GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE v. JESSE M. ROBREDO, GR No.

195390,
2014-12-10
Facts:
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the
manner the local government units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report,
showing that a substantial... portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly
chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark
violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known... as the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC).
December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216,[5] enumerating the policies and
guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise
carried a reminder to LGUs of the... strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the
20% development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or
purposes for which such funds are intended."
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and Department of
Budget and Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC No. 1, series of
2005,[7] pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of
the IRA for... development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the LGUs
in undertaking development projects. The said memorandum circular underscored that
the 20% of the IRA intended for development projects should be utilized for social
development, economic development and... environmental management.[8]
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the
assailed MC No. 2010-83,[9] entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances,
and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced... transparency and accountability of LGUs.
Issues:
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and
fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
Ruling:
The assailed memorandum circulars... do not transgress the local and fiscal... autonomy
granted to LGUs.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs.
[35] To highlight its significance, the entire Article X of the Constitution was devoted to
laying down the bedrock upon which this policy is anchored.
It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that
the LGC was enacted. Section 2 thereof was a reiteration of the state policy. It reads,
thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant...
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall... be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and
resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government
to the local government units.
Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization.
In Limbona v. Mangelin,[37] the Court elaborated on the concept of decentralization,...
thus:
[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power... and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the... central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum... intervention from central authorities. x x x.[38] (Citations omitted)
To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of
the President over LGUs to mere supervision.[39] "The President exercises 'general
supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered...
according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own."[
At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not
completely severe them from the national government or turn them into impenetrable
states. Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still
under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or
violations of existing laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the
power to discipline... and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed
to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires."
A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that they do not, in any
manner, violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To be clear, "[f]iscal autonomy means that
local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable... share in the national taxes released by the national government, as
well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It
extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within
the constraints... thereof."
It is inconceivable, however, how the publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts
and loans and procurement plans of LGUs required in the assailed issuances could
have infringed on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Firstly, the issuances do not
interfere with the... discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority projects
and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere transparency
measures which do not at all hurt the manner by which LGUs decide the utilization and
allocation of their funds.

Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim G.R. Nos. 187836 & 187916 , [November 25, 2014]
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city”
subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be
modified or repealed by another ordinance.”
When the judiciary mediates, we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
FACTS: These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.
(G.R. No. 156052), where the Court declared that the subject City of Manila Ordinance No.
8027, enacted during the term of Mayor Atienza, ordering the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals is constitutional.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.
The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027,
Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith
thereby allowing, once again, the operation of petroleum refineries and oil depots in the
Pandacan area.
The petitioners argue that the enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power because the measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of
the people. They further argue that Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16,
Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines on the duty of the State “to protect and promote
the right to health of the people” and “protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology.” Moreover, they argue that despite the finality of the Decision
in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances warranting the
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary
Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” Petitioners likewise
claim that the Ordinance is in violation of health and environment-related municipal laws, and
international conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a state party.
Respondents aver that petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public
policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal
laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the enactment of the assailed Ordinance No. 8187 allowing the continued stay of
the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.
HELD: YES, the Court saw no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down
insofar as the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or
repealed by another ordinance.” These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where
the Court upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of
the Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027,
provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled
by the courts. In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents — that the
removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary “to protect the residents of
Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.”
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter subject of these
petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of
the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention
of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous members were no longer re-
elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution of
these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until the end of January
2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood his ground and vetoed
the last ordinance.
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents. Expressing the same position, former
Mayor Lim even went to the extent of detailing the steps he took prior to the signing of the
Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to make the right decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the
operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of
the council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
“general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its
true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of
the members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it
wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy,
history reveals that there is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general
welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary
mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang
Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent. It remains so convinced.
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw
in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay
of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052. The same best
interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist
target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer
put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit
to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO.
3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only
delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it
cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus,
it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority
to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who
will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition
for local initiative and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is
“merely a resolution and not an ordinance.”

ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an
initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and
set aside.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of
public officials.”

Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under
Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides “amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress
or local legislative body.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance

Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is “the power of
local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.”

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium

Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati, Luz Yamane

Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation... is a duly organized condominium
corporation... which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of
the BA-Lepanto
Condominium... situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
the Corporation received a Notice of Assessment... signed by the City Treasurer.
liable to pay the correct city business taxes
The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes
assessed.
Corporation responded with a written tax protest... submit that the Assessment has no
basis as the Corporation is not liable for business taxes
Makati [Revenue] Code imposes business tax on owners or operators of any business
Corporation is not an owner or operator of any business in the contemplation of the
Makati [Revenue] Code and even the [Local Government] Code
It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not
for profit... under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making
activities
The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer
She insisted that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily...
for... profit
Corporation filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
dismissing the appeal for lack... of merit.
RTC concluded that the activities of the Corporation fell squarely under the definition of
"business"... thus subject to local business taxation
Corporation filed a Petition for Review... with the Court of Appeals.
appellate court... declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to
the City of
Makati.
the Corporation was not engaged in profit.
as its sole purpose was to hold title to the common areas in the condominium and to
maintain the condominium... assessment collected from unit owners limited to those...
necessary to defray the expenses in the maintenance of the common areas and
management the condominium... the City Treasurer... argued that the Corporation is
engaged in business, for the dues collected from the different unit... owners... is utilized
towards the beautification and maintenance of the Condominium, resulting in "full
appreciative living values" for the condominium units which would command better
market prices should they be sold in the future
Issues:
whether a local government unit can, under the Local Government Code, impel a
condominium... corporation to pay business taxes.[1]... whether the City of Makati may
collect business taxes on condominium corporations.
Ruling:
Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the "Corporation") is a duly
organized condominium corporation
Nowhere therein is there any citation made by the City Treasurer of any provision of the
Revenue Code which would serve as the legal authority for the collection of business
taxes from condominiums in Makati.
Reference to the local tax ordinance is vital, for the... power of local government units to
impose local taxes is exercised through the appropriate ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian, and not by the Local Government Code alone.[44] What determines tax
liability is the tax ordinance, the Local
Government Code being the enabling law for the local legislative body.
City Treasurer failed to cite the specific statutory basis of the tax.
condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the
Local Government Code
The assessment appears to be based solely on the Corporation's collection of
assessments from unit owners, such... assessments being utilized to defray the
necessary expenses for the Condominium Project and the common areas.
Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the Local Government Code or
the
Makati Revenue Code

Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

Facts: 

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in
1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms,
from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would
have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he
would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec
declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor. 

Issue: 

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of the three-term limit. 

Held: 

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the
next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja
vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

https://www.scribd.com/document/76765314/Pandi-v-CA-Digest

Fernando v. St. Scholastica,

Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80
square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the
sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the
elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some
thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities,
and other... improvements.[3]
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30,
1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,[4]
entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217[5] and 200[6] were enacted to amend
Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced
hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as
follows:
(1)
Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in
excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%)
see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking
area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.[7]
Issues:
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No.
192 are valid exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
Ruling:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be
for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the
general... public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent
domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is... invalid.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly
the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The means employed by
the petitioners,... however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this
purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this
Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of
security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete
wall. It may even be... argued that such exposed premises could entice and tempt
would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass
and breach. It also appears that the respondents' concrete wall has served as more
than sufficient protection over the last 40 years.
`
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the
State may not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the
sake of the aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive
how a... see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see- thru fence is
violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns
is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a
fundamental... right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone,[37] as
governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its...
citizens
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were
acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 1 92 against the
respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ
of prohibition. The... petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1
and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City.
Principles:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:[28]
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2)...
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process
clause
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64064
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018octoberdecisions.php?id=1076
https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2019/06/mandanas-v-ochoa-gr-no-199802-april-10-
2019.html
Ha Datu Tawahig v. Hon. Cebu City Prosecutor
Facts:
Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a Complaint-Affidavit[3] before the Cebu City Prosecutor
charging Sumatra with rape.
Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid found probable cause to charge Sumatra with rape and
recommended filing a corresponding information.
Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Sumatra, but he
would not be arrested until July 2, 2013.[7]Following his arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion
to Quash and Supplemental Motion to Quash.[8] These motions cited as bases
Sections 15[9] and 65[10] of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, and were:... predicated
on the ground that the [Regional Trial Court] ha[d] no jurisdiction over the
Singco denied the Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to Quash. She reasoned
that:[T]he [Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act] does not apply [to] the prosecution of a
"dispute" such as this case as it does not involve claims over ancestral domain nor it
relates (sic) to the rights of indigenous communities/people which would require the
application of customary laws and practices to resolve the "dispute" between the parties
herein.[13]
015, a certain Vicente B. Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales), identifying himself as Datu Bontito
Leon Kilat[14] and representing himself to be a "customary lawyer,"[15] filed a "Motion
to Release the Indigenous Person,"[16] which was founded on grounds substantially the
same as the Motion and Supplemental Motion to Quash.
Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus[21] on November 11, 2015. He notes that Igot
had already brought her accusations against him before the concerned Council of
Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal Court was subsequently formed.[22] He adds that
on January 3, 2007, the Dadantulan Tribal Court issued a Resolution[23] clearing him
and declaring that he "should [be spared] from criminal, civil[,] and administrative
liability."[24]Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws
concerning cases involving indigenous peoples,"[25] petitioner maintains that a writ of
mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to "uphold and respect"[26] the
Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "[t]hereby releas[e] [Sumatra] from jail to stop
[his] continued arbitrary detention."[27]
Issues:
whether or not this Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents Judge
Estela Alma Singco, City Prosecutor II Fernando Gubalane, City Prosecutor I Lineth
Lapinid, City Prosecutor Nicolas Sellon, and Assistant City Prosecutor Ernesto Narido,
Jr. to desist from proceeding with the rape case against petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra.
Ruling:
Court denies the Petition
1987 Constitution vests this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[28] However, it is not only
this Court that has the competence to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus. The Court of Appeals and regional trial courts are equally capable of taking
cognizance of petitions for such writs.
Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court of Appeals and
regional trial courts is not a license to immediately seek relief from this Court. Petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be filed in keeping with the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.[29]The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations
of judicial economy. I
The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets.
noted that "[t]he doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by
this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner
However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua
v. Ang, this Court held that "[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the
reason behind the rule is not present in a case[.]" This Court has recognized that a
direct invocation of its original jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as
when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is
raised is a pure question of law.In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-
defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court
may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the
case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when
there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when
the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a
patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
[36] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
This Court, however, takes cognizance of the Petition, in the interest of addressing the
novel issue of whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act works to remove from courts
of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples.It does not.
Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, it was
respondents' duty to desist from proceeding with the case against him. His plea for
relief, therefore, falls under the first situation. For a writ of mandamus to be issued in
such a situation, there must be a concurrence between: (1) a clear, duly established
legal right pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by law
upon respondent, which that respondent unlawfully neglects.[38]... first situation
demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a
correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed
upon them by law.Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It
cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled
Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act
mandated by law.
duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary.
Additionally, a writ of mandamus, as with certiorari and prohibition, shall be issued only
upon a showing that "there is no other plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law[.]"[41]
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking
cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative
rights and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be
issued.A crime is "an offense against society."[64] It "is a breach of the security and
peace of the people at large[.]"[65]A criminal action, where "the State prosecutes a
person for an act or omission punishable by law,"[66] is thus pursued "to maintain social
order."[67] It "punish[es] the offender in order to deter him [or her] and others from
committing the same or similar offense, . . . isolate[s] him [or her] from society, reform[s]
and rehabilitate[s] him [or her]."[68] One who commits a crime commits an offense
against all the citizens of the state penalizing a given act or omission:[69] "a criminal
offense is an outrage to the very sovereignty of the State[.]"[70] Accordingly, a criminal
action is prosecuted in the name of the "People" as plaintiff. Likewise, a representative
of the State, the public prosecutor, "direct[s] and control[s] the prosecution of [an]
offense."[71... capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State's
police power.[73] It inheres in "the sovereign power instinctively charged by the
common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of
the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights."[74]The basic precepts underlying crimes and
criminal actions make it improper for the State to yield "disputes" involving criminal
offenses to indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices.To yield criminal
prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of
criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of
reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable
the consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately
then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.It was never
the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its
view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances.
Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with
the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes
designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.Viewed through the lens
of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to even speak
of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law
are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying
customary laws.Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be
spared from criminal liability. The Regional Trial Court is under no obligation to defer to
the exculpatory pronouncements made by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must
proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged liability with all prudence and
erudition.WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Principles:
The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was
never intended and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal
offenses. Individuals belonging to indigenous cultural communities who are charged
with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under courts of law.

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice

Facts:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday
of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22,
2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe
and Evelyn
Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon
the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a resolution of...
endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño,
Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6]  On
even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.  By letter still of even
date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group's complaint to Speaker
Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed... the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11]... fter
hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly
the same time.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1,
2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion,
however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file
an answer to... the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each
of the 55 members of public respondent.
n September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with
application for injunctive reliefs.
ouse of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI... thereof.  These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote
to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI... thereof.  These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote
to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion... amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion... amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."[
Petitioner's argument 1
Petitioner alleges that public respondent's chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr.
(Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father,
former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the
Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her
office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public
respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the
finding of... sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
Petitioner's argument 3
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form
and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution
and its own Impeachment Rules.
Issues:
substantive issue â"€ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. 
Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged... violation of the due process clause
(Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
Constitution.
The one-year bar rule
Ruling:
GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias,
however.  So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
The swift completion of the Investigating Panel's initial task cannot be relegated as
shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just
one but five state... prosecutors.
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment
procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that
petitioner's initial participation in the impeachment proceedings

 the opportunity to file an Answer - starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance.  That the Committee refused to
accept petitioner's motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of
form of the impeachment... complaints is apposite, conformably with the
Impeachment Rules.

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination
of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. 
This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2),... Article XI of
the Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."[38]  In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and
substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry... out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rule
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010,
public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress
and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its  Impeachment Rules, admittedly...
substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general
circulation... the provisional adoption of... the previous Congress' Impeachment Rules is
within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.
the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment
The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public
respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Principles:
"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point.  In promulgating rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the
Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity.   As far as
promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
"promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different meanings as they are part of
a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation.  As detailed in one case,[48] the publication
of implementing rules occurs... after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood--that
is, to make known.  Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia.
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be
used.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the... constitution
are self-executing.
in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing . . . .
"effectively carry[ing] out the purpose"... impeachment is primarily for the protection of
the people as a body politic,... Francisco[58] states that the term "initiate" means to file
the complaint and take initial action on it.[59]  The initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint which... must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving.  It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.  The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral... of the complaint to the Committee on Justice... rom the records of the
Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'... taking initial action of said complaint.
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of
the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear.

Argana v. Republic,

Facts:
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for Forfeiture of
alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana, who served as
Mayor of the Municipality of Muntinlupa
Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry.  In 1990, the case was reactivated in
the Sandiganbayan.  Petitioners Maria Remedios Argana, Donata Almendrala Vda. De
Argana, Luis Argana, Jr., Peregrino Argana, Estate of Gelacio Argana, Eufrocinio
Nofuente, Amparo Argana Nofuente, Juanito Rogelio, Milagros Argana Rogelio, Maria
Felicidad Argana, Maria Dorotea Argana, and Refedor South Gold Property
Management & Development Corporation... filed a series of motions, including a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of the lack of authority of the PCGG to institute the case on
behalf of respondent. This issue eventually reached this Court and was decided in favor
of respondent... petitioners' offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG...
respondent, represented by PCGG Commissioners Reynaldo S. Guiao and Herminio A.
Mendoza entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioners, represented by
petitioner Maria Felicidad Argana.  Petitioners conveyed, ceded and released in favor...
of respondent a total of 361.9203 hectares of agricultural land in Pangil and Famy,
Laguna, or 75.12% of the properties subject of litigation, in consideration of the
dismissal or withdrawal of all pending civil, criminal and administrative cases filed,
litigated or investigated... by respondent against them.
PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the signing of the
Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for
approval
OSG requested for clarification from the PCGG if the compromise agreement included
all the sequestered assets of petitioners subject of litigation.  In response to the request,
PCGG informed the OSG in a letter dated February 4, 1998[8] that the properties
mentioned in the Compromise Agreement comprise all the sequestered assets subject
of litigation, and reiterated that it entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners
because it believed that the evidence might not be sufficient to... warrant continuing the
prosecution
President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos approved the Compromise
Agreement
OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement. 
Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion
Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998 approving the Compromise
Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof... respondent,
through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Rescind
Compromise Agreement
Petitioners filed an Answer to the Motion to Rescind... that respondent's counsel had no
authority to file the... motion
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting respondent's motion to rescind and setting
aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998
It also ruled that the presumption that the OSG had authority to file the Motion to
Rescind was not overcome by... petitioners.
Under Republic Act No. 1379,[14] the filing and prosecution of cases for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired property is a function of the OSG. Petitioners failed to show proof
that pleadings or motions filed by lawyers of the government or... the PCGG must first
be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Republic.
Issues:
It is argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should have denied respondent's
Motion to Rescind outright for having been filed without authority from the PCGG En
Banc and the President of the Republic, both of whom earlier approved and authorized
the execution... of the Compromise Agreement
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG and
of the OSG should have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper
because the motion was filed without the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the
President of... the Republic has no legal basis.  There is no requirement under the law
that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first
be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines.  More
importantly, R.A. No. 1379... expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of
forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee.[46] It must
be remembered that it was the OSG which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of
petitioners' allegedly... ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise Agreement between
petitioners and respondent was an amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action
for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was
merely performing its legal duty to... recover the wealth purportedly amassed unlawfully
by the late Mayor Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa.  The Motion to
Rescind was filed precisely because the PCGG, as respondent's authorized
representative in the compromise, discovered that the execution... of the Compromise
Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is the
duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture cases under
R.A. No. 1379. Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the OSG,...
assisted by the PCGG, in filing the Motion to Rescind.
Collantes v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the Decision[2] dated 10 March 2005 and the Resolution[3] dated 31
August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

12556.

Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was conferred Career Executive

Service Eligibility on 29 February 1996. Then President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him
the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. More than
a year later,... he was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from persons
close to then President Ejercito Estrada to give up his position so that the President
could unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at
the DILG.
on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post -
Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND).
Collantes was supposedly ordered by then
Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential
appointee
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he
received a letter from President Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February
1999.
on 24 March 1999, Collantes requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service
Board relative to the termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations
of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure as a CESO.
resi
President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES ranking structure,
CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999... despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not
receive new appointment
Taking definite action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto
and Mandamus before Us on 29 January 2001, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874.
on 13 August 2001, the CSC favorably acted on Collantes' letter-request issuing
Resolution No. 011364... on 30 August 2001, We rendered Our Decision in C.A. G.R.
SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by
Collantes
The controversy reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 149883... e
Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and terminated
Co
Thereafter, Collantes moved for the... execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364...
granted through CSC Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002
In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs Division of the DND, through Atty.
Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to revisit its Resolutions which were entirely in conflict
with Our 30 August 2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which has attained
finality pursuant to... the Supreme Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 149883... in co... in
complete turnabout from its previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482
dated 12 November 2002 declaring that had it been properly informed that a Petition for
Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then pending before Us, it would have refrained
from ruling on
Collantes' quandary
Issues:
whether... forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party... who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on
the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs
Ruling:
Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter
sought to be religated has been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an
estoppel against an estoppel, it "setteth the matter at large" has been applied by some...
authorities
Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the
same parties, the one which is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held
that the judgment prior in... time will prevail.
It has been held that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties,
although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.

Ombudsman v. De Chavez,
FACTS:

On August 18, 2005, the Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR)
received an Order from the Ombudsman. The order directed BSU-BOR to enforce the
Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, finding herein
respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service with its accessory penalties, despite the fact that the same are
pending appeal before the CA. Pursuant to said Order, BSU-BOR issued a Resolution
resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction before the RTC but was denied. Respondents
filed their notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Injunction with the CA which granted its petition. Thereafter, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene. It questioned the Order of the CA granting the
injunctive relief prayed for by the respondents. It contended that under the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, an appeal does not stay the execution of decisions,
resolutions or order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to injunctive relief.

2. Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executory.

HELD:

1. The respondents are not entitled to injunctive relief.

For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites must concur:

(1)That the invasion of the right is material and substantial;

(2)That the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

(3)That there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.

In the present case, the right of the respondents cannot be said to be clear and
unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that penalty of dismissal from the
service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executor in
accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in
administrative disciplinary cases.

2. The decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executor.

The Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty
imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-
making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as
the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provision of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Clearly, said Rules of Procedure
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case if appealed to the CA. The
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executor is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of
Court. 
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC V. REYES-BAKUNAWA
G.R. No. 180418 : August 28, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. LUZ REYES-BAKUNAWA,

MANUEL BAKUNAWA, JR., MANUEL BAKUNAWA III, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel
Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R.
Marcos.

The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had
served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was
during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her
husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and
manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; and that Luz
Bakunawa, "by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and
connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment
and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in
devices, schemes and stratagems,"

Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the complaint. It ruled
that as the evidence stands, neither the presence of the link with the Marcoses, nor the
irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for their misuse of that connection
exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG.

Republic filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied hence, an appeal to
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the complaint

HELD: No. Sandiganbayan decision sustained.

Political Law- Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown

to have originated from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former
President Marcos, the members of his immediate family, relatives, close subordinates
and close associates by illegal means

The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten nature of
the Bakunawas wealth. The mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did
not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1.
According to Republic v. Migri, the term subordinate as used in E.O. No. 1and E.O. No.
2 referred to a person who enjoyed a close association with President Marcos and/or his
wife similar to that of an immediate family member, relative, and close associate, or to
that of a close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima
facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue
of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not
suffice, then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a
government official or employee.

The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or
the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos; and mentions several other
circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses, such as her
assumption of office in the early part of the Marcos administration, the accommodations
extended to her during her various travels,the fact that her close relationship with the
Marcoses was of common knowledge among the Masbates,and the negotiated contracts
the Bakunawas entered into during the Marcos administration.

However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary
but a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the
Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of
their businesses.

We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was
able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacang Palace
during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship
with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass
the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a
close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O.
No. 2.

The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or insufficiency of

evidence involved its appreciation of the evidence. We cannot undo such determination
unless the Republic makes a strong demonstration to us that the determination was
whimsical or capricious. Alas, the Republic did not make such demonstration. Its
evidence could not sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their influence, or the
Marcoses influence in acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the ties or
relationship between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses had been "similar to that of an
immediate member of the family or a dummy."

PETITION DENIED.

EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No.

196231, 2014-01-28
Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.  The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling
that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the
disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to
subject her to disciplinary proceedings.  The Court affirmed the continuation of the
proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia
and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering.  On
May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. 
The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of
the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.  Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy
Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO
Garcia on April 27, 2010.  On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft,
approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval.   Since
the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for reconsideration had to undergo different
levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could
not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9)
calendars days from his receipt of... the order.
Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales'
petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in
the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36]  This
constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the
Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses of the bureaucracy.  Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of
the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members
of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very
powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other
grievance-handling investigative bodies."[39]  It has powers, both constitutional... and
statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of
public officers.[40]... b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the
Ombudsman's independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy.  In general terms, the framers of the Constitution
intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the
extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core
functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the...
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on
Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be
inferior but is similar in degree and kind to the  independence similarly guaranteed by
the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the
political... interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and
proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over
the Deputy Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the... independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself.  The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out
her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence
is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did.  By so doing, the law directly collided
not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and... balances that the creation
of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies
who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties.   The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only because they are subject to
pressures and controls external to her Office.  This need for complete trust is true in an
ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem... for the government.  For these reasons, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman)
should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the
Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman,
or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the
Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very
persons who can remove or suspend its members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-
impeachable officers is not... a carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to
determine the modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
he intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress
from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" to favored
public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this
must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right
to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security... of
tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual
leg to... stand on... b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the
case were already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other... persons may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on
the case forwarded to him within nine days.  In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied
on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in
ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within
five days:
Section 8.  Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable,
a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten
(10) days from receipt of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the
following grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing
Officer shall resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for
resolution.  [emphasis and underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply
to Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case;
he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly
negligent in their work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for
more than three months, it is noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and,
therefore, had to... review the case for the first time.[77]  Even the Ombudsman herself
could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given the amount of cases
that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved:
examination of the records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and
exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office
lies within his mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged
victim's father.  The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or... manner against any public official or
employee of the government.[78]  This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No.
6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.[80]
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the
basis of the unverified affidavit of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the
decision of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds;
we can be made to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities.  It is notable that of
all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio,
who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft took less than four months, and the
Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping incident rendered Mendoza's
motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly
aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and
prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the
composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic
component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between the
Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the
other.   What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of... her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special
Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an
extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must  also enjoy the same grant of
independence under the
Constitution.
n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to
reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned
(G.R. No. 196231).  We declared Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a
Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter
enjoys under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the
power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into
the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under
pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

Prosecutor III Leo C. Tabao v. Sheriff IV Jose P. Cabcabin,

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