PHILCONSA vs. Philippine Government - PREMATURITY - NOT RIPE

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CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its
President Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ARCHBISHOP
RAMON C. ARGUELLES, ARCHBISHOP ROMULO T. DE LA CRUZ, ARCHBISHOP
FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, and NORBERTO B. GONZALES, Petitioners
vs.
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT (GPH), represented by MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, and
MIRIAM CORONEL FERRER, MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT,
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents

G.R. No. 218406


November 29, 2016
PRINCIPLES:
JUDICIAL REVIEW – Actual Controversy: RIPENESS vs. PREMATURE

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions1 challenging the constitutionality and validity
of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered into between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27 March 2014 and 12 October 2012, respectively.

Essentially, the petitions commonly seek to declare the CAB and the FAB
unconstitutional for being similar to the void MOA-AD, which was struck down by the Court for
violating, among others, the constitutional provisions on constitutional amendments.

SC DECISION: Wherefore, we DISMISS the petitions on the GROUND OF


PREMATURITY.

FACTS: On 15 September 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO No. 1256 creating the
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and calling for a "comprehensive,
integrated and holistic peace process with Muslim rebels" in Mindanao. On 28 February 2001,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued. EO .No. 37 which amended EO No. 125 to reaffirm
the government's commitment to achieve just and lasting peace in the Philippines through a
comprehensive peace process.

Pursuant to EO No. 3, the Government Peace Negotiating Panel (GPNP) held


negotiations with the MILF, an armed, revolutionary Muslim separatist group based in Mindanao
seeking separation of the Muslim people from the central government. The negotiations
eventually led to the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) on 27 July 2008. However, on 14 October 2008, in the case of Province of North
Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,8
the Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional.

During the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III, the government resumed
peace negotiations with the MILF.

On 17 December 2012, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued EO No. 120,16


constituting the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, tasked, among others, to (1) draft the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law with provisions consistent with the FAB, and (2) recommend
to Congress or the people proposed amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.17 Under
Section 5 of the same EO, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission shall cease to operate upon
the enactment by Congress of the Bangsamoro Basic Law.

On 10 September 2014, a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, referred to as House Bill
(HB) No. 4994, was presented by President Aquino to the 16th Congress. On 27 May 2015, in
Committee Report No. 747, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Basic Bangsamoro Law of the House
of Representatives substituted said bill and passed another version known as House Bill No.
CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
5811.21 In the Senate, a revised version of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, known as the Basic Law
for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or Senate Bill No. 2894, was presented on 10 August
2015. However, on 6 June 2016, the 16th Congress adjourned WITHOUT passing the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Meanwhile, several petitions were filed with this Court assailing the constitutionality of
the CAB, including the FAB, and its Annexes.

ISSUE: WON the question of constitutionality of the CAB and FAB is ripe for adjudication.
(NO)

RULING: NO. Not ripe for adjudication due to non-enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what judicial power is, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Pursuant to this constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's JUDICIAL REVIEW
POWER IS LIMITED TO ACTUAL CASES OR CONTROVERSIES. The Court generally
declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere
academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies assures that the courts will not intrude into areas specifically confined to the other
branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite


legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.30 The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only when an actual case
between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.

Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of


RIPENESS. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed
by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

The CAB and the FAB cannot be implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be
enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law is duly passed by
Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution.

It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro
Basic Law enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the Constitution.
Congress must still enact a Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, it would still not
be subject to judicial review.42 The Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC43 that it has no
CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the
nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo. As the Court in Montesclaros noted, invoking Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The power of judicial review comes into play only after the
passage of a bill, and not before.44 Unless enacted into law, any proposed Bangsamoro Basic
Law pending in Congress is not subject to judicial review.

Clearly, any question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the
implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a
Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or
controversy that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over a co-equal
branch of government.

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