fur- specialising in clothing. Trade records
ther payment reflect 115 shipments to South Africa.
off $169 985.14
to a company
called Shanox-
ing Shenghua
Textile Co
that is most
likely a typo
made during
the original
transfer from
HSBC)
Henan Haixing Blanket 2 $299 970.27 A Chinese-registered textile factory

Textiles Co Ltd formed in 2010. The company’s
website indicates that it exports to
South Africa.18
Haimen Shengyuan 1 $249 985.14 A Chinese-registered company selling

Bedding Articles Co Ltd bedding products. Trade records
reflect 86 shipments to South Africa.
The company website states that
‘since the year 1995, Shengyuan has
begun to proceed [sic] products for
the USA market and the south [sic]
Africa market.’19
Jiangmen City Yingguang 2 $249 970.28 A Chinese-registered company

Stainless Steel Pr producing steel pots and pans.
The company website lists South
Africa as a specific site of sales for its
products.20
Haimen Yinan Internation- 3 $229 955.14 A Chinese-registered company. Trade

al Trading Co Ltd records reflect 105 shipments to
South Africa.
Nantong Yawen Textile 2 $224 970.27 A Chinese-registered company

Co Ltd specialising in blankets and duvets.
Trade records reflect 47 shipments to
South Africa.
Universe Home Textile Co 3 $209 970.28 A Chinese-registered company

Ltd Zhejiang specialising in textiles. Trade records
reflect 105 shipments to South Africa.
Haining Xinyi Import and 2 $199 970.31 A Chinese-registered company. The

Export Co Ltd company’s website indicates that it
has sales offices in South Africa and
Angola.21
continued...
18 http://en.hnhxmt.com/home-about.html
19 https://shengyuan.citydsq.com/
20 http://www.jmyingguang.cc/comcontent_detail/c=2&i=2&comContentId=2.
html
21 https://www.xinyfabric.com/aboutus.html

Nantong Fanou Textile 1 $149 985.13 A Chinese-registered company. Public
Co Ltd trade data reflects 5 shipments to
South Africa.
Changshua Wanlixing 1 $129 985.14 A Chinese-registered leather and tex-

Import and Export Co tile exporter. Public trade data reflects
536 shipments to South Africa.
Binzhou City Derun 1 $119 985.14 A Chinese-registered company

Handicraft producing textiles and other small
tradeables. Public trade data reflects
24 shipments to South Africa.
Bazhou Dongtai Furniture 1 $101 205.14 A Chinese-registered dining table

Co Ltd Zhongxin manufacturer. Public trade data
reflects 143 shipments to South Africa.
Taizhou F Mars Trade 1 $99 985.15 A Chinese-registered company. Public

Co Ltd trade data reflects 87 shipments to
South Africa and 3 to Botswana.
Shaoxing Dongtai Plymer- 1 $99 985.14 A Chinese-registered manufacturer

ic Materials Co of leather products. Public trade data
reflects 10 shipments to South Africa.
Tianjin Machinery and 1 $99 985.13 A Chinese-registered exporter of

Electric Equipment industrial machinery. Public trade
records reflect 1093 shipments to
South Africa.
Haimen Boyi International 1 $69 985.14 A Chinese-registered company. Public

Trade trade records reflect 52 shipments to
South Africa.
Gaoyang Zenhua Woollen 1 $59 985.14 A Chinese-registered company

Co Ltd Hebel specialising in textiles and machinery.
Public trade records reflect 40
shipments to South Africa.
Qinhai Tibetan Sheep 1 $49 985.14 A Chinese-registered company

Carpets (Group) Ltd specialising in woollen carpets. Public
trade records reflect 26 shipments to
South Africa.
TOTAL 80 $12 867

983.05
298. It is extraordinarily unlikely that Tequesta Group, Regiments Asia and

the Gupta enterprise decided to utilise money arising from Transnet-
related kickbacks to diversify into wholesale textile and domestic
appliance importation and sale. The use of these companies thus poses
something of a puzzle. One plausible explanation is that Tequesta and
Regiments Asia made use of an extant professional money laundering
organisation. This organisation identified and made use of companies
with an existing record of exports to South Africa, and who would thus
have an existing flow of legitimate large exports in which the moneys
laundered by the Gupta enterprise could be disguised and commingled.
It is also possible that the Chinese mainland companies were falsely
declaring exports to Chinese authorities (upon whose disclosures the
underlying data from Panjiva is based) in order to justify the funds
transfers, but that no commensurate reporting or declarations were
made in South Africa. This could be clarified by the Commission with
customs authorities in South Africa.
299. This is obviously a matter requiring further investigation, which would

include interrogating the bank accounts, customs declarations and
shipment records for the above companies.
S ection 6 – 9 5
6.4.5. THE USE OF HONG KONG SHELL COMPANIES TO
RECEIVE PAYMENTS FROM TEQUESTA GROUP AND
REGIMENTS ASIA
300. Our analysis of the recipients of payments made from the accounts
of Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia shows that there were a large
number of payments to companies registered in Hong Kong. The
sheer number of companies paid precludes us from analysing every
company. However, we undertook a sampling of the companies,
acquiring company formation forms, annual returns and other relevant
documents from the Hong Kong company registry. The companies
selected for sampling were chosen on the basis that they were the
Hong Kong firms that received most money from Tequesta Group and
Regiments Asia. We attach these documents as Annexure OO. The
identity of the companies sampled is set out in the table below.
301. Our sampling analysis shows that the payments were made to what
appear to be shell companies. Moreover, these shell companies share
many similarities. In particular:
a. The companies are often formed in 2013 or 2014, usually by company
formation agents who specialise in selling pre-incorporated shell
companies;
b. The companies are purchased by a second company formation agent
or corporate secretarial firm, usually a few months prior to them
receiving payments from either Regiments Asia or Tequesta;
c. The companies are then registered to a sole shareholder and director,
almost always a lone Chinese citizen;
d. The company form, in particular the number of authorized shares
(almost always 10 000), remains consistent throughout the life of the
company;
e. There is a cross-over in company formation agent/secretarial
company in certain companies.
302. The above features strongly imply that the companies were purchased
off-the-shelf from company formation agents. The companies were
then transferred to a sole director, almost certainly as part of a scheme
to launder funds from Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group, if not
other companies. The cross-over in company formation agents and
secretarial services used implies coordination. Together, these facts
plausibly suggest that the companies paid by Regiments Asia and
Tequesta Group were part of a co-ordinated and consolidated money
laundering scheme designed to obscure the flow of funds and to
make tracing their movement difficult for law enforcement and other
compliance or investigative bodies.
303. It is additionally striking that none of the Hong Kong companies, or

their directors, have any online presence or profile. One would expect
that legitimate companies being paid millions of dollars would have
some online presence used to, at the very least, identify and advertise
their existence and the services offered.
304. It should be noted that only one company we sampled did not conform
to the pattern set out above, namely, Sky Success Ltd. Sky Success
received 1 payment of $201 500 from Tequesta Group on the 2nd
of November 2015. Company formation documents show that Sky
Success was beneficially owned by Guidepost Investments Limited, a

Hong Kong company. Media reports suggest that Guidepost is involved
in real estate transactions in Hong Kong.22 In 2016, the Financial
Services Authority of Hong Kong issued a warning that Guidepost was
engaging in the unlicensed provision of financial services.23
305. In the table below, we set out the details of specific sampled companies.
Note that the companies below were the largest Hong Kong recipients
of payments from Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia, accounting for
a substantial portion of the total moneys paid out by both.
Table 6: The Hong Kong Shell Company Matrix
Name Date Secretarial Secretarial When Name Date of

Formed Company Company (admin) company of Sole First
(formation) trans- Director/ Payment
ferred Share from TG
to sole holder or RA
director
Delight 21/02/2014 Company Kit Hashmi Secre- 15/01/2015 Jukun 31/12/2014

Forever Ltd Secretarial tarial Xiang
Services
Enigma 12/05/2014 MJ Enterprise HK Haixin Business 12/05/2014 Zhan Yi 07/09/2016

Electronic Limited Consulting Limited
Technology
Fame Great 03/03/2014 GRL14 Limited JBL Secretary 10/07/2014 Shu Ying 15/12/2014
Trade Services Huang
Gallenade 06/03/2014 Topworld Baililai Internation- 08/12/2014 Liu Ayling 14/05/2015

Limited (Corporate al Group (HK)
Services) Limited [CPA]
Limited
Glory Rich 01/12/2014 GRL14 Limited Joy Enterprise 09/02/2015 Zhi Yin Liu 10/09/2015
Technology Secretary
Services
Hecome 21/03/2014 Comkit Limited Hashmi Secretari- 28/12/2014 Sai Tan 05/01/2015
Limited al Services
HK Juhengtai 29/04/2014 HK Xing Hong HK Xing Hong 29/04/2014 Hua Ge 30/01/2015

Trading Co Registrations Registrations
Limited Limited Limited
HK Sheng 26/03/2014 Zhongtian Hong Kong United 22/05/2014 Jiang 13/10/2015

Haoran Enterprise Intl Accounting & Sec- Qiang
Industrial Group Limited retarial Services
Limited
Honourway 26/09/2013 GNL13 Limited JBL Secretarial 08/04/2014 Jian Ping 18/08/2015
Garment Services Liu
Kalika Trading 17/03/2014 Kam Yuen Kam Yuen Leung 17/03/2014 Piyush 08/09/2016
Leung Sarawgi
Meridian 28/03/2014 Topworld Baililai Internation- 01/12/2014 Huafang 12/08/2015

Warrior (Corporate al Group (HK) Xu
Group Ltd Services) Limited [CPA]
Limited
RGS Technol- 26/03/2014 H&C Business H&C Business 23/03/2015 Peng 22/10/2015
ogy Limited (HK) Limited (HK) Limited Hong Zhu
continued...
22 https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/
v4yxm331ezlwlihapaz0rw2
23 https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/alert-list/g.html#1621 and https://isog.org/

fraud-warnings-and-alerts/fraud-warnings-fraud-alerts-g/
S ection 6 – 9 7
... continued
Shun Shi 12/12/2013 Sky Charm Touch Internation- 03/07/2014 Shu Bao 13/12/2014
Limited Secretarial al Group Huang
Services
Sky Success 22/10/2013 Bosco Secre- 22/10/2013 Guidepost 02/11/2015

Limited taries Limited Invest-
ments Ltd
Success 8/03/2013 GNL13 Limited JBL Secretarial 15/03/2013 Guo Mei 19/05/2015
Stand Services Tang
United Swift 04/02/2014 GRL14 Limited JBL Secretarial 08/04/2014 Yong Gang 25/02/2015
Limited Services Ding
Vast Wisdom 12/01/2015 SBC Corporate H&C Business 31/12/2015 Shuang- 24/09/2015
Services (HK) Limited feng Tang
Zealand 06/01/2014 H&C Business H&C Business 06/01/2014 Yuan Zhao 04/03/2015
Trading Ltd (HK) Limited (HK) Limited
6.4.6. THE PLETHORA OF MONEY LAUNDERING RED FLAGS

AND THE ROLE OF HSBC
306. Our analysis of the HSBC ledgers reflects a number of striking and
obvious red flags that should have alerted HSBC to the misuse of the
Tequesta and Regiments Asia accounts for money laundering.
307. First, neither Regiments Asia nor Tequesta Group was engaged in
any legitimate business. Indeed, the companies were established and
incorporated only weeks before the first payments were received
related to Transnet kickbacks. Any marginally competent compliance
department would wish to understand why newly formed companies
with no notable infrastructure were receiving such large payments.
308. Second, the deposits into Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group’s
HSBC accounts emanated almost entirely from Chinese state-owned
companies. A marginally competent compliance and anti-money
laundering department should have enquired why two newly formed
Hong Kong companies controlled by a sole director with no obvious
connections to China, Hong Kong or the rail industry, was receiving
such large payments from these companies. Moreover, a competent
compliance department would want to know why a company
receiving such large payments from rail infrastructure companies was
transferring large sums to textile, clothing and bedding manufacturers,
thus earning its money and paying it out to completely different sectors.
309. Third, the receipt and dissipation of funds from the accounts happened
in a highly suspicious manner. In particular, the funds paid in CSR,
CNR, Da Lian and CRRC were paid out of the HSBC accounts almost
immediately after they had been received.
310. In addition, the amounts paid out by Regiments Asia and Tequesta
had all the hallmarks of ‘smurfing’, in which large payment amounts
are split into a series of smaller payments made contiguous with each
other. This is to avoid the movement of single large sums that may
incur compliance checks or mandatory reporting requirements. There
are a large number of examples of this practice evident in the HSBC
ledgers, which are beyond the scope of this submission. We, however,
highlight two indicative examples.

311. In the first example: between the
10-Mar-15 $200 000
31st of December 2014 and the 25th
of March 2015, Regiments Asia 11-Mar-15 $250 000
transferred $2 984 050 to a company
12-Mar-15 $350 000
called Delight Forever Ltd in eleven
transfers. Most notably, between 14-Mar-15 $182 750
the 10th of March 2015 and 24th of 16-Mar-15 $198 000
March 2015, Regiments Asia made ten
transfers on a nearly daily basis. The 17-Mar-15 $300 000
transfers were mostly in round figures 18-Mar-15 $310 000
(see right):
23-Mar-15 $300 000
Table 7: Payment Amounts
and Dates for Transfers From 24-Mar-15 $349 000
Regiments Asia to Delight 25-Mar-15 $304 300
Forever Ltd
312. In the second example: between the 18th of August 2015 and the
6th of November 2015, Tequesta Group transferred $9 087 002.92 to
Al Malaki Limited in 34 different payments (although, realistically,
this was 33 payments as one outlier payment was made for only
$2.93). The payments took place on a regular basis, often only a day
or two apart, and were in round amounts:
Table 9: Payment
Amounts and Dates 18-Aug-15 $237 500 12-Oct-15 $299 000
for Transfers from 20-Aug-15 $243 000 13-Oct-15 $288 000
Tequesta Group
Limited to Al Malaki 27-Aug-15 $247 500 14-Oct-15 $297 000
1-Sep-15 $260 000 16-Oct-15 $330 000
2-Sep-15 $261 000 19-Oct-15 $313 000
4-Sep-15 $236 000 22-Oct-15 $150 000
7-Sep-15 $268 000 23-Oct-15 $328 000
16-Sep-15 $279 000 26-Oct-15 $320 000
21-Sep-15 $290 000 27-Oct-15 $325 000
22-Sep-15 $295 000 28-Oct-15 $200 000
23-Sep-15 $298 000 29-Oct-15 $100 000
2-Oct-15 $299 000 30-Oct-15 $320 000
5-Oct-15 $292 000 2-Nov-15 $328 000
6-Oct-15 $297,000 3-Nov-15 $320 000
7-Oct-15 $270,000 3-Nov-15 $326 000
8-Oct-15 $250,000 4-Nov-15 $320 000
9-Oct-15 $2.93 6-Nov-15 $200 000
S ection 6 – 9 9
6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE
HONG KONG LAUNDROMAT
313. Based on the above discussion, the following facts can be confirmed:
a. Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group were paid $145,177,086.91 by CSR,
CNR, Da Lian and CRRC, seemingly after it was decided to jettison the
use of the Worlds Window network to launder kickback payments;
b. Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group were incorporated in Hong Kong
shortly before receiving payments from CSR, CNR, Da Lian and CRRC;
c. The Gupta enterprise associate Salim Essa was the sole director of both
Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group until 2016, after which he was
replaced by Aashika Singh, another Gupta enterprise associate;
d. The amounts paid into Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group were
immediately dissipated out of these accounts;
e. The payments made out of the Tequesta and Regiments accounts were
made to:
I. A small range of individuals;
II. A large number of Chinese-registered textile, clothing, bedding
or consumer goods manufacturers, many of whom are shown by
public customs data to have made shipments to South Africa, or,
alternatively, to have at least reported such shipments to customs
authority in China;
III. A large number of Hong Kong-registered shell companies, all taking
the same corporate form, and none of whom have any notable
online profile
f. Payments to Morningstar International are also reflected in the
HSBC ledgers, as are payments out. These records show that only five
companies received payments from all of Morningstar International,
Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia, namely, Al Malaki Limited,
Success Stand Limited, Meridian Warrior GL, Flybridge International
DMCC, Celertus Co. Ltd.
g. Morningstar International, Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group
transacted using accounts held with HSBC in Hong Kong.
314. Based on the above facts, we believe it is reasonable to infer that:
a. The payments made to Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia by CSR,
CNR, Da Lian and CRRC were, in whole or part, actually made for the
benefit of the Gupta enterprise;
b. Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia were created specifically as vehicles
to receive and launder funds paid to the Gupta enterprise by CSR, CNR,
Da Lian and CRRC, and the receive and launder funds from Homix.
c. The Gupta enterprise, through Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia,
paid funds to at least two identifiable money laundering networks,
which may or may not have been linked, namely, the Hong Kong shell
company network and the Chinese-South Africa consumer goods
export-import network;
d. Morningstar International, Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia all
participated in the same money laundering network, as shown by
payments made by all three to the same five entities;
e. The manner in which the Tequesta Group and Regiments Asia accounts
were used should have raised a number of obvious and loud red flags,
which should have led to, at the very least, a temporary suspension of
these banking facilities by HSBC.
1 00 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA NS NET

6.6. THE CONTINUATION OF THE
TRANSNET BRIBERY SCHEME IN
DUBAI
315. In June 2020, amaBhungane published additional bank statements
related to Regiments Asia and Tequesta Group. They show that
Tequesta Group operated a US dollar denominated bank account held
at Habib Bank in Dubai, as did Regiments Asia. The bank statements
are attached as Annexure PP.
316. The bank statements for Tequesta Limited show that three payments
were made by CRRC to Tequesta as follows:
a. $2 168 192.64 on the 27th of October 2016;
b. $8 214 998.75 on the 29th of October 2016;
c. $9 503 192.02 on the 9th of October 2016
317. Calculations by amaBhungane show that these payments accorded
with kickbacks that were anticipated to be paid to Gupta enterprise
companies by CRRC.
318. Thus, by 2016, the HSBC/Hong Kong network had effectively ended, to
be replaced by a new Dubai mechanism to receive and pay out funds
from Transnet contracts. At this point, as amaBhungane notes, CRRC
was still due to receive vast sums from Transnet, and to pay vast sums
to the Gupta enterprise.
S ection 6 – 1 01
ANNEXURE:
LIEBHERR
DIAGRAMS
1 02
Tracing the first
Liebherr
Liebherr payment
$905 000.88
22/07/2013
22 July 2013
Accurate
SBC USD
$700 000 $130 000.88 $60 000
22/07/2013 23/07/2013 23/07/2013
Global
SBC USD
$168 845.32 $115 740
$100 000 (AED 620 000 (AED 425 000
23/07/2013 23/07/2013 24/07/2013
Gateway
Global SBC
SBC USD
AED 620 000 AED 425 000
23/07/2013 24/07/2013
Cash
$499 500 $92 378.61 AED 425 000 AED 616 560
22/07/2013 24/07/2013 24/07/2013 23/07/2013
Global
SBAD AED
AED 475 620
24/07/2013
Star Engineering
Sahara Wiz Craft Vikas via JJT
for Milk Plant
$499 500 $93 378.61 AED 475 620 AED 616 560
Annexures – 1 03
Unlimited Electronic
Computer
Liebherr
$913 583 $212 006.01
25/02/2014 17/02/2014
$450 000
Glboal Mashreq USD 25/02/2014
Commingles with
Accurate Mahreq USD
Liebher Money
$599 327
25/02/2014
Tracing the second

Liebherr payment Linkway
17 February 2014
Tracing the third

Liebherr Liebherr payment
$371 105.83
15/04/2014
15 April 2014
Accurate Mahreq USD
$375 000
28/04/2014
Fidelity Mahreq USD
$400 000
29/04/2014
Oakbay
$400 000 of which

$371k from Lieber

Mixed sources Tracing the
JJT Force Exim
including JJT Century fourth Liebherr
$8 200 000 AED MIXED SOURCES
11/05/2014-15/05/2014
$4 499 836.44
01/05/2014
payment
tranche
Global Mahreq Reliable 07 May -
AED Mahreq USD
26 May 2014
$5 336 000 AED $2 500 000
19/05/2014 12/05/2014
Accurate Accurate
Mahreq AED Mahreq USD Liebherr
$462 710.94 $1 237 289.06 $2 200 000.00 $405 598.52 $402 879.34 $296 890.30
(1.7m AED) (4.545m AED) 26/05/2014 07/05/2014 19/05/2014 26/05/2014
27/05/2014 28/05/2014
Accurate Mahreq
USD
$5 000 000
28/05/2014
Commingled with other Enterprise
Funds including from JJT
$1 105 368.16 from Liebher
Brookfield
Consultants US
$5 000 000
$1 105 368.16 from Lieber
Annexures – 1 05
Tracing the fifth
Liebherr tranche
09 Oct to 01 Dec 2014
Tracing can’t be completed
as records end 11/12/2014
Liebherr
$368 110 $270 840
09/10/2014 01/12/2014
Accurate SBC USD
$20 000 $20 000 $200 000

09/12/2014 10/12/2014 10/12/2014
Fidelity Mahreq USD Global Bank of Baroda

USD
$243 000
11/12/2014
? Fidelity Bank of Baroda

USD

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on democracy, human
rights and sustainable
development across the
world, in order to bring
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SWI Zondo Submission Gupta Enterprise Transnet

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GUPTA

The mission of Shadow World

A submission by Shadow World Investigations

Editor and Researcher: Paul Holden

Section 2: The Capture of Transnet and the

Section 3: Known Agency and/or Bribery/Kickback

Section 4: Payments Made to the Gupta Enterprise by

Section 5: Transnet, the Gupta Enterprise and the Worlds

2 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

Section 6: The Receipt and Dissipation of Funds from China

2. The Gupta enterprise undertook this theft by acting in concert with

CNR, CSR, CRRC AND ZPMC CONTRACTS

THE FIRST LAUNDROMAT: THE WORLDS WINDOW GROUP

8. The Gupta enterprise entered into these contracts through front

06 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

THE SECOND LAUNDROMAT: THE HONG KONG MACHINE

THE THIRD LAUNDROMAT: HABIB BANK

PAYMENTS MADE BY LIEBHERR CRANES

22. Using the internal accounting records revealed by the #Guptaleaks,

23. In tranche 1, Liebherr paid $905 000.88 to Accurate Investments on the

08 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

1 0 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

1: Confirm the extent of the Bank of

2: Question HSBC to seek clarity on

3: Urgently request that HSBC trace any

4: Further investigate payments made

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of second payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of third payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of fourth payment tranche made by

Liebherr Diagram related to the disbursal of fifth payment tranche made by

Dramatis Dramatis Personae of individuals and companies referred to in

1 2 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N S NET

SWI’s mission, which aims to achieve its vision, is to detail and

SWI as an institution, and through its individual staff members,

Andrew Feinstein and Paul Holden were also directors of

While this submission is made by SWI, the lead author is

2. This submission follows, and should be read alongside, Shadow World

3. This submission consists of evidence-based findings regarding the flow

4. This submission, as reflected in the Index, is structured as follows:

1 6 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

2. We take this opportunity to highlight the High Court ruling in the

3. The primary sources upon which we rely are:

4. As we believe that the majority of these documents (in particular

5. All remaining documents and sources are attached as annexures where

1 Corruption Watch and Another v Arms Procurement Commission and Others

1 8 – SU B M I S S I O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

2.2. UNDERSTANDING THE GUPTA

a. The Gupta family enterprise exists de facto not de jure;

4. Based on the available evidence, we have identified a number of

20 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

g. Companies: Overseas Companies Controlled Directly or Through

2.3. COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS

2.4. THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN

7. A number of characters and committees were repeatedly implicated

9. Considering that it was the Gupta enterprise that benefited handsomely

22 – S U B M I SSI O N : G U PTA EN T ERP RI SE & T HE CA PT U RE O F T RA N SNET

11. In brief, however, it is useful to bear in mind, when considering the

3.1. ZPMC AGREEMENT WITH JJ

To provide information about the Project to Party A. To purchase the