Guest Column | Col Mandeep Singh (Retd)

Answer Lies Within

The limitations of the air defence system can be handled by
correcting the C&R network
At 0100 hours on 11 December Regiment in September 1940 which de-
1971, 64 Air Defence (AD) Battery was ployed 1st Heavy AA Battery at Digboi
asked by Commander 16 (Independent) soon after its raising, with the Battery
Armoured Brigade to move a troop placed under operational control of the
forward to provide AD to a tank col- nearest Royal Air Force Base Operations
umn stuck across the Karir Nadi in the Room. As there was no AA formation
Shakargarh Bulge (during the Battle of headquarter in India as yet, the com-
Chakra as part of the overall Battle of mand was exercised through the local
Basantar) while trying to cross it during formation headquarters.
the attack on Dehira and Chakra villages. Raising of the first Indian AA Brigade
The troop was in action at the new loca- came about only in February 1942 when
tion by first light and successfully ward- 1st Indian AA Brigade was raised at
ed off repeated attacks by Pakistan Air Calcutta with the No 1 Gun Operations
Force. The Battery, under command the Room (GOR) being raised a month lat-
Armoured Brigade, continued to provide er. No. 2 and 3 GORs came up at Digboi
AD to the Armoured Brigade during the and Tatanagar respectively at the same
Battle of Basantar. In recognition of its time, making it a total of three GORs
service, 64 AD Battery was awarded the covering Assam and Bengal. 1st Heavy
battle honour Basantar River. AA Battery now came under No 2 GOR
64 AD Battery was under command for operational control.
16 (I) Armoured Brigade during the With additional AA Regiments be-
India-Pakistan War 1971, but its oper- ing raised, the entire country was soon
ational control was exercised through covered by 17 GORs which in turn were
the Control & Reporting (C&R) channel. linked to seven ‘filter rooms’ of the air
The Battery carried out all moves and force, fed information by a network of
deployments as per the tactical require- over 70 radars. Forward of the Air Minis-
ment, and as directed by the Armoured try Experimental Stations (AMES) were
Brigade Commander, and yet it was the the Wireless Observer Units with posts
C&R network that controlled the gun’s across the Manipur Road and south-
fire. Not only did the system work well ward toward the Chin Hills as far as Ara-
but no tank was lost to enemy air action AIR DEFENCE IAI’s MRSAM kan Hill tract.
during the entire battle. To coordinate the AA defences and
This needs recollection as command The idea of creating an Air Defence the air force, an AA officer (usually the
and control of ground-based AD sys- Command is not new and has been senior most AA officer) was designated
tems (GBADS) is debated in context of tried out, with variations, by a number as the AA Defence Commander (AADC).
the AD Command. The proposed cre- of countries but none of the leading mil- The air raid warning as provided to the
ation of AD Command was one of the itary powers today have an Air Defence AA batteries by the GOR (re-designated
first decisions announced by the newly Command per se. While it may not be as AA Operations Room) which engaged
appointed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). a reason enough for not having an AD the enemy raiders as per detailed ‘fire
To be headed by a three-star Indian Command, it does warrant a rethink control orders’ issued by the air force.
Air Force (IAF) officer, the Command over the question of creating an AD One such order issued is given below:
aims at integrating all the air defence Command to have unitary command
resources to ensure ‘optimisation of re- and control over all AD systems as the Orders for firing by AA Guns will be as
sources’ and preventing fratricide. more important issue is—should the follows:
One of the statements of CDS Gen. Bi- command and control instructions for By Day
pin Rawat on the subject that stands out AD resources come from one authority HAA (Higher Altitude Airship): Fire
is: ‘If you have to ensure there is no fratri- and if they do not, does it lead to sub-op- will be opened on any group of aircraft
cide, for every weapon system fired in the timal utilisation of resources and fratri- identified as hostile or which have com-
right time at the right aircraft, the com- cide? The answer may well lie in history mitted a hostile act, or when US Air
mand and control instructions should of AD Artillery. Force (USAF) Base Ops Room asks for
come from one entity. As of now it’s not,’ The common practice is to have the fire. Single ac will not be engaged except:
he is reported to have said. According to AAD units and sub-units ‘under com- n When they are being actively offensive
the Hindu newspaper of 2 January 2020, mand’ the field army with the control n When there is a reasonable chance of
Gen. Rawat made this statement in a exercised through the C&R System. This bringing them down,
meeting held specifically to discuss the has been the practice since the raising n On the request of US Ops Room for
creation of Air Defence Command. of the first Indian Anti-Aircraft (AA) Pointer Rounds. AADC Digboi and

42 FORCE | September 2020

top & bottom An artist’s visualisation of land-based air defence system; and Rajendra radar for surface to air missile Akash

Dinjan will then fire four rounds from by night, to order guns to cease fire for with poor, or no air force radar coverage
a single selected gun. operational reasons. and the AA brigades started co-ordi-
LAA (Lower Altitude Airship): Normal (War Diary of 2nd Indian AA Brigade. nating the siting and roster of GL sets,
rules of engagement. Accessed at History Division, Ministry of networking some of them with the for-
By Night — HAA: Fire will not be opened Defence, New Delhi.) mation AAOR and using them for early
except when permission has been ob- warning. These GL sets may have sup-
tained from US Air Force Ops Room. At no stage was the issue of the fire plemented the radar network of the air
LAA. Fire will not be opened at night orders the prerogative of the AA Com- forces but the procedure of warning and
even as above unless mander with the only exception being giving fire orders remained the same.
n The ac is making a direct attack on the permission to fire in self-defence if In time, all Indian divisions had an
the gun, or the AA location was directly attacked. integral AA Regiment and the com-
n Against parachute mines or flares. A similar arrangement was followed mand of these was exercised through
Base Ops room has the right by day or during all operations, including amphib- the formation command channel but
ious operations, for which Mobile AAOR the control orders were passed through
were employed. The air force radars for the C&R network. There was never an
such AAORs were mobile, even fitted on ambiguity about the exercise of control
amphibious vehicles and at times, on of AA batteries. There were occasions
landing crafts. The responsibility of sur- during the Battle of Burma that the AA
veillance and early warning remained batteries were used in direct firing role
that of the air force. GL radars of as per the formation plans but the em-
AA Artillery ployment in AA role was always
were used ay as per laid down procedures of
locations following the air force lead.
The Royal Air Force radars
accompanied the advancing
XIV Army, at times fitted
on to boats and riverine
crafts, DBKW amphibious
vehicles and jeeps. The
system worked with at-
tendant constraints.
As with other arms and
services, a large number
AA Artillery regiments were

FORCE | September 2020 43

Special Report
demobilised from 1945 onwards in- Even during the no limitations, but they are not a func-
cluding all the AAORs, that were raised India-Pakistan War of tion of command and control.
during the war. To exercise command
over the AA Regiments, not integral to
September 1965, Pakistan Identifying the Weak Link
the divisions, an Army Group Royal In- Air Force was able to The most critical component of an air
dian Artillery (AGRIA) was raised but deliver a deadly blow at defence system is the C&R system that
it did not exercise operational control Pathankot because the coordinates and controls the activi-
over the Regiments. This left a void in information picked up by ties of the surveillance sub-system and
the anti-aircraft defences in India as the radar at Amritsar was the weapons systems, be it airborne or
there was no operations centre to co- passed on to the Base surface based. The success of an air de-
ordinate and control the operations of fence engagement depends on getting
the anti-aircraft regiments and batter-
Operations Room but not the right information to the right weap-
ies. The immediate need was thus for acted upon for reason on system at the right time. For this a
an Anti-Aircraft Operations Room each not known. There was no seamless communication network is
for the Western and Eastern regions. inter-service failure, but essential that can link all the air defence
Accordingly, two new AA operations a lapse within the same elements. Herein lies the rub for the
rooms viz No. 1 and 2 AAOR were raised service three services have unique communica-
on 22 February 1946 but they were also tion protocols and it is this lacuna that
demobilised before partition with an need to be addressed.
AAOR being next raised only in 1951. information and issuing fire orders. It The reason for this logjam is that
is pertinent to note that ‘anti-aircraft while the IAF has its Integrated Air
C&R Organisation units whether deployed for the de- Command and Control System (IACCS),
The IAF, after Independence, estab- fence of airfields or allotted in support the army and the navy have Akash Teer
lished the Air Defence Areas (later of the field army, always come under and Trigun respectively. The main lim-
called the Air Defence Control Centre) the functional control of the air force. itation of the present system is the lack
to exercise operational control over (Maj Gen D.K. Palit, Vr C, History of of seamless integration in the services’
the AD assets through sector opera- Regiment of Artillery Indian Army, Lee C&R systems. The IACCS, which rides
tion centres and base operations cen- Cooper, London, 1972, p 174) on the air force (AF) net, should con-
tres. With time, the Joint AD centres The arrangement has continued tinue to be the national level but the
manned by both the IAF and army since, ensuring that while the ingress- Akash Teer and Trigun systems need to
representatives came up to control ing aerial platforms are suitably en- be integrated with it for the lack of inte-
the AD artillery assets and the C&R gaged by an appropriate weapon sys- gration is the main bottleneck and the
system has matured since then with tem, the safety of own aircraft is also primary challenge.
clearly defined procedure of passing ensured. It is not to say that there are One of the main reasons for failure of
HOME GROWN Test-firing of Akash SAM

44 FORCE | September 2020

air defences is the collapse of internal War II era understood this well and an un-bridgeable chasm being created
checks and balances. From the incident organised their formations according- between the two. With the air defence
of Patriot missile firing at a Royal Air ly. The Indian Army was no exception of the field armies being of critical im-
Force Tornado in 2003 to the more re- and all divisions had an AD Regiment portance, such gaps in understanding
cent shooting down of a Mi-17 V-5 chop- on their order of battle, a practice that air defence are too costly to be glossed
per of the 154 Helicopter Unit on 27 carried on till the early Sixties when a over. It will also be wise to remember
February 2019 by an IAF Spyder missile, decision was taken to group all AD reg- that no AD Command, from Pakistan
the fratricide incidents were a result of iments under independent AD brigades and Egypt to Iraq and United States
intra-organisational failures. Such in- to facilitate technical training and their have succeeded in accomplishing their
cidents are not new. Even during the employment. intended role. And wisdom lies in rec-
India-Pakistan War of September 1965, This move, however well intend- ognising the futility of the belief that
Pakistan Air Force was able to deliv- ed, was a retrograde step and meant India can succeed in this.
er a deadly blow at Pathankot because de-linking of the AD regiments from the There is no doubt that the wise men
the information picked up by the radar field formations. There was no direct on the (Raisina) hill will decide upon the
at Amritsar was passed on to the Base interaction of the Commanders and correct course of action in due course of
Operations Room but not acted upon the General Staff with the AD artillery, time but it will be wise to remember the
for reason not known. There was no resulting in lack of knowledge and ap- old story from the Upanishads of the
inter-service failure, but a lapse within preciation of the nuances of employing musk deer that spent its life looking for
the same service. To assume that an AD AD resources. An opportunity to cor- the elusive source of intoxicating per-
Command will somehow correct this, rect this was lost in mid-Eighties, when fume, not realising that the source was
without addressing the core issue, will the Reorganised Army Plains Infantry within.
be denying the realities and complexi- Division, when conceived, had its own The main limitation of the AD system
ties of a functional AD system. integral AD elements. Had the original lies within, in its C&R network. To look
proposal been implemented, the AAD for a big, bold decision that can correct
A Word of Caution would have been more integrated with it may well prove to be akin the hunt of
Air power, and by extension air defence, the field formations and Commanders the musk deer.;
can only be ignored at own peril by the and the General Staff more involved in
field army. This necessity, to co-opt and the planning and employment of air de- (The writer is former Army Air Defence
integrate AD with the field formations, fence. officer. He is an author of five books.
is not a recent requirement but has ex- Similarly, AD Command will result in His recent latest book Air Defence Ar-
isted since the middle of the last cen- the AAD being further delinked from tillery in Combat 1950-1972 came out
tury. In a way, the armies of the World the field armies, a move that result in in April 2020)

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