A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017. June 19, 2008

9/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555
Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of

proper and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-
restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with
rudeness and insolence. (Orfila vs. Arellano, 482 SCRA 280 [2006])
——o0o——

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017. June 19, 2008.*
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant, vs.

JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, respondent.
Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR); Section 68-A states that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned.—The DENR is the agency
responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
country’s natural resources. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products
without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that
the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed,
possessed, or abandoned.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic—courts, for reasons of law,
comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act
_______________
* EN BANC.
218
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017476e983d034a8d4c4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dagudag vs. Paderanga
and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative

forum.—Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright
for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA
530 (1999), the Court held that: The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if
any, committed in the administrative forum.
Same; Same; In Dy v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 331 [1999], the
Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he
can resort to the courts.—In Dy v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 331 (1999),
the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before
he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167
(1997), the Court held that: The Court in a long line of cases has
consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted
first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent
any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack
of cause of action.
Same; Same; Replevin; Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause
of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the
lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ [of replevin].—In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or
avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a
complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of
Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary;
(2) the
219
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 219
decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3)
courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy, 304 SCRA 331
(1999), the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in
the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency—not the courts. In
Paat vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 (1997), the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin].
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being
an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be
waylaid by the lower court. x x x x Moreover, the suit for replevin is never
intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under
P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken
by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
Same; Jurisdictions; Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts
cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence.—The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot
take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special
competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of
DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and
brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have
been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In
Tabao v. Judge Lilagan, 364 SCRA 322 (2001)—a case with a similar set of
facts as the instant case—the Court held that: The complaint for replevin
itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification
of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized
items to the DENR “for official disposition
220
and appropriate action.” x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have

been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the
seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for
respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Same; Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Replevin;
In Calub v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55 (2000), the Court held that
properties lawfully seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) cannot be the subject of replevin.—The forest products
are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized
the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,
331 SCRA 55 (2000), the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the
DENR cannot be the subject of replevin: Since there was a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our
view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They]
could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law,
and not otherwise.
Same; Same; Judges; Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of
the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross
ignorance of the law.—Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the
replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of
the law. In Tabao, 364 SCRA 322 (2001), the Court held that: Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in
the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had
not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent
thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
outright.
Same; Same; Code of Judicial Conduct; Judges should keep themselves
abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.—Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that competence is a prerequisite to the
221
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 221
due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges

shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge
necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep
themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with
laws.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate
in their language at all times.—Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be
patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and
courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the
attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the
litigants. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language
at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or
vile language. They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in
speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint;
and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their
court.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arcol and Musni for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct

unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag
(Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge
Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National
Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information
that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was
shipping container vans containing
222

illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments

were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid
inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).1
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives
from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard
inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The
team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of
the shippers and consignees:
Container Van No. Shipper Consignee

NCLU -2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
IEAU - 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
NOLU - 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
INBU - 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
NCLU - 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
GSTU - 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez

CRXU - 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
NCLU - 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate

of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the
forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-
94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest
products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered
them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC
Container Lines, Inc.2
On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a
notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the
government should not confiscate the forest
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 1.
2 Id., at p. 2.
223
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 223

products.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container

Lines, Inc.’s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he
did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the
forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no
knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.
On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer
Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO
bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building
informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication
scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody
appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March
2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR
Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest
products be confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge
Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of
replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen.
Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March

2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff
Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products.
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR,
CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set
aside: (1) Edma’s bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were
falsely declared as cassava meal and
_______________
3 Id.
4 Id., at pp. 44-46.
5 Id., at pp. 2-3.
6 Id., at pp. 20-22.
7 Id., at pp. 13-19.
8 Id., at pp. 23-24.
9 Id., at pp. 25-35.
224

corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest
products were not covered by any legal document; (5) nobody
claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6)
the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the
forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts
could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR; (10)
Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR
was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a
motion to dismiss ad cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005, the defendants
prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed:
(1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be
sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the
owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products.
In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the
motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) an affidavit-complaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge
Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:
“During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest

partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENR’s counsel was lambasted,
cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as

“SHUT UP” and “THAT’S BALONEY.”
xxxx
Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment
from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies
available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have
done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 48-61.

11 Id., at p. 47.
12 Id., at pp. 1-12.
225
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 225

xxxx
[Judge Paderanga’s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x
replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial
of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the
law.”
In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed

Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In his
comment14 dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he
exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that
he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because
they were related to a case pending before him.
In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge
Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3)
used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that
the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge
Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for
violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary;16 and that he be fined P30,000.
In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed
the case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision
based on the pleadings already
_______________
13 Id., at p. 103.
14 Id., at pp. 104-106.
15 Id., at pp. 107-112.

16 Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
17 Rollo, p. 113.
226

filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case

for decision based on the pleadings already filed.18 Since Gen.
Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to
have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.19
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the
law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the
DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s natural
resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products
without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A
states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product
illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC
Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were
abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized
the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright
for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,20 the Court held that:
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.

Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain
suits unless the available administra-
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 114-115.

19 Resolution, 23 April 2007, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017.
20 378 Phil. 282, 292; 320 SCRA 530, 539 (1999).
227
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 227

tive remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.” (Emphasis ours)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must

exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the
courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:
“This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any
finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action.” (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any
administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a
complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions
of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review
by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary
are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the
decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that all
actions seeking to recover
_______________
21 363 Phil. 676, 682; 304 SCRA 331, 336 (1999).

22 G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167, 175.
23 Supra note 21 at p. 683; p. 337.
228
forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that

agency—not the courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:
“Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
[of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum,
being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
xxxx
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool
to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the
DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended.
Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.”
(Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot

take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the
enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated
that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the
forest products and brought them to the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted
Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products,
that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that
the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v.
_______________
24 Supra note 22 at pp. 184-185.
229
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 229

Judge Lilagan25—a case with a similar set of facts as the instant

case—the Court held that:
“The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was]
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states
that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR “for official
disposition and appropriate action.” x x x To our mind, these allegations
[should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR
has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings
may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The
prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the
replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours)
In Paat,26 the Court held that:
“[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the

protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis
ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus
cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest
_______________
25 416 Phil. 710, 719-720; 364 SCRA 322, 331 (2001).

26 Supra note 22 at pp. 177-178.
230

products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the

Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be
the subject of replevin:
“Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized]
were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.”
(Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of
issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28
the Court held that:
“Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance
of cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he
plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from
the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to
him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to
dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary
or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
xxxx
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound
to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence.
Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of
the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.”
(Emphasis ours)
_______________
27 387 Phil. 67, 79; 331 SCRA 55, 66 (2000).

28 Supra note 25 at pp. 720-721; pp. 331-332.
231
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 231

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due
performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that
judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties.
Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and
show acquaintance with laws.29
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no
reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The
forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not
availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have
dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,30
the Court held that:
“Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the
judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of
our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment.
Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her
duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted
position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.”
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate

language in court: “We x x x find respondent’s intem-
_______________
29 Atty. Macalintal v. Judge Teh, 345 Phil. 871, 878; 280 SCRA 623, 631 (1997).
30 A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA 403, 415-416.
232

perate use of “Shut up!” and “Baloney!” well nigh inappropriate in

court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for.”31
Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic
notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and
undignified in court:
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is . . .
Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
xxxx
Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to . . .
Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor,
on the grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due
respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin dated March 29,
2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of
this case, were apprehended in accordance with . . .
Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your
proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure
receipt?
Atty. Luego: Under the rules . . .
Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does
[sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any
seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take out your
rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?
_______________
31 Rollo, p. 111.
233
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 233

xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension,
Your Honor, there was no claimant.
Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no . . .
Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it
from?
Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that
lumber.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor, . . .
Judge Paderanga: Shut up. That’s baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then
how can you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer.
Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company. Why did you not
issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company?
Atty. Luego: But the . . . May I continue, Your Honor?
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a
seizure receipt here. Well, I’m telling you you should have issued [a] seizure
receipt to the shipping company.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You
write
234

the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you think it should be.
Atty. Luego: I’m sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your
language. You say that I am wrong. It’s you who are [sic] wrong because you
do not read the law.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is
wrong.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind
of a lawyer are you?32
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals
[case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: No.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your heads.
Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads,
your Honor.33 (Emphasis ours)
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the

Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and
courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct states that judges
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 64-80.

33 Id., at pp. 99-101.
235
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 235

should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the

inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory,
excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34 They should (1) be dignified
in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous,
and civil to all persons who come to their court.35 In Juan de la Cruz
v. Carretas,36 the Court held that:
“A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers

x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to
reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care
and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a
dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He
can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the
level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh
words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public
confidence in the judiciary.”
_______________
34 Guanzon v. Rufon, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 38.
35 Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legaspi City) v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2043, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 218, 227-228.
36 Id., at pp. 228-229.
236

Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the

writ of replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance
of “shut up,” “that’s baloney,” “how dare you say that the court is
wrong,” “what kind of a lawyer are you?,” and “the problem with
you people is you do not use your heads” are undignified and very
unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Paderanga,37 the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for
repeatedly saying “shut up,” being arrogant, and declaring that he
had “absolute power” in court. He has not changed.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross
ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification
from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct
unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine
of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.39
The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In
Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,40 the Court held him
liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for
unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring
himself as having “absolute power” and for repeatedly telling a
lawyer to “shut up.” In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held
him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine
months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both
cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the
commission of an-
_______________
37 A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 21, 36.

38 Sec. 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
39 Sec. 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
40 Supra note 37 at p. 36.
41 455 Phil. 227, 236; 407 SCRA 475, 481 (2003).
237
VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 237

other offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and
the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga’s
arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.
Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending
against him—one42 for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the
other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross
ignorance of the law.
The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on
those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not
tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability
and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.44
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING
CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona,

Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Reyes, Leonardo-De
Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Nachura, JJ., On
Official Leave.
_______________
42 Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, RTJ-06-2025.

43 Summit World CDO, Inc. v. Judge Paderanga, OCA I.P.I.

No. 05-2381-RTJ.
44 Escobar Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, A.M. No. P-04-1786, 13
February 2006, 482 SCRA 265, 277-278.
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9/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555

Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017. June 19, 2008.*

LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant, vs.

Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 219

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

and appropriate action.” x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have

commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 221

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

due performance of judicial ofﬁce. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments

Container Van No. Shipper Consignee

GSTU - 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certiﬁcate

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 223

products.3 In an afﬁdavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container

damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest

cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as

10 Id., at pp. 48-61.

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 225

In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed

15 Id., at pp. 107-112.

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ﬁled. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case

“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.

18 Id., at pp. 114-115.

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 227

In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must

21 363 Phil. 676, 682; 304 SCRA 331, 336 (1999).

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot

24 Supra note 22 at pp. 184-185.

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 229

Judge Lilagan25—a case with a similar set of facts as the instant

In Paat,26 the Court held that:

“[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the

25 416 Phil. 710, 719-720; 364 SCRA 322, 331 (2001).

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the

27 387 Phil. 67, 79; 331 SCRA 55, 66 (2000).

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 231

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

perate use of “Shut up!” and “Baloney!” well nigh inappropriate in

VOL. 555, JUNE 19, 2008 233