PA Interv Reply

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Nos.

20-542, 20-574

In the Supreme Court of the United States


__________________
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KATHY BOOCKVAR, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PENNSYLVANIA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________________
JOSEPH B. SCARNATI, III, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________________
On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
__________________
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC.’S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
INTERVENE AS PETITIONER
__________________
Patrick Strawbridge Jay Alan Sekulow
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Counsel of Record
Ten Post Office Square Stuart J. Roth
8th Floor South PMB #706 Jordan Sekulow
Boston, MA 02109 CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
(617) 227-0548 AND ADVOCACY GROUP, P.C.
William S. Consovoy 1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
Thomas R. McCarthy Suite 200
Tyler R. Green Washington, D.C. 20006
Cameron T. Norris (202) 546-8890
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC jsekulow@claglaw.com
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
Arlington, VA 22209 Counsel for Movant
(703) 243-9423 November 6, 2020
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........................... ii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
ARGUMENT................................................................ 1
CONCLUSION ............................................................ 4
ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES


Conservation Law Found. of New England v.


Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) .................. 3

Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) ............... 4

Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793


(7th Cir. 2019) .......................................................... 3

Scarnati v. Boockvar, No. 20A53, 2020 WL


6128194 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) ................................... 4

Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S.


528 (1972) ................................................................. 2

Turn Key Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 164


F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 1999) ........................................ 3

Utah Ass’n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246


(10th Cir. 2001) ........................................................ 3
INTRODUCTION
If the presidential election hinges on the questions
presented here, then the President’s reelection cam-
paign should be a party. That conclusion is simple. So
simple that nearly all parties (including the Demo-
cratic plaintiffs who filed this case) have no objection
to Movant’s intervention. Pennsylvania’s Secretary of
State objects, but the Secretary’s arguments are
largely nonresponsive to the question of intervention.
The Court should grant Movant’s motion.

ARGUMENT
At the outset, this motion is not an appeal from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s (unreasoned) de-
nial of Movant’s intervention. Cf. Sec’y Resp. 1-2. Mo-
vant is not asking this Court to let it intervene in the
state-court proceedings, or to “review[]” the state
court’s application of Pennsylvania intervention law
(something this Court has no jurisdiction to review
anyway). Sec’y Resp. 1. Movant is asking this Court to
let it intervene here. That question requires this Court
to exercise its own discretion based on the interven-
tion rules embodied in federal law. See Mot. 2.

As for those federal intervention rules, the Secre-


tary contests only two requirements: timeliness and
inadequacy. She claims that Movant waited too long
to intervene in this Court and that the existing peti-
tioners adequately represent Movant’s interests. Sec’y
Resp. 2-4. Neither argument works.
2

With respect to timeliness, Movant seeks to inter-


vene as a petitioner, and the relevant certiorari peti-
tions were filed less than two weeks ago. The Secre-
tary does not explain how 14 days is a meaningful “de-
lay.” Sec’y Resp. 4. The added burden on the Secretary
is zero: She has not yet filed her briefs in opposition,
and she would have to file those briefs even without
Movant’s intervention. Even if she had filed them, the
Secretary would suffer no prejudice because Movant
simply adopts the existing petitions as its own. Cf.
N.B.D. v. Ky. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., No.
19-638 (granting leave to intervene as a petitioner
even though the motion was filed after the brief in op-
position).

With respect to inadequate representation, the


Secretary ignores the Court’s holding that the re-
quired showing is “minimal.” Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972). Rule
24 calls for no more than “sufficient doubt” that rep-
resentation “‘may be’ inadequate.” Id. at 538 & n.10.
That minimal doubt exists here. Movant is the real
party in interest; it has the most direct and tangible
stake in Pennsylvania’s vote count. Movant should
thus be permitted to control the representation of its
interest, which it cannot do unless it’s a party. Cf. id.
at 539 (noting that intervenor should not be obliged to
depend on an existing party’s performance as “‘his
lawyer’”). Further, the party that the Secretary con-
tends represents Movant’s interest—the state Repub-
lican party—“agrees that the Motion should be
granted.” Party Resp. 1. When an existing party does
not oppose intervention, courts consider this nonoppo-
sition telling evidence that the representation may be
3

inadequate. E.g., Utah Ass’n of Cntys. v. Clinton, 255


F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001); Conservation Law
Found. of New England v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44
(1st Cir. 1992).

In any event, adequacy is not a reason to deny per-


missive intervention—an independent basis for inter-
vention that the Secretary’s response largely ignores.
E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d
793, 804 (7th Cir. 2019). So even if the Secretary were
right about adequacy, the Court would still have
sound practical reasons to allow intervention. Mot. at
7-10. The real party in interest should be allowed to
participate in this case. And the interests of justice
and judicial economy favor giving Movant a voice
equal to the existing petitioners, especially given the
vital public interest at stake.

Finally, the Secretary’s continued insistence that


the existing petitioners lack Article III standing, see
Sec’y Resp. 4-5, is both irrelevant and incorrect. It’s
irrelevant because standing goes to the substance of
whether to grant or deny the petitions, not interven-
tion. See Turn Key Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,
164 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999) (“intervention can-
not be resolved by reference to the ultimate merits”).
That the Secretary thinks this Court should deny cer-
tiorari because the petitioners lack standing is not rel-
evant to whether Movant should be a party when the
Court makes that decision. Cf. N.B.D., No. 19-638
(granting intervention despite ultimately denying cer-
tiorari). The Secretary’s standing arguments are in-
correct anyway. The same arguments were raised in
her opposition to the emergency stay applications. See
4

Sec’y Stay Opp. 11-14. Yet four Justices (the same


number needed for certiorari) voted to grant those ap-
plications. Scarnati v. Boockvar, No. 20A53, 2020 WL
6128194 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020).

But if this Court has doubts about petitioners’


standing, those doubts would only be a reason to grant
intervention. No one seriously questions Movant’s
standing, given its direct interest in the presidential
election. In fact, now that Pennsylvania has entered
the post-election, vote-counting phase, Movant is “the
real party in interest.” Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S.
415, 416 (1952). This Court has added parties to re-
solve “standing” concerns in similar circumstances.
Id. That course would be particularly appropriate
here because, contrary to the Secretary’s authorities,
this case originated in state court and jurisdiction was
undisputed. Cf. Sec’y Resp. 6-7. Article III did not ap-
ply until the case arrived here, and Movant is plainly
injured by the state court’s decision to allow illegal
votes to be cast in Pennsylvania. “To dismiss the pre-
sent petition[s] and require the new plaintiffs to start
over” in state court, where the lower courts would be
bound to follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s de-
cision anyway, “would entail needless waste and runs
counter to effective judicial administration.” Mul-
laney, 342 U.S. at 416-17.

CONCLUSION
The Court should grant this motion and allow Mo-
vant to intervene as a petitioner.
5

Patrick Strawbridge Jay Alan Sekulow


CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC Counsel of Record
Ten Post Office Square Stuart J. Roth
8th Floor South PMB #706 Jordan Sekulow
Boston, MA 02109 CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
(617) 227-0548 AND ADVOCACY GROUP, P.C.
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
William S. Consovoy Suite 200
Thomas R. McCarthy Washington, D.C. 20006
Tyler R. Green (202) 546-8890
Cameron T. Norris jsekulow@claglaw.com
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 243-9423

November 6, 2020 Counsel for Movant

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