UZLJ 2019 2 (I) Complete PDF

University of
Zimbabwe Law
Journal
Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 ISNN 2617-2046
i
University of Zimbabwe Law Journal
©Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe 2019
Published by University of Zimbabwe Publications

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Mount Pleasant
Harare, Zimbabwe
EDITORIAL BOARD
Dr Innocent Maja (Editor-in-Chief)
Dr Tarisai Mutangi (Assistant Editor-in-Chief)
Dr Rosalie Katsande
Dr Elizabeth Rutsate
Mr Munyaradzi Gwisai
Mr Brian Crozier
Mr Nyasha Chishakwe
Mr Rodgers Matsikidze
Mr Blessing Mushohwe
ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Geoff Feltoe
Professor Lovemore Madhuku
Professor Julie Stewart
You can contact uzpub@admin.uz.ac.zw or faculty@law.uz.ac.zw to

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GUIDE FOR CONTRIBUTORS
Each contribution should be emailed to imaja@law.uz.ac.zw or gfeltoe@gmail.com
The editors will only accept contributions that comply with the following:
• The submission should be original.

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may consider republication of an article that has been published elsewhere if
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Reported Judgements:
High Court cases
S v Makuvasa 2011 (1) ZLR 330 (H)
Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1987 (2) ZLR 143 (H)
Appeal cases
S v Dube 1992 (2) ZLR 65 (S)
Minister of Home Affairs v Allan 1986 (1) ZLR 263 (S)
iii
i v University of Zimbabwe Law Journal 2019
Unreported Judgements:
Trial cases
S v Mpa HH-469-14
Mungate v City of Harare & Ors HH-328-16
Appeal cases
S v Jones S-154-94
Newlands Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Matanda Bros S-100-91
Legislation:
Acts
Domestic Violence Act [Chapter 5:16] (The Chapter number is placed in square
brackets and is italicised.)
Subsidiary legislation
Road Traffic (Safety-belt) Regulations, 1987 (SI 147/1987)
(SI is the abbreviation for Statutory Instrument.)
Reference to books and articles

Books
G. Feltoe, A Guide to the Zimbabwean Law of Delict, Legal Resources Foundation
2018.
J Burchell, Principles of Delict (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1993).
I Maja, The Law of Contract in Zimbabwe, Maja Foundation, 2015.
J Neethling et al., Law of Delict, (Sixth Edition, Lexis Nexis, Durban, 2010.
Articles
Armstrong, A “Consent in Rape Cases in Zimbabwe” in 1986 Vol 4 Zimbabwe Law
Review 112
Nyandiya-Bundy, S “Child Sexual Abuse in Zimbabwe” in 1994 Vol 6 No 2 Legal
Forum 5.
EDITORIAL
The University of Zimbabwe Law Journal is the successor to the

Zimbabwe Law Review and is published by the Faculty of Law at the
University of Zimbabwe. It carries peer-reviewed articles, book reviews
and case notes on any significant legal matters on Zimbabwean and
International Law. In the process, the University of Zimbabwe Law
Journal intends to contribute towards an indigenous Zimbabwean
jurisprudence.
The journal is published twice a year (April and October). Contributions
for consideration in the April issue should be sent by 15 February and
those to be considered for publication in October should be sent by
15 August each year.
Articles, book reviews and case notes to be considered for publication
should conform to the style guide and must be sent to either the
Editor in Chief, Dr Innocent Maja, imaja@law.uz.ac.zw or Professor
Geoffrey Feltoe, gfeltoe@gmail.com
The current edition (Volume 2, No. 1, 2019) has 10 articles, 2 book
reviews, an editorial on legal information and 5 case notes. It has
been published through the generous funding of the University of
Zimbabwe through the University of Zimbabwe Publications.
v
CONTENTS
EDITORIAL ............................................................... v
ARTICLES
The Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe’s Unconstitutional
Approach of Applying Rules of Locus Standi ....................... 1
BY JUSTICE ALFRED MAVEDZENGE
Protection from Unfair Dismissal and the Remedy of

Reinstatement under Zimbabwean Law ............................ 24
MUNYARADZI GWISAI
Access to Information Laws, Environmental Rights and Public

Participation In The Wildlife Sector ................................ 62
LENIN TINASHE CHISAIRA
The Rules of Civil Procedure in the Magistrates Courts of

Zimbabwe: When Rules of Civil Procedure Become an
Enemy of Justice to Self-actors ..................................... 77
RODGERS MATSIKIDZE
Rights Inference: Understanding the Meaning of Section 46 of the

Constitution of Zimbabwe Beyond Gubbay CJ’s Dictum ......... 93
BY JUSTICE ALFRED MAVEDZENGE
An Interrogation of the Law Relating to Cohabitation in Zimbabwe

and the Need for Law Reform ....................................... 116
BY BEVERLEY CASMILA MADZIKATIRE AND ELIZABETH RUTSATE
Collusion! in Defence of Free Speech in Sports and the

Unaccountability of Global Sports Administration Bodies ....... 149
BY LYNDON T. NKOMO
Reflecting on the Applicability of Freedom, Sanctity and Privity of

Contract in Zimbabwean Law of Contract ......................... 172
BY INNOCENT MAJA
Sentencing of Sexual Offenders ..................................... 181

BY GEOFF FELTOE
UZLJ University of Zimbabwe Law Journal vii
Labour Rights under Zimbabwe’s New Constitution:

The Right to be Paid a Fair and Reasonable Wage ................ 204
BY MUNYARADZI GWISAI, RODGERS MATSIKIDZE & CALEB MUCHECHE
BOOK REVIEWS
The Struggle Over State Power in Zimbabwe Law and
Politics Since 1950 by G.H. Karekwaivanane
(Cambridge University Press 2017) .............................. 233
BY GEOFF FELTOE
Provincial and Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe

An Analysis of the Law, Policy and Practice
By T.C. Chigwata (Juta 2018) .................................... 234
BY GEOFF FELTOE
CASE NOTES
Per Stirpes Principle Versus the Per Capita Principle in
Intestate Succession: A Brief Overview: Case Note on the
Case of in Re Estate Late Bellinah Mhlanga
Hh 816-17 HC 4168/17 DR 143/13................................... 236
BY ELIZABETH RUTSATE
Reporting a Court Case Arising from False Social Media Report:

Case Note on Mushunje V Zimbabwe Newspapers HH-47-17 .... 254
BY G. FELTOE
A Timely and Welcome Decision on Employer Liability for

Pension Arrears under Section 13 (1) Labour Act [Chapter
28:01]: Case on Misheck Ugaro v African Banking Corporation
SC 298 17 [Ref – LC/H/681/16] ...................................... 262
BY MUNYARADZI GWISAI
Actions against the Police: Unreasonable Obstacles to

Obtaining Redress .................. : Case Note on Nyika & Ors v
Minister of Home Affairs & Ors HH-181-16 (“The Nyika Case”) 270
BY G. FELTOE, J REID-ROWLAND AND R. MATSIKIDZE
Legal Information ...................................................... 279

blank
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ZIMBABWE’S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH OF APPLYING RULES OF
LOCUS STANDI
BY JUSTICE ALFRED MAVEDZENGE1

(in loving memory of the late Blasio Zivengwa Mavedzenge)
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the rationality and legality of the rule of locus
standi introduced by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe to the
effect that no litigant is allowed to act in more than one capacity of
locus standi in one matter. This rule was initially suggested in Mudzuru
v Minister of Justice and was crystallised in Samuel Sipepa Nkomo v
Minister of Local Government. When evaluated against the provisions
of section 46 and section 85 of the Constitution, this rule is
inconsistent with the liberal approach to determining locus standi
and is therefore ultra vires the Constitution. At a conceptual level,
this rule is untenable and irrational as it is contradictory to the
theoretical foundations upon which the constitutional idea of judicial
review is based. It is also inconsistent with the trajectory set by the
same Court in its very first case of Jealous Mawarire v Robert Mugabe.
Keywords: Constitution, locus standi, constitutional court, human
dignity, ultra vires
INTRODUCTION
Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution in May 2013 which introduces
and guarantees a range of progressive democratic principles, values
and rights. These values and principles include constitutional
supremacy (as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty),2 the rule of
1
Justice Alfred Mavedzenge holds a PhD in Constitutional Law from the University
of Cape Town. He is a Researcher at the Democratic Governance and Rights
Unit of the University of Cape Town’s Law Faculty and an associate at Maja and
Associates Commercial Law Chambers
2
See section 2 (1) and 3 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
1
2 University of Zimbabwe Law Journal 2019
law,3 separation of power,4 transparency, justice, accountability and

responsiveness.5 A range of civil, political and socio-economic rights
are guaranteed in Chapter Four of the Constitution.6 The intention is
to ensure that the exercise of public power and conduct of private
persons in Zimbabwe conforms and gives effect to these principles,
values and fundamental rights.
In order to ensure the enforcement of fundamental rights, the
Constitution provides for certain mechanisms which include the right
to approach a court of law to seek remedies against violations or
potential violations of specific rights that are enshrined in Chapter
Four of the Constitution. This right is encapsulated in s 85 (1) of the
Constitution. However, as is the case with most constitutional rights,
it is not an absolute right.7 It is qualified to ensure that the courts
entertain only those cases that entail “real, earnest and vital
controversy” amongst litigants and not mere “hypothetical cases, or
cases that are only of academic interest.”8 In order to distinguish
between ‘hypothetical’ and ‘real’ cases, the Constitution provides
for what are known as rules of locus standi which are basically rules
that regulate the application of the right to approach a court of law
or the right to bring an action before a court of law.9 These rules are
set out in s 85 (1) of the Constitution as follows:
Any of the following persons, namely-
(a) any person acting in their own interests; (b). any person
acting on behalf of another person who cannot act for
themselves; (c) any person acting as a member, or in the
interests, of a group or class of persons; (d) any person acting in
the public interest; (e) any association acting in the interests of
its members;
3
Ibid, section 3 (1)(b)
4
Ibid, section 3 (2) (e)
5
Ibid, section 3 (2) (g)
6
Also called the Declaration of Rights
7
It is not listed as one of the rights that cannot be limited. See s 86 of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
8
This is a dictum of Brandeis J in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority 297
US 288 (1936). For similar views, also see Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC);
1996 (1) BCLR 1 at para 165. Also see Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of
Rights Handbook 6 ed, Juta and Company 2013 at p. 72.
9
See Justice Alfred Mavedzenge and Douglas Coltart, A Constitutional Law Guide
towards understanding Zimbabwe’s Social, Economic and Cultural Human Rights,
International Commission of Jurists 2014 at p. 16
UZLJ Approach of Applying Rules of Locus Standi 3
is entitled to approach a court, alleging that a fundamental

right or freedom enshrined in this Chapter has been, is being or
is likely to be infringed, and the court may grant appropriate
relief, including a declaration of rights and an award of
compensation.
The significance of these rules cannot be gainsaid. They define

capacities in which a person can bring an action or petition before
the court, which is the locus standi or standing. If a litigant is unable
to demonstrate that he or she fits in any of these capacities, then his
or her case may not be heard by the court. Therefore, these rules are
so important that they determine who can bring an action before the
court for the vindication of constitutional rights.
Furthermore, these rules are also critical in the sense that they have
a direct bearing on the right to access appropriate relief. This right is
guaranteed in section 85 (1) which stipulates that any person who
acts in the capacities or locus standi described above is entitled to
appropriate relief if his or her petition succeeds in court. For a relief
to be ‘appropriate’, it has to meet certain attributes.10 One of these
is that the relief must be effective in the sense that it must adequately
vindicate the right(s) in question.11 For the court to give such a relief,
it must be convinced that the applicant’ case merits such kind of a
relief in the first place. It is inevitable that, as part of this assessment,
the court will consider the appropriateness of the relief sought in
relation to the locus standi upon which the applicant founded his or
her petition. Put differently, the court will inquire into the following
question: Is the relief sought appropriate for an action brought on the
basis of the particular locus standi invoked by applicant? Usually, for
a petition brought by litigants acting in their own personal interest,
the appropriate remedy would be a personal relief12 rather than a
public interest relief or a relief which affects the public.
Thus, rules governing locus standi do not determine only who can
bring a petition before the court but they also determine the
substantive nature of relief which a litigant can get from the court. It
is therefore very important to critically engage with questions
10
For some of these, see Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786
(CC) at para 19
11
See Mavedzenge and Coltart supra Note 9 at p. 15
12
Relief which attaches to the litigant personally, as opposed to attaching to
other persons who are not party to the case.
pertaining to how courts interpret these rules. In this paper, I examine

the approach that has been taken by the Constitutional Court of
Zimbabwe in applying s 85 (1) of the Constitution particularly on
whether or not a litigant can act in more than one capacity (locus
standi) in the same proceedings or in the same application. Decisions
of the Constitutional Court are binding on all other courts13 and
therefore, it is critical to engage with these decisions as they will
affect litigants in other courts.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S APPROACH IN APPLYING RULES OF LOCUS STANDI

The Constitutional Court seems to have suggested a curious application
of the rules of locus standi, to the effect that a litigant cannot act in
more than one capacity in a single matter. This proposition is
encapsulated in Mudzuru v Minister of Justice and Parliamentary
Affairs14 (Mudzuru case) where the learned Deputy Chief Justice Luke
Malaba (as he then was) said:
What is in issue is the capacity in which the applicants act in
claiming the right to approach the court on the allegations they
have made. In claiming locus standi under s 85(1) of the
Constitution, a person should act in one capacity in approaching
a court and not act in two or more capacities in one proceeding.
[My own emphasis]15
Although one could argue that by using the phrase “should act”, the
learned Deputy Chief Justice was making a suggestion rather than
laying out a rule regarding how provisions relating to locus standi
should be applied, this seems to have crystallized into a rule when
one takes into account the subsequent judgments made by the same
Court. For instance, in Samuel Sipepa Nkomo v Minister of Local
Government, Rural and Urban Development16 (Samuel Sipepa Nkomo
case), the learned Ziyambi JCC said:
In so far as the applicant alleges an infringement of his
fundamental right enshrined in Chapter 4 of the Constitution,
he may, in the absence of the rules referred to in s 85(3), be
permitted to access this Court directly. On this basis he has,
prima facie, the locus standi to bring his application in terms of
13
See section 167 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
14
[2015] ZWCC
15
Ibid at p. 8
16
CCZ 06-16 at para 8
s 85 (1) (a). But he cannot, as he has sought to do, act in his own
interest as well as the public interest. This point was emphasized
in Loveness Mudzuru & Anor v Minister of Justice, Legal &
Parliamentary Affairs N.O & 2 Ors where Malaba DCJ, delivering
the judgment of the Court, held that an applicant should confine
himself to one of the capacities set out in s 85 (1). [My own
emphasis]
Unlike the DCJ in the Mudzuru case, who uses the word “should” act
in one capacity, Ziyambi JCC (with the concurrence of eight other
judges) in Samuel Sipepa Nkomo case, uses the word “cannot” act in
more than one capacity and she references the Mudzuru case in arriving
at this interpretation. Thus, when one reads Ziyambi JCC’s judgment
in Samuel Sipepa Nkomo case, it seems that the Constitutional Court
has now laid it out as a rule that a litigant cannot claim more than
one ground of locus standi in a single application. For instance,
according to this approach (as suggested by the Constitutional Court)
a litigant in a single proceeding cannot simultaneously claim to act in
her own interest and in the public interest.
Through this paper, I question the rationality of this approach and
contest its constitutionality. I take the position that, with respect,
the Constitutional Court’s approach is wrong, irrational, unreasonable
and unconstitutional. I advance my argument in two parts. First, I
deploy the rules of constitutional interpretation in order to buttress
my position. However, I refuse to restrict this discussion to a mere
technical or legalistic review of how the Constitutional Court’s
interpretation is ultra-vires s 85 (1) of the Constitution and certain
values enshrined therein.17 To do so would be to miss the point entirely
because the Constitutional Court’s interpretation is a tell-tale sign
revealing the bench’s deep, underlying philosophical view of its own
role in protecting the Constitution. For that reason, in the second
part of the paper I discuss the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings
of judicial review in order to show that the Constitutional Court
interpretation of s 85 (1) of the Constitution is philosophically at
variance with the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution which
the Court is required to protect. First, I deal with the rules of
constitutional interpretation.
17
Such as the rule of law and constitutional supremacy.
RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Section 85 (1) of the Constitution is located within Chapter Four of
the Constitution, which is the Declaration of Rights. Therefore, when
interpreting how the rules of locus standi set out in s 85 should be
applied, the Court must revert to section 46 (1) of the Constitution
which provides that:
When interpreting this Chapter, a court, tribunal, forum or body—
a) must give full effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined
in this Chapter;
b) must promote the values and principles that underlie a
democratic society based on openness, justice, human
dignity, equality and freedom, and in particular, the values
and principles set out in section 3;
c) must take into account international law and all treaties
and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party;
d) must pay due regard to all the provisions of this
Constitution, in particular the principles and objectives
set out in Chapter 2; and
e) may consider relevant foreign law;
Therefore, the rules of locus standi must be interpreted and applied

in a manner that ensures that: the rights enshrined in the Declaration
of Rights are given full effect,18 the constitutional values (including
those enshrined in s 3) and relevant international law standards are
implemented.19 The import of these rules of interpretation is that
the right to approach the court must be interpreted generously but
without distorting the grammar used in framing that right.20 The first
18
Mawere v Registrar General (2015) ZWCC 04 at para 20, where the court adopted
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Rattigan v Chief Immigration Officer 1994
(2) ZLR 54 (S) at 57 F–H where Gubbay CJ (as he then was) said: “[When
interpreting constitutional rights] what is to be avoided is the imparting of a
narrow, artificial, rigid and pedantic interpretation; to be preferred is one [an
interpretation] which serves the interests of the Constitution and best carries
out its objects and promotes its purpose. All relevant provisions are to be
considered as a whole and where rights and freedoms are conferred on persons,
derogations therefrom, as far as the language permits, should be narrowly and
strictly construed.”
19
See supra note 15, Mudzuru case at para 25–26
20
See supra note 18, Mawere case at para 20 where the Constitutional Court of
Zimbabwe reproduced Kentridge AJ’s ruling in State v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642
(CC) to caution that: “[When interpreting constitutional rights] it cannot be
aspect to consider then is the grammatical construction of the right.21

Section 85 (1) of the Constitution stipulates that any of the persons
mentioned therein have the right to petition the court seeking
protection of the right(s) guaranteed for them in Chapter Four of the
Constitution. There is nothing in the grammatical construction of
section 85 which shows that litigants are prohibited from acting in
more than one capacity in a single proceeding. Thus, the scope of the
right to approach the court is grammatically cast widely and therefore,
is capable of a broad and purposive interpretation which takes within
its sweep a range of relevant constitutional values and international
law norms and standards.
The purpose of the rules of locus standi is to ensure that the right to
approach the court is fully facilitated22 in order to bring about effective
enforcement of constitutional rights.23 Therefore, when interpreting
and applying these rules, the court must seek to promote this purpose.
A rule which prohibits applicants from acting in more than one capacity
in a single matter is inconsistent with this constitutional goal. It has
the effect of restricting an applicant from securing relief that is
appropriate.
A relief is appropriate if it prescribes for the applicant remedies which
best secure his or her rights while, at the same time, it protects the
Constitution.24 Under certain circumstances, a litigant may have to
found her application on more than one capacity of locus standi in
order to claim a relief that is effective for the protection of the
too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might
wish it to mean. We must heed Lord Wilberforce’s reminder that even a
Constitution is a legal instrument, the language of which must be respected...I
would say that a Constitution embodying fundamental principles should as far
as its language permits be given a broad construction.”
21
See Zimbabwe Electoral Commission v Commissioner General, ZRP (2014) ZWCC
3 at para 8. Also see L Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes Butterworths
2002 p 96 and See GM Cockram Interpretation of Statutes 3 ed, Juta and Co
1987 at p 36
22
See 85 (3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
23
See L Chiduza and PN Makiwane ‘Strengthening Locus Standi in Human Rights
Litigation in Zimbabwe: An Analysis of the Provisions in the New Zimbabwean
Constitution’ in PER/PELJ 2016(19) at p 13
24
See G Musila ‘The Right to an effective remedy under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in 2006 Vol 6 African Human Rights Law Journal at
p 446. Also see Jawara v The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000) at para
32. Also see Fose case, supra note 10.
Constitution and or vindication of her fundamental rights. For instance,

Mrs X (an accused human rights activist) has been denied bail and is
being held at Matapi police cells where the living standards are inhuman
and degrading. Mrs X often gets arrested for engaging in public protests.
She wants to bring an application to the Constitutional Court seeking
an order which: (a) declares that the conditions at Matapi cells violate
the right to human dignity and no accused person should be detained
there until government fixes those conditions and, (b) that she be
moved to cells with humane living conditions. It is necessary that Mrs
X claim both (a) and (b) as part of the relief because she needs to be
moved from Matapi cells in order to protect her right to human dignity
which is being violated. Furthermore, as an activist who often
participates in protests, she also needs to be assured that she will not
be condemned to Matapi cells, should she be arrested again before
government fixes the living conditions there. In order to claim a relief
which declares the holding cells to be inhuman and unfit to hold any
arrested person and that she is removed from there, Mrs X would
have to approach the court acting both in her own interest and in the
interest of the public. A relief which declares the cells to be inhumane
and prohibits the state from detaining any accused person in those
cells until they are fixed, is a public interest relief which Mrs X can
only claim if she approaches the court on the basis of s 85 (1) (d) of
the Constitution of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, Mrs X can only seek
an order which compels the state to immediately move her from Matapi
cells if she approaches the court on the basis of section 85 (1) (a) of
the Constitution. Thus, Mrs X has to invoke both section 85 (1) (a) and
(d) in order to get the appropriate relief which will see her being
moved from Matapi cells while, at the same time, a guarantee that
she will not he condemned to the same cells should she be arrested
again before government fixes those cells.
Furthermore, a relief which would result in Mrs X being moved to
better cells without the court condemning the inhuman cells as unfit
for detention of any other person would not be an effective remedy.
Such a remedy would temporarily protect Mrs X’s rights but it leaves
the Constitution vulnerable as other people may have their rights
violated by being detained in the same cells. There are numerous
examples where a litigant would have to invoke more than one ground
of locus standi in order to seek an effective relief.25 As would be the
25
For instance, a parent who is threatened with arbitrary evictions has to act
both in his own interest and in the interest of other persons — his children. A
case in Mrs X’s situation, a rule which restricts litigants to choosing

one ground of locus standi may constrain them from seeking effective
relief, thereby undermining the effective protection of human rights
and the Constitution. Such a rule undermines the purpose of the right
to approach the court and is therefore ultra vires s 85 (3) (a),26 which
requires rules of procedure to fully facilitate the right to approach
the court and the right to effective remedies.27
This rule is also contrary to the cardinal values upon which the
Constitution is based. These values include justice and respect for
the rule of law28 — values which demand that persons must have
access to effective remedies in order to enforce the law-including
their constitutional rights. As the Icelandic Human Rights Centre rightly
observes:
Under the rule of law [and also constitutional supremacy],
effective remedies, effectiveness of justice, notably in providing
effective recourse to anyone who alleges that her or his rights
have been violated, is essential. Without such recourse, justice
is of little use.29
The unconstitutionality of this rule becomes even more apparent when

one applies s 46 (1) (c)30 which requires provisions in the Declaration
of Rights31 to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the
relevant international law standards and principles. These are
encapsulated in article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) which stipulates that:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
patient who is hospitalised in a clinic where the rights of patients are being
violated may have to act in his own interest as well as that of other patients
(who are in the same clinic) who are incapacitated to approach the court, yet
their rights are equally in danger.
26
Of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
27
See section 85 (1) and (3) (a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
28
See section 3 (1) and (2) (g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
29
See http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/
comparative-analysis-of-selected-case-law-achpr-iachr-echr-hrc/the-rights-to-
due-process/what-is-the-right-to-an-effective-remedy [accessed on 7
September 2018]
30
31
Of which the rules of locus standi are part of the Declaration of Rights
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to

adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. [and]…
(3) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a)
to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy…
The above provision has been interpreted as follows by the Human

Rights Committee:
Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective
protection of Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that
individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to
vindicate those rights. Such remedies should be appropriately
adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of
certain categories of person, including in particular children.
The Committee attaches importance to States Parties’
establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms
for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law.32
Rules of court procedure are part of the judicial mechanisms

(contemplated in article 2 of the ICCPR) for addressing allegations of
rights violations. As is mentioned by the Human Rights Committee
above, these rules of procedure must ensure that persons not only
get their cases heard by the court but they also get remedies that
effectively address the alleged violations or threats of violation. As I
demonstrated above, a rule which prohibits a litigant from invoking
more than one grounds of locus standi undermines the litigant’s ability
to claim effective remedies and therefore, such a rule falls foul of
Zimbabwe’s international legal obligations- especially those arising
from article 2 of the ICCPR.
By virtue of s 46 (1) (e) of the Constitution, courts may consider
comparative foreign jurisprudence when interpreting provisions in the
Zimbabwean Declaration of Rights. As I have argued elsewhere,33 the
Zimbabwean jurisprudence on the interpretation of certain
constitutional provisions and principles is still shaping up and,
32
See United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment no. 31
[80] ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to
the Covenant’ 26 May 2004, para 15
33
Mavedzenge and Coltart supra note 9 at p. 21. Also see Justice Mavedzenge
‘Accessing the National Voters’ Roll through the Right of Access to Information
In Zimbabwe’ in 2017 Vol 1 Zimbabwe Rule of Law Journal at p.4
therefore, courts should be keen to be persuaded by approaches taken

by sister courts in jurisdictions which share contextual similarities
with the Zimbabwean Constitution.
South Africa is one such comparative jurisdiction. The rules of locus
standi in s 85 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe mirror s 7(4)(b) of
the Constitution of the 1993 Constitution of South Africa.34 After its
landmark decision in Ferreira v Levin,35 where it held that these rules
contemplate a liberal approach to locus standi,36 the Constitutional
Court of South Africa has gone on to allow litigants to invoke more
than one locus standi in a single application. For instance, in Albutt v
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 37 the
Constitutional Court was confronted with an application which involved
a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as litigants. Chief
Justice Ngcobo had this to say about their locus standi:
The NGOs have standing on at least two grounds. First, they are
litigating in the public interest under section 38(d) of the
Constitution. The NGOs contend that the exclusion of victims
from participation in the special dispensation process violates
the Constitution, in particular, the rule of law. They submit that,
as civic organizations concerned with victims of political
34
Which provided as follows: “(a) When an infringement of or threat to any right
entrenched in this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to in paragraph (b)
shall be entitled to apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief,
which may include a declaration of rights ... (b) The relief referred to in
paragraph (a) may be sought by (i) a person acting in his or her own interest;
(ii) an association acting in the interest of its members; (iii) a person acting on
behalf of another person who is not in a position to seek such relief in his or
her own name; (iv) a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group
or class of persons; or (v) a person acting in the public interest.”
35
Supra note 6
36
For instance, in Ferreira v Levin, Chaskalson P said: “Whilst it is important
that this Court should not be required to deal with abstract or hypothetical
issues, and should devote its scarce resources to issues that are properly before
it, I can see no good reason for adopting a narrow approach to the issue of
standing in constitutional cases. On the contrary, it is my view that we should
rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be consistent with the
mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to
ensure that constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of the protection to
which they are entitled. Such an approach would also be consistent in my view
with the provisions of section 7(4) of the Constitution on which counsel for the
Respondents based his argument.” [My own emphasis]
37
2010 (3) SA 293 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC)
violence, they have an interest in ensuring compliance with the

Constitution and the rule of law. Second, they are litigating in
the interest of the victims under section 38(c). The victims whose
interests the NGOs represent were unable to seek relief
themselves because they were unaware that applications for
pardons affecting them were being considered.38
Thus, the Constitutional Court interpreted s 38 of the South African

Constitution (which is similar to s 85 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe),
to mean that a litigant can approach the Court on the basis of more
than one ground of locus standi. In Kruger v President of the Republic
of South Africa39 — where the applicant was an attorney who was
challenging the validity of certain regulations — the Court accepted
to hear the matter on the basis that the applicant had approached
the Court in both his personal capacity and in the interest of the
public (members of the legal profession), whose work was similarly
affected by the regulations. A similar approach was taken by the South
African Supreme Court of Appeal in Democratic Alliance and Others v
Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors40 where the
Court held that the political parties who were applicants in the matter
were properly before the Court on the basis that they were acting
both in public interest and in the interest of their membership who
were keen to see the Constitution being upheld by the President when
appointing the National Director of Public Prosecutions.
Kenya is another jurisdiction that is comparable to Zimbabwe. Article
22 of the Constitution of Kenya41 is analogous to s 85 (1) of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe. The Court of Appeal in Kenya interpreted
article 22 to imply that a litigant may rely on more than one ground
38
Ibid at para 33-34
39
2009 (1) SA 417 (CC); 2009 (3) BCLR 268 (CC) at para 25
40
2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA); 2012 (6) BCLR 613 (SCA) at para 44-45
41
It provides as follows: “(1) Every person has the right to institute court
proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights
has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened. (2) In addition to a
person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under clause (1) may be
instituted by– (a) a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act
in their own name; (b) a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a
group or class of persons; (c) a person acting in the public interest; or (d) an
association acting in the interest of one or more of its members. (3) The Chief
Justice shall make rules providing for the court proceedings referred to in this
Article, which shall satisfy the criteria that– (a) the rights of standing provided
for in clause (2) are fully facilitated;
of locus standi in one proceeding. For instance, in Randu Nzai Ruwa v

The Secretary, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission,42
the Court accepted to hear a case brought by litigants who were acting
in their own personal interest as well as in the interests of the public.
The Court of Appeal applied a similar approach in Mumo Matemu v
Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance43 by stating that:
It is our consideration that in filing the petition the 1st respondent
[an NGO] was acting not only on behalf of its members and in
accordance with its stated mandate, but also in the public
interest, in view of the nature of the matter at hand. The 1st
respondent, its members and the general public were entitled
to participate in the proceedings relating to the decision-making
process culminating in the impugned decision.
The reason why in these jurisdictions, the courts allow litigants to act
in more than one capacity in a single application is precisely to honour
the constitutional goal of affording individuals with wide and flexible
locus standing, in order to allow them to seek relief that is effective
for the protection of their rights and the Constitution.44
Finally, on this point, it is critical to consider the part of the preamble
to the Constitution of Zimbabwe which declares that:
We the people of Zimbabwe…Reaffirming our commitment to
upholding and defending fundamental rights and
freedoms…Resolve by the tenets of this Constitution to commit
ourselves to build a united, just and prosperous nation, founded
on values of transparency, equality, freedom, fairness, honesty…
The vision and aspirations set out above can be achieved only if “the
tenets of this Constitution” are interpreted and applied in a manner
that advances social justice. The majority of citizens live below the
poverty datum line45 and can rarely afford the costs of litigation. The
propensity of the Constitutional Court (which I discuss elsewhere)46
42
Civil Appeal Number 9 of 2013 at p. 10
43
Civil Appeal Number 290 of 2012 at para 30
44
Supra note 23 Chiduza at pp.3-4
45
See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Zimbabwe Country Profile
Report of 2018 at p. 19. Available at https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/
files/uploadeddocuments/CountryProfiles/2018/zimbabwe_cp_eng_2017.pdf
[Accessed on 7 September 2018]
46
See Justice Mavedzenge ‘Punitive Costs and Deliberative Democracy’ (2018)
accessible from https://constitutionallythinking.wordpress.com/
to award punitive costs against losing litigants has a chilling effect of

making citizens hesitate to petition the court. To achieve social justice
in such a socio-economic context, certain economically privileged
individuals who can afford to bring an application before the court
must seek more than just a personal victory. In line with the aspirations
expressed in the Constitution’s preamble, they must be free to seek
the protection of the Constitution for their own personal benefit as
well as for the benefit of those who may not have the money to file a
petition in court. In that sense, the rules of locus standi cannot be
applied restrictively. The broader aspirations of the Constitution, as
captured in the preamble, require these rules to be applied in a manner
that allow individuals who are committed to social justice and are
financially privileged, to petition the court in their own interest but
also in public interest, in order to utilize the law as a tool to achieve
social change.
In this connection, the Constitutional Court’s approach of restricting
litigants to choosing one ground or capacity of locus standi (in one
application) is irrational, worrisome and problematic as it is
anachronistic and ultra vires the spirit and object of s 85 of the
Constitution. Clearly, s 85 (1) gives an applicant five grounds of locus
standi. The litigant should be allowed to choose one or more grounds
to stand on, as long as he or she can demonstrate that the application
meets the requirements demanded by each ground of locus standi.
Admittedly, there is need for the court to protect itself against being
inundated with frivolous applications. However, that should not be
done by stipulating a rule which has potential consequences that are
as disastrous as undermining the ability of a litigant to claim effective
relief. Such a rule is unreasonable, irrational and unconstitutional.
It is worthy to note that the Constitutional Court, in its very first case
— Jealous Mawarire v Robert Mugabe47 — underscored the proposition
that s 81 (5) of the Constitution contemplates a liberal approach to
determining locus standi. If it is accepted that these rules contemplate
a liberal approach to determining locus standi, then it should be
accepted that they also allow a litigant to act in more than one capacity
in a single matter as long as there is a legitimate reason for doing so.
Sister courts in comparative jurisdictions have been consistent on
this subject, as I demonstrated above. It is therefore worrisome to
note that on one hand, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe accepts
47
Mawarire v Mugabe [2013] ZWCC 1
that s 85 of the Constitution is meant to provide litigants with a wide

and flexible ground to stand on but, on the other hand it suggests
that a litigant must be confined to choosing only one ground to stand
on, and cannot invoke more than one ground of locus standi in a
single application.
Having demonstrated that this rule is ultra-vires the interpretative
principles enshrined in the Constitution, I now turn to showing that
the rule is at variance with the conceptual foundations upon which
the power of the Constitutional Court-to conduct judicial review-is
founded.
LOCUS STANDI AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Rules enacted by the court to regulate locus standi are in a way
reflective of the court’s own attitude and perception towards its role
in a constitutional democracy, particularly the power to review laws
and government conduct. Where a court is ready to exercise its review
powers in a robust manner, it applies the rules of locus standi liberally,
of course subject to the Constitution and without opening floodgates
for busy bodies to bring frivolous and vexatious motions or applications.
As Lord Diplock rightly said in Rex v Inland Revenue Commrs48
This broadening of the rule of locus standi has been largely
responsible for the development of public law, because it is
only the availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which
invests law with meaning and purpose or else the law would
remain merely a paper parchment, a teasing illusion and a
promise of unreality. It is only by liberalizing the rule of locus
standi that it is possible to effectively police the corridors of
powers and prevent violations of law.
Limiting locus standi may be one way of avoiding to hear and determine
certain sensitive cases that are likely to be brought before the court
by the citizens, especially in politically charged jurisdictions.
Therefore, in order to do justice to a discussion of the rationality and
constitutionality of the approach taken by the Constitutional Court,49
it is inevitable to pay attention to the philosophical hesitations which,
potentially, the Court may have regarding the democratic legitimacy
of its judicial review powers. Such an examination is necessary,
especially given that Zimbabwe is a former English colony with a
48
[1981] 2 WLR 722 at p. 740.
49
In both Mudzuru (supra note 15) and Samuel Sipepa Nkomo (supra note 16).
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, as opposed to constitutional

supremacy.
1.1 Legitimacy of Judicial Review

The trend in contemporary constitution making processes is to create
an independent judiciary and give the courts extensive powers to
review all aspects to do with the exercise of public and private power.50
Such powers are what are known as judiciary review powers and, as
part of these powers the courts can review the constitutionality or
legality of any legislation enacted by the legislative arms of
government.51 They also have the power to review the legality of
conduct by members or institutions of government.52 The essence of
judicial review is that, if a law or conduct is found to be
unconstitutional or unlawful by the court, then such a law or conduct
should be declared to be invalid. 53 This, at times, creates the
perception that the judiciary wields the ultimate authority (and
perhaps too much power) to pronounce on the validity of any decision
made by the executive and the legislative arms of government.
Consequently, a debate has been raging amongst scholars regarding
the legitimacy of judicial review in a constitutional democracy such
as the one envisaged under the Constitution of Zimbabwe.54 The
question that has been asked in this debate is whether there is any
democratically legitimate claim for judges to wield such power?
Considering that the Constitution of Zimbabwe unequivocally provides
the judiciary with the power to review all laws and government
50
See for example the Constitutions of: Kenya (2010), South Africa (1996), Namibia
and Tanzania
51
See section 167 (3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. The judiciary also
has the power to review the validity of subordinate legislation such as regulations
or statutory instruments.
52
Section 2 (1) and section 68 of the Constitution are amongst the primary sources
of judicial review powers
53
To the extent that the law or conduct is inconsistent with the law or Constitution.
See Ibid, section 2 (1)
54
Samuel Freeman captures this debate in his article “Constitutional Democracy
and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review” in 1990 Vol. 9 No. 4 Law and Philosophy
pp. 327-370. Also see Barry Friedman. “The Birth of an Academic Obsession:
The History of the Counter Majoritarian Difficulty” in 2002 Yale Law Review
Journal at p. 153. Also see Jeremy Waldron “A Right-based Critique of
Constitutional Rights” in 1993 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies at pp. 18, 20-28
and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press 1977 at
p. 90-100 and p. 171-177.
conduct,55 one would assume that there is no need to discuss the

legitimacy of judicial review in Zimbabwe. One is tempted to assume
that the judges themselves do not have doubts about the legitimacy
of their review powers. I, however, argue that there still exists a
need to discuss the concerns raised against the legitimacy of judicial
review. My argument is based on the view that judicial review will not
be conducted in an effective manner if there is no proper understanding
of its legitimacy in a constitutional state. A litigant is likely to be
confronted by restrictive rules on locus standi, if the court has
hesitations about the legitimacy of its review powers.
Another reason why a discussion on the legitimacy of judicial review
powers is relevant in Zimbabwe is that, as a former British colony,
Zimbabwe has a long history of applying a Westminster system of
government; which elevates parliamentary sovereignty and views
judicial review with scepticism on grounds similar to those articulated
by the ‘anti-judicial review’ scholars.56 The introduction of the
Constitution of 2013 may be viewed as an attempt to completely break
away from the parliamentary sovereignty tradition.57 This however,
cannot succeed if there is no corresponding shift of judicial culture
and philosophy, to view judicial review powers differently. Such a
shift will not happen if the traditional and philosophical concerns
regarding the legitimacy of judicial review are not addressed. Rather,
what one is likely to see is the emergence of restrictive rules of
procedure including those governing locus standi, which effectively
shield the court from exercising its review powers.
Two main arguments have been advanced against the legitimacy of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy. There is what I call the
“democratic mandate argument”. This argument can be summed up
as follows: Democracy is based on the fundamental principle that
every person has the right to equal participation in decision making
processes.58 In a representative democracy, citizens do not participate
directly in decision making but, they delegate to their representatives
(Legislature and Executive) the authority to make decisions on their
55
Supra note 52 and 53
56
For a discussion of the views expressed by these scholars, see Samuel Freeman
supra note 54. Also see Michael Walzer’s objections to judicial review in
“Philosophy and Democracy” in 1981 Vol 9 Political Theory p. 379
57
Although it must be acknowledged that the former constitution attempted to
do this albeit in a restrictive manner.
58
See Jeremy Waldron supra note 54 at p. 36
behalf.59 Therefore, decisions should be made through the equal

participation of the elected representatives. On the other hand, judges
are few and unelected.60 By giving judges the power to review and
invalidate decisions made by those who are elected to act as the
people’s representatives, the concept of judicial review negates the
fundamental principle of democracy because, the authority to make
decisions is taken away from the elected representatives and is given
to a few, unelected judges.61 For that reason, Thomas Jefferson
forcefully criticised the concept of judicial review and characterised
it as “a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place
us under the despotism of an oligarchy.”62 According to Jefferson,
“The people themselves are the only safe depositories of government
[and this principle requires] absolute acquiescence in the decisions
of the majority — the vital principle of republics, from which there
is no appeal but force.”63 Thus, judicial review is perceived as an
attempt to reverse the democratic principle that it is the people
(through their elected representatives) who should make decisions.
The second argument is what I call the “democratic accountability
argument” which can be summed up as follows: As the people’s
representatives, the members of the Legislature and the Executive
arms of government are accountable to the citizens who elected them
and on whose behalf they make decisions.64 Therefore, the Executive
and the Legislature must be allowed to make whatever decisions they
want for it is them and not the judges who will account to the people
for those decisions.65
59
For a detailed discussion on this, see Glen E. Thurow “Representative
Democracy” in 1983 Vol 14 St. Mary’s Law Journal pp. 937-956
60
In Zimbabwe they are appointed by the President upon being recommended by
the Judicial Services Commission. See section 180 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe, 2013
61
See Kirsty Mclean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights
in South Africa, Pretoria University Law Press 2009 at p. 65. Also see Ran
Hirschl “Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards: Judicial Review vs Democracy
in Comparative Perspective” in 2000 University of Richmond Law Review at p.
415-421. Also see Jeremy Waldron, supra note 54 at p. 36
62
See Letter to William Jarvis in P. L. Ford (ed), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
Vol. 10, pp. 160-61.
63
See Adrienne Koch and William Peden (eds), The Life and Selected Writings of
Thomas Jefferson New York: Random House 1944 at p. 324.
64
See the discussion by Kirsty Mclean, supra note 61.
65
Ibid
The democratic mandate argument against the legitimacy of judiciary

review has been addressed comprehensively by Samuel Freeman66
and I align myself with his views for the reasons that I will explain.
Freeman67 argues that the legitimacy of judicial review hinges on
what ought to be considered as the most appropriate conception of a
constitutional democracy. Those who are opposed to the legitimacy
of judicial review perceive constitutional democracy as rule by the
majority.68 This is sometimes referred to as the procedural conception
of democracy.69 However, I argue that constitutional democracy must
be viewed as an extension of the theory of social contract. Put
differently, I argue that the social contract theory rather than the
procedural democracy theory is the most appropriate conceptual
framework through which the democratic legitimacy of judicial review
must be evaluated. In order to justify this claim, I must consider the
work done by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
and John Rawls on the theory of the social contract. Although these
four scholars had some differences70 regarding their philosophical views
on the idea of the social contract, they all reject the concept of “the
divine right of kings”71 and, they suggest that the only justified
authority is the authority that is generated out of agreements or
covenants between people. On that basis, they suggest the theory of
the social contract, as the idea that; in order to establish a civil society
(meaning a peaceful and prosperous society), human beings must agree
to live together under common laws encapsulated in a social contract.
66
Supra note 54
67
Supra note 54 at p. 331
68
See Samuel Freeman’s discussion, supra note 54
69
See Samuel Freeman, supra note 54 at p.332-336
70
For example, Thomas Hobbes advocated for the monarchy as the administrator
of the social contract, John Locke believed in the right of the people to revolt
against the monarch if it fails to adhere to the terms of the social contract. On
the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the social contract in Locke’s
conception sought to protect private property and therefore subordinated the
poor to the authority of the property owners. He argued that the terms of the
social contract must be changed so that the contract is based on the values of
human equality and freedom. For a detailed discussion See David Gauthier
“Hobbes’s Social Contract.”Xin 1988 No_sXVol. 22 at p 71-82. Also see David
Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?” in 1991 Vallentyne p. 13-30 and Jean
Hampton, XHobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge University
Press 1986
71
The idea of rule by man. See Ibid, David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?” in
1991 Vallentyne p. 13-30
According to Rousseau and Rawls, the social contract must be

negotiated and entered into by free and equal persons and, it must
set out certain basic values and principles which are necessary for
purposes of guaranteeing human equality and freedom.72 Thus, the
social contract theory is not only a rejection of the concept of the
divine rule of kings. It is also a realisation of the inherent inadequacy
of procedural democracy particularly that, it is possible that the
majority can make decisions that undermine democratic values such
as individual liberty and equality. For instance, the majority can decide
to deprive the minority of their right to equal political participation.
In order to address this concern, the theory of the social contract (at
least as conceived by John Rawls) suggests that the people must
negotiate and agree to a social contract which guarantees every
individual with minimum rights and liberties, which cannot be
undermined through laws and decisions made by the majority.
I argue, as Samuel Freeman does73 , that a national constitution is a
modern representation of the social contract. Freeman describes a
national constitution as something that is established as:
[a] result of an agreement, whose purpose is to define and
set up political institutions to determine laws and
institutions that are necessary for the effective exercise
of the equal basic rights that secure persons in the free
pursuit of their good. The procedures best designed to
realize this end meet the democratic requirements of
justice.74
The people of Zimbabwe negotiated and through a referendum, agreed
to establish a constitutional rule book which guarantees certain
rights75 , bestows obligations and entrenches certain values76 which
are to be treated as the foundation of their society. One of these
values is that Zimbabwe must be governed democratically and in
accordance with established human rights norms and principles.77 Thus,
the Constitution of Zimbabwe is a form of a social contract through
which the people have agreed to be governed according to certain
democratic values, principles and procedures. In this context,
72
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social ContractX(1762) at p. 59
73
Supra note 54
74
Supra note 54 at p. 350
75
See Chapter Four of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
76
See section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
77
Ibid, subsection (1) (c)
democracy cannot be viewed as limited to rule by the majority. It is

not the right of the majority to do whatever they want. Rather it is
the rule by the majority in accordance with certain procedures and
substantive values that are articulated in the political constitution,
which is the equivalent of a social contract. In that sense, the social
contract theory can help us to evaluate and explain the legitimacy of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy such as that envisaged
under the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
As explained earlier, the social contract is underpinned by certain
democratic values and principles which are meant to protect human
freedom and equality. There must be a mechanism or institutions in
place to interpret, protect and at times enforce these values and
principles.78 As part of the social contract, the people establish
institutions unto which they freely delegate the authority to perform
this role. In the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the people have given the
judiciary, the power to interpret, protect and enforce the terms of
their social contract which is the rights, values, procedures and
principles set out in the Constitution.79 Section 162 of the Constitution
makes this point explicit where it declares that “judicial authority
derives from the people of Zimbabwe and is vested in the courts”. As
part of this judicial authority, the courts have the power to review
and invalidate laws and conduct that is inconsistent with the terms of
the social contract-the Constitution. The Constitutional Court of
Zimbabwe in re Prosecutor General of Zimbabwe on his Constitutional
Independence and Protection from Direction and Control,80 affirmed
this position when Patel J held that the role of the court is to interpret
the law and, when it does so, “it fulfils its role under the separation
of powers framework. When it [the court] interprets a certain law to
compel someone to do something, it is not the court but the law that
compels that person to do so.”81 The legitimacy of judicial review
therefore resides in the fundamental belief under the social contract
theory that, there is need to establish an independent institution
which will protect the values and principles of the social contract in
between the periodic elections.
78
Samuel Freeman, supra note 54 at p. 357
79
This principle was also affirmed in re Prosecutor General of Zimbabwe on his
Constitutional Independence and Protection from Direction and Control [2017]
ZWCC 13 2015 at p. 9
80
Ibid, at p.10
81
Ibid
It could be counter-argued that the power to interpret and protect

the values of the social contract should be exercised by the elected
representatives of the people (the legislature and the executive) and
not by the unelected judges.82 The response to that argument lies in
the philosophical background of the doctrine of separation of powers
which is the idea that: in order to protect the values underpinning
the social contract (namely equality and individual freedom) the people
through the social contract, must avoid delegating power to a single
person or body.83 Rather, different functions and powers must be
delegated to different branches of the government and there must
be checks and balances to protect the people from possible abuse of
the delegated power.84 For that reason, the modern social contract
(the Constitution) delegates the power to make laws to the legislature,
and the executive is delegated with the power to make and execute
policies, while the judiciary is there to interpret the laws articulated
in the social contract.85 In that sense, the people could not delegate
to the legislature the power to interpret the very same laws that it
makes.86 Such power is given to the judiciary as an effective mechanism
of protecting the values of the social contract and, there lies the
democratic legitimacy of judicial review in a constitutional democracy.
Judicial review is therefore democratically legitimate because such
powers are given to the judiciary by the people through the
Constitution, in order to protect the values and principles underlying
democratic governance in a constitutional state.87 It is a form of
insurance against majority decisions (and sometimes decisions made
by powerful minorities) which undermine the very basis of democracy.
This is the reason why, in the Zimbabwean context, the Constitution
requires Courts to ensure that their rules of procedure adequately
facilitate the right of individuals to approach the Court and access
effective remedies against such decisions. It is against this background
that we should examine if (at a conceptual level) the rule established
by the Constitutional Court to restrict litigants to acting in once
capacity in each matter makes any rational sense. It does not because,
82
See Michael Walzer’s objections to judicial review in “Philosophy and
Democracy” in 1981 Vol 9 Political Theory p. 379
83
Supra note 62
84
See Samuel Freeman, supra note 54 at p. 353
85
Malherbe Rautenbach, Constitutional Law 4th edition, Lexis Nexis 2003 at p.
78
86
Samuel Freeman, supra note 54 at p. 336
87
Samuel Freeman makes a similar argument at p. 328, supra note 54
the effect of such a rule (as I demonstrated above) is to prevent the

citizens from accessing remedies which effectively protect and
enforces the terms of their social contract.
2. CONCLUSION
The Constitutional Court’s rule which prohibits litigants from acting
in more than one capacity in a single matter has a disproportionate
effect of undermining a litigant’s access to effective remedies. The
rule is inconsistent with the liberal approach to determining locus
standi and is therefore ultra vires section 85 of the Constitution. At a
conceptually level, this rule is untenable as it is contradictory to the
theoretical foundations upon which the idea of judicial review is
founded.
The emphatic views expressed by Chidyausiku CJ, Malaba DCJ in
Jealous Mawarire v Robert Mugabe and by Patel JCC in re Prosecutor
General of Zimbabwe on his Constitutional Independence and
Protection from Direction and Control88 create the impression that
the Constitutional Court appreciates its role as a vibrant interpreter
and enforcer of the social contract-the Constitution. However, when
the Court establishes unreasonably restrictive rules of locus standi, it
brings to the fore the question whether that Court genuinely believes
it has a legitimate mandate, derived from the people, to review
(without fear or favour) the exercise of public power? This is a question
which must be engaged with critically and on a continuous basis.
88
Supra note 80 at page 10 of his judgment where he emphatically declares that:
“Where a court interprets a law, it fulfils its role under the separation of
powers framework. When it interprets a certain law to compel someone to do
something, it is not the court but the law that compels that person to do so.
This application is founded on the wrong premise that the applicant must not
be compelled to abide by the law, whether by an order of mandamus or
otherwise. That premise is fundamentally flawed and patently untenable .. .”
PROTECTION FROM UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND THE REMEDY OF
REINSTATEMENT UNDER ZIMBABWEAN LAW
MUNYARADZI GWISAI1
ABSTRACT
This article looks at the remedy of reinstatement for unfair and
unlawful dismissal and its central significance in the realisation of
employees’ right to protection from unfair dismissal. The paper argues
that the right to protection from unfair dismissal lies at the
cornerstone of modern Zimbabwean labour law as was shown by the
massive public outcry in the wake of the Supreme Court decision of
Nyamande and Anor v Zuva Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd SC 43-15, which
upheld the continued application of the common law “Notice Rule”
of termination on notice by the employer. The paper argues that
without an effective remedy to unfair dismissal, in the form of
reinstatement, the right to protection from unfair dismissal will
remain a mirage. The paper makes a survey of the history of
reinstatement law starting with the traditional common law position
which rejected the remedy outright and the modern common law
one wherein the remedy has been recognised as a competent remedy.
The paper then discusses the history of the remedy in statutes
including the implications on the remedy of the new rights to
protection from unfair dismissal and to fair labour standards under
the Labour Act (No. 17 of 2002) and Constitution of Zimbabwe
Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. It discusses the different approaches
taken by courts and asserts that only the broad approach is consistent
with the underlying principle of right to employment security
recognised under the Labour Act and Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
The right of employees to protection from unfair dismissal is a
cornerstone of the labour law regime that underlies the Labour
Amendment Act (No. 17 of 2002), which probably represents the most
advanced labour legislative reform in the history of labour relations
in Zimbabwe.
1
Munyaradzi Gwisai is a registered legal practitioner and lectures in Labour
Law and Labour Relations, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe, and Briggs
Zano Working Peoples College.
24
UZLJ Unfair Dismissal and Remedy of Reinstatement 25
There are powerful constitutional and legislative basis for the right.
Constitutionally the right is implicit in section 65 (1) of the Constitution
which provides that every “person has the right to fair and safe labour
practices and standards...” Expressly the right provided for in section
12B (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. This provides that ‘Every
employee shall have the right not to be unfairly dismissed.’
Subversion of the employees’ right to protection from unfair dismissal
and employment security has been a key feature of the current
Zimbabwean labour relations system which is dominated by unitarist
and neoliberal norms. This was amply demonstrated in the now
notorious Supreme Court decision of Nyamande and Anor v Zuva
Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd,2 which led to unprecedented job massacres and
forced the State to legislatively reverse the effects of the decision by
enactment of the Labour Amendment Act (No. 5 of 2015.) But as the
Zuva decision showed, this has led to major controversies and serious
legitimacy questions not only relating to labour law but the entire
legal system. Commenting on this matter, MALABA CJ aptly observed:
The reaction to the Zuva judgment was a rush by employers...
to terminate employment relationships on notice.... As large
numbers of employees were left jobless and uncompensated
for the years they had worked for their respective employers
save for their salaries paid in lieu of notice, there was widespread
public outcry... The actions of employers revealed a national
crisis characterised by lack of protection for the employees who
lost employment... Termination of sources of livelihood wrought
severe financial hardships to households. That gave the
Legislature the rational basis for the enactment of the legislation
and for giving it retrospective effect.3
Thus the issue of employment security has become of profound

importance on the Zimbabwe labour law landscape. Besides the area
of the “notice rule” that was dealt with in the Zuva decision, another
critical area of the law of fair dismissal is that pertaining to the
remedies available for unfair dismissal. In particular the extent to
which the law recognises the remedy of reinstatement for both
wrongful and unfair dismissal. As with termination of the employment
relationship on notice, this area has also been characterised by judicial
conservatism and resistance to the clear direction of reform underlying
2
SC 43 – 15.
3
Greatermans Stores (1979) (Pvt) Ltd t/a Thomas Meikles Stores and Anor vs
The Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Anor CCZ 2 – 18.
the Labour Act and the Constitution. For this reason it is an area that
deserves a closer look to avoid future judicial tragedies as happened
with the Zuva judgment.
In this article I trace the history of the remedy of reinstatement from
a common law and legislative perspective and how the courts have
treated the same as well as the implications of the right to protection
from unfair dismissal by reference to the Labour Act and Constitution
of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 20 of 2013 and applicable
international law instruments. I argue that the import of the above
raises radical implication on the remedy of reinstatement which the
courts must now recognise.
REINSTATEMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE TERM

Generally the most effective remedy for wrongful dismissal or unfair
dismissal is that of reinstatement. Yet traditionally this remedy has
been unavailable under common law.
Reinstatement means “that the employee be replaced in her (his)
post and remunerated.”4 The employee is restored in their old job so
that she or he “can perform the work attaching to that post.”5 An
order for reinstatement requires the employer to treat the employee
in all respects as if she or he had not been dismissed. The employee is
“put back into the job which he or she occupied, restored to the
benefits they enjoyed and compensated for those lost in the interim.”6
It has been held that the term “reinstatement” simply means restoring
the employee on the payroll.7 It does not mean giving the employee
actual work to do, unless special circumstances exist such as where
the employee’s remuneration depends on actual work being given or
the advancement of their professional or artistic development.8
4
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis 1989 (1) ZLR 344 (S).
5
Bramdaw v Union Government 1931 NPD 57 at 78; Zvoma v Amalgamated
Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1988 (1) ZLR 60 (H) at 74. In Chegutu Municipality
v Manyora 1996 (1) ZLR 262 (S) at 265B it was held that, Òto reinstate a person
means in effect to put a person again into his or her former job.Ó
6
S Deakin & G Morris, Labour Law, 4th ed (Hart Publishing, 2005) 518. In Chiriseri
& Anor v Plan International S-56-02, SANDURA JA, held, Òwhere an order of
reinstatement is retrospective in effect, the damages to be paid in lieu of
reinstatement must include back pay and benefits.Ó
7
Munhumutema v Tapambwa & Ors 2010 (1) ZLR 509 (H) at 513E-G, per MUTEMA
J; Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Matsika 1997 (2) ZLR 389 (S).
8
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Matsika 1997 (2) ZLR 389 (S).
To that extent reinstatement is equivalent to the remedy of specific

performance under contract law. Specific performance is a well-
established remedy for breach of contract, available at the preference
of the innocent party, but subject to the discretion of the court. This
was well put in Farmers Co-operatives Society v Berry:9
Prima facie every party to a binding agreement who is ready to
carry out his own obligation under it has a right to demand from
the other party, as far as is possible, a performance of his
undertaking in terms of the contract.
Wrongful dismissal is when the employee is dismissed without notice

or the employer is unable to substantiate the alleged misconduct
leading to the dismissal.10
Unlawful dismissal is similar and applies when the worker is dismissed
without due notice or the employer fails to show lawful cause for
dispensing with the notice,11 such as when the employer is unable to
substantiate the alleged misconduct. It may also be dismissal in
contravention of statutory provisions.
Unfair dismissal relates to a mode of dismissal derived from statutes
whereby dismissal may be unfair because there is no fair or valid
reason for the dismissal, (substantive fairness).12 Dismissal may be
unfair because the method used to effect the dismissal is not fair,
(procedural fairness). The concept of fair dismissal is ultimately derived
from international labour law norms.13 It is unknown to common law.14
Reinstatement is available under both common law and statute law.
Statutes have adapted but also substantially modified the common
law.
9
91912 AD 343. See also, National Union of Textile Workers and Ors v Stag
Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors 1982 (4) SA 151 (T); Commercial Careers College
(1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis 1989 (1) ZLR 344; and Mudukuti v FCM Motors (Pvt)
Ltd 2007 (1) ZLR 183 (H) at 194B-C.
10
S Deakin & G Morris, (2005) at 403.
11
J Grogan, Workplace Law, 10th ed, (Juta, 2009) 164.
12
Chamwaita v Charhons (Pvt) Ltd LC/H/215/2009 at p 6.
13
Initially under the Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1963 (R 119)
and subsequently the Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer Convention, 1982 (C 158).
14
J Grogan (2009) citing Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt (2001) 22 ILJ 2407
(SCA).
REINSTATEMENT UNDER COMMON LAW

Two approaches to the issue of reinstatement are evident under the
common law regime, the traditional and the modern position.
The traditional or classical position held that reinstatement was not
available as a remedy for a wrongfully dismissed employee. The
employee was restricted to damages.15 The only exception being for
civil servants. The locus classicus for this position was the case of
Schierhout v Minister of Justice.16 In Commercial Careers College
(Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (S) at 348 GUBBAY JA (as he then
was) summarised the position thus:
Prior to the advent of the decision ... in National Union of Textile
Workers & Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors 1982 (4) SA 151
(T) it had become commonplace to assert that in the case of a
common law employee who had been wrongfully dismissed no
court of law could compel the employee to allow him to perform
his duties; for to do so would amount to an order for specific
performance of a contract for personal services of a continuing
nature, a remedy not available to the employee, who was
therefore restricted to a claim in damages.17
Under the classical position, reinstatement was not available, as a

rule of law or legal principle. This was unlike in other contracts were
the court “will as far as possible give effect to a plaintiff’s choice to
claim specific performance,” subject to the discretion of the court.18
Several reasons were advanced for denying the remedy. Firstly that
“such a contract is for personal services of a continuing nature and
because of the close personal relationship between persons who have
lost trust in each other, which makes it difficult for the court to provide
constant supervision for the enforcement of its order”.19 Denial was
15
National Union of Textile Workers & Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors 1982
(4) SA 151 (T) at 158H; Myers v Abrahamson 1952 (3) SA 121 at 123 – 125; See
generally - A Rycroft and B Jordaan, A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd
ed, (Juta, 1992) 101 – 103; and R Christie (2006) 528.
16
1926 AD 99 at 107 (INNES CJ).
17
ADAM J had earlier on dealt comprehensively with the applicable case law in
Zvoma v Amalgamated Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1988 (1) ZLR 60 (H).
18
Haynes v Kings Williamstown Municipality1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at 378 – 380,
cited in the Zvoma case at 72. Also Farmers Co – operatives Society v Berry
1912 AD 343 at 350.
19
Zvoma v Amalgamated Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd supra at 69, citing National
Union of Textile Workers & Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors,at 154; and
Schierhout v Minister of Justice at 107 – 109.
thus based on the “inadmissibility of compelling the employer to

employ another whom it does not trust in a position which imports a
close relationship”.
Secondly was the reason of absence of mutuality of remedies. No
court could force an employee to work faithfully and diligently. Further
it was unjust to compel the employer to reinstate an employee it no
longer wanted, when the same remedy could not be effected against
an employee who was in breach of her or his contract. The later
would amount to forced labour or slavery which is prohibited under
statutes and public policy considerations.
Finally was the argument that damages provided an adequate
substitute for specific performance. After all the employee did not
have a guarantee of employment for life for the contract could be
terminated without any reason on tender of the due notice, the notice
rule.20
The reason for the exception for civil servants was elaborated in
Schierhout v Minister of Justice at 107. It is premised on the fact that
the civil servant “contracts at his appointment that he will serve the
State in accordance with statutes (and)... retains his position until
duly removed or superannuated.” The civil servants’ employment
tenure is protected by statutes and regulations which contain elaborate
and entrenched provisions against arbitrary dismissal, which is what
“differentiates the position of a civil servant from that of an ordinary
employee.” The effect being that any dismissal not in compliance
with statutes is a nullity. “So that what is done contrary to that
prohibition of the law is not only of no effect, but must be regarded
as never having been done.”
The above conclusion is further supported by the special nature of
the relationship of civil servants and the State. It is not a relationship
of a personal nature or a close personal relationship as of the ordinary
employee.
The net effect is that under common law reinstatement is the
automatic remedy for a wrongfully or unlawfully dismissed civil servant
- Chairman of the PSC v Marumahoko, PSC & Anor.21
20
A Rycroft and B Jordaan, (1992) 101; S Deakin & G Morris, (2005) at 400, citing
Reda v Flag Ltd [2002] ITLR 747 [Privy Council].
21
1991 (1) ZLR 27 (H).
Modern Common Law Position

The classical position was subsequently rejected, hesitantly initially,22
but definitively in the decision of the full Transvaal bench in National
Union of Textile Workers and Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors.23
The court described the position in Schierhout v Minister of Justice
of denying reinstatement to the ordinary employee as “erroneous”
with DIJKHORST J holding at 158H:
In my view the approach to the application of the discretion in
respect of specific performance laid down in Haynes case is
equally applicable to the case of the wrongful dismissal of an
ordinary servant. This does not mean that the factors in
Schierhout’s case, why in such a case an order for specific
performance should generally speaking not be granted, should
be disregarded. They are weighty indeed and in the normal case
they might well be conclusive. But that is a far cry from saying
that the court should therefore close its eyes to other material
factors and refuse to evaluate them.
The above sentiments were endorsed by Zimbabwean courts, starting

with Zvoma v Amalgamated Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd,24 but fully
in Commercial Careers College (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis.25 In the latter case
the court endorsed the conclusion in National Union of Textile Workers
affirming that there is “no legal principle for not ordering specific
performance of an employment relationship”. The court stated that -
“This bold decision has much to commend it and is to be welcomed.”
22
One of the first cases to cast doubt on the classical position was in Myers v
Abrahamson 1952 (3) SA 121 at 123 – 125 where the court stated, Òl doubt
whether the practice of the Court in allowing only the particular remedy of
damages to the wrongfully dismissed employee can rightly be elevated to a
rule of lawÉÓ Stewart Writson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) was more
decisive and followed in subsequent decisions. See - SACCAWU & Ors v Steers
Fast Food (1993) 2 LCD 125 (LAC); Grinaker Electronic Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a
Grinel v EAWTUSA (1991) 12 ILJ 1284 (LAC) and Haworth & Associates CC v
Mpanya & Ors (1992) 13 ILJ 604 (LAC). This position subsequently received
legislative endorsement under s 193(2) of the RA, 1995, which made it explicit
that the reinstatement or re-employment is the primary remedy for unfair
dismissal subject to some very narrowly tailored excerptions. See also Basson
et. all (2002) 372.
23
1982 (4) SA 151 (T).
24
At 73-74. Also, Art Corporation Ltd v Moyana 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (S) at 313.
25
1989 (1) ZLR 304 (S) at 314.
Restrictive Approach
Although the courts changed their position of rejecting reinstatement
as a principle, the hostility to the remedy continued. This was reflected
in a line of cases that followed a restrictive approach in applying the
remedy, and a broad one that applied it broadly as the primary remedy
for wrongful dismissal.
The restrictive approach applies the remedy of reinstatement but
limiting it to exceptional circumstances. For instance in the Zvoma
case at 75 it was held that “...unless there is a clear and express
statutory right of reinstatement, generally the considerations outlined
in Schierhout’s case by INNES CJ would normally weigh heavily against
the grant of specific performance.” In Hama v NRZ , the court held
Although reinstatement is clearly the primary remedy for unfair
dismissal provided by law, very few successful applicants are
awarded it. The usual remedy for successful applicants is
compensation. Reinstatement is not the only or inevitable
remedy for wrongful dismissal. It is a remedy.26
Similar positions are evident in other jurisdictions.27
Broad Approach — Reinstatement as Principal Remedy

Other courts have pursued a broad approach, which takes
reinstatement as the primary remedy for wrongful dismissal and unfair
dismissal. This is especially for “statutory” employees whose conditions
of employment are protected by labour legislation including protection
from unfair dismissal. The position of such employees can hardly be
distinguished from that of civil servants given their level of protection
from arbitrary dismissal. In cases of unfair dismissal reinstatement
must be the primary remedy. The reasons for this were aptly captured
by GUBBAY CJ in Commercial Careers College (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra:
Even if one were to favour the restrictive approach, which l do
not, it is important to appreciate that in casu, the position of
the employee is somewhat different from the ordinary employee,
for the tenure of her employment is protected by legislature…
Consequently it may be argued with some force that the
employee falls into the same category as that of a public servant,
making the principle discussed by INNES CJ … applicable.
26
1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S). See also,United Bottlers v Kaduya 2006 (2) ZLR 150 (S)
CHIDYAUSIKU CJ.
27
O’Laoire v Jackel International Ltd [1990] ICR 197, 201, cited in Deakin &
Morris (2005) 519.
In the above matter the court decided to leave the question open,
and holding that there were sufficient factors that indicated granting
reinstatement at the discretion of the court, and in that case
proceeded to order reinstatement.
The modern common law position has been affirmed in various
decisions of the Zimbabwean courts. In Art Corporation v Moyana,28
the court held that, “the obvious remedy for unjustified (unfair)
involuntary termination is re-employment, if the employee so wishes,
otherwise compensation… reinstatement is clearly the primary remedy
for unfair dismissal.”29 In Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd v Nharara30 it
was held that where “an employee is found to have been wrongfully
dismissed, reinstatement is normally ordered.”
The broad approach articulated by GUBBAY CJ in fact received
legislative endorsement under s 29 of the Labour Amendment Act
(No.7 of 2005) which placed the onus to prove that the employment
relationship is no longer tenable, on the employer, including the
possible imposition of punitive damages where reinstatement is not
ordered. As argued below, the substituted s 89 (2) (c) (iii) LA makes
reinstatement the first and primary remedy for unfair dismissal. This
position is also affirmed in other jurisdictions which provide for fair
dismissal legislation, notably South Africa and the United Kingdom.31
Reinstatement is therefore the first and primary remedy for wrongful
or unlawful dismissal, unless the employee does not desire such remedy
and subject to the court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances
the court or a determining authority may thus issue a straight order
of reinstatement, as was done in Commercial Careers College (Pvt)
Ltd v Jarvis, supra. In Blanket Mine (Pvt) Ltd v Tlou it was held:32
28
1989 (1) ZR 304 (S).
29
Art Corporation v Moyana, 1989 (1) ZR 304 (S); Ruturi v Heritage Clothing
(Pvt) Ltd 1994 (2) ZLR 374 (S).
30
2006 (1) ZLR 203(S) at 205G.
31
See J Grogan (2009) at 174 stating, ÒSection 193 (2) makes it clear that
reinstatement is the preferred remedy for unfairly dismissed employees, and
that compensation should only be granted instead only when one or more of
the exceptions mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d).Ó S Deakin & G Morris (2005)
518 equally state that under s 118 of ERA 1996, Òthe preferred remedies for
unfair dismissal are reinstatement, re-engagement and monetary compensation,
in that orderÓ citing O’Laoire v Jackel International Ltd [1990] ICR 197, 200.
32
LC/MT/22/2005 [MATSHANGA P].
I find that it is equitable, reasonable and just that when an

employee loses his job in circumstances as the one that happened
in casu, then a straight order of reinstatement is perfectly in
order.
The fact that reinstatement has in the past been rarely granted reflects
judicial attitudes and those of employees in particular circumstances.
Many employees may not claim it, simply because it has not been
easily granted in the past, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Also unlikely to claim are employees of small employers who do not
have the benefit of protection from a trade union-protected
environment and may fear renewed contact with the manager or owner
who dismissed them.
A further reason is the attitude of the courts, which tend to accept
without much question employer’s reluctance to reinstate and a belief
that an imposed reinstatement will not work. However, as Deakin &
Morris point out, this perception may not be justified, and in fact
“there is evidence that re-employment rarely produces disruption to
relations within the undertaking concerned and that most reinstated
or re-engaged employees stay with the employer for a reasonable
length of time after the order is made.”33
Onus and Factors to Consider in the Exercise of Discretion

Consistent with general common law principles, the onus is on the
employer, as the party seeking to avoid specific performance, to
establish the facts and circumstances, which the court should consider
in the exercise of its discretion. 34 A bald statement that the
employment relationship is no longer tenable will not do, and was
correctly rejected in Dairibord Zimbabwe Ltd v Muyambi.35
The court then exercises its discretion on whether or not to grant
reinstatement.
33
S Deakin & G Morris (2005) 52.
34
Farmers’ Co-op Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343, held at 350, Ò ‘it is against
conscience that a party should have a right of election whether he would perform
his contract or only pay damages for the breach of it.’ The election is rather
with the injured party, subject to the discretion of the Court.Ó
35
S-22-02 at pg 7. Also, Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398
(A) at 442E-443H, cited in Intercontinental Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Nestle Zimbabwe
(Pvt) Ltd 1993 (1) ZLR 21 (H) at 30.
The discretion is “not completely unfettered” but has to be exercised

judicially and not capriciously or on wrong principles of law in order
to ensure that justice is done.36
Courts have looked at various factors in the exercise of the discretion.
The main issue is whether sufficient evidence has been established to
show that the employment relationship “has soured beyond
reconciliation”,37 or “is no longer tenable”38 or that reinstatement
would result “in the continuation of an intolerable personal
relationship”.39
The above is an objective assessment and may arise even in a situation
where “no blame whatsoever attaches to the employee.”40
In the aforementioned assessment, the factors cited in the Schierhout
case are weighty but not exhaustive. Other relevant factors may be
considered, such as those mentioned in Haynes v Kingswilliamstown
Municipality.41 These include, impossibility of performance; that
reinstatement would be unduly and unreasonably harsh on the
defendant, or would produce injustice or would be inequitable under
all the circumstances.
The Labour Act provides further statutory examples under s 89 (2) (c)
(iii), proviso (ii). These are “size of the employer, the preferences of
the employee, the situation in the labour market.” The list is not
exhaustive as the section also refers to “any other relevant factors.”
Under this rubric can be included factors like level of skills,
qualifications, age and levels of unemployment in the particular
industry. Examples of factors that have been considered by the courts
are numerous, including:
36
Zimbabwe Express Services (Pvt) Ltd v Nuanetsi Ranch (Pvt) Ltd 2009 (1) ZLR
326 (S) at 332 – 333; Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis 1989
(1) ZLR 344.
37
Hama v NRZ 1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S). Also - Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd v Gwekwerere
& Ors 2005 (2) ZLR 421 (S) at 428F; Chitambo v ZESA Holdings (Pvt) Ltd & Anor
LC/H/331/2013.
38
The phrase used in s 89 (2) (c ) (iii) Proviso (ii) LA 2002.
39
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra at 349F, where
GUBBAY CJ commented, Òone which would make it impossible for the employee
to perform his duties either to his own satisfaction or that of the employer.Ó
40
Commercial Careers College (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra, at 349F.
41
1951 (2) AD 371 (A) at 378H-9A.
• In circumstances of loss of confidence by the employer with a

senior employee, denial of reinstatement was held justified.42
Where there was a “breakdown in the relationship between the
appellant and the respondent, with no degree of trust or respect
remaining on either side,” as in Winterton, Holmes and Hill v
Paterson.43 In this case a professional assistant, engaged in a
dispute with the employer, traded insults with senior partners of
the firm and tried to get an order for civil imprisonment against
them for contempt of court.
• The moral blameworthiness of the parties. Reinstatement was held
appropriate because the employer had “dirty hands”, as when
the employer acted in flagrant bad faith, 44 or in breach of
fundamental rights of employees, 45 or because the moral
blameworthiness of the employee was beyond reproach.46 However
reinstatement was held inappropriate where the employee took
alternative employment during suspension.47
• The nature of the breach or unfair labour practice. Where it
involved breach of a fundamental right of the worker, such as to
membership of a trade union or to protection from unfair dismissal,
then reinstatement was held the most appropriate remedy.48
• The size and nature of the employer. The bigger the employer the
less likely that it will be held that the relationship is no longer
tenable, since personal contact is minimum.49 The same was held
42
Muringi v Air Zimbabwe Corporation 1997 (1) ZLR 355 (S) (involving a managing
director); Blue Ribbon Foods Ltd v Dube & Anor 1993 (2) ZLR 146 (S).
43
1995 (2) ZLR 68 (S).
44
In Banya v Madhater Mining Co (Pvt) Ltd LC/H/67/2008 where there was an
order for reinstatement by consent but the employer subsequently reneged
stating that the employee should have been retrenched. In Masvingo v Baloyi
LC/MS/01/09 the employer failed to comply with s 92E (2) LA 2002.
45
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra, where the employer
dismissed the employee the day after a visit from the labour officer after the
employee filed a complaint.
46
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra.
47
United Bottlers v Kaduya 2006 (2) ZLR 150 (S) at 153C-D; Zimsun v Lawn 1988
(1) ZLR 143 (S) 15.
48
National Union of Textile Workers and Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors 1982
(4) SA 151 (T); Jiah & Ors v PSC & Anor 1999 (1) ZLR 17 (S).
49
ZUPCO v Chisvo 1999 (1) ZLR 67 (S); Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt)
Ltd v Jarvis.
for an employee in a college or state corporation.50 The opposite

may apply for a small employer.51
• The seniority of the employee and the nature of the job. The
courts are more likely to rule that the employment relationship is
no longer tenable in relation to a managerial executive than a
junior employee, especially in a small company.52
• The intention of the legislature. In Commercial Careers College
(1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra, it was held that there was need
for “account to be given of the law giver’s object in protecting
the tenure of office of employees. To deny the remedy of
reinstatement is to circumvent it, albeit upon pain of rendering
himself liable to criminal prosecution and to a civil action for
damages.” 53 The above is particularly so where denial of
reinstatement would result in subversion of a basic constitutional
labour right or fundamental right of employees.54
REINSTATEMENT UNDER STATUTES

The common law principles on reinstatement have been codified,
adapted and modified by statutes. Reinstatement is available under
statutes, in particular the Labour Act. There are several circumstances
under which the remedy of reinstatement may apply under the Labour
Act.
The first is when the Labour Court substitutes its own decision for a
decision made by a lower tribunal. This may arise under s 89 (2) (a)
(ii) of the Act where the Labour Court has power to substitute its own
decision in place of that appealed against. Arbitrators enjoy the same
power under s 98 (9) of the Act. It may also arise in terms of s 93 (5b)
of the Act when the Labour Court determines an application for
confirmation of a draft ruling by a labour officer or designated agent.
50
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra.
51
Girjac Services (Pvt) Ltd v Mudzingwa 1999 (1) ZLR 243 (S) at 250; Winterton,
Holmes and Hill v Paterson 1995 (2) ZLR 68 (S), (a law firm).
52
A senior employee was held properly denied reinstatement in Muringi v Air
Zimbabwe Corporation 1997 (1) ZLR 355 (S); but not for college tutor in
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis.
53
See also, Mushaya v Glens Corporation 1992 (1) ZLR 162 (H).
54
For instance dismissal of employee on lawful maternity leave – ARDA v Murwisi
LC/H/90/04.
The second circumstance applies when a labour officer or designated

agent makes a draft ruling on a dispute of right or unfair labour practice
in terms of s 93 (5) (c) of the Act.
The third circumstance is when the Labour Court or an arbitrator
exercise their powers in terms of s 89 (2) (c) of the Act in relation to
a section 93 (7) application. This is where a conciliatory authority has
issued a certificate of no settlement but it is not possible for any
reason to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration or the period
for conciliation has expired but the conciliatory authority refuses for
any reason to issue the certificate of no settlement.
The fourth and final circumstance is where the Labour Court or the
appropriate determining authority makes a finding that the dismissal
is affected by a fatal procedural irregularity. This may arise from
decisions by labour officers or designated agents under the new s 93
(5), or awards of an arbitrator, or a determining authority under an
employment codes or other relevant body. It also indirectly arises
when the Labour Court exercises its review jurisdiction.
The final circumstance when reinstatement arises under the Labour
Act is in terms of the model code made under the Labour (National
Employment Code of Conduct) Regulations, 2006.
GENERAL POWER OF LABOUR COURT TO ORDER REINSTATEMENT ON APPEAL

On appeal, the Labour Court has a general power to confirm or vary
the decision appealed against or substitute its own decision in terms
of s 89 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act. This reads:
(2) In the exercise of its functions, the Labour Court may -
(a) in the case of an appeal –
(i) ...
(ii) confirm, vary, reverse or set aside the decision,
order or action that is appealed against, or
substitute its own decision or order.’ (Emphasis
added).
An arbitrator enjoys similar powers under compulsory arbitration in
terms of s 98(9) of the Act. This states that ‘In hearing and determining
any dispute an arbitrator shall have the same powers as the Labour
Court.’
The above power of the Labour Court under s 89 (2) (a) includes the
power to make a straight order for reinstatement, without any
alternative for damages as would be required under s 89(2)(c)(iii) of

the Labour Act. This position was affirmed in obiter by GARWE JA in
Zimnat Life Assurance Ltd v Dikinya,55 confirming the same conclusion
that this author had earlier argued for.56
Madhuku holds a contrary view, asserting that s 89(2)(a) of the Act
does not confer such power on the Labour Court because when
operating under that section it would be operating as a court of appeal
and not a court of first instance.57 That the proper basis of the powers
of the Labour Court are under s 89(2) (c), where supposedly the Labour
Court cannot issue a straight order for reinstatement. That it is a
jurisprudential absurdity for the legislature to have conferred an
employee who reaches the Labour Court via s 93(7) less rights than
the one who lands in the same court as an appellant.
This position is also reflected in Mandiringa & Ors v National Social
Security Authority58 where MAKARAU JP (as she then was) stated,
albeit in obiter, that:
It is therefore the settled position of our law that, in ordering
reinstatement in terms of the Labour Act, the Labour Court,
labour officers and arbitrators appointed under the Act are bound
to assess damages in lieu of reinstatement. Any judgment,
determination or award by these officials that fails to do so is
liable to be interfered with as misdirection or as failing to comply
with the Act in a material way. An award that orders
reinstatement of applicant without awarding a specified amount
of damages in lieu of reinstatement is incomplete and
consequently, incompetent and cannot be registered in terms
of s 98(14) of the Act as an order of this court.
The above arguments are not persuasive but bolster a conservative

pro-employer interpretation of the Labour Act centred around a
constriction of the powers of the Labour Court. This has been the
55
S-30-2010.
56
M Gwisai, Labour and Employment Law in Zimbabwe: Relations of work under
neo-colonial capitalism (ZLC and UZ, 2006) 124-25.
57
L Madhuku, Labour Law in Zimbabwe, (FES with Weaver Press, Harare, 2015)
238-40.
58
2005(2)ZLR 329(H) at 333F. The basis of the decision being Hama v National
Railways of Zimbabwe 1996 (1) ZLR 664(S). The same authority was followed
in Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd v Gwekwerere 2005 (2)ZLR 421(S) at 428F. Girjac
Services (Pvt) Ltd v Mudzingwa 1999(1) ZLR 243 (S) at 250C-D.
essential direction of the dominant section of the superior courts in

the last decade consistent with the demands of neoliberal capitalism.
In the Mandiringa and Gwekwerere decisions, the court assumed the
continued application of the decision in Hama v National Railways of
Zimbabwe59 despite the material changes in the wording of the
relevant provisions of the statutes. As correctly argued by Mucheche,
the court “failed to make a distinction between powers of the Labour
Court hearing an application and an appeal” under s 89(2)(c) and s
89(2)(a) respectively.60 In Mandiringa the court though had hesitancy
in the firmness of its conclusion.61
The distinction Madhuku draws between the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court as a court of “appeal” and as a “ court of first instance” is, with
respect, misplaced. It is now well-established that the appeal
jurisdiction of the Labour Court is that of an appeal in the wide sense,
going beyond an ordinary appeal, an appeal stricto sensu. Citing
extensive authorities MUTEMA P (as he then was) discussed the
different types of appeals in Chiwara v Crystal Candy.62 In the appeal
in the ordinary sense there is a rehearing on the merits but limited to
the evidence or information on which the decision under appeal was
given, and in which the only determination is whether the decision
was right or wrong. No fresh evidence may be heard. On the other
hand an appeal in the wide sense, may involve an appeal by way of
rehearing or an appeal de novo. In the former there is a rehearing on
the documents, but with a special power to receive further evidence
on the appeal.63 An appeal de novo involves a fresh hearing with the
59
1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S).
60
C Mucheche, Law and practice guide on labour dismissal remedies in Zimbabwe:
Reinstatement and damages (in foreign currency), (African Dominion
Publications, Harare, 2014) 52.
61
MAKARAU JP stated 334 that, ÒAssuming that l have erred in holding that an
award that does not specify an award of damages in lieu of reinstatement is
incompetent ÉÓ
62
LC/H/213/2009 at p 2-3 Authorities cited included, Words and Phrases Legally
Defined 3rd Ed Supp 2004, Lexis Nexis, Butterworths p. 49; and specifically –
Quilter v Mapleson (1882) 9 QB 672 at 676; Builders Licensing Board v Sperway
Constructions (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR at 619. Generally see also, ALB
& Anor v ZAIWU 1998 92) ZLR 196 (S) at 202 summarising the classification of
appeals cited in S v Mohamed 1977 (2) SA 531 (A) at 538 and Metal & Allied
Workers Union v Min of Manpower 1983 (3) SA 238 (N) at 242. Also, Continental
Fashions (Pvt) Ltd v Mupfuriri & Ors 1997 (2) ZLR 405 (S) at 410.
63
Wigg v Architects Board of South Australia (1884) 36 SASR 111 at 113. Applied
in Guta v MBCA Bank LC/H/79/2009.
parties being entitled to begin again and adduce new evidence, that
is a complete rehearing of and fresh determination of the merits of
the matter with or without additional evidence or information.64
In Zhakata v Mandoza N.O. and N M Bank Ltd,65 Bhunu J held that,
“an appeal in the context of the Labour Relations Act is an appeal not
in the ordinary sense...” This is correct. On appeal the Labour Court
can decide a matter on the record as in the ordinary appeal, but in
addition may also conduct a hearing into the matter in terms of s
89(2)(a)(i) of the Act.66 The Court is not bound by the strict rules of
evidence and the court may ascertain any relevant fact by any means
which the presiding officer thinks fit and which is not unfair or unjust
to either party.67
The above wide appeal jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not
accidental but designed to facilitate its role as the apex body for the
resolution of disputes and unfair labour practices in a manner
consistent with the purpose and objects of the Act of achieving social
justice and democracy in the workplace as stated in s 2A(1) of the
Act. The superior courts have since affirmed this exclusive equity
jurisdiction enjoyed by the Labour Court unlike the civil courts.68
A restrictive interpretation of the powers of the Labour Court under s
89(2)(a) would fatally cripple the equity jurisdiction of the Labour
Court, in particular its power to give effective remedies for breach of
rights conferred under the Act, including fundamental employees
rights. Such a reading is inconsistent with the purposive interpretation
model compelled by s 2A(2) of the Labour Act.
In any case one if one takes into account the history of the section it
becomes evident that the legislative intention was always one of
clothing the Labour Court with the broadest powers rather than to
64
Sweeney v Fitzhardinge (1906) 4 CLR; Simpson Ltd v Arcipreste (1989) 53 SASR
9
65
HH – 22 – 05 . See also, Tuso v City of Harare HH -1 – 04; Chahweta v National
Foods Ltd LC/H/173/2009 where ÒappealÓ under the Act was held to include
an appeal based on grounds of review.
66
Air Zimbabwe Corporation v Mlambo 1997 (1) ZLR 220 (S).
67
Section 90A Labour Act 2002.
68
Madhatter Mining Co v Tapfuma S-51-14; Fleximail Ltd v Samanyau & Ors S-21-
14; Malimanji v CABS 2007 (2) ZLR 77 (S) at 79D-E; Zhakata v Mandoza N.O. &
N M Bank Ltd HH – 22 – 05.
narrow them. The origins of s 89(2)(a) of the Labour Act lies in s 107
of the Labour Relations Act No. 16 of 1985. This read:
In determining an appeal in terms of this Part, the Tribunal may
confirm, vary or set aside the decision appealed against and
make an order accordingly, and may include in such order any
order as to costs that it thinks fit.
The above section was carried through, with some modifications in

subsequent amendments of the Labour Relations Act.69 In Ruturi v
Heritage Clothing (Pvt) Ltd,70 the court ruled that s 107 provided the
Labour Relations Tribunal with broad powers including the power to
make an order for reinstatement, where appropriate. Similarly in Art
Corporation v Moyana,71 the court also ruled that the broad powers
of a determining authority under the old s 111(1)LRA 1985 to “make
such order as it thinks appropriate for determining the dispute or
rectifying the unfair labour practice concerned”, included the
discretion to grant or decline reinstatement.
The restriction of the general power previously granted under s 111LRA
came through the new s 96(1)(c) introduced by the Labour Relations
(Amendment) Act, 1992. This provided a proviso requiring a mandatory
alternative of damages to reinstatement or employment. The new
provision was replicated in s 89(2)(c)(iii) introduced by s 29 of Act No.
17 of 2002 and subsequently further amended by s 29 of Act No. 7 of
2005, which added two further provisos. What is notable about the
last two amendments is that the formulation of the application of the
section was narrowed to special applications to the Labour Court under
s 93(7) of the Act, but not applied to the general powers of the Labour
Court as had been the case with s 96(1)(c) of the Labour Relations
Act. It was improper therefore to apply the Hama precedent
automatically to the changed provisions of s 89(2)(c)(iii) of the Labour
Act, without first analysing the implications of the change from the
wide formulation under s 96(1)(c)LRA, to the narrow formulation under
89(2)(c)(iii).
69
Presently s 89(2)(2)(a)(ii) and (c) LA 2002.
70
1994 (2) ZLR 334 (S).
71
The relevant provisions were s s 107 and 112 LRA. The court had earlier on
reached the same decision in relation to a similar provision pertaining to the
powers of a labour relations officer – that is s 111 (2) LRA 1985 - Art Corporation
v Moyana 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (S).
The real jurisprudential absurdity is not in the supposed inconsistency

between the powers under s 89(2)(a) and s 89(2) (c) of the Act. As
argued below such inconsistency does not arise. The fundamental
jurisprudential problem with the approach advocated for by Madhuku
is that it creates an inferior set of rights for employees covered by an
Act whose ostensible purpose is to advance social justice and equity
in the workplace compared to a common law regime, which courts
have consistently recognised as offering inferior rights. There is no
provision in either sections providing for the ouster, whether expressly
or by necessary implication, of the now well established common law
principle that reinstatement is a competent remedy for wrongful
dismissal, but available at the discretion of the court.
Powers of Labour Court and labour officers under s 93(5)LA

2015
The Labour Court is empowered under the new s 93(5b) of Act No. 5
of 2015 to confirm a draft ruling by a labour office or designated
agent “with or without amendment.” The section is not directly linked
to the powers of the court under s 89, which is unsatisfactory. However,
the power is broadly couched suggesting that the Labour Court retains
broad power to make an appropriate order as it has for an appeal
under s 89(2)(a). The issue remains to be tested.
A similar situation obtains in relation to labour officers/designated
agents when making a draft ruling in relation to a dispute of right or
unfair labour practice under the new s93(5)(c) of the Act. If the dispute
or unfair labour practice is a dispute of right, the labour officer, may,
upon a finding on a balance of probabilities, make a ruling that –
(i) The employer or other person is guilty of an unfair labour
practice; or
(ii) The dispute of right or unfair labour practice must be
resolved against any employer or other person in a specific
manner by an order –
A. directing the employer or other party concerned to
cease or rectify the infringement or threatened
infringement, as the case may be, including payment
of moneys, where appropriate;
B. for damages for any loss...
As with the powers of the Labour Court in relation to confirmation or

variation of a draft ruling, the above powers of the labour officer are
loosely and inelegantly drafted. They are bound to create confusion.
The powers though are couched widely, in a manner that gives the
labour officer broad powers in relation to the draft ruling. Following
on precedent, this seems to confer on the labour officer the power to
order reinstatement after consideration of the pertinent factors of
whether the employment relationship is no longer tenable. The same
was upheld in Mtetwa v Businesss Equipment Corporation72 where
the appeals committee made a straight order for reinstatement without
an alternative or damages. This was upheld by the court which held
that the employee could not subsequently opt for damages. This is in
a similar manner to that of a determining authority under s 111 of the
Labour Relations Act, 1985.73 Section 111(1) though was much better
worded on the powers of the labour officer, whilst s 111(2) gave explicit
examples of how the general power under s 111(1) could be exercised,
including an order for reinstatement. The provisions read:
(1) After due inquiry into, and consideration of any matter
that has been referred to it in terms of paragraph (d) of
subsection one hundred and nine, a determining authority
may-
(a) make such order as it thinks appropriate for
determining the dispute or rectifying the unfair
labour practice concerned; or
(b) ...
(2) Without derogation from the generality of subsection (1),
an order made in terms of that subsection may provide for
or direct, as the case may be –
(a) back pay from the time of the dispute or unfair labour
practice concerned; ...or
(b) ....or
(c) reinstatement in a job; or
(d) insertion into a seniority list at an appropriate point;
or
(e) promotion or, if no promotion post exists, pay at a
higher rate pending promotion; or
(f) employment in a job; or
(g) payment of legal fees and costs; or
(h) cessation of the unfair labour practice; or
as may be appropriate
72
S-25-04. Business Equipment Corporation v Mtetwa S-14-07 affirmed the
correctness of the earlier decision.
73
Art Corporation v Moyana, supra.
The above formulation of the powers of a determining authority under

the old Labour Relations Act, 1985 were clear and concise, and could
be used as a basis to amend the new s 93(5)(c) to remove the current
confusion.
REINSTATEMENT UNDER S 89(2)(C) LABOUR ACT

The third circumstance when reinstatement applies under statutes is
in terms of s 89(2)(c)(iii) of the Labour Act. Reinstatement or
employment in a job is provided as a specified remedy under s 89(2)(c)
(iii) of the Act. The section reads:
(2) In the exercise of its functions, the Labour Court may, ...
(c) in the case of an application made in terms of
subparagraph (i) of subsection (7) of section ninety-
three, make an order for any of the following or any
other appropriate order –
(iii) reinstatement or employment in a job:
Provided that –
(i) any such determination shall specify an amount
of damages to be awarded to the employee
concerned as an alternative to his reinstatement
or employment;
(ii) in deciding whether to award damages or
reinstatement or employment, onus is on the
employer to prove that the employment
relationship is no longer tenable, taking into
account the size of the employer, the preferences
of the employee, the situation in the labour
market and any other relevant factors;
(iii) should damages be awarded instead of
reinstatement or employment as a result of an
untenable working relationship arising from
unlawful or wrongful dismissal by the employer,
punitive damages may be imposed.
There is considerable controversy over the interpretation of the
section. Firstly whether it solely applies to s 93(7) applications or is
of broader effect. Under s 93(7)(ii) of the Act when a conciliatory
authority has issued a certificate of no settlement but it is not possible
for any reason to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration or the
labour officer for any reason refuses to issue a certificate of no
settlement after the prescribed period allowed for conciliation, any
party to the dispute may apply to the Labour Court, in case of a

dispute of right, for an order in terms of s 89(2)(c) of the Act. Another
issue is what is the effect of proviso (i) to s 89(2)(c)(iii) compelling an
alternative order for damages when reinstatement or employment is
awarded and who has the right of choice to effect the alternative,
the employee or the employer. Related to the above is whether the
previous locus classicus in this area, Hama v National Railways,74 still
applies, given the amendments effected by s 29 of the Labour
Amendment Act, No. 5 of 2005.
History of Section
The controversies arise from the wording and history of the section.
The original formulation of the precursor to the section, namely s 107
of the Labour Relations Act, 1985, was broadly worded, and without
the qualification of the damages alternative. The same applied to
determining authorities under s 111(1)LRA 1985. Section 112(2) LRA
1985 gave specific examples of how the power could be exercised,
including making an order for reinstatement. The courts held that in
terms of the above the Tribunal and determining authorities could, in
appropriate circumstances, award a pure order of reinstatement
without an alternative of damages.75
The first qualification arose with s 96(1) (c) of the Labour Relations
Amendment Act No. 12 of 1992. It provided:
Without derogation from the generality of sections ninety-three
and ninety five, a determination made in terms of those sections
may provide for –
(a) back pay from the time when the dispute or unfair labour
practice arose;
(b) ...
(c) Reinstatement or employment in a job provided that any
such determination shall specify an amount of damages to
be awarded to the employee concerned as an alternative
to his reinstatement or employment.
In Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe, supra, the court held that

by virtue of s 96(1) (c)LRA 1992 an order for reinstatement must be
74
1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S).
75
Art Corporation v Moyana 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (S); Ruturi v Heritage Clothing
(Pvt) Ltd 1994 (2) ZLR 374 (S).
accompanied with an alternative order for the payment of damages

in lieu of reinstatement. The case became the locus classicus.76
The proviso to s 96(1)(c)LRA 2002 did not specify who had the right to
make the choice between reinstatement and damages, between the
employee and the employer. Hama was silent on the matter but in
BHP Minerals Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Takawira77 the court held that
although the matter had not been dealt with directly the courts seemed
to assume the choice lay with the employer. The court ruled that
logically it made sense to interpret the proviso as for the benefit of
the employer. “The employer is given the opportunity to, as it were
buy his way out of his obligation. It makes no sense to allow the
employee to claim money in place of reinstatement.”
The effect of the above was to effectively neutralize the remedy of
reinstatement under the Labour Act. It gave the employer a veto over
its application hardly any different from the old classical common
law position that had proscribed reinstatement as a matter of law.
The courts did not explain how this could be so under a statute one of
whose purposes was to protect employees from arbitrary dismissal.
The provision was subsequently retained but in a modified manner as
s 89(2)(c)(iii) of the Labour Act, inserted by s 29 of the Labour Relations
Amendment Act, No. 17 of 2002. It read:
(2) In the exercise of its functions, the Labour Court may –
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) in the case of a application made in terms of
subparagraph (i) of subsection (7) of section ninety-
three, make an order for any of the following or any
other appropriate order –
(i) back pay ...
(ii) ...
(iii) reinstatement or employment tin a job:
Provided that any such determination shall specify
76
Followed in numerous cases including, ZESA v Bopoto 1997 (1) ZLR 126(S);
Mhowa v Beverly Building Society 1998 (1) ZLR 546(S); Olivine Industries (Pvt)
Ltd v Gwekwerere & Ors 2005 (2) ZLR 421 (S) at 428F; and Net*One Cellular
(PVT) Ltd v Communications and Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe
and 56 Employees S-89-05.
77
1999 (2) ZLR 77 (S).
an amount of damages to be awarded to the

employee concerned as an alternative to his
reinstatement or employment;
(iv) ...
Although the formulation of the reinstatement/damages proviso was

exactly the same with that in the Labour Relations Amendment Act
(No. 12 of 1992) there was a change in the scope of application of the
provisions. Whereas s 96(1)(c)LRA 1992 applied generally to
determining authorities including the Labour Relations Tribunal, s
89(2)(c)(iii)LA 2002 expressly stated that it applied to applications
made in terms of s 93(7)(ii) of the Labour Act. It did not expressly
apply to s 89(2)(a) when the court dealt with appeals. Prima facie
there was therefore a narrowing of the scope of application.
Despite the apparent change in the scope of application of the
provision, the courts mainly continued to apply the provision in the
same way as under s 96(1)(c)LRA 1992.78 They did not explain why the
rationale of the Hama decision should continue to apply generally,
when its basis, that is the wide scope under s 96(1)(c), had now been
restricted to the special s 93 (7) application. They did not explain
why it was necessary to depart from the plain and express wording of
s 89(2)(3)(c) that expressly stated that it applied to the special s
93(7) applications, including whether any absurdity would arise for
instance in comparison to the powers of the court in an appeal under
s 89(2)(a) of the Act. Perhaps if they did, they might have come to a
different conclusion as indeed the court did in obiter in Zimnat Life
Assurance Ltd v Dikinya.79
A further material amendment was introduced by s 29 of the Labour
Amendment Act No. 7 of 2005 amending s 89(2)(c)(iii). The amendment
introduced two further provisos to proviso (i), which potentially
impacted on the reinstatement/damages issue, as discussed below.
78
Mandiringa & Ors v National Social Security Authority 2005(2)ZLR 329(H) at
333F; Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd v Gwekwerere & Ors 2005 (2) ZLR 421 (S) at
428F; Net*One Cellular (PVT) Ltd v Communications and Allied Services Workers
Union of Zimbabwe and 56 Employees S-89-05; Chitambo v ZESA Holdings (Pvt)
Ltd & Anor LC/H/331/2013.
79
S-30-2010.
Present Law on Reinstatement under S 89(2)(C)Labour Act

In Mvududu v ARDA80 PATEL J specifically left the question of the full
import of s 89(2)(c)(iii)LA 2005 open, although in obiter the judge
seemed to accept that the Labour Court has the discretion to order
reinstatement.
It is my respectful submission that s 89(2)(c)(iii) of the Labour Act
does no more than substantially incorporate, with modifications, the
position already provided for under the general appeal power of the
Labour Court under s 89(2)(a)LA 2005 and under modern common
law. That is the Labour Court can grant the remedy of reinstatement
to an unlawfully or wrongfully dismissed employee who claims it, but
subject to the discretion of the court to decline the remedy where
the employer discharges the onus that the employment relationship
is no longer tenable. A further modification being that unlike under s
89(2)(a)LA 2005, a reinstatement order under s 89(2)(c)(iii) must be
accompanied with an alternative order for the payment of damages
by virtue of proviso (i) to s 89(2)(c)(iii). The proviso is for the benefit
and exercise by the employee. The proviso though is not in material
conflict with s 89(2)(a) of the Labour Act as the court exercising its
general equity powers can also include the same. It is also consistent
with trends in common law and is designed to facilitate the just,
effective and expeditious resolution of labour disputes.
There are several grounds for the above approach. The starting point
is the amendment to s 89(2)(c)(iii) LA 2002 by s 29 of Act No. 7 of
2005. This was highly significant. The amendment changed the
formulation that had been used in both s 96(1)(c) of the Labour
Relations Act and under Act No. 17 of 2002. Whilst retaining the proviso
on the damages alternatives, it added two critical provisos, provisos
(ii) and (iii). These provide the “coloured context” through which
proviso (i) must be understood. The provisos show the clear legislative
intention to retain reinstatement as the primary remedy for wrongful
dismissal as well as the essential principles of common law.
The first point is that despite the wording of proviso (i) the subsequent
provisos vest the Labour Court with the power to decide whether to
grant reinstatement or damages. Proviso (ii) expressly states that “in
deciding whether to award damages or reinstatement or
80
SC – 446-14.
employment…” Then can be no question of “deciding” if the employer

is allowed to subsequently unilaterally opt out of reinstating and paying
damages. Proviso (ii) makes clear that the onus “to prove that the
employment relationship is no longer tenable” is with the employer.
If the employer fails to discharge such onus, it follows that
reinstatement must be ordered. There would be no point in placing
such onus on the employer, if the employer is allowed to subsequently
unilaterally decide whether to reinstate or pay damages, as was
previously held.81 But the opposite applies. Reinstatement may no
longer be practicable or because of changed circumstances making
the employee now prefer damages instead of reinstatement as
originally claimed. 82
Proviso (iii) reiterates the position, providing that “should damages
be awarded instead of reinstatement as a result of an untenable
working relationship arising from unlawful or wrongful dismissal by
the employer, punitive damages may be imposed.” The wording is
clear that the award may be damages or reinstatement, and that in
case of the former punitive damages may be awarded. If proviso (i)
precluded discretion on the Labour Court then the wording of proviso
(iii) as with proviso (ii) would not make sense.
Under the three provisos the deciding agent is clearly the court, as
under common law and as acknowledged by labour scholars.83 Drawing
from common law, proviso (ii) does not provide the court with an
unfettered discretion but subjects it to the overall requirement of
whether the “employment relationship is no longer tenable,” by
reference to a non-exhaustive list of factors. Again drawing from
common law, the onus to establish why reinstatement should not apply
lies with the employer. alternative for damages were the employer
has proven that the relationship is no longer “tenable.”
81
BHP Minerals Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Takawira 1999 (2) ZLR 77 (S); Gauntlet
Security Services (Pvt) Ltd. v Leornard 1997 (1) ZLR 583 (S).
82
As was tried, but unsuccessfully by the employee in BHP Minerals Zimbabwe
(Pvt) Ltd v Takawira, supra; and in Mtetwa v Business Equipment Corporation
S-25-04; and further affirmed in Business Equipment Corporation v Mtetwa S-
14-07.
83
83G Makings states that after Act No. 7 of 2005, the ÒÉ decision as to whether
to order reinstatement or damages now lies with the dispute resolution
authorityÓ, in G Makings, Useful Labour Cases, 4th ed ( Aquamor, Harare,
2011) 44. See also C Mucheche (2014), supra at 48-49.
The second point is that s 89(2) must be read holistically and

purposively. In Sagitarian (PVT) Ltd t/a ABC Auctions v The Workers
Committee of Sagitarian (PVT) Ltd,84 GWAUNZA JA, cited authority
to the effect that a “section, of whatever length, must have a unity
of purpose... Separate subsections must all have some relevance to
the central theme which characterises the section.” That general
words may be “coloured” by their context.
The powers of the Labour Court under s 89(2) generally must be read
in line with the purpose of the Act under s 2A(1)(f) of the Act to
secure the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes.
Employees also have a right to protection from unfair dismissal under
s 12B(1) of the Act. It is now well-established that the normal or
primary remedy for unfair dismissal is reinstatement. A construction
that makes the position of the “protected” employee under the Act
worse than that of the ordinary employee under the common law, by
virtually giving the employer a veto power over reinstatement or to
“buy out” such remedy cannot be consistent with the objectives of
the section or the Act in general. Section 2A(2) requires that the Act
be construed in a manner that best ensures the attainment of its
objectives.
The above interpretation also removes any unnecessary conflict that
may be read between the powers of the Labour Court when hearing a
s 93(7) application and when exercising its general appeals powers
under s 89(2)(c) of the Labour Act. Under its broad power in terms of
the later section the court may, but is not obliged to issue an
accompanying alternative order of damages as recognised in the
Dikinya case, supra. It generally should, for the convenience and
expeditious resolution of the dispute, if reinstatement subsequently
prove impracticable after the judgment. This was the situation
historically with a determining authority under its broad powers in
terms of 111(1)LRA 1985 and the more specific powers under s 112LRA
1985. There was no necessary conflict.
Who Has the Right of Choice, Employee or Employer?

The wording of proviso (i) to s 89(2)(c) LA 2005 is clear that an order
for reinstatement must be accompanied by an alternative order of
damages. In Net*One Cellular (PVT) Ltd v Communications and Allied
84
2006 (1) ZLR 115 (S) at 118E -119C-E.
Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe and 56 Employees,85 CHIDYAUSIKU

CJ stated;
It is quite clear from the above section (s 89 (2) (c) (iii)) that
the Labour Court is enjoined to make an award of damages as
an alternative to reinstatement.
The question though is who has the right of choice– does it remain the
employer per the Takawira decision or has this to change in light of
the amendments to s 89(2)(c) under Act No. 7 of 2005? In the Hama
case the matter was not dealt with. Subsequently though the courts,
starting with the Takawira decision, ruled that it was the employer.86
There was no justification for this. The wording of s 96 (1)(c) did not
necessarily mean that choice was with the employer. The court
acknowledged as much in the Takawira case, but went on to ascribe
the right to the employer.
However, a holistic consideration of s 89(2) (c) shows that such
interpretation is inconsistent with the section and the purpose of the
Act. It also runs afoul of well established principles of common law on
remedies. It is respectfully submitted that it is time for the courts to
reconsider the issue, in view of the fact that Takawira was made
before Amendment No. 7 of 2005.
Only an interpretation that gives the choice to the employee avoids
the above pitfalls. Provisos (ii) and (iii) give the deciding power to
award reinstatement or damages to the court, but provided it is the
employee who has exercised their right to choose that as the primary
relief. If not, the question does not arise. The court can only grant
reinstatement if the employer has failed to discharge the onus to
show that relationship is no longer tenable. A reading that reposes
the employer with the power to unilaterally choose whether to
reinstate or pay damages after the judgment, defeats the purpose of
the provisos of vesting that power with the court, in pursuance of a
claim by the employee. It is illogical and runs counter to the very
purpose of provisos (ii) and(iii) to provide reinstatement as the first
remedy unless the employer has failed to discharge the onus.
Contrary to the argument in Takawira the reverse applies well. Whereas
the employer may fail to discharge the onus on it under proviso (ii)
85
S-89-05.
86
Gauntlet Security Services (Pvt) Ltd. v Leornard 1997 (1) ZLR 583 (S); ZESA v
Bopoto 1997 (1) ZLR 126(S).
and hence reinstatement is ordered. But in practice the employer has

before it every tool to make such reinstatement impracticable for
the worker. Mucheche puts it well, comparing such an enforced
reinstatement to building “a permanent structure on sinking sand”:87
No matter how strongly an arbitrator or judge of the Labour
Court may feel about reinstatement, it will be ridiculous to force
an employee into a cage of reinstatement which is nothing short
of a circle of despair. Such an employee’s woes may be
compounded by the fact that the belligerent employer may
choose not to give him/her work to do and render him/her a
white elephant.
Besides the above, many workers become scared of again facing

employers or managers that they fought over in court, and
understandably prefer to move on even if they have won
reinstatement. This is especially true of small to medium employers
and those without a trade-union protected environment. 88 The
employment relationship is inherently a personal one, in which these
dynamics are inevitable. This explains the series of cases that came
before the courts where workers who had successfully won
reinstatement made a u-turn to seek damages. In Shabani v ZIMPLATS89
the court approved the Appellant’s request for damages as opposed
to reinstatement on the grounds that he was now employed elsewhere
and “that the atmosphere at the Respondent institution is no longer
conducive for him to work under.”
Proviso (i) of s 89(2)(c)(iii) can therefore be read to be designed to
allow the flexibility necessary in the application of specific
performance in the context of the employment relationship. Whereas
under the common law where a party is awarded specific performance
but the defendant fails to comply, the plaintiff has to bring a new
action for cancellation and damages, with the first order remaining
extant and the second order standing independent.90 The above is
clearly a long and cumbersome process.
87
C Mucheche (2014) 50.
88
Deakin and Morris (2005) 522.
89
LC/H/48/2009 [Makamure P].
90
R Christie (2006), supra at 350 citing various authorities including, Schein and
Sliom v Joubert 1903 TS 428; Evans v Hart 1949 4 SA 30 (C ), and Papenfus v
Luiken 1950 2 SA 508 (O). Also, but perhaps more narrowly see, Olivine Industries
(Pvt) Ltd v Gwekwerere 2005 (2)ZLR 421(S) at 428F; Girjac Services (Pvt) Ltd v
Mudzingwa 1999(1) ZLR 243 (S) at 250C-D.
Christie states though that a plaintiff who sues for specific performance
may include an alternative claim for cancellation and damages and
this may be awarded. Alternatively, that even when not included in
the summons as an alternative claim, “cancellation and damages may
be awarded on a clause asking for general or other relief... or in the
absence of such a clause and without amendment of the declaration.”91
The trend under common law as outlined by Christie is one towards
removing the obstacles to an effective remedy to a party who has
been awarded specific performance but the defendant fails to comply.
It is in that light that Proviso (i) to s 89(2)(c)(iii) should be taken. It
codifies the above trend by making it easier for the employee to get
the alternative remedy of damages where the one of reinstatement
has become impracticable or unobtainable for whatever reason. The
employee does not have to institute fresh proceedings to get relief,
but the Act places the obligation on the court to make the alternative
order of damages to the one of reinstatement. Should there in fact be
no problems, then that’s the end of the matter as the employee gets
her or his primary remedy. But equally so, should reinstatement prove
to be sinking sand, the employee gets the monetary compensation.
Such a construction well accords with the purpose of the Act of
expeditiously and justly resolving disputes. It is particularly suited
for a court which is not governed by the strict formalities and
technicalities of the civil courts.
The above interpretation of s 89(2)(c) is in accordance with common
law, unlike the one that virtually overturns the now established
principle that reinstatement is a competent remedy for wrongful
dismissal. After all its the Hama decision itself that reiterated the
principle that courts must not easily infer the ouster of common law
unless this is by express provision or by necessary implication.
Such an interpretation is also jurisprudentially sound and accords with
the legislative intention of protecting employees from unfair dismissal
and promoting fair labour standards. Where the employer has failed
to discharge the onus on it to show that the relationship is no longer
tenable, there is no reason why reinstatement should not be granted.
Under fair dismissal legislation reinstatement is recognised as the
primary remedy for unfair dismissal. In some instances it may be the
only effective remedy as in cases of unfair discrimination against trade
91
R Christie, ibid.
unionists,92 or cases where the moral blameworthiness of the employer

is particularly high as in cases of gender or racial discrimination or
victimisation of employees.93 The deadly side effect of the contrary
interpretation being that it encourages employers to unfairly dismiss
union and workers committee activists, or discriminate against women
including sexual harassment or violate other fundamental rights of
employees knowing fully well that the courts will allow them to buy
out the victim.
This was exactly the Achilles heel of the old position, which rewarded
the guilty party by giving him, the “the opportunity to, as it were buy
his way out of his obligation”, as admitted in the Takawira case, supra.
This is contrary to the well-established principle of common law that
the choice of remedy lies with the wronged party, subject to the
discretion of the court, including specific performance.94 It is unfair
for the wrong-doer to have such choice as was done in the cases that
gave the employer such choice. Giving the employer the choice offends
the nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem maxim, “no one
maintains an action arising out of his own wrong”.95
The opposite applies where the worker is the one reposed with the
right of choice. A purposive reading of s 89(2) avoids any unnecessary
conflict in interpretation of the powers of the Labour Court under s
89(2)(a) and under s 89(2)(c) of the Act. A literal reading of s 89(2)(c)
of the old Labour Act shows that the s 89(2)(c) jurisdiction of the
Labour Court would, unlike the old s 96(1)LRA not apply generally,
but only to a s 93(7) application. However, there is no need to look at
it this way, as l previously argued. 96
Following the approach in Sagitarian (PVT) Ltd t/a ABC Auctions v
The Workers Committee of Sagitarian (PVT) Ltd, supra, the section
92
National Union of Textile Workers and Ors v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Ors 1982
(4) SA 151 (T); Jiah & Ors v PSC & Anor 1999 (1) ZLR 17 (S); Chitambo v ZESA
Holdings (Pvt) Ltd & Anor LC/H/331/2013.
93
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis, supra
94
Farmers’ Co-op Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343, held at 350, Ò ‘it is against
conscience that a party should have a right of election whether he would perform
his contract or only pay damages for the breach of it.’ The election is rather
with injured party, subject to the discretion of the Court.Ó
95
Mutasa v Masvingo Brick Tile LC/MS/13/05; Standard Chartered Bank Ltd v
Matsika 1997 (2) ZLR 389 (S) and Mushaya v Glens Corporation 1992 (1) ZLR
162.
96
M Gwisai (2006) 127, and also applied in Chitungwiza Municipality v Mvududu
LC/H/71/2009 p 3.
must be read with unity of purpose around its central theme. The two
subsections can be read together an din a non-conflictual manner.
Under its general power in terms of s 89(2)(c) the court can apply the
specific powers provided under s 89(2)(c)(iii), including making an
order with an alternative of damages. But it is not compelled to and
may go beyond this, given the broad wording of the subsection. The
above has always been the situation historically. The powers specified
under the present s 89(2)(c) of the Labour Act were similar to those
of a determining authority under s 111(2) of the Labour Relations Act,
1985. But the same authority also enjoyed broad unqualified powers
under s 111(1)LRA 1985, which are similar to the powers of the Labour
Court in terms of s 89(2)(c) of the Labour Act. This interpretation is
consistent with s 2A(2) of the Labour Act and best facilitates the
Labour Court in implementing its broad equity jurisdiction.
Finally the above interpretation avoids possible glaring absurd results.
For instance an interpretation that compels a mandatory damages
alternative order in which the employer has the choice to reinstate
or pay, could lead to impalpable injustice in cases of unfair dismissal
by constructive dismissal under s 12B(3)(a) of the Labour Act. Section
89(2)(c) does not provide for an independent standing relief of
damages, but only as an alternative to an order for reinstatement. In
one case an arbitrator, following the above rigid approach, made an
order of reinstatement or damages. But in constructive dismissal cases
reinstatement clearly does not apply, the intolerable relationship being
the reason the employee resigned. Only a flexible interpretation of
the powers of the court that gives it authority to decide on what is
the applicable remedy, subject to the employee’s initial choice of
what relief to seek, is the correct approach.
Recommendations
To capture the above characters of the remedy of reinstatement the
courts and the legislature need to reformulate its current wording, to
avoid confusion or subversion of the legislative intention. For instance
even within the current framework of both s 89(2)(c)(iii) and s 89(2)
(a) of the Labour Act, courts, arbitrators, labour officers and
designated agents can formulate their orders appropriately to show
clearly that the option of taking damages lies with the employee. An
order could be worded as follows:
The appellant is to be reinstated into her former position without
loss of salary and benefits from the date of dismissal to the date
of reinstatement less mitigation and should the appellant find

that reinstatement is no longer practicable or preferable, the
appellant is to be paid damages as an alternative to
reinstatement as may be agreed upon the parties or that failing,
as may be determined upon application by this court.
Similarly there is need to amend s 89(2) (a) (b) and (c) of the Labour
Act to achieve greater clarity. It would remove the reference to the s
93(7) applications but provide for a general provision dealing with
orders by the Labour Court and other determining authorities under
the Labour Act encompassing all applications, references or appeals
to the court and /or other determining authorities like a labour officer,
designated agent, arbitrator or determining authority under an
employment code or national model code. A useful reference to model
the amendment of s 89(2) (b) (c) is the old s 111(1) and s 112 LRA
1985 as read with s 107.
Finally the reinstatement/damages proviso should be re-worded to
clearly spell out the right of choice lies with the employee where
reinstatement is no longer practicable or preferable after the court
has found in favour of the employee. For instance Proviso (i) could
then read:
Reinstatement or employment in a job;
Provided that-
(i) any such determination shall specify an amount of damages
to be awarded to the employee concerned as an alternative
to his or her reinstatement or employment if the employee
finds that reinstatement or employment is no longer
practicable or preferable.
REINSTATEMENT IN CASES OF PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES AND REVIEW

The third circumstance of reinstatement under statutes is where the
Labour Court or the appropriate determining authority makes a finding
that the dismissal is affected by a material procedural irregularity or
the proceedings are set aside on review.
Irregularities may arise at various stages of proceedings under the
Labour Act. This may be in hearings under an employment code or
under the national model code. It may be in hearings by arbitrators,
labour officers or designated agents. The issue may be pertinent in
appeals before the Labour Court or when the court exercises its general
review jurisdiction or in applications.
The effect of procedural irregularities was well summarised in Maposa

v CMED (Pvt),97 where MATANDA-MOYO P (as she then was) held:
The law is very clear on the question of the effect of procedural
irregularities. Procedural irregularities can render the entire
proceedings void, and if an act is void, then it is a nullity.
In Tamanikwa & Ors v Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund,98
respondent failed to comply with the provisions of s 12B of the Labour
Act but dismissed its employees using an alternative set of regulations,
it was held:
Any disciplinary procedures which have been effected outside
the peremptory provisions of s 12B are clearly unlawful. The
dismissal of the appellant was therefore null and void.
These decisions follow a longstanding line of cases dealing with
precursors to the Labour Act, notably Standard Chartered Bank of
Zimbabwe Ltd v Matsika,99 dealing with statutory regulations or
employment codes.100 In other instances the courts have ruled that
the effect of the procedural irregularities is to render the proceedings
at the very least voidable at the instance of the employee.101 The
above must be read though in the context of the settled law that an
irregularity which does not cause prejudice does not by itself vitiate
proceedings. In Nyahuma v Barclays Bank (Pvt) Ltd102 it was held that;
“..it is not all procedural irregularities which vitiate proceedings. In
order to succeed in having proceedings set aside on the basis of
procedural irregularity, it must be shown that the party concerned
was prejudiced by the irregularity.” Or put differently a party “should
not escape the consequences of his misdeeds simply because of a
failure to conduct proceedings properly”, 103 or because of
technicalities.104
97
LC/H/81/2007. Cited, McFoy v United Africa Co. Ltd (1961) 3 AII ER 1169 at
1167; Jacks Club of South Africa & Ors v Feldman 1942 AD 340 at 359.
98
2013(2)ZLR 46(S) at 61.
99
Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v Matsika 1996 (1) ZLR 123 (S);
Mugwebie v Seed Co. Ltd & Anor 2000 (1) ZLR 93(S).
100
Madoda v Tanganda Tea Co. Ltd 1999 (1) ZLR 374 (S); Standard Chartered Bank
Zimbabwe Ltd v Chikomwe & Ors S-77-00; Kukura Kurerwa Bus Co v Mandina
LC/H/72/2008.
101
Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe v Mazvimavi 1995(2) ZLR 353(S).
102
2005 (2) ZLR 435 (S) 438E-F. Cited Jacks Club of South Africa & Ors v Feldman
1942 AD 340 at 359.
103
Air Zimbabwe v Mensa S-89-04.
104
Dalny Mine v Banda 1999 (1) ZLR 220 (S); Air Zimbabwe Corporation v Mlambo
1997 (1) ZLR 220 (S).
The effect of holding the dismissal null and void, is effectively to

reinstate the employee in their former job, as the dismissal is taken
as never having occurred. This is what was done in the Tamanikwa
and Matsika decisions. The reinstatement though may be temporary.
The employer is entitled to reinstitute fresh proceedings on the same
facts, but in a procedurally correct manner. This is what distinguishes
reinstatement in cases of procedural irregularities from that of
reinstatement on the merits.
The Labour Court, on appeal may exercise its powers in terms of s
89(2)(a)LA, to conduct a re-hearing to cure the irregularities, or if
this is not possible, remit the matter. When this happens, the
employment relationship is deemed to continue. In the case of a re-
hearing the court is starting afresh on a clean page and the effective
date of termination is from “the date on which the irregularity is
cured.”105 The finding of irregularity “means that the employee was
never lawfully dismissed. He must therefore continue to be treated
as an employee pending the outcome of the hearing on remittal.” 106
The same situation obtains on review. Where proceedings are set aside
on review, the status qua ante is restored, and in the case of dismissal
the employee is effectively reinstated in their former position.
Reinstatement is automatic. There is no issue of discretion of awarding
damages, as would be the case on appeal.107 In ZFC Ltd v Geza,108 the
court held:
The relief available on review is that proceedings or the decision
may be ‘set aside or corrected’ ...Miss Geza asked for a great
deal more than that. She wanted an order that ZFC Ltd reinstate
her or pay damages. That is the kind of relief one seeks on
appeal, not on review.
Where proceedings are set aside on review and the employee

reinstated, as with the case of procedural irregularities in general,
this may be only for a temporary period, as the employer is entitled
to re-institute proceedings on the same charges but in a procedurally
correct manner. This is why in cases of procedural unfairness it is
105
Dalny Mine v Banda 1999 (1) ZLR 220 (S).
106
Air Zimbabwe Corporation v Mlambo 1997 (1) ZLR (S) at 223.
107
Muringi v Air Zimbabwe Corporation & Anor 1997 (2) ZLR 488 (S). Generally
see, Bailey v Healthy Professions Council of Zimbabwe 1993 (2) ZLR 17 (S);
Health Professions Council v McGown 1994 (2) ZLR 329 (S) at 373C.
108
1998 (1) ZLR 137(S) at 139.
preferable to institute proceedings by way of an appeal rather than

an application in terms of s 89(1)(d1)LA when the court exercises its
general review jurisdiction similar to that of the High Court. As
discussed above, an “appeal” under the Labour Act, is an appeal in
the wide sense and encompasses grounds of appeal based on procedural
irregularities or review, where appropriate, but on a narrower scale
than the general review jurisdiction of the Labour Court under s
89(1)(d1) of the Act.109
REINSTATEMENT UNDER S 6 (2) OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT CODE

The final framework under which the issue of reinstatement may arise
under the Labour Act is in terms of s 6 (2) of the Labour (National
Employment Code of Conduct), Regulations, 2006, the model code.
An employer who has good cause to believe that an employee has
committed misconduct may suspend such employee and conduct a
hearing into the alleged misconduct and within fourteen days hand
down a determination.110 In terms of s 6 (2) the employer –
… may, according to the circumstances of the case-
a) serve a notice, in writing, on the employee concerned
terminating his or her contract of employment, if the
grounds for his or her suspension are proved to his or her
satisfaction; or
b) serve a notice, in writing, on the employee concerned
removing the suspension and reinstating such employee if
the grounds for suspension are not proved.
A question that arises is whether if the employee is not found guilty,

reinstatement is automatic or the employer has discretion not to
impose reinstatement if the relationship has broken down?
The precursor to s 6(2) was s 3 (2) S.I. 371 of 1985,111 which was
similarly worded but with the difference being that the determining
authority was not the employer but a labour relations officer. The
courts initially ruled that the determining authority had no discretion,
but had to order reinstatement if his or her finding was that the
109
See also, DE van Loggerenberg, Superior Court Practice, 2nd ed. (Lose-leaf,
Juta) A1-32.
110
Section 6 (1) Model Code.
111
Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of
Employment) Regulations, 1985.
employee was not guilty, and vice versa - United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd v
Murwisi 1995 (1) ZLR 246 (S).112 This position was overruled in Hama
v National Railways of Zimbabwe113 where the court ruled that the
common law position of discretion was retained under the Regulations
moreso because under the amended s 96(1)(c)LRA it was mandatory
that an order for reinstatement be accompanied by an alternative
order of damages. It is submitted that the situation under s 6(2) of
the model code is now different and that where the employer does
not find the employee guilty of the alleged offence the suspension
must be removed and the employee reinstated. Reinstatement is
automatic.
This is logical, because the reinstatement/damages proviso is no longer
applicable under s 6 (2) of the model code. The provisions of s 6 (2)
are clear and admit of no ambiguity, providing for “removing the
suspension and reinstating such employee if the grounds for suspension
are not proved.” The provisions are peremptory as per Tamanikwa &
Ors v Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund.114 In any case under
the model code we are dealing with a suspended employee rather
than a dismissed employee.
Interpreting s 6 (2) of the model code in a discretionary manner, as
may be suggested because of the phrase in s 6 (2) that the employer,
“may, according to the circumstances of the case”, defies common
sense and leads to glaring absurdities. “May” in those circumstances
really signifies the peremptory. The changed structure and nature of
s 6 (2) of the model code clearly make the Murwisi case the more
applicable precedent rather than the Hama decision.
Whereas under S.I. 371 of 1985, the determining authority was an
independent third party, the labour relations officer, who could
accordingly carry out an objective exercise of discretion on whether
to grant reinstatement, and if not, assess damages. The same applies
to the Labour Court or an arbitrator under s 89(2) of the Labour Act.
But this cannot be so under the model code. Under the code, it is the
same employer who charged the employee, conducted the hearing
and found the employee not guilty, who should decide whether
112
Initially declared in obiter by MCNALLY JA in Masiyiwa v T M Supermarket 1990
(1) ZLR 166, holding, ÒTo put it another way, he has a choice, but that choice
is governed, not by his discretion, but by his finding ÉÓ
113
1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S).
114
2013(2)ZLR 46(S) at 61.
reinstatement should apply or not, and if not, assess damages. This

clearly flies in the face of the “basic tenets of natural justice” and
the employee’s right to protection from unfair dismissal under s 12B(1).
If after a internal process that it completely runs and dominates the
employer has found the employee not guilty, then the logical thing is
that the employee be reinstated as provided in s 6 (2) (b), as argued
by Madhuku.115 Of course this raises problems where the relationship
has broken down or the employee no longer wants reinstatement, a
situation normally catered for by the alternative of damages. But this
is the fundamental problem of S.I. 15 of 2006 as a dispute resolution
system. It attempts to square a circle by impermissibly superimposing
a pluralist based system on a unitarist based one. This contradiction
cannot be resolved other than by either creating a semi-autonomous
determining authority at the workplace made up of representatives
of both the employer and employee as is normally done under
employment codes, or alternatively outsourcing this to an entirely
different third party, like the labour relations officer, as was done
under S.I. 371 of 1975.
There is urgent need to address this anomaly. In the absence of this,
an employee who no longer wants reinstatement can only resign after
the reinstatement, unless she or he can sue for constructive dismissal
where appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The above survey of the law, legislative and common law, shows that
the remedy of reinstatement has come a long way, evolving from the
position of complete non-recognition under classical common law to
one of general acceptance as a competent remedy and finally its
recognition as the primary remedy for unfair dismissal. This can only
be so under an Act whose declared purpose is inter alia, the attainment
of social justice and under a new constitutional dispensation that
enshrines labour rights including the right to fair labour practices and
standards.
With such clear and established legislative and constitutional
foundations one can only hope that the judiciary will follow suit to
fully recognise the remedy of reinstatement, for such is the only way
to ensure that the employee’s right to protection from unfair dismissal
and to fair labour practices and standards is fully and finally realised.
115
L Madhuku (2015) 125-27.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION LAWS, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE WILDLIFE SECTOR
LENIN TINASHE CHISAIRA1
ABSTRACT
The wildlife sector is strategic in Zimbabwe for its economic, social
and ecological purposes and hence the right to access information on
wildlife governance and conservation is critical. Zimbabwe has many
municipal and international law commitments on environmental
information rights, and practitioners can utilise these to facilitate
public participation in wildlife governance and conservation.
Environmental information rights are fundamental to the prevention
of environmental threats such as wildfire conflicts, corruption and
lack of transparency. This essay analyses the law on access to
information and especially State obligations at municipal and
international law and the extent to which State practice acts to
impede or enable the rights of the public to access information critical
for transparency and open governance of the wildlife sector. The
essay will make a comparative analysis of the environmental
information laws in force within the European Union region since
they seem more advanced than other regions in the world.
Keywords: Environmental Law; Information Rights; Wildlife; Public
Participation; Zimbabwe
1. INTRODUCTION
The right to access information by the public and by practitioners is
critical for the protection of the environment 2 and wildlife
conservation, especially in regions where the wildlife sector plays a
critical role for State revenue generation, cultural symbolism,
1
LLM Cand, International Human Rights Law and Public Policy (UCC, Ireland);
LLM, Economic Regulation (London); PGCert, Environmental and Natural
Resources Law (London); LL.B (Hons) (Univ. of Zimbabwe). Legal and Research
Officer at Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association. Emails:
info@leninchisaira.com; tinashe.chisaira@gmail.com. Grateful for comments
made on the initial paper by Prof Maeve McDonagh, School of Law, University
College Cork, Ireland.
2
See: Mason, M “Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights: The Aarhus
Convention” in 2010 Vol 10 No 3 Global Environmental Politics 10.
62
UZLJ Laws, Environmental Rights & Public Participation 63
economic leisure, social and ecological purposes. The right to access

environmental information is therefore vital for environmental
conservation, prevention of environmental threats and is an important
element of the main environmental-related legislation in Zimbabwe
and at the international levels. Scholars have highlighted that:
The right on the accessibility of the information relating to the
status of the environment… owes its existence, in the
contemporary form, to the long running genesis of the idea that
the improvement of the accessibility of the information on the
environment and on the activities that have adverse or damaging
effects upon the environment is the key goal of the
environmental law. The accessibility and the right of access to
such accessible information are in the direct connection with
one of the fundamental principles of the environmental law,
the principle of preventive action.3
Access to information rights are therefore crucial for wildlife

conservation and governance in Zimbabwe and Africa where the
wildlife and general environmental sectors are associated with the
occurrence of environmental and ecological threats, for instance,
poaching, reports of elite corruption4 and related environmental
injustice impunity, the latter usually instigated by private businesses.5
Wildlife and environmental rights can come under threat due to the
reported rise of corruption, wildlife crime and general opaque
environmental governance. Duarte in an observation on South Africa
makes the following critical observation:
[W]ildlife crime poses a significant threat to biodiversity,
communities and tourism. It promotes ecological degradation,
counteracts conservation efforts and poses a threat to the
sustainable development and use of natural resources. It also
exploits socio-economically vulnerable communities.6
3
Vucic M “The right to environmental information as a technique for the
protection of the environment” in 2011 Vol 63 No 3 Medunarodni Problemi
449-450
4
See, for instance: The Conversation, “How poaching claims against Grace Mugabe
benefit Mnangagwa” in The Star (Kenya 16 April 2018) < https://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2018/04/16/how-poaching-claims-against-grace-mugabe-
benefit-mnangagwa_c1744236> accessed 06 September 2018.
5
See Chamberlain L “Fighting Companies for Access to Information” in 2016 Vol
13 No 23 Sur International Journal on Human Rights 199
6
Gonçalves D “Society and the rhino: A whole-of-society approach to wildlife
crime in South Africa” in 2017 Vol 60 SA Crime Quarterly 9
A legal analysis of the association between information and

environmental rights and wildlife conservation is pertinent. Zimbabwe
is a paradox wherein there exist reports of misuse of wildlife resources
alongside strong provisions guaranteeing constitutionally-protected
environmental rights7 and access to information rights.8 Studies carried
on Zimbabwe’s wildlife sector by researchers and conservationists
also indicate the problems of lack of information as a hindrance to
environmental and wildlife conservation. The lack of access to
information has been linked to the general nature of the political
environment in the recent past. Gratwicke and Stapelkamp,
conservation researchers, highlight this environmental information
problem in the wildlife sector:
Information about the conservation industry is scarce and
anecdotal due to the corresponding break down in many of the
wildlife management systems. Unlike the recent past, when more
organized systems of efficient environmental management
monitored and preserved large tracts of the country’s flora and
fauna, Zimbabwe’s current political and environmental upheaval
has created its own brand of natural catastrophe that threatens
lives, both animal and human.9
Zimbabwe has good access to information and environmental rights

laws at the municipal level and is a signatory to relevant treaties at
international levels. At the domestic level, the rights to environmental
information are provided in the Constitution and specific statutes,
notably the Environmental Management Act.10 To some extent, the
right to access information is also covered by the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). 11 However, the AIPPA’s
controversy — mostly in political governance — seems to vitiate the
very objectives of protecting the right to information for the public.
The AIPPA, like freedom of information legislation around the world,
was intended to secure people’s rights to freedom of information.
The Act, like the Official Secrets Act, has ostensibly achieved different
results and has been vilified by civil and political rights advocates.
Asogwa and Ezema add to the debate by stating the following:
7
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, s 73
8
ibid s 62
9
Gratwicke B and Stapelkamp B “Wildlife Conservation and Environmental
Management in an ‘Outpost of Tyranny’” in 2006 Vol 3 ZimConservation Opinion
3
10
[Chapter 20:27]
11
[Chapter 10:27]
AIPPA has been used more to suppress information than to make

information available. The argument is that AIPPA is an
instrument for government control of information and the
suppression of opposition. For instance, reports have shown that
in January 2005, five officials were arrested under the OSA for
breaching the Act by revealing the internal disputes of the ruling
ZANU PF party to foreign governments.12
The prevalence of such legal controversy at the domestic level should

evoke some positives when Zimbabwe’s record at international level
is considered. The State is a signatory to some international treaties
providing for the protection of both access to information and
environmental rights. Treaties on environmental rights include the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and
Fauna (CITES Convention) 13 and the SADC14 Protocol on Wildlife
Conservation and Law Enforcement.15 Regarding access to information,
the State is a signatory to the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (Banjul Charter)16 and the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression in Africa17 .
This article presents a legal critique of the interaction between the
laws governing access to information, environmental rights and public
participation in the context of wildlife conservation and governance
in Zimbabwe. The study outlines and debates access to information
in the context of emerging environmental issues. The paper also makes
an analysis, especially with European and international law provisions.
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION RIGHTS

Access to information rights on wildlife conservation creates an
atmosphere conducive to active and informed public participation in
12
Asogwa BE and Ezema IJ “Freedom of access to government information in
Africa: trends, status and challenges” in 2016 Vol 26 No 3 Records Management
Journal 318, 331
13
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (Adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243
(CITES)
14
Southern African Development Community
15
SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (entered into
force 30 November 2003)
16
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981)
entered into force 21 October 1986 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M.
58 (1982) (Banjul Charter)
17
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (adopted 23 October
2002) African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 32nd Session
environmental protection and policy decision making processes. Brunch

and others, for instance, highlight that ‘for the public to effectively
advocate for environmental protection, access to relevant information
is important; civil society needs to know of environmental threats
and the origins of those threats.’18 Effective information rights laws
are therefore always critical for important advocacy in the wildlife
sector and the broader environmental sectors.
The public, environmental rights practitioners, environmental justice
groups and communities need information rights in order to express
themselves on wildlife conservation matters. The right to access
information for these groups needs to be sufficiently protected,
respected and linked with practical and accessible remedy structures
in the legal framework. The right of access to information enables
societies that are dependent on wildlife conservation to participate
and contribute to the decision-making process, and such participation
is a vital element in any democratic society.19 Participation and the
right to freely express views are necessary for the public and
practitioners to gain traction. The right to access information has
been “commonly recognized by international human rights treaty
bodies as coming within the scope of the right to freedom of
expression.”20 Thus there is an inseparable association between access
to information and the ability for free and informed expression. The
twin freedoms of information and expression are critical for the
democratic participation of the public in wildlife and environmental
governance and conservation.
When policy decisions are made by the State on wildlife and
environmental rights issues that are not transparent or undesirable
from the perspective of the public, the inherent trust that should
exist between the governed and the leaders is threatened. 21
Circumstances exist in the wildlife sector in Zimbabwe where State
18
Brunch C et al “Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental
Principles in Africa” in 2001 Vol 26 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law
131, 179
19
See, for instance: Byrne A “Report of the Work of the Committee on Free
Access to Information and Freedom of Expression by the Chair” in 1999 Vol 25
No 5 IFLA Journal 299
20
McDonagh M “The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law” in
2013 Vol 13 No 1 Human Rights Law Review 25
21
For further discussion on the concept of the social contract between the
government and the governed, see: J Rousseau Discourse on Political Economy
and the Social Contract Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford, 1999
decisions on wildlife governance have elicited protest from the public

and environmental and wildlife practitioners. Media and civil society
reports have exposed a system where wildlife policy decisions are
reached with seeming lack of regard for the interests or participation
of the public, for instance, as follows:
Zimbabwe’s decision to export wild animals to China will… drive
communities living near nature reserves deeper into poverty…
Zimbabwe has in recent years come under fire from
conservationists after it sold elephants to China under what was
described as inhumane conditions. Environment minister Oppah
Muchinguri-Kashiri recently said the country would export more
wild animals.22
Public participation should be taken into account within the

contemporary political context where developing and developed States
conflict with the nature of international environmental law. Zimbabwe
has generally been known for its anti-West stance, and this reflects in
policy positions including wildlife governance and conservation.
Nickerson supports this thesis in the following passage:
Although Zimbabwe is party to numerous international
environmental agreements, it should not be assumed that the
country adopts entirely the prevailing, usually Western-oriented
view of environmental issues. In fact, Zimbabwe, like many Third
World nations, has voiced serious complaints about the degree
to which international environmental law has been the product
of primarily developed nations.23
These reports are evidence of a State whose wildlife sectors suffer

from lack of participation by concerned members of the public and
environmental practitioners. For instance, consultations in decisions
such as export of live wildlife, and curbing poaching through
encouraging tip-offs. The growing problems of poaching have been
raised in recent studies as follows:
Some of the illegally hunted species in the northern GNP
(Gonarezhou National Park) are of conservation concern:
22
“Conservationist slams Zim wildlife exports” in The Zimbabwe Independent
(Harare, 22 Jan 2016) <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/01/22/
conservationist-slams-zim-wildlife-exports/> accessed 16 October 2017.
23
Nickerson, BJ “The Environmental Laws of Zimbabwe: A Unique Approach to
Management of the Environment” in 1994 Vol 14 No 2 Boston College Third
World Law Journal 189, 203.
crocodile is classified as lower risk; elephant, lion, cheetah,

hippopotamus are classified as vulnerable, and leopard is
classified as near threatened on the IUCN (the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature) Red List (IUCN 2012).24
The justification for environmental information rights in the wildlife

sector in Zimbabwe and other parts of Southern Africa has never been
more threatened than in the past decade. There has been growing
harassment of practitioners and journalists and lack of transparency
and public consultation in policy decisions making concerning, for
instance, the export of baby elephants and other live wildlife species
to zoos in countries such as the Peoples’ Republic of China. 25
Government officials have been making decisions on matters
concerning hunting, licencing, trade, conservation and export of
wildlife species without explicit sharing of information or allowance
for public scrutiny. On the other hand, investigative reporting on public
officials implicated in an alarming rise in cyanide-poisoning and
poaching of elephants and other wildlife species for ivory, trophies,
medicine, food and accessories has been clamped down.26
3. OUTLINE OF THE LAW

3.1 Municipal Law
Zimbabwe is highly dependent on its environmental and natural
resources base27 which is reflected in the country’s laws. Many laws
provide a foundation for freedom of information in the Zimbabwean
natural resources and extractive sectors. However, there is a need to
critique these regarding the right to information. The relevant
legislation includes the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Access to
Information and AIPPA28 and the Environmental Management Act29 .
24
Gandiwa E et al “Illegal hunting and law enforcement during a period of
economic decline in Zimbabwe: A case study of northern Gonarezhou National
Park and adjacent areas” in 2013 Vol 21 No 3 Journal for Nature Conservation
133, 139.
25
Op cit note 21
26
See: Associated Press in Harare, “Zimbabwe journalists arrested for linking
police with elephant poisonings” in The Guardian (London, 03 November 2015).
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/nov/03/zimbabwean-journalists-
arrested-for-linking-police-to-poaching > accessed 12 August 2018.
27
See, for instance, the 2013-2018 Policy blueprints, the Zimbabwe Agenda for
Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET), Economic Blueprint,
2013-2017 (Government Printers, Harare, 2013).
28
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27]
29
Environmental Management Act [Chapter 20:27]
The Constitution, as the supreme law in Zimbabwe, provides for both

environmental rights and the right of public bodies to access
information. The Constitution also includes the right of the people to
measures that promote conservation, as follows:
Every person has the right to have the environment protected
for the benefit of present and future generations through
reasonable legislative and other measures that promote
conservation.30
The constitutional right of access to information tallies with the

constitutional right to conservation promotion by the state. In order
for society to enjoy the constitutional rights to wildlife conservation,
all persons and groups must be able to access and receive reports
from State and wildlife public bodies on how the environment is being
progressively conserved. This provision makes an overview of the law
on access to information necessary. On the right of access to
information, the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides as follows:
Every person, including the Zimbabwean media, has the right of
access to any information held by any person, including the State,
in so far as the information is required for the exercise or
protection of a right.31
Provisions in the Environmental Management Act (EMA) strengthen

the constitutional right. EMA provisions outline the principles of
environmental management in Zimbabwe and the critical provision
on access to environmental information in Section 4 (1) (b) states
that:
Every person shall have a right to access to environmental
information, and protect the environment for the benefit of
present and future generations and to participate in the
implementation of the promulgation of reasonable legislative,
policy and other measures that prevent pollution and
environmental degradation; and secure ecologically sustainable
management and use of natural resources while promoting
justifiable economic and social development.32
Thus, access to environmental information is an absolute right and

explicitly obliges the State to facilitate such access, in this case, to
30
Constitution of Zimbabwe (n 6) s 73 (1) (b) (ii)
31
Ibid s 62 (2)
32
Environmental Management Act s 4 (1) (b)
information held by public bodies involved in wildlife conservation

and governance. This access should be easily implemented by directives
given to public bodies and agencies in the environmental and wildlife
conservation and governance sectors.
3.2 State Obligations under International Law

Zimbabwe has several international commitments in the area of access
to information, environmental justice and wildlife conservation. Both
soft and hard laws that have been ratified should provide
environmental practitioners and the public with the right to access to
information on environmental matters within the wildlife sector. These
include the CITES Convention33 , the Banjul Charter and the Declaration
of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa.
Zimbabwe is also a signatory to the SADC Protocol on Wildlife
Conservation and Law Enforcement. The protocol was adopted in 1999,
and it obliges SADC member states to set up a SADC-wide wildlife
management database. On information sharing, the Protocol directs
that:
The States Parties shall establish a regional database on the
status and management of wildlife. The regional database shall
comprise data on all wildlife resources within the Region; and
be accessible to States Parties and the general public.34
While information on the wildlife species of Southern Africa can be

gleaned from a visit to the website of various national parks, no
comprehensive and updated database outlines verifiable estimates
of wildlife populations and other vital statistics such as tracking
changes in the populace of the various species. Neither is information
on decision making behind export of live animals available whilst this
is pertinent mainly to the rural communities living within the
boundaries of various national parks, sanctuaries and game reserves.
4. LEGAL GAPS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION

Despite its status as signatory to various international conventions,
Zimbabwe is not in full compliance with its obligations. The right of
33
Zimbabwe joined the CITES Convention on 19 May 1981, and it entered into
force by accession on 23 June 1981. The CITES Convention obliges Parties to
enable public access to periodic reports prepared by such Party through CITES
(n 12) art VIII (8).
34
SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (n 14) art 8 (1).
access to information is still restricted from members of the public

civil society, communities and the media and this hinders public
participation especially for poor communities living in wildlife-
populated areas. Cirelli and Morgera argue that:
Public participation in decision-making and planning, as well as
access to justice, are significant contributing factors in ensuring
that governance of wildlife resources is transparent, authorities
are accountable, and that the diverse interests of society — in
particular, those of the poor, other disadvantaged groups, and
of local and indigenous communities — are duly taken into
account.35
As a member of the African Union and signatory to the AU Declaration

of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africaa, the public,
communities and civil society are entitled to share information relating
to wildlife, and environmental conservation. The Declaration provides
protection against sanction for people who share information regarding
potential environmental threats. The specific section states that:
[N]o one shall be subject to any sanction for releasing in good
faith information on wrongdoing, or that which would disclose a
serious threat to health, safety or the environment save where
the imposition of sanctions serves a legitimate interest and is
necessary in a democratic society.36
This is an extension of the Banjul Charter which provides for the right
for all people to receive information as well as to ‘express and
disseminate’ opinions.37
In Zimbabwe, in 2015, following the cyanide poisoning of around sixty
elephants by poachers, investigative journalists reported suspected
links between the poachers, an international ivory syndicate and top
government officials in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The journalists
were arrested for ‘publishing falsehoods’38 and in 2017, two years
later, their cases were still before the courts. The persecution of
35
Cirelli MT and Morgera E “Wildlife Law and the Legal Empowerment of the
poor in Sub-Saharan Africa” in 2009 FAO Legal Paper Online #77 26
36
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (n 16) art IV (2)
37
Banjul Charter (n 15) art 9 (1) and (2)
38
“Zimbabwe journalists arrested for linking police with elephant poisonings” in
The Guardian (London, 03 November 2015) < https://www.theguardian.com/
media/2015/nov/03/zimbabwean-journalists-arrested-for-linking-police-to-
poaching> accessed 09 September 2018.
information-sharing media, civil society, individuals and activists in

Zimbabwe is part of a more extensive and systematic clampdown on
freedom of information in the broader natural resources sector and in
the ultra-sensitive diamond mining sector39 .
Public bodies and the State must carry out the proactive duty of helping
stakeholders to access to information on environmental justice. While
the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement states
the need for proactive disclosure of wildlife information through the
mutual sharing of such information amongst member states and with
the general public, the protocol does not encourage or oblige member
states to educate the public on ways of obtaining access wildlife
information. In contrast, the UNECE40 Aarhus Convention41 provides
that:
Each Party shall promote environmental education and
environmental awareness among the public, especially on how
to obtain access to information, to participate in decision-making
and to obtain access to justice in environmental matters.42
Hence it is imperative that the SADC region comes up with measures

to promote the education of environmentally affected communities
and stakeholders to obtain access to information on wildlife
conservation and decision making. These means may include training
on accessing and interpreting data from the internet, making
applications for wildlife reports from government departments, safari
operators as well as from reputable research institutions, local
government structures and civil society.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

5.1. Effective Utilisation of the Legal Framework
The rights provided by the laws on access to environmental information
and wildlife conservation will be better achieved when practitioners
and the public can link up various tactics such as litigation, research,
lobby and advocacy with clear campaigns and calls. These tactics can
39
Human Rights Watch, Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the
Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2009).
40
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
41
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (adopted 25 June 1998, entered
into force 30 October 2001) (Aarhus Convention)
42
Ibid Art 3 (3).
effect the implementation of the constitutional and human right to

access information. Professor Welshman Ncube and others state that
the link between the various tactics is efficient:
Effective environmental protection and development not only
requires guaranteed rights to access to information…and
democratic ideals in an open, free and critical society, but also
requires a strong, vibrant, active, and above all, vigilant civil
society … imbued with a strong culture of responsibility,
accountability and transparency in relation to governance in
general.43
Interested stakeholders must utilise effectively the existing legal

framework for access to information in the environmental justice and
wildlife conservation movement. As the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe
provides for constitutional environmental and information rights,
environmental groups and stakeholders may also utilise the courts in
cases where environmental decisions and information is not made
reasonably available. The concept of habeas data44 could be utilised
to ascertain the extent; scientific justifications and political, personal
or political motives behind wildlife decisions such as export of baby
elephants.
Existing legislation, for instance, the country’s notorious AIPPA, which
has been viewed with hostility by various segments of the Zimbabwe
human and media rights sectors since the law’s inception in 2002,
offers opportunities for the public and environmental rights
practitioners. An interesting section of the AIPPA specifies that
whenever there is policy advice on the state of the environment,
such advice should be disclosed to members of the public. Hence
while part of the Act gives information exemptions and detects that
“[t]he head of a public body may not disclose to an applicant
information relating to advice or recommendations given to the
President, a Cabinet Minister or a public body,”45 the Act goes on to
make a proviso on environmental matters. The Act states that such
exemption does not apply to, among a few other exclusions,
43
Ncube W “Towards the Constitutional Protection of Environmental Rights in
Zimbabwe?” in 1996 Vol 13 Zimbabwe Law Review 97, 122
44
Brunch et al (n 17) 182. This is a “mechanism for obtaining access to
constitutionally guaranteed information which has been utilised with success
in Latin America
45
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (n 26) sec 15 (1)
“information relating to the state of the environment.”46 Therefore

the AIPPA also arguably provides an opportunity for the public and
environmental practitioners to seek information on otherwise
inaccessible policy advice concerning the wildlife sector. The
information may be from the safari industry or pro-hunting research
institutions or any another sector that may not be expected to
sympathise with environmental justice or proper wildlife conservation.
5.2. Proactive Disclosure by Public Bodies

Access to information in the environmental sector depends on political
will and the administrative framework.47 Currently, environmental
and wildlife information is hardly available, even on official websites
of environmental and wildlife agencies in Zimbabwe. Specific public
bodies dealing with environmental information such as the Zimbabwe
Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, EMA and the Ministry of
Tourism, Environment and Hospitality must ensure that reports and
information on wildlife trade, license and population statistics are
readily available to the public in electronic form.
By comparison, the EU is relatively up to date on this requirement.
Directives48 of the European Parliament and Council directs member
states to ensure that “environmental information progressively
becomes available in electronic databases which are easily accessible
to the public through public telecommunication networks”49 and
furthermore directs the regular update of information. The directive
was timeously domesticated by member states, for instance in the
Republic of Ireland through an updated statutory instrument.50 Hence
the commitment of European member states towards access to
information and environmental justice can serve as a preliminary guide
for access to information in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa.
46
Ibid s 15 (2)
47
See: Taylor J and Eleanor B “How do public bodies respond to freedom of
information legislation? Administration, modernisation and democratisation”
in 2010 Vol 38 No 1 Policy and Politics 119
48
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council
Directive 90/313/EEC (14 February 2003) L 41/26 Official Journal of the
European Union.
49
Ibid art 7 (1)
50
European Communities (Access to Information on the Environment)
(Amendment) Regulations 2014 [S.I. No. 615 of 2014]
51
Alexander J and McGregor, J “Wildlife and Politics: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe” in
2000 Vol 31 Development and Change 605, 624.
5.3. Transparency and Informed Public Participation

Enabling transparency, access to information and encouraging informed
public participation in the wildlife sector is an advantageous position
for society and the environment. Public participation is especially
critical in strengthening the rights of people to participate in general
governance and policy-making m processes.
In the past, Zimbabwe’s wildlife and community initiative the
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE) was introduced in ways regarded as lacking transparency
by communities in wildlife-rich areas, and that resulted in a massive
protest against the policy initiative:
Distrust and fear have been among the most important products
of the Gwampa CAMPFIRE initiative… A development project
with democratic potential had become the focus of resistance
and fear. An intervention promising a restoration of
environmental rights threatened eviction from the land.51
In that regard, it is imperative for government officials to lift the

current secrecy around access to information on environmental justice
and wildlife conservation to benefit democracy and promote trust in
the space of wildlife conservation. Legal scholars have additionally
observed that most governments have “the tendency of many states
in Africa to treat natural resources as proprietary owners to the
exclusion of their people who remain perpetually impoverished in the
midst of plenty.”52 This is a retrogressive mindset that will not result
in any tangible gains for policymakers in Zimbabwe, Africa or
worldwide. Secrecy and a patronising approach to environmental and
wildlife information must be strongly discouraged.
5.4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, environmental information laws in Zimbabwe based on
the various pieces of existing legislation are comprehensive enough
to provide a substantive legal right to access information on wildlife
conservation, sales and governance. The main issues and impediments
rest with the policy framework and the accompanying lack of political
will. Concrete steps for the achievement of adequate access to
52
Murombo T “The Utility of Environmental Rights to sustainable development in
Zimbabwe: A contribution to the Constitutional Reform Debate” in 2011 Vol 11
African Human Rights Law Journal 120, 132.
environmental in the wildlife sector of Zimbabwe requires measures

that include effective utilisation of the new municipal and international
legal frameworks; proactive disclosure by public bodies in the
environmental and wildlife sectors; improved transparency and an
informed and committed public, practitioners and judiciary. The
implementation of the right to access environmental information will
enable public participation in law and public policy decision making
processes. The State should abide by its duties through international
and regional treaties on access to information and environmental rights
regarding the strategic and ecologically significant wildlife sector.
This entails proactive measures by environmental and wildlife
conservation bodies and legal practitioners to enable the public with
the right of access to verifiable reports and statistics on wildlife.
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE MAGISTRATES
COURTS OF ZIMBABWE: WHEN RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
BECOME AN ENEMY OF JUSTICE TO SELF-ACTORS
RODGERS MATSIKIDZE1
ABSTRACT
Access to justice is central to justice delivery in any democratic
society. Most initiatives in Zimbabwe on access to justice are focused
on the substantive law. Recently an attempt was made to reform
rules of civil procedure but it appeared the exercise was more of gap
filling than a real reform. There was no specific goal and the method
was not inclusive particularly of the most affected litigant-the self-
actor. This paper proposes a number of approaches that can be utilised
to ensure that access to the court is enhanced. The main approach
being advanced is simplification of rules of civil procedure. Once
litigants are able to bring their matters to the courts then delivery
of justice is enhanced.
Key Words: Access to justice; Rules of civil procedure; Self-actor;
Simplification
INTRODUCTION
This article2 discloses an adverse picture on access to justice by the
self-actors in the Magistrates Court of Zimbabwe. The statistics of
self-actors failing to access justice shows the long road Zimbabwe as
a country needs to navigate before justice is for all.3 The self-actors’
journey to access justice seems to be a long arduous one and points
1.
Rodgers Matsikidze is a PhD student with the University of Witswatersrand
University of Johannesburg, Director-Legal Aid and Attachment Office &
Lecturer- Civil Procedure and Labour Law, University of Zimbabwe and a
practising legal practitioner at Matsikidze and Mucheche Legal Practitioners:
www.mmlawchambers.co.zw. He is also a Trustee of the Law Society of
Zimbabwe, Councillor, Council for Legal Education in Zimbabwe, and board
member for several organisations including Community Working Group on Health.
(CWGH).
2.
The article is based on my MPhil thesis: Rodgers Matsikidze, The Civil Procedure
in the Magistrates Court of Zimbabwe. A denial of justice to self-actors?
Unpublished M.Phil thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 2014,140.
3.
Ibid,140.
77
to the need for substantial reform of the civil procedure in the

Magistrate Court. A number of scholars have written extensively as
regards to the possible solutions to the problem of access to justice
through the courts. Most of these scholars are Western and North
American scholars and they contextualize the access to justice problem
within the European context.4
In the European and North American context, the thrust is on placing
the responsibility of making sure that everyone accesses justice on
the state. These authors look at the problem of access to justice from
different perspectives, hence their solutions are modelled by their
perspectives many of which are resource inclined. 5 A number of
scholars believe that it is the State that should provide legal aid to all
those who cannot afford lawyers. However, in Zimbabwe, the provision
of legal aid to litigants is very limited particularly in civil litigation.
However, in well-resourced jurisdictions, provision of legal aid provides
enhances access to justice.6 There are serious problems in Zimbabwe
like lack of adequate water and food which although at par with the
right of access to justice tend to get more focus as opposed to the
right of access to justice. In other words, the problem is not just the
procedures in the courts but poverty is also a huge and decisive factor,
in self-actors accessing justice. In my thesis it was established that
access to justice is broader than the question of legal aid or legal
representation.7 Access to justice examines the issues such as the
number of courts, or proximity to litigants and the substantive law,
i.e. to what extent does the substantive law protect self-actors’
rights.8 Access to justice further examines the question of procedural
access which is the focus of this paper. In this paper it is argued that
procedural access ought not to be difficult for self-actors to follow. It
4.
See Lord Woolf, “Report on Civil Procedure Reform in UK”, 1994, Also Sir Rupert
Jackson’s Report on UK Civil Procedure, 2013
5.
See Chan Gary K.Y, “The Right to Access to Justice, Judicial Discourse in
Singapore and Malaysia”, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol 2, Issue 1,
Berkeley, 2007, Singapore Management University.
6.
See Buhai Sande L, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A comparative
Perspective”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 42, 2009.
7.
See Rodgers Matsikidze, The Civil Procedure in the Magistrates Court of
Zimbabwe. A denial of justice to self-actors? Unpublished M.Phil thesis,
University of Zimbabwe, 2014
8.
Goldschmidt Jona, Barry Mahomey, Harvey Solomon and Joan Green, Meeting
the Challenge of Pro-se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and
Court Managers, American Judicature Surly, USA, 1998.
UZLJ Rules of Civil Procedure in Magistrates Courts of Zimbabwe 79
demystifies what seems to be a mystery to a number of scholars who

want to define access to justice in the context of provision of legal
representation. This paper argues that it is possible to enhance access
by simplifying the rules of the Magistrates Court of Zimbabwe and the
forms that have to be used by litigants.
The theoretical framework providing guidelines for enhancing
procedural access to justice is already well established. In England,
for example, there is a framework of eight “basic principles which
should be met by a civil justice system so that it ensures access to
justice.” These were identified by Lord Woolf in his inquiry report on
Access to Justice in the United Kingdom.9 The eight basic principles
are as follows:-
(1) It should be just in the results it delivers.
(2) It should be fair and seen to be so by ensuring that litigants
have an equal opportunity, regardless of their resources,
to assert or defend their legal rights; providing every
litigant with an adequate opportunity to state his own case
and answer his opponent’s, and treating like cases alike.
3) Procedures and costs should be proportionate to the nature
of the issues involved.
(4) It should deal with cases with reasonable speed.
(5) It should be understandable to those who use it.
QUOTE IND(6) It should be responsive to the needs of those
who use it.
QUOTE IND(7) It should provide as much certainty as the nature
of particular cases allow.
QUOTE IND(8) It should be effective: adequately resourced and
organised so as to give effect to the above principles. 10
The above principles anchors the proposed solutions to the reform of
the rules of civil procedure in Zimbabwe. I therefore suggest a number
of approaches and solutions to the growing woes of self-actors and
these are extensively discussed herein.
HOMEGROWN INITIATIVES: CONTEXTUALIZING THE REFORM AGENDA

There is no doubt that the initiatives to improve access to justice in
Zimbabwe should be homegrown. The initiatives should be linked to
9.
Lord Woolf, Access to Justice, Interim Report, June 1995 and also Access to
Justice, July 1996.
10.
Lord Woolf, Access to Justice Final Report, July,1996.
the socio-economic context. In other words, they should relate to the

self-actors’ experiences in the Zimbabwean courts.11 The majority of
self-actors lack knowledge of substantive and procedural law.12 Hence
any solution should be aimed at ensuring that the self-actors fully
understand the applicable law of the day and the procedures thereof.
The majority of self-actors have no money to hire legal practitioners.
This is mainly due to the economic meltdown in the past years that
has reduced most professionals to pauper levels let alone the middle
income and low-level income employees. In other words, the means
to hire legal practitioners are not there as available resources are put
to immediate needs like shelter and food.13 Self-actors are found not
only in the rural areas but also in the urban areas.14 Although having
formal education may often assist, the problem of self-actors is not
that they are uneducated but that they are not learned in legal issues.15
Self-actors, when in court have no one to assist them on procedures
that they may not understand.16 Having identified these aspects as
key problems, it follows that the solutions should be related to the
problems.
Provision Of Legal Aid

While legal aid plays a fundamental role in enhancing justice in Western
countries like USA, Canada and United Kingdom in Zimbabwe it will
hardly be a major solution in the current. Hence legal aid will remain
a limited avenue to improve access to justice. Currently in Zimbabwe
a few organizations are focusing on providing legal aid on civil matters.
Certainly, legal aid is not an immediate solution to the self-actors’
problems due to lack of adequate funding. Moreover, legal aid would
11.
See Rodgers Matsikidze, The Civil Procedure in the Magistrates Court of
Zimbabwe. A denial of justice to self-actors? Unpublished M.phil thesis,
University of Zimbabwe, 2014,p105
12.
Ibid p106.
13.
See also UNICEF ZIMBABWE REPORT, Beyond Income: Gendered Well-Being and
Poverty in Zimbabwe, https://www.uncef.org accessed on 12 February 2017
and Poverty and Poverty Datum Line Analysis in Zimbabwe 2011/12,
www.zimstat.co.zw
14.
Ibid p89 note 11.
15.
Ibid p89.
16.
See Galanter M, “Why the Haves” come out ahead: Speculation on the limits of
legal challenge”, Law and Society vol 9,No 1,1974.
not address the problems of those litigants who, even though they
have resources, choose to appear in court on their own. Legal aid
does not address the problem of complexity of the court procedures
which if address may increase access to court. Hence while it is
accepted that legal aid is a possible avenue to assist self-actors, its
success would depend on availability of funding.
Introducing Legal Literacy for All

In the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, a committee on civil law
reform recommended a wide spectrum of level of education and
literacy amongst unrepresented litigants, as well as a diverse ability
to express oneself in a public forum.17 This initiative may be a route
to go in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe might need to introduce law as one of
the subjects at Ordinary Level and Advanced Level. The impact may
not be felt immediately, but in the long run those with legal background
may have a better understanding of the law. However, to cater for
the generality of populace, community libraries may be needed to
house legal literature. Road shows in rural and urban areas by the
Ministry of Justice showcasing civil procedure might help to demystify
some of the key procedural aspects. However, this does not bring a
direct reform to the civil procedure but it will seek to increase the
legal knowledge of potential litigants. While this approach may be a
long term still it will be a move in the right direction.
INTRODUCING AUDIO AND VIDEO MANUALS AS INSTRUCTORS TO SELF-ACTORS IN COURT

In addition, video and audio media in vernacular languages on
substantive and procedural law issues may be developed and sold in
shops. If the expense is huge, the other route will be to avail such
media for free at every court and public hall. These will be
automatically played continuously to allow those, who would be
litigants to listen to or watch them. Those tapes will be playing as
manual tapes. The video and audio media will take potential litigants
through every step of procedure recorded. However, the use of video
and audio media to educate potential litigants would only be effective
if the rules of court procedure are simplified, and it also means more
resources will be needed to fund this kind of a project.
17.
See Law Society of Upper Canada report of 2008, www.Isuc.on.ca accessed 10
April 2011.
Introducing Alternative Dispute Resolution Services

There will be need to establish arbitration and conciliation centres
like the current set up being used in dealing with labour disputes in
Zimbabwe.18 In conciliation there are no rules of procedure save for
ground rules to govern the conduct of the parties.19 These fora will
help by providing a unique environment in which the self-actors can
easily express themselves. The conciliators or mediators should be
duly trained lawyers who can advise parties on the position of the law
when required. Arbitration, unlike conciliation or mediation, involves
a third party who produces a binding decision on all parties. The
advantage of arbitration is that parties agree to their own procedure.
In other words, parties agree to what they understand. These initiatives
can be useful but they are limited to specific types of dispute i.e.
family law. In complex civil cases, they may not serve the purpose.
Representation by a Pro Bono Lawyer or Trained Paralegal

There is need to extend pro bono services to civil cases as well. The
challenge with this approach is that such an initiative may meet
resistance with the lawyers in commercial practice.20 This is so because
of the magnitude of self-actors’ cases in Zimbabwe, as it may mean
that every lawyer would be handling a pro bono case each month.
Morally it means the lawyer in question would be shouldering the
responsibility of the government by bearing the in forma pauperis
(pro bono) costs.21 This may create resentment of in forma pauperis
cases by lawyers and naturally services of a disgruntled legal
practitioner may not be the best to the client. The paralegal thrust
can be useful although in essence use of paralegal creates problems
of demarcation of representation vis a vis the role of a legal
practitioner. Moreso still there are some cases were paralegal may
still not adequately represent the self-actor to the same competence
of a trained lawyer.
Use of Customary Fora for Dispute Resolution

Customary fora may be the way to resolve the challenge of complexity
of procedures faced by self-actors. There are a number of fora that
18.
See Labour Act 28.01 sections 93 and 98.
19.
See Labour (Settlements of Disputes) Regulations, SI 217 of 2003
20.
Maru Vivek, Between Law and Society-Paralegals and Provision of Primary justice
Services in Sierra Leone, Open Society Justice Initiative, New York, 2006.
21.
See ibid, 2014 note 11.
were used to solve disputes before 1890 when, Zimbabwe resorted to

the Roman-Dutch legal system and imported procedure. The customary
fora started from the level of the family head, dare,22 village head to
the chief/paramount chief or king. This limitation arises from the
fact that many of the chiefs are not appointed on merit or academic
achievement but in terms of inheritance laws of a particular clan. In
addition, there is a danger of cultural biases’ due to them applying
cultural practices that are gender insensitive.
In addition, chiefs and headmen are concentrated in rural areas.23
This leaves out the urban population who are affected by the general
law. The major drawback of using customary fora is that the general
law (i.e. common law and statutory law) is alien to the customary
fora. The outcome of the research shows that the majority of the
cases brought to court are under the auspices of general law.
EXPANSION OF THE ZIMBABWE WOMEN LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (ZWLA)

EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMME
The ZWLA empowerment model empowers women through training
of women self-actors’ litigants on drafting their court papers properly.
The programme largely caters for family law matters and focuses on
women self- actors. The women come for advice and are grouped
into various groups considering the nature of their cases, i.e. those
with maintenance cases are grouped together. If particular groups
reach certain numbers, they are given a day on which they should
come and see a qualified lawyer. On the day in question they will be
trained on how to complete maintenance forms or draft claims. They
will be further taught on filing of the papers and presentation of their
cases in Court.
The current limitation is that the empowerment programme is limited
to women litigants with maintenance cases. In the area of maintenance
cases the procedures are already simplified. Hence the procedure in
any maintenance case is standardized and parties only fill in the details.
This initiative needs to be expanded, that is by further identifying
other areas of civil litigation that may require forms that can be
standardised. A good example would be to standardize the eviction
22.
Dare means family council of elders.
23.
Nyamusi-Musembi Celestine, The Urban Poor, Problems of Access to Human
Rights: Traditional justice institutions-Can they be more effective? Institute of
Development Studies, University of Sussex, September 2002.
process. A claim form can be designed, as well as defence form, etc.

This can also be applied to guardianship and custody applications.
The forms should then identify all possible annexures that may be
required to support the claim or defence. Like what ZWLA does, at
every court there will be then a paralegal or a lawyer who then teaches
litigants with similar cases on what to do, how to fill in the forms.
These forms can be drafted for use up to the execution stage.
Admittedly, this initiative may not be able to take all kinds of cases or
address the self-actors’ challenges in full although it may eliminate a
number of procedural problems such as lack of skill in drafting a claim
or a defence or failure to use appropriate forms in terms of the Court
rules. However, an evaluation of ZWLA’s empowerment model noted
that, though women were taught the stages in the court procedures,
they still face procedural hurdles and for that reason it is submitted
that the focus should be on making the court procedures more
accessible. There is potential to revolutionize the Magistrates Court
through this initiative regardless of its limitations. It is more of an
equivalent to the self – help scheme in America but at a cheaper
level. The self-actors with similar cases would be coming to court at
specified days of the week for assistance.
Redefining the Role of the Magistrate

In Zimbabwe, the role of the Magistrate in a civil case is that of a
referee or an umpire. Our judicial system is adversarial in nature and
does not allow the Magistrate to descend into the arena. Hence the
Magistrate, even if aware that there is certain evidence which the
self-actor ought to furnish, will just proceed on the (inadequate)
evidence without informing the self-actor and may dismiss the claim
or defence on the grounds of inadequate evidence. However, in light
of the quest for justice, there is need to give wider powers to a
Magistrate to ascertain the real issues and evidence required in any
matter.24 Through court observations and in-depth interviews with
some Magistrates it was clear that some cases are lost by self-actors
on purely technical issues and failure to provide the evidence that is
required.
Magistrates should be allowed even before trial or hearing to call
parties in chambers and hear them informally. In those meetings the
24.
Ibid p152-3 note 11.
Magistrate should be allowed to point out the problems/deficiencies

associated with the plaintiff’s claim or the defendant’s defence. In
that respect the case is decided on merits rather than procedural
irregularity. Hence there is need to reform the role of the magistrate
from being a mere referee to being a more active participant. This
inquisitorial approach would help self-actors in accessing justice.
Simplification, Orality and Domestication of the Procedure: The

Immediate Solution to Woes of Self-actors
This initiative is the most convincing and all encompassing. This is
what scholars like Cappelletti call for.25 The current civil procedure is
legalistic and complicated. The procedure does not have any provisions
for informality. Simplification is cheap and can be efficiently dealt
with.
The first step in simplifying the civil procedure in the Magistrates
Court would be to completely overhaul the rules of the Court in terms
of content and language.
The Rules should be changed in terms of language by introducing plain
English and vernacular languages. In South Africa their constitution is
in vernacular language, hence there is nothing peculiar in the use of
the vernacular languages in courts. In fact, the rules of court are in a
vernacular of other nationals i.e. the English. The language barrier
has been the epitome of many litigants’ problems. If one asks, “What
is your cause of action?”, in English, it may be difficult for a self-
actor to appreciate but if put in a vernacular language, obviously the
self-actor would appreciate the meaning. Plain English removes some
legalese and Latin words, which have no relevance in the delivery of
justice.
Many self-actors support the use of simplified English or local
languages. In terms of content, the Rules should at each and every
stage have simplified content and forms. This entails removal of a
number of unnecessary procedures like detailed summons.
The Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs in conjunction with the Judicial
Service Commission should come up with a team of civil procedure
25.
Cappelletti M & Garth B, ‘Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make
Rights Effective, A General Report’ in Access to Justice, vol 1, A World Survey
Book 1, edited by Cappelletti and Garth B, 1-124, Alphen and Rijn Sijthoff and
Noordhoff,1978.
law experts to spearhead a programme of procedural law and other

reforms that can help self-actors to end the woes they currently face.
The following reforms are recommended:
Creating A Clients’ Services Office at Each Magistrates Court

The Clients’ Service Office (CSO) can be a useful tool and office to
the self-actor and to the state. Instead of Magistrates being burdened
with improper actions, the CSO becomes the first screening port of
call. This office can be manned by a paralegal, or an experienced
clerk or a lawyer. The duties of the officer manning the CSO would be
to cater for all self-actors who need general guidance as to what
should be done, in particular the nature of cases that can be brought
in the courts. The officer can even peruse the court papers the self-
actors would want to file and advise accordingly. The officer would
also be the custodian of the court manual book to be created. In fact,
he or she would be an equivalent of a tour guide. It is also high time
our courts provide for a client services department.
Developing a Manual Tool for Self-actors

There should be a manual book for self-actors and would be users of
the civil procedure in the Magistrates Court. This manual book should
be like any other manual book and translated in all languages. The
manual book should cover the following areas: -
i. The Court itself and its officials

Under this heading the manual should provide the structure of the
Court and key officers, — clerk’s office, interpreters, Magistrate’s
office, Messengers of Court’s office and what they do. This will
naturally enable the self-actor to have a quick grasp of the various
offices they would be dealing with on a number of aspects. The manual
would be a one stop tour guide. This manual should be available in
the Clients’ Services Office. It should also cover the areas listed below.
ii The jurisdiction of the court

In the manual book for self-actors there ought to be explanations as
regards to the jurisdiction of the court. In particular, what is meant
by jurisdiction, monetary or otherwise. The manual should give
examples of cases that ought to be brought before the Magistrates
Court.
iii. The drafting of pleadings/claims and defences

The manual should also have a provision for examples of common
claims and how they are put across in court, likewise there ought to
be examples as regards to possible defenses that can be brought in
court. There could also be cartoons to illustrate the same, in graphical
terms.
iv. Summary of key procedures

The manual should encompass summaries of key procedures of stages
in an action and in an application. These key steps should be explained
in simple terms and also the rationale to have such should be provided.
This would help the self-actors to know what ought to be done next
instead of just abandoning their cases. This answers a finding that
shows that some of the cases were abandoned by self-actors because
they did not know what to do next.
v. Follow up procedures and hints

The manual should also inform the self-actors how they should follow
up their cases. In addition, it should provide for the frequencies of
follow ups on cases. In addition, the manual should provide for hints
on issues to watch out if one has commenced proceedings in the court.
Hints could be on common mistakes self-actors often make.
vi. The enforcement mechanisms

The manual should also provide information on how a victorious party
can enforce a judgment including the practical stages to be followed
and samples of documents to be used. The manual should have the
contact and offices details of the messenger of court.
vii. The appeal and review procedures

The manual ought to provide details on appeal and review procedures.
In particular, it should offer information on how appeals and
applications for review should be done and to which court. Obviously
at this juncture it may be advisable to then inform the self-actors
that they may require the services of legal practitioners to take their
cases on appeal or review in the High Court.
Critics of the proposed manual could argue that it would give self-
actors an unfair advantage over their represented counterparts who
may not receive similar detailed information from their lawyers.
However, lawyers [Lawyers spent four years studying those Rules]
already have an upper hand, therefore the self-actors would not have
any advantage over others. In fact, it would be a significant step
towards creating a level playing field. Moreover, the self-actors would
not be assisted to prosecute their case or draft documents specifically.
They will be given general directions on what ought to be done. Such
assistance would definitely not be equivalent to legal representation.
In real terms it reduces the burden on the courts to deal with defective
papers. Hence costs of running the court are naturally reduced. The
costs are lessened even to the self-actors as they would be able to
successfully proceed without legal representation.
Abridged and Simplified Version of Action Procedure

The simplified version of the procedure ought to have only key and
basic stages like the names of the parties, their addresses, the claim
section where the claim would be filled in, the reasons for the claim.
In addition, the summons should be clear on what relief should be
granted. This simplified summons is easy to complete because it only
provides basic information to be filled in. A simplified summons will
be easy to complete and should be accompanied by explanatory notes,
with examples on expected answers. This is unlike the current summons
that provides for a number of things to be completed without guidance.
There particulars of claim would be drafted as per the Plaintiff’s
understanding as opposed to being guided. In addition the current
summons format is worded in legal language and one problem observed
is the complex legal terminology which is alien to users.26
Each and every stage of the procedure should then have those kinds
of forms and simplified content. In other words, this initiative does
not take away the need for Rules. Rules should be maintained but
subject to the above modifications. Such a reform will not be expensive
but may take some time to be fully implemented. In addition, at the
courts, the clerk’s office should be manned by a lawyer whose role is
to vet the completed summons and offer advice strictly on problematic
procedural aspects. The procedural stages in the Magistrates court
should be trimmed to only the following: -
a) General issues stage
b) Summons stage
26.
See Order 8 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules,1980
c) Defence or acceptance of claim stage;

d) Elaboration of claims and defence stage;
e) Narrowing of issues stage before a Magistrate stage;
f) Trial or hearing stage;
g) Enforcement of judgment stage.
These procedures can be enshrined in only seven main rules of the
court.
The Appearance to Defend

On this one I believe the current title for this stage, ‘Notice of
Appearance to Defend’ is rather misleading. It should simply be termed
’Notice of Intention to Defend.’
This simplified version is quite clear and should then be sold in shops
or at Clients’ Services Office at cost recovery price. The self-actor
who is a defendant would only be required to enter few details on
dotted lines. This would be unlike the current Notice of Appearance
to Defend which contains legalese and sometimes is assumed to an
end itself by some self-actors.27
Introduction of Stage Called Plaintiff’s Request for Defence

After the appearance to defend there should be a stage called
Plaintiff’s request for Defence. This would be different from the
current stage were after an appearance to defend a request for further
particulars may be made or for default judgment.28 Again, the new
version would remove the overloaded legalese.
This kind of a reply is straight forward and helps to remove the
discovery stage29. If the defendant wishes to further request for facts
and documents, he should then request for such under a simpler
document titled Request for supporting documents and facts. This
stage removes a number of complicated stages like request for further
particulars and motion to strike out30 .Once this has been done, the
plaintiff is obliged to furnish all documents and other exhibits to be
relied upon to the defendant. All essential facts should be furnished
27.
Ibid Order 10
28.
ibid Order 11 and 12
29.
ibid Order 18
30.
ibid Order 12, 14, and 16
as well. Hence no need for the discovery stage. The summons should
have all documents sought to be relied upon attached to it.31 After
this has been done the parties should be given ten days to file any
additional documents of facts they think are essential to their case.
After this stage the clerk then informs the parties to attend the Pre –
Trial Meeting with the Magistrate. It should be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court to call parties for pre-trial meetings. Once they
are called the parties should appear before the Magistrate for the pre
– trial meeting. This removes the obligation of the parties to apply for
a pre= trial conference and serve time and costs of the proceedings
unlike in the current form where there are many stages in the civil
procedure rules.32
PRE-TRIAL MEETING
The pre-trial meeting should allow the Magistrate to conciliate or
arbitrate where possible and advise the parties of possible solutions.
The Magistrate should be allowed to record a settlement, in the event
of agreement, that is binding on all parties and capable of
enforcement. In the event that parties do not settle, the presiding
Magistrate should in consultation with parties draft a document called
Trial Summary. (See Appendix 10).
Trial Stage
During the trial stage, the procedures should also be simplified. Parties
should be allowed to ask questions in vernacular and also the
Magistrate’s role should not be limited to umpire-ship but the
magistrate should have an active role of trying to ascertain the truth.
Indulgencies, postponements and introduction of new evidence and
material should be allowable if there is a genuine reason. At the trial
the Magistrate should first explain to the parties what they are
expected to do and the burden of proof on issues and constantly guide
them during trial.
Enforcement Stage
The enforcement stage should be made easier. The Messenger of Court
should be allowed to interview successful parties and inform them of
31.
Ibid Order 18
32.
Ibid Order 19
the forms to be completed. Furthermore, the fees for enforcement

should be reasonable or self-actors should be allowed to pay in
instalments for their judgments to be enforced.
The simple procedure suggested above would help a lot in making the
system cheaper and friendly to self-actors. Even to lawyer’s life would
be easier as they would use the same procedures that are simplified.
Other ancillary issues like default judgment, consent to judgment
and summary judgment can be addressed similarly as well.
Application Procedure
The application procedure should be simplified as well. There should
be prescribed forms and affidavits like in the maintenance court. The
forms should be capable of being used by lay people.
A simpler version of a court application should be as in Appendix 11
and 11(b) as supporting affidavit. The current court application
requires to be accompanied by an affidavit that sets out the cause of
action, parties’ particulars and also the relief they are seeking. There
is no form of what the affidavit entails.33 The court should then have
discretion after filing of the opposition to the application by respondent
to refer the matter to trial or decide it on the papers filed.
These forms should be in prescribed form and if litigants wish to write
more than one affidavit they may retype the documents to create
more space or add more affidavits or special blank affidavits. The
notice of opposition should be more simplified than the one in the
rules and should provide for guidance on the key issues to be included
in the defence through opposition.34
CONCLUSION
It is my view, there is need to start reform in this area immediately.
All key stakeholders should be involved. The Ministry of Justice and
Legal Affairs may do consultative meetings with self-actors to validate
the findings of this research and then proceed to engage a team of
lawyers with interest and expertise in access to justice to start
redrafting simplified rules with all key sets of forms. This initiative
will not require a lot of resources.
33.
ibid Order 22
34.
Ibid Order 22 Rule 2
The resources needed would be to cover the consultative meetings,

funding for the experts, drafting meetings, printing of copies of the
Rules and the manual book. Once the first draft is finalized, it would
be prudent to start a pilot project with one or two courts and work
with the new court procedures for a year. If the results are acceptable
then the new civil court procedure would be rolled out to all courts.
It has argued that there is need for reform as proposed in this study if
justice is to be a reality for those who cannot afford lawyers. In
addition, it should be realized that the civil procedure in our courts
should not be an end itself but an avenue to enhance justice. It should
not make justice costly and inaccessible but should balance its role to
maintain orderliness and at the same time availing access to self-
actors. The right of access to court is a right that unlocks other rights
and should be enhanced forthwith.
RIGHTS INFERENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF
SECTION 46 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE BEYOND
GUBBAY CJ’S DICTUM
BY JUSTICE ALFRED MAVEDZENGE1

(in loving memory of the late Blasio Zivengwa Mavedzenge)
ABSTRACT
The Constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees a wide range of
fundamental rights. These are set out in Chapter four-the Declaration
of Rights. However, the Constitution is silent on a number of
fundamental rights which include the right to access adequate
housing, the right to development and the right to the protection of
family. Thus, the Constitution does not expressly provide for these
rights, yet in the preamble it, captures and expresses a vision of a
prosperous and just society that is based on human dignity. There is
a real risk that this vision will remain a pipe dream if individuals do
not enjoy these rights. In this paper, I examine how and the extent to
which the interpretive guidelines set out in section 46 of the
Constitution, can be applied as a tool to infer or read in rights that
are not expressly provided for in the Constitution’s Declaration of
Rights. Inevitably I also examine the theoretical underpinnings of
the rules provided for in section 46 and argue that, the courts need
to engage with those theories in a critical and nuanced fashion in
order to develop a meaningful jurisprudence on how fundamental
rights should be interpreted in Zimbabwe.
Key words: constitution-constitutional court-section 46-constitutional
values-rights-human dignity-constitution of Zimbabwe.
INTRODUCTION
Amongst the progressive attributes of the 2013 Constitution of
Zimbabwe is that it guarantees an expansive Declaration of Rights,
especially when one compares it to the previous Lancaster House
1.
Justice Alfred Mavedzenge holds a PhD in Constitutional Law from the University
of Cape Town. He is a Researcher at the University of Cape Town Law Faculty’s
Democratic Governance and Rights Unit, and is an associate at Maja and
Associates Commercial Law Chambers.
93
9 4 University of Zimbabwe Law Journal 2019
Constitution of 1979 and to Constitutions of other jurisdictions.2 Yet,

it is also true that the Constitution of Zimbabwe does not expressly
guarantee certain rights that are very important, especially for the
socio-economic well-being of individuals and groups. Such rights
include the right of every person to access adequate housing3 , the
right to development4 and the right to the protection of family.5
Some may argue that if the Constitution does not expressly guarantee
these rights, then there is no need for courts to bother about their
enforcement. 6 This is a misplaced argument. There is more to
constitutional interpretation than just the words that are written in
the Constitution. Usually constitutions are meant to capture and
express a broad vision of a society. They rarely provide adequate details
on how that vision should be achieved.7 The courts, government
agencies and everyone seized with constitutional interpretation, must
then interpret the Constitution in a manner that promotes the
realisation of the stated goal or vision.
There can never be any reasonable doubt that, through the 2013
Constitution the people of Zimbabwe aspire to establish for themselves
a “just and prosperous nation”8 that is founded on “recognition of
inherent dignity and worth of each human being”9 as well as “the
equality of all human beings.”10 That aspiration cannot be achieved
if individuals and communities cannot enjoy such rights as the right
to development, the right to access adequate housing and the right
2.
Such as the Constitution of Zambia and the Constitution of Botswana
3.
The Constitution expressly provides for the right to shelter for children in section
81 (1) (f).
4.
See art 1 and article 2 of the United Nations General Assembly,XDeclaration on
the Right to Development: Resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 4
December 1986,XA/RES/41/128. Also see Arjun Sengupta “Right to Development
as a Human Right” in 2001 Vol. 36, No. 27 Economic and Political Weekly
5.
See art 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and for a
discussion of what this right entails see United Nations Human Rights Committee
“Report on protection of the family: contribution of the family to the realization
of the right to an adequate standard of living for its members, particularly
through its role in poverty eradication and achieving sustainable development
(A/HRC/31/37)”
6.
This may be the view of those who argue in favour of a strict literal interpretation
7.
Iain Currie and Johan De Waal make similar observation in The Bill of Rights
Handbook 6th ed, Juta and Company 2013 at p. 135 and 136
8.
See preamble of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
9.
See section 3 (1) (e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
10.
See section 3 (1) (f) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
UZLJ Rights Inference: Section 46 of Zimbabwe Constitution 95
to the protection of family. The Committee on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (CESCR) has interpreted the right to adequate housing
as the “right to live somewhere in peace, security and dignity”11 ,
thereby underscoring the inseparability of this right from the vision
of establishing a society based on respect for human dignity.12 The
same can be said with respect to the right to the protection of family13
and the right to development.14
Clearly these rights are so important that they cannot be ignored, if
Zimbabwean courts are to interpret the Declaration of Rights in a
manner which realises the vision captured in this Constitution. In this
paper, I do not address how these particular rights can be read into
the Zimbabwean Declaration of Rights. I have done so elsewhere.15
The question that I grapple with is whether and to what extent does
section 46 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe require courts to infer
rights that are not expressly provided for in the Declaration of Rights?
I take the position that, as a general rule, section 46 of the Constitution
requires courts to adopt a broad approach to interpretation of
fundamental rights. I acknowledge that this has already been pointed
out by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe-albeit in passing.16 Thus,
apart from just mentioning it and regurgitating Gubbay CJ’s dictum
in a 1994 case of Rattigan v Chief ImmigrationXOfficer 17 , the
Constitutional Court has not engaged on this subject in a deeper and
nuanced fashion. For instance in Madzimbamuto v Registrar General,
Ziyambi JA simply said:
The approach to interpretation of a constitutional right has been
laid down in many decisions of the predecessor of this Court.
Thus in Rattigan & Ors v Chief Immigration Officer & Ors 1994
11.
See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General
Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant),
13 December 1991 at para 7
12.
See Justice Alfred Mavedzenge PhD thesis “An analysis of how Zimbabwe’s
international legal obligation to achieve the realisation of the right of access
to adequate housing, can be enforced in domestic courts as a constitutional
right, notwithstanding the absence of a specific constitutional right of every
person to have access to adequate housing” University of Cape Town, 2018
13.
Supra note 4
14.
Supra note 3
15.
Supra note 11
16.
See Mawere v Registrar General (2015) ZWCC 04 at para 20 and Madzimbamuto
v Registrar General [2014] ZWCC 5 at 5–6
17.
1994 (2) ZLR 54 (S) at 57 F–H
(2) ZLR 54 (S) at 57 F-H the Court held: “This Court has on
several occasions in the past pronounced upon the proper
approach to constitutional construction embodying fundamental
rights and protections. What is to be avoided is the imparting of
a narrow, artificial, rigid and pedantic interpretation; to be
preferred is one which serves the interest of the Constitution
and best carries out its objects and promotes its purpose. All
relevant provisions are to be considered as a whole and where
rights and freedoms are conferred on persons, derogations
therefrom, as far as the language permits, should be narrowly
or strictly construed.18
After citing the above dictum, the learned Ziyambi JA went straight
to conclude and give an order without providing any meaningful
analysis of what this dictum entails, as if the dictum is self-explanatory.
The rest of the bench concurred with this judgment. The Court took a
similar approach in Mawere v Registrar General19 , where Garwe JA
(with concurrence of the entire bench) cited Gubbay’s dictum and a
couple of other remarks by judges from other jurisdictions, but did
not engage with this dictum to provide any nuanced interpretation of
section 46 of the Constitution.
Therefore, beyond Gubbay CJ’s dictum, there is not yet any meaningful
jurisprudence that has been developed on the practical implications
of section 46, especially when interpreting constitutional rights. There
is therefore a gap in the Zimbabwean jurisprudence on this subject.
Through this paper, I hope to make a contribution towards addressing
this gap.
The centre piece of my argument is that section 46 of the Constitution
is an expression of the following doctrinal theories of constitutional
interpretation: rights interdependence and indivisibility; the doctrine
of the ‘living’ constitution, the value based and purposive theory of
interpretation-and these presuppose a broad and or value laden
approach to rights interpretation, which in turn allows the courts to
infer some of these rights that are not expressly provided for in the
Declaration of Rights. First, I consider what section 46 says.
SECTION 46 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE

Section 46 sets out rules governing the interpretation of constitutional
rights. It is framed as follows:
18.
Supra note 16 Madzimbamuto v Registrar General at p.5-6
19.
Supra note 16, para 20
When interpreting this Chapter, a court, tribunal, forum or body—

a) must give full effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined
in this Chapter;
b) must promote the values and principles that underlie a
democratic society based on openness, justice, human
dignity, equality and freedom, and in particular, the values
and principles set out in section 3;
c) must take into account international law and all treaties
and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party;
d) must pay due regard to all the provisions of this
Constitution, in particular the principles and objectives
set out in Chapter 2; and
e) may consider relevant foreign law;
in addition to considering all other relevant factors that are to
be taken into account in the interpretation of a Constitution.
Thus, in addition to other relevant factors (such as views expressed in

literature by eminent scholars) which courts have discretion to
consider, section 46 identifies certain factors as mandatory. These
are: the need to ensure that rights are given their intended full effect:
the need to protect and promote constitutional values: the need to
promote compliance with international legal duties, norms and
standards: and the need to ensure that the interpretation is anchored
on textual context. Each of these factors or considerations is an
expression of the doctrinal theories that I identified above, and their
common purpose is to ensure that rights are interpreted in a manner
that guarantee their effective realization. I begin by discussing how
the rights interdependence and indivisibility theory underpins the rules
in section 4620 and why that should result in courts inferring certain
rights upon the Declaration of Rights.
RIGHTS INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY
Section 46 (1) (a) obliges courts to interpret the Declaration of Rights

in a manner that gives ‘full effect’ to the fundamental rights and
freedoms enshrined therein. The Constitutional Court often
regurgitates this provision, without explaining its practical
implications.21 In order to identify the practical implications of section
20.
Of the Constitution
21.
Supra note 17 and supra note 18
46 (1) (a), regard must be had to the theoretical underpinnings of the

rule prescribed therein.
The rule of constitutional interpretation, encapsulated in section 46
(1) (a) is a constitutional instruction for the court to observe and
apply the rights indivisibility and interdependence principle, when
interpreting the Declaration of Rights. Essentially, this principle entails
that fundamental rights cannot be interpreted and enforced separately
or in isolation because the effective realisation of certain rights
depends on the simultaneous enforcement of other relevant
fundamental rights.22 Put differently, in order to ‘give full effect’ to
a right as is required by section 46 (1) (a), the court must recognize
that some rights must be enforced simultaneously because there is a
conceptual relationship of interdependence between or amongst them.
Craig Scott suggests that there are two types of relationships of
interdependence between human rights, and these are the “organic
interdependence” and the “related interdependence”.23 Organic
interdependence is the relationship where:
one right forms a part of another right and may therefore be
incorporated into that latter right. From the organic rights
perspective, interdependent rights are inseparable or
indissoluble in the sense that one right (the core right) justifies
the other (the derivative right). To protect right x will mean
directly protecting right y...24
Thus, the concept of organic interdependence requires us to perceive

certain rights as constituent elements of other rights. Craig Scott
uses the example of the right to life and the right to adequate
housing.25 He argues that if the fundamental right to life is interpreted
broadly to mean the right to live a life in human dignity, then one
cannot live such a life without having access to adequate housing.26
22.
Craig Scott “Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards
a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights” in 1989 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal. p. 781. Also see Sandra Liebenberg. Socio-economic Rights:
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 2010 p. 51
23.
Supra note 22, Craig Scott at p. 779
24.
Ibid
25.
26.
Also see E Wicks. “The Meaning of Life: Dignity and the Right to Life in
International Human Rights Treaties.” in 2012 Human Rights Law Review at p.
206: Also see UN General Assembly “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:
Yacoob J in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Irene

Grootboom27 makes a similar assertion.
According to Scott, the organic interdependence of fundamental rights
can be explained on the basis of two conceptions. First is what he
describes as the “logical or semantic entailment.”28 It is the idea
that certain fundamental rights are to be regarded as ‘general core
rights’ and such rights logically imply other rights (derivative rights).29
Thus the ‘derivative right’ is a logical consequence of the ‘core right’.
For example, it can be argued that the right to life is a ‘general core
right’ which logically implies a range of other rights including the
right to have access to basic social services that are necessary for
human life.30 In this connection, the right to access adequate housing
is therefore, a ‘derivative right’ that is ‘logically derived’ from the
right to life. The relationship between the right to life (as the core
right) and the right to access adequate housing (as a derivative right)
is that of logical entailment in the sense that, it is illogical to expect
individuals to enjoy their fundamental right to life if they are not
guaranteed access to a basic livelihood such as adequate housing.
Similarly, it can be argued that the fundamental right to [substantive]
equality is a ‘general core right’ which logically takes within its scope,
other ‘derivative rights’ such as the right to development for a
previously marginalized community.
Critics may argue that the above approach allows judges to replace
the law with their own logic and this may undermine the rule of law
and separation of powers between the judiciary and law or policy
makers. In defence of Scott’s logical entailment approach, I argue
that this approach is not a licence to constitutional flights of fancy as
it does not mean that there are no limitations regarding the extent to
Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the

Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”[A/71/310]
8 August 2016, para 27
27.
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), para 23
28.
29.
Ibid
30.
Also see the decisions of the Supreme Court of India in the following cases:
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Shantistar Builders v Narayan
Khimalal Totame AIR (1990) SC 630; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v Nawab
Khan Gulab Khan laws (SC)-1996-10-10; Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh
AIR 1963 SC 1295 and Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 1675;
Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2
SCR 516, para 518
which judges should apply their logic. As will be made clearer in the
following sections of this paper, the judge’s logic must be rational in
the sense that it must be guided by the textual context- which
comprises of the prescribed constitutional values, principles,
international law and the words used in framing the right. Yacoob J in
Government of South Africa v Grootboom31 demonstrates how this
approach to constitutional construction can be applied within the
above highlighted limits, for purposes of giving effect to the
constitutional vision.
Scott identifies the second form of organic interdependence as the
‘effectivist or foundational conception’ which asserts, for example
that “the right to an adequate standard of living is part of or is
justified by the right to life because the effectiveness of the latter
right depends on it”.32 Thus, the ‘effectivist conception’ entails that
the enforcement of one right cannot be effective without
simultaneously enforcing the other right.
Both the logical entailment and the effectivist approach (as Craig
Scott’s conception of the rights indivisibility and interdependence
theory) require courts to refrain from interpreting rights as if they
are isolated from the other. As I mentioned earlier, the Constitutional
Court, by citing with approval Gubbay CJ’s dictum, has expressed this
view.33 However, it has not demonstrated in its jurisprudence, the
implications of that rule. In practice, the implications of this rule (as
encapsulated in section 46 (1) (a) of the Constitution) is therefore
that even if a right is not expressly guaranteed in the Declaration of
Rights, the court must infer that right (the derivative) upon another
expressly guaranteed right (the core right) as long as the ‘core right’
is grammatically framed broadly, and as long as it can be proven that
the expressly guaranteed right cannot be implemented effectively
without simultaneously enforcing the implied (derivative right) right.
Thus, section 46 (1) (a) of the Constitution is an expression of the
rights indivisibility and interdependence doctrine, which requires
courts to interpret the expressly guaranteed rights as widely as the
language allows in order to infer other rights which the Constitution
is silent on. In a sense therefore, section 46 (1) (a) requires courts to
refrain from perceiving the Declaration of Rights as an exhaustive list
of constitutional rights. It ought to be perceived as an outline of the
31.
Supra 26, at para 19-25 and 35-40
32.
33.
Supra note 17 and Supra note 18
‘core rights’ upon which numerous other derivative rights can be

inferred.34
Section 46 as an Expression of the Doctrine of a ‘Living

Constitution’
As discussed earlier, s 46 (1) (a) of the Constitution, requires courts to
interpret the fundamental rights enshrined in the Declaration of Rights
in a manner that gives full effect to those rights, while s 46 (1) (b)35
obliges courts to interpret fundamental rights in a manner that upholds
and promotes the entrenched constitutional values. In order to give
constitutional rights their full effect and to protect the underlying
constitutional values, courts have to refrain from rigidly holding on to
the traditional and age old interpretations of fundamental rights.36
Instead, the courts must develop and embrace new, nuanced and
updated meanings of fundamental rights in order to address
contemporary challenges which threaten to render rights illusory or
which threaten the values that underlie the Constitution.
Thus, the rules of constitutional interpretation, provided for in section
46 (1) (a) and (b) have their theoretical roots in the doctrine of a
living constitution. Regard must therefore be had to this doctrine if
we are to fully grasp the practical implications of section 46 (1) (a)
and (b) on rights interpretation.
Arguably, the doctrine of a living constitution was originally developed
in the American jurisprudence,37 but it must be noted that the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe38 confirmed the application of this doctrine in
Zimbabwe when it held that:
A Constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is enacted
in the form of a statute, it is sui generic. It must broadly, liberally
and purposively be interpreted so as to avoid the austerity of
tabulated legalism and so as to enable it to continue to play a
creative and dynamic role in the expression and the achievement
of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of
34.
To the extent permitted by the words used to frame the core rights
35.
36.
Supra note 16, Mawere v Registrar General, para 20
37.
For a discussion on this see See Aileen Kavanagh “The Idea of a Living
Constitution.” in 2003 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
38.
Though prior to the enactment of the 2013 Constitution
the values bonding its people and in disciplining its

Government.39
Unfortunately, in the above case, the Supreme Court simply reproduced

the dictum of Mahomed J.40 The Court did not engage sufficiently
with the doctrine itself, to examine its practical implications beyond
the rhetoric contained in the dictum cited above. However, one of
the scholars on this subject, Aileen Kavanagh provides a clearer
description of this theoretical approach to constitutional
interpretation. She describes it as:
The claim that the courts should develop and update
constitutional law when interpreting it. In other words, the idea
of the living Constitution forms part of an exhortation to the
courts to interpret the Constitution in a certain way, [that is],
to interpret it so as to develop its content, to keep it abreast of
changes in society, to update it and adapt it to modem needs
and circumstances.41
Thus, as a general rule the constitution must be interpreted in a manner

which adapts the meaning of its provisions to the present-day realities,
and the interpretation generated must be one which is in sync with
the contemporary needs and circumstances of society.42 The practical
implications of this rule [as encapsulated in section 46 (1) (a) and
(b)43 ] is therefore that, when interpreting constitutional rights the
courts should not restrict themselves to the traditionally accepted
meaning of certain constitutional rights. Where necessary, they should
adapt the scope and meaning of these rights in order to address
contemporary challenges which threaten to render those rights illusory
or which threaten the values upon which the constitutional order is
based. Thus, in a sense, the courts should infer certain rights upon
those that are expressly guaranteed in the Constitution, as a means
of addressing contemporary challenges which threaten the realisation
39.
Supra note 16, Mawere v Registrar General at para. Also see Capital Radio Pvt
Ltd v Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe 2003 (2) ZLR 236 (5), p 247 b-d
40.
In S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867; 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) at para 8, which he
later applied in Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura 2000 1994(1)
S.A. 407 (Nm S) at 418 F-H when he was sitting as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Namibia
41.
See supra note 37, Kavanagh, at p. 56
42.
See Hunter v Southam (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 649 and Attorney-General
(Manitoba) v Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd (1987) 38 D.L.R. (4th) 321, para
330.
43.
of the expressly guaranteed right or the constitutional values which

the right is meant to protect.
For instance, in Zimbabwe, the right to life may have originally been
conceptualised to protect individuals from unlawfully being deprived
of their life,44 perhaps because the major threat to that right was
arbitrary or extrajudicial killings. Following certain radical changes
in contemporary society, new threats to human life have also emerged.
The threat to human life is no longer limited to the act of arbitrary
killing by another human being, but they now also include loss of life
due to vicious diseases and epidemics (such as cancer, HIV and AIDS)
or due to malnutrition and poverty. If the ultimate purpose of the
constitutional right to life is to protect human life, then the scope of
the obligations of the duty bearer can no longer be interpreted as
limited to refraining from or protecting people from arbitrary killings.
The interpretation of the fundamental right to life has to be adapted
to the contemporary needs of society which is to protect human beings
from contemporary threats to human life which now include poverty
and the resultant lack of access to necessities of livelihood such as
adequate housing. Thus the right to life, which originally may have
meant the right to be protected from arbitrary killing, should now
also be given a nuanced meaning-which is the right to receive
reasonable assistance by the state in order to access basic necessities
of life in order to prevent loss of human life and to protect human
dignity.
However, as Kavanagh cautions, “constitutional interpretation by the
courts can be creative in order to bring it up to date with the
contemporary needs and circumstances, but this creativity should
take place within certain constraints.”45 Thus, the Constitution cannot
mean whatever the judge wishes it to mean. There has to be a
perimeter within which the court exercises its creativity to adapt or
develop the scope of the constitutional rights to meet the
contemporary needs of the society. Kentridge AJ46 also emphasised
this point by stating that:
[w]hen interpreting constitutional rights] it cannot be too
strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever
44.
See section 12 (1) of the previous Constitution: The Lancaster House Constitution
of Zimbabwe, 1979
45.
See supra note 37, 7 at p. 57
46.
In S V Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 17
we might wish it to mean. We must heed Lord Wilberforce’s

reminder that even a Constitution is a legal instrument, the
language of which must be respected...I would say that a
Constitution embodying fundamental principles should as far as
its language permits be given a broad construction.
As I indicated earlier, the Constitution requires courts to respect the

text used in framing the constitutional right, when interpreting the
Declaration of Rights.47 This is implicitly prescribed in section 46 (1)
(d) which requires courts to take into account the relevant provisions,
when interpreting constitutional rights. Therefore, the scope and
content of the right must be interpreted to address contemporary
needs but within the confines of the words used to frame the right.
To illustrate this point, Rebecca Wilkinson48 argues as follows in respect
of the Constitution of the United States of America:
Many clauses of the Constitution are unequivocal and leave no
room for [such] interpretation. For example, the prescribed age
requirement for Senators requires no [creative] interpretation
because its meaning cannot change. Yet some clauses are
couched in general phraseology. The Constitution does not
provide explicit guidance on how to interpret provisions such as
‘cruel and unusual’ or ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’.
These terms are ‘value-laden’ and consequently, various
interpretations are possible.49
Similarly, in Zimbabwe certain constitutional provisions are farmed

narrowly. For example, the right to shelter in section 81 (1) (f) is for
children, who are defined as “every boy or girl under the age of
eighteen”.50 It is therefore clear that adults cannot rely on this right
to claim access to shelter as a right.51 However, some rights are framed
broadly. For instance, the right to life is framed in s 48 (1) as “Every
person has the right to life.” This is a broad formulation which gives
adequate room for the court to interpret this right in accordance
with certain constitutional values, to address contemporary threats
to human life and reach the conclusion that this right implies the
47.
See section 46 (1) (d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 and Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission v Commissioner General, ZRP (2014) ZWCC 3 at para 8
48.
In “Interpreting a Living Constitution” 2015 North East Law Review at p.7-13
49.
Ibid, p. 7
50.
See section 81 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
51.
Supra note 11
duty of the state to make adequate housing accessible, in order to

protect and promote the attainment of life in human dignity.
Similarly, under the right to equality, the duty of the state to achieve
substantive equality is framed in broad terms in s 56 (6)52 as follows:
“The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to
promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people
or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination.” This allows the courts the flexibility to give content
to this obligation through an interpretation process which seeks to
protect constitutional values and give expression to the constitutional
vision of a society based on human dignity and equality. In that regard,
it can be argued for instance that the measures contemplated in section
56 (6) include making adequate housing accessible to disadvantaged
groups, or the right to development for such groups, in order to achieve
substantive equal protection of human dignity between or amongst
different communities in the country. Given that most fundamental
rights are framed broadly,53 it is possible to apply the rules prescribed
in section 46 (1) (a) and (b) to infer certain rights upon those that are
expressly guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights.
VALUE-BASED INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

In addition to observing the principle of rights indivisibility and applying
the doctrine of a living constitution, courts are also required to adopt
a value-based approach to rights interpretation. This is encapsulated
in section 46 (1) (b) as follows:
vWhen interpreting this Chapter [the Declaration of Rights], a court,
tribunal, forum or body- (b) must promote the values and principles
that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human
dignity, equality and freedom and in particular, the values and
principles set out in section 3 [of the Constitution].
In a number of cases which include Mawere v Registrar General54 and
Madzimbamuto v Registrar General, 55 the Constitutional Court
interpreted the above provisions to mean that they require courts to
interpret fundamental rights broadly, purposively and with flexibility,
52.
53.
See for example the following sections of the Constitution of Zimbabwe: 48
(1); 51; 57; 56 (6) and 74
54.
Supra note 15, Mawere v Registrar General
55.
Supra note 15, Madzimbamuto v Registrar General
in order to protect the values underpinning Zimbabwe’s constitutional

democracy. For instance, the Constitutional Court said:
[W]hen interpreting constitutional rights] what is to be avoided
is the imparting of a narrow, artificial, rigid and pedantic
interpretation; to be preferred is one [an interpretation] which
serves the interests of the Constitution and best carries out its
objects and promotes its purpose.56 [My emphasis.]
As I mentioned above, this is Gubbay CJ’s dictum in Rattigan v Chief

Immigration Officer. By reproducing this dictum several times, the
Court has underscored the idea that a value-based approach requires
courts to interpret fundamental rights broadly. Whilst it is true that a
broad construction is usually necessary, it is not always the case that
rights should be interpreted broadly in order to protect constitutional
values. In certain circumstances, the court may have to attach a narrow
interpretation in order to protect certain constitutional values.57
The above incorrect assumption may have been made because the
Court seems to have adopted Gubbay CJ’s dictum without further
engaging (in its jurisprudence) on what these values actually mean
and how (in practice) they should be applied when interpreting
constitutional rights. There are numerous constitutional values that
are enshrined in section 358 and it is impossible for the Court to examine
what all these values mean every time when the Court interprets
fundamental rights. However, what would be expected of the Court is
to engage on the relevant values and incrementally create a nuanced
jurisprudence on what those values mean and how in practice they
influence the interpretation of a right. The failure by the Constitutional
Court to do this has resulted in a dearth of local jurisprudence on the
meaning of constitutional values and how they should be applied when
one is interpreting fundamental rights. Thus, beyond Gubbay CJ’s
dictum (which as I showed above, makes some incorrect assumptions)
there is yet to be a nuanced interpretation and application of section
46 (1) (b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
56.
Supra note 15, Mawere case at para 20
57.
For example see President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC) where the right to free use
of private property was interpreted narrowly in order to protect the dignity of
the evictees which would be violated if they were to be evicted without being
given alternative housing.
58.
Christo Botha defines value-based interpretation as an approach which

entails “a value-coherent construction - the aim and purpose of which
must be ascertained against the fundamental constitutional values.”59
In practice, the first step is therefore to identify the constitutional
value(s) which would be affected by the court’s interpretation of the
right(s) in question. After that the court has to discuss what those
values entail or require of society and individuals, the norms and
standards implied by those values. The last step is to then incorporate
the norms and standards implied by those values or to adopt an
interpretation which best protects or promotes those norms and
standards. Whether a court should adopt a broad or narrow approach
in order to protect the constitutional values is a question whose answer
depends on what scope of the right would be best suitable to
accommodate and protect the norms and standards implied in the
constitutional values.
Comparative jurisdictions provide examples of how the above approach
can be applied. Similar to section 46 (1) (b) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe, the 1993 interim Constitution of South Africa required
courts to interpret rights in a manner that protects and promotes the
entrenched constitutional values. This rule of interpretation was
retained in the final Constitution of South Africa, 1996. One of the
enshrined values is human dignity. In S v Makwanyane60 the Court
grappled with the question whether capital punishment is
constitutionally valid or not. It was contended that capital punishment
is unconstitutional because it amounted to cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment and therefore, it was an impermissible limitation
of the freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.61 In
a way, the Court had to interpret what the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment entails.62
This had to be done in a manner that protects the constitutional value
of human dignity. The Court thoroughly engaged with the concept of
human dignity in order to deduce what it entails as a constitutional
value.63 Although most judges who sat on this case wrote separate
judgments, they all seem to agree64 that by entrenching the value of
59.
See Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 4th ed 2005 p. 193
60.
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665
61.
Ibid at para 27 for the summary of the arguments by parties
62.
Ibid, see for example paras 131 to 134
63.
And a fundamental right as well
64.
See the judgments of Langa J, Madala J, Mahomed J and Mokgoro J in supra
note 59 at paras 223 - 227; 237 - 243; 263; and 307 - 313 respectively.
human dignity, the Constitution recognizes that human beings have

inherent worthiness which must be protected at all times. O’Regan J
put this more directly and vividly as follows:
The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new
Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to
dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of
respect and concern.65
The above interpretation of human dignity was considered in order to

define what the freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment entails as a right. The Court concluded that, punishment
is inhuman and degrading if its impact depraves, undermines or
destroys the inherent worthiness of the human being.66 Thus, the
meaning of the freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment was interpreted by incorporating the value of human
dignity. In the same case, a similar approach was applied to interpret
the meaning of the right to life.67 In subsequent cases, the Court
applied a similar approach to interpret the meaning of the right to
equality,68 the right to adequate housing69 and the right to privacy.70
Elsewhere, the Supreme Court of Canada 71 and the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany 72 applied a similar approach to
interpret the meaning of the freedom from cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment. In India, the Supreme Court has similarly
incorporated the value of human dignity into the right to life in order
to reach the conclusion that the right to life implies the right to live
in human dignity.73
65.
Supra note 59 at para 328
66.
Ibid. See for example para 95, and paras 144-145
67.
Supra note 59 at para 327
68.
See Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759; 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at 31-33:
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo (6) BCLR 708; 1997 (4) SA 1 at
para 41 and Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (11) BCLR 1489; 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at
para 93
69.
Supra note 26
70.
National Coalition for Gays and Lesbians Equality v Minister of Justice 1998
(12) BCLR 1517; 1999 (SA) 6 (CC)
71.
Kindler v Canada (1992) 6 CRR (2d) 193 SC at 241
72.
[1977] 45 BVerfGE 187, 228 (Life Imprisonment case)
73.
Supra note 29
In citing the above as examples, I am aware that human dignity as a

conceptual value means much more than respect for the inherent
worthiness of the human being.74 I am also aware that the meaning of
human dignity and many other values such as equality, is a highly
contested subject which has seen courts and scholars in different
jurisdictions interpreting them differently.75 Therefore I am not (at
this juncture) advocating that the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe
should adopt similar interpretations as those developed by other courts
in the jurisdictions that I cited above. Rather, the point that I am
making is that the Constitutional Court has a role to give meaning to
the constitutionally entrenched values. This cannot be achieved by
merely restating section 46 (1) (b)76 or Gubbay CJ’s dictum when
interpreting fundamental rights. The Court must develop a nuanced
Zimbabwean jurisprudence on the interpretation of these values, and
it must demonstrate clearly how these values are informing the
interpretation of rights. As Laurie Ackermann77 rightly argues, this
means that the court must engage with the relevant philosophical
theories that led to the development of these values. Such analysis
must also be anchored on Zimbabwe’s historical and contemporary
contextual realities. In South Africa for instance, Ackermann J of the
Constitutional Court in Prinsloo v Van der Linde 199778 took into
account South Africa’s historical background of apartheid,
contemporary realities of racial inequalities, and juxtaposed these
against Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality, to develop an
interpretation of what the value of equality in South Africa entails.
He concluded that the entrenchment of equality as a constitutional
value represents South Africa’s aspiration to break from its apartheid
past and achieve a society where the inherent worthiness of each
person is equally respected and protected (which is Dworkin’s
interpretation of equality79 ). Jurisprudence has thus been developed
to the effect that the right to equality in South Africa does not always
74.
Laurie Ackermann, Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa 2013
at p. 23-24 and 28-29
75.
And sometimes putting different emphasis on different aspects of these values.
For this discussion see Oscar Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept”
in 1983 Vol 77, no 4 The American Journal of International Law pp 848-854
76.
Of the Constitution
77.
Supra note 73 at p.28-29
78.
1997 (6) BCLR 759; 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at para 31-42 where Ackermann J
engages with Ronald Dworkin’s theory on equality and juxtaposes that theory
against South Africa’s apartheid history
79.
Ronald Dworkin. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 2000 p.
1
mean the right to receive equal treatment, but it also mean that
previously marginalised groups should receive preferential treatment
so as to achieve the constitutional goal of a substantively equal
society.80 Yacoob J in Government of South Africa v Grootboom 81
takes a similar approach to interpret what the value of human dignity
entails in the interpretation of the right of access to adequate housing.
When the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe adopts this approach, it
will be clear (as it is in comparative jurisdictions) that by requiring
courts to adopt a value laden approach to rights interpretation, the
Constitution obliges courts (where necessary) to infer other rights
upon those that are expressly guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights.
The inference of rights is a consequence of incorporating certain
constitutional values into the expressly guaranteed rights. However,
as Lord Wilberforce said: “a Constitution is a legal instrument, the
language of which must be respected……a Constitution embodying
fundamental principles should as far as its language permits be given
a broad construction.”82 As I pointed earlier, this rule is encapsulated
in section 46 (1) (d). Therefore, the inference of other rights, which
is done by means of incorporating certain values into the expressly
guaranteed rights, can only be done to the extent permitted by the
words used to frame the fundamental right.
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

By virtue of binding courts to attach an interpretation which gives
full effect to the right, section 46 (1) (a) of the Constitution83 is in a
sense a constitutional injunction for courts to apply a purposive
approach to constitutional rights construction. Scholars on this
subject84 describe purposive interpretation as an approach which
requires that the interpretation of legal provisions must not exclusively
be limited to the literal meaning of words but should also consider
the context in order to infer the design or purpose which lies behind
the legal provision. The Supreme Court of Canada explained and
illustrated this approach as follows:
80.
Supra note 77
81.
Supra note 26
82.
This was cited by Kentridge AJ inXState v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)
83.
Which requires the court to attach an interpretation that gives full effect to
the right.
84.
G Devenish. Interpretation of Statutes 1992) p. 36. Also see L Du Plessis. Re-
Interpretation of Statutes 2002 p. 96 and Iain Currie supra note 6 at p 136-137.
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter

[must] be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a
guarantee; it [must] be understood, in other words, in the light
of the interests it was meant to protect. In my view…the purpose
of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference
to; the character and larger objects of the Charter [and] the
language chosen to articulate the specific rights or freedom, to
the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where
applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific
rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text
of the Charter.85
Thus, purposive interpretation is an approach which requires the court
to go beyond the grammatical construction of the right and ascertain
the purpose of the fundamental right in question. This approach has
been cited with approval by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe,86
which means that there can never be any doubt that section 46 (1) (a)
embodies a purposive approach to constitutional construction. The
Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe has even provided guidelines relating
to the steps which must be taken when applying this approach. It has
thus suggested that the purposive approach should be considered only
if limiting the interpretation to the literal meaning of the right would
produce an absurd meaning-87 an unreasonable interpretation which
(for instance) undermines the object of the Constitution.
However, what remains unclear is how the court should ascertain the
purpose of the right in the event that a literal meaning would produce
an absurd interpretation. If this is not clarified, then the purposive
approach remains vulnerable to abuse. It becomes a license for judges
to replace the law with their own opinions clothed as ‘the purpose of
the Constitution’. As I argue elsewhere88 , the Constitutional Court’s
ruling in Justice Mavedzenge v Minister of Justice89 is a practical
example of how the purposive approach can be misused if there is no
clarity about how the judge should ascertain the purpose of the right.
Some scholars90 have observed that the purpose of a legal provision
can be ascertained from documents which describe the background
85.
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 para 395-396
86.
See Zimbabwe Electoral Commission v Commissioner General, ZRP (2014) ZWCC
3, para 8. Also see Justice Alfred Mavedzenge v Minister of Justice, legal and
parliamentary affairs CCZ 05-18 at page 9
87.
Ibid, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission v Commissioner General, ZRP at para 8
88.
Supra note 11
89.
Supra note 85
90.
Supra note 7, Iain Currie at p. 141
leading to the drafting of the provision. Reliance on ‘travaux

preparatoires’ is allowed in international law.91 This may be a useful
strategy only if those documents and their authenticity can be
ascertained, which is rarely the case.92
Reference can also be made to the historical context in order to identify
the purpose of the right. 93 Here the assumption is that the
constitutional right seeks to prevent certain things that happened in
the past from happening again in the future,94 or that the constitutional
right is guaranteed in order to consolidate certain gains that were
made in the past. Unfortunately, historical facts and events are usually
a highly contested and disputed terrain to the extent that it is usually
impossible to ascertain the truth or veracity of certain historical claims.
Textual context can also be useful when ascertaining the purpose of
the right.95 This is the idea that the purpose of the right should be
ascertained by taking into account relevant provisions in the
Constitution and their historical origins. For instance, Iain Currie and
Johan De Wall96 suggest that “purposive interpretation is aimed at
teasing out the core values that underpin” the right. This view seems
to be based on the assumption that every right is guaranteed in order
to protect a certain value, and therefore, the best way of identifying
the purpose is to ask the question: what value does the right seek to
protect or advance? To a great extent, this assumption is true and can
be the most useful way of identifying the purpose of the right because,
a Constitution should be read holistically.97
The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for a list of values and principles
under section 3. It declares that Zimbabwe is founded on respect for
those values and principles. It further provides for a Declaration of
Rights which, in terms of section 46 (1) (b) must be interpreted in a
manner that upholds and promotes the values enshrined in section 3.
Therefore, section 46 (1) (b) of the Constitution makes it abundantly
91.
See Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
92.
Supra note 59 at para 17-18
93.
See Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at para 40 for an example of how
historical context was taken into account to ascertain the purpose of equality
as both a constitutional value and a right.
94.
Supra note 39, S v Mhlungu at para 8
95.
Supra note 7, Iain Currie at p. 143
96.
Ibid at p.136-137
97.
Ibid at 143-144, for a detailed discussion on this
apparent that there is a correlation between section 3 of the

Constitution and the Declaration of Rights apparent. The correlation
is that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights
are primarily 98 meant to serve and protect the values that are
enshrined in section 3 of the Constitution. Therefore, section 3 forms
the textual context which should be considered by the court in order
to ascertain the purpose of the right. By this I am not arguing that the
court should not consider context outside of section 3. Rather, the
argument is that constitutional values in section 3 should be the
primary reference point when the court is ascertaining the purpose
of the right. The courts can proceed to consider context outside of
section 399 if an inquiry focused on section 3 has failed to produce a
clear answer regarding the value or principle which the right seeks to
protect. Such an approach creates certainty regarding how courts
should identify the purpose for which a right has been guaranteed. It
shields the constitution from being replaced by the judges’ own
personal or collective opinion-sometimes based on their own preferred
version of history-which is then presented as the true purpose of the
right.
Thus, the purposive approach is a necessity and must be anchored on
the constitutional provisions (especially the values). By instructing
courts to adopt a purposive approach to rights interpretation, section
46 (1) (a) of the Constitution requires that, where it is necessary to
protect the purpose of the right, certain rights should be inferred
upon those that are expressly guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights.
For instance, if the right to life is interpreted by taking section 3 (1)
(e) of the Constitution into account as the primary textual context,
then the purpose for guaranteeing the right to life is to ensure that
the “inherent dignity and worth of each human being”100 is respected
at all times. This would then mean that the right to life implies other
rights such as the right to access adequate housing because human
dignity cannot be protected without ensuring that individuals and
their families have access to adequate housing. In that sense, the
purpose for guaranteeing he right to human dignity would not be
98.
There are numerous interests to be served, including the constitutional
objectives in Chapter two of the Constitution, but the primary here I suggest
that the primary interests are the constitutional values
99.
For example, reference should also be made to the objectives set out in Chapter
Two of the Constitution as required by section 46 (1)(d)
100.
See section 3 of the Constitution
achieved if the right to access adequate housing is not inferred upon

the right to life. Put differently, the right to life cannot be enforced
effectively, as required by section 46 (1) (a) if it is interpreted without
inferring upon it certain other rights which guarantee people access
to basic amenities that are necessary for the protection of human
dignity.
The above approach may be criticized by some as a conflation of
section 46 (1) (a), which requires rights to be given full effect, and
subsection (b) which requires courts to uphold constitutional values
when interpreting these rights. There is no conflation because the
two subsections (a) and (b) have a common purpose-which is to ensure
that constitutional rights are interpreted in a manner which does not
render them to be illusory and mere paper tigers. Whereas subsection
(a) requires rights to be given full effect, subsection (b) provides the
means through which how rights can be given full effect. The means
is to interpret them in a manner that protects the values which
underpin those values. In that sense, the protection of the
constitutional values is either the purpose for which the right was
guaranteed or the constitutional values function as signposts for
identifying the purpose served by the right. Thus, section 46 (1) (b) is
a means to achieve that which is required by subsection (a). In that
sense, the purposive approach to interpretation is itself a value laded
approach to rights construction and therefore section 46 (a) and (b)
must be interpreted together and holistically. Thus, the two are like
a bow and arrow which must be applied together in order to give
rights teeth and meaning.
CONCLUSION
The rules of constitutional interpretation that are provided for in
section 46 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution have their conceptual
roots in certain theories of constitutional construction, namely: the
rights indivisibility and interdependence theory, the doctrine of a living
constitution, the value based and purposive approach. These theories
are underpinned by a common objective-which is to facilitate the
interpretation of rights in a manner that promotes their effective
realization. When applied properly they will inevitably result in certain
rights being inferred upon the Declaration of Rights. Thus, section 46
(1) (a) and (b) is can be an effective pathway for reading in rights
which the Constitution is silent on, yet the enjoyment of those rights
is a precondition for the realization of the rights and the vision that is
expressly guaranteed or expressed in the Constitution. However, for
this to happen, the courts must adopt a more robust approach to the
application of the interpretive rules. This demands courts to go beyond
regurgitating what has been said by other courts or judges. The courts
must provide a comprehensive, deeper and nuanced engagement with
the conceptual underpinnings of these rules of constitutional
interpretation.
AN INTERROGATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO
COHABITATION IN ZIMBABWE AND THE NEED FOR LAW
REFORM1
BY BEVERLEY CASMILA MADZIKATIRE2 AND ELIZABETH RUTSATE3
ABSTRACT
This article specifically interrogates the extent to which the continued
lack of recognition of cohabitation relationships under Zimbabwean
law has resulted in disproportionate gendered impacts on women
involved in such relationships. Yet in all fairness and to a large extent,
a cohabitation relationship performs the same function as that of a
legally recognised marriage. It argues that the non-recognition is
discriminatory and violates section 56(1) of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe. The article builds a case on the need for law reform of
marriage laws in Zimbabwe that takes into account international
best practice.
Key words: Cohabitation, property, marriage, equality, non-
discrimination
INTRODUCTION
There is no legal definition of cohabitation in Zimbabwe nor are there
specific laws governing such relationships. A contextual definition of
the term has been adopted for purposes of this article. Cohabitation
is whereby “two adults live together in a relationship resembling a
marriage in some key respects, without being married” either under
civil or customary law4. The family is traditionally created by virtue
1
This article is largely drawn from a dissertation entitled, “A Critique of the
Law Relating to Cohabitation in Zimbabwe and Proposed Reforms” written by
Beverley Casmila Madzikatire in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the
Bachelor of Laws Honours Degree (LLBs)obtained in 2018 that was supervised
by Dr. Elizabeth Rutsate who has further revised and edited it as at 15 September
2018;
2
Beverley Casmila Madzikatire is a former law student at the University of
Zimbabwe, Faculty of Law who graduated with the LLBs Honours degree in
2018.
3
Dr. Elizabeth Rutsate is a Senior Law Lecturer within the Faculty of Law at the
University of Zimbabwe.
4
Hubbard et al, A Family Affair :The Status of Cohabitation in Namibia and
Recommendations for Law Reform (2010)Hubbard et al (Legal Assistance Centre)
116
UZLJ Interrogation of the Law Relating to Cohabitation 117
of a marriage acknowledged through a ceremony of payment of lobola

(bride wealth) or exchange of marriage vows in a court of law or at
church. For a cohabitation relationship to exist; there neither would
have been any payment of lobola nor marriage in court. Consequently
in the eyes of the law the couple is viewed as merely cohabiting;
more like two unrelated people sharing a house. Traditionally under
Shona customary law, this is widely known as “kuchaya mapoto” or
“kutizira”.5 Public policy therefore seems to militate against such
relationships6 with the law offering limited protection to cohabiters
during the subsistence of the relationship as well as at its dissolution.
Yet in all fairness and to a large extent, a cohabitation relationship
performs the same function as that of a legally recognised marriage.
2. BACKGROUND
Zimbabwe is a democratic society7 which is founded on respect for
values and principles which include the recognition of equality of all
human beings as well as non-discrimination.8 Hence all persons have
a right to equal protection and benefit of the law9 and the right not to
be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on the basis of their
social status.10 It is against this background that one notes the need
for legal recognition of cohabitation relationships in Zimbabwe. Whilst
the subject remains contentious especially regarding whether non-
recognition of cohabitation “is fair, reasonable and justifiable in a
democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality
and freedom”11 or whether it is in the interests of public morality12, it
is submitted that an approach taken in Karambakuhwa v Mabaya13 is
more encompassing vis-à-vis the rights and situation of cohabitants in
Zimbabwe.
From an international perspective, there has been in some jurisdictions
acceptance and legal recognition of family forms that are different
5
Literally translated to “beating of pots” or “eloping”
6
Chirawu Slyvia, Family Law in Zimbabwe Student Notes (unpublished,2016) pg
47
7
section 1 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe,2013
8
section 3(1)(f) & section 56 (1)
9
section 56(1)
10
section 56(3)
11
section 86(2)
12
section 86(2)(b)
13
An unreported Supreme Court case no. 158/89 where a cohabitation relationship
was given legal recognition
from marriage. One of the most progressive jurisdictions which

recognise cohabitation is Norway which provides a framework of laws
protecting such relationships. Tanzania also recognises cohabitation.
It is an inarguable fact that cohabitation has become more normative
and has attained significant similarity to marriages when viewed from
legal and economic perspectives. This calls for law reform which will
enable the de jure status to adjust and/or conform to social realities
on the ground as emphasized in Zimnat Insurance Company Limited v
Chawanda14 where it was stated that law in a developing country
cannot afford to remain static but must be dynamic and
accommodating to change. Law must adapt itself to fluid socio-
economic norms and values as well as evolving views of justice. A key
question has been what has been the basis for arguing in favour of or
against the recognition of cohabitation as a marriage worthy of legal
recognition?
1. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED FOR AND AGAINST THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF

COHABITATION RELATIONSHIPS
1.1. The Argument in Favour of Recognition of Cohabitation
Relationships
The legal recognition of cohabitation relationships has been an area
of heated debate with various scholars advocating for the protection
of vulnerable partners of such relations while others strongly argue
against such protection. H.R Hahlo15 states that “the fundamental
objection to placing a common-law marriage on the same or nearly
the same legal footing as a legal marriage is that as long as marriage
is retained as a legal institution couples who do not choose to avail
themselves of it but prefer to ‘shack up’ make a deliberate choice.
This has been largely referred to as autonomy of the individual,
freedom of choice. In other words, it is not the right of lawmakers to
dictate to persons (who have chosen not to marry) that consequences
flowing from marriage will attach to their relationship. A person who
chooses not to marry therefore cannot claim spousal benefits.
The only justification Hahlo gives for recognition of cohabitation
relationships is compassion for the woman who is usually the one who
pays for attaching to a cohabitation union the consequences of a legal
marriage. Research however, reveals that not all cohabitation
14
1990 (2) ZLR 143(S)
15
The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5th edition (1985)
relationships are by choice for example some cannot afford to pay

the traditional bride price, some live together as a prelude to marriage,
often while they are saving for the expenses attendant upon marriage.
Some are precluded by family reasons such as forbidden interracial or
interreligious marriages. Alternatively some parties who genuinely
want to marry cannot obtain a divorce from their existing spouse16
thus the choice argument seems misplaced.
Another argument advanced against legal recognition of cohabitation
relationships is that, the marriage institution loses its sanctity and
significance as recognition of such relationships protects persons who
undermine the very essence of the marriage institution. This is
evidenced by the existence of “mistress-patron” affairs. This seems
to be a public policy consideration based on preventing immorality.
However D. Singh17 distinguishes between a cohabitant and a mistress.
A female cohabitant is defined as one who is in a relationship and
cohabits in the same household as a male partner whilst the “mistress-
patron” relationship carries clear connotations of a deliberate variation
of the monogamous ideal because the mistress appears to coexist
with her lover’s spouse “in a form of quasi-polygamy, which activity
undermines the conventional marriage.18 Permanent and stable
relationships or partnerships should therefore be distinguished from
those of intermittent character.
J.D. Sinclair19 states that;
...a better argument for intervention is that the only thing that
distinguishes marriage from cohabitation is a piece of paper
that testifies to its existence. An undeniable similarity exists
between a recognised marriage and a cohabitation relationship.
The nature of the human relationship is ubiquitously identical,
children are often the result, and women are notoriously left
financially at risk when the relationship fails...Marriage and
cohabitation create similar emotional involvements,
dependencies and complex issues of finance and property.
16
Johnson v Johnson [1982] 12 Fam Law 116 cited in D Bloy Family Law (1995) pg
162
17
Divya Singh “Cohabitation relationships revisited: Is it not time for acceptance?
(1996) Volume 29, Issue 3, Comparative and International Law Journal of
Southern Africa
18
ibid
19
The Law of Marriage, Vol.1, 1996
In essence cohabitants face the same practical problems as their

married counterparts with whom any children should live and
encounter property and financial matters and possibly some element
of domestic violence or molestation.20 To that end cohabitants need
legal protection.
Sinclair notes two attitudinal perspectives to the legal protection of
cohabitation, one restrictive and the other realistic. On one hand the
question asked is whether cohabitation per se deserves special
protection by the law? On the other hand is the pertinent question
based on reality, that is, whether the victims of breakdown of intimate
relationships deserve special legal protection? The answer to the latter
is in the affirmative. One should not look so much as to whether on
face value cohabitation deserves legal protection but at the victims
of the breakdown of the relationship.
1.2. Challenges Associated with Non-recognition of Cohabitation

Relationships
The current family laws perpetuate discrimination and stigmatization
of cohabitants as legal status and benefits resulting from marriage
are the sole privilege of married couples. It can be argued that this
tramples upon the rights firmly entrenched in the Zimbabwean
Constitution namely the right to equal benefit and protection of the
law and the right to non-discrimination. Non-intervention in the
context of cohabitation manifests a choice to allow substantial
suffering to continue unalleviated21. The economically weaker partner
is always at the mercy of the stronger partner.
The law becomes retrogressive as it fails to fulfil its purpose of
adjusting to social changes in the lives of society. Thus it has been
said that by assuming that families always arise out of marriage and
using marriage as its point of departure, the law lags behind social
change.22 Hence the criticisms which have been levelled against the
contemporary analysis of the family in Africa are premised on its
tendency to define the family in terms of marriage23 with many African
law systems rarely making any provision for the rights of women who
20
D. Bloy Family Law (1995)
21
Sinclair supra
22
Amstrong. A et al, Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women’s Rights in African
Family Law, WLSA
23
ibid pg 57
are not formally married24 yet the concept of a family is not cast in
stone but covers a wide range of relationships which include
cohabitation relationships.
2. THE LEGAL STATUS OF COHABITATION RELATIONSHIPS IN ZIMBABWE: A BRIEF

OVERVIEW OF THE DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Introduction
According to Hahlo (supra), a cohabitation relationship is neither a
legal marriage nor does it ripen into one by the lapse of time.
Consequently, a cohabitation relationship generally lacks a clearly
determined legal status and there are no specific laws which are suited
to govern this type of relationship. Resultantly cohabitants suffer
certain vulnerabilities. To ascertain the legal standing of cohabitation
relationships in Zimbabwe, in this paper a cohabitation relationship
is contrasted with marriage. The main argument here is that; if only
a piece of paper distinguishes marriage from cohabitation, is the lack
of such paper by cohabitants enough justification to deny them the
legal benefits and protection enjoyed by spouses in a marriage? To
reach an informed conclusion, specific legal aspects that affect
cohabitants in Zimbabwe are explored with the key aim of revealing
the vulnerabilities that cohabitants encounter in each different aspect
discussed.
2.2. Cohabitation and the Law in Zimbabwe

Due to its colonial history, Zimbabwe has a dualist legal system whereby
general law (comprised of received laws and statutory law) operates
side by side with customary law.25 Coupled with other influences from
all over the world emanating from globalization, this has brought about
a legal pluralist environment. Ultimately this has meant that common
law, customary law and people’s customs and practices26 have been
accepted as applicable sources of law.27 There exists a potential conflict
of laws applicable to a particular situation regarding whether it is
general law or customary law that should apply. Traditionally a choice
of law criterion has been adopted to determine the applicable system
24
Ibid
25
Section 192 of Constitution
26
As long as they are positive cultural norms
27
S. Chirawu, G.Murungu et al, Challenging the Status Quo-Gender, HIV/AIDS
and the Law in Zimbabwe: A Rights-based Approach, (2007) WLSA
of law. However the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution has had the effect
of overriding some customary law choices which perpetuated gender
inequality as they tended to be discriminatory against certain groups
of people particularly women as based on gender.
Section 3 of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act28 provides
guidelines on the law to be applied in a given situation. Unless the
justice of the case otherwise requires, customary law applies in any
civil case where the parties have expressly agreed that it should apply;
or regard being had to the nature of the case and the surrounding
circumstances, it appears that the parties have agreed it should apply;
or regard being had to the nature of the case and the surrounding
circumstances, it appears just and proper that it should apply. In all
other cases, the general law of Zimbabwe is applicable. Surrounding
circumstances in relation to a case include the mode of life of the
parties; the subject matter of the case; the understanding by the
parties of the provisions of customary law or the general law of
Zimbabwe and the relative closeness of the case and the parties to
the customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe.
In Mabaudi v Mhora29 it was stated that customary law cannot be
applied to a cohabitation union. The parties in casu did not have a
customary union, which is the only recognized type of union under
customary law. The court held that general law could not be applied
as there was no cause of action pleaded based on general law and
none seemed to be applicable to the particulars of claim set out. It
follows that the applicable law to a cohabitation relationship is general
law but a party must specifically plead a recognized cause of action
such as mounting an action based on tacit universal partnership or
unjust enrichment.
Despite its growing contribution to the family setup, there is no clear
legal framework governing cohabitation in Zimbabwe. The complete
framework of legislation governing family law is not designed to cater
for cohabitants but “spouses” and to a limited extent unregistered
customary law unions which have always been distinguished by the
payment of lobola or bride-wealth. The distinction between an
unregistered customary law union and cohabitation seems to have
fallen away as the payment of lobola no longer is an essential element
28
[Chapter 7:05]
29
(HH) unreported case no 60/11
under customary law as enunciated in Katekwe v Muchabaiwa30 and

Karambakuhwa v Mabaya (supra).
Whilst there are mechanisms in place that can be invoked by cohabiting
couples31, the current laws are not designed to cater for cohabitants
as they are inadequate to most cohabiting situations. These
mechanisms do not automatically apply but rather have to be
specifically pleaded and proven. Cohabitants therefore remain
vulnerable as they do not have a clearly determined legal status. As a
result, the personal and proprietary consequences of cohabitation
remain unclear in several legal scenarios that include (i) claims for
adultery damages; (ii) sharing of property; (iii) intestate succession
rights, and (iv) maintenance during the subsistence of the cohabitation
and after its dissolution, to mention but a few.
Case law exposes the vulnerability of cohabitants. In a fairly recent
case, Nyamukusa v Maswera32 where an applicant sought distribution
of property acquired during her cohabitation relationship with the
defendant and customary union thereafter; the court clearly
distinguished the entitlements of a cohabitant to that of a spouse of
a registered marriage, the latter being in a better and more advantaged
position than the former;
She seems to be mistaking her entitlements to those of a wife
under a registered marriage as provided for in terms of the
Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:13].She seems to forget that
her claim is based on tacit universal partnership and/or unjust
enrichment.
Therefore the law as it stands provides no assistance to cohabitants,

especially women who are unable to assert their proprietary rights
and are then left with only what their partner chooses to give them.
2.2.1. Relevant Constitutional and Legislative Provisions

As indicated earlier, in Zimbabwe there is no piece of legislation that
specifically governs cohabitation relationships. The basic Statutes or
Acts that provide for family protection by the State only recognise
formal marriages and give rights to spouses within a formal marriage
30
1984(2)ZLR112(S)
31
such as mounting an action based on tacit universal partnership or unjust
enrichment
32
(HH) unreported case no 35/16 of 14 December 2015
to the exclusion of cohabitants. The spouse-centred pieces of

legislation that have provisions governing family relations in Zimbabwe
to the exclusion of cohabitants include (i) Administration of Estates
Act [Chapter 6:01], (ii) Civil Evidence Act [Chapter 8:01], (iii) Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], (iv) Customary Marriages
Act [Chapter 5:07], (iii) Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter
6:02], (iv) Maintenance Act [Chapter 5:09] and (v) the Matrimonial
Causes Act [Chapter5:13]. Further to that, the types of marriages
recognized in Zimbabwe are (i) the civil marriage contracted in terms
of the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11] which is monogamous; (ii) the
registered customary law marriage in terms of the Customary Marriages
Act [Chapter 5:07] which is potentially polygamous; and, (iii) to a
limited extent an unregistered customary law union which is valid
only for purposes of customary law and custom relating to the status,
guardianship, custody and rights of succession of children born of
such marriage.33
THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE, 2013

Section 56(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 provides that
every person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly
discriminatory manner on such grounds as include social status. It is
submitted that non recognition in the context of cohabitation deprives
cohabitants of the right to non- discrimination and the right to equal
benefit and protection of the law as per section 56(1) of the
Constitution. Every person must be given equal moral worth and
systematic inequality and disadvantage must be eradicated by actively
promoting substantive equality.
Section 46(c) of the Zimbabwean Constitution further states that a
court, tribunal, forum or body must take into account international
law and all treaties and conventions in which Zimbabwe is a party.
Zimbabwe is a signatory to treaties which include the Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on
the Rights of Women (Maputo Protocol), International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which recognise the
fundamental rights to equality and non-discrimination and further
recognise different family forms. Section 326(2) of the Constitution
33
Section 3(5) of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07]
of Zimbabwe also provides that when interpreting legislation, courts

and tribunals must adopt reasonable interpretation of legislation which
is consistent with customary international law applicable to Zimbabwe.
Thus the judiciary has a key role to play in protecting the family in
line with customary international law.
2.2.2. Statutory Provisions that Relate to Specific Areas of

Marriage Law
1. Property Distribution
There are no special rules governing property distribution between
cohabitants upon breakdown of the relationship34. Whilst distribution
of property upon divorce in marriage is governed by the Matrimonial
Causes Act35, which addresses the mischief of injustice in distribution
of property upon divorce by providing equitable principles, the Act
does not apply to cohabitants36. A good example is section 7(4) (g) of
the Act37 which requires courts to place divorcing spouses and children
in the position they would have been in had a normal marriage
relationship continued between them. Section 7(4) (e) also recognises
the direct or indirect contribution made by each spouse to the family,
including contributions made by looking after the home and caring
for the family and any other domestic duties, which provisions do not
apply to cohabitants.
Since a cohabitant cannot invoke the protective and adjustable
measures available to spouses; he or she is vulnerable when the
relationship ends. In a situation whereby property accrued during the
existence of the relationship is registered in the name of one partner,
that partner in whose name the property is registered is the sole
owner. The common practice has been for the aggrieved cohabitant
to seek remedy through proving their contribution in the cohabitation
relationship. This is achieved through establishing the existence of a
tacit universal partnership or alternatively claiming unjust enrichment
against the unjustly enriched partner so as to achieve a fair distribution
34
The principles of sharing matrimonial property upon divorce namely “his”,
“hers” and “theirs” as put out in Takapfuma v Takapfuma 1994(2)ZLR103 may
not apply to a cohabitation relationship
35
[Chapter 5:13]
36
Section 2 of the Act defines “marriage” to include a marriage solemnized in
terms of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07]
37
Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:13]
of property. However recourse to these legal solutions is not automatic

as outlined in statutory law. Rather one has to locate remedies within
the law of contract and the general law of property.
1.1. Tacit Universal Partnership

This is an alternative remedy available to a cohabitant based on the
Roman Dutch law of partnership, the societas universorum quat ex
quaestu veniunt38 where parties agree that all they may acquire during
the existence of the partnership from every kind of commercial
undertaking; shall be partnership property39. This specifically means
that as partners entered into a universal partnership, through their
conduct and joint endeavour, they jointly acquired and now own
property under discussion for their joint use and benefit.
The principle of tacit universal partnership was discussed at length in
the case of Masimbe v Mungofa.40 Referring to D v Wet N.O.41 and Ally
v Dinath42 the court held that there is no obstacle to a woman who
has lived with a man, as man and wife for a long time bringing this
type of action, namely the tacit universal partnership. However, the
cohabitant alleging the existence of such partnership has to fulfil
certain requirements before property can be equitably distributed
between the parties. In Nyamukusa v Maswera (supra) the court
reiterated the requirements for a tacit universal partnership spelt
out in Mtuda v Ndudzo43 as follows:
a) Each of the partners must bring something into the
partnership or must bind himself or herself to bring
something into it, whether money or labour or skill;
b) The business to be carried out should be for the joint
benefit of the parties;
c) The object of the business should be to make a profit; and
d) The agreement should be a legitimate one.
In addition, the intention of the parties to operate as a partnership is

also an important consideration. All these requirements must be met
prior to the finding of a relationship as a tacit universal partnership.
38
A Latin expression literally translated to mean, “dazzled as they come from
the income of a society for all”
39
Butters v Mncora 2014(3)All SA 259 (SCA)
40
HH-96-94
41
1953(1) SA 612
42
1984(2)SA 451(TPD)
43
2001(1) ZLR 710 (H)@p176 F-G
Sinclair44 points out the problems associated with the use of this legal
concept. Proving existence of a tacit universal partnership is difficult
since reliance is on an implied contract. Cohabitants seldom enter
into written agreements, making it difficult to prove the terms and
conditions of the implied partnership. This is more so when one
considers that in these cases oral evidence is largely used. The situation
is different if there is a contract present whose details and contents
are spelt out with clarity in terms of frameworks used for the sharing
of property and regulation of affairs. Unfortunately, most partners
who cohabit seldom enter into written universal partnerships. The
majority of cohabitants find themselves in a predicament when the
relationship ends as they are left without anything of note.
1.1. Unjust Enrichment Action

This is the other alternative route available to a cohabitant who wants
to claim equitable distribution of property upon breakdown of a
relationship in the courts of law. The requirements for an action for
unjust enrichment were laid out in Industrial Equity v Walker45. This
concept entails that the plaintiff has to prove contribution which if
not shared equally will leave the defendant unjustly enriched at the
plaintiff’s expense as stated in Nyamukusa v Maswera46. The requisites
to be met are;
a) The defendant must be enriched;
b) The plaintiff must have been impoverished by the
enrichment of the defendant;
c) The enrichment must be unjustified;
d) The enrichment must not come within the scope of one of
the classical enrichment actions;
e) There must be no positive rule of law which refuses an
action to the impoverished person.
This was successfully applied for in Goncalves v Rodrigues.47 The court

stated that it is a generic conception of the composite event which
gives rise to a claim for restitution. In casu after concluding that all
requisites had been proved to its satisfaction, the court ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount equivalent to fifty-per centum
44
supra
45
1996(1) ZLR 269(H)
46
HH-35-16
47
(HH) unreported case no 197/03 of 7 January 2002 & 11 February 2004
of present nature of the immoveable property or in default of doing

so the property would be sold to the best advantage and the net
proceeds divided equally between the parties.
Although these equitable doctrines work in favour of vulnerable
cohabitants, at most all they do is merely alleviate the situation of
cohabitants. In the majority of cases, cohabitants still suffer
vulnerabilities that emanate from the stringent requisites which are
often difficult to prove and inevitably lead to inequitable distribution
of assets. Family law consequences ought to flow automatically from
a cohabitation relationship that is stable and permanent, founded by
two parties with the intention to found a family.
1.1. Maintenance
Maintenance has been defined as payment of money or material
support that a person may be ordered by a court to pay so as to
provide support of his or her dependants48. Whilst partners to a civil
marriage in terms of the Civil Marriages Act49 and Customary Marriages
Act50 can claim maintenance from their spouses by virtue of a fully
recognised legal marriage in which either party is obliged to maintain
the other, this does not apply to cohabitants. There is no reciprocal
duty of support between cohabitants during the relationship or after
its termination by death or otherwise51. The Maintenance Act52 at most
acknowledges maintenance of spouses under customary law that is
those in unregistered customary law unions to the exclusion of
cohabitants. Section 6(3) states that husbands and wives under
customary law are primarily responsible for each other’s maintenance.
Since cohabitation is unknown under customary law, the legal
entitlement is not extended to cohabitants. Cohabitants may only
claim maintenance from their partners for their children but not for
themselves. This is so because maintenance laws do not distinguish in
as far as the maintenance of children is concerned.
It is argued however that if need is the determinant factor in awarding
maintenance then it should not be a challenge to use the same
48
J.Win & L.O. Venekelasen t al, Family Laws Customs and Practices in Zimbabwe
pg 99
49.
[Chapter 5:11]
50.
[Chapter 5:07]
51
Sinclair supra
52
[Chapter 5:09]
approach for cohabitation relationships. This is because cohabitation

relationships are normally dependency-producing ones and as such
logic demands that maintenance be awarded to the partner who is in
more need of such maintenance once it is established that the
cohabitation union was akin to marriage. Whilst the law does not
provide for such, the factual reality is that there is indeed reciprocal
maintenance between cohabitants who live as husband and wife during
the existence of the relationship which must not terminate with the
dissolution of the relationship.
1.1.1. Opportunities for Change

The case of Karambakuhwa v Mabaya (supra) has provided a window
of hope for law reform vis-à-vis maintenance for former cohabitants.
In casu the parties had cohabited in a union which was neither
registered in terms of status nor had lobola or roora (bridewealth)
been paid to the woman’s family. The woman’s claim for maintenance
was countered by the husband based on the assertion that he was not
legally liable to maintain her as he was a mere ‘seducer’. It was alleged
that since he had not paid nor promised to pay any roora for the
woman cohabitant, he was a mere seducer and therefore he was not
legally liable to maintain her.
The court referred to the Katekwe versus Muchabaiwa case53 and stated
that it is settled law that the question of roora is no longer an essential
element of marriage under customary law.54 The question of roora
was completely disregarded in determining whether the respondent’s
relationship with the appellant amounted to a customary union for
purposes of the Maintenance Act. The adduced evidence pointed to
the fact that the respondent had been accepted as a daughter-in law
according to custom. Further to that, the union between the appellant
and the respondent, viewed as that expected of a “husband and wife,”
was characterized by reasonable stability similar to many registered
marriages. By looking at the functional similarity between marriage
and cohabitation, the court thus discarded the allegedly cast in stone
approach which makes registration the only determinant factor in
establishing a marriage relationship.
53
supra
54
The court in Hosho v Hassisi (HH) unreported judgement no. 491/15 took a
different view stating that lobola remains the most cogent and valued proof
and indication of a customary union.
1.2. Insurance Claims and other Claims for Loss of Support

There being no reciprocal duty of support between cohabitants, it
follows therefore that a cohabitant cannot make a claim for damages
for loss of support after the death of his or her partner. If a cohabitant
who is the bread winner and sole provider dies, the surviving partner
cannot claim damages for loss of support due to him or her against
the third party who has unlawfully caused the death of the
breadwinner. This position governing cohabitation relationships is
however different from that which previously has been adopted for
unregistered customary law unions, the most popular example being
the case of Chawanda v Zimnat Limited (supra) where it was stated
that one can successfully institute a claim for loss of support arising
from the unlawful killing of their breadwinner to whom they were
married in terms of an unregistered customary law union.
In the absence of any significant uniform approach to the determination
of cases emanating from cohabitants and those in unregistered
customary law unions, dependent cohabitants have therefore
continued to suffer untold hardships as they are often left unsupported
financially when their partners who are principal breadwinners
substantially contributing to their welfare die or neglect to maintain
them during the existence of the relationship.
1.3. Evidence and Marital Privilege for Cohabitants

Marital privilege which protects communications between spouses from
being divulged in a court of law does not extend to cohabitants since
the privilege attaches to a legally recognised marital union. A
cohabitant is therefore a compellable witness and can be compelled
by a court of law to testify against his or her partner. Being called as
a witness for or against a partner in both civil and criminal proceedings
is socially undesirable as it disturbs harmony between the parties and
is harsh on the partner compelled to give evidence. Yet the confidences
exchanged between cohabitants are equally as intimate and
confidential as that of a married couple55 entitling such to the same
protection as that of a husband and wife.
Of particular relevance to this aspect is the Civil Evidence Act [Chapter
8:01]. Section 6 of the Act addresses competence and compellability
of witnesses in civil matters. Subsection 3 of Section 6 states that no
55
Bromley supra
person shall be compelled to disclose any communication, whether

oral or in writing, made by him to his spouse or made to him by his
spouse during their marriage. This applies whether or not the marriage
has been subsequently terminated by death or dissolved or annulled
by order of a court56. Such privilege however may not extend to
cohabitants as they are not encompassed in the definition of a spouse
in the Act.
Under Section 247 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence (C.P. & E)
Act [Chapter 9:07] or Criminal Code, the wife or husband of an accused
person is not compellable to give evidence against his or her spouse
(unless the crime is a grievous offence which in itself undermines the
marriage institution). These include rape; aggravated indecent assault;
sexual intercourse or performing an indecent act with a young person;
sexual intercourse within a prohibited degree of relationship;
kidnapping or unlawful detention of a child; bigamy and perjury. The
wife or husband of an accused person is a competent witness, but is
not compellable, to give evidence for the prosecution without the
consent of the accused person where such person is prosecuted for an
offence against the separate property of the wife or husband of the
accused person57. All these provisions seem to exclude cohabitants.
This means that if a cohabitation relationship breaks down, a bitter
and vindictive partner may break confidences and broadcast
information imparted and received on the shared understanding that
it would not go further. Familial harmony is thus undermined and
trampled upon.
1.4. Intestate Succession and Matters to do with Inheritance

Cohabitants do not have automatic intestate succession rights. Unlike
spouses within a formal marriage, cohabitants can only benefit from
the estate of a deceased partner through testate succession. Laws of
intestate succession do not encompass cohabitants. Hence if a partner
dies without a valid will, there is no legal protection if the property
in question is not registered in both the name of the deceased partner
and/or the surviving partner. Absence of a valid will in favour of the
surviving spouse therefore has dire consequences for the surviving
partner because if a partner dies without a valid will there is no
protection offered by the law.
56
section (6)4
57
section 247(3)
1.5. Entitlements in Respect of the Matrimonial Home

Unlike a spouse, a cohabitant holds no statutory right to occupy the
quasi-matrimonial home, but is entitled to remain in it only as an
owner or licensee. Section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act
[Chapter 6:02] provides that inheritance of the matrimonial home
and household effects is vested in the surviving spouse. A cohabitant
who is not the owner or lessee of the property has no special right to
occupy the common home. This arises from the fact that for a
cohabitant to then acquire the house; he or she must prove contribution
or joint ownership. Difficulties in proving this exposes the surviving
cohabitant not only to being evicted but also to property grabbing by
relatives of a deceased partner.
1.6. Adultery
Adultery occurs when sexual intercourse is engaged in by two people
whereby one of the parties or both are married to someone else at
the time the act of sexual intercourse took place. Consequently,
adultery damages are intended to compensate an innocent spouse for
the injury inflicted upon him or her by the defendant who has had
sexual relations with his or her spouse and also for the loss of
consortium the plaintiff may have suffered by reason of the withdrawal
of the comfort, society, love, companionship and assistance his or her
spouse was providing58. In Njodzi v Matione59 it was held that adultery
is an injury occasioned to the innocent spouse because of the
adulterous relationship. In that regard, the injured spouse can recover
damages for loss of a spouse’s consortium as well as any patrimonial
loss suffered and also personal injury or contumelia suffered by them,
inclusive of loss of comfort, society and services.
Adultery has been discussed at length in the context of registered
marriages as well as unregistered customary law unions but not in the
context of cohabitation. In Mukono v Gwenzi60, it was held that a
woman married in accordance with custom and whose marriage is
registered under the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07] cannot
claim damages against a woman who has committed adultery with
her spouse. This is so because the customary marriage under the said
58
Ncube W, (1989) Family Law in Zimbabwe pg54 para3
59
(HH) unreported case no.37/16
60
1991(1) ZLR 119
Act is potentially polygamous whereas a marriage under the Marriage

Act61 is monogamous. In Carmichael v Moyo62 it was held that a husband
in an unregistered customary law union has a legal right to sue in a
court administering customary law for adultery committed with his
spouse.
These personal consequences of marriage do not attach to cohabitation
relationships. A cohabitant cannot institute an action for adultery
damages against a third party who has engaged in sexual intercourse
with his or her partner. This would seem to suggest that in the absence
of a legally recognised marriage, no wrong is done since cohabitants
are deemed to be free to engage in sexual relations with other parties
without any consequence which obviously is not always the case. It is
argued however that once a cohabitation relationship is established,
the justice of the case would demand that in the event that one of
the cohabiting partners is unfaithful and has sexual intercourse with
a third party, the innocent partner must be awarded damages for the
wrong done. This is because except for lack of registration, for all
intents and purposes a cohabitation relationship is akin to marriage.
One can actually compare the situation to the consequences that
arise when parties breach a verbal or written contract with similar
terms.
3. MARRIAGE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. The Recognition of Cohabitation as an Emerging Family
Form
It has always been one of the key arguments by researchers on the
family, the most popular being Engels,63 that from time immemorial
the family as a social unit has been in a continuously evolving state. A
popular adage that has consequently emerged is that “the family is
61
[Chapter 5:11]
62
1994 (2) ZLR 176
63
Engels in “Origins of the Family, Private Property & the State” Available at:
https://readingfromtheleft.com/PDF/EngelsOrigin.pdf last accessed 08/30/
2018
in a state of continuity and change.”64 Engels65 cites from Lewis H.

Morgan’s 1877 book,66 where he states;
...when the fact is accepted that the family has passed through
four successive forms, and is now in a fifth, the question at
once arises whether this form can be permanent in the future.
The only answer that can be given is that it must advance as
society advances, and change as society changes, even as it has
done in the past. It is the creation of the social system, and will
reflect its culture. As the monogamian family has improved
greatly since the commencement of civilisation, and very sensibly
in modern times, it is at least supposable that it is capable of
still further improvement until the equality of the sexes is
attained. Should the monogamian family in the distant future
fail to answer the requirements of society it is impossible to
predict the nature of its successor.
It has been the case that in other jurisdictions of the world especially
Scandinavian countries (as discussed later in this article), cohabitation
has been recognized as an emerging form of a marriage relationship
despite its lack of some of the formalities currently viewed as essential
for its validity e.g. registration.
3.2. Identifying the Cohabitation Relationship as Constituting a

Family Social Unit
P.M. Bromley67 defines a family as a basic social unit constituted by at
least two people whose relationship may fall into one of three
categories. The first one being husband and wife or “two persons
living together in a manner similar to spouses.” The current laws
however are stagnant and seem not to embrace the fact that a
cohabitation relationship is an undeniable family form. The argument
here is that cognisance must be taken of this unique social phenomenon
as deserving of legal protection similar to the conventional marriage.
64
Since Welshman Ncube’s 1997 publication entitled, “Continuity and Change:
The Family in Zimbabwe” under the WILSA flagship, many other publications
on the evolving nature of the family have emerged and flooded the internet.
65
Ibid; See page 85
66
L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress
from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization, 1877 available at: http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/45950/45950-h/45950-h.htm or https://
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/morgan-lewis/ancient-society/index.htm
[last accessed 10 September, 2018]
67
P.M. Bromley and N.V. Lowe, Bromley’s Family Law 8th edition, 1992, pg 3
Following on that a key question arises, which is whether either

registration of a marriage or intention to found a family is the yardstick
of determining the validity of such relationships? If it is established
that the manner in which parties to a cohabitation relationship lived
together and that their intention thereof was to found a family, is it
justifiable to deny the parties legal recognition and protection? It is
hereby argued that cohabitants ought to be legally protected if it is
established that they fit into the description of a family unit.
3.2.1. Taking a Human Rights-based Approach to Recognizing

Cohabitation Relationships as Family Units
A rights based approach to development has been described as “a
conceptual framework for the process of human development
normatively based on international human rights standards and
operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights”68 It
integrates the norms, standards and principles of the international
human rights into the plans, policies and processes of development.
The rights based approach does not describe situations simply in terms
of human needs, or development requirements but further looks at
the society’s obligations to respond to inalienable rights of individuals69.
People are thus empowered to demand justice as a right and it gives
a moral basis from which to claim international assistance where
needed.70
Human rights are rights that accrue to a person simply by virtue of
being human and are independent of any acts of law71. A salient human
right is protection from discrimination and it is hereby argued that
non recognition of cohabitation as a family form indeed discriminates
between married and unmarried couples and amounts to unfair
discrimination. Taking an approach that is human rights based
effectively demands the establishment of a scheme that recognises
everyone’s equal rights and judges the behaviour of every person on
the basis of how people realise or violate those rights. It is more than
an individual process but a collective system which calls for state
intervention and cooperation of government with corporations and
68
Available at http://hrbaportal.org/faq/what-is-a-human-rights-based-
approach, Accessed 24 April 2018
69
Available at http://ww.icva.ch/doc00000664.html> Accessed 17 April 2018
70
ibid
71
S.Chirawu, G.Murungu et al, Challenging the Status Quo-Gender, HIV/AIDS and
the Law in Zimbabwe: A Rights-based Approach, (2007) WLSA
individuals to redress this discrimination especially since cohabitation

and marriage serve the same function and is becoming increasingly
normative. State institutions cannot continue to ignore this social
phenomenon.
In order to grasp the extent to which the family has evolved and
continues to do so in a manner that is increasingly accommodative of
cohabitation relationships, it becomes important to undertake a brief
analysis of relevant provisions that accommodate cohabitation under
the various international human rights conventions to which Zimbabwe
is party.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

(1966)
Article 23 of the ICCPR provides that the family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the state. In paragraph 2 of its General Comment No. 19
on Article 23 of the ICCPR (The Family) Protection of the Family, the
Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses72 the UN Human Rights
Committee takes note of the fact that the concept of family may
differ in some respects from state to state or region to region within
a state and thus it is impossible to give the concept a standard
definition. The committee goes further to take note of various forms
of family which include unmarried couples and their children. The
Human Rights Committee takes the same stance in paragraph 27 of
its General Comment No. 28 of 2000 on Article 3 on “Equality of
rights between men and women”73
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (CEDAW) (1981)
Stating that “state parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations...”;74 ‘Article 16.1 of the CEDAW
contains both a general call for equal rights and responsibilities of
72
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139bd74.html [last accessed
31 August, 2018]
73
available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c9b4.pdf [last accessed 31
August, 2018]
74
See Article 16 of the CEDAW available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm [last accessed 08/31/2018]
spouses and a right to equality in property relations in particular,’75

By necessary implication, it would follow that non-recognition of
cohabitation relationships perpetuates discrimination against women
in matters relating to marriage and family relations. In most instances
the woman will be a housewife or earns a small wage whilst the man
will be gainfully employed naturally placing the woman at an economic
disadvantage when the relationship terminates.
3. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples

Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)
(2005)
Despite the inarguable fact that Africa as a continent has its fair
share of unregistered customary marriages some of which are nothing
more than cohabitation relationships, it is to be noted that under the
Maputo Protocol a hard line stance is taken against unregistered unions
whereby Article 6 on Marriage in paragraph (d) states that, “...every
marriage shall be recorded in writing and registered in accordance
with national laws, in order to be legally recognised.” There thus
exists a gap between the de jure and de facto status of marriages and
what is recognized as a family on the continent inclusive of Zimbabwe
which requires urgent redress.
4. The African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)

(1981)
Article 2 of the ACHPR provides that every individual shall be entitled
to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and
guaranteed in the Charter without distinction of any kind such as
race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any
other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.
It can be argued that the phrase “other status” encompasses
cohabitants. One of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter
is in Article 3 which provides that every individual is entitled to equal
protection of the law. It therefore means that failure to offer legal
protection to cohabitation relationships perpetuates unjustified
inequality between formally married and cohabiting couples.
75
See A. Hellum and H.S. Aasen in “Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in
International, Regional and National Law- A Study of Human Rights Convention”
(2000) at page 282
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)
Both the CRC and the ACRWC recognize the family as the fundamental
basis of society and also the natural environment for the growth and
well-being of all its members particularly children which must be
afforded the protection and assistance necessary for the full
assumption of its responsibilities within the community.76 Reference
is made to “a family environment”77 which must be conducive for the
child to grow up in an atmosphere of happiness, love and
understanding. The term has been defined to mean different family
structures arising from various cultural patterns and emerging familial
relationships78 and this seems to encompass cohabitation relationships.
5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS: THE CASE OF

AFRICA AND SCANDINAVIA
5.1. Introduction
Despite the general lack of protection for cohabitation relationships
across the world inclusive of Zimbabwe there exists exceptional
jurisdictions within which provisions have been put in place to
eliminate the inherent insecurity of cohabitation relationships. This
has been achieved by giving legal recognition and protection to
cohabitants through acknowledging cohabitation relationships as a
new family form different from marriage. Examples used in this article
are South Africa, a country with a legal system similar in many aspects
to Zimbabwe; Tanzania, an African country which has pro-cohabitation
laws and Norway, a Scandinavian country which has the best practices
insofar as it gives considerable rights to cohabitants.
5.2. South Africa

South Africa like Zimbabwe has no specific legislation which governs
cohabitation relationships. It is characterized by rigid family structures
centred on marriage. In Volks No v Robinson and others79 the court
had occasion to mention that it could legitimately distinguish between
married and unmarried people and could accord benefits to married
76
see Preamble to CRC and Article 18 of the ACRWC
77
see Article 20 and Preamble to CRC and Article 18 ACRWC
78
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,” Fortieth session: Day of General
Discussion, Children without Parental Care”, CRC\C\153, 17 March 2006
79
2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC)
persons which it does not accord to unmarried persons80. However,

certain statutes in South Africa recognise cohabitants which will be
discussed below. South African courts like Zimbabwe have extended
protection to cohabitants who can prove the existence of universal
partnership.81 South African courts have further recognized contracts
entered into by and between cohabitants as enforceable. Further to
that, the Draft Domestic Partnership Bill of 2008 which has not been
adopted as law to date would alleviate most of the problems
cohabitants in South Africa encounter due to their non-recognition by
the current South African marriages legal regime.
5.2.1. Statutory Recognition

Similar to the position in Zimbabwe, cohabitation in South Africa is
recognised under the South African Domestic Violence Act of 1998. A
domestic relationship is defined to include persons who are of ...or
the opposite sex who live or lived together in a relationship in the
nature of marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to
each other, or are not able to be married to each other.82 The law thus
provides maximum protection to victims of domestic violence. The
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 defines a dependant to include a
‘partner.’ Consequently, either partner in a cohabitation relationship
may name the other as a beneficiary in a life-insurance policy. The
nomination will, however, have to be clear because a clause in an
insurance policy that confers benefits on members of the insured’s
‘family’ may cause problems.83 The South African Compensation for
Occupational Diseases Act, 1997 also states that a surviving domestic
partner may claim for compensation if their partner died as a result
of injuries received during the course of work, provided that, at the
time of the employee’s death they were living as ‘husband and wife.’
5.2.2. Cohabitation Contracts

South African courts have in the past recognised cohabitation
contracts. These are contracts similar to an ante nuptial contract
that regulates obligations during the subsistence of the relationship
80
for example duty of support, cohabitation and fidelity
81
Ally v Dinath supra , Butters v Mncora supra looks at indirect financial
contributions
82
Section 1 (vii)(b) of the Act
83
http://divorceattorneycapetown.co.za/living-together-law-cohabitation-
common-law-marriage-laws-of-cohabitation-common-law-marriage/ Accessed
23 March 2018
and patrimonial consequences of termination. Whilst some have argued

that they are contrary to public policy84, the argument proffered in
this article is in support of taking an accommodating approach that
does not view such contracts that create families as being contrary to
public policy. The position of a cohabitation relationship in society is
not likely to encourage people to cohabit who would not do so anyway
and if two people do intend to live together, it is better that the law
gives cohabitants a framework within which they should give some
thought to their financial and other arrangements if the union should
break down.85
In Steyn v Hasse86 it was held that in South Africa cohabitation is a
common phenomenon and widely accepted but cohabitants generally
do not have the same rights as partners in a marriage or civil union. It
was said that although no reciprocal duty of support arises by operation
of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants, it does not preclude such
duty from being regulated by agreement. This follows that if one
partner refuses to follow the agreement; the other partner can
approach a court for assistance. In most cases, a court will enforce
the agreement provided the agreement is not illegal, against the morals
of society or contrary to public policy.87 For example in Zimbabwe a
court would not be able to enforce an agreement between two persons
of the same sex purporting to be cohabiting because the relationship
contravenes Constitutional provisions and is void ab initio.
5.2.3. South Africa’s Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008

The 2008 Domestic Partnership Bill is an elaborate piece of draft
legislation which seeks to provide cohabitants with an option to register
their relationship as a domestic partnership and attaining similar rights
and responsibilities as those obtaining within a marriage union. The
draft bill provides for the legal recognition of domestic partnerships
and the enforcement of the legal consequences of domestic
partnerships. The mischief sought to be addressed is that there is no
legal recognition or protection for opposite-sex couples in permanent
partnerships. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to
84
Hahlo supra
85
Bromley P.M. et al supra
86
A93/2013
87
http://divorceattorneycapetown.co.za/living-together-law-cohabitation-
common-law-marriage-laws-of-cohabitation-common-law-marriage/accessed
23 March 2018
equal protection and benefit of the law. Rights of equality and dignity
of the partners in domestic partnerships therefore must be upheld
and family law must be reformed to comply with the applicable
provisions of the Bill of Rights.
1. Requirements to be Met under the Draft Bill

Clause 4 of the draft bill outlines qualifications that have to be satisfied
for one to be recognized as a cohabitant which includes the need;
• To be a partner in one registered domestic partnership at any
given time.
• For one of the prospective partners to be a South African citizen.
• Not to be formally married.
• Not to be within prohibited degrees of relationship to marry on
the basis of consanguity or affinity.88
• To be aged 18 years or older.89
Once the registration process is complete, the registrar issues to the
partners a certificate which becomes prima facie proof of the existence
of a registered domestic partnership between the partners and, where
applicable, a certified copy of the registered domestic partnership
agreement is attached thereto.90
2. Partners’ Duties and Entitlements under the 2008 SA Domestic

Partnerships Bill
Various duties and entitlements flow from a domestic partnership or
cohabitation relationship as provided for under the Draft 2008 Bill
namely;
(a) Duty of support
Clause 9 of the draft Bill provides for the duty of support. Partners
owe each other a duty of support in accordance with their respective
financial means and needs. It is defined in clause 1 as the responsibility
of each registered domestic partner to provide for the other partner’s
basic living expenses while the registered partnership still exists.
Maintenance after termination is provided for in clause 18 and
maintenance after death in clause 19.
88
clause 4(5)
89
clause 6
90
clause 6(6)
(b) Right of occupation of family home

Clause 11 on the right of occupation of family home states that both
registered domestic partners are entitled to occupy the family home
during the existence of the registered domestic partnership,
irrespective of which of the registered partners owns or rents the
property. The registered partner who owns or rents the family home
may not evict the other registered partner from the family home
during the existence of the registered domestic partnership. Further
to that clause 20 equates a spouse’s entitlements under the Intestate
Succession Act to a registered domestic partner.
(c) Division of property
Clause 22 governs property division upon termination of a registered
domestic partnership. A partner may apply to court for an order to
divide their joint property or separate property, as the court may
deem fit. A court must order the division of property in a manner it
regards as just and equitable considering relevant factors which are
outlined in the Bill. In dividing property, the court considers direct or
indirect contributions made by a partner to the maintenance or
increase of the separate property or part of the separate property of
the other registered domestic partner during the existence of the
registered domestic partnership.
(d) Unregistered Domestic Partnerships
In the 2008 draft Bill unregistered domestic partners are provided for
under Chapter 4. A partner may apply upon termination of the
partnership for an order for maintenance, intestate succession or a
property division order91 within two years from the date of termination
of the unregistered partnership.92 The court first looks at several factors
which include the length of the relationship, degree of financial
dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial
support between the unregistered domestic partners; the reputation
and public aspects of the relationship, the degree of mutual
commitment to a shared life and the relationship status of the
unregistered domestic partners with third parties.
Despite providing expansive protection to cohabitants, the draft Bill
has its own shortcomings. It has been argued that the bill is flawed in
that it wrongfully presumes that upon termination of the relationship
91
clause 26 of the Bill
92
clause33 of the Bill
individuals will have the knowledge and resources to engage with the
courts to seek protection.93 Further to that the Bill has taken too long
prior to becoming operational since it can only enter into operation
when a date is fixed by the president of South Africa through
proclamation in the Gazette.94 This is still to occur.
5.1. anzania
5.1.1. Statutory Recognition of Cohabitation

The Tanzanian law unlike Zimbabwe has an explicit provision which
seems to address the insecurity of cohabitants by providing better
protection for cohabitants’ rights. Section 160 (1) of The Law of
Marriage Act Chapter 29 speaks of a rebuttable assumption which
arises when a man and a woman have lived together for two years
that they are married. In a situation where this presumption is rebutted
in a court of competent jurisdiction, section 160(2) provides for the
woman to apply for maintenance for herself and children, if any. In
brief, the court is clothed with jurisdiction to make an order or orders
for maintenance and upon application made therefore either by the
woman or the man, to grant such other reliefs including custody of
children, as it has jurisdiction under the Act to make or grant upon or
subsequent to the making of an order for the dissolution of a marriage
or an order for separation, as the court may deem fit. The requirements
to be met for the presumption to apply are such that the plaintiff has
to prove that though not officiated, the relationship was in the eyes
of the community a lawful marriage and the two had lived together
as husband and wife. In John Kirakwe v Iddi Siko95 it was held that to
constitute a presumption of marriage three elements are necessary;
firstly, the parties should have cohabited for over two years, secondly,
the parties should have acquired the reputation of husband and wife
and thirdly, there was no formal marriage ceremony between the
said couples. In Martine v Christopher96 it was held that there is a
firm distinction between a formal marriage solemnized through some
form of a ceremony and the rebuttable presumption of marriage under
93
De Vos, P. Still out in the Cold? The Domestic Partnerships Bill and the
(Non)protection of Marginalised Woman, in Sloth-Nielsen J. and Z. Du Toit,(eds)
Trials & Tribulations, Trends and Triumphs: Developments in International,
African and South African Child and Family Law, 2008
94
Clause 36 of the Bill
95
[1989] TLR 215
96
Civil Appeal No.68 of 2003
section 160(1) of the Act. Thus the appellant’s ground of appeal based
on the fact that the court a quo distributed matrimonial assets before
declaring that the marriage had irretrievably broken down was
misplaced there being no marriage to dissolve. However, since the
parties had cohabited for 10 years without any form of marriage
ceremony, the presumption of being duly married was rebuttable but
the respondent in casu was entitled to the same reliefs as any other
woman upon dissolution of a formal marriage pursuant to what section
160(2) of the Law of Marriage Act Provides.
5.2. Norway
Norway has been described as an interesting example of the
institutionalization of modern cohabitation as the country has gone
full circle with regard to the regulation of cohabitation.97 Although
there is no specific Act which regulates all the affairs of cohabiting
couples in Norway, cohabiting couples enjoy considerable recognition
in many aspects such that it has been said that cohabitation in Norway
has been recognised in law in ways that blur the differences between
cohabitation and marriage. This is discussed in detail below and
particular reference is made to legislation which recognises and
protects the rights of cohabiting couples.
5.2.1. Property Matters

The Norwegian Household Community Act of 1991 which applies also
to two or more unmarried adults who live together in a household for
at least two years, confers upon such persons a certain right to take
over residence or household goods when the cohabitation ends due to
the death of a member of the household or for any other reason. The
distribution of the joint residence and household goods of cohabiting
couples is operational when a household community ceases to exist.
A partner can therefore have a right to purchase the common residence
and household goods at a market value upon termination of the
household98. It has been said that this inheritance right cannot be
restricted by a will or an inheritance agreement99.
97
Syltevik, L.V. “Cohabitation from illegal to institutionalized practice: the case
study of Norway 1972-2010” in 2015, Vol. 20, Issue 4, The History of the Family,
515-529
98
Sverdrup, National Report on Informal Relationships: Norway (2015) available
online at http://www.ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/Norway-Property
[last accessed 10 Sept, 2018]
99
ibid
Cohabitants can also establish co-ownership100 upon termination of a

cohabitation relationship. This applies where it has not been agreed
upon as to who is deemed the owner of particular items of property.
If such co-ownership is proved, partners own an equal part unless
facts of the case justify a different fraction of ownership. Co-ownership
limits the exclusive right of a cohabitant to dispose an item co-owned
and creditors may not dispose of the item as well. An unjust enrichment
action can also be mounted upon termination of the relationship in
exceptional circumstances.
5.2.2. Inheritance
The inheritance laws in Norway are favourable as they recognize the
right of a cohabitant to benefit from an estate under intestate
succession. The Norwegian Inheritance Act, 2009 101 confers to
unmarried cohabitants who have had; had or are expecting to have
children, a right to either inherit approximately 40,000 Euros or to
postpone the settlement and keep part of the deceased’s estate
undivided. By allowing a surviving cohabitant to inherit or retain the
undivided portion of the estate in certain circumstances, the law is
adaptive to change and steps in to protect the economically vulnerable
cohabitant.
The Inheritance Act defines cohabitation as two people who live
together in a marriage-like relationship and are above the age of
eighteen years as long as they are not married or registered partners
or cohabiting with others. The yardstick is evidently not registration
but determination of whether a certain relationship is “marriage like”.
This is indeed a progressive piece of legislation. The two persons must
permanently reside together but shorter periods of separation may
not disqualify a person the right to inherit. However, certain persons
are excluded from the definition of cohabitation that is two persons
that are so closely related that they cannot marry.
5.2.3. Adoption
The Norwegian Adoption Act, 2014 provides that married and
cohabiting couples have equal rights in as far as adoption is concerned.
Section 5 of the Act states that a person who is married or is a
cohabitant may only adopt jointly with his or her spouse or cohabitant,
unless the spouse or cohabitant is insane, mentally retarded or is
100
In accordance with the Norwegian Co-ownership Act
101
section 28(b) and (c)
missing. Section 5(a) defines the term “cohabitants” to mean two

persons who live together in a stable, marriage-like relationship.
Cohabitants can also adopt from each other but consent has to be
given first by the partner concerned.102 The effect of adoption is that
the adopted child retains the same legal status in relation to both
cohabitants as if he or she were their joint child.103
5.2.4. Similarities with Zimbabwe

However despite the legal recognition of cohabitants in Norway, similar
to the situation in Zimbabwe is the fact that cohabitants do not owe
each other a legal duty of maintenance. There is no recognised legal
duty which the law confers on cohabiting partners to maintain each
other. However an agreement by the partners may stipulate issues of
maintenance. The absence of symbolic aspects of marriage that include
the ritual, public declaration and wedding which are very important
social markers of the marriage relationship distinguish cohabitation
relationships from marriage.104
6. CONCLUSION
6.1. ntroduction
A brief analysis of the jurisdictions discussed clearly shows that
cohabitation relationships can be legally protected. An analysis of
the progressive South African and Tanzanian legal frameworks has
confirmed that “the African marriage covers a wider range of flexible
relationships, performing various social functions, which reflect their
specific socio-economic conditions.”105 Family law thus cannot be
confined only to registered marriage relationships. The yardstick ought
to be intention and not registration. Stable, intimate, dependence-
producing relationships are worthy of the protection of the law. Lessons
can thus be learnt from the progressive laws of Tanzania and Norway.
6.2. A Summary of the Zimbabwean Situation and Suggested

Solutions
The position of cohabitation relationships as currently obtaining in
Zimbabwe is highly unsatisfactory and needs redress as a family is not
102
Section 5(b) provided they are not of the same sex and the child originates
from a foreign state which disallows such adoption
103
Section 13
104
Syltevik supra
105
Amstrong et al supra pg 55
created only through registration. The current family law in Zimbabwe

unfairly discriminates between formally married partners and
cohabitants by excluding the latter from protection guaranteed by
these statutes. This is despite the fact that there exists a functional
similarity between marriage and cohabitation with only a piece of
paper distinguishing the two. Women are the most affected group as
in most cases they are unable to assert their proprietary rights. Modern
state intervention in family laws is critical to curb perpetuation of
economic vulnerability of cohabitants. Whilst there is no single solution
which completely addresses the situation of cohabitants in Zimbabwe,
various reforms can be adopted as drawn from the international human
rights framework and the very progressive grounding within
Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution. Suggested below are some of the
recommended solutions;
1. Law Reform
The role of law is threefold namely: to provide mechanisms and rules
for adjusting the relationship between family members; to provide
protection for individuals from possible harms suffered within the
family and lastly to support the maintenance of family relationships106.
Thus reform is vital in the context of cohabitation for law to fulfil its
purpose as law does not exist in a vacuum. Its effectiveness is judged
by its ability to fulfil these roles. There is need for home grown
solutions which fully address the vulnerability of cohabitants in
Zimbabwe because “…if the law is to be a living force, it must be
dynamic and accommodating to change.”107
A comparative analysis of Zimbabwe to the selected jurisdictions has
shown that cohabitation relationships can be protected by the state.
South Africa’s draft bill on domestic partnerships is a comprehensive
document which seems to address all aspects which need reform in as
far as cohabitation relationships are concerned. Zimbabwe would do
well to adopt the approach taken in the very progressive jurisdictions
of South Africa, Tanzania and Norway.
2. Cohabitation Contracts
Another best practice which Zimbabwe can emulate from South Africa
is the use of cohabitation contracts. The courts can give recognition
106
Eekelaar, Family Law and Social Policy,2nd ed (1984)
107
as per Gubbay CJ in Zimnat v Chawanda (supra)
to and enforce cohabitation contracts entered into by cohabitants for

lawful ends. These contracts will provide a mechanism for the sharing
of property and regulation of other legal aspects of the cohabitation
relationships. A cohabitation contract can encompass aspects such as
ownership and occupation of the common home, ownership of
household goods while the relationship lasts and after its termination,
each party’s obligation to contribute to household and living expenses,
and the ongoing duty of support.108
3. Use of Judicial Discretion

Another solution lies with the judiciary through its use of wide
discretionary powers. Instead of looking at whether a registered
marriage exists, a court may look at the function the relationship
serves to fulfil. The intention of the parties in entering the relationship
and their conduct may be helpful in this regard. Sinclair describes it
as “flexibility through the extension of discretionary judicial
powers.”109 Such an approach goes further than identifying if the
formalities of a valid marriage have been met. The judicial process
therefore has a vital role to play in moulding and developing the process
of social change to meet the expectations of people in developing
countries as stated in Zimnat v Chawanda (supra).
4. Legislative Intervention
The legislature may intervene by promulgating a law that legally
recognises cohabitation relationships and provides legal entitlements
to the partners during the existence of the relationship and upon its
dissolution. Cohabitants will be able to rely on statute for redress of
their family law based legal concerns. The statute may also provide
for the registration of cohabitation relationships.
108
Sinclair supra
109
ibid
COLLUSION! IN DEFENCE OF FREE SPEECH IN SPORTS AND
THE UNACCOUNTABILITY OF GLOBAL SPORTS
ADMINISTRATION BODIES
BY LYNDON T. NKOMO1
ABSTRACT
Global Sports Administrative Bodies are powerful and influential
institutions. Sovereign States in their individual capacities struggle
to deal with some of their rules and decisions. They also have direct
jurisdictional authority over individual athletes. At the centre of
their jurisdictional authority is their power to admit, suspend or
expel both individual nations and athletes from participating in global
sporting competitions. Athletes have to be careful about what and
how to express themselves on and off the field because of restrictive
rules on speech. Freedom of Speech in sports is, therefore, under
serious threat because of multi-million dollar commercial interests
in the form of sports sponsorships benefiting Global Sports
Administrative bodies. Consequently, within the context of global
sports administration some domestic constitutional freedoms such
as freedom of expression rank below international rules set by these
Global Sports Administrative institutions. Such conflict is not easy to
resolve and it requires political rather than legal initiatives to resolve.
Sovereign nations are unable to protect themselves and their athletes
against some unfair decisions of global sports administrative bodies.
Concerted efforts by groupings of nation states at continental or
regional levels are an imperative in dealing with what appears to be
administrative excesses of Global Sports Administrative Bodies.
Key Words: Global Sports Administrative Bodies, The Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS), International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF),
Freedom of Expression, Doctrine of Prior Restraint, Commercial
Sponsorships
INTRODUCTION
On Saturday 26 June 2010 at 09.00am there was an extensive report
on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation’s former SFM radio station
1
(LLB (HONS), LLM, MBA
149
morning news bulletin on Zimbabwe Football Association (FIFA)’s ban

on football players who celebrate scoring goals by pulling off their
shirts to show religious messages inscribed on undergarments such as
vests. The most common message was “I belong to Jesus.” The report
went on to say that ZIFA had taken a similar measure on Evans
Gwekwerere, a local football player. ZIFA imposed a ban on him for
showing an undergarment vest with a similar type of message each
time he scored a goal for his club, Dynamos. On 6 February 2014, a
local newspaper The Chronicle reported that “HIGHLANDERS FC faces
serious sanctions from the world soccer mother body FIFA if their
coach Kelvin Kaindu continues to wear clothing with religious
statements during matches. The Zambian mentor, a God-fearing man,
has sometimes been spotted during official matches wearing a white
shirt with the inscription, Joshua 1v5 or ‘It Shall be Well’.”2
The Vatican Sports Foundation was reported as having criticized FIFA
for trying to ban religious expressions. According to the Catholic news
agency website, the President of the John Paul II Foundation for Sports,
Eddio Constantini “…severely criticised the president of the
International Soccer Association Board (FIFA), Joseph Blatter, for
seeking to prohibit religious speech during matches. Blatter’s action
came after the Brazilian national team huddled for a prayer at the
conclusion of the Confederations Cup”’3
The FIFA ban against any player displaying an undergarment with
religious or political expressions emanate from FIFA Law 4, Clause 5,
which states that “Equipment must not have any political, religious
or personal slogans, statements or images. Players must not reveal
undergarments that show political, religious, personal slogans,
statements or images, or advertising other than the manufacturer`s
logo. For any offence the player and/or the team will be sanctioned
by the competition organiser, national football association or by FIFA.”4
2
Skhumbuzo Moyo, “It shall NOT be well: FIFA bans clothing with religious
messages” The Chronicle, 6 February, 2014
3
“Vatican Sports Foundation Criticises FIFA for trying to ban religious expression”
16 July 2009, www.catholicnewsagency.com Accessed on 10 August 2010
4
FIFA LAWS OF THE GAME 2009/2010 http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/federation/81/42/36/lawsofthegameen.pdf. Accessed on 10
August 2010 and the latest version is 2018/2019, http://static-3eb8.kxcdn.com/
documents/661/133139_290518_LotG_18_19_EN_DoublePage_150dpi.pdf
Accessed on 19 July, 2018
UZLJ In Defence of Free Speech in Sports 151
FIFA Law 4, Clause 5 expressly bans any form of speech on under-

garments worn by footballers. It is wide in its scope of application
and it prima facie infringes on the concerned footballers’ fundamental
right to freedom of expression. This law has not materially changed
since the World Cup in South Africa was held even though FIFA and
the International Football Association Board regularly reviews the
“Laws of the Game”
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical justification for supporting protection of free speech
in general has been thoroughly explained in literature and there is no
need to repeat it. However, the general protection of free speech has
been premised mostly on protection of political speech probably
because it lies at the core of the circle of protection5 of free speech
and although one of the fundamental justifications for protection of
free speech is self-fulfilment or self-realisation6 which is inextricably
linked to individual autonomy7 . Self-fulfilment ordinarily underpins
the intrinsic value of free speech more than its instrumental value,
especially in defence of free speech in professional sports which are
inherently associated with the desire for team or individual
achievements. Thomas Emerson makes reference to self-fulfilment
in his identification of four values underpinning the importance of
free speech which are as follows:
1) assuring individual self-fulfilment; 2) advancing knowledge
and discovering truth; 3) provid[ing] for participation in decision
making by all members of society; 4) achieving a more adaptable
and hence a more stable community, …maintaining the precarious
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.8
Competitiveness in professional sports is inherently characterised by

the desire for self realisation underlined by the hunger to succeed or
upstage one’s competitor more than for its recreational purposes.
The expressions that follow in the heat of the moment especially
after a contest won or a goal in football scored, regardless of whether
the team is on the losing end or not, demands tolerance. Lee Bollinger
5
Richard Moon The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression University
of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo London, p 16
6
Thomas I Emerson “Towards a general theory of the First Amendment” 72 Yale
Law Journal 877 1962-1963 p 878-9
7
Ibid
8
Ibid
introduces a new debate on this concept and argues that ‘tolerance’

equates to “showing understanding or leniency for conduct or
ideas…conflicting with one’s own’ rather than as the ability to
endure.”9 Tolerance thus underlines the intrinsic value of free speech
which is inextricably linked to self-fulfilment or self-realisation. Thus,
the emergence of success or a win in any competitive professional
sports is the pinnacle of self-realisation or self-fulfilment which is
usually denoted by certain individual expressions whether involuntarily
or voluntarily done in response to a momentous achievement.
Therefore, this paper argues that speech which is ordinarily expressed
by footballers especially in victorious moments; including the
revelation of expressions written on undergarments deserve protection
due to the intrinsic value of that articulation to the individual
expressing it. Further that where such speech violates other people’s
rights as defined by individual domestic constitutions of the affiliate
members of FIFA, appropriate legal sanctions should then be imposed
post facto rather than imposing pre-publication bans. Thus, protection
of speech in sports should be premised ordinarily on the justification
of self-realisation and tolerance of speech and this is advanced here
as a basis against the denial of free speech rights of athletes by global
sports administrative bodies like FIFA.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER ZIMBABWEAN LAW

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by Section 61 (1) of the
Zimbabwean Constitution, which provides that:
“Freedom of expression and freedom of the media
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes-
(a) freedom to seek, receive and communicate ideas
and other information
And section 61 (5) provides that:

Freedom of expression and freedom of the media exclude;
(a) incitement to violence
(b) advocacy of hatred or hate speech;
(c) malicious injury to a person’s reputation or dignity;
(d) malicious or unwarranted breach of a person’s right
to privacy.
9
Bollinger Lee C. The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech
in America Oxford: Oxford UP 1986
Section 61 (1) constitutionally guarantees the right to free expression

whilst section 61 (5) prohibits certain forms of speech as noted above.
The speech that is banned by FIFA’s Law 4, Clause 5 is one that is
generally protected under the Zimbabwean Constitution.
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The question that this paper seeks to answer is how then does one
reconcile constitutional guarantees and the rules of sport without
necessarily interfering with the efficient administration of sport? The
problem with FIFA’s rule is that it bans all kinds of slogans and
advertising on undergarments. The rules do not categorise what is
acceptable and unacceptable speech but imposes pre-publication ban
of forms of expression on undergarments. It is understandable that
some forms of speech may impinge on the basic rights of other people
and some commercial speech may conflict with the rights of corporates
with exclusive rights to advertise at FIFA organised events and
tournaments. Football is a source of livelihood for many professional
footballers and, as such, it is presumed that care is needed through
management to ensure the protection of the investment taken by
major stakeholders in the sport. Most of the financing in football comes
from the sale of television and radio broadcasting rights, and team
and individual sponsorship endorsements. Nevertheless, the question
remains as to whether the ban should be effected prior to publication
or post facto or at all. Prima facie, any form of pre-publication ban of
speech is censorship and it must be settled by our courts as to whether
such justification is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
PRE-PUBLICATION BAN
The pre-publication ban of undergarment speech that is created by
the provisions of FIFA’s Law 4, Clause 5, is drawn from the doctrine of
prior restraint. This, as explained by Thomas J Emerson “…deals with
official restriction imposed on speech or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication and its effect is to prevent
communication from occurring at all.”10 Ariel L. Bendor argues that
“in practice, it is possible to restrict a right through the use of criminal
law, civil law, administrative law, or a combination of both. Rights
may be limited by means of physical or normative prior restraint (action
taken to prevent a given act from occurring), by means of subsequent
10
Thomas J Emerson ‘The Doctrine of Prior Restraint’ Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol 20 No. 4 (Autumn 1955), p 648
sanctions (penalties imposed to create a disincentive to act in a certain

way), or by combination of the two.”11
Violation of FIFA’s Law 4, Clause 5 by any footballer attracts sanctions
which can either be a caution (yellow card) or expulsion (red card)
from the football match and, in some grave circumstances, financial
penalties. Prior restraint is, therefore, a form of censorship which is
not concerned with the substance or content of the speech no matter
how positive or harmless it may be. John Calvin Jefferies argues that
“Any system of prior restraint of expression comes to court bearing a
heavy presumption against constitutional validity.”12
The construction of Section 61 (1) (a) of the Zimbabwe Constitution
prima facie makes the doctrine of prior restraint illegal unless, after
balancing the provisions of this section with the rights of any other
people in terms of section 86 (1) of the same Constitution, it is found
that the limitation of speech by way of a prior restraint was reasonable
and justifiable in a democratic society. Whilst freedom of speech is
the cornerstone of human liberty and dignity,13 this fundamental right
is nevertheless not absolute.14
FIFA’s intention is to protect its commercial interests through the sale
of television broadcasting rights and attracting sponsorship from
various corporates. Therefore, care is taken not to permit expressions
or conduct likely to hurt the interests of the sponsors.
However, there seems to be some discriminatory application of the
rules by FIFA and its affiliates because whilst written expressions on
undergarments are prohibited, the same measure of restriction is not
applied to other expressive displays such as dreadlock hair styles which
may be regarded as a form of religious expression. The issue of
dreadlocks is of particular importance because whilst some footballers
wear them for fashion others do so as part of the Nazarene religious
practice associated with the Rastafarian religious movement.15 Dianne
11
Ariel L Bendor ‘Prior Restraint, incommensurability, and the constitutionalism
of means’ Fordham Law Review Vol 68 1999, p 294
12
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr ‘Rethinking Prior restraint’ Yale Law Journal Vol 92,
No.3 (Jan. 183), p 409
13
Cohen v California 403 US 15, 24
14
Section 36 of the Constitution of South Africa
15
Dianne Gereluk ‘Why can’t I wear this?! Banning symbolic clothing in schools’
Philosophy of Education 2006 at p 107 http://ojs.ed.uiuc.edu/index.php/pes/
article/viewFile/1522/262 Accessed on 13 October 2010
Gereluk argues that Rastafarianism is a religion and some who have

been sanctioned for wearing dreadlocks in school have argued against
the bans on the basis of freedom of religion. The Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe in re Enoch Chikweche 16 held that the status of
Rastafarianism as a religion in the wide and non-technical sense had
to be accepted and the applicant’s manifestation of his religion by
wearing dreadlocks fell within the protection afforded by s 19(1) of
the pre-2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 17 The Court cited with
approval the decision of Judge Posner in Reed v Faulkner 842 F 2d 960
at 962 where he held that Rastafarianism is a religious sect that
originated among black people in Jamaica…’ It follows, that if wearing
Rastafarian dreadlocks is regarded as a form of religious expression
then why should FIFA discriminate against footballers who express
their faith by wearing under-garments with religious messages printed
on them?
The Tehran Times reported that FIFA attempted to ban female Iranian
football players from wearing the hijab whilst playing football at the
Youth Olympic Games notwithstanding their strict Islamic dress code.18
Lack of policy consistence on the part of FIFA regarding intolerance
towards certain forms of expressions displays a selective ban of some
forms of expression. Such bans deny both the intrinsic and instrumental
values of individual forms of expression as expressed within the context
of sport.
SPORTS AS A HUMAN RIGHT

A number of international instruments recognise participation in
various sporting disciplines as a human right. Paragraph 4 of the
Fundamental Principles of Olympism acknowledges that “The practice
of sports is a human right”. Article 11 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women makes
reference to the provision of the same opportunities to participate
actively in sports and physical education. Article 1 of the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)’s Charter
of Physical Education, Physical Sport provides in Article 1.1 that “Every
human being has a fundamental right of access to physical education
16
995 (4) SA 284 (ZC)
17
Ibid at p 290 G
18
The Tehran Times ‘FIFA ban Iranian Women from wearing the Hijab in YOG’,
April 4, 2010 http://www.tehrantimes.com/PDF/10836/10836-13.pdf Accessed
on 18 October 2010
and sport, which are essential for the full development of his
personality.” This proposition affirms the nature of human rights as a
complex symbiotic web of social values that modern democratic states
accord to all their citizens. Sport is, therefore, a medium of expression
of talent, skills, intellectual art, ideas and thoughts through which
successful participation brings joy and personal fulfilment to the
individuals concerned. The joy may not be complete unless forms of
expression are performed and any inhibition of such performances
will be prima facie in violation of the individual footballer’s freedom
of expression.
IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

In re Munhumeso & Ors19 Gubbay CJ observed that “The importance
attaching to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly must never be under-estimated. They lie at the
foundation of a democratic society and are one of the basic conditions
for its progress and for the development of every man.”20 The judge
further argued that “Freedom of expression, one of the most precious
of all the guaranteed freedoms has four broad special purposes to
serve; (i) it helps an individual to obtain self-fulfilment; (ii) assists in
the discovery of truth; (iii) it strengthens the capacity of the individual
to participate in decision making; and (iv), it provides a mechanism
by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance
between stability and change.”21
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa has made
similar observations and acknowledgments as exhibited by O’Regan
J’s views in Fred Khumalo & Ors v Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa22
that “Freedom of expression is integral to a democratic society for
many reasons. It is constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human
beings. Moreover, without it, the ability of citizens to make responsible
political decisions and to participate effectively in public life would
be stifled.” 23
The value of freedom of expression is recognised in international
instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
19
1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S)
20
Ibid, at p56
21
Ibid, at p57
22
CCT 53/01
23
Ibid, at para 21
Rights (ICCPR) (Article 19 (2)), the European Convention on Human

Rights (ECHR) (Article 10 (1)), the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR) (Article 13), and the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights (ACHPR).
IS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT?

It has been observed in Khumalo and Others v Bantubonke Harrington
Holomisa (Supra) that “… although freedom of expression is
fundamental to our democratic society, it is not a paramount value. It
must be construed in the context of the other values enshrined in our
Constitution.”24 A court seized with the duty to construe the scope
and application of a fundamental right as against the rights of others
must play a balancing act that ensures the right equipoise between
recognition and enforcement of the right and the respect of the rights
of other citizens.
In the exercise of one’s freedom of expression regard must be had to
constitutional limitations. However, it must be noted that “Rights
and freedoms are not to be diluted or diminished unless necessity and
intractability of language dictate otherwise.”25 The test will not be
complete unless a court answers the question whether it is reasonably
justifiable in a democratic state to curtail a particular constitutional
freedom as required by s86 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
‘I BELONG TO JESUS’ CELEBRATION

The question which this paper attempts to answer in addition is how
expressions such as ‘I belong to Jesus’ can be protected in international
sports administered by International Sports Federations such as FIFA.
Thomas Scanlon argues that “In order for any act to be classified as
an act of expression it is sufficient that it be linked with some
proposition or attitude which it is intended to convey”.’26 Therefore,
the exhibition of an undershirt or garment with the inscription ‘I belong
to Jesus’ is a religious expression acknowledging of the power of Jesus
Christ which the athletes concerned probably link to their sporting
success and it stands as a proposition which the footballers concerned
intend to convey. Consequent upon this and on the basis of Thomas
24
Khumalo & Ors (Supra) at para 21
25
Thomas Scanlon ‘Theory of Freedom of Expression’ Philosophy and Public Affairs
Vol 1 Number 2, (Winter 1972), p 206
26
Ibid
Scanlon’s reasoning,27 this expression should be protected speech

because of the intrinsic religious value it carries for some of the
professional footballers.
RATIONALE FOR CENSORING EXPRESSION IN SPORT

Ray Tarnowski28 argues that censorship in sport is employed because
professional leagues are run like businesses and, as such, authorities
running a particular professional sport such as football have particular
concern for the image they portray to the public. Therefore, they
would not want to alienate public support for a particular sport29
which they administer. He further contends that “no sports league
could prosper if its product — the athletes and coaches — offend the
public.”30 In sports such as NBA basketball, financial penalties are
imposed for breaking censorship rules even where a particular player
self-criticizes or is critical of match officials. In football, a player is
shown either a yellow card for minor offences or a red card for repeated
or serious offences. John O. Spengler et al,31 argue that “Constitutional
law usually is not applicable to professional sports for two major
reasons. One, athletes in professional sports are parties to a collective
bargaining agreement. When a player union agrees to a collective
bargaining agreement, certain individual rights are relinquished,
including freedom of expression. Secondly, professional Sports Leagues
are not state actors but private entities.”32 Aleck Van Vaerenburg
points out two issues that make it difficult for human rights to be
taken as part of the Sports Administration, namely, contractual and
lack of government involvement in the administration of sport. It must
be noted that the second reason proffered by Spengler et al relates
to the application of the United States of America’s Constitution which
is to the effect that “The majority of the rights and protections
afforded by the US Constitution and its amendments only apply to
governmental or state action.”33
27
Ibid
28
Ray Tarnowiski ‘Shut Up and play: Censorship in major professional sports’
April 24, 2003, http://wwww.unc.edu/-tarnowsk/shut.pdf Accessed on 16 July
2010.
29
Ibid, page 2
30
Ibid, page 2
31
John O Spengler, Paul Anderson, Daniel P Cannaughton and Thomas A Baker,
Introduction to Sports Law, p162
32
John O Spengler, Paul Anderson, Daniel P. Cannaughton and Thomas A Baker
Introduction to Sports Law p 162
33
Ibid p 163
The South African position differs as argued by Jonathan Burchell

that “The Constitutional Court …has underscored the application of
the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) to relationships
between private individuals, as well as between State and the
individual.”34 The Zimbabwean position is similar to that of South
Africa by virtue of the provisions of s 45 (1) and (2) of the Constitution
of Zimbabwe which stipulate the scope of application of the Bill of
Rights. Prima facie, an individual sportsman whose constitutional rights
may have been violated by a sports federation (which can be a private
body) can, on the basis of the violated right, seek vindication of his or
her rights.
ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

FIFA’s constitution provides for dispute resolution mechanism through
arbitration and its constitution which requires the inclusion of
arbitration clauses as a form of dispute resolution mechanism in the
constitutions of the national football associations/federations down
to the professional football clubs’ statutes of governance for as long
as they are affiliated to the national association which is a member of
FIFA. Consequent upon this, it is the individual footballer who suffers
in the event of any violation of his or her constitutional freedoms due
to the restrictions that have to be included in club contracts preventing
individual footballers from suing FIFA or their national association in
domestic courts. The complexity of this issue is that football
tournaments are organized either by the national association or the
international federation and, as such, professional footballers are made
to contract themselves out of their constitutional rights whenever
they take part in their sport.
Louis M Benedict argues that “... the broad truth is that within the
international system States are much less important…”35 mainly
because they compete against each other on platforms established
by private international bodies such as FIFA and the International
Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF). He further contends that “…
these major international bodies operate at a level of coherent global
34
Jonathan Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy in South Africa: A
transplantable hybrid’ Electronic Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 13.1 (March
2009) http://www.ejcl.org Accessed on 6 August 2010, p 4
35
Louis M Benedict ‘The global politics of sports: The role of global institutions
in sports’ p 1-2.
power unknown to the aspirants in the field such as… human rights.”36
The resultant effect is the emergence of States that are weaker in
their ability to protect the civil rights of their citizens against such
international sports bodies as FIFA and the IAAF. Attempts by some
countries like Nigeria and Greece to interfere with the authority of
some of these global sports administrations like FIFA have been
vigorously resisted and taken as political interference in sport37 . In
respect of actions by Nigeria and Greece respectively, FIFA threatened
to ban Nigerian football teams from all international tournaments
that are organized by FIFA and suspended the Greek Football
Association’s FIFA membership. As FIFA is an internationally recognized
global football administration body and there is political leverage to
be gained from participating in FIFA organized football events,
particularly because of their popularity with the majority of the
electorate, the threats of FIFA sanctions weakens a State’s ability to
protect the civil liberties of its citizens. The popularity of the World
Cup may be epitomized by an estimated audience of 700 million people
who watched the FIFA World Cup Final in Johannesburg, South Africa
in July 2010.38
Consequently, if the State is weak and athletes are also weak, the
latter become commercial objects with little or no basic freedoms
sacrificed on the altar of commercialisation of sports. These athletes
are huge assets on their clubs’ balance sheets, not free to disengage
themselves from their contracts and gagged from speaking to the
media without authorisation for fear of antagonizing their sponsors
or risking huge financial losses in penalties or loss of personal
sponsorships. Athletes are required to conduct themselves in ways
that do not alienate their leagues from their sponsors. Ethan Yale
Bordman notes that “... in an effort to curb player comments about
the game several years ago Cincinnati Bengals added an addendum to
all contracts, allowing the team to terminate performance bonuses
for players who criticise team mates, team managers, or game
36
Ibid.
37
‘World Cup 2010: FIFA threatens Nigeria with ban over team’s suspension’
www.telegraph.co.uk Accessed 4 October 2010
38
Graham Dunbar Associated Press, ‘FIFA expects 700 million to watch World
Cup Final’ 11 July 2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/11/
fifa-expects-700-million-watch-world-cup-final.html. Accessed on 5 October
2010.
officials.”39 Sports leagues are run as businesses and, to prevent any

possibilities of financial losses by way of sponsorship withdrawals,
national leagues and global sports administrations are always quick
to impose sanctions against ‘delinquent’ sportsmen.40 Ray Tarnowski
argues that “playing a professional sports is a privilege and to enjoy
this privilege you must follow the rules but how does one reconcile
this with the internationally recognized right to take part in sports if
it is a privilege.” 41 It appears that the assertion that playing
professional sports is a privilege is the basis upon which basic human
rights are trammelled. This weakens a player’s ability to speak out
and stand against any violations of basic human rights in the
management of sport because of the fear of losing very lucrative
professional contracts. The downside of this assertion is that it pays
little attention to the athletes’ natural talents and abilities which in
many cases attract sponsorships for the sports by creating platforms
for commercial advertising due to the large audience, particularly for
football, which is targeted by commercial sponsors. There is therefore
an imbalance of value between the natural talents that attract
lucrative sports sponsorships and the commercial rights on one part
and the inherent basic rights of the athletes on the other.
Global sports administrations are sponsored by international businesses
that are keen to preserve the sanctity of their global images by
dropping certain leagues or individual sports personalities who may
have conducted themselves in ways perceived to be offensive to some
sections of the global community. For instance, the news of Tiger
Woods’ infidelity led to withdrawal of his personal sponsorships by a
number of commercial enterprises such as AT&T42 and Accenture.
Stephanie Rice, an Australian swimmer. lost her Jaguar sponsorship
for tweeting anti-gay sentiments43 . Therefore, the most prudent way
of protecting the commercial interests of global sports administrative
39
Ethan Yale Bordman ‘Freedom of speech and expression in sports’ Michigan
Bar Journal September 2007, p 37
40
Note 9 (above) p 3
41
Ibid
42
‘AT&T drops sponsorship deal with Tiger Woods’ http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/
business/01/01/10/att-drops-sponsorship-deal-tiger-woods Accessed on 10
October 2010
43
‘Gay slur costs Stephanie Rice Jaguar sponsorship deal’ September 07, 2010
12:00AM http://www.heraldsun.com.au/entertainment/confidential/gay-slur-
costs-stephanie-rice-jaguar- sponsorship-deal/story-e6frf96x-1225914998070
Accessed on 6 October 2010
bodies is by punishing what is perceived to be dishonorable conduct

or speech with potential to alienate sponsors from the sport, regardless
of the individuals’ constitutional rights.
It does not matter whether or not the speech/expression is offensive,
for as long as it is perceived to be potentially harmful to the pecuniary
interests of the global sports administration such speech will be
banned. In fact, as noted above, FIFA exercises pre-publication
censorship regardless of the nature of the content intended to be
published thus, from simple birthday dedications to strong religious
and political views, all have no place on soccer platforms convened
by FIFA and its affiliates. The fact is that undergarment free speech
lags subserviently to commercial interests.
Andre J Lang argues that
…the problem with the emergence of various global
administrative bodies is that their rules, procedures and internal
organizations generally do not correspond with the procedural
and substantive standards that have been developed for the
exercise of power within the liberal –democratic nation states.44
There is lack of accountability on the part of global sports

administrations as
[t]he global administrative space is characterized by lack of
accountability towards individuals. In particular the rules and
decisions adopted by GABs often do not observe the standards
of fundamental rights protection that is required within the
nation state.45
Therefore, there is a serious conflict between the interests of

democratic States to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens
and the commercial interests of global sports administrations that
compromise the basic freedoms of footballers and other athletes.
The challenges are, therefore, how to hold the global sports
administrations accountable for violation of free speech rights of sports
people and how to create the right equipoise between protection of
commercial interests and the right to free speech of professional
players. The scales are currently tilted in favour of commercial
44
Andre J Lang ‘Global administrative law in domestic courts. Holding global
administrative bodies accountable’ p 4
45
Ibid p 4
interests because of the huge pecuniary interests that global sports

administrations have in different sporting disciplines. Most football,
athletics and cycling clubs are no longer social clubs but incorporated
commercial enterprises. Businesses exist to make money for the
investors and anything likely to hinder good returns is regarded as
anathema to the business’ reason for existence. In this context, where
finance is paramount, fundamental rights including free speech become
secondary concerns.
STATUS OF FIFA
The status of FIFA makes it difficult if not impossible for the individual
rights of football players to be protected or enforced against FIFA
because according to Rule 64 (2) of FIFA Statute 2009, “Recourse to
ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for
in FIFA regulations.”46 FIFA is a voluntary association of football
administrations responsible for organising football in their countries47 .
Membership to FIFA is on a voluntary basis and as such FIFA emphasises
independence from political interferences in football thus steering
away from accountability to any nation. Member Associations including
football players and their agents are barred from suing each other in
domestic courts which are mandated to interpret and enforce
constitutional rights and freedoms derived from national constitutions.
To ensure that this requirement is implemented, Member Associations
are obliged by FIFA Statutes to include
[a] clause in their statutes or regulations stipulating that it is
prohibited to take disputes in their Association or disputes
affecting Leagues, member leagues, clubs, players, officials and
other Association officials to ordinary courts of law…48
These provisions thus incapacitate footballers from seeking to vindicate

their rights against violations by FIFA and its affiliates. Ordinarily,
individuals vindicate their basic constitutional rights in ordinary courts
of law. FIFA and its affiliates or member associations are empowered
to “impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this
requirement and ensure that any appeal against such sanctions shall
likewise be strictly submitted to arbitration, and not to ordinary
46
Rule 64 (2) FIFA Statutes August 2009
47
Ibid, Rule 10(1)
48
Ibid, Rule 64 (3)
courts of law”49 When a sportsman elects to be a professional footballer

under FIFA or its affiliate members’ organised leagues they effectively
contract themselves out of some of their basic human rights. The
scheme of arbitration provided for in FIFA Rules is intended only to
apply in the enforcement of FIFA regulations and football laws.
This places FIFA in the position of being an independent and
unaccountable global sports administrative body. The challenge,
therefore, is how to hold FIFA and other like sports federations
accountable for their actions in accordance with the dictates of some
domestic laws of their individual member association. FIFA may be
calling for consistency in their decision making process and the rules
that bind them but athletes should not be forced to sacrifice their
basic constitutional rights in the service of the commercial interests
of sports federations.
WAY FORWARD
Andre J Lang argues that “[i]t should be the role of domestic courts
to establish accountability mechanism towards those sports regimes
whose internal rationality is focused on cleanliness and economic
prosperity of sports.”50 However, the difficulty with Lang’s contention
is one of enforcement of the decisions of the court because most
sports competitions are arranged under the auspices of the global
administrative bodies. FIFA has powers under its statutes to ban, expel
or suspend any member association which violates its statutes or whose
national government interferes with the administration of football in
that country. For instance, FIFA suspended the Greek Football
Association’s membership after the Greek Government refused to pass
a law that guaranteed that football matters could only be decided by
the Greek Football Association.51 Thus, whilst a domestic court may
vindicate an individual footballer’s constitutional rights, that footballer
or the national association of the footballer’s country may either be
banned or expelled from participating in competitions arranged by
FIFA. Therefore, Lang’s argument may not be sustainable as FIFA
statutes render decisions of domestic courts ineffective especially
relating to enforcement against a non-resident international body.
49
Ibid
50
Andre J Lang (ibid at note 43) p 24
51
Gabriel Marcotti ‘Is football still above the law?’ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/sport/football/article621061.ece Accessed on 11 August 2010
Perhaps, the best route is to learn from how the European Union
reacted to the FIFA stance on one occasion. The European Commission
took a unified stance against FIFA when it sought to introduce a rule
that would potentially infringe on the freedom of movement and
protection against discrimination within the European Community. In
this regard, the European Commission in 200852 rejected a proposal
by FIFA relating to the 6 + 5 Rule which entailed that “…that 6 of the
11 football players on the pitch have to be of the nationality of the
country of the football club…” 53 The position of the European
Commission was that professional footballers are workers, and
therefore the right to free movement and the principle of non-
discrimination applies to them. The 6+5 Rule would constitute a direct
discrimination of the grounds of nationality. 54 The European
Commission further stated that European Member States were bound
by the European Treaty and if any of the member states were to allow
the enforcement of this rule in their country then the European
Commission would take the Member States to court. This stance caused
FIFA to stand down on its proposals. The action by the European Union
indicates that if continental bodies such as the African Union are
prepared to stand together and defend the basic rights that they have
all agreed to protect through the African Charter of human Rights,
then FIFA and other related Global Sports Administration bodies will
be forced to revise some of their restrictive rules that infringe on
basic human rights.
The argument from the European Commission was premised on
potential violations of the basic rights to free movement and the right
not to be discriminated against. These basic human rights fall into
the same category as the right to freedom of expression. As has been
argued above, there is no basic human right that assumes greater
value than others and as such the right to free speech must be
protected in equal manner to the right to free movement or the right
against discrimination.
Pre-publication censorship of speech by FIFA should not be permitted.
Sanctions should only be imposed on offending footballers if the speech
is likely to incite violence, terrorism, war, or hatred among different
52
Commissioner Vladimir Spidal ‘The Commission shows red card to the 6+5 rule
proposed by FIFA’ 28 May 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/social/
main.jsp?langid=en&catid Accessed on 11 August 2010
53
Ibid
54
Ibid
people or groups of people in a particular country or region or if it

promotes discrimination among different people on the basis of
religion, colour, creed and such other associated factors post facto.
Ordinarily, international bodies intervene in countries where there
are human rights violations on the premise that international peace
and order are sustained better in an international system that consists
of countries respectful of human rights. This proposition should,
therefore, form the basis of continental intervention to defend the
basic human rights of sport personalities. Only in circumstances where
an athlete makes speech or other forms of expressions such as those
prohibited should they be sanctioned by either FIFA or the National
Association or the organizers of a competition that is run under the
auspices of global administrative body. Whilst Global Sports
Administrations have no national identity, they have significant
influence in countries where they operate especially through their
affiliate member bodies such as ZIFA or the appropriate body dealing
with human rights violations complaints in a particular country such
as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission.
The vigor with which international communities such as the EU and
the UN speak out against human rights violations should be with the
same strength demonstrated to engage FIFA and other related
International Sports Federations to ensure their respect for
fundamental human rights. Sponsorship withdrawals must not be used
to muzzle sports personalities. If, as argued by David Kinley and Sarah
Joseph, multi-national corporations such a Nike, Adidas and Coca Cola
can sometimes be economically stronger than the State in which they
are operating — particularly in developing countries — then
mechanisms must be in place to ensure that both legal and quasi
legal duties are imposed on them to ensure that they will always act
in ways that seek to protect human rights55 and not to indirectly
promote violations of basic human rights by threatening sports
sponsorship withdrawals.
Some US courts have held that they have jurisdiction over particular
international sports administrative bodies as in the matter of Harry
L. Reynolds, Jr v International Amateur Athletic Federation & Ors56
55
David Kinley and Sarah Joseph ‘Multinational Corporations and Human Rights’
Alternative Law Journal Vol (27) No.1, February 2002 at p 9
56
841 F. Supp.1444 (1992)
where the issue before the court was whether or not the US court
concerned could exercise personal jurisdiction over the IAAF. Using
the Ohio long arm statute in the Ohio Revised Code which sets out the
ground upon which a non-resident defendant may be sued in the Ohio
courts57 the court found that it could exercise personal jurisdiction
over the IAAF. The court noted that in Flight Devices, 466f.2d at224-
25 that the Ohio long arm statute was construed to extend the
jurisdiction of Ohio courts to the constitutional limits.
Individual countries may need to formulate similar legislation in order
to have jurisdiction over bodies such as FIFA in order to enforce
judgments in areas where it has both direct and indirect activities.
CONCEPT OF PROPORTIONALITY
Whatever the methods employed to force FIFA and other global sports
administrations to respect basic freedoms, the guiding factor in
ensuring the proper interpretation and application of the scope of
the basic freedom of expression should always be the concept of
proportionality. This principle entails that the decisions of officials
should be judged not just against the criteria of legality and rationality,
but against a benchmark which maintains that limitations on the
fundamental rights must be necessary to meet a legitimate end in a
democratic society, and must not infringe a basic right to a greater
extent than is required to achieve that end.58
The issue here is whether impugning of the fundamental rights such
as the right to freedom of expression in sports is necessary to achieve
a legitimate end? If so, what is the legitimate end? FIFA Statutes do
not seem to set out the mischief aimed at by banning such forms of
expressions and religious practices but one would assume that it may
be to ensure orderliness in the administration of football. If that is
the argument, then how does FIFA justify acceptance of certain forms
of expression and discriminate against others when their objectives
are similar. For instance, the dreadlocks associated with Rastafarianism
are accepted whereas taking off a shirt to show religious expressions
is prohibited. Some football teams gather together to do their war
cries before the start of matches, yet praying together as the Brazilians
national football team did after winning the Confederations cup was
57
Ibid, p 1449-50
58
‘Note on the legal doctrine of proportionality’ Children’s Rights Alliance
February 2007
prohibited59 as was the wearing of T-shirts with religious or political

messages 60 . FIFA does not seem to have a problem with footballers of
catholic faith who are allowed to perform the crucifixion as a sign of
celebrating their victories but the Iranian women were banned from
playing football wearing the hijab61 until they forcefully pleaded with
FIFA for this permission.
In English law, the test for proportionality was set out in de Freitas v
Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and
Housing in which the Privy Council set out a three pronged test to the
following effect; whether:
The legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify
limiting a fundamental right;
The measures designed to meet the legislative objective are
rationally connected to it;
And the means to impair the right or freedom are no more than
is necessary to accomplish the objective.62
The first issue is whether the objective of FIFA in restricting under-

garment messages is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of
freedom of speech. There is no evidence available on record to show
that a player or players were hurt or harmed for expressing their
religious or political opinions. The majority of football violence
emanates from hooliganism perpetrated mostly by drunken football
fans. The determination of appropriate thresholds or proportions of
speech would therefore guide FIFA and any other country as to what
is permissible speech in a particular society and avoid sanctioning
footballers and other athletes for expressing speech that may not
have any effect on sporting interests or commercial interest.
The proportionality principle is part of the European Court
jurisprudence and in David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission
of the European Communities63 sport was deemed to be subject to
59
Note 2 above
60
Salvatore Landolina, ‘World Cup 2010: FIFA ban Brazil players from displaying
religious t-shirts’ June 12, 2010, http://www.goal.com/enus/news/3296/brazil/
2010/06/12/1972668/world-cup-2010-fifa-ban-brazil-players-from-displaying-
religious- Accessed on 22 October 2010
61
Note 7 above
62
[1999] 1 AC 69 at p80 also referred to in Regina v Secretary for the Home
Department ex parte. Daly at para 25 per Lord Steyn
63
C-519/04P
community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity and the

judgement goes on to state that the courts will not intervene to
interfere with rules that concern purely sporting interests.64 The task
would be to come up with an appropriate equipoise that will ensure a
balance between the protection of the interests of FIFA or any other
international sports administrative body and the individual
fundamental rights of the athletes as protected under the domestic
laws of the country of domicile of the club or the athlete.
Alec Van Vaerenburg identifies two key issues that restrain domestic
courts from intervening in sports disputes even where human rights
issues have been violated. Regrettably most of the instances arise
from doping cases. He noted that “... the sports regime only establishes
a contractual relationship or at best regulates private matters between
individuals”65 and does not normally involve the State. The court
decision reached in Gundel v I EF was that “a penalty prescribed by
doping regulations is one of the forms of penalty fixed by contract
and therefore based on party autonomy”.
The reasoning was that parties to a contract are assumed by law to
have equal bargaining power and as such are autonomous. This
assumption may not be correct because the nature and structure of
FIFA does not establish a platform for negotiation on its rules by
individual football professional. The bargaining power of the individual
players is weak as correctly noted by Van Vaerenburgh that
[a]thletes are forced to subscribe to the statutes of a private
body if they want to compete. Those accession agreements lack
the even handedness and arm’s length bargaining of ordinary
contracts.
Professional football players cannot negotiate directly with FIFA

regarding any football rules. Members of FIFA are football federations/
association that administer football in different countries. In the
domestic scenario it may either be a professional league that will be
affiliated to the national administrator or the football club that will
be affiliated to the national association. FIFA rules and regulations
are implemented and enforced by the national association. Again,
the football players come at the tail end and have no right of audience
64
Ibid. Press Release dated 18 July 2006
65
Alec Van Vaerenburg ‘Regulatory Features and Administrative Law Dimensions
of the Olympic Movement’s Anti-doping Regime’ Global Administrative Law
Series, IILJ Working Paper 2005/11 p 13
at the national association.

Thus to contend that human rights issues in sports cannot be addressed
in sports governance is to ignore the fact that the contract that enables
a party to compete as a professional footballers does not permit direct
negotiations with the rule makers and it is not autonomous as assumed
in the matter of Gundel v IEF66 . Thus if footballers are unable to
autonomously negotiate their contracts and are constrained in their
conduct on the field including what expression may be exercised by
them then they start their negotiations from a very weak position.
Domestic courts must find some grounds for intervening particularly
where human rights are violated with the justification that State funds
are sometimes used to fund the construction of stadiums — particularly
in the under-developed world — and they are not private venues where
speech may be restricted. Thus the fact that FIFA and its affiliates
use public resources in pursuing their objectives must encourage
domestic courts to intervene whenever there is a call against potential
human rights violations by FIFA and other international sports
federations.
Timothy Zick argues that “…speech and spatiality cannot be completely
severed from one another”67 Football is played for enjoyment of fans
and the cheering expressions of the fans are regarded as part of public
discourse. However, footballers are banned from exhibiting either
religious or political speeches on the same platforms. Implicit in and
essential to freedom of expression is the need for adequate physical
space in which speech can be without restraint.68
Whilst FIFA resents political intervention in the administration of
football, it has itself taken political positions regarding certain political
dispensations. It banned South Africa from participating in international
football during the apartheid era until after 1994. FIFA’s position with
regard to players exhibiting free speech of either political or religious
nature may be construed as hypocrisy. In any case, the very nature of
FIFA’s structures and operations is largely political. For instance, one
of the essential pre-condition for a country to host the World Cup is
that the bidding federation must secure government guarantee for its
66
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, March 15, 1993.
67
Timothy Zick ‘Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography’ (2006).
Faculty Publications Paper 276. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/276
or George Washington Law Review Vol 74, 2006 p441
68
Ibid
bid. It is, therefore, not surprising that the huge contribution of funds
needed to support the preparation for the hosting of the World Cup
tournaments are drawn from the national government treasuries of
the hosting countries.
CONCLUSION
The importance of free speech in sports cannot be over emphasised.
The administration of professional sports should not place unchecked
prominence over fundamental human rights. What FIFA and other global
sports administrative bodies may be avoiding is being held to account
for their actions by national governments. Now is therefore the time
for continental political bodies to confront FIFA head on and ensure
that mechanisms are put in place to hold them accountable for human
rights violations.
REFLECTING ON THE APPLICABILITY OF FREEDOM,
SANCTITY AND PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IN ZIMBABWEAN LAW
OF CONTRACT
BY INNOCENT MAJA1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the applicability of the long established
contractual doctrines of freedom of contract, sanctity of contract
and privity of contract in modern day Zimbabwean law of contract.
It argues that even though the three doctrines are still applicable,
there are instances where they have not be strictly adhered to and in
some cases redefined.
Key words: freedom of contract, sanctity of contract, privity of
contract, contract.
1. INTRODUCTION
The doctrines of freedom of contract, sanctity of contract and privity
of contract are foundational principles upon which Roman-Dutch law
of contract was initially established. This article analyses the three
doctrines and reflects on the extent to which these doctrines are still
applicable in the current Zimbabwean law of contract.
2. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The doctrine of freedom of contract provides that one is free to enter
(not to enter) into a contract without interference or restriction.2 A
person has the freedom to choose with whom to contract, whether or
not to contract, and on what terms to contract. In Printing & Numerical
Registering Company v Sampson, the court underscored the doctrine
of freedom of contract when it held as follows:3
If there is one thing more than another that public policy
requires, it is that man of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be
1.
LLBs (Hons), LLM and LLD. Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe.
2.
Maja, I The Law of Contract in Zimbabwe (2016) Maja Foundation, Harare.
3.
Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 465.
172
UZLJ Freedom, Sanctity and Privity of Contract Law of Contract 173
held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore,

you have this paramount public policy to consider — that the
courts are not likely to interfere with this freedom of contract.4
It is interesting to note that in Munyanyi v Liminary Investments &

Anor,5 the court established that freedom of contract is not limited
only to the freedom to make a contract but also freedom to vary the
contract. The parties have the liberty to change their minds as many
times as it suits them as long as at each time that they do so, they are
acting in concert and their minds meet.6
In Chanakira v Mapfumo & Anor,7 the court established that public
policy upholds — as a fundamental principle — the freedom and sanctity
of contract and requires that commercial transactions should not be
‘unduly trammeled by restrictions on that freedom.’
Inherent in the doctrine of freedom of contract is the acknowledgment
that individual citizens and or corporations have delegated sovereignty
that enables them to participate constantly in the law-making process.
The consent of contracting parties embodied and expressed in a
contract creates law. Viewed from this perspective, freedom of
contract decentralises the law-making process. As a result, law is not
only an order imposed by the state from above upon its citizens but
also an order created from below.8
A critical look at the current law of contract shows that there are a
number of circumstances where the doctrine of freedom of contract
is not strictly applied. First, freedom of contract is limited by the
requirement that all contracts should be legal. This means that any
contract which is entered into freely and voluntarily but which
contravenes some legal rule in statute or public policy in common law
cannot be enforced at law based on illegality.
4.
See also Chanakira v Mapfumo & Anor Limited S-86-06; Tonderai Hamandishe
& Anor v Maffack Properties (Pvt) Ltd HH-160-10; and International Trading
(Pvt) Ltd 1993 (1) ZLR 21 (H).
5.
Munyanyi v Liminary Investments & Anor, HH-38-2010.
6.
See Kessler, Friedrich, ‘Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract’ (1943). Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2731.
7.
Chanakira v Mapfumo & Anor HH-155-10.
8. 8
See Cohen, M ‘The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46 Harvard Law Review 553, 585;
& Note, E Mutuality in ‘Exclusive Sales Agency Agreements’ (1931) 31 Columbia
Law Review 830.
Second, an agreement entered into freely and voluntarily with a person

without contractual capacity is deemed void in the law of contract.
For instance, contracts entered into freely and voluntarily by minors,
insane persons, intoxicated persons, prodigals, insolvents etc. cannot
be enforceable at law. This limits freedom of the parties to choose
the person with whom to contract.
Third, monopolies restrict the freedom of parties to choose with whom
they want to contract. For example, in Zimbabwe the Zimbabwe
National Water Authority monopoly on water and the Zimbabwe
Electricity Supply Company monopoly on electricity limit the
consumer’s freedom to contract with whosoever they please.
Consumers are compelled to contract with these institutions only.
Fourth, covenants in restraint of trade also restrict freedom of
contract. A contract in restraint of trade is one by which a party
restricts his future liberty to carry on his trade, business or profession
in such manner and with such persons as he or she chooses.9 Such
contracts place restrictions upon the parties’ freedom to contract
with whosoever they want and wherever they choose.10
Fifth, quasi-mutual assent potentially limits freedom of expression.
Quasi-mutual assent binds a party to a contract — no matter what his
or her real intention is — if (s)he conducts himself in a manner that
makes the other party reasonably believe that (s)he has assented to
the terms of a contract. This rule may lead to the imposition of non-
consensual obligations and therefore restrict the doctrine of freedom
of contract.
Finally, standard form contracts also limit freedom of contract.
Examples of standard form contracts include bank account opening
contracts, insurance policy contracts, air tickets, mortgage contracts,
university enrolments etc. For practical reasons and cost
considerations, it is more expedient for banks, insurance companies,
airlines, building societies, and universities to couch their contracts
in a standard manner thus limiting the freedom of contract on the
part of the contracting client.
9.
Seddon, N; Bigwood, R; Ellinghaus, M (2012) Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of
Contract 351.
10.
See Mangwana v Muparadzi 1989 (1) ZLR 79 (S
Clearly, even though the doctrine of freedom of contract is still part

and parcel of the current law of contract, it has not been strictly
applies in some instances.
3. SANCTITY OF CONTRACT
Sanctity of contract provides that once a contract is entered into
freely and voluntarily, it becomes sacrosanct and courts should enforce
it.11 According to Sir David Hughes Parry:12
When all persons interested in a particular transaction have given
their consent to it and are satisfied, the law may safely step in
with its sanctions to guarantee that right be done by the
fulfillment of reasonable expectations.
A similar sentiment was echoed in E. Underwood & Sons Ltd v B.

Baker13 where the court held as follows:
To allow a person of mature age and not imposed upon, to enter
into a contract, to obtain the benefit of it, and then to repudiate
it and the obligations that he has undertaken, prima facie at all
events, is contrary to the interest of any and every country.
In Madoo (Pty) Ltd v Wallace14 the Court held that ‘[o]ur system of
law pays great respect to the sanctity of contact. The Courts would
rather uphold than reject (contracts).’ The Zimbabwean case of Old
Mutual Shared Services (Pvt) Ltd v Shadaya15 established that the
doctrine of sanctity of contract holds in Zimbabwe. Mwayipaida Family
Trust v Madoroba and Others buttresses this point by holding that
‘[i]t is the policy of the law to uphold, within reason, the sanctity of
contracts.’16
Beale, Bishop and Furmston17 argue convincingly that sanctity of
contract has a double emphasis. The first emphasis is that if parties
hold to their bargains, they are treated as masters of their own bargains
and the courts should not indulge in ad hoc adjustment of terms that
11.
Maja,I The Law of Contract in Zimbabwe (2016) Maja Foundation, Harare.
12.
Sir David Hughes Parry The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law (1959) The
Hamlyn Trust Series 1-2.
13.
E. Underwood & Sons Ltd v B. Baker 1899 (1) CH 305.
14.
1979 (2) SA 957.
15.
HH-15-2013.
16.
S-22-04; 2004 (1) ZLR 439 (S).
17.
Beale HG; Bishop WD & Furmston MP Contract Cases and Materials (2008) 58.
strike them as unreasonable or imprudent. The second emphasis is

that if parties must hold to their bargains, then the courts should not
lightly relieve contractors from performance of their agreements.
A number of decisions have upheld the application of the doctrine of
sanctity of contract in Zimbabwe. For instance, in Mangwana v
Mparadzi18 the court held that, ‘[t]he principle that contracts are to
be obeyed (i.e. that they are sacrosanct) takes precedence over the
principle of freedom of trade.’ In Book v Davidson19 the court held as
follows:
I cannot see why a person, who has agreed to the restraint with
both his eyes open, should be allowed to aver that the restraint
was unreasonable without showing the courts the circumstances
that make it unreasonable or unfair to him.
In Meyers-Mbidzo N.O v Chipunza and Another,20 the court took the

view that poor business decisions and greed cannot be allowed to
interfere with the sanctity of contracts and that courts should uphold
sanctity of contract.21 Again, in Warren Park Trust v Pahwaringira
and Others,22 the court established that sanctity of contract is upheld
even by ensuring that termination of contract is done by following
the mode of termination to the letter.23
A number of principles underpin the doctrine of sanctity of contract.
First, there is the golden rule of interpretation of contracts whose
major cannon is that contracts are interpreted using the ordinary
grammatical meaning of words used. A case in point is Total SA (Pty)
Ltd v Bekker24 where the court held that:
… [t]he underlying reason for this approach is that where words
in a contract, agreed upon by the parties thereto and therefore
common to them, speak with sufficient clarity, they must be
taken as expressing their common intention.
18.
Mangwana v Muparadzi 1989 (1) ZLR 79 (S)
19.
Book v Davidson 1988 (1) ZLR 365 (S).
20.
HH-3-2009.
21.
See Unilever South East Africa v Viewleen Investments (Pvt) Ltd HH 37-07. See
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Limited v Desden Properties (Pvt) Limited & Anor
1964 RLR 7(G) 11H-I; 1964 (2) SA 21 25 G-H; Fisc Guide Investment v Tazarura
& Ors HH-28-2005.
22.
HH-39-2009.
23.
See also Minister of Public Construction & National Housing v Zesco (Pvt) Ltd
1989 (2) ZLR 311 at 316
The net effect of such interpretation is to preserve the sacrosanct

nature of a contract.
Second, there is the parole evidence rule that empowers the courts
to interpret express terms of a written contract within the four corners
of the agreement without admission of extrinsic evidence except in
limited circumstances. The assumption is that parties intended the
written document to reflect all the express terms of the contract and
courts should consider the written document sacrosanct. In Nhundu v
Chiota and Another,25 the court held as follows:
When a contract has been reduced to writing, the document is,
in general, regarded as the exclusive memorial of the transaction
and in a suit between the parties, no evidence to prove its terms
may be given, save the document or secondary evidence of its
contents, nor may the contents of such document be
contradicted, altered, added to or varied by parole evidence.
Third is the principle of caveat subscriptor that indicates that a

signature appended on a written contract binds the signatory to the
terms of the contract. Muchabaiwa v Grab Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd26
established that ‘[t]he general principle, commonly referred to as
caveat subscriptor, is that a party to a contract is, in general, bound
by his signature, whether or not he read and understood the
document…’. Implicit in caveat subscriptor is that once a person signs
a contract the contract becomes sacrosanct and binding. This upholds
sanctity of contract.
Interestingly, the current law of contract has some principles that
limit the application of the doctrine of sanctity of contract. For
instance, the legal principle that a covenant in restraint of trade is
not enforced if it is contrary to public policy27 limits sanctity of
contract. It follows, therefore, that a court can intervene and alter a
term in a covenant in restraint of trade that it considers against public
policy, thus curtailing sanctity of contract.
24.
Total SA (Pty) Ltd v Bekker (1954) 35 ALR 434, at 437.
25.
2007 (2) ZLR 163 (S).
26.
1996 (2) ZLR 691 (S).
27.
n Basson v Chilwans 1993 (3) SA 742, it was held that ‘[t]he contract in restraint
of trade is against public policy if it restricts a party’s freedom of economic
activity in a manner or to an extent that is unreasonably judged against the
broad interests of community and the interests of the contracting parties.’
The doctrine of severability of some aspects of a contract — the blue

pencil test — also limits the application of the doctrine of sanctity of
contract. The blue pencil test allows the court to sever unreasonable
parts and enforce only the reasonable parts of a contract. This was
demonstrated in Mangwana v Mparadzi28 where the court shortened
the time restriction imposed on the appellant from five years to three
years and limited the restraint clause to Chinhoyi and not the rest of
Zimbabwe on the basis that the restraint of trade was unreasonable.
It is clear that the doctrine of severability of a contract limits the
sanctity of the contract to the extent of the severability of the
provisions deemed unreasonable.
The principle of severing illegal parts of a contract and enforcing
legal parts impacts sanctity of contract. For instance, in Niri v Coleman
and Ors,29 as well as Muleya v Bulle,30 the Court established that the
charging of excessive interest prohibited by the law does not disentitle
the lender to recover the debt together with lawful interest. This
essentially replaces the illegal excessive interest with lawful interest
and makes the contract with illegal sections enforceable to some
degree. In Sibanda v Nyathi and Ors,31 the Court held that a court has
a power to sever an illegal part of the contract concerning a purchase
price 32 and declare the true purchase price to reflect the true
agreement between the parties.
It is clear from the above that the doctrine of sanctity of contract is
predominantly used in the current law of contract in Zimbabwe.
4. PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
The doctrine of privity of contract provides that contractual remedies
are enforced only by or against parties to a contract, and not third
parties, since contracts only create personal rights.33 According to
Lilienthal,34 privity of contract is the general proposition that an
28.
In16 above.
29.
2002 (2) ZLR 580 (H) 588.
30.
1994 (2) ZLR 202 (H).
31.
2009 (2) ZLR 171 (H).
32.
In this case, $70 million was the illegal purchase price and $130 million was the
true purchase price.
33.
See Bhana, D; Bonthuys, E & Nortje M Students’ Guide to the Law of Contract
(2009) 18.
34.
Lilienthal JW ‘Privity of Contract’ (1887) 1 (5) Harvard Law Review 226.
agreement between A and B cannot be sued by C even though C would

be benefited by its performance. Lilienthal further posits that privity
of contract is premised upon the principle that rights founded on
contract belong to the person who has stipulated them and that even
the most express agreement of contracting parties would not confer
any right of action on the contract upon one who is not a party to it.
In Gwanetsa v Green Motor Services,35 the Court established as follows:
The general rule is that an agent may not depute another person
to do that which he has himself undertaken to do. There is no
privity of contract between the sub-agent and the principal.36
In the same vein, Kennedy v Loyne37 held that:

… [t]he rule is that where an agent has employed another person
to perform the duty entrusted to him, no action accrues to the
principal against the sub-agent; but he must sue the agent, who
on his part, must sue the sub-agent.38
Zimbabwean courts have been consistent in applying this doctrine

where parties to agency contracts have sought to escape liability based
on having engaged sub-agents. In such cases, the courts have insisted
on placing liability on the contracting parties, thus upholding the
principle of privity of contract. The test to determine whether there
was privity of agreement or not is a factual one requiring a careful
consideration of the factual matrix.39
There are a number of instances where the doctrine of privity of
contract is not applied in the law of contract in Zimbabwe. First,
privity of contract will not apply in cases of an undisclosed principal.
For instance, if A has made a contract with B, C may intervene and
take A’s place if he can show that A was acting throughout as his
agent.40
35.
HH-159-03.
36.
See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co (1915) AC 847 853.
37. 37
(1909) 26 SC 271, at 279.
38. 38
See Ncube v Mpofu & Ors HB-69-06.
39.
Terra Graphics (Pty) Ltd t/a Terra Works v MEC: Department of Police, Road
and Transport Free State Provincial Government and Anor (3489/2012) (2013)
ZAFSHC 11 (7 February 2013).
40.
Inn 8 above 404. See also Watson v Gilson Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd 1997 (2) ZLR
318-319.
Second, privity of contract has limited application in trusts. A trust

forms an equitable obligation to hold property on behalf of another.
The law of trusts can enable a third party beneficiary to initiate action
that will enforce the promisor’s obligation. Using the above example,
if B had contracted with A in the capacity of trustee for C, C as
beneficiary under the trust has enforceable rights. These rights arise
because the law of trusts gives a beneficiary certain rights against a
trustee. In the context of privity, if C is a beneficiary under a trust, C
can bring an action against B, the trustee, which has the effect of
compelling B to sue A for breach of contract. In formal procedural
terms, C sues in an action in which B and A are joined as defendants.
The use of trust law here does not give rise, in the strict sense, to an
exception to the doctrine of privity. In conceptual terms, B pursues
the action against A, albeit at C’s insistence.
Third, privity of contract is usually limited in instances where contracts
are made for the benefit of third parties — commonly known as
stipulatio alteri. Astra Steel & Eng Supplies (Pvt) Ltd v PM Mfg (Pvt)
Ltd41 establishes that for a stipulatio alteri to exist, the stipulator
and the promiser must intend to create a right for the third party to
adopt and became a party to the contract. Until acceptance of the
benefit by the third party takes place, the contract remains one
between the actual parties.
Fourth, there are statutory exceptions to the doctrine of privity of
contract. For example, the Road Traffic Act42 empowers a party injured
in a motor accident to recover compensation from an insurance
company once he or she has obtained judgment against the insured.
5. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above analysis that even though the doctrines of
freedom of contract, sanctity of contract and privity of contract are
still applicable to the current Zimbabwean law of contract, there are
areas where these principles have not been strictly applied.
41.
HH-393-12.
42.
[Chapter 13:11].
SENTENCING OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
BY GEOFF FELTOE
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the complex issue of sentencing of sexual
offenders against the backdrop of the recent calls for mandatory
minimum sentences in cases of sexual crimes. Some countries have
introduced mandatory minimum sentences but the paper points out
some of the problems in deciding upon appropriate minimum
sentences for the different sexual crimes. It demonstrates
inconsistencies in the sentencing patterns in Zimbabwe for sexual
offences and explores the alternative of setting of sentencing
guidelines to achieve more consistency in sentencing levels.
Key words: Sexual offences, mandatory minimum sentences,
inconsistency in sentences
PART 1 — INTRODUCTION
SENTENCING
Sentencing in all criminal cases is a complex process as the penalty
must fit the crime and the offender. Before coming to a conclusion on
the appropriate sentence all the individual circumstances of each
case must be considered. One very important factor which is perhaps
not always given full weight is the impact of the offence on the victim.
Justice demands that serious offences should not be trivialized by
imposing sentences that are too lenient but, on the other hand, harsh
sentence must not be automatically imposed without taking account
of the specific circumstances of each case.1
SEXUAL OFFENCES
There are various sexual offences, the most serious of which are rape
and aggravated indecent assault, both of which carry a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment. The offence of so-called “statutory
rape” carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for ten years.
1
For a detailed analysis of the sentencing role of judges see S v Mharapara HH-
26-17 p 4 and S v Makucheche HH-10-18 at p 12.
181
This paper concentrates on the offences of rape and statutory rape of

girls. It examines the current patterns of sentencing for these two
offences and looks at the reasons for the recent demand for the setting
of mandatory minimum sentences for these offences.
What can be safely stated at the outset is that rape is obviously a
dreadful crime which deserves to be punished severely. Statutory rape
can border on the crime of rape, if not sometimes cross the line into
rape. Sexual exploitation by men of young girls should attract severe
punishment. Young girls need to be protected against older men who
sexually groom and entice them with promises of rewards to allow
sexual relations to take place. Those men who use their power and
authority to pressure girls into submitting to sexual relations should
be charged with rape and not statutory rape. Thus a teacher who
threatens to fail a pupil unless she allows him to have sexual relations
with her should be charged with rape.
AGE OF CONSENT
Recently there has been a lot of debate about raising the age of consent
for the purposes of the crime of rape. It is of interest to note that
France is intending to raise the age of sexual consent to 15.
Presently sexual intercourse with a girl who is 12 or below is
automatically rape as the girl is deemed to lack capacity to consent.
A girl who is 13 but under 14 is rebuttably presumed to lack the capacity
to consent until otherwise proved. If the presumption is not rebutted,
the male who has sexual relations with her commits rape.
A girl who is 12 or older but who is not yet 16 can consent to sexual
intercourse but the male who has sexual intercourse with her still
commits the offence under section 70 of the Code of having consensual
relations with a young person. This offence currently requires that
the sexual intercourse be “extra-marital”. This needs to be amended
deleting the word conditional “extra-marital” because in the Mudzuru
case2 the Constitutional Court ruled that marriage to a person under
the age of 18 is prohibited and thus the fact that the accused
purportedly married the girl cannot be a defence.
It is suggested that the minimum age below which the girl will be
deemed to lack capacity to consent should be raised to 14 from the
2
Mudzuru & Anor v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors
CC-12-2015
UZLJ Sentencing of Sexual Offenders 183
present 12 so that if a male has sexual intercourse with a girl under

14 he would be guilty of rape. It is also suggested that the upper age
for statutory rape could be raised to 18.
MANDATORY SENTENCES FOR SEXUAL OFFENCES

The main justification for mandatory minimum sentences for serious
crimes, such as rape, is to try to ensure that the sentences imposed
fully reflect the gravity of these offences. By prescribing the maximum
sentence only, the legislature has left it to the courts to decide on a
case by case basis what sentence up to the maximum is appropriate.
Where only maximum sentences are set, there are also likely to be
inconsistencies in the sentences handed down by different judicial
officers.
The clamour for mandatory sentences occurs when there is a public
perception that some judicial officers are imposing woefully
inadequate sentences for serious crimes, such as rape. The high
incidence of rape and its devastating effects on victims has led to
demands for far harsher sentences to be imposed for this crime and
this then leads on to demands for minimum sentences. This has led
various countries to introduce minimum sentences for sexual offences
which sentences vary in accordance with the presence of certain
specified aggravating factors. These include South Africa, Tanzania,
Kenya and Lesotho. See Annexure 3 for details of the mandatory
sentences that apply in these countries.
The courts tend to be resistant to mandatory sentences because they
strongly believe that mandatory sentences deprive the courts of their
discretion to decide upon appropriate sentences which take into
account the wide range of various factors that may apply in different
cases. This resistance remains even where the courts do not have to
impose the mandatory minimum sentences where they find that there
are special circumstances.
Opponents of mandatory sentences argue that these sentences have
no additional deterrent effect and lead to overloading of the prisons
with long term prisoners.3 What is more important in deterring
criminals is to ensure that there is a high probability that they will be
arrested and tried; the strong likelihood that they will be brought to
book is more likely to deter them. In respect of rape, it is argued that
we should encourage more reporting of such cases and we should also
improve efficiency of investigation and evidence gathering to ensure
a better rate of conviction. The use of DNA evidence would greatly

help in this regard. We should also have a register of all sex offenders
so that when they are released from prison they can be kept under
surveillance to deter them from repeating their crimes and to ensure
that paedophiles are not employed in places where they would have
access to children such as schools and similar institutions.
On the other hand, mandatory lengthy prison sentences for sex
offenders at least ensure that the public is protected against these
sexual predators during the time they are locked up.
PROBLEMS IN DECIDING UPON MINIMUM SENTENCES

The setting of the level of mandatory sentences for the various
categories of sexual offences is not easy and can turn out to be fairly
arbitrary. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offences can widely vary within the different categories of sexual
offences. Care has to be taken when drawing guidance from other
countries in the region on the levels of mandatory sentence that they
have set because the nature of the crimes concerned may differ from
country to country.
If we rush to impose mandatory sentences without giving proper
consideration into what levels are appropriate, and the implications
of imposing these may be, the whole enterprise may prove to be
counterproductive as we may open the way to a succession of
constitutional challenges to the new provisions. Mandatory minimum
sentences have been ruled to be constitutional under the pre-2013
Constitution provided that a lesser sentence may be imposed if there
are special circumstances.4 However, the reasoning in one of these
cases suggests that although the legislature is best placed to decide
what sentences are appropriate for serious crimes, it might still be
possible to argue that a mandatory sentence that has been set is so
excessive and disproportionate as to constitute an inhuman punishment
in violation of the Constitution. Although mandatory minimum
3
In a lecture in 20174 Edwin Cameron, a judge in the Constitutional Court in
South Africa cogently set outs the reasons why he opposes the imposition of
mandatory minimum prison sentences. See “Imprisoning the Nation: Minimum
Sentences in South Africa” Dean’s Distinguished Lecture Programme delivered
at University of Western Cape on 19 October 2017.
www.groundup.org.za/article/minimum-prison-sentences-must-go-says-
constitutional-court-judge/
4
See S v Arab 1990 (1) ZLR 253 (S) and Chichera v A-G 2005 (1) ZLR 307 (S)
sentences have been upheld in South Africa5, the majority of the

Constitutional Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to impose
mandatory sentences on juveniles over 16 but under 18.6
SENTENCING COUNCILS
In some jurisdictions the alternative to minimum mandatory sentences
imposed by the legislature has been to establish a Sentencing Council
along the lines of the one in England. This Council is composed of
judicial officers and lawyers and its function is to promote greater
consistency in sentencing, whilst maintaining the independence of
the judiciary. The Council produces guidelines on sentencing for the
judiciary and criminal justice professionals and aims to increase public
understanding of sentencing. The courts must follow these guidelines
unless it is in the interests of justice not to do so.
PART 2 — RAPE
EFFECTS OF RAPE
Rape has been described as involving the ultimate invasion of a female’s
body, her sexual autonomy and her privacy leading to extreme
humiliation and degradation of its victims. This crime grossly violates
many of the most fundamental constitutional rights of women, such
as their rights personal security, bodily and psychological integrity,
freedom from violence7 and inherent dignity8 freedom from cruel
and degrading treatment 9 and the right to equality and non-
discrimination.10 Rape victims are terrorized by rapists. The rapist
may enter the house or room occupied by a female and use physical
force or threats against her life to rape her. He may waylay her in an
open place, drag her into some bushes and forcibly rape her. Not only
is the woman or girl subjected to the appalling ordeal of rape but she
will often fear that her attacker will kill her after the rape. Where
the rapist uses physical force to overcome her resistance, she will
suffer bodily injury including vaginal injury which may result in later
gynaecological complications. The rapist will often further terrify the
5
S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC)
6
Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development
2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC).
7
Section 52
8
Section 51
9
Section 53
10
Section 56
victim after the rape by threatening to come back and kill her if she
reports the rape to the authorities. The rape victim is at risk of
contracting HIV and other STDs. She may also be impregnated and
unless she is able to obtain emergency contraception to prevent
pregnancy or a lawful abortion, she will then have to give birth to a
child who is the product of rape.
But the dreadful effects of rape extend well beyond the act of rape
itself. The long-term psychological effects of rape can last for the
rest of the survivor’s life and can amount to a living hell for some
survivors. These after-effects can include post-traumatic stress,
depression, vivid flashbacks and recollections of the trauma, low self-
esteem, difficulty in forming relationships with others and eating and
sleep disorders. Depression may become so acute that she may become
suicidal.
In S v Phiri HH 195-15 the court had this to say:
The general public has rightly demanded that rapists should be
severely punished. Rape is a crime of violence rather than
passion. It dehumanises and traumatizes the victim. It is even
worse when the victim is potentially exposed to the lethal
infection of the HIV virus and other sexually transmitted
infections. The courts should, in my view, play their role by
punishing such offenders in a manner which acknowledges the
serious nature of the offence and the interests of justice.
The long term damage done to a child who is raped can be even
worse. According to one author:11
…childhood sexual abuse is considered one of the worst forms
of trauma, and its effects, long term signs and symptoms are
now found to span a large range of conditions. Sexual abuse is
considered ‘soul murder’ as it literally robs the child victim of
their innocence, severely disrupts their developing ego structure
and sense of Self, and will later distort the then adult’s ability
to function and form healthy relationships with others.
It has been found that the risk of lasting psychological harm to the
child victim is greater if the perpetrator of the sexual assault on the
child is a close relative such as a father or someone in a position of
11
Linda Callaghan In rage: Healing Rage of Child Sexual Abuse, Tyrone Hill
Publishers, New Jersey 2007
protector and guide, such as a teacher.. Victims of child sexual abuse

may sometimes themselves become abusers in later life.
It is therefore vitally important in determining the appropriate
sentence for rape to take full account of the nature of this crime and
its short and long-term consequences. In England the sentencing
guidelines for sexual offences have been amended so that the courts
will fully consider the impact of sex offences on victims. As well as
physical harm, the new approach reflects more fully the psychological
and longer term effects on the victim, enabling courts to pay heed to
the true extent of what the victim has been through.12
INADEQUATE SENTENCES FOR RAPE

Section 65(2) of the Code provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
that the court should take into account in imposing sentences in rape
cases. Unfortunately the lack of proper sentencing guidelines for this
offence has led some regional magistrates to impose woefully
inadequate sentences that fail to reflect the seriousness of this offence
and generally their sentencing patterns for this offence are erratic
and inconsistent. This is most apparent in cases of rape of children.
Review and appeal courts have tried to correct these anomalies where
they occur.
For instance, in S v Phiri HH 195-15 a 54 year old accused was convicted
of 5 counts of the rape of his step-daughter, a 14 year old. All 5
counts were treated as one for sentence and the accused was
sentenced to 16 years, 4 years conditionally suspended. The magistrate
sentenced him to an effective sentence of imprisonment of 12 years.
The review court said this was far too lenient and totally inadequate
for his repeated transgression. An effective term of 20 years to 25
years imprisonment would have been appropriate.
GENERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN RAPE CASES

There is one case which purports to give some general guidelines for
sentencing in rape cases is that of S v Ndlovu 2012 (1) ZLR 393 (H). In
this case a 43 year old man was convicted of five counts of raping his
own daughters aged 4 and 7. The magistrate imposed a total effective
sentence of 40 years imprisonment. Although he characterised rape
12
“New sex offence guidelines to overhaul sentencing” By Kathleen Hall in The
Law Society Gazette 12 December 2013 https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/
new-sex-offence-guidelines-to-overhaul-sentencing/5039178.article
as traumatising, humiliating and abominable, the review judge reduced

this sentence to a total effective sentence of 18 years. The judge said
that the sentence for rape should not exceed the sentence ordinarily
imposed for murder with extenuating circumstances and culpable
homicide. Working from this comparison with homicide sentences,
the judge concluded that a single count of rape should attract a
sentence from 5 to 10 years. Only in a rare, very serious case should
the sentence go beyond 10 years and the very worst cases should
attract life imprisonment.
It is respectfully submitted that the crime of rape is of a very different
nature to homicide and causes drastic immediate and long-term harm
of a different character to that of homicide. It is a truly abominable
crime. Surely a sentence well in excess of 5-10 years is appropriate
for a single count of a young child rape by a father or a brutal rape of
an elderly woman. Although the appropriate sentence must be assessed
on the facts of each case of rape it is certainly arguable that the
magistrate’s sentence in the Ndlovu case took into account properly
the despicable nature of the offence committed by a father on his
own very young daughters.
SOME HIGH COURT CASES

There are various cases involving adult men raping child victims where
the High Court found the sentence imposed was too lenient or where
it could be argued that the sentences imposed were too lenient or
the reduced sentence was too lenient.
In S v Ncube HB-136-17 the appellant was convicted of two counts of
rape upon a 12 year old after dragging her into some bushes and
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment of which 4 years imprisonment
was conditionally suspended, making an effective sentence of 8 years.
His appeal against sentence was dismissed.
In S v Mafuwa HH-664-17 a 40 year old teacher raped a 4 year old pre-
school after luring the girl to his office. After raping the complainant,
appellant threatened to cut her head off with a knife if she disclosed
the offence to anyone. He also told her that if asked by anyone she
should say she was raped by school pupils. After the rape, complainant
went home and reported to her mother that she was in pain, after
which her mother examined her private parts and noticed bruising on
her genitals and later the rape was reported to the police. The teacher
was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment of which 3 years’
imprisonment were conditionally suspended, making an effective

sentence of 9 years.
In S v Nemukuya HH-102-09 the accused was 59 at the time of
conviction. He raped his 12 year old grand-daughter.. Rather than
protecting the child he took advantage of being in loco parentis over
her. He overpowered the girl “without using much physical force”.
The complainant suffered a lot of psychological trauma. The accused
threatened her with death if she reported the rape. When she did
report, her report was suppressed by the family. Only later was the
matter reported to the police. The magistrate sentenced him to 18
years’ imprisonment of which 4 years were suspended. On appeal,
the court substituted a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with 4
years suspended, which was an effective sentence of 8 years.
In S v Murehwa HH-41-2004 the accused was convicted of 2 counts of
rape on a 9 year old school girl as she was coming from school. He was
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment on each count. Of the total of 14
years imprisonment of which 4 years were conditionally suspended,
making an effective sentence of 10 years. This sentence was
confirmed on appeal.
In S v Tafirenyika HH-441-13 a 70 year old man raped an 11 year old
girl. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment of which 7 years
were conditionally suspended, an effective sentence of 8 years. The
man was married to the aunt of the girl. She was staying at their
house. After the rape he threatened that if she told anyone about
what had happened he would throw into a crocodile infested pool.
The appeal against sentence was dismissed.
On the other hand more severe sentences was handed down in the
following cases:
In S v Mpande HH-43-11 appellant raped a 3 year old girl left in his
care and infected her with syphilis. He was “in a protective
relationship” with complainant. The appellant therefore abused the
trust of both the complainant and her grandmother who employed
the appellant. That together with the age of the child made this “a
very bad case of sexual abuse.” He was sentenced him to 18 years
imprisonment of which 3 years was conditionally suspended making
an effective sentence of 15 years. The appeal was dismissed. The
court commented that he was lucky not to get a harsher sentence.X
In S v Mukarati HH-323-14 a prophet took advantage of a so-called

cleansing ceremony of a 13 year old girl and was sentenced to 20
years imprisonment of which 2 years was conditionally suspended, an
effective sentence of 18 years. This was a well calculated offence by
a cunning appellant. Those who commit heinous offences of this nature
must accept that they cannot avoid being removed from society for a
fairly long period of time. Such sentences are a desperate response
by these courts to the continued and almost unabated occurrences of
such offences. The appeal against sentence dismissed.
In S v Nyathi 2003 (1) ZLR 587 (H) a man forcibly raped his 16 year-old
daughter 10 times over a period of 18 months. The magistrate imposed
an effective total sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. The review
judge considered this sentence to be excessive and reduced it to an
effective total sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment.
In S v Chirembwe HH-162-15 the accused was convicted of 30 counts
of unlawful entry into domestic premises and 21 counts of rape. On
review the sentence was changed to a total of 73 years imprisonment
of which 18 years is suspended, making an effective sentence of 55
years.
SURVEY OF REGIONAL COURT SENTENCES

The Legal Resources Foundation has surveyed recent rape cases in
the regional courts from around the country. This survey has revealed
considerable inconsistencies in sentences imposed in what appear to
be very similar cases. Some of the sentences in serious rape cases
involving rape of child victims by adult males appear to be too lenient.
See Annexure 1 for a sample of sentences from the Harare Magistrates
Court.
ADULT RAPE VICTIMS

The Legal Resources Foundation survey has also revealed considerable
inconsistencies in sentences imposed in what appear to be very similar
cases. The sentences in rape cases involving rape of adult women by
adult males appear to be too lenient. See Annexure 2 for a sample of
sentences from the Bulawayo Magistrates Court.
One particularly bad case which attracted a long term of imprisonment
was that of S v Ndebele HB-131-10. In this case the appellant was
convicted of 3 counts of rape and 2 counts of aggravated indecent
assault on two heavily pregnant women, one of whom was 9 months
pregnant. The complainants were walking with their 9 year old cousin
in a bushy area. The accused man ordered the women to go behind a
bush and when they resisted he assaulted them with a stick to get
them to comply. Once in the bush, the man slapped the first
complainant twice and forced her to lie down ordering her to remove
her panties. He ordered the second complainant and the 9 year old
boy to sit down nearby as he raped the first complainant once. When
the man finished raping the first complainant the first time, he ordered
the second complainant to suck his penis before raping the first
complainant a second time. When the man finished raping the first
complainant the second time, he demanded that she should thank
him for what he had done which she did. He then ordered the second
complainant to suck his penis the second time before ordering the
first complainant to bend over and raping her for the third time. All
this happened in the full view of the 9 year old boy who had been
ordered to sit down a short distance away.
The court pointed out that this was an extreme case of rape and
aggravated indecent assault where the Appellant exhibited callousness
of the highest order and appeared to derive sadistic pleasure in abusing
heavily pregnant women in the full view of a 9 year old child. He was
sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for the 3 counts of rape and 15
years imprisonment for the 2 counts of aggravated indecent assault.
Of the total 33 years imprisonment, 8 years imprisonment was
conditionally suspended. The overall effective sentence was 25 years
was confirmed by the appeal court.
In S v Zakeyo HH-142-12 a prophet had called a married woman to his
house and had overpowered her and raped her. She was instructed
not to tell anyone about the rape otherwise she would die or the
severity of her illness would increase. Appellant was convicted on a
charge of rape and sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment, 4 years
conditionally suspended, making an effective sentence of 13 years.
The appeal against sentence was withdrawn.
In S v Machingura HH-236-12 a man raped a woman in his car at knife
point. After the rape he threatened her with death and the death of
her husband if she disclosed the rape. The court held that the sentence
of 10 years of which 3 years was conditionally suspended, an effective
sentence 7 years, was not too harsh.
CHILD RAPISTS
A recent study into sentencing patterns in regional magistrates’ courts
in Zimbabwe has disclosed that a significant percentage of rapes are
committed by persons under the age of 18. This is a social problem
that needs to be addressed urgently. Many of the offenders come
from poor families and some have themselves been the victims of
sexual abuse and have developed disturbed personalities. However,
rape remains an extremely serious offence even though the offence
has been perpetrated by a person under the age of eighteen. For this
reason the courts are obliged to impose sentences that do not trivialise
the serious crimes committed.
The courts have understandably been most reluctant to incarcerate
children in ordinary prisons. The general policy has been to keep
children out of prison wherever possible. The Constitution in section
81 provides that children accused of crimes should not be detained
except as a measure of last resort and if they are detained, they
should be detained only for the shortest period of time. In South
Africa the Constitutional Court has ruled that mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles between 14 and 16 are unconstitutional: see
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
CCT-98-08.
The problem here is the limited range of sentencing options available
in such cases. The regional courts have usually adopted the expedient
device of sentencing juvenile offenders to receive corporal
punishment. There are two drawbacks of this approach. First, if the
offender already has a disturbed personality, corporal punishment
administered in the prisons may well make the youth more disturbed
and more likely to commit further crimes. Secondly, this sentencing
alternative may well become unavailable if the Constitutional Court
upholds recent rulings by the High Court13 that this form of punishment
is unconstitutional.
In a serious rape case such as where the victim is a very young child,
a community service order is certainly not appropriate. What would
be far more appropriate would be to order, on the basis of probation
13
S v Chokuramba HH-718-14 and Pfungwa & Anor v Headmistress of Belvedere
Junior Primary School & Others HH-148-17. These decisions still await
confirmation by the Constitutional Court according to section 175(1) of the
Constitution.
officers, that the offenders be held in institutions for the training and
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. However, the places in such
institutions are very limited and there is currently a shortage of
probation officers. This issue must be urgently addressed.
In S v Tsingano HH-279-11 a 17 year old juvenile first offender raped
a 14 year old who had been asleep after throttling her. Disregarding
the probation officer’s recommendation, the trial magistrate
sentenced the juvenile to 9 years imprisonment of which 2 years were
conditionally suspended. Whilst acknowledging that rape is a
disturbingly prevalent serious offence and also that in casu the accused
showed perseverance and determination in the commission of the
offence, in view of accused’s age and personal circumstancesit was a
gross error of judgment to sentence him to an effective term of
imprisonment let alone one of 7 years. The accused was sentenced to
3 years imprisonment the whole of which was conditionally suspended.
In S v Marufu HH-298-11 a 17 year old was convicted by a regional
magistrate on 4 counts of rape. He was sentenced to 12 years
imprisonment of which 4 years were conditionally suspended. The
appeal court substituted a sentence of 4 years imprisonment of which
2 years 8 months was conditionally suspended.
STATUTORY RAPE
What makes the issue of sentencing for this offence a complex matter
is that there are a wide range of differing circumstances that fall
within its ambit. This has been pointed out in various case such as S v
Mutowo 1997 (1) ZLR 87 (H) at p 88 and S v Tshuma HB-70-13. There
is, for instance, a vast difference between a situation where a 60
year old man entices a naïve 13 year old girl to have sexual relations
with him by giving her money or gifts and a situation where a 17 year
old youth and a 15 year old girl who is nearly 16 years old fall in love
and mutually agree to have sexual relations after the girl tells him
that she wants to have sexual relations with him. The problem is that
between the most blameworthy and the least blameworthy situations
postulated above there are many variations and different factors that
have to be weighed in deciding upon the appropriate sentence.
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL ACTIVITY

It is inevitable that some teenage boys will have sexual relations with
teenage girls with their consent. If they do not use protection, the
result can be transmission of sexually transmitted diseases and
pregnancy. Teenage pregnancy carries serious health risks and some

pregnant girls may resort to dangerous illegal abortions. Because of
this, the criminal law under section 70 thus tries to discourage boys
over 16 from having sexual relations with girls under 16.
A boy who is only 16 or 17 years of age commits the offence under
section 70 of the Code if he has sexual relations with a consenting girl
who is only a few years younger than him. But in sentencing the boy
the court must obviously take full account of the age of the accused.
This will also apply to some extent to a male only a year or so over 18
who has consensual sexual relations with a girl of 15 where there is
no evident sexual exploitation involved.
In the case of S v Masuku HH-106-15 a boy aged 17 had sexual relations
with his girlfriend who was 15. This resulted in the girl falling pregnant.
The judge said that the court must not impose unnecessarily punitive
sentences for such boys. She was of the opinion that even a suspended
prison sentence was inappropriate in the present case and instead
decided that a direct sentence of community service would be
“sufficiently rehabilitative and more in tune with a policy approach
towards juvenile justice, which places emphasis on rehabilitation
rather than branding such a youth as a criminal.” She then went on to
observe that the law can only do so much to discourage teenage
sexuality and prevent the dangers for girls that it poses. Society and
policy makers need to accept the social reality of prevalent teenage
sexuality and devise appropriate social interventions. She suggest
interventions such as availing contraceptive protection and a more
rigorous and open approach to sex education in schools. These
interventions are necessary “since the dominant message of abstinence
has obviously not succeeded in keeping the youth from having sex
among their group.”
MALE SEXUAL PREDATORS

There should be common agreement that severe sentences must be
imposed on men who sexually prey on young girls. Situations where
older men induce immature girls to have sexual relations with them
can be characterised as sexual exploitation. Where magistrates have
handed down lenient sentences upon men who have sexually exploited
girls, judges dealing with such cases on review or appeal have severely
criticised the magistrates. Some of these judgements are summarized
below.
In S v Virimai 2016 (1) ZLR 533 (H), the review judge decried the
prevalent practice of imposing inappropriately lenient sentences for
this offence. In that case a 28 year old soldier had consensual sexual
relations on a number of occasions with a girl aged 14 years. The
magistrate sentenced him to a fine of $300 or in default of payment
of the fine to 2 months imprisonment and in addition 2 months
imprisonment wholly suspended on conditions of good behaviour. He
also considered imposing community service but found that this would
not fit in with the soldiers’ work schedule. The review judge concluded
that the sentence imposed was both manifestly and shockingly lenient.
She said the soldier had taken advantage of a vulnerable young girl. A
substantial custodial term of imprisonment would have been
appropriate with a portion of the custodial sentence suspended. The
option of accused performing community service should never have
entered into the mind of the magistrate for public policy reasons.
In S v Nyirenda 2003 (2) ZLR 102 (H) a 37 year old man had sexual
intercourse with a 15 year old neighbour. The age difference between
the two was regarded as an aggravating factor although the
complainant’s closeness in age to 16 was held to be mitigatory. The
sentence imposed was two years imprisonment of which 16 months
was suspended on condition of good behaviour which meant that the
effective sentence was a paltry 6 months’ imprisonment.
In S v Mbulawa 2006 (2) ZLR 38 (H) the accused was convicted of
committing an immoral or indecent act with or upon a young person.
He was aged 30 and the female complainant was aged 12.14 He had
fondled her breasts, kissed her and fondled her private parts on a
number of occasions over a period of a month. The court held that
sexual abuse of children is viewed by the courts in a serious light and
paedophilia has to be dealt with effectively. The courts have to drive
home the message that such conduct will not be tolerated as it has
grave consequences on the youths. Self-gratification of adults should
not be at expense of debauching young persons. The accused had
offended against morality by not only gratifying his own sensualities,
but by also exciting, encouraging and facilitating the illicit gratification
of the 12 year old complainant. The sentence should not be such that
it gives the impression that the court is condoning sexual abuse of
children. The accused’s moral blameworthiness was so high that an
effective sentence in the region of two years was appropriate.
14
If the girl was indeed only 12 surely she was below the age of consent and the
correct
In S v Girandi HB-55-12 a male aged 23 had sexual intercourse with a

form one girl aged 13. The accused person was sentenced to 14 months
imprisonment of which 4 months was suspended on condition of not
further offence committed and 10 months was further suspended on
condition of performing community service. The review judge said
that the sentence was disturbingly lenient and inappropriate. He said
that this offence is prevalent and there was the need to send a signal
to society that courts will descend heavily on child sexual abusers.
The accused was an adult who was 10 years older that the girl and he
had manipulated the girl to have sexual intercourse with her His moral
blameworthiness was high and a non-custodial sentence was not
reasonable under the circumstances. It trivialises the offence and
rewards the offender. In this case sentence of not less than 2 years
imprisonment should have been imposed.”
In S v Matare HH-410-16 a 36 year old married man had sexual
intercourse with a 15 year old girl on several occasions and he was
sentenced to 18 months imprisonment all of which was suspended for
good behaviour and community service. The review judge concluded
that the sentence was far too lenient. The accused showed no remorse
but instead denied any wrongdoing and “quite incredibly” claimed
that the girl had seduced him. The review judge said this and other
factors should have outraged the trial court.
In S v Banda, S v Chakamoga HH-47-16 two accused, both of whom
were over 30 years, were convicted, in unrelated trials, of having
sexual relations with a young person. In both matters the girls were
aged 15. They both impregnated the young girls. Fortunately, neither
of the girls contracted a STI or HIV. The only difference was that one
accused took the young girl for his wife. The other gave the young girl
two small sums of money after he had had his way with her. In each
case, the accused was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, half of
which was suspended. The review judge, Charewa J, said that
“sentencing a man of over 30 to an effective 12 months imprisonment
for having sexual intercourse with a young person of 15 can hardly be
aimed at deterring other older men from preying on young and
immature persons, who are swayed by the offer of $1 or $2, in these
harsh economic times. The very fact that a young person ‘agrees’ to
sexual intercourse with a much older man for such a paltry amount is
clear evidence of her immaturity and incapacity to make an informed
choice or decision. Nor can a promise to marry, or even eventual
marriage of the child be mitigating.”
At page 9 the judge pointed out:

It is up to judicial officers to show that the courts will not tolerate
predatory older men who prey on young persons by handing down
appropriately severe sentences. The prevalence of these type
of offences, the consequential incalculable damage they cause
in preventing young persons from attaining their full potential,
the damage to the social fabric, coupled with its impact on
national development and the need to conform to international
standards in the protection of children ought to be additional
grounds for handing down deterrent sentences.
The judge advised that an effective sentence of not less than three
years should be imposed in these cases, on an incremental basis for
those accused who are twice the victims’ ages, are married with
children of their own, and impregnate the girls or infect them with
sexually transmitted diseases other than HIV.
All of these cases involved men who were considerably older than the
girls and who were found to have exploited the young girls and who
must or should have known that what they were doing was not only
immoral but also unlawful.
There are thus a whole multiplicity of factors that can come into play
in deciding the appropriate sentence on the specific facts of a case.
These have been set out in a series of cases15 and are detailed in re S
v Tshuma HB-70-13. Some of the stated mitigatory factors must be
considered with caution. For example, the fact that the accused comes
from a community where it is not well known that it is impermissible
to have sexual relations with a girl under the age of 16 and was unaware
that child marriage violates the constitutional rights of girls. In S v
Nyamande HH-719-14 a 54 year old man had sexual relations with a
girl aged 14 years over a period of 6 months resulting in the girl
becoming pregnant. He was sentenced to a wholly suspended term of
imprisonment. The accused said in mitigation that at his church they
are allowed to marry as many wives as they want and he wanted the
complainant to be his third wife. The court said that an effective
custodial sentence was called for in this case. This was required to
protect young girls from sexual abuse and to deter abusers who acted
under the guise of marrying the girls when such marriages are now
prohibited.
15
For instance, S v Nare 1983 (2) ZLR 135 (H)
The weight to be attached to the fact that the girl is not a virgin and
has had sexual relations previously also needs to be carefully
considered. As is pointed out in the Tshuma case above the fact that
the girl is sexually experienced is certainly not a defence and the
offence is still committed. If a much older man sexually entices a girl
of 14 to have sexual relations with him, the fact that the girl has
previously had sexual relations on one occasion with her boyfriend
should not detract from the seriousness of the offence.
The fact that the offender is married already should be treated as
aggravating as a mature married man who seeks sexual gratification
by enticing a young girl must be seen as irresponsible and he deserves
to receive a severe punishment.
Sexual exploitation of girls under the age of 16 must be condemned
by imposing severe sentences. Fines, wholly suspended prison
sentences and community service orders are inappropriate for men
who sexually prey on young girls. We also need a criminal offence to
punish men who sexually groom young girls through the Internet so
they can sexually exploit them or induce them to supply naked pictures
of themselves. There should also be a sex offenders’ register which
can be used to monitor the activities of paedophiles on their release
from prison to try to prevent them from re-offending.
On the other hand, we should be careful about imposing mandatory
minimum sentences for this offence because of the widely differing
situations which can fall within the ambit of this offence. It would be
better to compose detailed sentencing guidelines for magistrates to
ensure that they impose appropriate sentences for the different types
of this offence.
ANNEXURE 1
Sample of Rape Sentences Imposed in Harare Regional Court 2016-2017 on Rapists at
least 18 Years of Age Raping Children
NOTE
This sample reveals substantial differences in sentencing for what are apparently similar
rape cases. Of course, to do a full comparison the individual facts of the case and the
circumstances of the accused would have to be factored in. All these cases were listed as
rape but it would need to be checked whether some of those involving children over 12 are
not statutory rape cases.
Age of Age of
offender victim Actual sentence Effective sentence
35 11 30 years, 5 years c/s 25 years
30 9 20 years 2 years c/s (2 counts) 18 years
37 4 16 years 3 years c/s 13 years
22 3 12 months,6 months c/s 6 months
33 13 36 months, 12 months c/s 24 months
20 12 12 months 6 months c/s 6 months
32 13 7 months c/s 7 months wholly suspended
26 14 24 years, 4 years c/s (3 counts). 20 years
27 15 30 months, 10 months s c/s 20 months
33 15 2 and a half years, 1 year c/s 1 and a half years
24 15 4 years, 1 year c/s 3 years
50 15 30 months, 12 months c/s. 18 months

ANNEXURE 2
Sample of Rape Cases 2016-2017 in Regional Court Bulawayo Involving Accused and
Complainants over 18
Age of Age of Actual Effective

Offence Offender Complainant sentence sentence
Rape 49 20 10 years,3 years c/s 7 years
Rape 45 19 7 years, 4 years c/s 3 years
Rape 29 21 5 years, 2years c/s 3 years
Rape 60 17 15 years 15 years

ANNEXURE 2 (cont)
Sample of Rape Cases 2016-2017 in Regional Court Bulawayo Involving Accused and
Complainants over 18
Age of Age of Actual Effective

Offence Offender Complainant sentence sentence
Rape 54 24 20 years 20 years
ANNEXURE 3
South Africa
Criminal Law Amendment

Act 105 of 1997.
Mandatory Minimum
Offence Penalty
Rape First offence: 10 years

Second offence: 15 years
Third offence 20 years
Gang rape;
Where the complainant was raped more than once; Life imprisonment
Complainant was under 16; (25 years)
Complainant was physically disabled or mentally ill;
Where the accused knew that he was HIV positive at the
time of the rape.
Kenya
Offence Offence Mandatory

Sexual Offences Minimum Maximum
Act No 3 of 2001 Penalty Penalty
Rape §3 10 years Life imprisonment
Attempted Rape §4 5 years Life imprisonment
Acts which cause penetration or

indecent acts committed within
the view of a family member,
child or person with mental
disabilities §7 10 years
ANNEXURE 3 (cont)
Kenya
Offence Offence Mandatory

Sexual Offences Minimum Maximum
Act No 3 of 2001 Penalty Penalty
Defilement §8 Age 0-11:

Life
Imprisonment
Age 12-15: 20 years
Age 16-18: 15 years
Gang Rape §10 15 years Life imprisonment
Indecent act with child or adult §11 Age 0-18:

10 years
Maximum
Adult: 5 years
Tanzania
Offence Penal code amended

by Sexual Offences
Special Provisions
Act of 1998 Mandatory Minimum Penalty
Rape § 131 Against victim age 0-18:

First offence: imprisonment
for two years and corporal
punishment
Second offence: life
imprisonment
Third offence and recidivism.
Against victim age 19+: 30
years, corporal punishment
and fine
Gang rape § 131 Life imprisonment
Attempted rape § 132A 30 years with or without

corporal punishment
10 years if rape attempt is
based on false representations
or deceit for purposes of
obtaining consent
Defilement of wife under § 138 (1) 10 years

the age of 15
Guardian Allowing defilement

of child under the age of 15
by her husband § 138 (2) 10 years
ANNEXURE 3 (cont)
Tanzania (cont)
Offence Penal code amended

by Sexual Offences
Special Provisions
Act of 1998 Mandatory Minimum Penalty
Sexual exploitation of children § 138B 5 years
Grave sexual abuses § 138 (1) Against victim age 0-15:

20 years
Against victim age 15+:
15 years
Sodomy and bestiality § 154 (1) Against victim age 0-10:

Life imprisonment
Against victim age 10+:
30 years
Incest by woman § 160 Against victim age 0-10

30 years
Lesotho
Minimum Minimum
Sexual Penalty Sexual Penalty for
Offences for first Offences second or
Offence Act offence Act subsequent
offence
Offence of persistent sexual abuse § 32(a) 15 years 32(b) Life

of a child imprisonment
Unlawful sexual act where the § 32(a) 10 years 32(b) Life

convicted person was infected with imprisonment
HIV or another life threatening
disease at the time of the offence
but did not at that time know or
have a reasonable suspicion of being
infected
Sexual offences against a child; § 32(a) 10 years 32(b) Life

commercial Sexual exploitation of a imprisonment
child; sexual offences against
disabled persons committed by a
person of age 18 or above
LABOUR RIGHTS UNDER ZIMBABWE’S NEW CONSTITUTION:
THE RIGHT TO BE PAID A FAIR AND REASONABLE WAGE
BY MUNYARADZI GWISAI1, RODGERS MATSIKIDZE1 & CALEB MUCHECHE1
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental change introduced under s 65 (1) of the new
Constitution of Zimbabwe2 is the enshrinement of the right of
employees to be paid a fair and reasonable wage. It reads:
65 Labour rights
(1) Every person has the right to fair and safe labour practices
and standards and to be paid a fair and reasonable wage.
This provision marks a milestone in the labour law regime of Zimbabwe.
It brings Zimbabwean law in closer conformity with relevant regional
and international instruments.
Although the philosophical basis of the Labour Act3 is pluralist, with
the Act providing that its “purpose is to advance social justice and
democracy in the workplace,”4 the regime covering wages has been
decidedly unitarist. Hitherto neither statutes nor common law had
prescribed the quantum of wages payable to employees. This, despite
perhaps one of the most rallying demands of labour in the last two
decades being the demand for a Poverty Datum Line-linked living
wage. This is understandable, when one considers that by 2011, nearly
93 per cent of formal sector employees were earning wages less than
the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL), the generally accepted
measurement of poverty.5 Thus, for most workers, a living wage
remains a mirage. They are mired in dire and debilitating poverty.
1.
Munyaradzi Gwisai lectures in Labour Law and Labour Relations, Faculty of
Law, University of Zimbabwe, and Briggs Zano Working Peoples College. Rodgers
Matsikidze, LLBS Hons (UZ), MPhil (UZ) is the Chairman of the Department of
Procedural Law, UZ, and a registered legal practitioner. Caleb Mucheche, LLBS
Hons (UZ), LLM (UNISA), LLM (UNILUS), is former Dean, Faculty of Law, ZEGU
and a registered legal practitioner.
2.
Introduced by Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 (1/
2013).
3.
[Chapter 28:01].
4.
Section 2A (1) of the Act.
5.
ZimStat 2011 Labour Force Survey (Zimstat, Harare, 2012) 53.
204
UZLJ Right to be Paid a Fair and Reasonable Wage 205
The demand for a living wage, not surprisingly, has found echo in
popular musical hits such as Chinyemu by Leornard Dembo and Mugove
by Leornard Zhakata. Indeed, for a nation largely turned Christian, a
demand with Biblical foundations.6
The conflicts over a living wage, became particularly intense in the
post-dollarisation era after March 2009. On the one hand, labour felt
it deserved a dividend for the immense sacrifices it made in the
preceding period of economic collapse and hyper-inflation running
into billions, which virtually wiped out wages. Employers on the other
hand argue for wage restraints to ensure sustainable economic
recovery. Unreasonable wage increments will kill the goose that lays
the golden eggs, they argue.
This conflict spilled into the courts where differing positions emerged.
One line of cases, starting from the premises of the interests of the
business, took the approach that increments above the prevailing
inflation rate, were grossly unreasonable and against public policy as
in the Tel-One (Pvt) Ltd v Communications & Allied Services Workers
Union of Zimbabwe decision.7 The other line, started off from the
premises of the workers’ right to a living wage, and rejected the
approach that saw such increments as unreasonable per se, as in City
of Harare v Harare Municipal Workers Union.8
The new Constitution radically changed the situation by, for the first
time in Zimbabwean constitutional history, explicitly providing for
the right to “a fair and reasonable wage.” In this essay we dissect the
implications of this new constitutional right on the law of
remuneration, in the context of international human rights and labour
law and contrasting philosophical and jurisprudential worldviews.
6.
“Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that
you also have a Master in Heaven.” “Colossians 4 vs 1” in Holy Bible, King
James version (Christian Art Publishers, 2012). Similar values are stated in
“James 5 vs 4” in Holy Bible King (2012) “Behold, the hire of the labourers
which have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud crieth:
and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord
of Sabbath.”
7.
2007 (2) ZLR 262 (H); and Chamber of Mines v Associated Mineworkers Union
of Zimbabwe LC/H/250/2012.
8.
2006 (1) ZLR 491 (H).
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK BEFORE ACT NO. 20 OF 2013

Prior to the new constitutional dispensation the principal methods
for the determination of wages were under common law and relevant
labour statutes.
Under the common law, the amount of wages to be paid is in terms of
the agreement made by the parties under the contract of
employment.9 What the employer pays for is the availability of the
employee’s services and not the value of the product of the actual
work done by the employee.10 Increments are at the discretion of the
employer.11 Considerations of equity, fairness or reasonableness do
not enter into the picture per se. Renowned author RH Christie puts it
thus: 12
The starting point of the common law is that the courts will not
interfere with a contract on the ground that it is unreasonable.
In Burger v Central African Railways 1903 TS 571 Innes CJ said
that:
‘Our law does not recognize the right of a court to release a contracting
party from the consequences of an agreement duly entered into him
merely because that agreement appears to be unreasonable.’
What is paramount is what the parties themselves see as reasonable
as reflected in the terms of their contract of employment. The main
responsibility of the courts is to enforce this contractual will of the
parties and not seek to second-guess adult free persons. 13 The
emphasis is on the market as the principal and most fair manner of
determining a reasonable wage. Hepple B captures it well:
The freedom of the employer and worker from the interference
of the state in the labour market, the freedom of the contracting
9.
National Railways of Zimbabwe v National Railways Contributory Fund 1985
(1) ZLR 16 (S);Gladstone v Thornton’s Garage 1929 TPD 116; A Rycroft and B
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd ed (Juta, 1992) 67.
10.
Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd v Jarvis 1989 (1) ZLR 344; Belmore
v Minister of Finance 1948 (2) SA 852 (SR).
11.
Chiremba (duly authorized Chairman of Workers Committee) and Ors v RBZ
2000 (2) ZLR 370 (S); Chubb Union Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Chubb Union Workers
Committee S 01/01. Also: Nare v National Foods Ltd LRT/MT/38/02.
12.
R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed (LexisNexis, 2009) 14.
13.
As put by INNES CJ in Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 at
73: “No doubt the condition is hard and onerous; but if people sign conditions
they must, in the absence of fraud, be held to them. Public policy so demands.
parties and the freedom of private will to determine the content

of the contract.14
The legal philosophy underpinning common law is clearly utilitarian

and reflected in the theory of labour relations of unitarism. The
individual parties, meeting in the free market, are the ones who know
what is best for themselves. Allowing such individual parties maximum
contractual freedom will derive not only maximum benefit for the
parties but society at large.15 Unitarism is a theory that places a
premium on the unity of interests and goals between labour and capital
in the employment relationship, but within a framework in which
capital enjoys undoubted superior status.16 Conflict is unnatural and
dysfunctional.
This free market based conception underlies the decision in Tel-One
(Pvt) Ltd v Communications & Allied Services Workers Union of
Zimbabwe, supra. In such case, the arbitrator had awarded a 266%
wage increment across the board. The employer made an application
to the High Court to set aside the award on the ground that it was in
violation of Zimbabwe’s public policy.17 It argued that it was grossly
unreasonable as it would result in over 130% of its overall income
going to wages. In setting aside the award, HUNGWE J, at 266A-C,
ruled:
There is no doubt in my mind that the spirit of collective
bargaining between employer and employee is to arrive by
consensus or, if that fails, by arbitration, at what a fair wage is.
The idea is to preserve the employer-employee relationship.
The employee makes his labour available for a fair fee. The
‘If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily
shall be held scared and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you
have this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to
interfere with this freedom of contract.’ (per JESSEL M.R. in Printing and
Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson [1875]LR 19 Eq. 462 at 465).” See also: R
Epstein, “In defence of the contract at will” 51 Chi. L. Rev. (1984) 947; A
Rycroft and B Jordaan op cite 10 – 17.
14.
B Hepple (ed) The making of labour law in Europe (Mansell, 1986).
15.
J S Mill, “On Liberty”in John Stuart Mill: A Selection of His Works J M Robson
(ed) (Macmillan, 1966) 13 – 19.
16.
M Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 10th (ed)
(LexisNexis) 2009) 6.
17.
Under art 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Arbitration Act [Chapter 7:15].
employer engages the employee on acceptable terms and

conditions. The employer employs his resources to ensure that
the goose that lays the eggs for their mutual benefit continues
to do so. Society expects these mutually beneficial outcomes.
The economy thrives and so does the community generally and
its members in particular. An award that plunges the apple-cart
over the cliff in my view could not be said to be in the best
interest of the general good of Zimbabwe...
The court proceeded to place at the pinnacle of considerations to be

made when determining whether a wage increment was reasonable,
the ability of the employer to pay:
In all work situations salaries and wages are limited by an employer’s
ability to pay. The courts and indeed all tribunals delegated with
decisions of a financial nature would be failing in their duty if they
were to will-nilly give awards whose effect would be to drive
corporations into insolvency thereby destroying the economic fabric
of the nation. Such awards would defeat the very purpose they are
meant to serve. As such they are liable to be set aside as being in
conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe...
The Labour Court went further in Chamber of Mines v Associated
Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe.18 In that case the trade union had
made a demand of 55% wages increment whilst the employer offered
5%, roughly the prevailing inflation rate. The Labour Court set aside
the 20% increment by the arbitrator, as being outrageous. The court
observed:
Thus it is high time the labour advocacy institutions migrate
from the hang-over of the hyper-inflationary environment to
the current multi-currency stable environment. This will ensure
sustainability of the workers’ welfare and also ensure economic
development… The inflation level obtaining in the country is at
about 5% which should provide an essential guide for salary
negotiations…
Whilst workers should be remunerated fairly, l do not believe it
is reasonable to do so at the expense of the sustainability of the
companies which pay them… I am satisfied that the Chamber
has justified the setting aside of the arbitral award. Whilst it is
necessary to raise the workers’ salaries, the raise should be in
tandem with the inflationary levels, production levels, and other
18.
LC/H/ 250/2012.
costs. I am satisfied that a blanket raise by 20% is outrageous. A

5 % raise meets the justice of the case.
In neither of the above cases did the court seek to balance or place in
context the economic factor of the employer’s business interest with
the other factors that are accepted under appropriate international
labour standards.19 These factors include economic – social factors
such as productivity, standards of living in the country and the average
wages in the country as well as the needs of the worker and their
family and the specified purposes of the Labour Act.
Given that Zimbabwe has ratified some of the important ILO
instruments on wage-fixing, these should have been of high persuasive
authority to the courts in determining what a grossly unreasonable
wage increment was.20 It would have required a contextual and
balanced approach, weighing the factors based on the interests of
the business such as ability to pay and profitability and those in favour
of the needs of the worker and their family such as the bread basket
and PDL. In doing so the courts would have been guided by the fact
that the specified objective of the Labour Act is to advance social
justice in the workplace and that Zimbabwe has ratified regional and
international instruments that provide for the employee’s right to
19.
Zimbabwe has ratified important ILO conventions dealing with wages including:
ILO 026 Convention: Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Manufacturing,
Commerce, Domestic Sectors) (1928); ILO 099 Convention: Minimum Wage Fixing
Machinery (Agriculture) (1951). There are also other relevant ILO instruments,
which Zimbabwe has not ratified such as: ILO 131 Convention: Minimum Wage-
Fixing (1970); ILO 135 Recommendation: Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation
(1970).
20.
The Long Title of the Labour Act stipulates that one of the objectives of the
Act is “to give effect to the international obligations of the Republic of
Zimbabwe as a member state of the international Labour OrganisationÉ” The
Labour Court has in other instances, correctly in our view, used relevant ILO
conventions to help interpret provisions of the Labour Act as was done in:
Mavisa v Clan Transport LC/H/199/2009 applying ILO 135 Convention: Workers
Representatives Convention (1971); ILO 087 Convention: Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) to help interpret the provisions
of s 14B( C ) and s 29 (4a) of the Act; and Chamwaita v Charhons (Pvt) Ltd LC/
H/215/2009 applying provisions of the Termination of Employment Convention,
1982 (C 158). Generally on the appropriateness of using principles under relevant
international treaties – see section 15B of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01]
and Kachingwe, Chibebe and ZLHR v Minister of Home Affairs and Commissioner
of Police 2005 (2) ZLR 12 (S) and S v Moyo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 338 (H) at 341E-
F
“just and favourable remuneration.”21 In any case the courts should

have been bound by the principle that the grounds on which an arbitral
award can be set aside for contravention of public policy in particular
unreasonableness, are of a very limited nature.22 The courts were
clearly guided by a unitarist approach to labour relations yet one
which is inconsistent with the specified objectives of the Act. This
was obviously in tandem with the dominant ideological thrust during
the Government of National Unity, which tended to emphasize free-
market values. This was aptly captured in the 2010 Budget Statement
of the then Minister of Finance, T Biti, wherein he stated:23
The review of the role of arbitrators in awarding wage
adjustments that bear no relationship to the competitiveness
of most industries and indeed the entire economy, is unavoidable.
Failure to nip in the bud unsustainable wage awards will be
swiftly punished in the global village as our products price
themselves out of the market, both locally and in the export
markets.
REGULATION OF WAGES UNDER THE LABOUR ACT AND PUBLIC SERVICE ACT
The regulation of wages under statutes had not gone too far beyond
the common law. In the public sector wages and related benefits were
set by the Public Service Commission with the concurrence of the
minister responsible for finance.24 The Commission was required to
consult the recognized public sector associations and organizations
before setting the terms and conditions including remuneration, but
failure to consult or to reach agreement with the associations did not
invalidate any wage regulations so made.25 The Public Service Act
does not provide for the right of employees to “a fair and reasonable
wage” but only provides public sector employees to an enforceable
21.
Article 23 (3) Universal Declaration of Rights; art. 14 (b) Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights in SADC.
22.
Discussed in detail, infra 7.
23.
Cited in: 25 Labour Relations Information Service 3 (June – August 2012) 2.
The Finance Minister repeated the same sentiments in the November 2011
Budget Statement stating: “Stakeholder submissions by industry as well as the
labour movement acknowledge rising incidences of wage demands divorced
from productivity by workers unions and arbitration awards that fail to take
into account affordability at company levels.”
24.
Section 19 (1) as read with s 8 (1) of the Public Service Act [Chapter 16:01].
25.
See section 20 (1) and (2) of the Public Service Act as read with s 73 (2)
Constitution of Zimbabwe 1979 (SI 1979/1600 of the United Kingdom).
right to remuneration.26 The only major modification to common law

is the requirement that salaries be fixed to by reference to, “academic,
professional or technical qualifications or the attributes necessary
for the efficient and effective execution of the tasks attached to the
post.”27
The above provision is important in so far as it limits the arbitrary
discretion of the employer to differentiate between wages of
employees in different grades as would otherwise be allowed under
the common law. Nonetheless, it does not advance the employee’s
cause for a fair and reasonable wage.
The employment relationship in the private sector is generally covered
by the provisions of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. The situation
was only marginally different from that under common law. The Act
does not specifically provide for a right to “a fair and reasonable
wage,” whether as a fundamental right, a specified fair labour practice
or under its mandatory minimum wages regime.
Under Part 2, the Act provides for various fundamental rights of
employees, including the right to fair labour standards. Section 6 (1)
creates a fundamental duty of the employer to pay the prescribed
remuneration, but the section does not expressly provide for a fair
labour standard of fair and reasonable wages. It merely compels the
employer not to pay a wage which is lower than that specified by law
or agreement:
No employer shall pay any employee a wage which is lower than
that to (sic) fair labour standard specified for such employee by
law or by agreement.
Mandatory minimum wages may be set in terms of sections 17and 20

of the Act. Under section 17 (3) as read with section 17 (1)the Minister
of Labour may, after consultation with the Wages Advisory Council,
make regulations providing for, inter alia:
17 (3) (a) the rights of employees, including minimum wages,
benefits, social security, retirement, and superannuation benefits
and other benefits of employment;
26.
Section 22, Public Service Act.
27.
Section 20 (2) Public Service Regulation 2000 (SI 1/2000).
Section 20 further provides, inter alia, that:

20(1) The Minister may, by statutory instrument –
(a) In respect of any class of employees in any
undertaking or industry –
(i) specify the minimum wage and benefits in
respect of such grade of employees;
(ii) require employers to grant or negotiate
increments on annual income of such minimum
amount or percentage as he may specify;
and prohibit the payment of less than such specified
minimum wage and benefits or increments to such
class of employees;
(b) …
(c) …
(d) give such other directions or make such other
provision as he may deem necessary or desirable to
ensure the payment of a minimum wage or benefits
to any class of employees;
(e) provide for exemptions from paragraphs (a), (b), (c)
and (d).
Where a minimum wage notice is issued in terms of these provisions

every contract of employment or collective bargaining agreement has
to be modified or adapted to the extent necessary to bring it into
conformity with the minimum wages regulations.28 However, it is again
noted that there are no specific minimum standards by which the
Minister sets the minimum wages, including that the minimum wages
be “fair and reasonable wage” or guarantee the employees “a decent
standard of living.”
Another platform for regulation of wages under the Labour Act relates
to statutory collective bargaining agreements made in terms of Part
VIII and Part V of the Act. These may be industry-wide agreements
made under a National Employment Council or a workplace agreement
made under a Works Council. However, as with the ministerial wage
regulations, there are also no prescribed minimum standards by which
the agreements must adhere.29 Thus the parties are free to negotiate
28.
Section 17 (3) of the Act.
29.
See the bargaining agenda set in s 74 (3) of the Act which includes: “Érates of
remuneration and minimum wages for different grades and types of
occupation...”
what they deem fit as a fair or reasonable wage. The parties though,
do not have absolute freedom. Firstly, reflecting the state corporatist
origins of the Act, the Minister of Labour has residual power to direct
the renegotiation of an agreement which the Minister feels has become:
(a) inconsistent with this Act or any other enactment or –
(b) ….
(c) unreasonable or unfair, having regard to the respective
rights of the parties.30
The Act does not define the phrase “unreasonable or unfair.” The
discretion is left with the Minister. It may be argued though that the
Minister may generally be guided by the objects of the Act specified
in section 2A (1). The later though, can only take the argument so far,
because neither s 2A (1) nor the Act in general provides for an explicit
fair labour standard of a right to a fair and reasonable wage.
Secondly, a party aggrieved by an award made under compulsory
arbitration can appeal to the Labour Court on a question of law,31 or
if made through voluntary arbitration, make an application to the
High Court to set it aside as being, inter alia, in contravention of the
public policy of Zimbabwe.32 It has been held that an appropriate
ground on which an award may be held to be in contravention of the
public policy of Zimbabwe, is where the award is deemed grossly
unreasonable.33 But the courts have generally held that the ground
of “unreasonableness” is of very limited use in such applications or
appeals and the party who seeks to establish this bears “a formidable
onus”34 to show that the award made is “so outrageous in defiance of
common sense and logic.”35 This is why the bar set in Chamber of
Mines v Associated Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe, supra, of using
the inflation rate as the essential basis of judging reasonability or
30.
Section 81 (1).
31.
Section 98 (10). See Chamber of Mines v Associated Mineworkers Union of
Zimbabwe, supra n. 7.
32.
Article 34 (2) (b) (ii), Arbitration Act [Chapter 7:15]. Tel-One (Pvt) Ltd v
Communications & Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe 2007 (2) ZLR
262 (H).
33.
Tel-One (Pvt) Ltd v Communications & Allied Services Workers Union of
Zimbabwe ibid; and Chamber of Mines v Associated Mineworkers Union of
Zimbabwe, op cite n 7.
34.
Cargo Carriers (Pvt) Ltd v Zambezi & Ors 1996 (1) ZLR 613 (S).
35.
Chinyange v Jaggers Wholesalers SC 24/03; Beazley NO v Kabel & Anor SC/22/
03; ZESA v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (S).
otherwise of an award without regard to the specified objectives of

the Labour Act and considering all other relevant factors such as the
needs of the worker, was too low and inconsistent with case authority.
From the above it becomes clear that the Labour Act does not compel
the employer to pay “a fair and reasonable wage,” let alone a living
wage. At most s 2A(1), may be used as an interpretation tool to
determine what is a fair and reasonable wage in relation to minimum
wages notices decreed by the Minister, or directions by the Minister
for renegotiations of collective bargaining agreements or in relation
to wage awards made by arbitrators.36 However, the absence of an
explicit inclusion in the Act of the employees’ right to a fair and
reasonable wage whether as a fundamental right of employees or as a
fair labour standard, makes the potential use of s 2A (1) as a basis for
such right tenuous and unlikely. This is moreso in view of the already
declared skepticism of the Supreme Court on the generalized use of
this section.37
RIGHT TO FAIR AND REASONABLE WAGE AND APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION MODEL

The preceding survey of the legal framework prevailing prior to Act
No. 20/2013 shows that Zimbabwean law did not provide for a fair
and reasonable wage or a living wage. Not surprisingly the demand
for the right to a fair and reasonable wage or a living wage was one of
the primary demands of workers and trade unions in relation not only
to labour law reform but constitutional reform as well.
This was aptly captured in the National Constitution Assembly Draft
Constitution.38
This demand is manifest in s 65 (1) of the new Constitution. Although
this section is clearly inspired by s 28 (1) of the NCA Draft Constitution
36.
By reliance on s 2A (2) of the Act providing that the Act “ ... shall be construed
in such manner as best ensures the attainment of its purpose referred to in
subsection (1).”
37.
In United Bottlers v Kaduya 2006 (2) ZLR 150 (S) at 155B-C, CHIDYAUSIKU CJ
observed in relation to s 2A says“The section is not a wholesale amendment of
the common law. The common law can only be ousted by an explicit provision
of the Labour Act.”
38.
Section 28 (1), NCA Draft Constitution (2001), s 28 (1) providing: “Every worker
has the right to fair and safe labour practices and standards and to be paid at
least a living wage consistent with the poverty datum line.”See generally, M
Gwisai The Zimbabwe COPAC Draft Constitution and what it means for Working
People and Democracy (ZLC, 2012) 54.
but not going as far as the later in providing for a living wage consistent
with the poverty datum line, the enshrinement of the right to a fair
and reasonable is still of profound significance. It has provided what
has so far been the critical missing link in the legal framework, and
which allowed the common law and unitarist based approach to reign
with impunity.
For the first time in Zimbabwean labour history, statute law now
provides for the regulation of wages based on normative values of
fairness and reasonableness, something which is alien to common law
and was omitted in the statutory framework. This is even done at the
highest possible level, namely as an enshrined fundamental right under
the Declaration of Rights. What had been missing as a directly specified
fair labour standard in the purposes of the Labour Act under s 2A (1)
is now provided for, but now as a constitutional right.
THE TEST FOR “A FAIR AND REASONABLE WAGE” UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the Constitution does not directly define the phrase “a fair
and reasonable wage,” it provides clear guidelines to be used in
interpreting the phrase. In the first instance in interpreting the
Declaration of Rights, one is required to give full effect to rights
provided in the Constitution and to promote the values that underlie
a democratic society based on inter alia justice and human dignity.39
This is strengthened by s 46 (2) of the Constitution which requires
that when any court or tribunal is interpreting an enactment and
when developing the common law, it must promote and be guided by
the spirit and objectives of the Declaration of Rights.40
Critically further, the courts and tribunals are required to “take into
account international law and all treaties and conventions to which
Zimbabwe is a party.”41 Of particular further importance are the
provisions of s 327 (6) of the Constitution. This provides:
When interpreting legislation, every court and tribunal must
adopt any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with any
international convention, treaty or agreement which is binding
on Zimbabwe, in preference to an alternative interpretation
inconsistent with that convention, treaty or agreement.
39.
Section 46 (1) (a) (b) of the Constitution.
40.
Which is also reinforced in s 176 of the Constitution.
41.
Section 46 (1) ( c ) of the Constitution.
The phrase “a fair and reasonable wage” is in fact derived from

international law instruments, most of which Zimbabwe has ratified.
These must provide guidance on how it is interpreted by virtue of s 46
and s 327 (6) of the Constitution.
Firstly art. 14 (b) of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC
2003, provides:
(b) Workers are (to be) provided with fair opportunities to
receive wages, which provide for a decent standard of
living; … (emphasis added).
Zimbabwe is also party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1948, whose art.23 (3) provides:
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and herself existence worthy
of human dignity…
Zimbabwe has also ratified the International Covenant of Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights 1966 whose article 11 (1) provides:
Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself or herself and his or her family
including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary
social services…
The International Labour Organisation has several instruments dealing

with minimum-wage fixing.42 Perhaps the most relevant are ILO 131
Convention: Minimum Wage-Fixing (1970) and ILO 135
Recommendation: Minimum Wage-Fixing (1970). In terms of article 1
of ILO R135, one of the key factors to be considered in wage fixing is
the need to “… to overcome poverty and to ensure the satisfaction of
the needs of all workers and their families…”
In terms of the specific elements to be considered when determining
an appropriate minimum wage that realizes the above purposes, article
3 of ILO C131 states these as, subject to national practice and
conditions:...43
42.
See for instance: ILO 026 Convention: Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery; ILO
030 Recommendation: Minimum Wage – Fixing Machinery; ILO 099 Convention:
Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) (1951).
43.
ZimStat, “Appendix: Summary of International Labour Organisation (ILO) position
on Poverty Datum Line in relation to wages and salaries” (ZimStat, 2013).
(a) The needs of workers and their families, taking into account
the general level of wages in the country, the cost of living,
social security benefits, and the relative living standards
of other social groups;
(b) Economic factors, including the requirements of economic
development, levels of productivity and the desirability
of attaining and maintaining a high level of employment.
Therefore under ILO instruments the decided bias in the fixing of
minimum wages is the “human factor”, that is the needs of the worker
and their family to live a poverty-free life but this done within
prevailing “national practice and conditions” including economic and
social considerations.
The influence on the above ILO conventions is a pluralist conception,
at the centre of which is poverty reduction and collective bargaining
as key factors. The instruments provide for two broad considerations
to be made, encompassing both worker friendly and employer friendly
factors, but with the specified fundamental purpose being poverty
reduction and ensuring the satisfaction of the needs of the worker
and their family. This frame-work allows flexibility in the determination
of what is fair and reasonable wage, taking into account the concrete
realities in each given country, with effective collective bargaining
providing the yard-stick of what is appropriate national practice. The
underlying theoretical basis is pluralism, especially the adversarial
version. This has been defined as a theory of labour relations in which
employers accept the inevitability and need for collective regulation
of the employment relationship, in particular through collective
bargaining.44
Following on the above international instruments, the concept of a
just or fair remuneration has had major influence in recent
constitutional reform on the continent and globally including, Kenya,45
Malawi46 and Mozambique.47 Perhaps the fullest expression is to be
found in article 91 of the Constitution of Venezuela, which provides:
44.
M Finnemore op cite 144-145.
45.
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides in s 41 (2) (a): “(1) Every person has
the right to fair labour practices. (2) Every worker has the right – (a) to fair
remunerationÉ..”
46.
See s 31 (1), Constitution of Malawi, providing: “31 (1) Every person shall have
the right to fair and safe labour practices and to fair remuneration.”
47.
Article 89 (1) of the Constitution of Mozambique provides: “Labour shall be
protected and dignified ... the State shall promote the just distribution of
the proceeds of labour.”
Every worker has the right to a salary sufficient to enable him

or her to live with dignity and cover basic material, social and
intellectual needs for himself or herself and his or her family.
The payment for equal salary for equal work is guaranteed, and
the share of the profits of a business enterprise to which workers
are entitled shall be determined… The State guarantees workers
in both the public and private sector a vital minimum salary
which shall be adjusted each year, taking as one of the references
the cost of a basic market.
The Australian case of Ex Parte H.V. McKay 1907 provides perhaps the
most elaborate statement of the test for a “fair and reasonable wage.”
In that case the court had to determine what was meant by the phrase
“fair and reasonable wages” in an enactment which provided duty
exemption for Australian manufacturers paying such wages. The court
held:
The provision for fair and reasonable remuneration is obviously
designed for the benefit of the employees in the industry; and
it must be meant to secure to them something which they cannot
get by the ordinary system of individual bargaining with
employers. The standard of ‘fair and reasonable’ must,
therefore, be something else; and l cannot think of any other
standard appropriate than the normal needs of the average
employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilized
community…
The court went on to state that whilst there is need to balance the
different factors, the “first and dominant factor” in ascertaining a
“fair and reasonable” wage for an unskilled employee are the “normal
needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a
civilized community.” And that a wage cannot be regarded as fair and
reasonable, “ if it does not carry a wage sufficient to insure the
workman food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, provision for evil
days, etc as well as reward for the special skill of an artisan if he is
one.”
The Court stated that the standard is an objective one, which is not
dependant on the profitability of the business, but rather the needs
of the employee:
… the remuneration of the employee is not made to depend on
the profits of the employer. If the profits are nil, the fair and
reasonable remuneration must be paid; and if the profits are
100 per cent, it must be paid. There is far more ground for the
view that, under this section, the fair and reasonable

remuneration has to be paid before profits are ascertained –
that it stands on the same level as the cost of the raw material
of the manufacture.
The same conclusion was reached in the American case of Morehead

v New York ex rel. Tipaldo.48 Dealing with a similar provision the
Industrial Court of Kenya held that:49
The terms fair and reasonable are to be interpreted in the
context of the standards at a particular work place, the national
labour standards and with due regard to international labour
standards.
The concept of “a fair and reasonable wage” therefore encapsulates
the concept of the bread-basket or a living wage that ensures a
dignified or decent standard of living, as the starting and primary
point. The most scientific method of measuring standards of living is
the Poverty Datum Line (PDL). The PDL is a general measurement of
standards of living and poverty. It represents “the cost of a given
standard of living that must be attained if a person is deemed not to
be poor.”50
To measure standards of living, two measures are generally used,
namely the Food Poverty Line (FPL) and the Total Consumption Poverty
Line (TCPL). The FPL “represents the minimum consumption
expenditure necessary to ensure that each individual can, (if all
expenditures were devoted to food), consume a minimum food basket
representing 2 100 kilo calories.” An individual whose total
consumption expenditure does not exceed the food poverty line is
deemed to be very poor.
On the other hand the TCPL is derived “by computing the non-food
consumption expenditure of poor households whose consumption
expenditure is just equal to the FPL. This amount is added to the
FPL.”51 An individual whose total consumption expenditure does not
exceed the total consumption poverty line is deemed to be poor.
Therefore the human factor, in particular the need to prevent poverty
is the key determinant of a ‘fair and reasonable wage.” This generally
48.
298 US. 587 (1936).
49.
VMK v CUEA [2013] KLR in interpreting s 41 (2) (a), Constitution of Kenya,
2010, which provides: “Every worker has the right – (a) to fair remuneration”
50.
ZimStat (2012) 53.
51.
ibid.
would be PDL-Linked. This is the ‘first and dominant factor.” Employers

who seek to pay less than this wage, therefore have the onus to
establish compelling reasons why this should be so, by for instance
reference to the other factors such as economic and financial. But
the burden is onerous and heavy because of the primacy of the human
factor. Where incapacity is raised, there must be full financial
disclosure by the employer. In Ex Parte H.V. McKay, supra, it was
held that there is no general obligation on an employer to give full
financial disclosure on its finances, but only if the employer is paying
a fair and reasonable wage, otherwise it would have such duty.
The above conception of a “fair wage” is also aptly captured in the
Marxist theory of labour relations as expressed by F. Engels. According
to him a fair wage is one consistent with what he terms the Law of
Wages, namely:52
Now what does political economy call a fair day’s wages and a
fair day’s work? Simply the rate of wages and the length and
intensity of a day’s work which are determined by competition
of employer and employed in the open market. And what are
they, when thus determined? …. A fair day’s wages, under normal
conditions, is the sum required to procure to the labourer the
means of existence necessary, according to the standard of life
in his station and country, to keep himself in working order and
to propagate his race. The actual rate of wages, with the
fluctuations of trade, may be sometimes below this rate; but,
under fair conditions that rate ought to be the average of all
oscillations.
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ZIMBABWEAN LAW

The thrust of the above on the position in Zimbabwean law is profound.
By virtue of sections 46 and 327 (6) of the Constitution, the phrase
“fair and reasonable wage” in s 65 (1) must therefore be interpreted
consistent with the above international law instruments which
Zimbabwe has ratified and which give primacy to the human factor.
In other words, by enshrinement of the right to a fair and reasonable
wage in the Declaration of Rights there is a nod towards minimum
wages being at least those that provide adequate food, clothing,
shelter, healthcare, education of children, frugal comfort and social
security taking into account the general standard of living and cost of
living in the country by reference to the PDL.
52.
F Engels, “A Fair Day’s Wages for a Fair Day’s Work,” The Labour Standard 7
May 1881 in Inqaba ya Basebenzi 2 (Aug-Oct 1983) 7.
The above means the approach followed in the Chamber of Mines

case, supra, is decidedly no longer good or binding authority under
the new constitutional dispensation. Such decision, which was based
on the sole consideration of the inflation rate and interests of the
business, cannot clearly stand in view of s 65 (1) of the new
Constitution. In terms of the later, considerations of fairness require
balancing both the business factors and the human factor but with
first priority being given to the human factor.
ONUS AND EVIDENTIARY BURDEN

The above interpretation means that s 65 (1) of the Constitution has
now set a general standard of remuneration by which all employees
should be paid, but like all general rules, excerptions are applicable
in appropriate circumstances. The onus though, lying on the party
seeking to resile from the general rule to show compelling reasons
why it should not.
This means in effect that the Constitution shifts the onus to the party
who says it cannot comply with such standard to provide adequate
reasons why it cannot. This means that where an employer seeks to
pay less than a PDL-linked wage, the employer has the onus to prove
compelling reasons why this should be so. If the employer pleads
financial incapacity to pay fair wages, then it follows that the onus
shifts to the employer to establish this and generally the burden is
high because this is a justiciable right provided in the Declaration of
Rights.
The employer has a duty of full disclosure. This may pertain to areas
such as the overall pay-roll, in particular the distribution of salaries
between the highest paid categories and the lowest paid ones, as was
held required in the case of City of Harare v Harare Municipal Workers
Union.53 Additional details of this duty are provided in Sections 75
and 76 of the Labour Act. Section 75 establishes a duty to negotiate
in good faith whereby all parties to the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement are required to disclose “all information relevant
to the negotiation including information contained in records, papers,
books and other documents.” Section 76 establishes a duty of full
financial disclosure where financial incapacity is alleged. It reads:
(1) When any party to the negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement alleges financial incapacity as a ground for his
53.
2006 (1) ZLR 491 (H).
inability to agree to any terms or conditions, or to any

alteration of any terms or conditions thereof, it shall be
the duty of such party to make full disclosure of his
financial position, duly supported by all relevant
accounting papers and documents to the other party.
In terms of the above, especially where there are allegations of
astronomical salaries and benefits being paid to top management,
the employers would have a duty to disclose details such as housing
allowances; education allowances for managers’ dependants; vehicle
and fuel benefits; club subscriptions and so forth. Similarly is the
duty to disclose details of capital investment plans in the last few
years and projections in the near future, details of the profits or
otherwise made by the company; the dividend attributed to the owners
or share-holders and so forth. This duty of full financial disclosure is
already widely practiced in industry in relation to applications for
exemptions, including with appropriate measures to protect
confidentiality.
Alternatively or additionally, the employer may need to provide
mitigatory measures, such as an increment for a shorter duration;
subsequent cost of living adjustments; special bonuses on increased
production or employee share ownership or profit-sharing schemes.
Failure to fulfill the above, means the employer would have failed to
discharge the onus on it, and therefore must pay the PDL-linked living
wage as was done in City of Harare v Harare Municipal Workers Union,
supra, where CHITAKUNYE J upheld an award of 120% by an arbitrator
and held:
The arbitrator carefully considered the interests of both parties
as portrayed by the parties before him. The applicant’s argument
of inability to pay was well considered… The substantive effect
of the award was simply to awaken the applicant to the realities
of today’s economy…Applicant argued that respondents should
not concern themselves with what is being awarded to other
employees or officers of the applicant. But surely, the
respondents are entitled to point out that those categories of
employees or officials are getting astronomical salaries which
may in fact be eating more into the applicant’s revenue than
the paltry salaries and allowances the lowly paid workers are
getting. The applicant appeared not to be comfortable to deal
with this and appeared content to brush it aside. But surely if
you have an entity that pays astronomical salaries to its top
heavy management and officers but that same entity is reluctant
to pay its lowly paid workers a living wage, can such an entity
sincerely cry bankruptcy if ordered to pay its lowly graded
workers a meaningful salary? There was simply nothing to fault
the arbitrator in arriving at the decision he gave on what was
placed before him. At 494D-F
CONCRETE IMPLICATIONS ON CURRENT REVIEW OF WAGES
At this stage in Zimbabwe’s history it cannot be sufficient to only

consider the inflation rate, when the prevailing minimum wages are
still less than half of the PDL and in fact where only 6 percent of paid
employees in 2011 were receiving an income above the TCPL as shown
in Table 1.54
Table 1: Percent Paid Employees Aged 15 Years and Above Paid Cash Only or Both in
Cash and in Kind by Type of Employment and Cash Received in the Month Preceding
the Survey, 2011 LFCLS55
Cash Received Informal Employment Formal Employment Total

Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
US$100 and below 46.3 64.0 52.5 4.9 6.3 5.3 27.7 41.5 32.2
$101-$200 31.9 20.1 27.8 25.2 19.7 23.6 28.9 19.9 26.0
$201-$300 14.5 10.5 13.1 43.6 50.1 45.5 27.6 25.9 27.1
$301-$400 2.9 2.7 2.8 11.6 7.9 10.5 6.8 4.7 6.1
$401-$500 1.6 0.8 1.3 5.0 4.1 4.8 3.1 2.1 2.8
$501-$1000 1.5 1.0 1.3 5.6 8.9 6.6 3.3 4.1 3.6
$1001-$3000 0.7 0.5 0.6 2.8 2.3 2.6 1.6 1.2 1.5
$3001 and above 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4
Not Stated 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Total Percent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total Number 712 815 538 611 100 100 100 1251 426
Nor can arguments of wage restraints hold water when employers
54.
The estimated TCPL for May 2011 was US$497.84 for a family of five. ZimStat
(2012) 53.
55.
Zimstat (2012) 123.
and senior management are paying themselves astronomical salaries

way disproportionate to the starvation wages the lowest employees
are receiving as was recognized in the City of Harare case. This was
also dramatically revealed in the “Salarygate Scandal” showing the
astronomical salaries being earned by top executives in state owned
or state supported companies and local authorities, with the Premier
Service Medical Society (PSMAS) taking top prize.56 Further details
are provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
Table 2: Sector Comparison of Total Monthly Cash by IPC Level57
Quasi-
IPC Manufac- Hospita- Govern- Tele-
Level turing Banking Insurance lity ment Mining coms
1 $10 842 $6 653 $9 185 $11 800 $8 436 $18 523 $10 586
2 $7 028 $4 772 $6 606 $4 916 $4 916 $12 867 $6 826
3 $3 073 $2 667 $2 969 $3 771 $3 451 $4 840 $4 919
4 $2 479 $1 331 $3 214 $2 924 $3 005 $3 633 $4 508
5 $2 008 $1 707 $2 161 $1 546 $2 322 $3 705 $2 893
6 $1 356 $2 062 $1 990 $1 196 $2 237 $2 259 $3 709
7 $1 483 $1 612 $1 063 $730 $1 319 $1 839 $2 334
8 $856 $849 $791 $573 $1 363 $1 234 $1 830
Table 2:(cont)
56.
For instance at Premier Service Medical Aid Society (PSMAS), in 2012 of the
total wage bill of US$33 413 373 – 00, almost half was paid to the top 14
managers compared to over 700 other employees. Of these the Chief Executive
Officer, Mr C Dube, earned a basic monthly salary of $230 000 – 00, (rising to
$530 000-00 with allowances), followed by the Group Finance Manager at
$200 000 – 00 a month and the Group Operations Executive at $122 000 – 00, a
month. See P Chipunza “PSMAS shock salary schedule” The Herald 23 January
2014 p 1. Other top earners were the 19 top executives of the City of Harare
who “earned” a total of $500 000 every month, led by the Town Clerk, Dr T
Mahachi at $37 642 – 00 a month followed by directors at $36 999 – 00 a month.
See I Ruwende “19 City Council executives gobble US$500 000 every month”
The Herald 28 January 2014. On the other hand the CEO of ZBC Holdings was
reported to earn $40 000-00 a month and the General Manager of NSSSA was at
$20 886.78 a month. “How they spend mega salaries” The Herald 5 April 2014.
57.
Industrial Psychology Consultants (Pvt) Ltd (2011).
Quasi-
IPC Manufac- Hospita- Govern- Tele-
Level turing Banking Insurance lity ment Mining coms
9 $738 $555 $588 $312 $594 $927 $1 575
10 $757 $652 $616 $356 $837 $717 $1 129
11 $668 $644 - $724 $765 $425 $874
12 $539 $413 $364 $434 $1 060 $484 $1 458
13 - $725 $357 - $676 $516 -
14 $526 $500 $417 $253 $634 $567 $774
15-16 $318 $496 $451 $191 $455 $279 $636
The above figures have in fact recently been revealed to be an

understatement by the Salary-Gate Scandal.
Table 3a: Salaries and Benefits of Executives in Parastatals and Local authorities
Benefits Comments
Fuel 250 litres to 350 litres per month for the CEO; 150 litres to 300
litres per month for Executives below the CEO
Cell phone allowance $250 to $935 per month for the MD, $100 to $250 per month for
the Executives below the MD
Medical Aid 100 per cent for all Executives ($450)
Pension 100 per cent for all Executives ($2 379)
Vehicle The type of cars include Mercedes Benz, Jeep for the MD. For
the positions below MD the following cars apply, Isuzu KB, Mazda
BT50
School fees per term For the CEO, some companies pay between $1 500 and $2 500
per child per term for two or three children. Some companies
pay 100 per cent fees for Executives including University fees
both locally and abroad. For line managers, some companies pay
a certain percentage of total fees incurred. This percentage
ranges between 50 per cent and 90 per cent of the invoice.
Housing Allowance This ranges between $300 and $2 500 per month
Table 3a: (cont)

Benefits Comments
Entertainment Some companies are offering entertainment allowances as per

Executive’s request. Some companies offer a flat fee of between
$100 and $120 per month for entertainment
Lunch allowance of 441 on average
Other allowances amount to 41 691 on average
Bonus Most companies offer bonuses equivalent to monthly basic salary.

However, some companies use an option of profit sharing for
Executives.
Source: ZCTU 18 December 2013 Daily News 26
The enshrinement of the right to a fair and reasonable wage, compels

the awarding of wage increments that move wages towards the PDL
within the shortest possible time. By 2011 this would have meant on
average net wages of at least $400.00 taking into account a maximum
20 percent contribution by a spouse working in the informal sector.
The figure would have been higher in 2013, probably in excess of
$450.00, given the increase in PDL and TCPL figures. In March 2013
the ZimStat PDL monthly figure was $541, based on a family of five,
whilst that of the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe, based on a family
of six, was $564.73 in June 2013.58 Given that about 87 percent of
employees in the formal sector were, in 2011, being paid less than
this, it means that increments merely based on the inflation rates
would never achieve a PDL-linked wage. Such increments would merely
freeze the very inadequate present. It being borne in mind that despite
the real increases in wages since 2009, average wages as of March
2013 remained less than 45 percent of the PDL of US$541.00.
Section 46 (1) (b) of the Constitution states that interpretation of
statutes must be such that inter- alia, it promotes justice and human
dignity. Any interpretation that moves wages towards the PDL or a
living wage cannot be said to be grossly unreasonable, even if it is
above the prevailing inflation rate, for it gives the workers an income
that helps them live a dignified life. If anything special reasons have
to be shown by any employer wishing to pay wages less than the PDL
why this should be so. Reference may also be had to section 24 of the
Constitution, which states as one of the desired national objectives
as “… to provide everyone with an opportunity to work in a freely
chosen activity, in order to secure a decent living for themselves and
their families.”
58.
See ZimStat (2013) supra; Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (2013).
It is an accepted reality that workers suffered the most in the hyper-

inflation years, were the purchasing value of wages for ordinary
workers who were chained by practice and law to the increasingly
useless local dollar, was virtually wiped out.59 The performance of
the economy improved considerably in the post-dollarisation period,
and it is only fair that the benefits of such improvement be shared
equitably, including through granting of PDL linked living wages. See
Table 4.
Table 4: Economic overview since dollarisation
Revised
forecast (Mar
Indicator /Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 forecast 2014 World
(Dec-2013) Bank)
GDP growth rate 5.7% 5.4% 9.3% 4.4% 5.5% 5.43 3%
GDP absolute
(US$bn) 5.220 5.502 5.916 6.517 6.892 5.02
Inflation
(annual ave.0 -7-7% 4.5% 4.9% 3.9% 3.9% -2.47
Interest rates 30% 21- 10% 10% 10% 10%

24%
Source: Old Mutual Investment, December 2013 and March 2014
TWO EARNERS ARGUMENT AND THE CHINA-FACTOR

Neither will the expressed constitutional purpose of fairness be realized
by an argument that the PDL includes the income of two spouses and
therefore the wage of the individual employee cannot be equivalent
to that. In a situation where only 16 percent of the working population
is in paid-permanent employment, and 75 per cent in “vulnerable
employment” in the informal sector and communal, resettlement
farming, most persons are earning a pittance.60 Estimates show that
a good 64.0% of women in paid employment in the informal sector
59.
Under the Exchange Control (Payment of Salaries by Exporters in Foreign
Currency for Critical Skills Retention) Order 2008 (SI 127/2008) only those highly
skilled employees and senior management could be paid in foreign currency on
approval by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, thereby protecting them from the
ravages of hyper-inflation. For all other workers payment of wages in foreign
currency was an illegal act. See section 4 Exchange Control Regulations 1996
(SI 109/1996), Matsika v Jumvea & Anor 2003 (1) ZLR 71 (H).
60.
ZimStat (2011) 51.
earned $100 and below in 2011.61 This means that on average the
contribution of a spouse employed in the informal sector was at most
around 20 percent to the TCPL. In 2011 wages in the formal sector
had to be at least a net of $400.00 to amount to a living wage consistent
with the TCPL as provided by the national authorities. However, that
figure is in fact an understatement given the high levels of
unemployment and cultural factors. The employee in formal
employment in reality not only looks after his or her nuclei family as
provided under the Western-influenced nuclei family of five used to
calculate the TCPL by ZimStat, but has a very large extended family
responsibility.
Therefore into the foreseeable future, the wage of the earner in formal
employment will provide the bulk of the earnings of the family, and
thus minimum wages should be as close as possible to the PDL.
Equally unconvincing are employer arguments of competiveness,
especially the so-called China-factor, the foci must remain Zimbabwe.
Comparative regional and international wage comparatives are varied.
Moreover, nominal wage figures may be misleading in so far as they
do not take into account varied cost of living indexes from country to
country. This is why the ILO instruments place focus on “national
practice and conditions” as well as “the general levels of wages in
the country.”62
In any case, from a public policy perspective, the above employer
arguments are self-defeating in the long-term. Having wages so far
below the PDL, means depressed demand for the products of industry
and the likely continuation of debilitating labour migration.
It is submitted that in the current scenario, section 65 (1) of the
Constitution compels arbitrators and courts to grant increments above
the inflation rate in order to move to “fair and reasonable wages.”
Whilst the actual rates of increment should take into account the
specific circumstances of the given industry including, the economic
and financial condition of the employers, the rate of inflation and
comparative wages in other industries, the primary and dominant
consideration must be the obligation to ensure that the lowest paid
workers earn a wage as close as possible to the PDL, as described
above. Increments for employees earning above this must be sufficient
enough to reward the employees for their extra skills, including by
61.
Ibid 123.
62.
Article 3 ILO 131 Convention: Minimum Wage Fixing.
comparison to other industries, productivity etc as was done in the Ex

parte H.V. McKay case, supra.
Evidence from the ground indicate the recognition that increments
cannot be constrained solely by the rate of inflation, with increments
agreed or granted by arbitrators in 2013 generally being above the
inflation rate.63
Where an employer is unwilling to pay a PDL-linked living wage and is
also unwilling or unable to effect mitigatory and compensatory special
measures, then such employer has no right to be in business, if all it
can offer are wages that amount to semi-slavery. As noted by HIGGINS
J, in Ex Parte H.V. McKay, supra, the payment of fair and reasonable
wages, “stands on the same level as the cost of the raw material of
the manufacture.” Without raw materials there can be no production
or business. Even in the darkest ages of colonial primitive
accumulation, there was a bar beyond which even the colonial courts
were not prepared to go under. Thus for an employer who pleaded
inability to pay wages because of the difficulties it was facing in its
business, the court, in R v Millin SR 171, declared: “No one has the
right to exploit natives on a gambling venture of this kind.”
LEGAL REFORM
The above described new constitutional regime also has significant
implications on labour law reform, in particular in reference to the
Labour Act and Public Service Act. These two principal labour statutes
will need to be amended to bring them into conformity with the new
constitutional standards.
In relation to the public sector, there is need to insert a proviso in the
provisions dealing with salaries subjecting the Civil Service
Commission’s power to set salaries not only to the collective bargaining
process but also the employees’ right to a fair and reasonable wage.64
The same would apply in relation to the Labour Act. A modest start
was made under section 13 of the Labour Amendment Act, 2015,65
63.
Whilst in 2013 the annual inflation rate is less than 2%, several negotiated
wage increments or arbitral awards have been significantly above this, including:
10.5% in the NEC for the Commercial Sector; and 6% for the Collective Bargaining
Agreement for the National Employment Council for the Printing, Packaging
and Newspaper Industry, SI 69/2006 as amended.
64.
Such as in s 22 of the Public Service Act and s 20 (2) of the Public Service
Regulations, 2000.
which expands the subjects of scope of collective bargaining under

section 74 of the Act to include measures “to mitigate the cost of
living.” But the general thrust of the amended section is focus are
“measures to foster the viability of undertakings and high levels of
employment.” More is required to ensure the Labour Act is
constitutionally compliant. A starting point could be the insertion of
the right to a fair and reasonable wage as a fundamental right of
employees under Part 2 of the Act, possibly under section 6. Similarly
the sections dealing with wage-fixing such as by the Minister under
sections 17 and 20 or through collective bargaining under Parts VIII
and Part V, must have amendments specifying that the minimum
thresholds of wages is that which ensures the employees’ rights to a
fair and reasonable wage. There can be further elaboration under
both Acts of the factors to be considered as done in article 91 of the
Constitution of Venezuela or in the ILO conventions and international
human rights instruments with primacy given to the needs of the worker
and their family to live a decent life worthy of human dignity.
CONCLUSION
The recent constitutional reform enshrining the employees’ right to a
fair and reasonable remuneration is an important step forward in the
march towards a fair and just society. However, even if that is achieved,
it can only be the first step forward, for there can never be real social
justice in work relations under a system based on wages and salaries
alone, or ultimately industrial peace and political stability.
More enlightened bourgeois theories of labour relations have come
around to this conclusion, in particular that of consultative pluralism
and radical nationalist theories, whereby employees are entitled not
only to fair wages but also a share of the company profits.66 Examples
of the later include, previously under the Zimbabwean Indigenization
and Economic Empowerment legislation wherein employees may be
entitled up to 28% share-ownership of indigenized foreign firms.67
65.
Act No. 5 of 2015.
66.
M Finnemore op cite 145.
67.
See the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33]; the
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010 (SI 21/
2010) as amended by the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment
(Amendment) Regulations, 2010 (No. 2) (SI 116/2010) and the Indigenisation
and Economic Empowerment (General) (Amendment) Regulations, 2011 (No.
3) 2011 (SI 34/2011).
This echoes the ZCTU Model Collective Bargaining Agreement proving

that the “employer shall be required to allocate at least 20% of net
profit at the end of each financial year to employees as a share of
profits…”68 Similarly under the Kadoma Declaration reached by
representatives of business, labour and the state, profit-sharing is
declared to be one of the goals of Zimbabwean industrial relations.
Similarly South Africa has also provided for similar under its Black
Economic Empowerment legislation.69 In advanced countries, such as
the UK and Australia, many large corporations have since the early
1980s, been providing for broad-based employee profit sharing
schemes, with some estimates putting the figure at 62 percent of all
the large public companies.
The above reflects the recognition by liberal political science that
sustainable liberal democracy is not possible where workers lack
corresponding social justice and democracy in the workplace. Industrial
democracy is a necessary condition for political democracy.
Even more fundamental is the position of the classical Marxist theory
that the wage system, even where “fair and reasonable wages” are
paid, is inherently unjust and exploitative. This is because wages do
not express a proportionate share of the wealth or surplus value
created by the worker, but are payment for the cost of labour power
as determined by the labour market.70 As recognized by HIGGINS J in
Ex Parte H.V. McKay, supra, the contest between labour and capital is
an unequal one because the former is always under “the pressure for
bread.” Or as Engels puts it, “the workman has no fair start. He is
fearfully handicapped by hunger.”71
With wages at most being an amount equivalent to the average human
needs of a worker and their family and not the surplus value created,
it means, according to Engels, “that the produce of the labour of
those who work, gets unavoidably accumulated in the hands of those
that do not work, and becomes in their hands the most powerful means
to enslave the very men who produced it.” In other words, the wages
system is inherently exploitative against workers and in favour of the
employer – capitalist class. Further that such unequal and exploitative
68.
Clause 43 (1) ZCTU Model CBA.
69.
See s 9 (1) Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No. 53/2003, whereby
employee-share ownership is granted a weight of 20 points out of a 100 credits.
70.
Engels F, (1881) supra.
71.
Ibid.
relations of production also lay the foundations for an equally unjust,

unequal and oppressive social superstructure of society at large in
politics, law, culture and the intellectual aspects against the majority
that labours and for a tiny minority that does not work but controls
the means of livelihood.
In the circumstances of the above political economy, equity and
fairness dictates that under the new Constitution a “fair and reasonable
wage” can only be a living wage linked to the Poverty Datum Line or
as the other Leonard pleaded, years after the first one, workers be
paid “Mugove Wavo.”
BOOK REVIEWS
The Struggle Over State Power in Zimbabwe Law And Politics Since
1950 by G.H. Karekwaivanane (Cambridge University Press 2017)
BY GEOFF FELTOE
This excellent and important book opens by relating what happened

at the trial in 1968 of four liberation fighters charged by the Rhodesian
regime of possession of arms of war, an offence that carried the death
penalty. The fighters refused legal representation, called no witnesses
and openly admitted they had brought arms into the country. They
proclaimed that they had committed no crime as they had legitimately
taken up arms to depose an illegitimate and highly repressive colonial
regime. They maintained that the court itself was illegitimate and
had no right to try them. Their court “performance” allowed them to
assert their political convictions and put on trial the colonial regime.
This book deals the interrelationship between politics and law in the
colonial period between 1950 and 1979, and the post-Independence
period from 1980 to 2008. It examines how law was used in many
different ways at various stages.
The author points out that law was used by the colonial state to try to
constitute state power and legitimise its rule and to implement its
policies of protecting the interests of the settlers and marginalizing
and exploiting the black majority; by colonized people to try to assert
their rights as citizens; by lawyers to try to shield people who had
fallen foul of increasingly repressive laws; and by persons tried under
draconian laws to declare the complete illegitimacy of the colonial
state and its courts. The regime adopted varying approaches to the
application of customary law and the role of the chiefs. The author
points out that previous studies have tended to concentrate on the
coercive role of law and have not given sufficient attention to the
diverse ways in which law was deployed by the regime at different
stages and the differing responses to the law by the people affected
by it.
The author then points out the different roles played by law in post-
Independent Zimbabwe. He examines, for instance, how the
government sought to transform the legal system, including its racial
composition, effect radical reforms to gender rights and modernize
233
the administration of customary law, although later traditional leaders

were politically co-opted by the ruling party. He looks at how an
increasingly authoritarian government made use of colonial laws for
repressive purposes, and how black lawyers and the people affected
responded to repression and played a key role in the development of
a human rights culture and legal activism. The book ends with the
observation that this evaluation of the history of legal struggles over
the period covered “alerts scholars and activists alike to the rich
repertoire of strategies and discourses that were employed and
deployed in struggles against state repression in colonial and post-
colonial Zimbabwe.”
This fascinating and meticulously researched book should be essential
reading for anyone interested the legal history of pre-and post-
Independence Zimbabwe.
Provincial and Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe An Analysis of

the Law, Policy and Practice By T.C. Chigwata (Juta 2018)
This is an impressive piece of sustained scholarship. It is exhaustively
researched, carefully structured and lucidly, meticulously and
convincingly reasoned.
The main question posed in this book is whether the multilevel
governance system in Zimbabwe is designed in a manner that promotes
the role of subnational governments in achieving development, building
democracy and ensuring sustainable peace.
The author defines development, democracy and sustainable peace
and sets out the design features of subnational governance which are
likely to stimulate development, build democracy and help to sustain
peace.
He critically examines the present structures of provincial and local
governance in Zimbabwe to determine whether they incorporate these
essential design features. After careful analysis in great detail of the
current structures, he concludes that the present Zimbabwean
multilevel system of governance fails to comply with many of these
design features. He argues these failings make it less likely that
Zimbabwe devolved governance system will contribute optimally to
development, democracy and sustainable peace. However, points out
that the 2013 Constitution does provide a foundation for building a
more effective system of multilevel governance, although it does not
UZLJ Book Reviews 235
itself allocate significant powers to provincial governance structures.

Throughout the work, he identifies features of the current provincial
and local government structures which are inconsistent with the new
Constitution and need to be changed. He contends, rightly, that more
than mere alignment with the Constitution is required; what is needed
is “the development of a new statutory framework that reflects the
constitutional ‘spirit’ of multilevel governance and devolution of
power.”
The author points to a variety of serious problems that have beset
devolved governance in Zimbabwe. For example, he examines the
negative impact of the ongoing national economic crisis upon local
government’s revenue raising capacity and funding support from
central government. He also points to the serious problem of the
misuse of the almost unlimited powers of the Minister of Local
Government, which powers have been used to undermine local
government institutions run by opposition party supporters. He also
makes observations on how the widespread problem of corruption at
national level has infected many of the local government institutions.
This work therefore provides a series of very useful proposals for
reforming multilevel governance system in Zimbabwe, drawing on a
whole range of comparative material. He not only analyses what is
demanded by the new Constitution, but also critically examines draft
legislation for provincial and local governance that has been produced
at the behest of the Ministry of Local Government and points to the
deficiencies therein.
CASE NOTES
PER STIRPES PRINCIPLE VERSUS THE PER CAPITA PRINCIPLE

IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Case Note on the Case of in Re Estate Late Bellinah

Mhlanga
HH 816-17 HC 4168/17 DR 143/13
BY ELIZABETH RUTSATE1
1. INTRODUCTION
One area of law which has been a source of serious conflict particularly
within families is the law of succession. Prior to delving deeper into
the topic it is imperative that as a starting point the term ‘succession’
be defined. In defining the term ‘succession,’ Moses Bello J.P. a
member of the Nigerian judiciary had this to say;
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary,2 defines succession
in the context of this topic to mean the act of taking over an
official position or title. According to Kerry R., succession is
concerned with the transfer or devolution of property on death.3
Succession therefore can be loosely defined to mean inheritance,
the right to inherit, the order in which inheritance is bequeathed
and the condition precedent under which one can succeed
another. The law of succession therefore is all about the transfer
or devolution of property on the death of an owner to another,
his heir.4 The law is the rule by which such devolution occurs.5
Subsumed under the law of succession are two principles that have
clearly dominated the manner in which estates have been administered
across the majority of jurisdictions in the region and abroad whether
1
Elizabeth Rutsate is a Senior Lecturer within the Private Law Dept. of the
Faculty of Law at the University of Zimbabwe. Succession Law is one of the
courses she lectures on at undergraduate level.
2
8th Edition, 2015
3
Kerridge R. Parry & Kerry: The Law of Succession, 12th Ed (London, Sweet &
Maxwell 2009) Pg.1
4
Ibid
5
M. Bello JP, Principles and Practice of Succession under Customary Law, 2015,
p.1
236
UZLJ Case Notes 237
under general law, common or customary law. These are per stirpes
and per capita principles of succession. What is most peculiar about
the per stirpes principle is that it is applicable under both testate6
and intestate7 succession whether under general or customary law.
Due to Zimbabwe’s dualist legal system, intestate succession occurs
under both general and customary law. In this case note the focus is
on the implications of the two principles under intestate succession
under general law. Taking particular note of this all encompassing
element of the per stirpes principle, Mwayera J in the In Re Estate
Late Bellinah Mhlanga case made the following comments;
Although the Human and Herold cases supra referred to testate
succession the principle ofXper stirpesXinheritance is equally
applicable in an intestate estate...From the foregoing discussion
it has been established that theXper stirpesXprinciple is part of
the common law of Zimbabwe and is applicable under general
law. It is also applicable under customary law with equal force.8
Intestate succession occurs in three situations namely (a) if a person

upon death does not leave behind a valid will; (b) if the beneficiary
appointed in a will predeceases the testator and the latter does not
substitute the predeceased heir with another prior to his/her own
subsequent death, then that part of the will, will be dealt with under
the law of intestate succession; and (c) where a beneficiary or heir
appointed in a will cannot or declines to take up the appointment,
that portion of his/her inheritance will automatically fall under
intestate succession. Under Roman Dutch common law, it is also
possible to have an estate that falls under both testate and intestate
succession. This happens where a person dies partly testate and partly
intestate.
6
Testate succession happens where a deceased person (testator) leaves behind
a valid will stipulating how his/her estate will be distributed in strict accordance
with their wishes as contained in their will. A testator can then indicate within
the will whether after their death they wish their estate to be distributed in
accordance with per capita or per stirpes succession.
7
If a person dies without having written a will or if the will is declared invalid,
the estate will be distributed on the basis of intestacy i.e. a state of having no
valid will. The intestate law of succession refers to theXdistributionXof assets in
a deceased’s estate whereby the deceased would have died without leaving
any valid will. It will be the duty of the executor dative in consultation with
the Master of the High Court to decide on the most suitable type of intestate
succession under the prevailing circumstances.
8
At page 6 of the unreported High Court judgment (both pdf and word versions)
2. BACKGROUND ISSUES
Time and again a key question has arisen among estates administrators
vis-à-vis what the two principles of per stirpes and per capita succession
entail in intestate succession and the key difference between them.
Another question which has been raised regards which of the two
principles offers a fairer framework under which a deceased’s estate
is distributed to his/her descendants, heirs or beneficiaries? The per
stirpes principle came under spotlight in Zimbabwe in the High Court
case of Estate Late Bellinah Mhlanga,9 a matter placed before Mwayera
J whereby the court’s opinion was sought on the meaning and
application of the per stirpes principle. Two contentious issues were
placed for determination namely (i) whether or not the per stirpes
principle applies under general law in intestate succession in Zimbabwe
and under common law in the absence of a specific legal provision in
statutory law and (ii) the legal interpretation of the per stirpes
principle under general law and as set out under customary law in
Section 68F of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01]. Further
to the two issues determined under the per stirpes principle in the
Estate Late Bellinah Mhlanga case (supra), this case note seeks to
make a brief comparative analysis of per stirpes and per capita
principles prior to making a case justifying the decision taken by the
executor in this case to opt for the per stirpes principle as being more
appropriate under the circumstances; which decision was supported
by the court as presided over by Mwayera J.
3. PER STIRPES SUCCESSION

Intestate succession can either be per capita or per stirpes. Per stirpes
is a Latin expression meaning “by the roots. The word stirps refers to
the singular while in plural form reference is made to a number of
stirps or stirpes. A stirpis has also been defined as;
...a child of the deceased, or a predeceased child who left behind
living descendants. A deceased person therefore has as many
stirpes as he left living children or predeceased children with
living descendants.10
A stirps is a line of descendants of common ancestry who form the

roots. It includes every descendant of the deceased who survives the
9
HH 816-17
10
W. Abrie et al, Deceased Estates, 5th ed, ProPlus Publishers: Lynnwood Ridge,
2003
UZLJ Case Notes 239
deceased or a predeceased descendant of the deceased who leaves

behind living descendants. Succession per stirpes means inheriting
from an ancestor “by representation” or “by class.” Where
beneficiaries are to share in a distribution “per stirpes” the living
members within the generation closest in relationship to the deceased
ancestor whose estate is being distributed receive an equal share.
Since all children of a deceased person form a stirps; they all inherit
an equal share of the deceased’s estate. However in cases where one
child predeceases the parent and leaves behind children, upon the
death of the grandparent, the predeceased child’s children jointly or
severally share the share due to their parent in equal shares. This is
what is referred to as succession “by representation” to what their
deceased parent would have been entitled to. According to W.D.
Rollison;11
Inheritance per stirpes signifies that the particular descendants
(remote heirs) inherit such portion (share or interest) only as
their immediate ancestor would have inherited if he had survived
the death of the intestate. Thus, if the intestate has left a son,
and the children of a deceased son, as his only lineal descendants
and as the only relatives who are entitled to inherit his property,
one-half of his property would be inherited by his surviving son
and the other half by the children of the deceased son. The
children of the deceased son, that is, the grandchildren of the
intestate, inherit the same portion that their father (the son of
the intestate) would have inherited if he had survived the death
of the intestate...(which they share equally among themselves)
In the above quote reference is made only to sons, clearly reflecting

the status of the law of succession at the time W.D. Rollison authored
his article. This was a time (1935-6) when issues to do with the human
right to equality and non-discrimination had not taken root and
intestate succession was marked by the primogeniture rule of
succession which preferred sons to daughters. If the above quote had
been written recently, the words ‘son or daughter’ would have been
used as was the case with the children born of Bellina Mhlanga in the
Estate Late Bellina Mhlanga case who were equally entitled to succeed
their deceased parent’s estate regardless of sex. Below is an illustration
of intestate succession per stirpes;
11
See W.D. Rollison, Principles of the Law of Succession to Intestate Property
(continued) in Notre Dame Law Review, Volume 11 Issue 2 Article 2, 1936, 136
– 137. Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=4119 &context=ndlr Accessed 09/08/2018
Figure 1: Illustration of intestate succession per stirpes
Figure 2: Illustrating Per Capita Intestate Succession
4. INTESTATE SUCCESSION PER CAPITA

Per Capita is a Latin maxim meaning, “by the head” or “headcount.”
Hence per capita succession involves taking “by total headcount” all
surviving heirs or beneficiaries across different generations or “by a
UZLJ Case Notes 241
total number of living individuals” within a particular generation. The

succession can cover all living beneficiaries who are related to the
decedent through blood ties (consanguineal), marriage ties (affinal),
and adoption (fictive). The phrase kinship system refers to all of
theXrelationshipsXbased on blood, marriage, and adoption that
intertwines individuals in sets of rights and obligations. In practice
this means that if the beneficiaries to an estate are to share in a
distribution “per capita,” then all of the living members of the
identified group or generation will receive an equal share. However,
if a member of the identified group predeceases the decedent, then
a share won’t be created for the predeceased member and all of the
shares of the other members will be increased accordingly after they
equally share the predeceased member’s share.
5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PER STIRPES OND PER CAPITA PRINCIPLES

As indicated earlier succession per stirpes refers to ‘allocation by
class’ or ‘by representation.’ In any distribution per stirpes, all the
living members within the class of beneficiaries who are closest in
relationship to the decedent will receive an equal share. However in
the event that one of these beneficiaries closest in relationship to
the decedent has predeceased the benefactor but is survived by any
descendants, then that deceased beneficiary’s descendants will take
“by representation” what their deceased parent would have taken.
On the other hand distributing an estate in a manner in which it is
shared per capita involves ‘taking a total headcount’ or ‘the total
number of living individuals’ within an identified group or generation
who are entitled to inherit. These will share equally what is there.
However in the event that a member of this identified group is
deceased, then unlike in succession per stirpes a share won’t be
created for the deceased member. Rather, that which would have
been given to the deceased had they been alive is added to the total
sum to be shared by the living beneficiaries resulting in an increase in
the individual shares of those living beneficiaries.
In summary therefore, the difference between the per stirpes and
per capita principles lies in the fact that while inheriting per stirpes
would entail equal sharing of the inheritance among all of the
decedent’s descendants (living and deceased) within the first line of
generation; per capita succession only occurs among living descendants
and other beneficiaries who may not be a decedent’s direct
descendants but affinal and/orXconsanguineal kin within that particular
generation closest in line to the decedent.
Take for example a decedent called George who had three children
Mary, Jane and George Junior. Mary predeceased George but left behind
3 children Amy, Sarah and Tom. Jane is also deceased but is survived
by two children Jack and Jill. George Junior is still living and has one
child Joel. The decedent George left behind $630 000 cash. If that
amount would be shared per stirpes, George Junior would get one-
third of the $630 000 which would amount to $210 000. Mary’s $210
000 entitlement would be shared equally among her 3 living children,
each getting $70 000. This is inheritance per stirpes by representation.
George’s son, Joel will not get anything since his father George Junior
is still alive. Jack and Jill who are born of Jane will share their late
mother’s share of $210 000, each getting $105 000 as they are
representing their mother in the inheritance.
The same example will be used with the $630 000 shared using the
per capita principle. Since Mary and Jane are deceased, their shares
are added onto George Junior’s share and he inherits the full amount
of $630 000 as he is the only living beneficiary within that first
generation after George Senior. Mary and Jane’s children do not inherit
anything as there is no representation under the per capita principle
in intestate succession. For argument sake if George Junior and Mary
are both living with Jane predeceasing George Senior, then Jane’s
share of $210 000 will be shared equally between Mary and George
Junior each getting a total share of $315 000. As indicated earlier,
despite a deceased heir having living descendants, they will not inherit
by representation as is the case with per stirpes because the per
capita principle focuses on living beneficiaries within a particular
generation closest in line to the decedent. In some cases however the
per capita principle as used in testate succession has included all
living heirs across several generations who have to equally share the
inheritance despite one heir being the decedent’s child while another
is a grandchild, great grandchild or nephew. In the case on hand, this
would mean all the seven living heirs namely George Junior, his son
Joel, Mary’s three children Amy, Sarah and Tom as well as Jane’s two
children, Jack and Jill would equally share the $630 000, each getting
$90 000 if indicated as such in a will. Most people have tended to
prefer using the per stirpes principle rather than per capita as the
former caters for all beneficiaries, both living and deceased (if only
through their descendants by representation).
UZLJ Case Notes 243
6. IMPACT OF THE USE OF REPRESENTATION IN THE SUCCESSION PER CAPITA

PRINCIPLE
It is important to note that within some jurisdictions, for example the
American legal system, the distinguishing line between succession
per stirpes and that which is per capita has increasingly become blurred
with the modification of the per capita principle. There has been
modification of the succession per capita principle to come up with
the per capita at each generation and the per capita with
representation principles which seem to echo the per stirpes
principles.12 Strictly applied per capita succession ensures that if any
of the decedent’s beneficiaries predecease the decedent, their share
will not transfer to their descendants but will transfer to and is shared
equally among the remaining surviving beneficiaries.
Using succession ‘per capita at each generation’ approach ensures
that heirs of the same generation will each receive the same amount.
The inheritance is divided into equal shares for the generation closest
to the deceased with surviving heirs. These shares are equal in number
to the number of original members either surviving or with surviving
descendants. Each surviving heir of that generation gets a share. The
remainder is then equally divided among the next-generation
descendants of the deceased in the same manner. On the other hand,
succession per capita by representation is such that, the predeceased
beneficiaries’ shares at the same generation are divided equally
between all their children. In other words the surviving descendants
of predeceased beneficiaries of the same generation get to equally
share what their predeceased ancestors would have inherited in equal
shares. It would seem like the key aspect of succession per capita is
collation13 at each and every generational level of succession.
12
The per stirpes principle is now referred to as the old English approach within
the American legal system.
13
Succession law is underpinned by the Common Law requirement for collation.
Under collation it is a requirement that all descendants of a decedent inherit
equal portions and where one child has benefitted more through some loan or
other benefit received from the decedent during their lifetime, the child who
unfairly benefitted should pay back the advanced money so as to ensure all the
children benefit equally from the decedent’s estate. These descendants include
children born out of wedlock and adopted children, who have all the rights of
flesh and blood.
7. EXAMPLE SHOWING THE INTER-LINKAGES BETWEEN THE PER STIRPES AND PER
CAPITA PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION AS DRAWN FROM REPRESENTATION
Representation is the principle of law by which the children or their
descendants of an heir to an estate, who dies intestate have a
collective interest in the ancestor’s intestate share of the inheritance.
This could either be through representation in per stirpes succession
or per capita succession by representation. Taking for example a
decedent Sam who was a widower at the time of death but who during
his lifetime was married under general law and had two daughters
Ann and Alice. He dies intestate leaving an estate worth $400 000
after the deduction of all duties, debts and other charges. Ann was
never married and has no children. Alice who predeceased her father
Sam left behind two sons Hillary and David whereby David also died a
few days before the death of Sam, his grandfather. David leaves behind
two children Peter and Pam. In sharing the $400 000, Ann and the late
Alice are entitled to $200 000 each because the degree of their blood
relationship to the deceased Sam is equal and so they share per capita
or in equal parts what Sam their late father has left behind. However
since Alice is no longer there to take up her share, her children Hillary
and David are expected to succeed per stirpes to their late mother’s
$200 000 share in equal shares of $100 000 each. While Hillary takes
his per capita share of $100 000, David being deceased cannot take
up his own per capita share. Being survived by Peter and Pam David’s
per capita share is inherited by the two in equal shares of $50 000
each.
In the ultimate, Ann’s per capita share of $200 000 from her late
father Sam’s estate remains unaffected; Hillary and David having an
equal degree of relationship to Ann’s sister, the late Alice, were
entitled to $100 000 per capita of Alice’s share but jointly inherited
$200 000 per stirpes from Sam their grandfather. Peter and Pam also
took per capita shares of what their late father David was entitled to
per stirpes, hence the two inherited a share of their great grandfather
Sam’s estate per stirpes. The degrees of consanguinity among Ann,
Hillary, Peter and Pam are unequal since Ann is the late Sam’s child
while Hillary is his grandchild and Peter and Pam are his great
grandchildren hence they cannot have per capita shares. From Sam’s
estate, Ann gets 50%, Hillary, 25% while Peter and Pam share the
remaining 25% i.e. 12.5% each. Although they all inherit per stirpes
from the late Alice’s share Hillary, Peter and Pam have unequal degrees
of relationship to her whereby Hillary is one generation removed from
Alice while Peter and Pam are two generations removed. Inheriting
UZLJ Case Notes 245
per stirpes, they cannot have equal or per capita shares across different
generations. However strictly speaking all living descendants inheriting
per capita should have equal shares despite having unequal degrees
of relationship to the deceased ancestor. To cure the injustice of having
all beneficiaries sharing an inheritance equally despite different
degrees of consanguinity towards the decedent, the practice has been
to allow per capita sharing among beneficiaries within the same
generation or who are equally removed from the benefactor, for
example grandchildren born of the decedent’s several children.14
8. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE IN RE ESTATE LATE BELLINAH MHLANGA HH 816-17

HC 4168/17/ DR 143/13
This matter was brought before Mwayera J in chambers for the
determination of a question of law arising in terms of section 113 of
the Administration of Estate Act [Chapter 6:01]. Having had a
difference of opinion on how the estate was to be administered, the
Master of the High Court and the executrix dative in Re Estate Late
Bellinah Mhlanga (supra). The key issues for determination by the
honourable judge by way of judicial opinion were;
a) Whether or not the per stirpesXprinciple applies under general
law in intestate succession in Zimbabwe and under common law
in the absence of a specific legal provision in statutory law.
b) What is the legal interpretation of theXper stirpesXprinciple both
under general law and as set out under customary law in the
Administration of Estates Act Section 68F.
In casu, Bellinah Mhlanga, a widow (hereinafter called the decedent)
died intestate on the 28th day of January 2010, in Harare as per the
death certificate. The decedent during her lifetime had been married
under the Marriages Act [Chapter 5:11] to one Amon Mhlanga who
had predeceased her. All in all, the decedent had had six children
Busisiwe, Lovemore, Dakarayi, Cynthia, Luwis and Eric of which Tapuwa
14
However this also depends on the number of surviving children in each family
whose parent would have predeceased the grandparent with the estate being
shared among descendants because if one deceased son had 2 children while
another had 4 children, those grandchildren from the two families will have
different allocations since in one family more children share the same pie e.g.
each family shares $60 000 each from the $120 000 estate. Despite belonging
to the same generation, in one family a grandchild will get $30 000 while in the
other each will get $15 000.
Caroline Mhlanga had predeceased her mother. However, Tapuwa

Caroline was survived by three children namely Tafadzwa, Nyasha
and Tatenda Chidyiwa who in other words were the decedent’s
grandchildren. On 30 January 2013, the estate was duly registered by
Cynthia Mhlanga a daughter of the decedent, through completion of a
death notice. Having been married under the Marriages Act [Chapter
5:11], general law applied to the administration of the decedent’s
estate. The decedent was the registered owner of property, a house
in the Glen View high density suburb of Harare.
In completing form M.H.C. 12 showing that one of the children of the
deceased namely Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga had predeceased the
decedent, the duly appointed executrix dative of the estate, Slyvia
Chirawu (as she then was)15 amended the account accordingly to award
the share of Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga to her three surviving children
on the basis of theXper stirpesXprinciple. It is on the basis of this award
in terms of the per stirpes principle that a difference of opinion arose
between the executrix dative and the Master of the High Court, the
latter having directed that Tapuwa Caroline was not supposed to inherit
since she had predeceased her mother. The Master was of the view
that the per stirpesXprinciple did not apply, hence Tapuwa Caroline’s
children were not entitled to inherit from their grandmother’s estate
by representation of their late mother. It would be my assumption
that the Master was in favour of a strictly applied per capita succession
approach which would cater only for the living children of the late
Bellinah Mhlanga. The executrix dative on the other hand maintained
that the children ought to inherit by representation of their mother
through the succession per stirpes approach. It is due to the difference
of opinion that the matter was brought before a judge of the High
Court in Chambers.
9. BASIS FOR DECISION

The court after determining that the resolution of the matter hinged
on the nature of law applicable in the deceased estate in question as
well as the interpretation of theXper stirpesXprinciple proceeded to
interpret the law of succession in accordance with the facts that were
placed before it as summarized below;
15
She is now a judge of the High Court of Zimbabwe
UZLJ Case Notes 247
a) Supremacy of the Constitution

As a starting point the court considered the supremacy of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the Constitution) over all matters (law, practice, custom
or conduct) and all persons, natural, juristic or otherwise in terms of
section 2. Accordingly the administration of an estate was supposed
to be in line with the constitution to the extent that an entitled
beneficiary ought to be recognised and not discriminated against. It
was considered as mandatory that emphasis should be on equality
before the law especially where the entitlement was anchored on
law.
b) Continued applicability of Common Law

In its determination, the court indicated that common law was still
applicable in Zimbabwe and the statutory provisions that had been
enacted did not oust common law but rather complemented each
other. Closely looking at how the estate of one who dies intestate
leaving no surviving spouse was disposed of under the Deceased Estate’s
Succession Act [Chapter 6:02], the court indicated that resort has to
be made to common law. In casu general law automatically applied to
the estate since the decedent had been married under a civil marriage.
However, despite having no surviving husband, the decedent was
survived by children and descendants and hence common law in
conjunction with general law had to be resorted to in the
administration of her intestate estate. In its delineation of the common
law position in Zimbabwe, the court made reference to the decision
taken in the case of Nzara and othersXvXKashumba NO and
Others16 Xwhere it was held that by virtue of s 192 of the Constitution,
Roman Dutch law remains also the common law of Zimbabwe. The
applicable law as currently obtaining made provision for theXper
stirpesXprinciple under general law; intestate succession based on
common law, and also testate succession.
In its interpretation of the law vis-à-vis succession to deceased estates,
the court averred that theXper stirpesXprinciple was clearly set out
under both general and customary law in Zimbabwe. The customary
law position of the per stirpes principle was said to be well captured
in the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01] part 111A with
particular reference to section 68 F.
16
HH 151-16
It was also pointed out that despite the per stirpes principle applying
to both testate and intestate estates under both customary and general
law, this did not distort its general meaning since the common law of
Zimbabwe was the one giving it meaning. The court proceeded to
find the principle’s definition as outlined within theXAdvanced Oxford
Learners Dictionary17 Xand that proffered by the court in Rotmanskey
and AnotherXvXHeiss.18 XIn that case, the court of appeal 1898 at p 634
described the terms stirpes and per stirpes as follows;
Stirpes is root of inheritance, it designates the ancestor from
whom the heir derives title and it necessarily presupposes the
death of the ancestor. When issue are said to take per stirpes, it
is meant that the descendants of a deceased person take the
property to which he was entitled or would have been entitled
if living.
In the matter on hand, the court stated that the per stirpesXprinciple
encapsulated inheritance by representation by the deceased person’s
descendants. As such it became crucial to conceptualize what
descendants were so as to fully appreciate the inheritance by
representation principle of per stirpes. The court cited M.J. De Waal
and M.C. Schoeman-Malan19 who state that, “a person’s blood relations
can be divided into three categories - a person’s descendants are
those who descend directly from him for example, his children,
grandchildren and great grandchildren.” Further to that the court in
identifying a deceased person’s heirs made reference to the case of
DeraXvXChimari20 where it was stated clearly that in dealing with the
principle of vesting, heirs are determined once and for all at the time
of death. Hence in inheritanceXper stirpesXthe right of representation
is determined by what was prevailing at the date of death of the
deceased. The principle of vesting was deemed relevant in so far as it
determined who predeceased the deceased and whether they left
any descendants who could inherit by representation. It became
common cause therefore that Tapuwa Caroline’s children should also
inherit per stirpes because the fact that Tapuwa Caroline had
predeceased her mother did not alienate her children’s rights as
17
The dictionary defines the per stirpes principle as referring to the acquisition
of inheritance by a deceased person’s descendants in equal share.
18
89 Md 633 MD
19
M.J. De Waal and M.C. Schoeman-Malan, TheXLaw of Succession, (Juta and
Company Limited), 2013 (reprinted edition) at p. 16
20
HH 177-13
UZLJ Case Notes 249
descendants who qualified as beneficiaries of their Grandmother

Bellinah Mhlanga’s estate.
In its own words the court stated;
The definition ofXper stirpesXcertainly includes surviving children
and descendants of predeceased children. It is succession by
representation which in simple terms entails inheritance on the
basis of blood relationship with a predeceased heir of the
deceased, whose place the descendant fills. What occurs in per
stirpes principle is that a descendant of the predeceased heir
moves up into the place of the predeceased heir. The
grandchildren are entitled to inherit by representation as they
move into their parent’s place. In the case ofXHeroldXvXVissen
and OrsX1937 LPD 67 at 74 the court affirmed the principle set
out inXHumanXvXHuman ExecutorsX1893 SC 172 wherein it was
stated that only grandchildren from children who predeceased
the testator must be included on the grandchildren to benefit
under the estate. It was further made clear that grandchildren
whose parent predeceased the grandparent were entitled to
inherit and succeed by representation (success by
representation) which is an acknowledgement of theXper
stirpesXprinciple. There is no legal bar to the application of
theXper stirpesXprinciple in the current estate of Bellinah
Mhlanga...The death of their mother does not take away their
blood line and descendant rights to inherit. As clearly
discussedXper stirpesXprinciple is not anchored by predeceasing
the deceased but rather blood relationship of children and
descendants. Even if there is no Will and last Testament the
right to inherit by representation is based on the blood
relationship line.21
c) The role played by administrative rules of procedure in

confirming inheritance per stirpes under the common law
applicable in Zimbabwe
In coming up with a decision in the matter on hand, the court also
brought under scrutiny Form M.H.C. 12 filled in by an executor or
executrix as required by the Master’s office prior to the office
authorising the final distribution of an Estate. The scrutiny concerned
Form M.H.C.’s import and purpose in the administration of deceased’s
estates. It became apparent that to complete this form, detailed
information was required with regards to the following issues;
21
At pages 6 and 7 of the unreported judgment, (pdf and word versions)
• Identification of deceased’s relatives, their names and degree or

nature of relationship.
• Address of each surviving relative and date of death of each
deceased relative.
• Surviving spouse-date and place of marriage.
• Children of the deceased and dates of birth giving names of those
who may be dead, dates of their deaths and names of their
children. If the predecessor’s children had no issue, this fact must
be stated
• Father and mother of the deceased (need not be answered if the
deceased left children)
• Brothers and sisters of the deceased stating whether full or half
blood and their address and date of birth in case of half brothers
and half sisters name of step parent should be stated only those
brothers and sisters whether of full or half blood who survived the
deceased are to be given in this answer. (Need not be answered if
both parents survived the deceased or if the deceased left children.
• Names of brother or sister, stating whether full or half blood who
may be dead giving their dates of death and names, addresses
and dated of birth of their children. If predeceasedXbrothers and
sisters had no issue, this fact must be stated (need not be answered
if both parents survived the deceased or if the deceased left
children).
Emanating from the detailed M.H.C 12 form, the court questioned
the logic behind asking for the name of a child who predeceased the
deceased parent; whether they had their own children; if so their
names and details; if in the ultimate such grandchildren would not be
eligible to inherit by virtue of their parent having predeceased the
grandparent. Form M.H.C. 12 was ruled to be in conformity with the
common law as imported from the Cape of Good Hope which in turn
confirmed the applicability of theXper stirpesXprinciple in intestate
inheritance.
It was emphasised that the mere fact that Tapiwa Caroline Mhlanga
had predeceased her mother did not disqualify her children, the grand
children of Bellinah Mhlanga, who were rightfully entitled as
descendants to inheritXunder the per stirpesXprinciple. The court
proceeded to define descendants and the per stirpes principle in a
manner which confirms the definitions outlined earlier in this article.
The court made reference to the definition and illustration of the per
UZLJ Case Notes 251
stirpes principle given by J. Jamneck and C. Rautenbach (eds), M.

Paleker (et al) inXtheir book entitled “The Law of Succession in South
Africa”22 Xwhereby the authors defineXstirpesXas a line of descendants
of common ancestry, including every descendant of the deceased who
survives the deceased or a predeceased descendant of the deceased
who leaves living descendants.
d) Best interests of the child, a key element

In coming up with a decision in the in Re Bellinah Mhlanga case, the
court also considered the fact that the interests of minor children
were at stake. The court acknowledged its duty to protect the best
interests of minor children particularly considering that in the case
before it, the rights and interests of the late Tapuwa Caroline’s children
were clearly sanctioned by the law. The court made reference to
Section 81(2) and (3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe on the rights of
children which state;
(2) A child’s best interests are paramount in every matter
concerning the child.
(3) Children are entitled to adequate protection by the courts,
in particular by the High Court as their upper guardian.
In addition to the court’s citation of section 81, it is also important to

take note of Section 19(1) of the same Constitution on children which
also calls on the Zimbabwean State to adopt policies and measures
that ensure that in matters relating to children, the best interests of
the children concerned are paramount.
10. THE DECISION

Based on its interpretation of the law of intestate succession
particularly concerning the applicability of the per stirpes principle
for a decedent’s descendants born of a predeceased child, the court
agreed with the approach taken by the executrix in the case by finding
that Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga’s children were legally entitled to
inheritXper stirpes from the Estate of late Bellinah Mhlanga, their
grandmother.XThe court order reads;
22
J. Jamneck and C. Rautenbach (eds), M. Paleker, A. van der Linde and M.
Wood-Bodley The Law of Succession in South Africa (2nd edition), (Oxford Press-
Southern Africa) 2012 at p. 13
Accordingly it is ordered that:-

1. TheXper stirpesXprinciple is applicable in all estates
regardless of being governed by customary law or general
law and or common law.
2. Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga’s children are legally entitled to
inheritXper stirpesXfrom the estate of late Bellinah Mhlanga
their grandmother.23
11. A CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

It is clear from the facts of the case concerning the estate of the late
Bellinah Mhlanga that the approach taken by the executrix which was
subsequently supported by the High Court was the best under the
circumstances. This is because when the per stirpes principle of
succession was applied, the outcome was just and fair to all the
concerned parties because;
1) In line with a Constitutional requirement, the best interests of
children were fulfilled since Tapuwa Caroline’s children’s rights
and entitlement to inherit per stirpes from their deceased
grandmother’s estate were protected by the High Court;
2) The use of the per stirpes principle ensures the protection of
another key Constitutional provision within section 56 of the
Constitution namely ‘equality and non-discrimination.’ Most
interesting is the fact that the per stirpes principle of succession
guarantees equality of a deceased parent’s children (both living
and dead). There is no discrimination against those children who
would have predeceased their parents particularly where they
are survived by their own children. It is my own interpretation
that the equality and non-discrimination principle is applicable to
both the living and the dead children a deceased parent whose
estate should be distributed equally among them particularly where
the deceased children leave their own issue behind who in turn
take up the latter’s share by representation.
On the other hand, assuming that the court had agreed with the
approach suggested by the Master and the decedent’s estate had been
distributed in accordance with strict per capita succession, the share
due to the late Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga (equivalent to one-sixth of
the value of the estate) would have been shared equally among her
23
At page 7 of the unreported High Court judgment (word and pdf versions)
UZLJ Case Notes 253
surviving siblings thereby increasing their individual shares substantially

to one-fifth for each.24
The use of the per stirpes principle of succession enabled Tapuwa
Caroline’s three children to inherit per stirpes from their late
grandmother’s estate with each getting per capita (in equal parts) a
one-eighteenth share. For argument’s sake, if the house was valued
at $54 000, each child’s share would be worth $3 000, while their late
mother’s siblings would each have a share worth $9 000. This would
meet the justice of the case rather than having each living sibling
getting $10 800 and Tapuwa Caroline’s children getting nothing at all.
In conclusion it is respectfully argued that application of the per capita
principle of succession would have made sense if Tapuwa Caroline
Mhlanga had died leaving no surviving children.
24
The surviving siblings of Tapuwa Caroline Mhlanga would have ended up having
a one-fifth share each leaving Tapuwa’s three minor children with nothing, a
great injustice indeed.
REPORTING A COURT CASE ARISING FROM FALSE SOCIAL
MEDIA REPORT
Case Note on Mushunje V Zimbabwe Newspapers HH-47-17
BY G. FELTOE
THE FALSE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT

The facts of the Mushunje case show how false and highly defamatory
information published on a social media website can spread like
wildfire and do enormous damage to the reputation of a person. In
this case the damage was to a well-known professional model who
was falsely accused of serious child abuse.
The events leading to an action for defamation by the plaintiff against
the Zimbabwe Newspapers were as follows: a social media site
published a decidedly damaging article about the plaintiff. It alleged
falsely that the plaintiff was HIV positive and had injected her HIV
tainted blood into the son of her boyfriend. She was also alleged to
have made the child drink her urine and to have physically abused the
child. Based on these publications, the mother of the child filed a
complaint against plaintiff with the police. The social media site then
published another article alleging that plaintiff had been arrested.
Charges of child abuse were then brought against the plaintiff but she
was acquitted on all charges after medical tests on both the child and
the plaintiff showed that neither was HIV positive, nor did the child
exhibit any signs of abuse.
THE ZIMPAPERS STORY

Zimpapers published a series of articles about this matter which were
also posted on its website and this resulted in a number of international
online sites re-publishing the same story. The newspaper articles dealt
with the court case and the acquittal, and ended up pointing out the
injustice to which the plaintiff had been subjected as a result of the
false allegations levelled against her.
In addition to an action for defamation against the website which had
originated the false story, the plaintiff sued Zimbabwe Newspapers
for defamation based upon its reporting of this matter in its two
newspapers, The Herald and H-Metro.
254
Plaintiff alleged that newspaper articles were unfair, unbalanced and

inaccurate and failed to make it clear in its reports that there were
merely allegations against the plaintiff instead of presenting them as
facts. The plaintiff said the defendant’s reporters had not approached
the plaintiff to obtain her side of the story. The plaintiff also argued
that the newspapers continued to report the allegations long after
the results of the medical facts were already in the record.
The reporters of the defendant admitted that they had read the story
on the social website but maintained that they had based their reports
solely on the public court proceedings. The court accepted this. The
reporters said they did not seek to interview the plaintiff during the
court proceedings because this would have amounted to interference
with court proceedings which were underway but, after the plaintiff
was acquitted, they interviewed her and published what the plaintiff
said in the interview.
WHETHER THE STORIES WERE DEFAMATORY

The court accepted that the articles were defamatory although,
confusingly, later the judge said that she was “not convinced that the
articles were unfair, unbalanced and inaccurate and are thus
defamatory of the plaintiff as alleged.” (Emphasis added by case noter.)
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC FIGURES

The court erroneously stated that in an action for defamation by a
public figure such as a celebrity or a politician, the plaintiff must
establish that the defamatory statement was made “with actual malice
or reckless disregard for the falsity or otherwise of the statement.”
The judge derives this requirement from the American case of St
Amant v Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). This approach, which was
originally enunciated in the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), is squarely based on the emphatic freedom of
the press guarantee in the First Amendment to the American
Constitution. This extremely high burden of proof on the plaintiff has
meant that defamation claims by public figures in America rarely
prevail. The American approach has not been followed in Zimbabwe
and it is not correct that in our law a public figure can only succeed in
an action for defamation if it is shown that there was malice or reckless
disregard for the falsity or otherwise of the statement by the press in
publishing the statement.
Indeed in South Africa, under South African common law, the press
was strictly liable for defamation. However, in a series of constitutional
decisions the South African courts have decided that there was a need
to balance the right to untarnished reputation against the right to
freedom of expression and the duty of the press to inform the public
about matters of public interest. This has led the South African courts
to modify the strict liability approach by providing that a newspaper
is entitled to a defence where it publishes a story in the public interest
believing it to be true after taking all reasonable steps to check the
facts even if the story turns out to be false. In effect a newspaper will
not be liable if it was not negligent. The courts have said that some
latitude must be allowed to the press in order to allow robust and
frank comment in the interests of keeping members of society informed
about what Government is doing or has done and revealing abuses of
power in the public and private sectors. Errors of fact should thus be
tolerated, provided that statements are published justifiably and
reasonably: that is, with the reasonable belief that the statements
made are true.
This did not mean that there should be a licence to publish untrue
statements about politicians. They too have the right to protect their
reputations and publication of false statements in mass circulation
newspapers can do enormous damage. See National Media Ltd & Ors
v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA); Khumalo & Ors v Homilisa 2002 (5)
SA 401 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC); and Thembi-Mahanyele v Mail
and Guardian & Anor 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA). There is considerable
merit in this approach and it is strongly arguable that, under section
61 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which guarantees the freedom of
the media, the press should be entitled to similar protection to that
which obtains in South Africa where a print or electronic media outlet
publishes a story in the public interest reasonably believing its facts
to be true. Section 61(5)(c) makes it clear that freedom of the media
excludes maliciously injuring a person’s reputation. There is no clear
ruling in Zimbabwe as to whether we will follow the constitutional
rulings in South Africa that the press is entitled to raise the defence
that it published facts in the public interest reasonably believing the
facts to be true but which facts turned out to be false.1
1.
In the Garwe v Zimind Publishers (Pvt) Ltd 2007 (2) ZLR 207 (H) at 231 the
defendants contended that they genuinely believed in the truth of the statement
they published. The court found that published facts were false and rejected
the defence of justification.
In Zimbabwe the position regarding the approach towards the animus

injuriandi requirement remains somewhat unclear. Originally in Smith
NO and Lardner-Burke NO v Wonesayi 1971 (2) RLR 62 (G) the court
decided that subjective intention to defame is not required. However,
later cases seem to have adopted the approach that some form of
intention is required. In Garwe v Zimind Publishers (Pvt) Ltd 2007 (2)
ZLR 207 (H) at 235 D-E the judge quotes Burchell to the effect that
subjective intention to defame is required on the part of an individual
as opposed to the mass media, but then proceeds to find that the
newspaper, its editor and reporter had had the intention to defame.2
In the present case the judge also said that “persons who find
themselves in the public eye must expect a certain amount of publicity
and intrusion into their private and personal lives, including inaccurate
statements as long as the publicity is not malicious or reckless in its
disregard of truth.” This, she said, “is more so when they are public
or famous figures where the happenings in their lives are, after all,
news for the average citizenry. They should therefore not be thin
skinned, belligerent or litigious, but ought to have the courage to
take such social blows, which go with the territory, on the chin. They
must understand that once they are in the public arena they become
targets of pot-shots for real or imagined indiscretions, errors or
failures. Therefore, unless the publications about them are malicious,
or reckless in their disregard of truth, or clearly intended to tarnish
their reputations, such persons should not rush to court to seek
damages.” (Emphasis added by case noter).
Whilst public figures are in the public eye, in Makova v Masvingo
Mirror (Pvt) Ltd & Ors 2012 (1) ZLR 503 (H) it was pointed out that the
fact that the plaintiff is a politician and a public figure, whose life is
necessarily in the public domain and open to criticism, does not divest
him of protection against harm to his dignity and reputation. In
particular, the defendant is not entitled to protection against
defamation if it makes false allegations. See Levy v Modus Publications
(Pvt) Ltd 1998 (1) ZLR 229 (S). It has not been accepted in Zimbabwe
that a defendant is only liable for defamation of a public figure if it is
proved that the statement was made maliciously. It is only when the
defendant relies on the defence of qualified privilege that the issue
of malice may arise as this defence can be defeated if the defendant
acted maliciously.
2.
Intention, the court said, can take the form of dolus directus or other forms of
dolus like dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis. See p 235D.
HEADLINES
The articles complained of and published in The Herald and H-Metro
had headlines which portrayed as hard facts, rather than as allegations,
that the model had injected her lover’s son with her HIV infected
blood and had forced the boy to drink her urine. For example, one of
these headlines read: “MODEL INJECTS HIV BLOOD IN CHILD…..Forces
boyfriend’s son to drink urine.”
The stories following these headlines did, however, refer to allegations
against the plaintiff made in court proceedings. The judge found that
taken alone these headlines were clearly defamatory. However, the
judge went on to state that reasonable readers do not go by the
headline alone but will read the content of the story to obtain the
true gist of the story. This, she said, is “more so when one is a ‘famous’
person where the headline is an effective bait to catch the eye of
more readers.”
The judge agreed with the defendant that the headlines complained
of are mere captions which indicate the nature of the story to follow
so as to catch the readers’ attention to entice them to buy the paper
and read the article. She said that if actions for defamation were to
be based merely on newspaper headlines, then “there would be an
onerous plethora of litigation.” She went on as follows: “In my view a
headline is akin to the heading on any legal document, which does
not create any substantive rights for the parties concerned but merely
indicates what the legal document is all about. In the same way that
one cannot sue for breach of a heading on a legal document, one
ought not to be able to claim infringement or damage to reputation
merely from a newspaper headline which is not supported by the
substance of the article.”
It is submitted that the heading in a legal document is entirely different
from a headline in a newspaper. A legal document is likely to be read
carefully by the persons that it will bind or affect. On the other hand,
the courts have accepted that the ordinary reader of a newspaper is
not supercritical and does not read every item with meticulous care.
Rather than engaging in a process of careful intellectual analysis,
because of the mass of material the reader is likely only to form an
overall impression of the material. See Mugwadi v Dube & Ors 2014
(1) ZLR 753 (H). Because this reality is recognised by the courts, it is
important that the headline does not create a misleading impression.
A headline should accurately sum up the contents of story that follows.
It is advisable that where a newspaper is covering criminal allegations

that have yet to be proven that its headline reflects the fact that
these are allegations and not proven facts. There is a danger of
misleading readers when sensational headlines are used to catch their
attention.
THE DEFENCE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE3

The defendant raised the defence of qualified privilege, contending
that it had a duty to inform the public about these court proceedings
and their outcome, and the public had a reciprocal interest to receive
this information. It maintained that its coverage of the court
proceedings from the initial remand to the dismissal of the charges
was fair, accurate and balanced coverage.
The court set out the requirements for this defence in a rather
confusing and somewhat inaccurate fashion.
The judge correctly states that for qualified privilege the person
making the statement must have a duty or interest to communicate
the information and the recipient of the statement must have a
reciprocal duty or interest to receive the information.
The judge says that the defendant must show that the statement is
true, adding that truth is an absolute defence to a claim for
defamation. There seems to be some confusion here between the
defences of justification and qualified privilege. The judge says that
truth alone is an absolute defence. Truth is an essential requirement
for justification but for justification the statement must not only be
true but it must it must also be in the public interest to publish the
true facts. A defendant is not allowed to dredge up and publish long
forgotten true facts where it is not now in the public interest or for
the public benefit to publish these facts.4
Typically the defence of qualified privilege will fail if the published
statement is not true. Thus in the Garwe case the defence failed
because the statement about the judge was false. However, it is not
invariably the case that the statement must be true. The law recognises
certain situations where a person has a right to make a statement
3.
The requirements of the defence of qualified privilege is set out clearly in the
Garwe case at 230 and in Chinamasa v Jongwe P& P Co (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR
133 (H) 163-165 and Musakwa v Ruzario 1997 (2) ZLR 533 (H).
4.
See J Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa pp 212-214.
even though the statement turns out to be untrue. Thus in Musakwa v

Ruzario 1997 (2) ZLR 533 (H) the court held that where the defence
of qualified privilege is raised it is not necessary to establish that the
defamatory statement is true. The degree of truth in the defamatory
statement is only relevant to the issue of whether the bounds of
privilege have been exceeded or the statement was motivated by
malice.
Another requirement for the defence of qualified privilege, the judge
says, is for public figures there must be no malice or reckless disregard
of the truth of statements complained of. In fact our law does not
draw any distinction between public figures and other persons: malice
will defeat qualified privilege in both cases.
A further requirement, the judge says, is that the plaintiff’s reputation
is not damaged. The correct position is that the defence of qualified
privilege allows the defendant to publish what amounts to a
defamatory statement where it has a duty to do so and the recipient
has an interest in receiving the information. With press reporting of
court cases, the press is entitled to report the start of a criminal case
but it is then expected to report later developments in the case,
especially if the accused person has been acquitted.
Finally the court says that a defendant may raise either absolute or
qualified privilege, pointing out that the defence raised in the present
case was qualified privilege. What the judge omits to mention is that
absolute privilege only applies to statements made by members of
parliament during parliamentary proceedings.
The court found that the reporting by the defendant was a “quite”
fair and balanced and “largely” accurate account of what had occurred
when the matter was going through the courts and that the defendant
did not act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the truth. As the
report dealt with allegations of child abuse, this was clearly a matter
of public interest upon which defendant had a duty to report to the
public.
CONCLUSION
The court made rather heavy weather in dealing with what should
have been a relatively straightforward matter of whether the
newspaper reports were defamatory and, if they were, whether they
fell within the protection of the defence of qualified privilege. Once
the court found that the newspapers had not based their reports on
the malicious and false report on the social website, the sole issue
was whether its reports of the court proceedings fell within the ambit
of the defence of qualified privilege. The newspapers were entitled
to report the criminal court proceedings against the plaintiff provided
they did so fairly and accurately and in a balanced fashion, and
provided that they did not report in a manner that showed that they
were actuated by malice in relation to the plaintiff.
In the present case, although the somewhat sensational headlines
used did not make it clear that these were mere allegations, the
content of the stories made it clear that criminal allegations had
been made. The fact that the plaintiff was a public figure was only
relevant to establishing the public interest that the public would have
on receiving information about this matter. But even if the plaintiff
was not a public figure the public would have still had a right to know
that she was being prosecuted on serious allegations of child abuse.
The outcome in this case, of course, would have been different if the
defendant had simply reproduced the totally false and highly damaging
story contained in the social media. By carrying this false story in its
newspaper, it would have been guilty of spreading further this scurrilous
story and the defence of qualified privilege would not have applied.
A TIMELY AND WELCOME DECISION ON EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR PENSION ARREARS UNDER SECTION 13 (1)
LABOUR ACT [CHAPTER 28:01]
Case on Misheck Ugaro v African Banking Corporation

SC 298 17 [REF – LC/H/681/16]
BY MUNYARADZI GWISAI1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Misheck Ugaro vs
African Banking Corporation SC–298 17 concerning employers’ liability
for arrears accrued viz pension contributions for their ex-employees
is an important decision for the benefit of one of the most vulnerable
sections of workers: pensioners. The court affirmed in an order by
consent the liability of employers under s 13 (1) of the Labour Act to
pay arrears for pension contributions accrued during a former
employee’s employment.
In doing so, the court also provided a timely clarification on a matter
that has caused much suffering for former employees, as lower
tribunals like National Employment Council Designated Agents and
labour officers have been declining to hear disputes concerning pension
arrears by employees. They declared that they lacked jurisdiction
and argued that such disputes did not qualify as unfair labour practices
under s 13 of the Labour Act and that the former employees had to
sue the pension fund and not their former employers.
Consequently former employees were restricted to initiating action
against pension funds in the civil courts. Court action is not only costly
but involves cumbersome and sophisticated procedures requiring legal
representation which is beyond the reach of most workers and
pensioners. Even then, the obstacle that confronted litigants was that
the Pension Fund would plead that it could not grant a full pension
benefit because the employer had not remitted the necessary
contributions.
1.
Munyaradzi Gwisai is a registered legal practitioner and lectures in Labour Law
and Labour Relations, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe, and Briggs Zano
Working Peoples College.
262
UZLJ Case Notes 263
This is exactly what happened in the instant case. Appellant was a

former employee of Respondent who joined in 2002 and resigned on
31 December 2014. A dispute arose over, inter alia, his pension
entitlements. Appellant argued that Respondent was in arrears with
contributions for the period 2002 to 2009, resulting in undue prejudice
to him. In terms of the contract of employment, Appellant was obliged
to be a member of the employer-specified pension fund, the African
Banking Corporation Zimbabwe Pension Fund. In terms of rule 5.1 of
the Fund Rules the employer was obliged to effect deductions
equivalent to 6% of the employee’s annual salary and make employer
contributions to a total equivalent to 15% of the employee’s salary
and remit such contributions to the Pension Fund on a monthly basis.
The employer had failed to effect deductions or remit contributions
and did so belatedly after the employee’s resignation. A dispute arose
as to the pension benefits that the former employee was entitled to;
details of which are not relevant for this article.
The employee referred the dispute to a labour officer in terms of s 93
(1) of the Labour Act alleging an unfair labour practice by his former
employer. Conciliation failed and the dispute was referred to an
arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled in favour of the employee holding
that the employer was liable under the Labour Act to effect pension
contributions arrears to the Pension Fund for the period in arrears.
The employer appealed to the Labour Court submitting that the award
was a nullity because an arbitrator acting under the Labour Act lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter, as the dispute did not qualify as an
unfair labour practice under section 13 (1) of the Labour Act. It was
argued that the proper party to be sued was the Pension Fund, which
was a separate legal entity, and the ex-employer merely an agent for
the pension fund.
MUSARIRI J upheld the appeal and reversed the award on the basis of
two grounds. First, that the arbitrator erred in holding the employer
liable for pension claims, whereas the proper party to sue was the
pension fund. He held:
The Fund being a legal entity, is itself answerable for pension
claims made against it. Its Rules clearly say so. Thus the arbitrator
fell into grievous error when he held the appellant accountable
instead of the Fund. In the normal course the employer acts as
the agent for the Fund. Certainly that is so during the currency
of the employment contract. But once the contract is terminated
as in casu, the employee should deal directly with the Fund. As
it turns out the appellant obtained an account from the Fund on

behalf of the respondent. If the respondent was dissatisfied
therewith he ought to have confronted the Fund directly.”[page
2 of the Unreported Judgment].
The second reason was that a former employer was not liable under s
13 of the Labour Act because the section deals with the liability of
the former employer concerning wages and benefits upon termination
of the employment contract, but does not deal with the liability of a
pension fund. He rejected the submission that a former employee
had option to sue both the former employer and the Pension Fund. He
held:
I pressed the respondent’s attorney to explain why they did not
deal with the Fund. He sought to argue that the employer and
the Fund have joint liability. In such scenario the employee can
opt to claim from either of the two. He referred to section 13 of
the Labour Act ... However, none of the six subsections was
cited. My reading of all of them indicates that they deal with
the employer’s liability concerning wages and benefits upon
termination of the employment contract. None deal with the
liability of a pension fund.” [page 2, Unreported Judgment].
Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court citing two grounds. First,

that contrary to the judgment of the Labour Court, an ex-employee
has the right to sue his ex-employer for failure to remit contributions
to a pension fund in terms of s 13(1) of the Labour Act, as such failure
amounted to an unfair labour practice. Secondly, that contrary to the
Labour Court’s judgment, pensions arrears were elements of terminal
benefits that an ex-employee could sue his ex-employer for under s
13 (1) of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal by consent
ordering:
IT IS ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:
1. The appeal be and is hereby allowed with each party
bearing its own costs.
2. The judgment of the court a quo be and is hereby set
aside.
3. The matter be and is hereby remitted to the Labour Court
for it:
To determine the actual period during which the appellant was

employed by the respondent and in respect of which the respondent
was contractually obliged to remit pension contributions to the relevant
Pension Fund.
UZLJ Case Notes 265
To compute the exact amount of the contributions payable in respect

of both employer’s and employee’s contributions, less the amounts
already paid by the respondents for the period of actual employment
determined in terms of paragraph (a) above.
The decision of the Supreme Court is significant and welcome for two
major reasons: namely, in relation to the locus standi of former
employees to sue their former employers for pension arrears under
the Labour Act and secondly as a guide to the kind of terminal benefits
covered under s 13 (1) of the Labour Act.
LOCUS STANDI OF EX-EMPLOYEES TO SUE EX-EMPLOYERS UNDER THE LABOUR ACT

The first significance of the Supreme Court decision is that it affirmed
that an ex-employee has the right to sue their former employer as
regards unpaid or unremitted pension contributions under s 13 (1) of
the Labour Act as an unfair labour practice and is not restricted to
only suing the appropriate pension fund. Section 13 (1) provides:
13. Wages and benefits upon termination of employment
1. Subject to this Act or any regulations made in terms
of this Act, whether any person;
(a) Is dismissed from his employment or his
employment is otherwise terminated; or
(b) Resigns from his employment; or
(c) Is incapacitated from performing his work; or
(d) Dies;
he or his estate as the case may be, shall be entitled to the wages and
benefits due to him up to the time of such dismissal, termination,
resignation, incapacitation or death as the case maybe, including
benefits with respect to any outstanding vacation and notice period,
medical aid, social ,social security and any pension, and the employer
concerned shall pay such entitlements to such person or his estate; as
the case may be, as soon as reasonably practicable after such event,
and failure to do so shall constitute an unfair labour practice.”(my
emphasis).
Although an order by consent without reasons, the Supreme Court
order effectively affirms earlier decisions that the effect of s 13 (1)
of the Act is to render continuation of the employment relationship
between the employer and former employee for the specific purposes
specified under the section, beyond termination of the contract.
The continuity of the employer-employee relationship was well

enunciated in the case of Nyanzara v Mbada Diamonds (Pvt) Ltd2 where
it was held:
The relationship of Employer/Employee can loosely be said to
continue after termination of employment as envisaged in s 13(1)
of the Labour Act is only for the purposes of giving effect to or
enforcement of payment of terminal benefits.
The Ugaro decision has reaffirmed the above line of cases by the
Superior Courts.
SECTION 13 (1) OF THE ACT COVERS BROADER TERMINAL BENEFITS THAN “WAGES AND
BENEFITS.”
The second significance of the Ugaro case lies in that the Supreme
Court has effectively affirmed that the terminal benefits protected
under s 13 (1) of the Act are not confined to “wages and benefits” as
had been held by the Labour Court. The ambit of terminal benefits
covered under s 13 (1) of the Act is broader than wage arrears or
benefits which should be paid directly to the former employee as
part of her/his terminal benefits. But the section is broader and
encompasses other terminal benefits which may not necessarily be
paid directly to the former employee but to contributions which the
former employee/employer should have paid to relevant third party
service providers in terms of the contract of employment. The section
specifically mentions “medical aid, social security and any pension.”
Thus where an ex-employer has failed to remit necessary contributions,
the employer commits an unfair labour practise under s 13 (1) of the
Act, entitling the ex-employee to initiate proceedings in terms of s 93
(1) of the Labour Act seeking an order compelling the former employer
to pay the arrear contributions.
The Labour Court had adopted an unnecessarily restrictive approach
to s 13 (1) which subverted the purpose of the section and that of the
Labour Act under s 2A (1) and (2). The Supreme Court endorsed the
broader purposive approach required under s 2A (2) of the Act. This
provides that
2.
HH–63–15. See also, PTC V Zimbabwe Posts Telecommunications Workers Union
& Ors 2002 (2) ZLR 732 (S) AT 727 D-E; and African Banking Corporation
Zimbabwe Ltd v Karimazondo & Ors SC-368-15.
UZLJ Case Notes 267
(2) This Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures

the attainment of its purpose referred to in subsection
(1).
In terms of s 13 (1) of the Act, an employer has a duty to pay its
former employees “such entitlements” as are due to him or her, as
soon as reasonably practicable after the termination.
The entitlements referred therein are provided at the start of the
paragraph, namely,
... the wages and benefits due to him up to the time of such
dismissal, termination, resignation, incapacitation or death as
the case maybe, including benefits with respect to any
outstanding vacation and notice period, medical aid, social
security and any pension...
The employer has an obligation to pay the former employee their

other terminal benefits besides the wages. Such benefits may include
medical aid, social security and pension benefits. This paragraph must
be interpreted in a manner that is reasonable and attains the objectives
of the Act. Section 13 (1) is clearly meant to ensure that the former
employee gets their entitlements in relation to wages and any other
benefits accrued as a result of the contract of employment. Such
benefits may include medical aid, social security and pensions.
The overwhelming industrial practice is that for social security or
social insurance schemes, it is not the employer who provides the
direct benefit but benefits are provided by a third-party service
provider, on payment of the necessary contributions and premiums
by the member/employer.
Where an employee is entitled or obliged to be a member of such a
scheme, his/her “entitlement” or “benefit” is that the employer makes
the necessary contributions and remits them to the third-party service
provider, so that the employee can subsequently access the benefits
provided by the third party. In that case, the employer has a separate
and independent liability to that of the third party service provider.
The employer’s liability is to remit the deductions it would have made
on the employee’s salary, to the third party service provider. The
deductions are actually part of the employee’s remuneration.
The liability of the Pension Fund is separate and distinct. It is to provide
the benefits in terms of the applicable Fund Rules. A member has a
separate and distinct cause of action as a member against the third
party service provider if it fails to provide the service. But where one
has failed to meet their obligations, such as failure to pay the necessary
contributions, a member has no right to sue the third service provider
for the benefit. He or she has to clean their “dirty hands” by making
up to date payments of contributions to the third party service provider.
The above is what the former employee in the Ugaro case sought to
do by forcing the ex-employer to effect the payments to which it was
contractually obliged. The interpretation to s 13 (1) of the Act that
had been adopted by the Labour Court of denying such ex-employees
locus standi, led to absurd and unjust results which were contrary to
the clear legislative objective underlying s 13 (1) of the Act. It would
allow employers not to pay deducted contributions for pensions, NSSA,
medical aid, funeral policies, which duties they have directly under
the contract of employment, but the former employee would have no
cause of action under the Labour Act to challenge such unlawful
conduct by the former employer.
Yet in the case of contributory schemes like pensions, medical aid,
funeral schemes and so forth, the deductions made by the employer
would be actual deductions on the salary of the employee, which
salary is guaranteed under s 6(1) (a) of the Act. But the restrictive
position adopted by the Labour Court would not allow the former
employee to claim for this as an unfair labour practice under s 13 (1)
of the Act. Nothing could be further from the clear intention of s 13
(1) and the Labour Act, in general. Such an interpretation and approach
does violence to the established cannons of interpretation of statutes
and to the Labour Act in particular.
The cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is that words must be
given their ordinary grammatical meaning except where that meaning
leads to an “absurdity so glaring that it could never have been
contemplated by the legislature.” 3
Interpreting the word “entitlements” in s 13 (1) as excluding pension
contributions deducted from the employee’s salary, would clearly lead
to absurd and unjust results to former employees. Even if it was
assumed that the term “entitlements” is capable of more than one
meaning, the same result would apply by operation of appropriate
maxims of interpretation of statutes. In particular, the presumption
3.
Venter v R 1907 TS 910 at 915. Also, NEC Catering Industry v Catering and
Hospitality Industry Workers Union 2008 (1) ZLR 311 (S) at 316B-D; and G E
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes JUTA 1992 at 177
UZLJ Case Notes 269
that the legislature does not intend that which is harsh, unjust or
unreasonable. Where there is ambiguity, or doubt or where more than
one interpretation is possible, “it is obvious that the intention which
appears to be the most in accordance with convenience, reason, justice
and legal principles, should … be presumed to be the true one.”4
The above presumption is consistent and has been codified under s 2A
(2) of the Act. One of the specified purposes of the Labour Act is the
promotion of fair labour standards. Section 6 provides specified labour
standards, which include the right to be paid a wage or in terms of an
agreement under the law or an Act.
In casu, the employee’s contract of employment provided him with a
right to participation in a pension scheme and for the employer to
make deductions to be remitted to the appropriate pension fund. The
employer breached such duty, not as an agent but a party to the
contract and an employer under the Labour Act. It was therefore
correctly held liable.
CONCLUSION
It is only right that the Supreme Court in the Ugaro case put right a
major injustice done against some of the most vulnerable members
of society _ pensioners _ especially considering the historic injustice
that this group suffered at the dawn of dollarization in February 2009,
when pension funds and employers made arbitrary and unfair
conversions of Zimbabwe Dollar pensions into paltry US Dollar pensions.
One hopes that the case marks the beginning of justice for these
marginalized members of society.
4.
P St Langan Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes 1969 at 199. See also, Borcheds
NO v Rhodesia Chrome and Asbestos Ltd 1930 AD 112 at 121; Dadoo Ltd & Ors
v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 552.
ACTIONS AGAINST THE POLICE: UNREASONABLE OBSTACLES
TO OBTAINING REDRESS
Case Note on Nyika & Ors v Minister of Home Affairs &
Ors HH-181-16 (“The Nyika Case”)
BY G. FELTOE, J REID-ROWLAND AND R. MATSIKIDZE
INTRODUCTION
The police force plays an important role in our society. Under section
219 of the Constitution the Police Service’s functions include—
•
detecting, investigating and preventing crime;
•
preserving the internal security of Zimbabwe;
•
protecting and securing the lives and property of the people;
•
maintaining law and order; and
•
upholding this Constitution and enforcing the law without fear or
favour.
All these functions should be executed within the framework of
relevant legislation governing the exercise of these functions and in
accordance with the constitutional rights of citizens.
The police are given extensive legislative powers to carry out its
legitimate functions. The problem is that their far-reaching powers
are open to abuse or misuse and, not infrequently, police officers
have abused or misused their powers resulting in serious violation of
the rights of citizens.
As pointed out in the Nyika case, the police interact with the public
on a daily basis and it is typically ordinary citizens who are the victims
of violations of their rights arising out of abuse or misuse of police
powers. Victims of police abuse will often be seeking redress for
violations of some of their most fundamental human rights, such the
right to life, liberty, bodily integrity, dignity and protection of their
property. The claims may include actions for unlawful arrest and
detention, malicious prosecution, unlawful assault, unlawful causing
of injury or death, unlawful deprivation or destruction of their property
and other human rights violations.1 Given the serious nature of these
1.
The shortened prescription period also applies to other legal actions against
the police (such as delictual actions for injury caused by negligent driving) and
actions for breach of contract.
270
UZLJ Case Notes 271
claims, it is vitally important that these matters are dealt with by the
courts, the police are held accountable for such abuses and appropriate
redress is given to victims.
The aggrieved parties have a legal right to bring delictual claims against
the offending police officers and, where the police officers commit
the delicts in the course of their employment as police officers, they
can also claim against the Ministry in charge of the police on the basis
of vicarious liability.2 Suing the individual police officers responsible
and making them pay damages acts as a deterrent against such
misconduct on the part of police officers. These cases serve to alert
the police to the legal consequences of abuse or misuse of their powers
and show the public that such misconduct will not be tolerated by the
courts.
Although the legal right to obtain redress exists on paper, many victims
may not be aware of their right to sue the police and even if they are
aware, they may lack the financial resources to engage lawyers to
bring actions and may not be able to obtain state legal aid which is
limited in its scope. The civic organisations offering legal assistance
to victims of police abuse do not have the capacity to offer such
assistance to victims all around the country. Victims may try to bring
their cases to court without legal assistance but they face often
insurmountable obstacles because of ignorance of the complex
procedural and technical requirements for such claims.
What the Nyika case clearly establishes is that no unreasonable further
obstacles should be placed in the paths of litigants seeking remedies
for these wrongs. It deals with whether the special legislative provisions
stipulating a shorter period of prescription for actions against the
police create unfair barriers for persons seeking redress and whether
these provisions violate fundamental constitutional rights of litigants.
EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION
The Nyika case revolves around an aspect of extinctive prescription.
Tsanga J points out that if a debtor successfully raises the defence of
2.
Recent cases in South Africa have expanded the scope of liability of the State
for actions on the part of police officers. For instance, in the case of K v
Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) a woman was brutally
raped by three uniformed policemen who had given her a lift. With reference
to constitutional provisions relating to the functions of the police the
Constitutional Court found the State delictually liable for the crime committed
by the police officers.
“extinctive prescription” in legal proceedings, the claim against him

or her is made permanently unenforceable. Once the prescription
period has expired the court has no discretion to admit the claim on
the basis that the claim is legally well founded and even that there is
irrefutable evidence proving the claim, or there were valid reasons
why the claim was not brought within the prescribed period. To
interrupt the running of prescription requires the service of the
summons; the issuing of the summons does not suffice.
The main justifications for setting a prescription period is to create
legal certainty and finality in litigation. It encourages claimants to
bring their claims in a timely fashion and before the evidence turns
stale. It protects debtors from facing claims which have been existed
for such a long time that it is unfair to expect debtors to defend
themselves against these claims. But extinctive prescription can be a
trap for unwary claimants and legal practitioners representing
claimants must ensure that the claims are brought before the
prescription period expires. Legal practitioners are guilty of actionable
negligence if they carelessly allow their clients’ claims to prescribe.3
The periods of prescription for delictual actions are laid down in the
Prescription Act [Chapter 8:11]. In s 2 “debt” is defined so as to include
a delictual claim and then in s 15 the prescription periods for debts
are set out. Three years is the usual period for prescription for a
delictual action.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN POLICE ACT

There are special provisions in the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] dealing
with the period of prescription for claims arising out of delicts
committed by police officers. Section 70 provides that in a civil action
instituted against the State or a member of the police force “in respect
of anything done or omitted to be done under this Act shall be
commenced within eight months after the cause of action has arisen,
and notice in writing of any civil action and the grounds thereof shall
be given in terms of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14] before
the commencement of such action.”
3.
See, for instance, Erasmus Ferreira & Ackermann & Ors v Francis 2010 (2) SA
228 (SCA); Manase v Minister of Safety and Security & Anor 2003 (1) SA 567
(Ck); Moatshe v Commercial Union 1991 (4) SA 372 (W) Slomowitz v Kok 1983
(1) SA 130 (A); Manyeka v Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1979 (1) SA 844 (SE)
UZLJ Case Notes 273
Under s 6 of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], 60 days’ written

notice must be given of an intention to claim money from the State.
The notice must set out the grounds of the claim and, where
appropriate and possible, give details of officials involved and have
copies of documents relating to the claim attached to it. The 60 days
is incorporated into the eight month period under which the claim is
to be brought under the Police Act. The courts have the power to
condone failure to give the required notice where there has been
substantial compliance with the section or where there has been no
undue prejudice to the State or to the officer being sued.
THE NYIKA CASE

In the Nyika case two army officers had been badly injured when
police officers shot at them, apparently mistaking them for robbers
and despite the fact that the army officers had complied with the
instruction to get out of their vehicle and raise their hands. The army
officers then sought to claim delictual damages from the Minister of
Home Affairs4 , the Police Commissioner-General and the police officers
involved in the shooting.
Summons had been issued but the claim expired as the summons had
not been served on the defendants within the mandatory eight month
period. The court found that the failure to issue serve summons with
the prescribed period was apparently “largely a result of tardiness on
the part of their legal practitioner.”
Counsel for the army officers then brought an application in the High
Court seeking a declaration that the provisions in the Police Act
requiring that the action be brought within eight months and that
notice of 60 days be given before commencing action are
unconstitutional. Respondents counsel argued that the shortened
period of prescription was legally justified and was not
unconstitutional.
4.
The lawyers for the applicant had originally incorrectly cited the Ministry instead
of the Minister. Counsel for the respondents raised the issue of the mis-citation
at the outset of the application seeking a ruling on the constitutionality of the
shortened period of prescription for actions against the police. The High Court
took cognizance of the error in citation and altered the citation to read the
Minister. This was done without applicant’s counsel making a formal application
for correction of this mis-citation.
ARGUMENTS OF APPLICANT’S COUNSEL

The applicants argued that not only the eight months’ period was
unreasonable but also the 60 day notice period incorporated therein
was also unreasonably short.
The applicant’s counsel argued that the justification relied upon for
the shortened period of prescription is illogical and untenable and
the preferential treatment of the police in terms of the time period
for bringing a claim violated the constitutional right to equality before
the law and equal protection and benefit of the law (section 56 of the
Constitution). Computers and e-governance now allow for efficient
handling of cases by large State institutions. There are many other
large institutions, such as the Central Intelligence Organisation and
big private corporations, which do not have a special prescription
protection like that for the police.
Counsel for the applicant argued that the shortened period of
prescription was also a violation of the right of access to justice. This
right is encapsulated in section 69 of the Constitution which gives the
right to have access to the courts and to have their civil rights
determined before a court within a reasonable time. Counsel relied
heavily on the South African case of Mohlomi v Minister of Defence
1997 (1) SA 124 (CC). In this case the court had to decide whether a
provision obliging claimants to bring claims against the Ministry of
Defence within six months incorporating a one month notification
period was justifiable. The Constitutional Court decided that this
provision infringed the right of access to court because it did not
afford claimants an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial
redress for wrongs allegedly done to them. In reaching this conclusion
the court took into account socio-economic conditions in the country,
namely poverty, illiteracy, cultural and language differences and the
inaccessibility of legal assistance. This meant that for the majority
poverty, illiteracy and inequality adversely impacted on the ability to
access the law. Legal illiteracy in particular abounds and many people
who may have been injured may simply be unaware of their rights in
light of limited availability of legal aid. The court held further that
the infringement of the right could not be justified in terms of the
limitation section of the Constitution because it would be possible to
satisfy the State’s legitimate objectives through means less stringent
and detrimental to the interests of claimants. The test derived from
this case, as applied in later cases, is whether the litigant has the
opportunity to exercise the right to judicial redress and whether the
limitation is reasonable in terms of time.
UZLJ Case Notes 275
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL

Counsel for respondents argued that the eight month prescription
period for actions against the police was reasonable and justifiable
and was not unconstitutional. Counsel cited Minister of Home Affairs
v Badenhorst 1983 (2) ZLR 248 (S) at p 253A-B in which Gubbay JA
referred with approval to the following observations in an early South
African case:
A police constable may have to deal with a great number of
cases, the details of which would probably be evanescent, and
if a plaintiff was not under an obligation to bring an action within
a period, recollection of the proceedings would probably vanish
from the mind or become obscure; therefore provisions of s 30
seem to be only reasonable.5
The respondents’ counsel maintained that, because of the large size

of the police force and considerable volumes of cases handled by
police officers, there were good reasons for ensuring that actions
against the Ministry of Home Affairs and police officers were disposed
of quickly before memories of the facts of individual cases were
forgotten. This justified the shortened period of prescription for such
cases.
DECISION OF THE COURT

Tsanga J found that the provision for the shorter period of prescription
for actions against the police violated s 69(2) (on the right to a fair
hearing before a court within a reasonable time) and s 56 (1) (on the
right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of
the law).
She agreed with the approach in the Mohlomi case. In Zimbabwe there
was also a right of access to justice. She pointed out that knowledge
of the law is necessary to access justice and in Zimbabwe lack of
knowledge of the law is widespread and legal aid is limited. The State
does little to disseminate legal information and the geographical reach
of non-governmental organisations providing legal information is
hampered by financial constraints. Put in this context the shortened
time frame for bringing actions against the police “can only but deny
ordinary people the right to access courts.” She then concluded:
5.
Hatting v Hlabaki 1927 CPD 220 at 223E
Therefore, if the critical test for reasonableness of a time limit

such as the eight months in the Police Act, is whether it permits
sufficient or adequate time to exercise the right of access to
the court, then undoubtedly for the vast majority of our populace
who face the challenges alluded to, the resounding answer is
that it simply does not.
The learned judge pointed out that other legal systems have dispensed
with restrictive protections for the police and other State institutions
by way of shortened periods of prescription. For instance, following
the ruling in the Mohlomi case in South Africa the period of prescription
for actions against the police was changed to three years by legislation.
The judge therefore decided that there was no reason why the general
prescription period for ordinary debts as contained in s 15(d) of the
Prescription Act should not govern claims against the police. The 60
notice period, however, allowed the police enough time to respond to
the claim and decide whether or not to settle the claim and the
provision allows for condonation of the non-compliance with the time
period and extension thereof for good cause shown.
Tsanga J found that it is “precisely in the everyday role of police as
public servants that ordinary citizens generally encounter challenges
with members of the police force which they expect the police to be
held accountable for. Moreover, human rights standards have
influenced the outlook on time limits as stipulated in the guiding
recommendations to the implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to which Zimbabwe itself is a party.”
In more general terms, she pointed out that the arena of constitutional
challenges to legislative provisions has tended to be dominated in the
past by cases brought by political elites relating to high-level abuses,
such as those arising from electoral provisions, public order and
security laws and media laws. Those bringing such actions obviously
have the capacity to pursue these matters. She says that it the court’s
vigilant scrutiny of constitutionally deficient legislation should not be
confined to such cases but must encompass cases such as the present
one where abuses are suffered at the everyday level by ordinary
citizens.
The judge referred this matter to the Constitutional Court in terms of
s 175(1) of the Constitution for its confirmation or otherwise of this
constitutional ruling. When the matter came before the Constitutional
Court for confirmation, the court struck the matter off the roll on the
UZLJ Case Notes 277
basis that the High Court had erred in correcting the erroneous citation
of the Ministry instead of the Minister without a proper application
being made for the amendment by the applicant’s counsel. The
applicant’s counsel then made a successful chamber application before
the High Court to correct the mis-citation. The matter has now been
referred back to the Constitutional Court and is awaiting a hearing of
the matter and a decision.
It is respectfully submitted that the Constitutional Court had also the
opportunity to allow for filing of the application for the correction of
erroneous citation. The constitutional jurisprudence should always
lean towards disposing a matter on merits as opposed to technical
aspects. This is precisely the purpose of the provisions of rule 5 of the
Constitutional Court Rules which allow departure from the rules in
the interests of justice. In this case, clearly the case in question had
public benefit and interest. There was no prejudice that would be
suffered if the Constitutional Court had allowed the matter to be
postponed sine die to allow the amendment. The amendment at this
point would not prejudice any of the litigants as the Minister had
always been represented since the commencement of proceedings.
Thirdly, even if there was a prejudice, the importance of the case far
outweighed the importance of the case to the litigants and the public.6
GENERAL COMMENTS
The judgment in the Nyika case is significant for taking full account
of the socio-economic conditions that inhibit ordinary persons from
successfully obtaining redress for abuses suffered at the hands of the
police.
The unjustifiably shortened period of prescription for actions against
the police (whether for abuses or for any other reason) is just one of
many barriers faced by ordinary litigants. It must be removed but a
lot more needs to be done to ensure that persons who suffer abuse or
loss at the hands of the police obtain redress.
A suitable starting point, with regard to abuses, is to ensure that
police officers are fully trained on the proper exercise of their powers
6
For criticism of the tendency to disallowing cases from going forward because
of minor technical irregularities see Musa Kika’s article entitled ÒThe role and
attitudes of the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court in operationalizing the 2013
constitution, 2013-2017Ó in the Rule of Law Journal at pages 10-14
in a manner which does not lead to abuses of the basic rights of persons
with whom they interact. The police service must display zero
tolerance to such misbehaviour and take firm disciplinary action against
all abusers. It should make widely available a far stronger version of
the Police Service Charter. The Government should use its country-
wide information dissemination capacity to inform aggrieved parties
remedies available to them and should prioritise such cases when
granting state legal aid. Government must not leave it entirely to
civic organisations, such as the Legal Resources Foundation and
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, to provide the necessary
assistance. Finally a proper mechanism must be established for fair
and expeditious processing of complaints against the police. This must
be done in accordance with section 210 of the Constitution which
provides:
An Act of Parliament must provide an effective and independent
mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from
members of the public about misconduct on the part of members
of the security services, and for remedying any harm caused by
such misconduct.7
If such a mechanism were established and properly capacitated, it

would provide one way of ordinary persons could obtain redress.
However, this mechanism must not be used simply to cover up police
excesses rather than fairly investigating complaints and providing
redress where complaints are well founded.
The police force must also display that it is non-partisan in the way in
which it operates in accordance with the constitutional provisions
mandating this.8
7.
Section 207 of the Constitution includes the police service as one of the security
services.
8.
Section 119 (3) lays down that the Police Service must be non-partisan, national
in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority
as established by this Constitution. Section 208 provides that police officers as
members of security services must not —
(a) act in a partisan manner;
(b) further the interests of any political party or cause;
(c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or
(d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.
LEGAL INFORMATION
The following provides information on aspects of the Legal System of

Zimbabwe.
STATUTES OF ZIMBABWE
The Statutes of Zimbabwe are available on the Law Development Web
site http://www.ldc.gov.zw/statute-law-of-zimbabwe/
For up to date information and commentary on Acts and Bills see the
Veritas Zimbabwe Web site http://www.veritaszim.net/
CASE LAW IN ZIMBABWE

Law Reports:
The Zimbabwe Law Reports (published by the Legal Resources
Foundation). These reports from 2015 Part 2 onwards will only be
available electronically on the Juta Zimbabwe Law Reports site.)
The Zimbabwe Law Reports (published by the Judicial Service
Commission)
Unreported judgments
Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute https://zimlii.org/
All judgments on Zimlii are searchable on the home page by subject,
judge, parties, court or case number. Judgments are available as
follows:
Constitutional Court Judgments 2002 and 2012-2018
Supreme Court Judgments 1983-1987 and 2002X-2018
High Court Harare Judgments 2001-2018X
High Court Bulawayo Judgments 2001-X2018
High Court Masvingo Judgments 2016-X2018X
High Court Mutare Judgments 2018X
There is also a case index and there are case summaries. For case
summaries of unreported judgments see also http://www.lrfzim.com/
case-summaries/ Case summaries for 2010 - 2016
Veritas
For up to date information and commentary on important case law
developments see the Veritas Zimbabwe Web site http://
www.veritaszim.net/
279
JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION

http://jsc.org.zw/
Court judgments for Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Court
Harare and High Court Bulawayo from 2011-2018
GOVERNMENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
http://www.justice.gov.zw/
Departments: Policy Legal Research, Law Development Commission,
Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, Legal Aid Directorate,
Community Service, Human Resources, Finance and Administration,
Internal Audit, Deeds, Companies and Intellectual Property, Attorney-
General’s Office and Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services.
Ministry of Home Affairs http://www.moha.gov.zw/
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development
http://www.women.gov.zw/
National Prosecuting Authority
REGULATORY BODIES
Law Society of Zimbabwe http://lawsociety.org.zw/
The primary duties of the Law Society are to:
•
Promote the study of the law
•
Contribute, undertake or make recommendations on legal training
•
Control of admission of new members to the profession
•
Maintain a register of members
•
Regulate the profession in respect of continuing training, discipline
and trust accounts
•
Represent the profession and articulate its views on various issues
•
Promote justice, defend human rights, rule of law and the
independence of judiciary
•
And generally control and manage the legal profession
The membership of the Law Society is drawn from all registered legal
practitioners residing in Zimbabwe whether in private practice, in
commerce or in civil service.X
Directory of Law Firms and Legal Practitioners http://
lawsociety.org.zw/Directory
UZLJ University of Zimbabwe Law Journal 281
Council for Legal Education http://lawsociety.org.zw/AboutUs/

Council
This Council enables the Law Society to have full control of the
profession fromXtraining, admission to regulationXof the membership
in terms of discipline, trust accounting transparency, quality of service
and client compensation as well as independence of the profession.
SOME NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

Legal Resources Foundation of Zimbabwe http://www.lrfzim.com/
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights https://www.zlhr.org.zw/
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum http://www.hrforumzim.org/
Centre for Applied Legal Research http://www.ca-lr.org/
Veritas Zimbabwe http://www.veritaszim.net/
Zimbabwe Women’s Lawyers Association http://www.zwla.co.zw/
Zimrights http://www.zimrights.co.zw
Women and Law in Southern Africa https://www.wlsazim.co.zw/
Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre & Network www.zwrcn.org.zw/
Justice for Children www.justiceforchildren.org.zw/
Childline www.childline.org.zw/
Counselling Services Unit Tel +263 (0)4 773 496, 772 843, 772 883,
792 222, (0) 772 260 378
Zimbabwe Association for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of
the Offender
Zimbabwe Association for the Prevention of Crime and
Rehabilitation of Offenders Telephone: +263-(0)4-770046/ 780401-
3 Email:Xzacrohab@mweb.co.zw
UNIVERSITY LAW FACULTIES
University of Zimbabwe Faculty of Law http://www.uz.ac.zw/
index.php/law-faculty-contacts
Southern and Eastern African Regional Centre for Women’s Law
which is housed in the Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
https://www.searcwl.uz.ac.zw
Midlands State University Faculty of Law https://ww5.msu.ac.zw/
home/faculties/law/
Great Zimbabwe University Herbert Chitepo School of Law
www.gzu.ac.zw/school-of-law/
Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University https://www.zegu.ac.zw/

Programs/HLLB
LAW JOURNALS PRODUCED BY UNIVERSITY LAW FACULTIES IN ZIMBABWE
The University of Zimbabwe Law Journal (in hard copy)
Midlands State University Law Review (in hard copy and on ZIMLII
website)
Journal produced by International Commission of Jurists and the Centre
for Applied Legal Research
Zimbabwe Rule of Law Journal (in hard copy and on ZIMLII website)
Journal produced by the Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute
Zimbabwe Electronic Law Journal
https://zimlii.org/content/welcome-zimbabwe-legal-information-
institute-website-0
BOOKS ON ZIMBABWEAN LAW
Legal System
Lovemore Madhuku An Introduction to Zimbabwean Law (Weaver Press
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010)
Vakayi Chikwekwe An Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe
(VDC Legal Publications Mambo Press Gweru 2016)
Arbitration
Caleb Mucheche Commercial Arbitration Law in Zimbabwe and South
Africa
Civil Procedure
Geoff Feltoe and Ellen Sithole A Guide to Civil Procedure in the
Magistrates Courts in Zimbabwe (LRF 1994)
Commercial Law
A. Chizikani Commercial Law in Zimbabwe (Word and Image
Publications 2010)
R. Christie Business Law in Zimbabwe (Juta 1998)
Manase and Madhuku A Handbook on Commercial Law in Zimbabwe
(University of Zimbabwe Publications 1996)
Caleb Mucheche Commercial Law in Zimbabwe: Cases and Materials
Caleb Mucheche Advanced Practical Guide to Business Law in
Zimbabwe
Company Law
Caleb Mucheche Company Law in Zimbabwe Commentary and Legal
Solutions for Insolvent Companies in South Africa
Caleb Mucheche Company Law Shareholder Rights in Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche Corporate Governance Law in South Africa and
Zimbabwe
Competition Law
Caleb Mucheche Competition Law in Zimbabwe
Constitutional Law
Greg Linington Constitutional Law in Zimbabwe (LRF 2001)
Justice Mavedzenge and Douglas Coltart A Constitutional Law Guide
Towards Understanding Zimbabwe’s Fundamental Socio-economic
and Cultural Human Rights (ICJ and Zimrights 2014)
Caleb Mucheche Commentary on the Constitutional Court Rules of
Zimbabwe
Consumer Law
Caleb Mucheche Consumer Law in Zimbabwe
Contract Law
Innocent Maja The Law of Contract in Zimbabwe (The Maja Foundation
Harare 2015)
Conveyancing
Lloyd Mhishi A Guide to the Law and Practice of Conveyancing in
Zimbabwe (LRF 2004)
Criminal Procedure
John Reid-Rowland Criminal Procedure in Zimbabwe (LRF 1997)
Energy Law
Caleb Mucheche Energy, Electricity, Oil and Gas Law in Zimbabwe
Ethics and Practice
Brian Crozier Legal Ethics: A Handbook for Zimbabwean Lawyers (LRF
2012)
Theo Gambe The Legal Profession and Practice Management: a
Practical Approach (2013)
Mary Welsh Civil Practice Handbook (LRF 1996)
Family Law
Welshman Ncube Family Law in Zimbabwe (LRF 1989)
Immigration and Human Trafficking
Caleb Mucheche Immigration and Human Trafficking Law in Zimbabwe
Insolvency Law
Caleb Mucheche Insolvency Law in Zimbabwe
Insurance Law
Caleb Mucheche Insurance and Pensions Law in Zimbabwe
Investment Law
Caleb Mucheche Investment and Indigenisation Law in Zimbabwe
Labour Law
Lovemore Madhuku Labour Law in Zimbabwe (Weaver Press and
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2015)
Munyaradzi Gwisai Labour & Employment Law in Zimbabwe: Relations
of Work Under Neo-Colonial Capitalism (Labour Centre and
Institute of Commercial Law)
Caleb Mucheche Law and Practice at the Labour Court, 4th Edition
Caleb Mucheche Constitutionalism and Contemporary Labour Law
Developments in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia: Labour
Broking, Termination on Notice and Sexual Harassment
Caleb Mucheche Labour Law Rights Under the Constitution of
Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche A Practical Guide to Labour Law, Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration in Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche A Guide to Collective Bargaining Law and Wage
Negotiations in Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche Law and Practice at the Labour Court of Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche Commentary on the Labour Court Rules of Zimbabwe
Caleb Mucheche Law and Practice at the Labour Court Dismissal
Remedies in Zimbabwe: Reinstatement and Damages
Caleb Mucheche Justiciability of Labour Right to Strike Under the
Constitutions of Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa
Caleb Mucheche Constitutionality of Temporary Employment Services/
Labour Broking in South Africa.
Land Law
Caleb Mucheche Land Law in Zimbabwe
Mining Law
Caleb Mucheche Mining and Exploration Law in Zimbabwe
Local Government
Tinashe Chigwata Provincial and Local Government Reform in
Zimbabwe An analysis of the Law, Policy and Practice (Juta 2018)
Media Law
Geoff Feltoe A Guide to Media Law in Zimbabwe (LRF 2003)
Caleb Mucheche Media and Journalism Law in Zimbabwe
Medical Law
Geoff Feltoe and Tim Nyapadi Law and Medicine in Zimbabwe (Baobab
Books & LRF 1989)
Caleb Mucheche Medical and Health Law in Zimbabwe
Sentencing
Geoff Feltoe A Guide to Sentencing (LRF 1990)
Succession
Slyvia Chirawu Principles of the Law of Succession in Zimbabwe
incorporating the Women’s Rights Perspective (Women and Law
in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust Harare 2015
George Karekwaivanane The Struggle over State Power in Zimbabwe
Law and Politics since 1950 (Cambridge University Press 2017)
The following are books produced by or with involvement from staff
in the Southern and Eastern African Regional Centre for Women’s Law
which is housed in the Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe https:/
/www.searcwl.uz.ac.zw.
The website allows open access to textbooks and to dissertations under
e-resources
Stewart, J.E. and Armstrong A., (eds) The Legal Situation of Women
in Southern Africa, (UZ Publications, Harare, 1990)
Stewart, J.E. and W. Ncube (eds) Widowhood, Inheritance Laws,
Customs and Practices in Southern Africa; Women and Law in
Southern Africa Project, (Harare 1995).
Stewart, J.E with Dengu-Zvobgo, K., Donzwa, W, Gwaunza, E.
Kazembe, J., Ncube, W., Inheritance in Zimbabwe: Law, Customs
and Practice, (WLSA, Harare 1994)
Stewart, J.E with K. Dengu-Zvobgo, B. Donzwa, E. Gwaunza, J.

Kazembe and W. Ncube, Continuity and Change; The Family in
Zimbabwe, (WLSA, Harare, 1997)
Stewart, J.E with K. Dengu-Zvobgo, B. Donzwa, E. Gwaunza, J.
Kazembe and W. Ncube, Paradigms of Exclusion: Women’s Access
to Resources in Zimbabwe, (WLSA, 1997)
Stewart, J.E. and W. Ncube, Standing at the Crossroads: WLSA and
the Rights Dilemma which way do we Go? (WLSA, Harare, 1997)
Stewart J.E. et al, Paving the Way Forward, A Review and Research
Primer of WLSA Research Methodologies, (WLSA, Harare, 1997).
Stewart J.E. with A. Weis-Bentzon, A. Hellum, W. Ncube and T.
Agersnap Pursuing Grounded Theory in Law: South North
Experiences in Women’s Law, (Tano, Oslo and Mond, Harare, 1998)
Stewart J.E. et al In the Shadow of the Law: Women and the Justice
Delivery System in Zimbabwe, (WLSA, Harare 2000)
Stewart et al, Pregnancy and Childbirth Joy or Despair: Women and
Gender Generated Reproductive Crimes of Violence (WLSA, Harare
2001)
Stewart J.E. (Series Editor and General Editor): P. Mutunga (ed) Life
Skills, Sexual Maturation and Sanitation: What’s (not) happening
in our schools – An Exploratory Study from Kenya, (WLC and Weaver
Press Harare, 2003)
Stewart J.E. (Series Editor and General Editor): E. Kirumira (ed) Life
Skills, Sexual Maturation and Sanitation: What’s (not) happening
in our schools – An Exploratory Study from Uganda, (WLC and
Weaver Press Harare, 2003)
Stewart J.E. (Series Editor and General Editor): Stewart, J.E. (ed)
Life Skills, Sexual Maturation and Sanitation: What’s (not)
happening in our schools – An Exploratory Study from Zimbabwe,
(WLC and Weaver Press Harare, 2004)
Stewart, J with Anne Hellum, Shaheen Sardar Ali and Amy Tsanga
(eds) Human Rights, Plural Legalities and Gendered Realities:
Paths are Made by Walking, (Weaver Press, Harare, 2007)
Stewart, J.E. and Tsanga A.S.(eds) Women and Law: Innovative
Approaches to Teaching Research and Analysis,( Weaver Press,
Harare 2011)
Stewart, J.E (ed) Nyaruwata, L and Chideya, T Genuine Issues in
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: A Training Manual
(OSSREA, Addis Ababa 2014)
Stewart, J.E. (ed) Jaji, R and Gaidzanwa, R Gender in the Political

Arena: A Training Manual, (OSSREA, Addis Ababa 2014)
Stewart, J.E. (ed) 2014 Ondimu, K Gender, Population Dynamics and
Policy: A Training Manual for Graduate Studies, (OSSREA, Addis
Ababa 2014)
Stewart, J.E. (ed) 2014 Beyene, F and Nemera, Z., Gender, Agriculture
and Natural Resources: A Training Manual, OSSREA Addis Ababa
Stewart, J.E. (ed) 2014 Kilonzo,S and Magak, K., Gender, Vulnerability
and Social Protection: A Training Manual, (OSSREA, Addis Ababa)
Stewart J.E, and Katsande. R.KX(2018) We Don’t Know When the Trucks
Will Come: Social Theories of Urban Violence in the Global South:
Towards Safe and Inclusive Cities, co-published by the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Routledge (New York)
pp 49 – 62
Katsande, R. K, Stewart, J.E and Mandipa, E. Infrastructure as a passive
medium for violence: Mapping Women’s housing entitlements
through the 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution. In Chirisa, I et al.
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Urbanization in Zimbabwe: Past,
Present and Future. University of Zimbabwe publications (2018)
The following publications compiled by Geoff Feltoe are available
electronically on the Zimlii Website https://zimlii.org/ go to drop
down menu “Books”. These books will be regularly updated with new
case law and statutory provisions:
A Guide to Administrative and Local Government Law in Zimbabwe
(2017)
Commentary on the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act
[Chapter 9:23] (January 2018)
A Guide to the Zimbabwean Law of Delict (January 2018)
Criminal Defenders Manual (2016)
Judges Handbook for Criminal Cases (2016)
Magistrates Handbook for Criminal Cases (2016)

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Reference to books and articles

The University of Zimbabwe Law Journal is the successor to the

Protection from Unfair Dismissal and the Remedy of

Access to Information Laws, Environmental Rights and Public

The Rules of Civil Procedure in the Magistrates Courts of

Rights Inference: Understanding the Meaning of Section 46 of the

An Interrogation of the Law Relating to Cohabitation in Zimbabwe

Collusion! in Defence of Free Speech in Sports and the

Reflecting on the Applicability of Freedom, Sanctity and Privity of

Sentencing of Sexual Offenders ..................................... 181

Labour Rights under Zimbabwe’s New Constitution:

Provincial and Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe

Reporting a Court Case Arising from False Social Media Report:

A Timely and Welcome Decision on Employer Liability for

Actions against the Police: Unreasonable Obstacles to

Legal Information ...................................................... 279

BY JUSTICE ALFRED MAVEDZENGE1

law,3 separation of power,4 transparency, justice, accountability and

is entitled to approach a court, alleging that a fundamental

The significance of these rules cannot be gainsaid. They define

pertaining to how courts interpret these rules. In this paper, I examine

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S APPROACH IN APPLYING RULES OF LOCUS STANDI

RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Therefore, the rules of locus standi must be interpreted and applied

aspect to consider then is the grammatical construction of the right.21

Constitution and or vindication of her fundamental rights. For instance,

case in Mrs X’s situation, a rule which restricts litigants to choosing

The unconstitutionality of this rule becomes even more apparent when

processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to

The above provision has been interpreted as follows by the Human

Rules of court procedure are part of the judicial mechanisms

therefore, courts should be keen to be persuaded by approaches taken

violence, they have an interest in ensuring compliance with the

Thus, the Constitutional Court interpreted s 38 of the South African

of locus standi in one proceeding. For instance, in Randu Nzai Ruwa v

to award punitive costs against losing litigants has a chilling effect of

that s 85 of the Constitution is meant to provide litigants with a wide

LOCUS STANDI AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, as opposed to constitutional

1.1 Legitimacy of Judicial Review

conduct,55 one would assume that there is no need to discuss the

behalf.59 Therefore, decisions should be made through the equal

The democratic mandate argument against the legitimacy of judiciary

According to Rousseau and Rawls, the social contract must be

democracy cannot be viewed as limited to rule by the majority. It is

It could be counter-argued that the power to interpret and protect

the effect of such a rule (as I demonstrated above) is to prevent the

Thus the issue of employment security has become of profound

REINSTATEMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE TERM

To that extent reinstatement is equivalent to the remedy of specific

Wrongful dismissal is when the employee is dismissed without notice

REINSTATEMENT UNDER COMMON LAW

Under the classical position, reinstatement was not available, as a

thus based on the “inadmissibility of compelling the employer to