People v. Ursua
People v. Ursua
People v. Ursua
URSUA
FACTS:
Defendant-appellant Benedicto Ursua was charged and convicted of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence for firing the revolver delivered to him by policeman Alejandro Quiro, hitting the
latter in the abdomen, resulting in his death. The court, however, failed to enter judgment with respect
to the civil liability. Accused filed a notice of appeal. The private prosecution filed an MR judgment on
the civil liability of the accused. The court denied the MR because the cause had been appealed by the
accused and said appeal had been allowed, it had already lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion
of the private prosecution. Thus, the latter appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court can validly take cognizance of the appeal of the offended party independently of
the appeal of the accused
RULING:
Yes. In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933, declared the appeal of the
accused abandoned. Therefore, the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the private
prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused.
The trial court's resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the accused, it had lost its
jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution nine days after
the date of the judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purposes
of the civil liability of the accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that such
right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has the
right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended party should have
the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and
his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the
court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the cause, the offended party would be deprived of his right
to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused
files his appeal before the expiration of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the
appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the
appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed
by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the accused.
As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to have entered judgment with respect to the civil
liability of the accused (Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344). Section 407 of General Orders, No. 58 expressly
imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil liability arising from the
offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a separate action.