CITIZENSHIP

VIVO VS CLORIBEL
FACTS:
This is a case of Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines for a visit but who refused to leave.
And one where the improvident issuance of an ex-parte preliminary injunction, followed by
judicial inaction, actually extended the stay of aliens beyond the period authorized by law, and
even beyond what the visitors had asked for.
Private respondents are a Chinese mother, and her 2 minor children. They arrived from Hongkong
and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary visitors on October 1960,with an initial
authorized stay of three (3) months. The husband and father of these aliens applied for
naturalization, and CFI granted his petition in 1961. The said temporary visitors petitioned for an
indefinite extension of their stay. By virtue of a Cabinet Resolution granting aliens concurrent
jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs authorized (in 1961) the change in category from temporary visitors to that of
special non-immigrants under the Immigration Law for a period of stay extending
up to 11 April 1963.
The Secretary of Justice approved the extension and thus authorized, subject to the condition that
the said aliens shall secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two months over and
beyond their extended stay and maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration
and to pay the corresponding fees. But the petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to
recognize the said extension further than 16June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment of the
extension fees. The respondents requested the President to extend their stay up to April 1963 in
order to coincide with their hope – for and forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance of the
husband/father. The request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner. The commissioner
informed the respondents that the new Secretary of Justice ruled in that the Cabinet Resolution
had no force and effect, and denied the request for extension of stay of the respondents and
advised them to leave the country voluntarily not later than June 1962; otherwise, they would be
proceeded against, in accordance with law. The respondents did not leave the country on the date
specified, but instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction, to restrain the Commissioner
of Immigration from issuing a warrant for their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their
temporary stay and to order the Commissioner to implement the extension.
The court then denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of a prima facie showing and
set the case for hearing on 13 July 1962. On July 1962, respondents re-filed the same petition
with the same court. The petition alleged three grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of
their stay was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2)
they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the granting of the
husband/father’s petition for naturalization, which had not been appealed, and he was due to take
his oath of allegiance on 11 April 1963; and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work
great injury and injustice to themselves.
The judge issued ex-parte and without hearing an order granting preliminary injunction, and, on a
bond ofP3,000.00.
The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating that:
 the visitors’ authorized stay expired on June 1962; their change in category from temporary
visitors to special non-immigrants and the extension of their authorized by the Secretaries
of Foreign Affair sand of Justice was invalid as it is the Commissioner of Immigration
who is vested by law with power to grant extensions of stay
 the petition filed was not the proper remedy
  the Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of the father/husband and even if he will
become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she
has yet to show that she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
On 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for the unreasonable length of time
that the petitioners had failed to prosecute their case. But the court denied the motion to dismiss
for being “not well taken.” On December 1965, the Commissioner filed with the SC an
action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondent court.
ISSUE: WON Chua (the mother/wife) automatically became a naturalized Filipino
RULING: The court ruled that the wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her
marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization.
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities that she
came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay
permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong
her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the
qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted herself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the
Philippines in her relation with the constituted government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16 June
1962, she(Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification of
continuous residence in the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June
1962 being illegal. As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, our
pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966, 18 SCRA713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship “if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent.”
“Dwelling” means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of respondents visitors was
supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship … their lawful period of stay had already expired
and they had already been required to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here (Kua
Suy et al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963).
Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the result of the
naturalization proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized stay
was for a definite period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the termination of
the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and can not be set at a definite date.
MERCADO VS MANZANO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the
respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: WON a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of
the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath
as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit