IELTS Reading Practice Test 6 - Vol 6
IELTS Reading Practice Test 6 - Vol 6
IELTS Reading Practice Test 6 - Vol 6
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READING PASSAGE 1
You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1-13, which are based on Reading Passage
1 below.
B Recent research offers insight into why many people end up unhappy rather than pleased
when their options expand. We began by making a distinction between "maximizers” (those
who always aim to make the best possible choice) and "satisficers” (those who aim for "good
enough,” whether or not better selections might be out there).
D We found that the greatest maximizers are the least happy with the fruits of their efforts.
When they compare themselves with others, they get little pleasure from finding out that they
did better and substantial dissatisfaction from finding out that they did worse. They are more
prone to experiencing regret after a purchase, and if their acquisition disappoints them, their
E Does it follow that maximizers are less happy in general than satisficers? We tested this by
having people fill out a variety of questionnaires known to be reliable indicators of wellbeing. As
might be expected, individuals with high maximization scores experienced less satisfaction with
life and were less happy, less optimistic and more depressed than people with low maximization
scores. Indeed, those with extreme maximization ratings had depression scores that placed
them in the borderline of clinical range.
F Several factors explain why more choice is not always better than less, especially for maxi‐
misers. High among these are “opportunity costs.” The quality of any given option cannot be
assessed in isolation from its alternatives. One of the “costs” of making a selection is losing the
opportunities that a different option would have afforded. Thus, an opportunity cost of
vacationing on the beach in Cape Cod might be missing the fabulous restaurants in the Napa
Valley. Early Decision Making Research by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed that
people respond much more strongly to losses than gains. If we assume that opportunity costs
reduce the overall desirability of the most preferred choice, then the more alternatives there
are, the deeper our sense of loss will be and the less satisfaction we will derive from our
ultimate decision.
G The problem of opportunity costs will be better for a satisficer. The latter’s “good enough”
philosophy can survive thoughts about opportunity costs. In addition, the “good enough"
standard leads to much less searching and inspection of alternatives than the maximizer’s
“best" standard. With fewer choices under consideration, a person will have fewer opportunity
costs to subtract.
H Just as people feel sorrow about the opportunities they have forgone, they may also suffer
regret about the option they settled on. My colleagues and I devised a scale to measure
proneness to feeling regret, and we found that people with high sensitivity to regret are less
happy, less satisfied with life, less optimistic and more depressed than those with low
sensitivity. Not surprisingly, we also found that people with high regret sensitivity tend to be
maximizers. Indeed, we think that worry over future regret is a major reason that individuals
become maximizers. The only way to be sure you will not regret a decision is by making the
best possible one. Unfortunately, the more options you have and the more opportunity costs
you incur, the more likely you are to experience regret.
I In a classic demonstration of the power of sunk costs, people were offered season subscrip‐
tions to a local theatre company. Some were offered the tickets at full price and others at a
discount. Then the researchers simply kept track of how often the ticket purchasers actually
attended the plays over the course of the season. Full-price payers were more likely to show up
at performances than discount payers. The reason for this, the investigators argued, was that
the full-price payers would experience more regret if they did not use the tickets because not
Questions 1-4
Look at the following descriptions or deeds (Questions 1-4) and the list of categories
below.
Write the correct letter, A-D, in boxes 1-4 on your answer sheet.
A maximizers
B satisficers
Questions 5-8
Do the following statements agree with the information given in Reading Passage
1?
Questions 9-13
Choose the correct letter. A, B, C or D.
A considerable amount of research since the mid 1980s has been concerned with what has
been termed children’s theory of mind. This involves children’s ability to understand that people
can have different beliefs and representations of the world– a capacity that is shown by four
years of age. Furthermore, this ability appears to be absent in children with autism. The ability
to work out that another person is thinking is clearly an important aspect of both cognitive and
social development. Furthermore, one important explanation for autism is that children
suffering from this condition do not have a theory of mind(TOM). Consequently, the
development of children’s TOM has attracted considerable attention.
Wimmer and Perner devised a ‘false belief task’ to address this question. They used some toys
to act out the following story. Maxi left some chocolate in a blue cupboard before he went out.
When he was away his mother moved the chocolate to a green cupboard. Children were asked
to predict where Maxi willlook for his chocolate when he returns. Most children under four
years gave the incorrect answer, that Maxi will look in the green cupboard. Those over four
years tended to give the correct answer, that Maxi will look in the blue cupboard. The incorrect
answers indicated that the younger children did not understand that Maxi’s beliefs and
representations no longer matched the actual state of the world, and they failed to appreciate
that Maxi will act on the basis of his beliefs rather than the way that the world is actually
organised.
A simpler version of the Maxi task was devised by Baron-Cohen to take account of criticisms
that younger children may have been affected by the complexity and too much information of
the story in the task described above. For example, the child is shown two dolls, Sally and
Anne, who have a basket and a box respectively. Sally also has a marble, which she places in
her basket and then leaves to take a walk. While she is out of the room, Anne takes the marble
from the basket, eventually putting it in the box. Sally returns and child is then asked where
Sally will look for the marble. The child passes the task if she answers that Sally will look in the
basket, where she put the marble; the child fails the task if she answers that Sally will look in
the box where the child knows the marble is hidden even though Sally cannot know, since she
did not see it hidden there. In order to pass the task, the child must be able to understand that
another’s mental representation of the situation is different from their own, and the child must
be able to predict behavior based on that understanding. The results of research using false-
belief tasks have been fairly consistent: most normally-developing children are unable to pass
the tasks until around age four.
Leslie argues that, before 18 months, children treat the world in a literal way and rarely
demonstrate pretence. He also argues that it is necessary for the cognitive system to
distinguish between what is pretend and what is real. If children were not able to do this, they
would not be able to distinguish between imagination and reality. Leslie suggested that this
pretend play becomes possible because of the presence of a de-coupler that copies primary
representations to secondary representations. For example, children, when pretending a
banana is a telephone, would make a secondary representation of a banana. They would
manipulate this representation and they would use their stored knowledge of ‘telephone’ to
build on this pretence.
There is also evidence that social processes play a part in the development of TOM. Meins and
her colleagues have found that what they term mind mindedness in maternal speech to six-
month old infants is related to both security of attachment and to TOM abilities. Mind
Mindedness involves speech that discusses infants’ feelings and explains their behaviour in
terms of mental stages(e.g_ ‘you1 re feeling hungry’)
Lewis investigated older children living in extended families in Crete and Cyprus. They found
that children who socially interact with more adults who have more friends. And who have
more older siblings tend to pass TOM tasks at a slightly earlier age than other children.
Furthermore, because young children are more likely to talk about their thoughts and feelings
with peers than with their mothers, peer interaction may provide a special impetus to the
In addition, there has been concern that some aspects of the TOM approach underestimate
children’s understanding of other people. After all infants will point to objects apparently in an
effort to change a person’s direction of gaze and interest; they can interact quite effectively
with other people; they will express their ideas in opposition to the wishes of others; and they
will show empathy for the feeling of others. Schatz studied the spontaneous speech of three-
year-olds and found that these children used mental terms and used them in circumstances
where there was a contrast between, for example, not being sure where an object was located
and finding it, or between pretending and reality. Thus the social abilities of children indicate
that they are aware of the difference between mental states and external reality at ages
younger than four.
A different explanation has been put forward by Harris. He proposed that children use
‘simulation’. This involves putting yourself in the other person’s position, and then trying to
predict what the other person would do. Thus success on false belief tasks can be explained by
children trying to imagine what they would do if they were a character in the stories, rather
than children being able to appreciate the beliefs of other people. Such thinking about
situations that do not exist involves what is termed counterfactual reasoning.
A different explanation has been put forward by Harris. He proposed that children use "simula‐
tion”. This involves putting yourself in the other person’s position, and then trying to predict
what the other person would do. Thus, success on false belief tasks can be explained by
children trying to imagine what they would do if they were a character in the stories, rather
than children being able to appreciate the beliefs of other people. Such thinking about
situations that do not exist involves what is termed counterfactual reasoning.
Questions 14-20
Look at the following statements (Questions 14-20) and the list of researchers
below.
Write the correct letter. A-G. in boxes 14-20 on your answer sheet.
A Baron-Cohen
B Meins
E Dunn
F Schatz
G Harris
14
gave an alternative explanation that children may not be
understanding other’s belief
15
found that children under certain age can tell difference between
reality and mentality
16
conducted a well-known experiment and drew conclusion that
young children were unable to comprehend the real state of the world
17
found that children who get along with adults often
comparatively got through the test more easily
18
revised an easier experiment to rule out the possibility that
children might be influenced by sophisticated reasoning
19
related social factor such as mother-child communication to
capability act in TOM
20
explained children are less likely to tell something interactive to
their mother than to their friends
Questions 21-26
Complete the summary below.
Choose ONE WORD ONLY from the passage for each answer.
In 1980s, research studies were designed to test the subject called Theory of Mind
that if children have the ability to represent the reality. First experiments were
What is Meaning
—Why do we respond to words and symbols in the waves we do?
The end, product of education, yours and mine and everybody's, is the total pattern of reactions
and possible reactions we have inside ourselves. If you did not have within you at this moment
the pattern of reactions that we call "the ability to read.” you would see here only meaningless
black marks on paper. Because of the trained patterns of response, you are (or are not) stirred
to patriotism by martial music, your feelings of reverence are aroused by symbols of your
religion, you listen more respectfully to the health advice of someone who has “MD" after his
name than to that of someone who hasn’t. What I call here a “pattern of reactions”, then, is the
sum total of the ways we act in response to events, to words, and to symbols.
Our reaction patterns or our semantic habits, are the internal and most important residue of
whatever years of education or miseducation we may have received from our parents’ conduct
toward us in childhood as well as their teachings, from the formal education we may have had,
from all the lectures we have listened to, from the radio programs and the movies and television
shows we have experienced, from all the books and newspapers and comic strips we have
read, from the conversations we have had with friends and associates, and from all our experi‐
ences. If, as the result of all these in uences that make us what we are, our semantic habits are
reasonably similar to those of most people around us, we are regarded as "normal,” or perhaps
“dull.” If our semantic habits are noticeably different from those of others, we are regarded as
“individualistic" or “original.” or, if the differences are disapproved of or viewed with alarm, as
“crazy.”
Semantics, then, does not deal with the “meaning of words” as that expression is commonly
understood. P. W. Bridgman, the Nobel Prize winner and physicist, once wrote, “The true
meaning of a term is to be found by observing what a man does with it, not by what he says
about it.” He made an enormous contribution to science by showing that the meaning of a
scienti c term lies in the operations, the things done, that establish its validity, rather than in
verbal definitions.
Here is a simple, everyday kind of example of “operational” de nition. If you say, “This table
measures six feet in length,” you could prove it by taking a foot rule, performing the operation
of laying it end to end while counting, “One...two...three...four...” But if you say—and revolu‐
tionists have started uprisings with just this statement “Man is born free, but everywhere he is
in chains!”—what operations could you perform to demonstrate its accuracy or inaccuracy?
But let us carry this suggestion of “operationalism" outside the physical sciences where
Bridgman applied it, and observe what “operations” people perform as the result of both the
language they use and the language other people use in communicating to them. Here is a
personnel manager studying an application blank. He comes to the words “Education: Harvard
University,” and drops the application blank in the wastebasket (that’s the “operation”)
because, as he would say if you asked him, “I don’t like Harvard men.” This is an instance of
"meaning” at work—but it is not a meaning that can be found in dictionaries.
If I seem to be taking a long time to explain what semantics is about, it is because I am trying, in
the course of explanation, to introduce the reader to a certain way of looking at human
behavior. I say human responses because, so far as we know, human beings are the only
creatures that have, over and above that biological equipment which we have in common with
other creatures, the additional capacity for manufacturing symbols and systems of symbols.
When we react to a ag, we are not reacting simply to a piece of cloth, but to the meaning with
which it has been symbolically endowed. When we react to a word, we are not reacting to a
A basic idea in general semantics, therefore, is that the meaning of words (or other symbols) is
not in the words, but in our own semantic reactions. If I were to tell a shockingly obscene story
in Arabic or Hindustani or Swahili before an audience that understood only English, no one
would blush or be angry; the story would be neither shocking nor obscene-induced, it would
not even be a story. Likewise, the value of a dollar bill is not in the bill, but in our social
agreement to accept it as a symbol of value. If that agreement were to break down through the
collapse of our government, the dollar bill would become only a scrap of paper. We do not
understand a dollar bill by staring at it long and hard. We understand it by observing how
people act with respect to it. We understand it by understanding the social mechanisms and
the loyalties that keep it meaningful. Semantics is therefore a social study, basic to all other
social studies.
Questions 27-31
Choose the correct letter, A, B, C or D.
C Print only carries meaning to those who have received appropriate ways
to respond.
D The writers should make sure their works satisfy a variety of readers.
D complex situations.
A He is an expert of language.
31 What does the writer intend to show about the example of “personnel
manager”?
C The idea of operationalism does not make much sense outside the
physical science.
D Job applicants should take care when filling out application forms.
Questions 32-35
Do the following statements agree with the information given in Reading Passage
3?
32
Some statements are incapable of being proved or disproved.
33
Meaning that is personal to individuals is less worthy to study
than shared meanings.
34
Flags and words are eliciting responses of the same reason.
35
A story can be entertaining without being understood.
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Questions 36-40
Complete each sentence with the correct ending, A-H, below.
Write the correct letter, A-H, in boxes 36-40 on your answer sheet.
36
A comic strip
37
A dictionary
38
Bridgman
39
A story in a language the audience cannot understand
40
A dollar bill
A is meaningless.
H suggests that certain types of behaviors carry more meanings than others.
1 D 2 B
3 A 4 C
9 B 10 D
11 C 12 D
13 C 14 G
15 F 16 C
17 D 18 A
19 B 20 E
23 four/4 24 older
25 adults 26 challenging
36 B 37 E
38 G 39 A
40 D 27 C
28 C 29 A
30 C 31 B
34 TRUE 35 FALSE