Are We What We Own?

77

he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast

o
down, - not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but
in much the same way for all. [pp, 291-292]

James stipulates that there is also a nonmaterial self, but that a

substantial part of who we are is composed of the things we ca11
ours.
Are We What We OWn?* The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship
between possessions and our sense of who we are, This relation­
Russell Belk ship is of importance not only for understanding our behavior as
consumers but, more important, for understanding how consump­
tion relates to our broader projects in life (Be1k 1987a) . Defining
ourselves by our possessions can contribute to feelings of we11­
being as well as feelings of emptiness and vulnerability if we

W e cannot hope to gain a comprehensive understanding of

compulsive buying without first gaining some unde rstand_
believe that we are nothing more than what we own, Overreliance
on possessions for self-definition may be manifested in how we
ing of the meanings that consumers attach to possessions. A key to shop, how we care for the things we acquire, and the degree to
understanding what possessions mean is recognizing that, know­ which we cling to our possessions rather than discard them.
ingly or unknowingly, intentional1y or unintentional1y, we regard A key concept linking the extended self to compulsive shop­
Our possessions as parts of ourselves (Belk 1988). We are what we ping is that of materialism. Materialism has been defined as "the
have and possess. This is perhaps the most basic and powerful fact importance a consumer attaches to worldly possessions . At the
of consumer behavior. highest levels of materialism, such possessions assume a central
Treating possessions as extensions of ourselves is not a new place in a person's life and are believed to provide the greatest
phenomenon. William James (1890) observed that: sources of satisfaction" (Be1k 1985, p. 265) . For the highly materi­
alistic consumer, purchases are potential panaceas for all manners
a man's Selfis the Sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only of dissatisfactions with self and with life generally. O'Guinn and
his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, Faber (1989) found some aspects of materialism to be related to
his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation compulsive shopping tendencies, and Dittmar (1992) found even
and works, his lands, and yacht and bank-account. All these stronger evidence of such a relationship. To the highly materialis­
things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, tic person, purchases of consumer goods offer the potential for
magical transformation of self (Be1k 1991a). Buying becomes a
"r would like to thank April Benson for her kind help in extracting transformative ritual intended to precipitate a totally new life; it is
pertinent material from my previously published article, for allowing me to an attempt to replay the romantic rebirth of the Cinderella story.
update this material by inviting this chapter, and for her help in securing The first section of the material that follows considers evidence
reference material during a year I spent in Zimbabwe enlarging my extended
self that possessions are an important component of the sense of self.
The most direct form of evidence is found in the nature of se1f­
 I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own? 79
78
bed with a comforter and matching pillows, on a rainy Wednes­
perceptions. The second section addresses the question of what
day afternoon, feverish, a little congested in the sinuses and
functions the extended self serves for us. It begins with a brief chest, thinking about his dry cleaning. [po 293]
review of the basic states of our existence: having, doing, and
being. These states are each potentially critical to self-definition,
The conflation of person and possessions is even stronger among
but for the materialist having becomes all important. Next, the
the living, as James (1890) notes:
functions of possessions in human development are considered. A
central function considered in this section is the role of possessions It is clear that between what a man calls me and what he
in creating or maintaining a sense of past. simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act
A third section examines how material objects become a part of about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act
the self. A key process in this involves the initial incorporation of about ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our
objects into our extended selves. A number of incorporation pro­ hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the
cesses are discussed, not all of which involve possession in the same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked. And our
sense of individual ownership . A final section discusses the impli­ bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are they us?
cations that the extended-self construct has for further research on Certainly men have been ready to disown their very bodies
compulsive buying. It briefly reviews the construct of the extended and to regard them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay
from which they should some day be glad to escape. [po 291]
self and offers conclusions.

Research that has addressed the "things" that are viewed to

POSSESSIONS IN SELF-PERCEPTION RESEARCH constitute self (MCClelland 1951, Prelinger 1959) has generally
found that possessions are second only to body parts and mind in
their centrality to self. The particular possessions we see as most a
possession as Parts of self part of ourselves (Belk 1987b) also show a close relationship to the
objects we see as m ost magical, and include perfume, jewelry,
Rochberg-Halton (1984) specifies the role of possessions in the clothing, foods, transitional objects, homes, vehicles, pets, reli­
project of self-construction: "Valued material possessions . . . act gious icons, drugs, gifts, heirlooms, antiques, photographs, souve­
as signs of the self that are essential in their own right for its nirs, and collections (Belk 1991a). McCarthy (1984) concludes that
continued cultivation, and hence the world of meaning that we such objects act as reminders and confirmers of our identity, and
create for ourselves , and that creates our selves , extends literally that this identity may often reside more in these objects than it
into the objective surroundings" (p. 335). does in the individual.
In DeLillo's (1985) postmodern novel White Noise it is suggested In claiming that something is "mine, we also come to believe
/I

that while life is b rief, the extend ed self may survive the body: that the object is "me." How can we explain the particular choice of
possessions deemed most critical to self-definition? Besides magi­
The dead have faces, automobiles. If you don't know a name, cal efficacy, control has b een suggested to be the critical determi­
you know a street name, a dog's name, "He drove an orange nant of feelings of possession (Furby 1978, Tuan 1984) . That is,
Mazda." You know a couple of useless things about a person the m ore we believe we possess or are posse ssed by an object, the
that become major facts of identification and cosmic place­
more a part of self it becomes. There is some evid ence that men are
ment when he dies suddenly, after a short illness, in his own
 I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own ? 81
80

more likely than women to value objects for the sense of control Ames (1984) records feelings attached to a nineteenth-century
that they provide (Lunt and Livingstone 1992). Where men tend purchase of a parlor organ:
to value possessions for self-focused and instrumental reasons,
women tend to emphasize expressive and other-oriented reasons Buying a prominent object like a parlor organ might initiate a
new chapter in a set of lives, not only by providing a new way
for feeling attachment to possessions (Dittmar 1992) Kamptner
to use time but also a new tool to measure time. In later years
1989, Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). the object would serve to remind its owners of the day it first
Age is another factor affecting the nature of our attachment to entered their home and of the time that had passed since then.
possessions. In a three-generational study of favorite possessions, It would not only structure their present but also their percep­
Rochberg-Halton (1984, 1986 , Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg­ tions of their own past. They knew from experience that
Halton 1981 ) found that as we age the possessions we cite as purchasing a major object could be a significant and momen­
"special" tend increasingly to be those that symbolize other people tous occasion in itself, a time of heightened positive emotions
(e.g., gifts from people) photographs of people). They interpret and feelings of well-being and importance . a major pur­
these findings to suggest an age-related widening of the boundaries chase would transform them in their own eyes and in the eyes
of self (Rochberg-Halton 1984). These findings may suggest that of others. They would become worth more . . . and acquire
possessions are not only regarded as a part of self, they may also be greater status. By so doing they would receive more respect
instrumental to the "development" of our sense of self. Research and deference from others which would, in turn, make them
on the role that special possessions may play in easing life transi­ feel better about themselves. Buying a parlor organ would
make them something they were not before. [pp. 30 - 31]
tions suggests that possessions can be instrumental to the mainte­
nance of self-concept (e.g., Anderson 1985, McCracken 1987,
In this example we see an instance in which a family possession
Nemy 1986). One instance in which possessions provide such a
rather than a personal possession contributes to sense of self. In
sense of self-continuity is seen in the careful packing, transport,
other cases, such as monuments and landmarks) entire communi­
and redeployment of treasured possessions when we move from
ties or even nations may share these objects as parts of extended
one locale to another (Belk 1992).
self.
The feeling of identity invested in material objects can be
Investing Self in Objects extraordinarily high. One of the modern equivalents of the parlor
organ, in terms of impact on extended self) is the automobile
The idea that we make things a part of selfby creating or altering (Bloch 1981, Myers 1985, Stone 1966, Weiland 1955). Niederland
them appears to be a universal human belief. Csikszentmihalyi and Sholevar (1981) suggest that for many young American males
and Rochberg-Halton (1981) provide a more psychological expla­ in particular, the automobile is a part of their ego ideals. A shiny
nation in suggesting that we invest "psychic energy" in an object to new car is experienced very much as a shiny new self. This view is
which we have directed our labor, time, and attention. This energy supported by consumer self-concept research (e.g., Bloch 1982)
and its products are regarded as a part of self because they have Grubb and Hupp 1968, Jacobson and Kossoff 1963, Munson and
grown or emerged from the self. Purchasing objects offers another Spivey 1980, Ross 1971) Wright et al. 1992). The processes of
means for investing self (in this case more symbolically) in posses­ creating and nurturing extended self through an automobile may
also be seen in customizing (personalizing) the car and in lavishing
sions.
82 I SHOP, THEREFORE J AM 83
A.re We What W e Own?

great care on its maintenance. When such a car is damaged, the FUNCTIONS OF EXTENDED SELF
owners react as if their own bodies had been injured. Consider the
sense of personal injury described by Bellow (1975) when a trea­
sured car is assaulted: "Someone had done to my car as rats, I had Having, Doing, and Being
heard, did when they raced through warehouses by the thousands
and tore open sacks of flour for the hell of it. I felt a similar rip at Objects in our possession can literally extend self, as when a tool or
my heart . . . I had allowed the car to become an extension of my weapon allows us to do things of which we would otherwise be
own self . . . , so that an attack on it was an attack on myself. It incapable. Possessions can also symbolically extend self, as when a
was a moment terribly fertile in reactions" (p. 36). uniform or trophy allows us to convince ourselves (and perhaps
Furthermore , the possessors of such damaged treasures are others) that we can be a different person than we would be without
anxious to either restore the auto to its former perfection or them. Tanay (1976) offers an example of the latter type of self­
replace it with a more perfect substitute. These reactions reflect extension in suggesting that handguns represent a symbolic penis
for their owners. However, Kates and Varzos (1987) challenge this
the desire to restore the damaged sense of (extended) self caused
interpretation and instead emphasize the instrumental rather than
by the injury to the automobile. The owner of an expensive
symbolic power given by guns. It was this sense of enhancement of
Porsche described his attachment in this way:
pe rsonal power that reputedly made the six-gun the "equalizer" in
American Western lore. Whereas Tanay's symbolic interpretation
Sometimes I test myself. We have an ancient battered Peugeot,
is focused on the sense of '1Jeing" presumably provided by such a
and I drive it for a week. It rarely breaks, and it gets great
weapon, this alternative interpretation maintains that it is what
mileage. But when I pull up next to a beautiful woman, I am
one can "do" with a gun that contributes to sense of self. Having
still the geek with the glasses.
possessions can thus contribute to our capabilities for either doing
Then I get back into the Porsche. It roars and tugs to get
or being.
moving. It accelerates even going uphill at 80. It leadeth trashy
The relationships between having, doing, and being are strong
women ... to make pouting looks at me at stoplights. It
and have been most fully explored by Jean-Paul Sartre. In Being
makes me feel like a tomcat on the prowl.
and Nothingness, Sartre (1956) suggests that doing is merely a
. Nothing else in my life compares- except driving
transitional state or a manifestation of the more fundamental
along Sunset at night in the 928, with the sodium-vapor lamps
reflecting off the wine-red finish, with the air inside reeking of desires to have or to be. Further, Sartre maintains that the only
tan glove-leather upholstery and the. Blaupunkt playing reason we want to have something is to enlarge our sense of self,
the Shirelles so loud it makes my hair vibrate. And with the and that the only way we can know who we are is by observing
girls I will never see again pulling up next to me, giving the car what we have. In other words, having and being are distinct but
a once-over, and looking at me as if I were a cool guy, not a inseparable. When an object becomes a possession, what were
worried, overextended 40-year-old schnook writer. [Stein 1985, once self and not-self are synthesized, and having and being
p.3 0] merge. Thus, according to Sartre, possessions are all-important to
kn owing who we are. We seek, express, confirm, and ascertain our
As these examples suggest, the degree to which self becomes sense of being through what we have.
extended into possessions can be great (Belk 1988). Other people also affect the relationships between our having,
dOing, and being, according to Sartre. Besides others sometimes
84 I SHOP, THEREFORE 1 AM Are We What We Own ? 85

serving in an object capacity as possessions, others are an impor­ existence, according to Fromm, is to realize one's identity without
tant mirror through which we may s~e ourselves. These others first the threat of losing it inherent in the having mode - for which he
come to associate possessions with possessor and then, depending asks, "1fT am what I have and if what I have is lost, who then am I?/I
upon which is known best, infer the traits of one from the other. (Fromm 1976, p. 76).
Belk (1978, 1988), Belk and colleagues (1982), and Holman (1981), The views of Sartre, Marx, and Fromm on having, doing, and
review abundant buyer behavior literature supporting this view. being present significant philosophical alternatives that it is not
Contrasting Sartre's view that having and being are the central necessary or possible to resolve here. All three agree , however,
modes of existence is Karl Marx's view that doing, and particularly that having possessions functions to create and maintain a sense of
working, is central to existence and self-worth. The problem with self-definition and that having, doing, and being are integrally
having, in Marx's view, is that it produces a false path to happiness related. Furthermore, various disciplines share the notion of fe­
through "commodity fetishism" (Marx 1867). In commodity fetish­ tishism as involving an essentially unhealthy investment of self in
ism goods are worshipped by consumers and believed to have possessions. As Ellen (1988) argues, Marxist economic's commod­
magical powers to bring happiness, provoking a pervasive expec­ ity fetishism , anthropology's religious fetishism, and Freudian
tation that happiness lies in the next purchase, or, "I would be psychology's sexual fetishism have more commonalties than dif­
happy if I could just have . . ." The idea noted earlier of magical ferences.
transformation via consumer purchases is evident here as well.
Both the compulsive consumption and the self-gift literatures (e.g. ,
Mick 1996, Mick and DeMoss 1990, O'Guinn and Faber 1989, Mastery of Possessions and Human Development
Sherry et al. 1995) find goods such as clothing and jewelry to be
common foci of compulsive purchases to self and others. Notably, Developmental evidence suggests that the identification with our
both are worn close to the body and promise potential magical things begins quite early in life when as an infant we learn to
transformation of self. Fairy tales are full of magical rings, magical distinguish self from environment and then from others who may
shoes, and other items of adornment that transform their wearers envy our possessions. Emphasis on material possessions tends to
(Belk 1991a). The branded magic of Nike, Armani) and Tiffany decrease with age, but remains high throughout life as we seek to
represent a highly polished extension of these tales of magic. express ourselves through possessions and use material posses­
While Sartre saw having as the dominant mode of existence and sions to seek happiness, remind ourselves of experiences, accom­
Marx saw certain forms of doing (through meaningful and properly plishments, and other people in our lives, and even create a sense
rewarded work [Marx 1842]) as the dominant mode of existence, a of life after death. Our accumulation of possessions provides a
third view explicated by Fromm (1976) completes the possibilities sense of past and tells us who we are, where we have come from ,
by advocating being as the preeminent form of existence. Like and perhaps where we are going.
Marx, Fromm attacks "radical hedonism," or the concentration on
having, as being unrewarding. He suggests that this view promotes Self versus Environment
a having mode of existence that views things, experience, time,
and life itself as possessions to be acquired and retained. In the The functions that possessions fulfill in our lives are not constant
alternate being mode of existence that Fromm proposes, this ori­ Over our life spans . In infancy the distinction between self and
entation is rejected in favor of an opposing orientation to share, to not-self emerges as a result of the contingency and kinesthetic
give, and to sacrifice. The outcome of practicing this being mode of feedback produced by the infant's actions (Lewis and Brooks 1978,
 I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own? 87

Seligman 1975). That is, as the infant's motor skills develop, those to control these objects: "A great part of the value of those things
objects that can be controlled come to be seen as self and those which little children want to own is far from intrinsic. It arises
objects that cannot be controlled come to be seen as environment. directly from the fact that others have or want the object. And thus
According to Isaacs (1933), the mother's caregiving also pro­ we enter the open field of rivalry. Not to have what others have, or
duces the first sentiments ofownership: "In the case ofthe infant at to have less than they, is to feel shut out from the love and regard
the breast, to have is literally and simply to take into oneself, into of the person giving. It is to be treated as not loveworthy." (Isaacs
one's mouth. The nipple is only here at all when it is in my mouth, 1935, p.74).
when it is (in feeling) a part of me. And to bite and swallow a thing In this sense relationships with objects are always three-way
is for long the only sure way of retaining it. . . . This is the (person-thing-person) relationships. This brings forth a "meum
ultimate form of ownership, from which all others are derived" (p. et tuum" concern with object ownership (Beaglehole 1932).
226). The rivalry aspects of possession seem clear among young
Even though the mother provides care, nourishment, and children. Horney (1937) suggests that such competitiveness, along
security, her lack of perfect responsiveness to the infant's desires with other evidence oflack ofaffection from parents or peers, leads
makes it likely that she is the first object that comes to be regarded the child to compensate as an adult through neurotic strivings for
as not-self. It is also the separation from mother that has led others power, prestige, and possessions - a pattern that may become
to suggest that the "security blanket" serves as a transitional object, manifest in compulsive shopping. Muensterberger (1994; Chapter
helping the child to feel the security of the mother through an 7, this volume) finds a similar connection between a felt lack of
object that symbolizes her (e.g., Furby and Wilke 1982, Passman parental love and compulsive collecting. Whether or not this is a
1976, Passman and Halonen 1979, Weisberg and Russell 1971, complete explanation of these adult traits, it seems a more plau­
Winnicott 1953). sible basis for adult orientations toward possessions than are ex­
If the early changes in person-object relationships may be planations via Freudian oral and anal fixations (Belk 1982a). Freud
described as moving from being one with the environment to himself was an avid collector of antiquities, but did not apply such
having objects that aid in the transition to a world where self is explanations to his own or others' collecting activity (Belk 1995).
distinct from the environment, the next changes may be charac­ Although receiving material objects may convey a sense oflove
terized as moving from having transitional objects to doing things and worth to a child, from the parents'point ofview control of their
with or to the environment. This motivation has been labeled children's material possessions as rewards or punishments offers a
competence (Furby 1980), mastery, (White 1959), or efficacy motiva­ means of bringing about desired behaviors. The way that parents
tion (Lichtenberg 1989). This concept has been expanded by Furby use such resource-mediated behavioral modification may not only
(1980), who suggests that we develop a stronger sense of self by affect behaviors (both those concerning possessions and other
learning to actively control objects in our environment rather than behaviors), it may also create new attitudes toward the possessions
feeling controlled by them. used as reinforcements. For example, if sweets are withheld or
Withdrawn, or if threats to do so are made, these actions may
Self versus Others simultaneously enhance the value of sweets, encourage the delay
of gratifications until unpleasant tasks are completed, or instill an
Data from Kline and France (1899) and Isaacs (1935) suggest that attitude that good performance should be followed by indulgence.
the relationship between a person and an object is never as simple The potential effects of such socialization on adult lifestyles are
as a person-thing bond, however, because other people often seek easily envisioned.
 --~--.-,-~-~~~----"-~-.,~-,, .. - .. ~.---,~----,--~ ...• " .., .. ,--~. -"--~.
111"""-­

88
I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own? 89

Adolescence and Adulthood age of a tendency to live vicariously through one's children. Chil­
dren at this point represent an extension of self, but not to the
Erikson (1959) suggested that adolescents predictably undergo an exclusion of material possessions. In fact, Belk (1985) found par­
"identity crisis." One element of this search is that adolescents at ents to be more materialistic and possessive than their children
this stage increasingly seek identity through acquiring and accu­ and their own parents. Because of accumulated possessions, well­
mulating selected consumption objects. A study of 8- to 30-year­ developed skills, possession of both a past and a future, and
old Chicagoans by Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) parenthood, the middle years of life are also likely to involve the
found that this generation was more likely than its parents and most extended concept of self.
grandparents to cite as favorite possessions those that either reflect
skills in use (e.g., athletic equipment) or that the possessor can Old Age
manipulate or control (e.g., music instruments, stereo, pets).
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) found that dur­ If the young are future-oriented, the old are past-oriented. Csik­
ing preretirement adulthood, emphasis shifts from defining one­ szentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) found that for their
selfby what one does to defining self through what one has. Furby Chicago sample such possessions as photographs, athletic tro­
(1978) found that 40- to 50-year-olds were the most likely of all age phies, and mementos are most treasured by grandparents. The
groups to cite social power and status as reasons to own personal reason most often cited for possessions being treasured by this
possessions. Csikszentmihalyi (1982) explains: group was their ability to symbolize others, often because they
were gifts from these important others. Sherman and Newman
Aperson who owns a nice home, a new car, good furniture, the (1977) found that postretirement-age persons who possessed such
latest appliances, is recognized by others as having passed
remembrances were happier than those who did not. Places espe­
the test of personhood in our society . . . the objects we
cially relevant to one's past have also been found to be particularly
possess and consume are . . . wanted because . . . they tell
us things about ourselves that we need to hear in order to keep valued by the old because of the memories they stir (Howell 1983,
ourselves from falling apart. This information includes the Lowenthal 1975).
social recognition that follows upon the display of status sym­ During old age the sense of one's own mortality also becomes
bols, but it includes also the much more private feedback more and more undeniable. With decreasing future years, declin­
provided by special household objects that objectifY a person's ing skills and abilities, and a shrinking network of old friends, it
past, present, and future, as well as his or her close relation­ might be imagined that sense of self contracts as well. However,
ships. [pp. 5-6] this is not necessarily the case. In fact, some seek to assure that
their selfwill extend beyond their death. Lifton (1973) suggests five
Olson (1981, 1985) found that young couples cited as favorite ways in which this may be attempted: (1) through one's children,
objects in the home those that reflected their future plans and (2) through belief in a life after death, (3) through one's works, (4)
goals, while older couples cited objects related to their experiences through identification with nature (which will continue), and (5)
together as a couple. Cameron (1977) conducted a series of experi­ through experiential transcendence (e.g., absorption in music may
ments suggesting that having children is a key life event that allow the person to transcend the world of here and now and
causes the parents to become less self-focused and more focused SYmbolically be reborn). A sixth way that is not listed is to have
on children. Feibleman (1975) notes the emergence by late middle One's possessions (especially those in collections one has created)
90 I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM 91

"live on" through heirs or museums (Belk 1991b, Rigby and Rigby there appears to be a desire to bask in the glory of the past in the
1949). hope that some of it will magically rub off - a form of positive
contagious magic (Levi-Strauss 196211963). Another reason for the
accumulation of antiquities that are found or acquired (rather than
Possessions and the Sense of Past inherited or claimed on the basis of more direct linkage to the
extended self) is that they are necessarily rare and therefore
A general function of possessions across the age continuum is to potentially serve as symbols of status or as "status markers" (DOU­
provide us with a concrete sense of our past. Overall, Csikszentmi­ glas and Isherwood 1981).
halyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) found that the three types of We can summarize then the functions that possessions play in
possessions most frequently treasured by the 315 Chicago families the extended self as involving the creation, enhancement, and
they interviewed were furniture, visual art (including that created preservation of a sense of identity. Possessions help us at all ages to
by family and friends), and photographs. In each case the most know who we are. This does not imply, however, that we are
frequently given explanation for valuing these objects was the . always active in selecting the possessions that we see as a part of
memories they called forth of other people, occasions, and rela­ our selves. As the next section discusses, passive receipt of objects
tionships. These reasons overshadowed both functional explana­ into the extended self also occurs (Belk 1988).
tions for attachments to furniture and aesthetic reasons for valuing
art objects and photographs.
Integral to a sense of who we are is a sense of our past. PROCESSES OF SELF-EXTENSION
Possessions are a convenient means of storing the memories and
feelings that evoke our sense of past. A souvenir may make
tangible some otherwise intangible travel experience. An heirloom Ways of Incorporating Possessions into the Extended Self
may record and recall family heritage. And a historic monument
may help to create a sense of a nation's past. Sartre (1943) suggests three primary ways through which we may
The desire to know one's individual past can explain the come to regard an object as a part of self. One way is through
retention of personal memorabilia, just as the desire to remember appropriating or controlling an object for our own personal use, a
family heritage can explain retention of family heirlooms, and the view similar to McClelland's (1951) hypothesiS that objects are
desire to appreciate national history and achievements can explain experienced as part of self to the extent that we can exercise power
museum patronage and visits to historic sites. But what can explain and control over them. Sartre also holds that we can appropriate
the desire to acquire and collect antiques and antiquities from intangible or nonownable objects by overcoming, conquering, or
another time, place, and family? Clearly it is not a claimable sense mastering them. Thus climbing a mountain or living in a city can
of past that is achieved at any except the broadest level of identity. make these "nonobjects" feel a part of us. And it is only through
Part ofthe answer lies in the desire to identifY with an era, place, or learning to ride a first bicycle, manipulating a new computer
person in which we believe a desirable set of traits or values system, driving a first car, or successfully negotiating rapids in a
inhere. At a national level neoclassical architecture seems to have new kayak that these objects really become parts of the extended
this objective. At a more personal level owning artifacts that once self. This is an important point, for it provides an explanation of
belonged to a famous historical figure seems to share this objective how nondurable products or services and public property or events
(Rigby and Rigby 1949, Wallendorf and Belk 1987). In each case may come to be viewed as possessions and thereby potentially
92 I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own? 93

contribute to sense of self. A related way of appropriating a second­ way of creating the object. For some people money is too abstract,
hand durable possession like a home or an automobile is through invisible, or "commoditized" (Kopytoff 1986) to become a part of
cleaning it, and in so doing symbolically removing any contagious extended self. Nevertheless, money is a highly charged and magi­
traces of former owners. McCracken (1988) describes such cleans­ cal symbol for many people (Belk 1999). If the desire is to extend
ing as a possession ritual. self through having, then using the money to buy more tangible,
A second way of coming to own an object and incorporating visible would-be extensions of self is more likely for such people
it into self is by creating it - a view echoing anthropological find­ (Wright et al. 1992). The latent buying power of money can also
ings and Locke's (1690) labor theory of property-that ownership contribute to sense of self. As Marx (1844) proclaimed, "that which
comes through transformation. Whether the thing created is a exists for me through the medium of money, that which I can pay
material object or an abstract thought, the creator retains an for, i.e., which money can buy, that am I, the possessor of money"
identity in the object as long as it retains a mark or some other (p. 377). In this sense we may suppose that money enlarges our
association with the person who brought it into existence. This sense of self because it enlarges our imagination of all that we
identity is sometimes codified through copyrights, patents, and might have and do. Money also gives us the power to selectively
scientific citations that preserve associations between people and acquire or reject purchasable objects, thereby more selectively
their mental creations. shaping our extended selves. Sartre also sees giving possessions to
The third way in which objects may become a part of self is by others as a means to extend self. In giving an object as a gift it will
knowing them (in the biblical sense). Whether the object known is continue to be associated with the giver so that the giver's identity
a person, place, or thing, Sartre maintains that the relationship in will have been extended to include the recipient.
knowing the object is inspired by a carnal and sexual desire to have All three means of making objects a part of extended self
the object. Likewise, as Beaglehole (1932) observed, it is our outlined by Sartre (control/mastery, creation, and knowledge) are
intimate knowledge of a community, store, or book that makes it active and intentional ways of self-extension. Clothing (Solomon
not only "ours" but also a part of self. It is only when the object is 1986), housing (Jaeger 1985), and automobiles are all acquired as a
known passionately that it becomes subject rather than object. One ·second skin" that others often use to make inferences about us.
way of passionately knowing an object is through collecting it. Objects such as land to the farmer, crafts pieces to the craftsperson,
The cultivation of a collection is a purposeful, self-defining act . , and artworks to the artist may become a part of extended self
(Belk 1995). While the collections of both humans and animals because we have intentionally worked on or created these things,
were once primarily assemblages of necessities stored in order to investing both energy and self in them. These are clearly all active
be more secure in satisfying future needs, collections today are processes. But objects like household furnishings may also become
made of luxuries assembled in order to seek distinction and self­ a part of us through the knowledge that comes with habituation­
definition (Belk 1982b). As Rigby and Rigby (1949) insightfully "they have become part of our familiar interior landscape, have
observed: "From the small boy to the connoisseur, the joy of the setting for numerous special as well as ordinary occur­
standing before one's accumulated pile and being able to say 'this in our lives, and often have received the same amount of
belongs to me' is the culmination of that feeling that begins with 'care and attention that we lavish upon ourselves and immediate
ownership of the first item . . . they become us" (p. 35). -"""'...... :1__ members. During their tenure with us, a great many memo­

Rather than representing a fourth way of bonding oneself with are likely to have accreted in these objects. Thus not all forms
objects, Sartre believed that buying an object is merely another self-extension are active and intentional. Self-extension can also

""''<.1' f''lwwiM! ,
 94
I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM Are We What We Own? 95

come about through the gradual accommodation of objects in our

tempted self-enlargement or compensation for a diminished sense
lives and the slow accretion of meaning in objects that have taken
their place with us. of self motivates compulsive consumption more than does the
wish to rid ourselves of money. The materialist has a magical,
optimistic belief in the efficacy of consumer goods to bring about a
total transformation of current life to one that is far, far better- a
CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
romantic belief in a fairy tale of transcendent consumption. This
COMPULSIVE CONSUMPTION RESEARCH
magical and unrealistic belief seems more intimately connected to
compulsive consumption than does the self-punitive waste of
The possessions incorporated in extended self serve valuable func­
money. Whatever the motivation for compulsive consumption,
tions for healthy personalities. One such function is acting as an
there can be extremely negative consequences to building a sense
objective manifestation of self: an exterior representation of our
of self that is externally manifest, because the inner core self is
interior structures. As Douglas and Isherwood (1979) note, such
likely to feel more and more empty and more vulnerable as this
possessions are "good for thinking./I They help us manipulate our
process continues over a lifetime. Moreover, when attempts to
possibilities and present the self to others in a way that is able to
enhance self through accumulating possessions results in the
garner feedback from those who are reluctant to respond so openly
to the unextended self. compulsive acquisition of consumer goods, using purchasing as an
intended mood enhancer and possessions to compensate for a lack
The possessions in our extended self also give us a personal of significant others in our lives, more psychological harm than
archive or museum that allows us to reflect on our histories and see good may result.
how we have changed. Through heirlooms, the family is able to This does not mean that compulsive consumption is caused
build a similar archive and allow individual family members to only by the desire for contributing to our extended self through
gain a sense of permanence and place in the world that extends ownership of possessions. The process of acquisition may be more
beyond their own lives and accomplishments. Communities, na­ likely than the process of possession to be the main source of
tions, and other group levels of self are similarly constituted via gratification in compulsive buying. But whether or not this is the
monuments, buildings, books, music, and other created works. case may depend upon the degree of compulsion, as Schor (1998)
The association of these artifacts with various group levels of self argues:
provides a sense of community that is essential to group harmony,

spirit, and Cooperation. In addition, natural wonders can be incor­

Using the same test [as Faber and O'Guinn 1992] on a group of
porated into extended self in such a way that we have an even mostly college students in Arizona, Allison Magee [1994] esti­
greater feeling of immortality and place in the world. mated 15-16 percent [are compulsive buyers]. (We know the
This is not to suggest that extending self into material posses­ tendency is greater among youth.) On the other hand, clini­

sions has only positive effects. Research on materialism reveals

cally defined compulsives may not be fundamentally different
some of the negative consequences of relying on possessions to from "normal" consumers. They're just the extreme cases.
provide meaning in life (e.g., Dittmar 1992). Money can be expul­ Millions of ordinary people also exhibit high "generalized
sively and wastefully spent on consumer goods, sometimes be­ urges to buy." Indeed, an innocuous form of compulsive buy- .
cause we feel we do not deserve to have wealth (Belk 1991a; ing appears to afflict one-quarter of us. This should probably
come as no surprise in a country [the U.S.A.] where 41 percent
Boundy, Chapter I, this volume). However, it is likely that at-
of the population age 22-61 (and nearly half of all young
 4,. sa _.----------­ -
96
91

adults) say that "shopping makes me feel good" [Farkas and REFERENCES
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