LTD Part 3 Cases and Laws

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed
with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in
Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application
seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor,
appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles,
opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition
to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the
whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until
1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato
Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina
trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government
did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs
of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the
MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T.
Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. 7 However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.8 1awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely
erred in holding that there is no need for the government’s prior release of the subject lot from the
public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the
required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that
the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears
close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly
or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the
Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." 15 In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and
certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while
the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were
classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed.
In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after
1awphi1.nét
the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial
park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. 20 It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo
v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court
of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona
fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
"agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly,
the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts. l^vvphi1 .net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the
assertion—shown earlier to be unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit
had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession
since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back
to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it
is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private
person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Penned by Justice P. Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurred in by Justices A. Austria-Martinez

and E.J. Asuncion.
2 Penned by Judge E. Terencio.
3 Penned by Judge R. Barrios.
4 Rollo, p. 31.
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 50.
7 Id. at 40.
8 Id. at 16; but see 103.
9 Id. at 77.
10 Id. at 10.
11 Id. at 19.
12 G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604.
13 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 1995 at 182.
14 G.R. No. 127060, 19 November 2002, 392 SCRA 190.
15 Id. at 201.
16 Rollo, p. 21.
17 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
18See e.g., Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480;
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 218 Phil. 666,674 (1984); Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry, 211 Phil 260 (1983); Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals 429 Phil. 377
(2002).
19 See Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 357 (1997).
20Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12 citing Director of Forestry v. Muñoz,
G.R. No. 24796, 28 June 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.
21 Supra note 19.
22Id. citing Vano v. Government of P.I., 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Li Seng Giap y CIAA v. Director,
55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Fernandez Hermanos v. Director, 57 Phil. 929 [1931]; Military
Reservations v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 [1973]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476;
Vallarta v. IAC, 152 SCRA 679; Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, 192 SCRA
121.
23 See Rollo, at 35.
24 Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.
25See Article 1113, Civil Code, which states: "All things which are within the commerce of
men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611;
26
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
27 Rollo, p. 35.
28Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 597 (1999); Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 38; Rivera v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130876, January 31, 2002, 244 SCRA 218; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 325 Phil. 674 (1996); Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368;
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA 390.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27088 July 31, 1975

HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HEIRS OF LARUAN, * respondents-appellants.
Leonardo A. Amores for petitioners-appellants.
Reyes and Cabato for respondents-appellees.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 738 entitled "Heirs of Batiog
Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan" "... declaring the contract of sale between Lacamen and Laruan null
and void [for lack of approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes] ..."
Petitioners-appellants are the surviving heirs of Batiog Lacamen, while respondents-appellants are
the heirs of Laruan.1
Sometime on January 28, 1928, Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Batiog
Lacamen2 conveying for the sum of P300.00 his parcel of land situated in the sitio of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Mountain Province, comprising 86 ares and 16 centares 3 and covered by Certificate of Title
No. 420 of the Registry of Benguet. The deed was acknowledged before Antonio Rimando, a notary
public in the City of Baguio.4
Immediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen
entered in possession and occupancy of the land without first securing the corresponding transfer
certificate of title in his name. He introduced various improvements and paid the proper taxes. His
possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse. After his death in 1942, his heirs
remained in and continued possession and occupancy of the land. They too paid the taxes.
After the last Global War, Lacamen's heirs "started fixing up the papers of all the properties" left by
him5 In or about June, 1957, they discovered that Laruan's heirs, respondents-appellants, were able
to procure a new owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. 420 by a petition filed in court alleging that
their copy has been lost or destroyed. Through this owner's copy, respondents-appellants caused
the transfer of the title on the lot in their names.6 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-775 was issued to
them by the Registry of Deeds of Benguet.
Refused of their demands for reconveyance of the title, petitioners-appellants sued respondents-
appellants in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City on December 9, 1957, prayings among other
things, that they be declared owners of the subject property; that respondents-appellants be ordered
to convey to them by proper instruments or documents the land in question; and that the Register of
Deeds of Benguet be ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-775 and issue in lieu
thereof a new certificate of title in their names.7
In answer, respondents-appellants traversed the averments in the complaint and claim absolute
ownership over the land. They asserted that their deceased father, Laruan, never sold the property
and that the Deed of Sale was not thumbmarked by him. 8
On 5 April 1962, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City found for respondents-appellants and
against petitioners-appellants. Forthwith, petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 7 December 1966, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
In this review, petitioners-appellants press that the Court of Appeals erred —
... IN DECLARING THE SALE BETWEEN LACAMEN AND LARUAN TO BE NULL

AND VOID.
II
... IN APPLYING STRICTLY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 118 AND 122 OF

ACT NO. 2874 AND SECTIONS 145 AND 164 OF THE CODE OF MINDANAO AND
SULU.
III
... IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

BAGUIO CITY.
which assignments could be whittled down into the pervading issue of whether the deceased Batiog
Lacamen and/or his heirs, herein petitioners-appellants, have validly acquired ownership over the
disputed parcel of land.
The 1917 Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu declares in its Section 145 that no contract or
agreement relating to real property shall be made by any person with any non-Christian inhabitant of
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, unless such contract shall bear the approval of the provincial
governor of the province wherein the contract was executed, or his representative duly authorized
for such purpose in writing endorsed upon it. 9 Any contract or agreement in violation of this section is "null and void" under
the succeeding Section 146. 10
On 24 February 1919, Act No. 2798 was approved by the Philippine Legislature extending to the
Mountain Province and the Province of Nueva Vizcaya the laws and other legal provisions pertaining
to the provinces and minor political subdivisions of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, with
the specific proviso that the approval of the land transaction shall be by the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes. 11
Then on 29 November 1919, came Act No. 2874 otherwise known as "The Public Land Act". It
provided in Section 118 thereof that "Conveyances and encumbrances made by persons belonging
to the so-called 'non-Christian tribes', when proper, shall not be valid unless duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes." Any violation of this injunction would result in the
nullity and avoidance of the transaction under the following Section 122.
During the regime of the Commonwealth, C.A. 141 otherwise known as "The Public Land Act" was
passed — November 7, 1936 — amending Act No. 2874. However, it contained a similar provision in
its Section 120 that "Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christians shall not be
valid unless duly approved by the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.
The contracting parties, Lacamen and Laruan, are bound by the foregoing laws, since both of them
are illiterate Igorots, belonging to the "non-Christian Tribes" of the Mountain Province 12 , and the
controverted land was derived from a Free Patent 13 or acquired from the public domain. 14
The trial court did show cordiality to judicial pronouncements when it avoided the realty sale between
Lacamen and Laruan for want of approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. For
jurisprudence decrees that non-approved conveyances and encumbrances of realty by illiterate non-
Christians are not valid, i.e., not binding or obligatory. 15
Nevertheless, the thrust of the facts in the case before Us weakens the gathered strength of the
cited rule. The facts summon the equity of laches.
"Laches" has been defined as "such neglect or ommission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with
lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a
bar in equity." 16 It is a delay in the assertion of a right "which works disadvantage to
another" 17 because of the "inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the
property or parties." 18 It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, 19 ordains that relief
will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 20 It is different from and
applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is
a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this
inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties.
Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not. 21
Laruan's sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the sole fact that it
lacked the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. There was impressed
upon its face full faith and credit after it was notarized by the notary public. 22 The non-approval was
the only "drawback" of which the trial court has found the respondents-appellants to "have taken
advantage as their lever to deprive [petitioners-appellants] of this land and that their motive is out
and out greed." 23 As between Laruan and Lacamen, the sale was regular, not infected with any
flaw. Laruan's delivery of his certificate of title to Lacamen just after the sale symbolizes nothing
more than a bared recognition and acceptance on his part that Lacamen is the new owner of the
property. Thus, not any antagonistic show of ownership was ever exhibited by Laruan after that sale
and until his death in May 1938.
From the transfer of the land on January 28, 1928, Lacamen possessed and occupied the ceded
land in concepto de dueño until his death in April 1942. Thereafter his heirs, petitioners-appellants
herein, took over and exercised dominion over the property, likewise unmolested for nearly 30 years
(1928-1957) until the heirs of Laruan, respondents-appellants, claimed ownership over the property
and secured registration of the same in their names. At the trial, petitioners-appellants have been
found to have introduced improvements on the land consisting of houses, barns, greenhouses,
walls, roads, etc., and trees valued at P38,920.00. 24
At this state, therefore, respondents-appellants' Claim of absolute ownership over the land cannot be
countenanced. It has been held that while a person may not acquire title to the registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the
heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and
the title thereto, by reason of laches. 25 Much more should it be in the instant case where the
possession of nearly 30 years or almost half a century now is in pursuance of sale which regrettably
did not bear the approval of the executive authority but which the vendor never questioned during his
life time. Laruan's laches extends to his heirs, the respondents-appellants herein, since they stand in
privity with him. 26
Indeed, in a like case, 27 it was ruled that —

Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction,
knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land,
paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring
from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values
offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
For notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the vendor Laruan suffered the vendee Lacamen to
enter, possess and occupy the property in concepto de dueño without demurrer and molestation,
from 1928, until the former's death in 1938; and when respondents-appellants succeeded to the
estate of their father, they too kept silent, never claiming that the lot is their own until in 1957 or after
almost 30 years they took "advantage of the [non-approval of the sale] as their lever to deprive
[petitioners-appellants] of this land" with a motive that was "out and out greed." Even granting,
therefore, that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their quiescence and inaction
for almost 30 years now commands the imposition of laches against their adverse claim. (Miguel,
footnote 27)
It results that as against Laruan and his heirs, respondents-appellants herein, the late Batiog
Lacamen and his heirs, petitioners-appellants herein, have superior right and, hence, have validly
acquired ownership of the litigated land. Vigilantibus non dormientibos sequitas subvenit.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court
is hereby reversed and set aside.
The petitioners-appellants are hereby declared the lawful owners of the land in question.
Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-775 in the name of respondents-appellants is hereby
cancelled and in lieu thereof the Register of Deeds of Benguet is ordered to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioners-appellants.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal at pp. 2-3.
2 Annex A, Petitioners Complaint below Record of Appeal, at p. 7.
3 Equivalent to 8,616 square meters.
4 Annex A, Petitioners' Complaint below, Record on Appeal, at p. 10.
5 Record on Appeal, at p. 4.
6 Idem, at p. 5.
7 Idem, at pp. 1-6.
8 Idem, at pp. 11-17.
9 See Sale de Porkan v. Yatco, 70 Phil. 163-165.
10 Idem.
11 See Sec. 1, Act 2798. This Act was amended on March 23, 1920 by Act No.
2913, but Sec. 1, Act 2798 was retained.
12 Brief, Petitioners-appellants, at pp. 5-6.
14 See Palad v. Saito, 55 Phil. 836, 837.
15 Mangayao v. Lasud, L-19252, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 158, cited in Mangayao v.
De Guzman,
L-24787, February 22, 1974, per Fernando, Second Division, 55 SCRA 545, 546.
16 27 Am Jur 2d 687, citing Re O' Donnell's Estate, 8 Ill App. 2d 348, 132 NE 2d 74;
See also 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., 171, 172.
17 Hall v. Mortgage Secur. Corp. 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S.E. 145, 393, 11 A.L.R. 118
18 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., 177.
19 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.
20 Vda de Lima v. Tio, L-27181, April 30, l970, 32 SCRA 518.
21 Nielson & Company, Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601,

December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1040.
22 Ramirez v. Her, Adm. Case No. 500, September 27, 1967. 21 SCRA 207.
23 Record on Appeal, 20, 21.
25 De Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277; Wright Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co., L-18904, July 11, 1964, 11 SCRA 508.
26 30A C.J.S. 33, citing Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. US, Del., 39 S. Ct
407.
27 Miguel v. Catalino, L-23072, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 234.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,

GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO
MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an
estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan
River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road.
Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River
as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-
appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the
year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959,
respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of
Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500

hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National
Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation
under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P
750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had
earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total
acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000
square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the
West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2)
parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,
designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole
of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65
hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion
of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included
in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent
Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form
two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further
north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of
respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern
branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For
about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River
forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition
persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches
of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12
December 1969.4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822.
The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is
located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed,
being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821
also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821.
They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they
plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion during summer.5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry
against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini,
Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a
case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints6 before the then Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged
ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio
Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be
entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then
set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of
facts.7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the
Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the
finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that
when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed
owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that
the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the
year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that
they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the
peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final
arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is
a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their
findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion
(Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same
land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff
purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and
is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip
(Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the
owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to
make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by
the current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the
word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the
Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which
comes during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower
portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with
water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water
level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest
depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the
highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the
one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the
year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and
goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74
of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry
season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the
waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the
west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of
water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence when the whole of
the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay;
since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the
disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes
found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in
the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to
the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered
by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the
entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year
(i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from
September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from
1âwphi1
Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba
was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of
Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale
signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern
branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case,
Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which
includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July
1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to
respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west
both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821.
It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water
passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano
Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the
land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban,
has a height of eight (8) meters.17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface
of the earth. However, Exhibit "E"18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property
standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before
the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written to
make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portion—is an implied admission
of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo,
the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like
slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of
time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could
not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code
states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1)
the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed
the public ownership of river beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario
considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo
rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora
bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos
o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion publico . .
. los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de
la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los
arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de
los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas
ordinarias.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it
were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the
purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply
divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The
intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed
to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated
by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened
that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a
channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers
that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the
eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which
respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307
across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring
ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of
Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. On
the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods that caused the land to
reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is
hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern
portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The
total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina
Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even
smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot
821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were
accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his
landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already
noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot
821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable
conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant
action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests
on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought
separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad
who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was
transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared
for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice
instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against
respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing
in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since
1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for
Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for
forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations
presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less
than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and
possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly
submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be
instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Records, p. 123.
2
Id., p. 120.
3
Id., p. 209.
4
Id., p. 210.
5
Exhibits "1-C. " "1-D" and "1-E" for the Prosecution. Records, p. 209.
6
Records, pp. 1-6.
7
Id., p. 24.
8
Court of First Instance Decision, p. 40; Rollo, p. 98.
9
Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270 (1987).
10
Sese vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585 (1987).
11
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 215 (1986).
12
Court of First Instance Decision, p. 39; Rollo, p. 97.
13
Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 5-6; citation omitted.
14
53 Phil. 423.(1929).
15
TSN, 7 October 1975, pp. 4-6.
16
TSN, 13 October 1975, pp. 9-10.
17
TSN, 3 November 1976, p. 3.
18
Records, p. 122.
19
Hilario vs. City of Manila, 126 Phil. 128 (1967).
20
3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español (6a ed., 1934), p. 75.
21
Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 (1908). See also Article 461, Civil Code.
22
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514 (1984).
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.]
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,

GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG,
PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, Petitioners, v. GUILLERMO MANALO and
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON
APPEAL; REASON. — The findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they
carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This is in recognition of the peculiar
advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the
witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final
arbiter of questions of fact. But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a
question of law cognizable by this Court.
2. CIVIL LAW; LAW ON WAGES; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN GOVERNMENT VS. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE,
NOT APPLICABLE TO OWNERSHIP OF RIVER BED; CASE AT BAR. — The Court is unable to agree with
the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose is applicable to
the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied
the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the
definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August
1866. Upon the other hand; what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan
River. We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar: "Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods."
2. ID.; ID.; NATURAL BED OR CHANNEL OF A CREEK OR RIVER, DEFINED. — Article 70 defines the
natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest
floods.
3. ID.; OWNERSHIP; RIVER BED, NOT SUBJECT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — The
conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record. Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was
included in Lot 307. If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307,
then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land
from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad,
must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the
rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the
western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also
what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Secondly, the pictures
identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a river
bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the
eastern bed becomes visible. Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken
facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up
portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides
connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic
feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed
regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to
go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the
depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. The
records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the
earth. However, Exhibit "E" for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in
the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to
respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses — perhaps written to make
legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portion — is an implied admission of the
existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the
depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on
either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
4. ID.; ID.; RIVER; PARTS. — Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a
composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.
5. ID.; ID.; WHENEVER A RIVER, CHANGING ITS COURSE BY NATURAL CAUSES, OPENS A NEW BED
THROUGH A PRIVATE ESTATE, THIS BED SHALL BECOME OF PUBLIC DOMINION; CASE AT BAR. —
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to
floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by,
inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. It so happened that
instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a
channel on it.
6. ID.; ID.; ACCRETION; REQUISITES . — Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457
of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MET IN CASE AT BAR. — After examining the records of the case, the Court
considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of
the eastern branch of the river. The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo
border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch
which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307
across the river. Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the
Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the laud purchased
by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner. On
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. Besides, it is
important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the
strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable
area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding
purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80
hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821
which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91
hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo’s contention were accepted, it would mean that
in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of
Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like
slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the
land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the
depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
8. ID.; ID.; QUIETING OF TITLE; PLAINTIFF MUST HAVE AT LEAST EQUITABLE TITLE OR INTEREST IN
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE ACTION; CASE AT BAR. — We turn finally to the issue of
ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo’s claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged
prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through
his (Judge Taccad’s) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over
the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners
forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo’s allegation of prior possession, petitioners
presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and
adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action
for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the
Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging
neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an
estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan
River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road.
Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River
as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-
appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the
year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959,
respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge
Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares,
more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto; on the East by National Road; on South by
Julian Tumolva; and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No.
12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P750.00. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw lib rary
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had
earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition
of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described
as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square
meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now
Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed
at P440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . ." 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2)
parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,
designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of
the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares
purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land
bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot
307.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent
Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two
(2) branches — the western and the eastern branches — and then unites at the other end, further
north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of
respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern
branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For
about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks
is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition
persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of
the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December
1969. 4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot
822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821
is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed,
being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also
belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They
occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant
tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry
against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini,
Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a
case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaint 6 before the then Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged
ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio
Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered
declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint: The case was then set
for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts.
7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders: chanrob 1es virtual 1aw lib rary
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No.
821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot
No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of
the Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED." 8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the
Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding
of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that
when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed owned
by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the
depression on the earth’s surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the
bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that
they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the
peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final
arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct,
is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings
that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed
of the Cagayan River. The trial court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion),
for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy
(Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio
Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is on y six (6) inches deep and twelve
(12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs.’W’, ‘W-1’, ‘W-2’, ‘W-3’ and ‘W-4’). It has
been held by our Supreme Court that ‘the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual
deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it,
and the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest’ (Roxas v. Tuazon, 6 Phil.
408)." 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus: chanrobles.com : virtual law l ibrary
"As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since
the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up
during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season
especially from September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the
river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its
southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains
its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land would be under water." cralaw virtua1aw library
In Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —
‘According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth
of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they
attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is
uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the
ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above,
the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at
their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels
of land in question.’
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the
waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west
side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself The small residual of water
between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence when the whole of the late
Judge Juan Taccad’s property was shall susceptible to cultivation and uneroded." 13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since
Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of
lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed
property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in
Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand; what is involved in the instant
case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to
the case at bar:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods." (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by
its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire
depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e.,
from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters (i.e., from September
to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record.
Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio
Taguba was included in Lot 307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was
included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale
transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed
by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of
the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is
separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not
only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. chanrobles virtual lawlib rary
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July
1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to
respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both
show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It
has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and
very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water
passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano
Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the
land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has
a height of eight (8) meters. 17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of
the earth. However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property
standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before
the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses — perhaps written to
make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portion — is an implied admission
of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the
depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on
either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute
sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The following things are property of public dominion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis supplied).
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1)
the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed
the public ownership of river beds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar
en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto, en todo rio es preciso
distinguir: 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos
ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
"Realmente, no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil
que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres
elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion
del art. 407, num. 1, donde dice: son de dominio publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales;
declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de
dominio publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el ert. 33, y
2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores
crecidas ordinarias." 20 (Emphasis supplied).
respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to
floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by,
inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that
instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a
channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers
that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the
eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea);
and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo
may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies
on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring
ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of
Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the laud purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner. On
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern
portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The
total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina
Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller
than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an
area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo’s contention were accepted, it
would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what
the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep
vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This
topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an
increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either
the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo’s claim over Lot 821 rests on
accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought
separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad
who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad’s) tenants. When ownership was transferred
to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation
purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted the
appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo’s
allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective
names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955. chanroblesvirtualawlibr ary
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for
Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for
forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations
presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code,
the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than
satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession
of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04892 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly
submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be
instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Records, p. 123.
2. Id., p. 120.
3. Id., p. 209.
4. Id., p. 210.
5. Exhibits "1-C." "1-D" and "1-E" for the Prosecution. Records, p. 209.
6. Records, pp. 1-6.
7. Id., p. 24.
8. Court of First Instance Decision, p. 40; Rollo, p. 98.
9. Go Ong v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270 (1987).
10. Sese v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585 (1987).
11. Pilar Development Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 215 (1986).
12. Court of First Instance Decision, p. 39; Rollo, p. 97.
13. Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 5-6; Citation omitted.
14. 53 Phil. 423. (1929).
15. TSN, 7 October 1975, pp. 4-6.
16. TSN, 13 October 1975, pp. 9-10.
17. TSN, 3 November 1976, p. 3.
18. Records, p. 122.
19. Hilario v. City of Manila, 126 Phil. 128 (1967).
20. 3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español (6a ed., 1934), p. 75.
21. Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 (1908). See also Article 461, Civil Code.
22. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514 (1984).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION,
respondents, CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case commenced before the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has
spanned six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the Decision, dated
January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch
7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Pasay City
and Republic Real Estate Corporation".
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law,
reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to

undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking
and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine
in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed
Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in
Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and
prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21,
1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC")
to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement 2 for the reclamation of
the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint 4 questioning
subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the
subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any
public bidding.
The Answers 5 of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively,
averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the
phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than
the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were
approved by the authorities concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order6 the dispositive portion of which was to the
following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all
persons claiming under them, to refrain from "further reclaiming or committing
acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or
the Manila Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction 7 which
enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under
them "from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession."
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene8, dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L. Bautista,
Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martiner,
Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento,
Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc.,
Metropolitan Distributors of the Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that
they were buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would
be affected by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the
trial court and the Answer attached thereto admitted.9
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss 10 the Complaint of the Republic,
placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx xxx xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south
boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north
boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of
Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and
submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls,
highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any corporation
and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own expense such
projects, in which case the President of the Philippines may, after competitive
didding, award contracts for the construction of such project, with the winning
bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of
percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the
area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full compensation for the
purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of
reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided,
finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders,
rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects
and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of
foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. . . . . (emphasis ours).
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected, movants
contended that the issues raised by the pleadings have become "moot, academic and
of no further validity or effect."
Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. ("PLCU") moved to intervene 11,
alleging as legal interest in the matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for
the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of June 10, 1969, the lower
court of origin allowed the said intervention 12.
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first
Amended Complaint, (3) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of Defendant
Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended
Complaint, (6) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to
the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the
Second Amended Complaint, (8) the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary
Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant Pasay City and Defendant
Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in Intervention of
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11) Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene,
(12) the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion
for Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(15) the Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (16) the Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union,
Inc., (17) the Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (18) the Complain in
Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of
Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the Motion
to Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said Motion to Dismiss, (23)
the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (24) the
Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25) the
Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (26)
the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, and all
the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to
"YYY- 4", (b) Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation's Exhibits "1-RREC"
to "40-a" and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc's., Exhibits
"A-PLACU" to "C-PLACU", the Court hereby:
(1) Denies the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant
Republic Real Estate Corporation and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the
finding of this Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress
to cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in question and that the
passage of said Republic Act No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised in
the pleadings "moot, academic and of no further validity or effect;" and
(2) Renders judgment:
(a) dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;
(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and

Conscience Union, Inc.,
(c) Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant

Pasay City to have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved
by the Director of Public Works and to have all the contracts and sub-contracts
for said reclamation awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and
(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as
soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City
shall have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the
Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as
soon as the corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor and
sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-
8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No.
3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:
Sec. 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is

hereby amended by the addition of the following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of

areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the

State without need of judicial action.
Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been
accepted by the National Government shall be taken over by the National
Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the
project involved by administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines ("CDCP") signed a Contract13 for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I
and II) which contract included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 which transferred to the Public Estate Authority ("PEA") the rights and obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on the one
hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did not work out. The parties involved
failed to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision 14 dismissing the appeal
of the Republic and holding, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the

following modifications:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and submission of

RREC's plans specification to the Department Public Works and Highways in
order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic;
2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and
possession over all vacant spaces in the twenty-one hectare area already
reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas
thereat over which permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall,
including the structures, remain in the possession of the present possessor,
subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor,
as regards the continued possession and ownership of the latter area.
3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the

Twenty-One (21) hectares of land already reclaimed by it, to be exercised
within one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and
enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect RREC's option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such
Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had actually
reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them, movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for
Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive portion of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is
hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of
the RREC's plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and
Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic.
2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and

possession of the above enumerated lots (1 to 9).
3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the

land referred to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion, to be exercised within one
(1) year from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and condition
embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay
City to respect RREC's irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned, the
Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek
relief, albeit with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of Court of
Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy. The corresponding
Commissioner's Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted and now forms part of the
records.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines ("CCP") filed a Petition in
Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine
(9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals ordered to be turned
over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it
did, before the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been considered in the formulation of
this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment of errors,
that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED APRIL
21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN PASAY CITY AND RREC;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD

RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE TURN-
OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
OF NINE (9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING

DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21,
1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the
negative.
Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and

chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore
lands along the seaside of Pasay City 15; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore
areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the
National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41,
dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered
"foreshore land" through the following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a

request for an opinion from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications as to whether the term, "foreshore areas"
as used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that
defined in Webster's Dictionary and the Law of Waters so as to
make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal,
opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of

Public Works, the law of Waters speaks of "shore"
and defines it thus: "that space movement of the
tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line
reached by highest equinoctial tides."
Webster's definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and

low-water marks usually fixed at the line to which
the ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension,
the beach, the shore near the water's edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore

or foreshore lands should be confined to but a
portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area.
(p. 6, Intervenors-appellees' brief).
Bearing in mind the (Webster's and Law of

Waters) definitions of "shore" and of foreshore
lands, one is struck with the apparent
inconsistency between the areas thus described
and the purpose to which that area, when
reclaimed under the provision of Republic Act No.
1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said Law)
authorizes the construction thereat of "adequate
docking and harbor facilities". This purpose is
repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands

normally extend only from 10 to 20 meters along
the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact
certain parts in Manila bordering on Manila Bay,
has no foreshore to speak of since the sea
washes the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had

in mind. Webster's limited concept of foreshore
when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it
intends that the wharves, piers, docks, etc. should
be constructed parallel to the shore, which is
impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could

not have intended to enact an ineffectual measure
not one that would lead to absurd consequences,
it would seem that it used "foreshore" in a sense
wider in scope that defined by Webster. . . .
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-

appellant could not offer any refutation or contrary opinion.
Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with
the "rule on context" in statutory construction which provides
that in construing a statute, the same must be construed as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole (see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of particular
expressions will largely depend upon the connection in which
they are found and their relation to the general subject-matter of
the law. The legislature must be understood to have expressed
its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act
is directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is
the statute, considered as one entire and continuous act, and
not as an agglomeration of unrelated clauses. Each clause or
provision will be illuminated by those which are cognate to it
and by the general tenor of the whole statute and thus
obscurities end ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most
direct and natural means. Secondly effect must be given, if it is
possible, to every word and clause of the statute, so that
nothing shall be left devoid of meaning or destitute of force. To
this end, each provision of the statute should be read in the light
of the whole. For the general meaning of the legislature, as
gathered from the entire act, may often prevail over the
construction which would appear to be the most natural and
obvious on the face of a particular clause. If is by this means
that contradiction and repugnance between the different parts of
the statute may be avoided. (See Black, Interpretation of Laws,
2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the "Explanatory Note" to House Bill

No. 3830, which was subsequently enacted as Republic Act No.
1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime

Commerce of the Philippines, it is necessary that
harbor facilities be correspondingly improved
and, where necessary, expanded and developed.
The national government is not in a financial
position to handle all this work. On the other
hand, with a greater autonomy many chartered
cities and provinces are financially able to have
credit position which will allow them to undertake
these projects. Some cities, such as the City of
Bacolod under R.A. 161, has been authorized to
reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.
Other cities end provinces have continuously

been requesting for authority to reclaim foreshore
lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern,
and to undertake work to establish, construct on
the reclaimed area and maintain such port
facilities as may be necessary. In order not to
unduly delay the undertaking of these projects,
and inorder to obviate the passage of individual
pieces of legislation for every chartered city and
province, it is hereby recommended that the
accompanying bill be approved. It covers
Authority for All chartered cities and provinces to
undertake this work. . . . (emphasis supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and

construing the provisions of R.A. 1899, then Secretary of Justice
Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the "Bacolod City pattern" was the

basis of the enactment of the aforementioned bill
of general application. This so-called "Bacolod
City pattern" appears to be composed of 3 parts,
namely: Republic Ad No. 161, which grants
authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry
out . . . the reclamation . . . of any [sic] carry out
the reclamation project conformably with
Republic Act No. 161; and Republic Act No. 1132
authorizing Bacolod City to contract indebtedness
or to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding six
million pesos to finance the reclamation of land in
said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the
precise space therein referred to as "foreshore"
lands, but it provided that docking and harbor
facilities should be erected on the reclaimed
portions thereof, while not conclusive would
indicate that Congress used the word "foreshore"
in its broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of
reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau
of Public Works maps out an area of
approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the
boundaries of which clearly extend way beyond
Webster's limited concept of the term "foreshore".
As a contemporaneous construction by that
branch of the Government empowered to oversee
at least, the conduct of the work, such an
interpretation deserves great weight. Finally,
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and
approved the Bureau's interpretation of the term
'foreshore' when instead of taking the occasion to
correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it
authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full
estimated cost of reclaiming the total area
covered by the plan. The explanatory note to
House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act
No. 1132 states among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a

plan for the reclamation of about 1,600,000 square
meters of land at an estimated costs of about
P6,000,000.00. The project is self-supporting
because the proceeds from the sales or leases of
lands so reclaimed will be more than sufficient to
cover the cost of the project.
Consequently, when Congress passed Republic

Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate the reclamation
by local governments of foreshore lands on the
basis of the Bacolod City pattern and in order to
obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and provinces
requesting authority to undertake such projects,
the lawmaking body could not have had in mind
the limited area described by Webster as
"foreshore" lands. . . . .
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the

strict literal meaning of "foreshore" lands which may be
reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress
would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu,
Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as
suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill
considering that these cities do not have 'foreshore' lands in the
strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not approve the
proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore,
that Congress intended not to limit the area that may be
reclaimed to the strict definition of "foreshore" lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was

at that time the chief law officer and legal adviser of the
government and whose office is required by law to issue
opinions for the guidance of the various departments of the
government, there being then no judicial interpretation to the
contrary, is entitled to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated

February 3, 1965 in Ponce vs. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs.
City of Cebu (L-2266), by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices
(the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to express
their view because in their opinion the questions raised were not
properly brought before the court), which in essence applied the
strict dictionary meaning of "foreshore lands" as used in RA
1899 in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was promulgated
long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the
above opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has
started the subject reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the

Supreme Court issued the aforementioned Resolution, enacted
RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated money
"for the construction of the seawall and limited access highway
from the South boundary of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to
the South, and from the North boundary of the city of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the North
(including the reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas . .
. provided . . . that . . . existing projects and/or contracts of city
or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and
submerged lands shall be respected . . ." This is a clear
manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did not intend
to limit the interpretation of the term "foreshore land" to its
dictionary meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had

in mind the judicial construction given to a former statute on the
subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute
was enacted having in mind the judicial construction that the
prior enactment had received, or in the light of such existing
judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am.
Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said
interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the Ponce
cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas
previously embraced in a RA 1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities
without foreshore lands which were sought to be excluded from
the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that
respect be given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but
also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the
judicial construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in
accord with the interpretation and construction made by the
Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned
reclamation of "foreshore lands" only in RA 5187, but Congress
included "submerged lands" in order to clarify the intention on
the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the
reclamation of lands bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It
is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the intention of
Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities
and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict
dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include
submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA
1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its
disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against
the recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 16 So also, resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language
of the law being plain and unambiguous. 17 Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice are
unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. 18 To repeat, the term
"foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream);

the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were
to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated February 3,
1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment
of Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"), the relevant portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx xxx xxx

m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway
from the south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to
the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north,
including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged
areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shell be
given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the
President of the Philippines may, after competitive bidding,
award contracts for the construction of such projects, with the
winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be
paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not
exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and
shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the
provisions of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of
reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions
and those of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or
contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation
of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. . . . .
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden
the scope of "foreshore lands." The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an
Appropriations Act, entitled — "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS,
SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS."
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-
21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of
the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
the tides." As opined by this Court in said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista

Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and Jose P.
Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are ultra
vires and hence, null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of
the area aforementioned, because the term "foreshore lands" as
used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the
sense attached thereto by common parlance; (emphasis ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his
opinion dated December 22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:
Decem
ber 22,
1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources

Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
xxx xxx xxx
I. Facts —
1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic

Act No. 1899, the Municipality of Navotas enacted Ordinance No.
1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation
contract with Mr. Chuanico.
2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded

between the Municipality of Navotas, represented by the
Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the
above ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the
attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting the
reclamation project and shall advance the money needed
therefor; that the actual expenses incurred shall be deemed a
loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the
irrevocable option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per
square meter; that he shall have the full and irrevocable powers
to do any and all things necessary and proper in and about the
premises," including the power to hire necessary personnel for
the prosecution of the work, purchase materials and supplies,
and purchase or lease construction machineries and equipment,
but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in behalf of the
Municipality shall be submitted to public bidding.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed

Resolution No. 22 approving and ratifying the contract.
xxx xxx xxx
III. Comments —
1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis

of Navotas Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn, had been enacted
avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the
contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the provisions of
the said law.
By authorizing local governments "to execute by

administration any reclamation work," (Republic Act No. 1899
impliedly forbids the execution of said project by contract. Thus,
in the case or Ponce et al. vs. Gomez (February 3, 1966), five
justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the contract
between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the
reclamation of foreshore lands because "the provisions of said .
. . contract are not . . . in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1899," as against one Justice who opined that
the contract substantially complied with the provisions of the
said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially

similar to the Cebu reclamation contract, it is believed that the
former is likewise fatally defective.
2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction

of a channel along the Manila Bay periphery of that town and the
reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said
channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the basic
letter it is stated that "practically, all the 650 hectares of lands
proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement" do not
constitute foreshore lands and that "the greater portion of the
area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being used as a
fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing
ground of sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of
these averments, the Navotas reclamation contract evidently
transcends the authority granted under Republic Act No. 1899,
which empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more
than "foreshore lands, i.e., "that part of the land adjacent to the
see which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow
of the tides." (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited
case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-0 with five
Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual
stipulation for the reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu
City, and permanently enjoined its execution under Republic Act
No. 1899.
xxx xxx xxx
In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the

view that the Navotas reclamation contract is not binding and
should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.
Very
truly
yours,
(SGD)
CLAU
DIO
TEEHA
NKEE
Secret
ary of
Justic
e
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and later
Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of
former justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in connection with which
subject opinions were sought, were with similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords
with RA 1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55
hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that
RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to a tentative schedule of work
to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its
supposed accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
to the reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for
subject reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and
conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications of the

reclamation project were presented to reflect any accomplishment. Not even any statement or
itemization of works accomplished by contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and other
relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment. Neither
was the requisite certification from the City Engineer concerned that "portions of the
reclamation project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or
completed" obtained and presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by RREC, and
extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer,
surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged reclamation work of RREC testified on
the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did the work,
where was it commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to light by any
witness before the court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and
point out the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of
proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint of
plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only "as soon as
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted
the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public Work, and shall have
obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding public bidding for the award to the
contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected." (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No. 103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never complied
with such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently,
RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work which was stopped by said writ of
preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit "21-A" for
RREC before the lower court, and Exhibit "EE" for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be
deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract out the dredging work to C and A
Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to be
reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on
July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCP's reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation
team would take one year before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the
reclamation work undertaker by RREC could not have started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further with its
reclamation work, it had barely five (5) months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work
on subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible for RREC to reclaim 55
hectares, with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the
report of RREC (Exhibit "DD" for CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary
injunction issued on April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its
dredging operation since May, 1962.
The "graphical report" on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962, attached to the
Progress Report marked Exhibit "DD", is a schematic representation of the work
accomplishment referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various elevations of the
land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest elevation of 2.5 meters
above MLLW. Such portrayal of work accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether
or not RREC had actually "reclaimed" any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with
C and A Construction Company (Exhibit "EE", the required final elevation for a completely
reclaimed land was 3.5 meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said Contract for
Dredging Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is — when the work on subject RREC-Pasay
City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project worked on
by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW. The entire area it
worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet
reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and Managing partner
of Leandro V. Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Mañoza, Jr. of
Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz, Executive Assistant, Office of
the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of
CCP Advisory Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable
witnesses recounted on the witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available
was the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be
seen in front of and behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128). When the
CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1968 to 1969, the land above sea level
thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of the surroundings
were all under water, particularly the back portion fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp.
181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the
ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp.
320, 324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and declare that
"the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RREC's plans and
specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may
continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and
academic." Said requirement has never become moot and academic. It has remained
indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully
resuming the reclamation work under controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the
decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area with
the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted
to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for compensation of
P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the CDCP started working on the
reclamation of the CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to
settle its subject claim for compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June
10, 1981, guided by the cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information
gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed RREC that
the value of what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only P8,344,741.29,
and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid
evaluation made by the government, through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual
and realistic, so much so that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor
General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of

P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data, etc., as compensation
based on quantum meruit. The least we would consider is the
amount of P10,926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel that 6% is very
much less than the accepted rate of inflation that has
supervened since 1962 to the present, and even less than the
present legal rate of 12% per annum. 19
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was compensation for what it had done, and for the
dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it used, on subject reclamation project.
Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled
lots, to wit:
LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT
42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the
Restaurant name of GSIS
3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the
name of CCP
12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the
and PICC parking name of CCP
space
22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the

sculpture of Asean name of CCP
Artists-site of
Boom na Boom
23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the
of Philcite name of CCP
24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the
Star City, CCP, name of CCP
Philcite
25 open space 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the
occupied by Star name of CCP
City
28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the
beside PICC name of CCP
29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the
leased by El name of CCP
Shaddai
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in
their answer to the Complaint and Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City
never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had long
become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is of
no moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute
ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of the action did not really warrant
the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.
Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title

or the right of possession of real properly, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property
in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be

cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the
action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation,
RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover
to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens
title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or
annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 174, Cimafranca vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the
germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the
subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding instituted in accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area
within subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was
accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the
dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at
the expense of another 20, we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid
for the said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by
the former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted
letter dated June 25, 1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court, for
its herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the
preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer
Channing rightly puts it: "Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our
sympathies — Whatever makes us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in
time and in eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine
our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being."
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28, 1992, and
Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals, are both SET ASIDE; and
Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21,
1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real
Estate Corporation (RREC) as authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a quo in Civil
Case No. 2229-P is made permanent and the notice of lis pendens issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of Pasay City
is directed to take note of and annotate on the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of
subject notice of lis pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City and Republic
Real Estate Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND
SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest
thereon of six (6%) percent per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount
shall be divided by Pasay City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., I DISSENT: Ponce is not binding precedent, and P.D. 3-A is in utter nullity:
Davide, Jr., J., also that of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.
Romero, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Puno, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Vitug, J., In the result.
Kapunan, J., No part, having appeared for the Gov't. when I was in the OSG.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this and in the concurring opinion of Justice Puno.
Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Martinez, J., I join the Chief Justice in his dissent.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
Culture doesn't save anything or any-one, it doesn't justify. But it's a product of man: he
projects himself into it, he recognizes himself in it; that critical mirror alone offers him his
image." So said Jean Paul Sartre, one of the greatest philosophical thinkers of our time.
Matthew Arnold referred to it as the "pursuit of our total perfection" or the "study of
perfection." The English mathematican and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, placing
premium on human subjectivity, declared, "Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness
to beauty and humane feeling.
Image, perfection, beauty, and feeling. These are elements which are also associated with art
and creation. Yet, art in itself is a multi-faceted concept. The revered and, at times,
controversial President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, in one of his numerous speeches, elevated
art to the level of a pyscho-social necessity of man when he said, ". . . (A)rt establishes the
basic human truths which ust serve as the touchstone of our judgment." Indeed, there is no
question that art satisfies one of the deepest spiritual needs of man.
Of course, when one speaks of art and culture, he in fact speaks of it in two ways: the
abstract and the concrete. What is abstract is conditioned by time; that which is and the
concrete is ravaged by it. While the concept of "culture and art" endures man's folies,
amassing innumerable, priceless enhancements as it effortlessly slides through generations
of human progress, its tangible counterpart, that which is preserved for our children's
appreciation, is unfortunately fragile. Art works, music, architecture, literature, and other
cultural embellishments which exhibit extraordinary longevity are proclaimed as national
treasures, and rightly so, for they are lasting testiminials of man's boundless imagination and
creativity, that single trait that places the human species above all other creatures of the
Almighty.
Most evidence of a culture's richness are lost, not in the tide of nature's frivolity, but through
man's foolishness and capriciousness. Wars used to be the main culprit in the virtual
obliteration of the works of ancient scholars. We are now, and for the past century or so,
faced with a greater foe: progress. Progress and development are the hallmarks of
successful governance. Our leaders, and there are so many of them now, decide "what is
best" for the public. Inopportunely, what is perceived to be in the "best interest" of the
majority in the name of "progress" may sometimes, and in the long run, the calamitous to the
entire people in terms of cultural atrophy. This is the quandary in which this Court finds itself
as it attempts to weigh once more private rights against sovereignty and the general welfare.
Background Facts
In a nutshell, the undisputed facts in these consolidated petitions follow.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899, which authorized chartered cities and municipalities to
reclaim adjoining foreshore lands, the City Council of Pasay resolved to reclaim a portion of
the Manila Bay covering the Manila-Pasay-Parañaque bounderies and, for this purpose,
enacted Ordinance No. 121 on May 6, 1958. Two days later, on the strength of said ordinance,
Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta contracted with Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) for
the reclamation of portions of the Manila Bay. On April 21, 1959, the City Council of Pasay
amended Ordinance No. 121 by enacting Ordinance No. 158. A new agreement between the
parties (the Reclamation Agreement) was executed three days thereafter, whcih, among other
things, granted the reclamation project to RREC and gave it an irrevocable option to
purchase a maximum of 60% of the area reclaimed at P10.00 per square meter, the amount of
which could be set off against any outstanding obligation of the City to RREC. Such an
option could only be effected within a year from the time the City Engineer certified that 50
hectares had been reclaimed. The reclamation itself was made by the RREC through third
parties who were awarded contracts on the various phases of the project through public
bidding. To raise more funds, RREC entered into contracts to sell the reclaimed areas which
it could purchase from Pasay City by exercising its option under the Reclamation Agreement.
Proceedings before the trial court
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint (amended on March
5, 1962) against Pasay City and RREC for "Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction" before Branch 7 of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, praying for the declaration of nullity of Ordinance
Nos. 121 and 158, the Reclamation Agreement, and the Contracts to Sell between RREC and
the buyers of the reclaimed land. Among other things, the following matters were alleged: (a)
the area reclaimed was already reserved as a national park under Proclamation No. 41, dated
July 5, 1954 and Act No. 3915, hence, the subject of the Reclamation Agreement was beyond
man's commerce; (b) Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 were ultra vires and void ab initio for being
violative of R.A. No. 1899, because they involved the reclamation of "submerged areas" and
not "foreshore lands" as allowed by said law; and (c) the Reclamation Agreement was illegal,
contrary to morals and public policy because it was executed with neither authority from the
National Government nor any public bidding.
In their separate answer, Pasay City and RREC set forth the following negative defenses: (a)
Pasay City was empowered by R.A. No. 1899 to reclaim any portion of the Manila Bay; (b) the
area reclaimed was not a portion of the Manila Bay Resort, which was the area reserved as a
national park under Proclamation No. 41 and Act No. 3915; (c) under R.A. No. 1899, the term
"foreshore lands" meant much more than its technical definition and extended to submerged
areas beyond the water marks of the shore; and (d) all the actuations of the City RREC
regarding the reclamation project were in accordance with R.A. No. 1899 and related laws.
On April 26, 1962, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Pasay City
and RREC to refrain from their activities at the Manila Bay. On January 10, 1968, however,
RREC filed a "Motion to Dismiss" the complaint on the ground that the passage of Republic
Act No. 5187 (otherwise known as the Public Works Act) on September 16, 1967, rendered the
issues raised by the Republic of the Philippines moot and academic. Specifically, RREC
relied on Section 3 (m) thereof which stated that all "contracts of city or municipal
governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected"
during the construction by the national government of a sea wall and limited access highway
passing through the projected area of the reclamation. In the meantime, the trial court
allowed Jose Bautista and others who allegedly bought in good faith and for value from
RREC some portions of the reclaimed land, to intervene in the action and join cause with
Pasay City and RREC. On the other hand, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLCUI),
a civic organization, joined with the Republic of the Philippines and filed a complaint in
intervention.
On May 24, 1972, the court a quo rendered a judgment on the pleadings, upholding the
validity of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 of the Reclamation Agreement; dismissing the
complaint as well as PLCUI's complaint in intervention; enjoining RREC and Pasay City "to
have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public
Works, and to have all the contracts and subcontracts for said reclamation awarded by
means of, and only after, public bidding"; and lifting the preliminary injunction, dated April
26, 1962, as soon as said conditions shall have been met by RREC and Pasay City.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

During the pendency of the State's appeal with the Court of Appeals, President Marcos
issued on January 11, 1973, Pressidential Decree No. 3-A, providing, inter alia, that "the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person aurhorized by it under a proper contract," and that it shall take
over any validly existing reclamation contract on the basis of quantum meruit. On the
strength of P.D. No. 3-A, the Commission of Public Highways and the Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) took over the reclamation contract
between Pasay City and RREC for the construction of the Manila-Cavite City Coastal Road.
CDCP development the area already reclaimed by RREC and continued reclaiming where the
latter left off. These areas, which came to be known as the Cultural Center Complex and the
Financial Center Complex, were registered in the name of the CCP.
On February 4, 1977, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1084. It was designated as the agency primarily responsible for all the reclaation
projects of the national government. The PEA then took over the Manila Bay reclamation
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and CDCP.
In 1978, RREC filed a claim for P30,396,878.20 with the ten Ministry of Public Highways (MPH)
for its actual reclamation in the CCP Complex before CDCP assumed authority over the
project. The MPH, on the other hand, determined the amount of reclamation by RREC to be
only P10,926,071.29. Later, RREC offered to settle the case with the Office of the Solicitor
General for the original amount of its claim. The OSG would, however, settle only for the
lesser amount assessed by the MPH. This was acceptable to RREC only with an additional
6% interest per annum from 1962 up to the time of payment. Within the decade that followed,
RREC's proposals for settling the case ballooned from a P35,455,011.31 cash settlement or a
property settlement of 3.5 hectares in the CCP Complex covered by TCT No. 75676, to a cash
settlement of P175 million, then later, P245 million. The Office of the President, to which the
proposals were referred, rejected the same. In other words, no amicable settlement was
reached.
The first decision
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming the trial court's
judgment with the following modifications: (a) the requirement on public bidding and
submission of plans and specifications to the DPWH by RREC was deleted; (b) the Republic
of the Philippines was ordered to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession of
the 21 hectares already reclaimed by RREC; and (c) RREC's irrevocable option to purchase
60% of the 21 hectares it had already reclaimed was sustained.
The amended decision
On April 28, 1992, the appellate court rendered an amended decision. It agreed with the
position of Pasay City and RREC in their motion for reconsideration that the actual the
reclaimed was 55, not 21, hectares. Considering, however, that latter were willing to accept 35
hectares of open land in the CCP Complex, the court ordered the Republic of the Philippines
to reconvey to Pasay City and RREC said parcels of land comprising nine lots registered in
the name of CCP. This is the decision being assailed by both parties in the instant
consolidated petitions.
Issues raised
In G.R. No. 103882

Are Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, as well as the Reclamation Agreement between Pasay City
and RREC, valid and bindings as against the National Government and the Cultural Center of
the Philippines?
The Republic of the Philippines claims that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
validity of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 and the Reclamation Agreement executed pursuant
thereto, and in ordering the reconveyance of the nine lots titled in the name of CCP to the
City of Pasay and RREC. It stresses that the reclamation project undertaken by Pasay City
and RREC violated R.A. No. 1899, especially since the subject areas were "submerged
lands", not "foreshore lands" which are the only lands that may be reclaimed by local
governments under said law.
The CCP, as intervenor in G.R. No. 103882, alleges that the appellate court's amended
decision was not binding upon it because it was never made a party to the action and that it
was compelled to intervene in the instant petitions to protect its proprietary interests. It
claims that the Court of Appeals erred in findings that the actual area reclaimed by RREC was
55 hectares, and in ordering it to turn over to RREC and Pasay City the nine lots registered in
its name.
In G.R. No. 105276
Is P.D. 3-A constitutional?
The City of Pasay and RREC claim it is not and that the Court of Apealls erred in not ruling
upon its constitutionality, considering that said decree deprived them of their property and
rights of ownership without due process of law and without payment of just compensation,
and that it violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and in not awarding them
damages for the alleged illegal takeover of the reclamation contract and the reclaimed area.
Thus, they pray for the modification of the assailed amended decision by awarding them
damages and conveying to them, not merely 35, but 55 hectares of the land allegedly
reclaimed.
The Commissioner's Report
On September 10, 1997, the Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case
to the Court of Appeals to receive further evidence and determine the actual area reclaimed
by RREC and the arreas of the CCP Complex which are "open spaces." In its Commissioner's
Report dated November 25, 1997, the appellate court conclude that the CCP and the Solicitor
General failed to refute its earleir finding that RREC and Pasay City were able to reclaim 55
hectares of the Manila Bay.
Discussion of Issues
1. Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, as well as the Reclamation Agreement between Pasay
City and RREC, are null and void for violating the clear and unambiguous provisions
of R.A. No. 1899.
In 1984, the term "foreshore lands" was defined by this Court in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals.1 Although the subject of this case was part of the Laguna de Bay, the Court
nevertheless applied Bouvier's definition of "foreshore lands," viz: "that part of the land
immediately in front of the shore; the part which is between high and low water marks, and
alternately covered with water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is indicated by
a middle line between the highest and lowest tides."
This judicial interpretation did not escape the attention of the legislature in the enactment of
later related laws. In R.A. No. 5187, for example, Congress specified the areas that may be
reclaimed in the construction of the Manila-Cavite City Coastal Road to include both
"foreshore and submerged areas." The Chief Executive also recognized the disparity
between the two terms when he signed into law P.D. No. 3-A, authorizing the reclamation of
"areas under water, whether foreshore or inland." Similarly, P.D. No. 1094, creating the Public
Estates authority to "reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas."
Initially, legislative intent and later jurisprudential usage clearly delimited the term "foreshore
lands" to that part of the land where the tides literally converge, thus excluding submerged
lands. This restricted explication was unquestionably ackonwledged by the other branches of
government when, in passing subsequent related statutes, they added the terms "submerged
areas" or "areas under water" to foreshore lands." Under the principles of legal construction,
since R.A No. 1899 partakes of the nature of a legislative grant of a sovereign right to
municipalities and chartered cities, that is, the right "to reclaim," it must be strictly construed
against the latter.
R.A. No. 1899 was, therefore, enacted to apply strictly to "foreshore lands." Thus, when RREC
was permitted by the City of Pasay, through Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 and the ensuing
Reclamation Agreement, to reclaim up to a one-kilometer stretch into the Manila Bay, more
than just "foreshore lands" was obviously contemplated and involved. Furthermore, R.A. No.
1899 mandates that any reclamation must be carried out by the municipality or chartered city
concerned2 with the aid of funds which it may borrow from third persons or lending
institution. 3 The reclamation of Manila Bay was undertaken, not by Pasay City, but by RREC
itself under a special power of attorney from Pasay City using funds exclusively borrowed by
the latter from RREC. To compound the anomaly of it all, the reclamation project itself was
awarded by Pasay City to RREC without any public bidding. Finally, to complete Pasay City's
absolute abdication of its duty to champion public over private interest, RREC was granted
an irrevocable option to purchase the land reclaimed in lieu of simply paying for it using a
determinable and liquadated amount "in Philippine currency or in the currency in which the
principal has been originally received,"4 as required by R.A. No. 1899. In fact, RREC began
disposing of the land by entering into contracts to sell with various third persons while the
reclamation project was still in progress and long before it acquired any right of dominion
over the lands yet to be reclaimed. These are all blatant violations of R.A. No. 1899. Hence,
Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, no less than the Reclamation Agreement and the Contracts to
Sell it has spawned, should all be deemed null and void, the reclamation itself being ultra
vires.
2. P.D. No. 3-A is constitutional and valid
Applying the regalian doctrine, the State owns all waters and lands of the public domain,
including those physically reclaimed. As a general rule, therefore, only the National
Government can reclaim foreshore lands and other submerged areas. At times, though, the
State, to effectuate an expressed public, policy, delagates some of its sovereign powers
either to the legislature or to some of its alter egos. One such instance was R.A. No. 1899
which was intended to increase the autonomy of local governments, an innovation
introduced by the Marcos administration. There is no doubt, however, that R.A. No. 1899 was
a mere public grant, a privilege which may be withdrawn by the granting authority, the
sovereign, in the exercise of police power. This is precisely what President Marcos did when
he issued P.D. No. 3-A, a valid and effective means of regaining the State's right to reclaim. It
must be noted that this decree was not revoked by President Aquino when she assumed the
presidency.
P.D. No. 3-A does not violate the equal protection clause, as claimed by Pasay City and
RREC, because, far from singling out the latter, its terminology is simple and extensive
enough to cover just about any municipality or city. The decree was signed by President
Marcos under his emergency powers when martial law was in effect throughout the country.
Thus, it is not an undue delegation or usurpation of legislation power. Neither does it
authorize the taking of property without just compensation, for it specifically allows such
payment, albeit based on quantum meruit. Incidentally, while RREC attacks the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 3-A, and only at this late stage in the proceedings, it relied on this
"quantum meruit compensation" clause in the same decree when it filed a claim before the
then Ministry of Public Works way back in 1978 and again in 1983. This is an oddity which
this Court takes notice of in disallowing RREC from taking contrary positions regarding the
validity of a statute in this action. It cannot take advantage of a provision of law even as it
attacks the same.
Finally, the Court notes that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28,
1992, is based on inadequate evidence. Its conclusion that RREC was able to reclaim 35
hectares is totally unsupported by the dubious proof presented by Pasay City and RREC.
In ruling in favor of Pasay City and RREC, the appellate court relied mostly on three
documents issued by the government to the RREC, namely, the "Cost of Data for Items of
Work Covered by the Republic Real Estate Corporation for Work Performed in the Manila
Bay" issued by the Ministry of Public Highways, and two letters both addressed to RREC
Executive Vice President Vicente Asuncion, Jr., one dated June 6, 1979, from then Minister of
Public Highways Baltazar Aquino, and another, dated June 10, 1981; from then Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza. These documents, however, never proved that RREC was able to
reclaim 35 hectares. In fact, the letter of Aquino, finding that RREC had reclaimed 55
hectares, was in its own words, merely "tentative, pending the submittal of corroborative
documents"; hence, it does not amount to the "certification" contemplated in R.A. No. 1899.
Mendoza's letter, on the other hand, far from supporting RREC's position, rejected RREC's
proposal in the latter's attempt at settlement. It is puzzling why the appellate court even
considered this letter in favor of RREC and Pasay City .
On the other hand, there is aimple proof that RREC was not able to reclaim the 55 hectares
which it claims it did, or even 35 hectares, as found by the Court of Appeals as follows: aerial
photographs of the Manila Bay area in 1966 and 1968; photographs of the CCP taken 1967
and 1968 during construction of the main building; and the testimonies of the persons
familiar with the circumstances under which said photographs were taken, as well as the
other witnesses who were, one way or another, connected with the construction of the CCP
main building, including a member of the Board of Directors of RREC.
3. RREC is entitled to some monetary award
While the extent of reclamation actually done by RREC is debatable, there is no dispute that it
did reclaim some portion of the Manila Bay. In the preceding discussion, we declared the
nullity of Ordinace Nos. 121 and 158 and the Reclamation Agreement, which are the
wellsprings of RREC's right to be compensated. Its reclamation efforts were also found to
be ultra vires. Equity and fairness, however, dictate that it be compensated for the work
actually performed by it. After all, the State cannot deny that it did benefit from such
reclamation. RREC was initially willing to settle the case for P30,396,878.20. In view of the
foregoing premises, we believe that RREC should only be given the amount which the State
was willing to pay, that is P10,929,071.29, without legal interest. It is axiomatic that legal
interest is given either for the use of the money (a loan or forbearance of money) or as a
penalty for beach of an obligation (damages). In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,5 the Court had occassion to set the guidelines by which litigants may claim
or be awarded interest as or by way of actual or compensatory damages. Thus,
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of

money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation not consisting of a loan or forbearance of money, is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, were the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. . . . (Citations omitted)
These are the only circumstances under which interest in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages, liquidated or otherwise, may be justified. In the case at bar, no loan
or forbearance of money is involved; neither is there any breach of obligation. Consequently,
the lone commitment of the State would be the payment for services allegedly rendered,
services for which RREC would have the National Government cede to it its property, the
value of which has been inflated to unimaginable proportions since the inception of the
reclamation project. This is manifestly cupidity at its worst. Neither should the state be
penalized for something for which it is entirely blameless. The circumstances which led to
the filing of these twin actions have long been overtaken by supervening events, rendering
the issues incipiently raised moot and academic. Thus, RREC and Pasay City are, as they
should be, only entilled to P10,926,071.29. No more, no less.
Conclusion
For almost three decades, the Cultural Center of the Philippines has been the principal, if not
the sole, purveyor of the arts in this country. It has weathered criticism, civil unrest, and
"internecine" politics. It relies on the occasional beneficence of loyal patrons, the so-called
"cultured" class scorned and spurned by the "masa." Otherwise, it subsists on the rental
income it receives from private entities leasing portions of the CCP Complex. With the trial
and appellate courts upholding their claims, Pasay City and RREC wish to dismember this
bastion of cultural heritage and stunt its growth by claiming ownership over a substantial
portion of its property, that which literally serves as its bloodline. This must not be
countenanced. The CCP is certainly not about to draw its curtains and take a final bow. As
Matthew Arnold said more than a century ago, "I am a Liberal, yet I am a Liberal tempered by
experience, reflection, and renouncement, and I am, above all, a believer in culture.
I vote to grant the State's petition, with the qualification adverted to above.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Fidel P. Purisima, as fortified by the
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, insofar as it (1) nullifies (a) the Reclamation
Agreement between Pasay City and the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) and (b)
Pasay City Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, and (2) retains ownership of the reclaimed land in
favor of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. With due respect, I submit, however, that the
majority has no factual basis for its determination of the compensation awarded to RREC and
Pasay City.
(1) Nullity of Reclamation Agreement and Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158.
Pasay City justifies its execution of the Reclamation Agreement with RREC and the passage
of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 on the basis of Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), the law
authorizing chartered cities and municipalities to undertake the undertake the reclamation
of foreshore lands. The questioned Agreement and Ordinance, however, cover submerged
areas of the Manila Bay. As explained in the ponencia, with which I agree, the legal and
common definition of foreshore land does not include areas that are fully submerged by the
sea.
The Manila Bay area is, therefore, definitely outside the scope of RA 1899. It remains part of
the public domain and is, as such, outside the commerce of man. It could not be the object of
ordinary contracts or ordinances. The questioned Agreement and Ordinances, the objects of
which involve such public property, are thus null and void.
(2) Reclained Area
Belongs to CCP
As a consequence, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), to which PD Nos. 15 and 774
have conveyed ownership of the reclaimed land, remains the lawful owner of the subject
land. Title to the nine (9) lots, which Respondent Court wrongfully ordered to be turned over
to Pasay City, had long been issued in favor of CCP (One subsequently to the GSIS as a
successor-in-interest). Such titles are unaffected by the claims of RREC and cannot be
collaterally attacked 1 in this litigation.
(3) No Factual Basis for
Determination of Compensation
Even if the Agreement and Ordinances were null and void, it cannot be denied that RREC and
the city government of Pasay spent time, money and effort which undoubtedly inured to the
benefit of the government. It is a time-honored principle that no one, not even the
government, may be enriched at the expenses of another,2 particularly one who, like RREC
and Pasay City, acted on good faith.
While RREC and Pasay City should be compensated for their work on the reclamation
project, I respectfully submit that the amount of such compensation must be supported by
substantial and material proof of the reasonable expenses they incurred. But, the records of
the case are bereft of any such factual evidence.
However, the records do indicate some attempts of the parties to reach an amicable
settlement as a consequence of the promulgation of PD 3-A by former President Ferdinand
Marcos. Thus, in 1978, RREC sought the amount of P30,396.878.20 representing the
supposed monetory value of the reclamation work that it had undertaken so far. The then
Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) (and later the solicitor general also) rejected this offer in
1981 and, instead, counteroffered P10,926,071.29 as the reasonable value of such work.
RREC replied that it would be consider such amount only if it would bear six (6) percent
interest per annum from 1962 up to the time of payment. It submitted other proposals, but all
were rejected by the government. No final extrajudicial settlement was ever reached.
Obviously, the offers and counteroffer were made by the parties with a view to arriving at
compromise agreement. At that point, they were not submitted as evidence, but only as a
means of arriving at a peaceful settlemet prior to judgment. By then, the case, which had
commenced in December 1961 and was still on appeal with the Court of Appeals, was already
dragging on for the two decades.
Nature of Compromise
A compromise is an agreement between two or more parties whereby their differences are
adjusted in a manner which they mutually agree on, and which they prefer to "hope of
gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.3 The parties usually make reciprocal concessions
in order to avoid litigation or terminate a pending one. 4
However, basic is the rule on evidence that in civil cases, an offer of compromise cannot be
taken as an admission of liability; nor can it be admissable as an evidence against the
offeror.5 The offer to compromise a claim or a cause of action is not an admission that the
claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute and that an amount is to be paid to
avoid or end the controversy.6 I submit that an unaccepted offer or counteroffer of
compromise cannot be the basis of the sum to be adjudged in favor of or against a party,
more so if such sum is unsuported by competent evidence. In such case, the court itself
insofar as it adopts the amount either offered or conteroffered would be bereft of factual
basis for its decision. Where the proposed compromise is not accepted, the parties to the
litigation would be back to square one; they have to present before the court sufficient and
credible evidence to prove their respective claims.
As a rule, an offer or a counteroffer given in an effort to reach a compromise should not be

accorded evidentiary value on its face, because by its very nature, a compromise is
concessionary. And if one of the parties does not concur, the court cannot impose an amount
based on the unaccepted offer, even if culpability of a party has been duly established. The
amount of any such liability must be independently ascertained with competent evidence.
Otherwise, this Court would be setting a dangerous precedent. Hence, parties, would not
submit offers to compromise for fear that such offers, if not accepted, would be used by the
Court against them. Upon the other hand, parties may offer bloated amounts in the hope that
siad sums could influence the court to eventually grant them a relief more than they deserve.
In any, event, the rationale for the policy encouraging compromise would be defeated.
In the case at bar, we should bear in mind that when RREC conceded in 1981 to the solicitor
general's counteroffer of P10,926,071.29, provided the amount would bear 6 percent interest
per annum, it was with the caveat that such interest rate was already "very much less that the
accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 . . . ." Indeed, if we are to compare
current prices with those of three and a half decades ago, or even seventheen years ago,
such interest rate on the principal may no longer compensate the 1962 expense. In other
words, what may have been a "fair and reasonable" compromise in 1981 may no longer be
acceptable at this time. In any event, the solicitor general's counteroffer, not being supported
with factual evidence, still cannot be the basis of a judicial award.
Need to Receive Evidence of
Value of RREC Accomplishment
In the instant case, there appears no dispute that RREC has undertaken partil work for the
Manila Bay reclamation project to the extent of 1,558,395 cubic meteres of dredge-fill work. In
the words of the ponencia:
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was the payment for what it had done on,
and for dredge-fill of 1,558.395 cubic meters used for the reclamation project
worked on.
This case must therefore be remanded for the purpose of receiving evidence of the peso
value of the 1,558,395 cubic meters of dredge-fill work undisputedly done by RREC.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the following:
1. The RECLARATION of the nullity of (a) the Reclamation Agreement Between Pasay City
and RREC and (b) Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 of Pasay City.
2. The RETENTION of ownership of the reclaimed land in favor of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines.
3. The REMAND of the case to the Commission composed of the former Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals (consisting of Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena, chairman; Minerva
P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Quirino D. Abad Santos Jr.) for the sole purpose of receiving evidence
of the peso value of the work accomplished by RREC and Pasay City for which they shall be
paid by the national government.
Separate Opinions
Culture doesn't save anything or any-one, it doesn't justify. But it's a product of man: he
projects himself into it, he recognizes himself in it; that critical mirror alone offers him his
image." So said Jean Paul Sartre, one of the greatest philosophical thinkers of our time.
Matthew Arnold referred to it as the "pursuit of our total perfection" or the "study of
perfection." The English mathematican and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, placing
premium on human subjectivity, declared, "Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness
to beauty and humane feeling.
Image, perfection, beauty, and feeling. These are elements which are also associated with art
and creation. Yet, art in itself is a multi-faceted concept. The revered and, at times,
controversial President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, in one of his numerous speeches, elevated
art to the level of a pyscho-social necessity of man when he said, ". . . (A)rt establishes the
basic human truths which ust serve as the touchstone of our judgment." Indeed, there is no
question that art satisfies one of the deepest spiritual needs of man.
Of course, when one speaks of art and culture, he in fact speaks of it in two ways: the
abstract and the concrete. What is abstract is conditioned by time; that which is and the
concrete is ravaged by it. While the concept of "culture and art" endures man's folies,
amassing innumerable, priceless enhancements as it effortlessly slides through generations
of human progress, its tangible counterpart, that which is preserved for our children's
appreciation, is unfortunately fragile. Art works, music, architecture, literature, and other
cultural embellishments which exhibit extraordinary longevity are proclaimed as national
treasures, and rightly so, for they are lasting testiminials of man's boundless imagination and
creativity, that single trait that places the human species above all other creatures of the
Almighty.
Most evidence of a culture's richness are lost, not in the tide of nature's frivolity, but through
man's foolishness and capriciousness. Wars used to be the main culprit in the virtual
obliteration of the works of ancient scholars. We are now, and for the past century or so,
faced with a greater foe: progress. Progress and development are the hallmarks of
successful governance. Our leaders, and there are so many of them now, decide "what is
best" for the public. Inopportunely, what is perceived to be in the "best interest" of the
majority in the name of "progress" may sometimes, and in the long run, the calamitous to the
entire people in terms of cultural atrophy. This is the quandary in which this Court finds itself
as it attempts to weigh once more private rights against sovereignty and the general welfare.
Background Facts
In a nutshell, the undisputed facts in these consolidated petitions follow.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899, which authorized chartered cities and municipalities to
reclaim adjoining foreshore lands, the City Council of Pasay resolved to reclaim a portion of
the Manila Bay covering the Manila-Pasay-Parañaque bounderies and, for this purpose,
enacted Ordinance No. 121 on May 6, 1958. Two days later, on the strength of said ordinance,
Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta contracted with Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) for
the reclamation of portions of the Manila Bay. On April 21, 1959, the City Council of Pasay
amended Ordinance No. 121 by enacting Ordinance No. 158. A new agreement between the
parties (the Reclamation Agreement) was executed three days thereafter, whcih, among other
things, granted the reclamation project to RREC and gave it an irrevocable option to
purchase a maximum of 60% of the area reclaimed at P10.00 per square meter, the amount of
which could be set off against any outstanding obligation of the City to RREC. Such an
option could only be effected within a year from the time the City Engineer certified that 50
hectares had been reclaimed. The reclamation itself was made by the RREC through third
parties who were awarded contracts on the various phases of the project through public
bidding. To raise more funds, RREC entered into contracts to sell the reclaimed areas which
it could purchase from Pasay City by exercising its option under the Reclamation Agreement.
Proceedings before the trial court
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint (amended on March
5, 1962) against Pasay City and RREC for "Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction" before Branch 7 of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, praying for the declaration of nullity of Ordinance
Nos. 121 and 158, the Reclamation Agreement, and the Contracts to Sell between RREC and
the buyers of the reclaimed land. Among other things, the following matters were alleged: (a)
the area reclaimed was already reserved as a national park under Proclamation No. 41, dated
July 5, 1954 and Act No. 3915, hence, the subject of the Reclamation Agreement was beyond
man's commerce; (b) Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 were ultra vires and void ab initio for being
violative of R.A. No. 1899, because they involved the reclamation of "submerged areas" and
not "foreshore lands" as allowed by said law; and (c) the Reclamation Agreement was illegal,
contrary to morals and public policy because it was executed with neither authority from the
National Government nor any public bidding.
In their separate answer, Pasay City and RREC set forth the following negative defenses: (a)
Pasay City was empowered by R.A. No. 1899 to reclaim any portion of the Manila Bay; (b) the
area reclaimed was not a portion of the Manila Bay Resort, which was the area reserved as a
national park under Proclamation No. 41 and Act No. 3915; (c) under R.A. No. 1899, the term
"foreshore lands" meant much more than its technical definition and extended to submerged
areas beyond the water marks of the shore; and (d) all the actuations of the City RREC
regarding the reclamation project were in accordance with R.A. No. 1899 and related laws.
On April 26, 1962, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Pasay City
and RREC to refrain from their activities at the Manila Bay. On January 10, 1968, however,
RREC filed a "Motion to Dismiss" the complaint on the ground that the passage of Republic
Act No. 5187 (otherwise known as the Public Works Act) on September 16, 1967, rendered the
issues raised by the Republic of the Philippines moot and academic. Specifically, RREC
relied on Section 3 (m) thereof which stated that all "contracts of city or municipal
governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected"
during the construction by the national government of a sea wall and limited access highway
passing through the projected area of the reclamation. In the meantime, the trial court
allowed Jose Bautista and others who allegedly bought in good faith and for value from
RREC some portions of the reclaimed land, to intervene in the action and join cause with
Pasay City and RREC. On the other hand, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLCUI),
a civic organization, joined with the Republic of the Philippines and filed a complaint in
intervention.
On May 24, 1972, the court a quo rendered a judgment on the pleadings, upholding the
validity of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 of the Reclamation Agreement; dismissing the
complaint as well as PLCUI's complaint in intervention; enjoining RREC and Pasay City "to
have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public
Works, and to have all the contracts and subcontracts for said reclamation awarded by
means of, and only after, public bidding"; and lifting the preliminary injunction, dated April
26, 1962, as soon as said conditions shall have been met by RREC and Pasay City.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

During the pendency of the State's appeal with the Court of Appeals, President Marcos
issued on January 11, 1973, Pressidential Decree No. 3-A, providing, inter alia, that "the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person aurhorized by it under a proper contract," and that it shall take
over any validly existing reclamation contract on the basis of quantum meruit. On the
strength of P.D. No. 3-A, the Commission of Public Highways and the Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) took over the reclamation contract
between Pasay City and RREC for the construction of the Manila-Cavite City Coastal Road.
CDCP development the area already reclaimed by RREC and continued reclaiming where the
latter left off. These areas, which came to be known as the Cultural Center Complex and the
Financial Center Complex, were registered in the name of the CCP.
On February 4, 1977, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1084. It was designated as the agency primarily responsible for all the reclaation
projects of the national government. The PEA then took over the Manila Bay reclamation
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and CDCP.
In 1978, RREC filed a claim for P30,396,878.20 with the ten Ministry of Public Highways (MPH)
for its actual reclamation in the CCP Complex before CDCP assumed authority over the
project. The MPH, on the other hand, determined the amount of reclamation by RREC to be
only P10,926,071.29. Later, RREC offered to settle the case with the Office of the Solicitor
General for the original amount of its claim. The OSG would, however, settle only for the
lesser amount assessed by the MPH. This was acceptable to RREC only with an additional
6% interest per annum from 1962 up to the time of payment. Within the decade that followed,
RREC's proposals for settling the case ballooned from a P35,455,011.31 cash settlement or a
property settlement of 3.5 hectares in the CCP Complex covered by TCT No. 75676, to a cash
settlement of P175 million, then later, P245 million. The Office of the President, to which the
proposals were referred, rejected the same. In other words, no amicable settlement was
reached.
The first decision
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming the trial court's
judgment with the following modifications: (a) the requirement on public bidding and
submission of plans and specifications to the DPWH by RREC was deleted; (b) the Republic
of the Philippines was ordered to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession of
the 21 hectares already reclaimed by RREC; and (c) RREC's irrevocable option to purchase
60% of the 21 hectares it had already reclaimed was sustained.
The amended decision
On April 28, 1992, the appellate court rendered an amended decision. It agreed with the
position of Pasay City and RREC in their motion for reconsideration that the actual the
reclaimed was 55, not 21, hectares. Considering, however, that latter were willing to accept 35
hectares of open land in the CCP Complex, the court ordered the Republic of the Philippines
to reconvey to Pasay City and RREC said parcels of land comprising nine lots registered in
the name of CCP. This is the decision being assailed by both parties in the instant
consolidated petitions.
Issues raised
In G.R. No. 103882

Are Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, as well as the Reclamation Agreement between Pasay City
and RREC, valid and bindings as against the National Government and the Cultural Center of
the Philippines?
The Republic of the Philippines claims that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
validity of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 and the Reclamation Agreement executed pursuant
thereto, and in ordering the reconveyance of the nine lots titled in the name of CCP to the
City of Pasay and RREC. It stresses that the reclamation project undertaken by Pasay City
and RREC violated R.A. No. 1899, especially since the subject areas were "submerged
lands", not "foreshore lands" which are the only lands that may be reclaimed by local
governments under said law.
The CCP, as intervenor in G.R. No. 103882, alleges that the appellate court's amended
decision was not binding upon it because it was never made a party to the action and that it
was compelled to intervene in the instant petitions to protect its proprietary interests. It
claims that the Court of Appeals erred in findings that the actual area reclaimed by RREC was
55 hectares, and in ordering it to turn over to RREC and Pasay City the nine lots registered in
its name.
In G.R. No. 105276
Is P.D. 3-A constitutional?
The City of Pasay and RREC claim it is not and that the Court of Apealls erred in not ruling
upon its constitutionality, considering that said decree deprived them of their property and
rights of ownership without due process of law and without payment of just compensation,
and that it violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and in not awarding them
damages for the alleged illegal takeover of the reclamation contract and the reclaimed area.
Thus, they pray for the modification of the assailed amended decision by awarding them
damages and conveying to them, not merely 35, but 55 hectares of the land allegedly
reclaimed.
The Commissioner's Report
On September 10, 1997, the Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case
to the Court of Appeals to receive further evidence and determine the actual area reclaimed
by RREC and the arreas of the CCP Complex which are "open spaces." In its Commissioner's
Report dated November 25, 1997, the appellate court conclude that the CCP and the Solicitor
General failed to refute its earleir finding that RREC and Pasay City were able to reclaim 55
hectares of the Manila Bay.
Discussion of Issues
1. Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, as well as the Reclamation Agreement between Pasay
City and RREC, are null and void for violating the clear and unambiguous provisions
of R.A. No. 1899.
In 1984, the term "foreshore lands" was defined by this Court in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals.1 Although the subject of this case was part of the Laguna de Bay, the Court
nevertheless applied Bouvier's definition of "foreshore lands," viz: "that part of the land
immediately in front of the shore; the part which is between high and low water marks, and
alternately covered with water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is indicated by
a middle line between the highest and lowest tides."
This judicial interpretation did not escape the attention of the legislature in the enactment of
later related laws. In R.A. No. 5187, for example, Congress specified the areas that may be
reclaimed in the construction of the Manila-Cavite City Coastal Road to include both
"foreshore and submerged areas." The Chief Executive also recognized the disparity
between the two terms when he signed into law P.D. No. 3-A, authorizing the reclamation of
"areas under water, whether foreshore or inland." Similarly, P.D. No. 1094, creating the Public
Estates authority to "reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas."
Initially, legislative intent and later jurisprudential usage clearly delimited the term "foreshore
lands" to that part of the land where the tides literally converge, thus excluding submerged
lands. This restricted explication was unquestionably ackonwledged by the other branches of
government when, in passing subsequent related statutes, they added the terms "submerged
areas" or "areas under water" to foreshore lands." Under the principles of legal construction,
since R.A No. 1899 partakes of the nature of a legislative grant of a sovereign right to
municipalities and chartered cities, that is, the right "to reclaim," it must be strictly construed
against the latter.
R.A. No. 1899 was, therefore, enacted to apply strictly to "foreshore lands." Thus, when RREC
was permitted by the City of Pasay, through Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 and the ensuing
Reclamation Agreement, to reclaim up to a one-kilometer stretch into the Manila Bay, more
than just "foreshore lands" was obviously contemplated and involved. Furthermore, R.A. No.
1899 mandates that any reclamation must be carried out by the municipality or chartered city
concerned2 with the aid of funds which it may borrow from third persons or lending
institution. 3 The reclamation of Manila Bay was undertaken, not by Pasay City, but by RREC
itself under a special power of attorney from Pasay City using funds exclusively borrowed by
the latter from RREC. To compound the anomaly of it all, the reclamation project itself was
awarded by Pasay City to RREC without any public bidding. Finally, to complete Pasay City's
absolute abdication of its duty to champion public over private interest, RREC was granted
an irrevocable option to purchase the land reclaimed in lieu of simply paying for it using a
determinable and liquadated amount "in Philippine currency or in the currency in which the
principal has been originally received,"4 as required by R.A. No. 1899. In fact, RREC began
disposing of the land by entering into contracts to sell with various third persons while the
reclamation project was still in progress and long before it acquired any right of dominion
over the lands yet to be reclaimed. These are all blatant violations of R.A. No. 1899. Hence,
Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, no less than the Reclamation Agreement and the Contracts to
Sell it has spawned, should all be deemed null and void, the reclamation itself being ultra
vires.
2. P.D. No. 3-A is constitutional and valid
Applying the regalian doctrine, the State owns all waters and lands of the public domain,
including those physically reclaimed. As a general rule, therefore, only the National
Government can reclaim foreshore lands and other submerged areas. At times, though, the
State, to effectuate an expressed public, policy, delagates some of its sovereign powers
either to the legislature or to some of its alter egos. One such instance was R.A. No. 1899
which was intended to increase the autonomy of local governments, an innovation
introduced by the Marcos administration. There is no doubt, however, that R.A. No. 1899 was
a mere public grant, a privilege which may be withdrawn by the granting authority, the
sovereign, in the exercise of police power. This is precisely what President Marcos did when
he issued P.D. No. 3-A, a valid and effective means of regaining the State's right to reclaim. It
must be noted that this decree was not revoked by President Aquino when she assumed the
presidency.
P.D. No. 3-A does not violate the equal protection clause, as claimed by Pasay City and
RREC, because, far from singling out the latter, its terminology is simple and extensive
enough to cover just about any municipality or city. The decree was signed by President
Marcos under his emergency powers when martial law was in effect throughout the country.
Thus, it is not an undue delegation or usurpation of legislation power. Neither does it
authorize the taking of property without just compensation, for it specifically allows such
payment, albeit based on quantum meruit. Incidentally, while RREC attacks the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 3-A, and only at this late stage in the proceedings, it relied on this
"quantum meruit compensation" clause in the same decree when it filed a claim before the
then Ministry of Public Works way back in 1978 and again in 1983. This is an oddity which
this Court takes notice of in disallowing RREC from taking contrary positions regarding the
validity of a statute in this action. It cannot take advantage of a provision of law even as it
attacks the same.
Finally, the Court notes that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28,
1992, is based on inadequate evidence. Its conclusion that RREC was able to reclaim 35
hectares is totally unsupported by the dubious proof presented by Pasay City and RREC.
In ruling in favor of Pasay City and RREC, the appellate court relied mostly on three
documents issued by the government to the RREC, namely, the "Cost of Data for Items of
Work Covered by the Republic Real Estate Corporation for Work Performed in the Manila
Bay" issued by the Ministry of Public Highways, and two letters both addressed to RREC
Executive Vice President Vicente Asuncion, Jr., one dated June 6, 1979, from then Minister of
Public Highways Baltazar Aquino, and another, dated June 10, 1981; from then Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza. These documents, however, never proved that RREC was able to
reclaim 35 hectares. In fact, the letter of Aquino, finding that RREC had reclaimed 55
hectares, was in its own words, merely "tentative, pending the submittal of corroborative
documents"; hence, it does not amount to the "certification" contemplated in R.A. No. 1899.
Mendoza's letter, on the other hand, far from supporting RREC's position, rejected RREC's
proposal in the latter's attempt at settlement. It is puzzling why the appellate court even
considered this letter in favor of RREC and Pasay City .
On the other hand, there is aimple proof that RREC was not able to reclaim the 55 hectares
which it claims it did, or even 35 hectares, as found by the Court of Appeals as follows: aerial
photographs of the Manila Bay area in 1966 and 1968; photographs of the CCP taken 1967
and 1968 during construction of the main building; and the testimonies of the persons
familiar with the circumstances under which said photographs were taken, as well as the
other witnesses who were, one way or another, connected with the construction of the CCP
main building, including a member of the Board of Directors of RREC.
3. RREC is entitled to some monetary award
While the extent of reclamation actually done by RREC is debatable, there is no dispute that it
did reclaim some portion of the Manila Bay. In the preceding discussion, we declared the
nullity of Ordinace Nos. 121 and 158 and the Reclamation Agreement, which are the
wellsprings of RREC's right to be compensated. Its reclamation efforts were also found to
be ultra vires. Equity and fairness, however, dictate that it be compensated for the work
actually performed by it. After all, the State cannot deny that it did benefit from such
reclamation. RREC was initially willing to settle the case for P30,396,878.20. In view of the
foregoing premises, we believe that RREC should only be given the amount which the State
was willing to pay, that is P10,929,071.29, without legal interest. It is axiomatic that legal
interest is given either for the use of the money (a loan or forbearance of money) or as a
penalty for beach of an obligation (damages). In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,5 the Court had occassion to set the guidelines by which litigants may claim
or be awarded interest as or by way of actual or compensatory damages. Thus,
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of

money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation not consisting of a loan or forbearance of money, is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, were the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. . . . (Citations omitted)
These are the only circumstances under which interest in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages, liquidated or otherwise, may be justified. In the case at bar, no loan
or forbearance of money is involved; neither is there any breach of obligation. Consequently,
the lone commitment of the State would be the payment for services allegedly rendered,
services for which RREC would have the National Government cede to it its property, the
value of which has been inflated to unimaginable proportions since the inception of the
reclamation project. This is manifestly cupidity at its worst. Neither should the state be
penalized for something for which it is entirely blameless. The circumstances which led to
the filing of these twin actions have long been overtaken by supervening events, rendering
the issues incipiently raised moot and academic. Thus, RREC and Pasay City are, as they
should be, only entilled to P10,926,071.29. No more, no less.
Conclusion
For almost three decades, the Cultural Center of the Philippines has been the principal, if not
the sole, purveyor of the arts in this country. It has weathered criticism, civil unrest, and
"internecine" politics. It relies on the occasional beneficence of loyal patrons, the so-called
"cultured" class scorned and spurned by the "masa." Otherwise, it subsists on the rental
income it receives from private entities leasing portions of the CCP Complex. With the trial
and appellate courts upholding their claims, Pasay City and RREC wish to dismember this
bastion of cultural heritage and stunt its growth by claiming ownership over a substantial
portion of its property, that which literally serves as its bloodline. This must not be
countenanced. The CCP is certainly not about to draw its curtains and take a final bow. As
Matthew Arnold said more than a century ago, "I am a Liberal, yet I am a Liberal tempered by
experience, reflection, and renouncement, and I am, above all, a believer in culture.
I vote to grant the State's petition, with the qualification adverted to above.
I concur with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Fidel P. Purisima, as fortified by the
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, insofar as it (1) nullifies (a) the Reclamation
Agreement between Pasay City and the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) and (b)
Pasay City Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158, and (2) retains ownership of the reclaimed land in
favor of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. With due respect, I submit, however, that the
majority has no factual basis for its determination of the compensation awarded to RREC and
Pasay City.
(1) Nullity of Reclamation Agreement and Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158.
Pasay City justifies its execution of the Reclamation Agreement with RREC and the passage
of Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 on the basis of Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), the law
authorizing chartered cities and municipalities to undertake the undertake the reclamation
of foreshore lands. The questioned Agreement and Ordinance, however, cover submerged
areas of the Manila Bay. As explained in the ponencia, with which I agree, the legal and
common definition of foreshore land does not include areas that are fully submerged by the
sea.
The Manila Bay area is, therefore, definitely outside the scope of RA 1899. It remains part of
the public domain and is, as such, outside the commerce of man. It could not be the object of
ordinary contracts or ordinances. The questioned Agreement and Ordinances, the objects of
which involve such public property, are thus null and void.
(2) Reclained Area
Belongs to CCP
As a consequence, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), to which PD Nos. 15 and 774
have conveyed ownership of the reclaimed land, remains the lawful owner of the subject
land. Title to the nine (9) lots, which Respondent Court wrongfully ordered to be turned over
to Pasay City, had long been issued in favor of CCP (One subsequently to the GSIS as a
successor-in-interest). Such titles are unaffected by the claims of RREC and cannot be
collaterally attacked 1 in this litigation.
(3) No Factual Basis for
Determination of Compensation
Even if the Agreement and Ordinances were null and void, it cannot be denied that RREC and
the city government of Pasay spent time, money and effort which undoubtedly inured to the
benefit of the government. It is a time-honored principle that no one, not even the
government, may be enriched at the expenses of another,2 particularly one who, like RREC
and Pasay City, acted on good faith.
While RREC and Pasay City should be compensated for their work on the reclamation
project, I respectfully submit that the amount of such compensation must be supported by
substantial and material proof of the reasonable expenses they incurred. But, the records of
the case are bereft of any such factual evidence.
However, the records do indicate some attempts of the parties to reach an amicable
settlement as a consequence of the promulgation of PD 3-A by former President Ferdinand
Marcos. Thus, in 1978, RREC sought the amount of P30,396.878.20 representing the
supposed monetory value of the reclamation work that it had undertaken so far. The then
Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) (and later the solicitor general also) rejected this offer in
1981 and, instead, counteroffered P10,926,071.29 as the reasonable value of such work.
RREC replied that it would be consider such amount only if it would bear six (6) percent
interest per annum from 1962 up to the time of payment. It submitted other proposals, but all
were rejected by the government. No final extrajudicial settlement was ever reached.
Obviously, the offers and counteroffer were made by the parties with a view to arriving at
compromise agreement. At that point, they were not submitted as evidence, but only as a
means of arriving at a peaceful settlemet prior to judgment. By then, the case, which had
commenced in December 1961 and was still on appeal with the Court of Appeals, was already
dragging on for the two decades.
Nature of Compromise
A compromise is an agreement between two or more parties whereby their differences are
adjusted in a manner which they mutually agree on, and which they prefer to "hope of
gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.3 The parties usually make reciprocal concessions
in order to avoid litigation or terminate a pending one.4
However, basic is the rule on evidence that in civil cases, an offer of compromise cannot be
taken as an admission of liability; nor can it be admissable as an evidence against the
offeror.5 The offer to compromise a claim or a cause of action is not an admission that the
claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute and that an amount is to be paid to
avoid or end the controversy.6 I submit that an unaccepted offer or counteroffer of
compromise cannot be the basis of the sum to be adjudged in favor of or against a party,
more so if such sum is unsuported by competent evidence. In such case, the court itself
insofar as it adopts the amount either offered or conteroffered would be bereft of factual
basis for its decision. Where the proposed compromise is not accepted, the parties to the
litigation would be back to square one; they have to present before the court sufficient and
credible evidence to prove their respective claims.
As a rule, an offer or a counteroffer given in an effort to reach a compromise should not be

accorded evidentiary value on its face, because by its very nature, a compromise is
concessionary. And if one of the parties does not concur, the court cannot impose an amount
based on the unaccepted offer, even if culpability of a party has been duly established. The
amount of any such liability must be independently ascertained with competent evidence.
Otherwise, this Court would be setting a dangerous precedent. Hence, parties, would not
submit offers to compromise for fear that such offers, if not accepted, would be used by the
Court against them. Upon the other hand, parties may offer bloated amounts in the hope that
siad sums could influence the court to eventually grant them a relief more than they deserve.
In any, event, the rationale for the policy encouraging compromise would be defeated.
In the case at bar, we should bear in mind that when RREC conceded in 1981 to the solicitor
general's counteroffer of P10,926,071.29, provided the amount would bear 6 percent interest
per annum, it was with the caveat that such interest rate was already "very much less that the
accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 . . . ." Indeed, if we are to compare
current prices with those of three and a half decades ago, or even seventheen years ago,
such interest rate on the principal may no longer compensate the 1962 expense. In other
words, what may have been a "fair and reasonable" compromise in 1981 may no longer be
acceptable at this time. In any event, the solicitor general's counteroffer, not being supported
with factual evidence, still cannot be the basis of a judicial award.
Need to Receive Evidence of
Value of RREC Accomplishment
In the instant case, there appears no dispute that RREC has undertaken partil work for the
Manila Bay reclamation project to the extent of 1,558,395 cubic meteres of dredge-fill work. In
the words of the ponencia:
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was the payment for what it had done on,
and for dredge-fill of 1,558.395 cubic meters used for the reclamation project
worked on.
This case must therefore be remanded for the purpose of receiving evidence of the peso
value of the 1,558,395 cubic meters of dredge-fill work undisputedly done by RREC.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the following:
1. The RECLARATION of the nullity of (a) the Reclamation Agreement Between Pasay City
and RREC and (b) Ordinance Nos. 121 and 158 of Pasay City.
2. The RETENTION of ownership of the reclaimed land in favor of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines.
3. The REMAND of the case to the Commission composed of the former Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals (consisting of Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena, chairman; Minerva
P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Quirino D. Abad Santos Jr.) for the sole purpose of receiving evidence
of the peso value of the work accomplished by RREC and Pasay City for which they shall be
paid by the national government.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos and concurred by

Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes.
2 Exh. "P"; Folder No. I, Record on Appeal, p. 24.

3 Annex "A"; Record on Appeal, pp. 10-17.
4 Annex "E"; Record on Appeal, pp. 64-73.
5 Annexes "F" and "G"; Record on Appeal, pp. 74-105.
6 Annex "H", Record on Appeal, p. 106.
7 Annex "I"; Record on Appeal, p. 107.
8 Annex "J"; Record on Appeal, pp. 109-128.
9 Annex "H"; Record on Appeal, p. 129.
10 Annex "N"; Record on Appeal, pp. 169-172.
11 Annex "O"; Record on Appeal, pp. 175-176.
12 Annex "T"; Record on Appeal, p. 193.
13 Rollo, G.R. No. 103882, pp. 853-869.
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 105276, pp. 7-47.
15 See Amended Complaint; supra, footnote 4.
16 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 405.
17 People v. Amigo, 252 SCRA 43.
18 Largado v. Masaganda, 5 SCRA 552.
19 CA Rollo, p. 760.
20 Art. 2142, Civil Code:
Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of
quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at
the expense of another.
1 131 SCRA 532.
2 At Section 1, in relation to Section 9.
3 At Section 3.
4 At Section 6.
5 234 SCRA 78, 95-96 (1994).
1 Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 257 SCRA 174,184, May 30, 1996.
2 Art. 22, Civil Code. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 148 SCRA 315, 324, March 9, 1987; Ramie Textiles, Inc. v. Mathay Sr.,
SCRA 586, 592, April 30, 1979.
3 Del Rosario v. Madayag, 247 SCRA 767, August 28, 1995.
4 Galay v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 629, December 4, 1995; Domingo v.

Court Appeals, 255 SCRA 189, March 20, 1996; Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,
279 SCRA 647, 675, September 29, 1997.
5 § 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court. See also Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court
of Apeals, 257 SCRA 643, 656, June 26, 1996.
6 Servicewide Specialists, Inc., ibid., citing 15A CJS Compromise and

Settlement § 22.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for
brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity)
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out
all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,"
and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the same
date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by
PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29,
1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works
on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price
escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No.
1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and
transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all
the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have
not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which
areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473)
square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately
Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888)
square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level
located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting
and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register
of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and
7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred
and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration
in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President
Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No.
365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of
Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-
going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and
retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No.
132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of
judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court." 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in
the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19,
1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract;
(b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the
Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended
JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT
AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE
PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL

INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT

FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations
for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner
on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed
upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the
renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot
because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the
Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking
the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential
approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still
to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA
and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing
the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits
the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended
JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and
ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a
single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to
insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard
the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if
the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the
public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution,18 covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from
private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for
brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed
lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084
(charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended
JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial
confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or
still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because
of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the
reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy
percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended
JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the
Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As
it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case,
however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. 22 The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a
petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain
information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to
the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for
mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the
publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the Executive Department
had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for
the petitioners in Tañada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant
case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially
from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation.
Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private
parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the
terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public
disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct
judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The
principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of
the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.
We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant
case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will
suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus,
there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the
right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent
PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount
public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of
the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have
been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and
operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely
involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic
development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would
constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access
to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we
rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional
rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental
public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public
concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section
28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom
of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to
citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and
amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public
officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information
is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before
the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the
1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation

of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.
Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade
the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their
discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose
publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public.
Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size,
location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions
of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must
prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long
before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public
bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at
any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by

the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While
the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with
the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must
pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There
is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general,
as discussed earlier – such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign
relations, intelligence and other classified information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract
is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. 1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates
the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in
the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the
State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1)
official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and
(3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document
that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting,
justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials.
The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and
other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may
impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house
of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-
equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is not
the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of
the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed
of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian
doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 43 Article
339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the
Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the
maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the
grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking
the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve
ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property
devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to
those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property
not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted
property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase
the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into
private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties. 45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of
reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and
the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by
dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the
Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to
the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made
or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or
blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and
plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the
public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public
purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may
by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands.
Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government
reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available
only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654
did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained
private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act. 46 The
salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or
other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not
otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and
are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be
disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain
into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to
"declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall be classified" as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands,
however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-
agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify
inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions
also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain
into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-
agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of
these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public
service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654.
Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service.
This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to
private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were
the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under
Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to
private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The
1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands,
which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered
part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for
lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands
only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor
mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government
reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural
lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore
remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from
acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as
agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public
agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty
hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by
homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two
thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association."
(Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No.
2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining for
the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as
the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No.
141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to
"declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the
government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited
and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for
the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable
public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President
must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to
disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public
uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the
public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may
be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands
for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the
same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act
No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of
the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties.
The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or
those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under
the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA
No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX,
Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that
the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of
1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government
were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing,
however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the
public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But
even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land
remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained
in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA
No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands,
however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became
inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of
government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of
the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. 56 These lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government
reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified
under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the
government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under
Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold
to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that –
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes
for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or
transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the
purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted,
donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority
required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government
units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State.
These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private
parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-
agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional
limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner,
such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands. 57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No.
141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as
follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public
purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now
the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of
such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same
manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be
made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government
permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935
Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in
the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer
needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property
of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the
applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those
properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the
"development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State,
even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth,
are classified as property of public dominion.
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian
doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that –
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In
contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public
agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If the
land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of
agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore,
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals
who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine
citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that –
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land
of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any
qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by
lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in
excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease,
concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in
excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the
Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain,
and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public
domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter.
Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or
other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the
purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse,
canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain.
Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged
areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and
submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed,
classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government
corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations
and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain"
even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title
to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain,
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is
necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states –
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such
legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian
doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and
except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and
the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the
lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease,
alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which
says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced
in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable
public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is.
In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this
is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances
where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a
chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural
lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like
the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social
unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name
of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is
registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares
in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual
could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a
limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent
is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable
public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective
way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three
properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of
1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further
reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim
another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the
750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are
still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's
"actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own
expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation
costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will
share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is
defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common
areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the
name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or
conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation
Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and
delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of
AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any
given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of
additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture
PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila
Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland
Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby
granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the
Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its
supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural

lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that –
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands
are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force
concluded that –
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of
ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of
which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating
the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except
by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose
ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila
Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and
consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority
to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive Department
attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine
Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had
transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274 of
the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared
otherwise. The Court ruled that –
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.
v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands
reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84
hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the
name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of
a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the
Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government
had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are
"waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works,
then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only
with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not
"otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could
reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public
dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land
because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a
private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire
ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of
land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the
disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must
first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands
must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP
and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not
have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to
reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas
under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or
any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas
under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by
the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the
National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which
"shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person
or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services
rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed
land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no
longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title.
There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea,
these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part
of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can
these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are
the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public
agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public
services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the
functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of
land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as
may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary."
PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by
private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its
properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since
many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation
to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525
recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these
reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration
segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public
service.1âwphi1.nêt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned
by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as
alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers
and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public
lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate
taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses,

permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the
development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and
brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such
privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other
causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of
the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-
classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate
agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises
"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus,
DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should
be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can
undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain.
Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under
Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands
as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the
Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while
PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether
directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other
hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain
to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable
laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA,
citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of
the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting
its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to
sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the
contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation
covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership
and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084;
Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and
respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident
to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall
issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said
entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and
non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority
shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to
implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in

favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to
the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to
be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such
patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate
of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall
be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may
derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from
Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled
and/or operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals
since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales
and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by
PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations
but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085
would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a
public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and
67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a
public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of
the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended."
This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No.
654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its
assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654
merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does
not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code,
the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79
of PD No. 1445 mandates that –
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no
longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by
the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their
presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the
presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less
than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like
period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the
event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such
price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the
Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989.
This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public auction,
and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at
the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA
imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged
areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional
reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On December
23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands
through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public
bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another
350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750
hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, 95 is
not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three
years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country
had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear:
"Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as
legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban.
Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance
of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement
or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may
likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the
land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional
ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local
governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a
percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of

Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may
consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate
constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the
BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not
expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor
or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares 96 of non-
agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing
such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government
Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is
echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual
issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the
property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the
issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA
and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land
ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over which the Director
of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on
a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco
v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only
so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his
exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land
ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director
of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents
were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be
part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the
same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a
land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of
Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration
Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of
grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of
the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land
Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of
Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land
automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under
the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao
Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National Government
transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other
facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the
registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section
122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496
without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a
wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent
or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to
cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being
alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or
public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself,
cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the
alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government
units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the
provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President
Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and
in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto
the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the
technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No.
1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60
of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the
registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain
held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they
cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition.
Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141
does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands.
The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare
lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency
tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to
reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all
Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be
undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with
national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared
policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited
to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government

which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a
government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum
utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to
reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions
and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416,
do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of
the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any
national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged
with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or
sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other
alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only
when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands
of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands
of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as
well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands.
Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not
automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands
will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done
under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to
be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will
effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was
intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos,
now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in
corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil
that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction
of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to
acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands
of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529,
without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No.
1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529
includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be
registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration,
however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of
the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be
registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed
in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of
any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the
executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may
be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private
property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a
municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the
municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in
any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the
Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering
such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein,
is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for
registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely
by an adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the number of
the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest
taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee
simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government,
province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for
the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or
issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or
interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or
patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands
or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the
Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original
cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP
under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture,
the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the
certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The
transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands
other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a
transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 the Government Auditing
Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the
government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public
lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be
distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the
State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable
or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer
of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or
whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The
Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last
issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual
matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnote
1 Section 4 of PD No. 1084.
2 PEA's Memorandum dated August 4, 1999, p. 3.
3PEA's Memorandum, supra note 2 at 7. PEA's Memorandum quoted extensively, in its

Statement of Facts and the Case, the Statement of Facts in Senate Committee Report No.
560 dated September 16, 1997.
4In Opinion No. 330 dated December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel, citing
COA Audit Circular No. 89-296, advised PEA that PEA could negotiate the sale of the
157.84-hectare Freedom Islands in view of the failure of the public bidding held on
December 10, 1991 where there was not a single bidder. See also Senate Committee Report
No. 560, p. 12.
5 PEA's Memorandum, supra note 2 at 9.
6 Ibid.
7 The existence of this report is a matter of judicial notice pursuant to Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court which provides, "A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of x x x the official acts of the legislature x x x."
8 Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
9 Renato Cayetano.
10 Virgilio C. Abejo.
11Report and Recommendation of the Legal Task Force, Annex "C", AMARI's Memorandum
dated June 19, 1999.
12 AMARI's Comment dated June 24, 1998, p. 3; Rollo, p. 68.

AMARI filed three motions for extension of time to file comment (Rollo, pp. 32, 38, 48),
13
while PEA filed nine motions for extension of time (Rollo, pp. 127, 139).
14 Petitioner's Memorandum dated July 6, 1999, p. 42.
Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, with Solicitor General Ricardo P.
15
Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Azucena R. Balanon-Corpuz, and Associate Solicitor

Raymund I. Rigodon signing PEA's Memorandum.
Represented by Azcuna Yorac Arroyo & Chua Law Offices, and Romulo Mabanta Sayoc &
16
De los Angeles Law Offices.
Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985); Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975 );
17
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974 ); Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971 ).
18 Section 11, Article XIV.
19 Manila Electric Co. v. Judge F. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 (1982); Republic v. CA
and Iglesia, and Republic v. Cendana and Iglesia ni Cristo, 119 SCRA 449 (1982); Republic
v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875 (1982); Director of Lands v. Lood, 124
SCRA 460 (1983); Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 128 SCRA 44 (1984); Director of Lands v.
Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., 141 SCRA 21 (1986); Director of Lands
v. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., 146 SCRA 509 (1986); Republic v. IAC and Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lucena, 168 SCRA 165 (1988); Natividad v. CA, 202 SCRA 493 (1991);
Villaflor v. CA and Nasipit Lumber Co., 280 SCRA 297 (1997). In Ayog v. Cusi, 118 SCRA
492 (1982), the Court did not apply the constitutional ban in the 1973 Constitution because
the applicant corporation, Biñan Development Co., Inc., had fully complied with all its
obligations and even paid the full purchase price before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, although the sales patent was issued after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
20 PD No. 1073.
Annex "B", AMARI's Memorandum dated June 19, 1999, Section 5.2 (c) and (e) of the
21
Amended JVA, pp. 16-17.
22 Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998).
23 136 SCRA 27 (1985).
24Article 2 of the Civil Code (prior to its amendment by EO No. 200) provided as follows:
"Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is provided otherwise, x x x."
25Section 1 of CA No. 638 provides as follows: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette all important legislative acts and resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines; all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; x x x."
26Section 79 of the Government Auditing Codes provides as follows: "When government

property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon
application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his
duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be
valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it
may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper
committee on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other
authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the
Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of
general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality
where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property
may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or
body concerned and approved by the Commission."
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 (1997); Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193
27
SCRA 520 (1991); Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
28 See note 22.
29 Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states as follows: "Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."
30 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
31 See note 22.
32 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, pp. 24-25, (1986).
33 Supra, Note 22.
34 Ibid.
35 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987).
36 Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995).
37 See Note 22.
38 Chavez v. PCGG, see note 22; Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515 (1991).
39 Almonte v. Vasquez, see note 36.
People's Movement for Press Freedom, et al. v. Hon. Raul Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642,
40
En Banc Resolution dated April 13, 1988; Chavez v. PCGG, see note 22.
41 Section 270 of the National Internal Revenue Code punishes any officer or employee of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue who divulges to any person, except as allowed by law,
information regarding the business, income, or estate of any taxpayer, the secrets, operation,
style of work, or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer, or confidential information
regarding the business of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the
discharge of his official duties. Section 14 of R.A. No. 8800 (Safeguard Measures Act)
prohibits the release to the public of confidential information submitted in evidence to the
Tariff Commission. Section 3 (n) of R.A. No. 8504 (Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control
Act) classifies as confidential the medical records of HIV patients. Section 6 (j) of R.A. No.
8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act) classifies as confidential the records of the adopted child,
adopting parents, and natural parents. Section 94 (f) of R.A. No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act)
requires the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to maintain the
confidentiality of confidential information supplied by contractors who are parties to mineral
agreements or financial and technical assistance agreements.
42The Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias declared that: "We, having acquired full
sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded
away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown
and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all
what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish." See concurring opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199 (1998).
43 Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909). The exception mentioned in Cariño,
referring to lands in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest, since
time immemorial, is actually a species of a grant by the State. The United States Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., declared in Cariño: "Prescription
is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546; 'Where
such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.' It may be that this means
possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription,
even against the Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient
reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty." See also Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13 (1991).
44 Article 1 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
45Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 (1960); Joven v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134
(1953); Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990). See concurring opinion of Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199 (1998).
46Act No. 926, enacted on October 7, 1903, was also titled the Public Land Act. This Act,
however, did not cover reclaimed lands. Nevertheless, Section 23 of this Act provided as
follows: "x x x In no case may lands leased under the provisions of this chapter be taken so
as to gain control of adjacent land, water, stream, shore line, way, roadstead, or other
valuable right which in the opinion of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands would be
prejudicial to the interests of the public."
47Section 10 of Act No. 2874 provided as follows: "The words "alienation," "disposition," or
"concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for
the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or
mineral lands."
48Title II of Act No. 2874 governed alienable lands of the public domain for agricultural
purposes, while Title III of the same Act governed alienable lands of the public domain for
non-agricultural purposes.
49 Section 57 of Act No. 2874 provided as follows: "x x x; but the land so granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not
be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except
when authorized by the legislature; x x x."
50 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
51Section 2 of CA No. 141 states as follows: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to the
lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws
and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called "friar lands" and those which,
being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in
force or which may hereafter be enacted."
52Like Act No. 2874, Section 10 of CA No. 141 defined the terms "alienation" and
"disposition" as follows: "The words "alienation," "disposition," or "concession" as used in this
Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or
benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands."
53R.A. No. 6657 has suspended the authority of the President to reclassify forest or mineral
lands into agricultural lands. Section 4 (a) of RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988) states, "No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have delimited by law, the specific limits of
the public domain."
54 Covering Sections 58 to 68 of CA No. 141.
55 299 SCRA 199 (1998).
56Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution limited the disposition and utilization of
public agricultural lands to Philippine citizens or to corporations at least sixty percent owned
by Philippine citizens. This was, however, subject to the original Ordinance appended to the
1935 Constitution stating, among others, that until the withdrawal of United States
sovereignty in the Philippines, "Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in
the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations,
respectively, thereof."
57Section 44 of PD No. 1529 (previously Section 39 of Act No. 496) provides that "liens,
claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and the Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be
valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record" constitute statutory liens
affecting the title.
1âwphi1.nêt
58RA No. 730, which took effect on June 18, 1952, authorized the private sale of home lots
to actual occupants of public lands not needed for public service. Section 1 of RA No. 730
provided as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by RA No. 293, any Filipino citizen of legal age
who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he resides and who
had in good faith established his residence on a parcel of land of the Republic of the
Philippines which is not needed for public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a
private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him, not more than one thousand
square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. x x x." In addition, on June 16, 1948,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 293 allowing the private sale of marshy alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to lessees who have improved and utilized the same as farms,
fishponds or other similar purposes for at least five years from the date of the lease contract
with the government. R.A. No. 293, however, did not apply to marshy lands under Section 56
(c), Title III of CA No. 141 which refers to marshy lands leased for residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural purposes.
59 See note 49.
60 See note 60.
61 Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, see note 56.
62 Ibid.
63Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505 (1911); Government v. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112
(1929).
64 118 SCRA 492 (1982).
65 Annex "B", AMARI's Memorandum, see note 2 at 1 & 2.
66 PEA's Memorandum, see note 6.
67 Ibid., p. 44.
68 See notes 9, 10 & 11.
69 Annex "C", p. 3, AMARI's Memorandum, see note 12 at 3.
70 This should read Article XII.
71 Section 8 of CA No. 141.
72 Emphasis supplied.
73 187 SCRA 797 (1990).
74Article 422 of the Civil Code states as follows: "Property of public dominion, when no
longer needed for public use or public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State."
75 AMARI's Comment dated June 24, 1998, p. 20; Rollo, p. 85.

76Dizon v. Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 705 (1965); Republic v. Lat Vda. de Castillo, 163 SCRA 286
(1988).
77 Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909).
78 Proclamation No. 41, issued by President Ramon Magsaysay on July 5, 1954, reserved for
"National Park purposes" 464.66 hectares of the public domain in Manila Bay "situated in the
cities of Manila and Pasay and the municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon," which area, as described in detail in the Proclamation, is "B]ounded on the North, by
Manila Bay; on the East, by Dewey Boulevard; and on the south and west, by Manila Bay."
See concurring opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Republic Real Estate Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 1999 (1998). Under Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, "national parks" are inalienable natural resources of the State.
79 Fifth Whereas clause of EO No. 525.
80 Section 4, Chapter I, Title XIV, Book IV.
81Section 6 of CA No 141 provides as follows: "The President, upon the recommendation

of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands
of the public domain into – (a) Alienable or disposable, x x x."
82Section 7 of CA No. 141 provides as follows: "For purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands
are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
83 On "Lands for Residential, Commercial, or Industrial and other Similar Purposes."
84RA No. 293, enacted on June 16, 1948, authorized the sale of marshy lands under certain
conditions. Section 1 of RA No. 293 provided as follows: "The provisions of section sixty-one
of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and forty-one to the contrary
notwithstanding, marshy lands and lands under water bordering on shores or banks or
navigable lakes or rivers which are covered by subsisting leases or leases which may
hereafter be duly granted under the provisions of the said Act and are already improved and
have been utilized for farming, fishpond, or similar purposes for at least five years from the
date of the contract of lease, may be sold to the lessees thereof under the provisions of
Chapter Five of the said Act as soon as the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service."
85 PEA's Memorandum, see note 2 at 45.
86 See note 73.
87 Section 4 (b) of PD No. 1084
88R.A. No. 730 allows the private sale of home lots to actual occupants of public
lands. See note 63.
89 Issued on February 26, 1981.

90While PEA claims there was a failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, there is no
showing that the Commission on Audit approved the price or consideration stipulated in the
negotiated Amended JVA as required by Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code.
Senate Committee Report No. 560 did not discuss this issue.
91Paragraph 2 (a) of COA Circular No. 89-296, on "Sale Thru Negotiation," states that
disposal through negotiated sale may be resorted to if "[T]here was a failure of public
auction."
92Senate Committee Report No. 560, Statement of Facts, p. 7, citing PEA Board Resolution
No. 835, as appearing in the Minutes of the PEA Board of Directors Meeting held on May 30,
1991, per Certification of Jaime T. De Veyra, Corporate Secretary, dated June 11, 1991.
93 Opinion No. 330, citing COA Audit Circular No. 89-296. See note 5.
94 PEA's Memorandum, see note 2.
Senate Committee Report No. 560, pp. 7-8, citing the Minutes of Meeting of the PEA
95
Board of Directors held on December 19, 1991.
96Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: "x x x Citizens of the
Philippines may x x x acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead or grant." However, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) limits the ownership of "public or private agricultural land" to a maximum of five
hectares per person.
97 96 Phil. 946 (1955).
98 48 SCRA 372 (1977).
99 168 SCRA 198 (1988).
100 172 SCRA 795 (1989).
101 73 SCRA 146 (1976).
102 Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148 (1991).
103Republic v. Ayala Cia, et al., 14 SCRA 259 (1965); Dizon v. Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 705
(1965).
104Section 44 of PD No. 1529 states as follows: "Every registered owner receiving a

certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: First. Liens, claims or rights arising or
existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law
required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record. x x x." Under Section 103 of PD
No. 1529, Section 44 applies to certificates of title issued pursuant to a land patent granted
by the government.
105 Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
106 Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152 (1909).
Annex "B", AMARI's Memorandum, see note 21 at 16, Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended
107
JVA.
108Section 10 of CA No. 141 provides as follows: "Sec. 10. The words "alienation,"
"disposition," or "concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized
by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other
than timber or mineral lands."
109Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, which requires public auction in the sale of
government assets, includes all kinds of disposal or divestment of government assets. Thus,
COA Audit Circular No. 86-264 dated October 16, 1986 speaks of "guidelines (which) shall
govern the general procedures on the divestment or disposal of assets of government-
owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries." Likewise, COA Audit
Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, speaks of "guidelines (which) shall be observed and
adhered to in the divestment or disposal of property and other assets of all government
entities/instrumentalities" and that "divestment shall refer to the manner or scheme of
taking away, depriving, withdrawing of an authority, power or title." These COA Circulars
implement Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code.
110The share of AMARI in the Freedom Islands is 77.34 hectares, which is 70 percent of the
net usable area of 110.49 hectares. The net usable area is the total land area of the
Freedom Islands less 30 percent allocated for common areas.
The share of AMARI in the submerged areas for reclamation is 290.129 hectares, which is
111
70 percent of the net usable area of 414.47 hectares.
112Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides as follows: "The following contracts are inexistent
and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; x
x x; (4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men; x x x."

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Twelfth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-second day of July, two thousand two.
Republic Act No. 9176 November 13, 2002

AN ACT EXTENDING THE PERIOD UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 2020 FOR THE FILING OF
APPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEGALIZATION (FREE PATENT) AND JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE TITLES TO ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AMENDING
Be it enacted by the Senate and Hose of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Section 45, Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Section 45. The President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, shall from time to time fix by proclamation the period
within which applications for free patents may be filed in the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office or region specified in such proclamation, and upon the expiration
of the period so designated, unless the same be extended by the President, all the lands
comprised within such district, chartered city, province, municipality or region subject thereto
under the provisions of this chapter may be disposed of as agricultural public land without
prejudice to the prior right of the occupant and cultivator to acquire such land under this Act
by means other than free patent. The time to be fixed in the entire Archipelago for the filing of
applications under this Chapter shall not extend beyond 31 December 2020: Provided, that
the period shall apply only when the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares.
The period fixed for any district, chartered city, province or municipality shall take effect thirty
(30) days after the publication of the proclamation in one (1) newspaper of general circulation
in the city, province or municipality concerned. A certified copy of said proclamation shall be
furnished by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources within thirty (30) days
counted from the date of the presidential proclamation to the Community Environment and
natural Resources office and to the provincial board and municipal board or city council and
barangay council affected, and copies thereof shall be posted on the bulletin board of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office and at such conspicuous places in
the provincial capitol. It shall moreover be announced and aired over the government station
in the concerned local area."
Section 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same ACT, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not
to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated
by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the
lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.
Section 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated
as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 4. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, executive orders, executive issuance or letters of
instruction, rules and regulations, or any part thereof, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions
of this Act, are hereby deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 5. Separably Clause - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or parts of this Act shall be
declared unconstitutional or invalid by any competent court, other parts or provisions thereof not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 6. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
two(2) national newspaper of general circulation.
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This Act, which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 4628 and Senate Bill No. 1695 was finally
passed by the House of Representative and the Senate on September 2, 2002 and September 3,
2002 respectively.
OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: November 13, 2002
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., Respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for Private Respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended; and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit ‘M-1’);
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired
by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the
sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen
by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabela
(Exh.’N’) on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh.’N-1’), during their special session on
November 22, 1979." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable
law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme.
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of the chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Petition for Review does not dispute — indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court — the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor
is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the
1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the
public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were
then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company v. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots
were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . ., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco’s application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed.
x x x
"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction

between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction
or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens
title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
`presupposes that the land is public’ (Mindanao v. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644)." cralaw virtua1aw library
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Cariño in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed,
affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That
said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view — becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein.
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Cariño, involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those `who may
prove’ possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this
means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words ‘may
prove’ (acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, like Lacaste v. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina v. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac v. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel v. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico v. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner’s case, with the latter’s proven occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-
in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent. . . .
x x x
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing

provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent." 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13
that the possessor(s)." . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .
. ." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well
put in Cariño,." . . (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish
it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." cralaw virtua1aw library
If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to
make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or,
for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acme’s right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations
from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then
extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already
vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid
and proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations
to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner’ prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
x x x
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. `A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power’ (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
x x x
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become
fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a
patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation’s right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands v. CA, 123 Phil. 919)." 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its
own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt
of Acme’s entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could
have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the
letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by
valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation’s holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"6. To uphold respondent judge’s denial of Meralco’s application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original
owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go
through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco v. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate
of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and
sold or exchanged." cralaw virtua1aw library
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage,
in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it
were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as
well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in
Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person,
was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion,
and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided
no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the

Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and,

therefore, dissent here.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I am honored by my brethren’s judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,

1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is
the better . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark
1909 case of Cariño 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine . . . that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the
period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to ‘at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title’ by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by
a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on
said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity’s sake. But
since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the
recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
library
cralaw virtua1aw
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in
the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient . . .
If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain, and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]." 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Cariño (the Igorot chief who
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations
of June 25, 1880, "The words ‘may prove’ (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court’s decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco
decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law
without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure
ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully
sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico, supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
1973 Constitution’s prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of
the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition, Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels’ open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation’s lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P45 million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the
State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied
and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish
and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would
have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31,
1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31,
1987. 7
The cited Act’s provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act
and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications
for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8
Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line
from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances
of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in
Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred
and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise
of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired,
while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein
majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which
are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is
needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable." 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors’-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious.
But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession,
the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural
failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-
cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation’s predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and
in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all,
recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign
its rights to the private land to natural persons — (as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or in interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) . . .
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 11. . . . No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may
any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates
of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799; Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic v. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and
afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company v. Castro Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982].
"To uphold respondent judge’s denial of Meralco’s application on the technicality that
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original
owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco.
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein
provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers, 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am. Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed
to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give
effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred, One
part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory, or of no
effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension
of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the
precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where
this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a
statute is general, everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is
supplied by implication." (Pliakos v. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE
2d 47; cited in 73 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 422-423).
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco v. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Endnotes:
1. 114 SCRA 799.
2. Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, 944.
3. Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
4. Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437.
5. Of said Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880.
6. underscoring supplied.
7. 63 Phil. 654.
8. 108 Phil. 251.
9. 21 SCRA 743.
10. 29 SCRA 760.
11. There was withal a later attempt by the ponente in Herico (Castro, J.) to somewhat
soften the import of the doctrine, in his concurrence in Meralco (114 SCRA 799, 810-
813).
12. Underscoring supplied; the provision referred to is Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141.
13. Sec. 48(b).
14. Referring, precisely, to Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution.
15. Ayog v. Cusi, Jr., 118 SCRA 492.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799, and Republic v. Villanueva and Iglesia
in Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, respectively.
2. Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil
132.
3. Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
4. Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437.
5. For the text of the Act, as amended, see page 3 of the main opinion.
6. Note in brackets supplied.
7. Under CA 292 approved June 9, 1938; R.A. 107, approved June 2, 1947; R.A. 2061,
approved June 13, 1958; R.A. 6236, approved June 19, 1971; and P.D. 1073 issued
January 25, 1977.
8. 114 SCRA at pp. 823-824.
9. Idem, at pp. 809-810.
10. Idem, at p. 810.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34602 May 31, 1979
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioners,

vs.
LILIA A. ABAIRO, CELSO ABAIRO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ISABELA, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Eligio A. Labog for private respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 27, 1971 (pp. 17-18, rec.),
of respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela confirming the ownership by Lilia A. Abairo and
Celso Abairo, of a parcel of land.
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 1, 1971, respondent Lilia Abairo filed an application
for registration under the Land Registration Act of a parcel of land containing an area of about 573
square meters situated in Centro, Cauayan, Isabela, alleging open, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owner by herself and through her predecessors-
in- interest since time immemorial up to the present (p. 12, rec.).
Respondent Lilia Abairo and her counsel appeared at the initial hearing but nobody appeared to
oppose the petition for registration of her title, except the assistant provincial fiscal who entered his
opposition in behalf of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, but who subsequently
withdrew his opposition on the ground that there was a new law extending the period for filing
registration petitions up to 1976. The fiscal submitted a report of the Director of Lands to the effect
that he is withdrawing his opposition. The fiscal likewise submitted a letter from the Bureau of
Forestry showing that it has no opposition to the application for registration of title. These facts are
embodied in the Order of Judge Andres Plan, to wit:
When this case was called for initial hearing, the applicant, assisted by counsel,
appeared. The Fiscal manifested in open Court that due to the amended bill which
extends the period of filing registration petitions up to 1976, the serious opposition
filed has become moot and academic. The Fiscal also submitted a report of the
Director of Lands to the effect that the Bureau of Lands is withdrawing its opposition.
The Fiscal also submitted a letter from the Bureau of Forestry showing that they have
no opposition to the application for registration of title,
With these manifestations of the fiscal, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forestry, the lot has become non-contested.
Upon motion of counsel for the applicant, let an order of general default issue against
the whole world. Upon his petition, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Raymundo B. Neris Jr., is
hereby appointed Commissioner to receive the evidence in support of the petition for
registration. (p. 16, rec.).
After the case was heard, respondent Court rendered a decision dated September 27, 1971,
confirming the ownership of respondent Abairo over the land in question after finding that the original
owner of the land in dispute was a certain Pablo Rivera, who possessed the land which formed part
of his estate since 1912 or even much prior thereto; that he sold said land to Inocencia Accad
sometime in 1939 and the latter had been in possession of said land up to the time when she sold it
to her daughter, Lilia A. Abairo, on December 31, 1969; that respondent has a residential house on
the land and that she has declared the lot for taxation purposes in her name and has been
religiously paying taxes thereon; that respondent Abairo and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in the concept of owners since
1912 up to the present; that the land is free from all liens and encumbrances; and that the land is the
conjugal property of spouses Lilia and Celso Abairo (pp. 17-18, rec.).
A motion for reconsideration dated November 18, 1971 (p. 19, rec.) was filed by the Solicitor
General on the ground that respondent Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for
registration of title as it was filed on March 1, 1971, after December 31, 1968, the date set by R.A.
No. 2061 as the time limit for the judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles like that of
applicant, and before the effectivity on June 19, 1971, of R.A. No. 6236 extending the time limit for
such purpose.
Respondent Court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration in an order dated December 15,
1971 (p. 28, rec.). Hence, this petition.
It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Court should have dismissed the application of
respondent Lilia Abairo because it has no jurisdiction over it inasmuch as it was filed on March 1,
197 1, that is, after December 31, 1968, the expiry date for filing such kind of applications based on
imperfect or incomplete titles under RA No. 2061.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
R.A. No. 6236, enacted on June 19, 1971, further amended Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 (which was
previously amended by R.A. No. 2061) by extending to December 31, 1976 the time limit for the
filing of applications for the judical confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
As amended by R.A. No. 2061, Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 reads:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one, nineteen hundred and sixty-
eight within which to take advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with section forty-
five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this
chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons
from acting under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President (emphasis supplied).
As amended by R.A. No. 6236, the aforesaid Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one, nineteen hundred and seventy-six,
within which to take advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this
extension shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144 hectares:
Provided further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with section forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President (emphasis supplied).
As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, promulgated on January 25, 1977, the filing of such
application has been extended to December 31, 1987.
It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their titles at any time
prior to the cutoff date of December 31, 1976 (as provided for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even
if such application were filed during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971,
like the application of respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1, 197 1.
All the amendments to Section 47 of C.A. 141 expressly includes the proviso that "this section shall
not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior
to the period fixed by the President." No period has been fixed by the President despite the authority
granted him by the aforesaid proviso.
But even in the absence of the aforesaid proviso of Section 47, as amended, the basis of the petition
is too technical to merit serious consideration. The extension until December 31, 1976 by R.A. No.
6236 for the filing of such application, retroacted to, and covered the applications filed after January
1, 1969 and before June 19, 1971. Moreover, the application which private respondent filed on
March 1, 1971, could be considered as re-filed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6236 on June 19,
1971, less than four months thereafter.
Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing
such applications time and time again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the
law to own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the
citizenry.
Considering the area of the lot applied for — only about 573 square meters — it was quite unfair, if
not oppressive, to put the private respondent to such expense and anxiety, after the Director of
Lands withdrew his opposition, while the Director of Forestry interposed no opposition to private
respondent's application.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE
PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for
appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on
January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the
case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun
in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land
Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of
the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by
him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is
to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any
vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if
it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as
the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be
necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the
vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael
Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has
been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back
as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of
Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from
acquiring public or private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo
Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the
land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with
an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned
by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:
1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution
may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their
disposition.
1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands"
had, therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't.,
12, Phil., 593; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co.,
19 Phil., 505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175,
181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15,
1940, overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for
the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing
for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy
or acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question and that the
purchase made in 1938 is null and void.
This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower
court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and
void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to
state our opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:
I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic.
(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
Public Land Act includes residential lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well
settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are
neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme
Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the sections 13
and 15 of that Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.
xxx xxx xxx
"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the
court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber
or mineral lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given
agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis
added.)
"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the
first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by
the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in
the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of
section 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural
public lands" is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as defined by
said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."
"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is
agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture
for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into a rural
estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must necessarily be
included within the classification of a agricultural land. Because of the special applicability of
the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision therein
rendered:
"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for
Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to
the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in
favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where
land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so
under other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains
only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots
or urban land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone
is no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert
them into rural estates." (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161,
163 164, 165, 166; emphasis added.).
(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Act), the phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land"
includes lands of the public domain suitable for residential purposes.
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:
"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ."
(Emphasis added.).
"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of

the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly
appears from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, are not subject to alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act
the lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable,
(b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond
to lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1,
Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are
the only natural resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public
lands shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that
under this classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference
however, is more apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the
Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is
equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or
disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and
disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But
notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially agricultural public lands because only
agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth
Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and such conflict should be
avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the fundamental provisions of the
Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.
"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an

Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution,
although such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court
may resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts
cannot go beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute;
and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that
purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution
the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No.
141, which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the
amendments thereto, form to the Constitution.
"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted,
such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by
reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural
public land, it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the
constitutional provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential lot
is alienable under section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions
is only for purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the
inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient
authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation,
and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has been
maintained by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to say:
"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a
vague manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to
be sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find
solemn determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now
put another construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now
put another construction of the act on account of any suppose change of
convenience." This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that
the practical erroneous; so that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a
different construction. Lord Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is
desirable not so much that the principle of the decision should be capable at all times
of justification, as that the law should be settled, and should, when once settled, be
maintained without any danger of vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and
practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time will be sustained
though carried beyond the pair purport of the statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .
"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction

is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from
being adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that
the legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the
judiciary and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction
which is for the time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has
the sanction of the of the authority appointed to expound the law, just and correct
conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on
which founded the maxim of stare decisis. Such a construction is public given, and
the subsequent silence of the legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though
not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article XII
of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor
given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes
residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber
lands.
"Adoption of provisions previously construed — ad. Previous construction by Courts.

— Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been
reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to
have been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law,
unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly
provided for; and the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after
a similar or cognate statute has been judicially construed. So where words or
phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by the court to have been
used in a particular sense in a previous statute on the same subject, or one
analogous to it, they are presumed, in the a absence of clearly expressed intent to
the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the statute as in the previous statute."
(59 C.J., 1061-1063.).
"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. — In the adoption of the code, the

legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been
placed on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general
revision of provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former
statutes is a legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a
contrary intent is clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory
language after it had been judicially construed shows that they had such construction
in view." (59 C. J., 1102.)
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant
(appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain
by reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors
in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection (b), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant
as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article
XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private
agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above
quoted provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential,
commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used
in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to
wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral
or forestal.
"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in
a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and
have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the
words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense may vary
from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., p.
758.) .
"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and
defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady,
and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our patrimonial estates,
to the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent
the acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And
yet a city or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land.
"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is

opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words
are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to
effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if
possible be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the
legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest
reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal
interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by
hereditary succession."
The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent
of the Constitutional Convention.
One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1)
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our
commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources
are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack
of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not
completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time
will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a
mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in
our hands but in those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
592.).
From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflict with
the consequent danger to its internal security and independence.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources said;
"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land
and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should
be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by
the case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid
settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas.
Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt
against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States. A new increase of
alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas
affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of
aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."
xxx xxx xxx
It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed
principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same
reasons the Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the
transfer of assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary
succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.).
All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with
Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the
outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.
BRIONES, M., con quien estan conformes PARAS y TUASON, MM., disidente:
El solicitante en este expediente pide el registro del solar de que se trata como terreno de propiedad
privada, y tan solo con caracter supletorio invoca las disposiciones del capitulo 8.º de la Ley No.
2874 sobre terrenos publicos (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 3.)
Por su parte el Director de Terrenos se opone a la solicitud en virtud de tres fundamentos, a saber:
(1) porque ni el solicitante ni sus predecesores en interes pueden demonstrar titulo suficiente sobre
dicha parcela de terreno, no habiendose adquirido la misma ni por titulo de composicion con el
Estado bajo la soberania de España, ni por titulo de informacion posesoria bajo el Real Decreto de
13 de Febrero de 1894; (2) porque el citado solar es una porcion de los terrenos de dominio publico
pertenecientes al Commonwealth de Filipinas; (3) porque siendo el solicitante un ciudadano chino,
no esta capacitado bajo las disposiciones de la Constitucion de Filipinas para adquirir terrenos de
caracter publico o privado (idem, pags. 5 y 6).
Tanto el solicitante como el Director de Terrenos practicaron sus pruebas ante un arbitro nombrado
por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas. Con vista de tales pruebas, el Juez Magsalin, del
referido Juzgado, dicto sentencia a favor del solicitante, de la cual transcribimos las siguientes
porciones pertinentes:
La representacion del opositor Director de Terrenos trata de probar por medio del testimonio
del Inspector del Buro de Terrenos que, el terreno objeto de la solicitud es parte del dominio
publico y ademas el solicitante es ciudadano chino, pero dicho testigo afirmo que el terreno
objeto de la presente solicitud es un solar situado dentro de la poblacion del municipio de
Guinayanga, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes y careciendo de
merito esta oposicion debe desestimarse la misma.
Por tanto, previa desestimacion de la oposicion del Director de Terrenos, se adjudica con
sus mejoras la parcela de terreno objeto de la presente solicitud descrito en el plano Psu-
109117, a favor del solicitante Oh Cho, ciudadano chino, mayor de edad, casado con Yee
Shi, y residente en el municipio de Guinayanga, Tayabas, Islas Filipinas. (Decision, pag. 8,
Record on Appeal.)
De lo transcrito se infiere de una manera forzosa lo siguiente: (a) que el tribunal inferior desestimo
de plano la oposicion del Director de Terrenos fundada en el supuesto de que el solar
cuestionado es parte del dominio publico; (b) que el mismo tribunal rechazo el otro fundamento de
la oposicion, esto es, que siendo el solicitante ciudadano chino esta incapacitado bajo nuestra
Constitucion para adquirir terreno, ya publico, ya privado, aunque sea un solar de caracter urbano;
(c) que, segun el fallo del Juez a quo, no siendo publico el terreno cuestionado, es
necesariamente terreno privado.
El Director de Terrenos, no estando conforme con la sentencia, apelo de ella para ante el Tribunal
de Apelacion y hace en su alegato dos señalamientos de error, ninguno de los cuales pone en tela
de juicio la calidad de privado del terreno cuestionado. El apelante no plantea ninguna cuestion de
hecho; plantea solo una cuestion de derecho. Por eso que en la reconstitucion de este expediente
— el original se quemo durante la guerra — no ha habido necesidad de incluir las notas
taquigraficas ni las pruebas documentales, y de hecho hemos considerado y decidido este asunto
sin dichas notas y pruebas. El abogado Constantino, del apelado, en la audiencia para la
reconstitucion de los autos, hizo esta manifestacion; "In view also of the fact that the questions
involved here are only questions of law, this representation waives the right to present the evidence
presented in the trial court . . . ." Por su parte, el Procurador General, al explanar el caso en
representacion del apelante Director de Terrenos, principia su alegato con la siguiente declaracion:
This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature pending
in the trial courts.
Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is
the only question raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas which sustained the affirmance and decreed the registration of the said property in
favor of the applicant who, by his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic. This question is raised in connection with the constitutional provision that no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners except in cases of
hereditary succession. (Pags. 1, 2, alegato del apelante.)
Habiendose apelado de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion ¿por que se elevo este
asunto al Tribunal Supremo, ante el cual ya estaba pendiente aun antes de la guerra, y sin
resolverse durante la ocupacion japonesa? La razon no consta especificamente en autos, pero
como no se trata de una alzada del Tribunal de Apelacaion a la Corte Suprema, la unica explicacion
que cabe es que aquel, la percatarse de que en la apelacion no se planteaba mas que una cuestion
de derecho, ordeno, como era de rigor, el traslado del asunto a esta Corte por ser de su jurisdiccion
y competencia.
Hemos estimado necesario sentar las anteriores premisas porque las mismas sirven de base a la
argumentacion que a seguida vamos a desenvolver para fundamentar esta disidencia.
I. De lo expuesto resulta evidente que el Director de Terrenos se ha opuesto al registro solicitado,

entre otros fundamentos, porque el terreno es publico; que el tribunal inferior ha desestimado este
fundamento por "carecer de merito," fallando que el terreno es privado; que el Director de Terrenos,
en su apelacion ante nosotros, no cuestiona esta conclusion del Juez a quo, sino que dando por
admitido que el terreno es de propiedad privada, arguye, sin embargo, que bajo la seccion 5,
Articulo XII de la Constitucion de Filipinas el solicitante, por ser extranjero, no puede adquirir terreno
agricula privado, estando incluido en este concepto un solar urbano como el de que se trata en este
expediente. Planteado el asunto en tales terminos ¿puede esta Corte considerar y resolver un punto
no contendido entre las partes — un punto que esta firme y definitivamente resuelto y no es objeto
de apelacion? Dicho de otra manera: ¿puede esta Corte, como hace la mayoria en su opinion,
revocar una conclusion del tribunal-inferior que no esta discutida en el alegato del apelante?
¿Podemos, en buena ley procesal, declarar publico el terreno en cuestion por nuestra propia
iniciativa, cuando el mismo Procurador General, que representa al Estado, admite en su alegato el
caracter privado del solar, y solo suscita una cuestion, de derecho, a saber: que bajo nuestra
Constitucion ningun acto traslativo de dominio a favor de un extranjero es valido, asi se trata de
predio urbano, porque la frase "terreno agricola privado" qe se contiene en la Constitucion abarca
no solo las fincas rusticas sino tambien las urbanas? Y, sobre todo, ¿podemos, en equidad y
justicia, considerar y revisar un punto que no solo no esta discutido por las partes, pues lo dan por
admitido y establecido, sino que es de derecho y de hecho al propio tiempo? ¿Que base tenemos
para hacerlo cuando no tenemos delante las pruebas tanto testificales como documentales?
Nuestra contestacion es, en absoluto, negativo.
La competencia de esta Corte para revisar las sentencias de los tribunales inferiores, de las cuales
se ha interpuesto apelacion, se basa en el principio de que dicha competencia, en su ejercicio, tiene
que limitarse a las cuestiones controvertidas, y esto se determina mediante el señalamiento de
errores que el apelante hace en su alegato. El articulo 19 del antiguo reglamento de los
procedimientos en este Tribunal Supremo decia en su primer parrafo lo siguiente:
Anexo al alegato del apelante y en pliego separado, se acompañara una relacion de los
errores de derecho que han de discutirse. La especificacion de cada uno de estos errores se
hara por parrafos separados, con toda claridad, de una manera concisa, y sin incurrir en
repeticiones, y seran numerados por orden correlativo.
El articulo 20 del mismo reglamento preceptuaba:
Ningun error de derecho fuera del relativo a competencia sobre la materia de un litigio, sera
tomado en consideracion como no se halle puntualizado en la relacion de los errores y
presentado como uno de los fundamentos en el alegato.
Interpretando estas disposiciones reglamentarias, la Corte hizo en el asunto de Santiago contra

Felix (24 Jur. Fil., 391), los siguientes pronunciamientos doctrinales:
1. APELACION; EFECTO DE DEJAR DE PRESENTAR RELACION DE ERRORES; REGLA

FIRMEMENTE ESTABLECIDA. — Es regla establecida por la jurisprudencia de los
Tribunales de estas Islas, en virtud de repetidas y uniformes sentencias de esta Corte, la de
que si en una apelacione el recurrente dejare de hacer señalamiento de los errores en que
haya incurrido el Tribunal inferior, y se limitare a discutir cuestiones de hecho en general, no
es posible que este Tribunal pueda considerar ni revisar la resolucion adversa a la parte
apelante, por el motivo de haberse dictado contra la ley y el peso de las pruebas, sino que
es necesario que se señale y se especifique el error o errores que determinaron la decision
apelada que el apelante califica de ilegal e injusta.
2. Id.; Id.; Regla Igual a la Adoptada por los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos. — Igual
doctrina legal se halla en observancia en los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos de America
del Norte, toda vez que una manifestacion general de que el Juzgado erro en dictar
sentencia a favor de una de las partes, no es suficiente como base para que la Corte pueda
revisar la sentencia apelada, pues que a no ser que la apreciacion hecha por un Juez de los
hechos alegados y probados en juicio sea manifestamente contraria al resultado y peso de
las pruebas, el Tribunal de alzada suela aceptar el juicio y criterio del Juez sobre las
cuestiones de hecho, y no procede revocar sin motivo fundado la sentencia apelada.
(Enriquez contra Enriquez, 8 Jur. Fil., 574; Capellania de Tambobong contra Antonio, 8 Jur.
Fil., 693; Paterno contra la Ciudad de Manila, 17 Jur. Fil., 26)" (Santiago contra Felix, 24 Jur.
Fil., 391.)
Esta doctrina se reitero posteriormente en los siguientes asuntos: Tan Me Nio contra Administrador
de Aduanas, 34 Jur. Fil., 995, 996; Hernaez contra Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.
La regla 53, seccion 6, del actual reglamento de los tribunales, dispone lo siguiente:
SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction
over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not
specified, and also clerical errors.
No se dira que la cuestion de si el terreno cuestionado es publico o privado, considerada y resuelta

por la mayoria en su decision sin previo señalamiento de error ni apropiada argumentacion en el
alegato del Procurador General, esta comprendida entre las salvedades de que habla la regla arriba
transcrita porque ni afecta a la jurisdiccion sobre la materia del litigio, ni es un "plain error," o
"clerical error."
Se notara que en el antiguo reglamento no habia eso de "plain errors not specified" (errores
patentes o manifiestos no especificados en el alegato). Pero ¿cabe invocar esta reserva en el caso
que nos ocupa Indudablemente que no, por las siguientes razones: (a) los autos no demuestran que
el Juez a quo cometio un error patente y manifiesto al declarar en su sentencia que el terreno no es
publico sino privado; no tenemos mas remedio que aceptar en su faz la conclusion del Juez
sentenciador sobre este respecto por la sencilla razon de que no tenemos ante nosotros las
pruebas ni testificales ni documentales, y, por tanto, no hay base para revisar, mucho menos para
revocar dicha conclusion, habiendose interpretado esta reserva en el sentido de que solo se puede
tomar "conocimiento judicial del error palpable con vista de los autos y procedimientos"; (b) aun
admitiendo por un momento, a los efectos de la argumentacion, que Su Señoria el Juez padecio
error palpable al sentar dicha conclusion, como quiera que el Procurador General no suscita la
cuestion en su alegato debe entenderse que ha renunciado a su derecho de hacerlo, optando por
fundamentar su caso en otros motivos y razones; por tanto, no estamos facultados para
considerar motu proprio el supuesto error, pues evidentemente no se trata de un descuido
u oversight del representante del Estado, sino de una renuncia deliberada, y la jurisprudencia sobre
el particular nos dice que "el proposito subyacente, fundamental de la reserva en la regla es el de
prevenir el extravio de la justicia en virtud de un descuido." He aqui algunas autoridades pertinentes:
Purpose of exception as to plain errors. — The proviso in the rule requiring assignments of
error, permitting the court, at its option, to notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in
intended, in the interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public
duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings,
especially such as clearly demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of action."
Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange Co. (155 Fed., 719, 724; 84 C. C. A., 145).
The rules does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of
small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and of a
controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent the
miscarriage of justice from oversight. Mast vs. Superior Drill Co. (154 Fed., 45, 51; 83 C. C.
A. 157).
II. Hasta aqui hemos desarrollado nuestra argumentacion bajo el supuesto de que la calidad de
privado del terreno litigioso no es controversia justiciable en esta instancia por no estar suscitada la
cuestion en el alegato del Procurador General ni ser materia de disputa entre las partes en la
apelacion pendiente ante nosotros; por lo que, consiguientemente, no estamos facultados para
revisar, mucho menos revocar motu proprio la conclusion del tribunal a quo sobre el particular.
Ahora vamos a laborar bajo otro supuesto — el de que el Procurador General haya hecho el
correspondiente señalamiento de error y la cuestion este, por tanto, propiamente planteada ante
esta Corte Suprema para los efectos de la revision. La pregunta naturalmente en orden es la
siguiente: ¿cometio error el Juez a quo al declarar y conceptuar como privado el terreno en
cuestion, o es, por el contrario, acertada su conclusion a este respecto? Somos de opinion que el
Juez no cometio error, que el terreno de que se trata reune las condiciones juridicas necesarias
para calificarlo como privado y diferenciarlo de una propiedad de dominio publico, y que, por tanto,
el solicitante tiene sobre la propiedad un titulo confirmable bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de
Registro de Terrenos No. 496.
Afirmase en la decision de la mayoria que el solicitante no ha podido demostrar que el o cualquiera

de sus causantes en derecho adquirio el lote del Estado mediante compra o concesion bajo las
leyes, ordenanzas y decretos promulgados por el Gobierno Español en Filipinas, o en virtud de los
tramites relativos a informacion posesoria bajo la ley hipotecaria en tiempo de España. De esto la
mayoria saca la conclusion de que el terreno cuestionado no es privado porque, segun su criterio,
"todos los terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (Gobierno Español, se quiere decir), ya
mediante compra, ya por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico"; y citando como autoridad el
asunto clasico de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular la ponencia no admite mas excepcion a la regla
que el caso en que un terreno ha estado en la posesion del ocupante y de sus predecesores en
interes desde tiempo inmemorial, pues semejante posesion justificaria la presuncion de que el
terreno nunca habia sido parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes
de la conquista española."
Lo que, en primer lugar, no parece correcto es la seguridad con que en la ponencia se afirma que el
terreno no se adquirio bajo la soberania española en virtud de cualquiera de los modos conocidos
en la legislacion de entonces, pues como no tenemos delante las pruebas, no hay naturalmente
manera de comprobar la certeza de la proposicion. Si se tiene en cuenta que el Director deTerrenos
se opuso a la solicitud de registro por el fundamento de que el terreno es de dominio publico, y que
el tribunal inferior desestimo este fundamento, la presuncion es que la calidad de privado del terreno
se probo satisfactoriamente, presuncion que queda robustecida si se considera que el Procurador
General, al sostener la apelacion del Gobierno, no discute ni cuestiona en su alegato la conclusion
de que el referido terreno es de propiedad particular.
Por otro lado, la mayoria parece dar un caracter demasiado absoluto y rigido a la proposicion de
que "todos los terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (en tiempo de España), mediante
compra o por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico." Interpretando estrictamente la ley, esta
Corte Suprema denego el registro solicitado en el celebre asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno
Insular que cita la mayoria en su opinion, por eso mismo que se acentua en la ponencia — por el
fundamento de que Cariño no pudo demostrar titulo de compra, concesion o informacion posesoria
expedido por el Gobierno en tiempo de España, siendo por consiguiente el terreno parte del dominio
publico. Pero al elevarse el asunto en grado de apelacion a la Corte Suprema de los Estados
Unidos, la misma revoco la sentencia de esta Corte, declarando el terreno como propiedad privada
y decretando su registro a nombre del solicitante. En la luminosa ponencia del Magistrado Holmes
se sientan conclusiones que proclama el espiritu liberal de aquel gran jurista y reafirman con vigor
democratico los derechos de propiedad de los nativos de estas Islas sobre sus predios en contra del
concepto y teoria feudales de que la Corona de España era la dueña absoluta hasta del ultimo
palmo de tierra y de que ningun habitante podia ser dueño de nada, a menos que tuviese en sus
manos un titulo o papel expedido por aquel Gobierno. He aqui lo que dice el Magistrado Holmes:
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below — namely, whether
the plaintiff owns the land. The position of government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescripcion against the Crown, and that, if
there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the
title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the
plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine Government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the
Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which
the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's
case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees,"embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to
those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also that, in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert,
as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of
the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and
how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide. (U. S. Supreme Court
Reports, Vol. 212, p. 596.)
Mas adelante se dice lo siguiente en la citada sentencia de la Corte Suprema Federal:
It is true that, by section 14, the Government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules
and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands were some, but not all, spanish
conditions has been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of
public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this
section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land
admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such
circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that
date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a
paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.
xxx xxx xxx
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bas by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14
of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton vs. Murciano (3 Phil., 537), while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems
proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good
grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of
Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil.,
546): "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." It may be that this
means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As
prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no
sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to
lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, as not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles
that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not
been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege.
As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the
court of land registration for another recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty
years as still running against alienable Crown land.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require
that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by
the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212,
pp. 597-599.)
Resulta evidente de la jurisprudencia sentada en el citado asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno

Insular que cualquiera que fuese la teoria acerca del superdominio feudal que la Corona de España
asumia sobre todos los terrenos en Filipinas, en la practica y en la realidad se reconocia que el
mero lapso de tiempo en la posesion (20 o 30 años, segun el caso) podia establecer y de hecho
establecia derechos privados de propiedad por justa prescripcion, y el titulo presuntivo asi adquirido
era para todos los efectos equivalente a una concesion expresa o un titulo escrito expedido por el
Gobierno. Pero de todas maneras — parafraseando lo dicho por el Magistrado Holmes — aun
suponiendo que España tenia semejante soberania o superdominio feudal sobre todas las tierras en
este archipielago, y que contra otras naciones los Estados Unidos, al suceder a España, afirmaria
dicha suberania, de ello no se sigue que contra los habitantes de Filipinas el Gobierno americano
(ahora la Republica filipina) tomaria la posicion de que España tenia tal poder absoluto.
Historicamente se sabe que el cambio de soberania tuvo el efecto de liquidar muchas instituciones y
leyes españolas que vinieron a ser obsoletas, arcaicas en el nuevo estado de cosas, e
incompatibles con el espiritu del nuevo regimen. No habia ninguna razon para que este cambio no
produjese tambien sus saludables efectos en las normas juridicas del regimen de la propiedad
sobre la tierra. Parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Holmes, y aplicando la doctrina al presente
caso, no hay razon por que, medinate "una refinada interpretacion de una casi olvidada ley de
España," se considere como terreno publico lo que evidentemente, bajo todos los conceptos y
normas, es un terreno privado.
La jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular ha venido a establecer

la norma, la autoridad basica en los asuntos de registro ante nuestros tribunales. Al socaire de su
sentido y tendencia genuinamente liberal se han registrado bajo el sistema Torrens infinidad de
terrenos privados. En casos mucho menos meritorios que el que nos ocupa se ha reconocido por
nuestros tribunales el caracter o condicion de propiedad privada de los terrenos sobre que versaban
las solicitudes, aplicandose no las habilitadoras y supletorias clausulas de las leyes sobre terrenos
publicos — primeramente la Ley No. 926, despues la No. 2874, y finalmente la No. 141 del
Commonwealth — sino las disposiciones mas estrictas de la Ley No. 496 sobre registro de terrenos
privados, bajo el sistema Torrens. No existe motivo para que esa tendencia liberal y progresiva
sufra una desviacion en el presente caso.
Pero aun bajo la legislacion española interpretada estrictamente, creemos que el terreno en
cuestion es tan privado como el terreno en el asunto de Cariño, si no mas. Segun la sentencia del
inferior — el unido dato para este examen, pues ya se ha dicho repetidas veces que no tenemos
delante las pruebas — "el terreno objeto de la presente solicitud era primitivamente de Capitana
Gina y que esta estuvo en posesion desde el año 1880, despues paso a ser de Francisco
Reformado hasta el año 1885, mas tarde o sea en 1886 fue de Claro Lagdameo, a la muerte de
este le sucedio en la posesion su viuda Fortunata Olega de Lagdameo, esta en 1929 lo vendio a
sus tres hijos Antonio, Luis y Rafael appellidados Lagdameo, segun los Exhibitos F y G, y estos
ultimos a su vez lo vendieron en 1938 al solicitante Oh Cho, segun los Exhibitos B 1-y C-1." " ...
Este terreno es un solar residencial dentro de la poblacion del municipio de Guinayangan, Tayabas,
y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes que ocupa casi todo el terreno ..." (Pieza de
Excepciones, pag. 8).
Como se ve, por lo menos desde 1880 habia un conocido propietario y poseedor del terreno — la
Capitana Gina. Ahora bien, coincide que el 25 de Junio de aquel año que precisamente cuando se
expidio el Decreto "para el ajuste y adjudicacion de los terrenos realengos ocupados indebidamente
por individuos particulares en las Islas Filipinas." Si bien es cierto que el objeto del Decreto o ley era
el ordenar que se cumpliesen y practicasen los procedimientos de ajuste y registro descritos en el
mismo, y en tal sentido el requirir que cada cual obtuviese un documento de titulo o, en su defecto,
perder su propiedad. Tambien es cierto que en el Decreto se expresaban ciertas salvedades que
paracian denotar que estos tramites formanes no eran de rigurosa aplicacion a todo el mundo. Una
de dicha salvedades, por ejemplo, proveia (articulo 5) que, para todos los efectos legales, "todos
aquellos que han estado en posesion por ciento periodo de tiempo serian considerados como
dueños — para terreno cultivado, 20 20 años sin interrupcion, es suficiente, y para terreno no
cultivado, 30 años." Y el articulo 6 dispone que "las partes interesadas no incluidas en los dos
articulos anteriores (los articulos que reconocen la prescripcion de 20 y 30 años) podran legalizar su
posesion, y consiguientemente adquirir pleno dominio sobre dichos terrenos, mediante
procedimientos de ajuste y adjudicacion tramitados de la siguiente manera." Esta ultima disposicion
parece indicar, por sus terminos, que no es aplicable a aquellos que ya han sido declarados dueños
en virtud del simple transcurso de cierto lapso de tiempo (Vease Cariño contra Gobierno
Insular, supra, 598).
No consta en la sentencia del inferior que Capitana Gina se haya acogido a las disposiciones del
referido Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880, obteniendo un documento de titulo para legalizar su
posesion, pero tampoco consta positivamente lo contrario, pues no tenemos ante nosotros las
pruebas. Pero aun suponiendo que no se hayan cumplido los tramites formales prescritos en el
Decreto, de ello no se sigue que el terreno no era ya privado entonces, pues la presuncion es que
no hubo menester de semejante formalidad porque la Capitana Gina o sus causantes en derecho ya
habian sido declarados dueños del predio por el mero transcurso de un lapso de tiempo, a tenor de
las salvedades de que se ha hecho mencion. Esta presuncion es tanto mas logica cuanto que el
articulo 8 del Decreto proveia para el caso de partes que no solicitaban dentro del plazo de un año
el ajuste y adjudicacion de terrenos de cuya posesion disfrutaban indebidamente, y conminaba que
el Tesoro "reasumira el dominio del Estado sobre los terrenos" y vendera en subasta la parte que no
se reserva para si; y no solo no consta en autos que la posesion de Capitata Gina o de sus
causahabientes en derecho se haya considerado jamas como ilegal o que el Estao y sus agentes
hayan adoptado y practicado contra ellos las diligencias y procedimientos de que trata el cittado
articulo 8 del Decreto, sino que, por el contrario, consta en la sentencia que desde Capitana Gina en
1880 hubo sucesivas transmisiones de derechos primeramente a Francisco Reformado en 1885 y
despues a Claro Lagdameo en 1886, y a la muerte de este ultimo a su viuda Fortunata Olega de
Lagdameo, de quien pase el titulo en virtud de compraventa a sus hijos Antonio, Luis y Rafael
apellidados Lagdameo, y la ultima transaccion sobre el solar tuvo lugar en fecha bastante reciente,
en 1938, cuando los ultimamente nombrados lo vendieron a Oh Cho el solicitante en el presente
expediente de registro. De todo lo cual se deduce que el solar en cuestion fue considerado siempre
como propiedad privada — por lomenos alli donde la memoria alcanza — desde 1880 hasta que
fenecio la soberania americana en Filipinas, y que ni el Estado ni sus agentes se entrometieron
jamas en el hecho de su posesion exclusiva, continua y publica a titulo de dueño por diferentes
personas no solo bajo el Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880 tantas veces mencionado, sino aun bajo el
Decreto de 13 de Febrero de 1894 (informacion posesoria) que fue practicamente el ultimo decreto
expedido en las postrimerias de la soberania española en relacion con el ajuste y adjudicacion de
terrenos realengos o publicos. Y no se diga que ello habria sido por inadvertencia de las
autoridades, particularmente del Fisco, porque tratandose de un solar situado en la misma
poblacion de Guinayangan, uno de los pueblos mas antiguos de la provincia de Tayabas, es
indudable que si no reuniera las condiciones y requisitos para ser conceptuado como propiedad
privada y la posesion de sus ocupantes sucesivos fuese indebida e ilegal, ya los agentes del Fisco y
Tesoro lo hubiesen prestamente confiscado a tenor del articulo 8 ya citado del Decreto de 25 de
Junio de 1880 (Vease Cariño contra Gobierno Insular, ut supra 598.) El que nada de esto haya
acontecido es la mejor prueba de que en tiempo de España los diferentes y sucesivos ocupantes de
este solar ya tenian titulo dominical perfecto, y es sencillamente absurdo, ridiculo que ahora, al cabo
de 66 años, se declare publico el terreno; y todo ¿por que y para que — para rendir sometimiento,
repitiendo de nuevo la sutil ironia del Magistrado Homles, a la "refinada interpretacion de una casi
olvidada ley de Espana." Y resulta mas la futilidad de este tardio tributo a un anacronismo, a una
momia juridica de un pasado cada vez mas remoto, si se considera que cuando el Magistrado
Homes pronuncio su sentencia a todas luces libera y progresiva (23 de Enero de 1909) estabamos
tan solo a escasamente 10 años desde la caida de la soberania española en Filipinas mientras que
ahora que se intenta una radical desviacion del surco trazado por la solida reja de dicha sentencia
estamos ya casi a medio siglo de distancia, con pleno dominio republicano sobre el territorio
nacional. Esto no debiera preocuparnos si no fuese porque esta decision de ahora puede ser
interpretada como una abrogacion de tantos precedentes moldeados en la turquesa de la doctrina
holmesiana, y al propio tiempo como la demarcacion del punto de partida de una nueva ruta en
nuestra jurisprudencia sobre registro de terrenos.
Sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria se dice que el solicitante no puede alegar con exito que su
lote es terreno privado porque la posesion de su primer predecessor (Capitana Gina) comenzo solo
en 1880, mientras que en el asunto de Cariño contra El gobierno Insular, es exige como requisito la
posesion desde tiempo inmemorial, posesion que, segun la mayoria. "justificaria la presuncion de
que el terreno nunca habia sido parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun
antes de la conquista española." No parece sino que se quiere señalar una fecha, un año, como
norma para determinar la inmemorialidad del comienzo posesorio. Pero ¿que fecha, que año seria
este? ¿1870, '60, '50? ¿No seria suficiente v. gr. 1875, '65, o '55? En el asunto de Cariño la fecha
conocida y recordada de la posesion inicial podia fijarse alrededor de la mitad del siglo pasado, o
sea 1849, pues segun las pruebas, Cariño y sus antecesores habian poseido el terreno algo mas de
50 años hasta el tratado de Paris — Abril 11, 1899. En el presente caso, desde Capitana Gina hasta
que el solicitante presento su solicitud de registro el 17 de Enero, 1940, habian transcurrido
60 años; de suerte que en cuanto al tiempo de la posesion ambos casos son identicos. Con una
ventaja a favor del presente caso, a saber: mientras en el asunto de Cariño las tierras objeto de la
solicitud eran pasto, en gran parte, y solo cultivadas unas cuantas porciones, en el que nos ocupa el
lote es urbano, sino en uno de los pueblos mas antiguos de Filipinas, con una casa de materiales
fuertes enclavada en el. Es innegabl que la posesion de un solar urbano es mas concreta, mas
terminante y mas adversa a todo el mundo, sin excluir el Estado.
Pero aun limitandonos a la posesion bajo la soberania española para los efectos de la calificacion
del terreno como propiedad privada, todavia se puede sosener que el presente caso es tan bueno si
no mejor que el de Cariño. En el asunto de Cariño el punto de partida conocido es alrededor de
1849; en el nuestro, 1880, en que comenzo la posesion de Capitana Gina, segun la sentencia
apelada. Pero esto no quiere decir que antes de Capitana Gina el solar no fuese ya finca urbana,
habida por algun otro como propiedad particular. Hay que tener en cuenta que se trata de un solar
ubicado en la poblacion de Guinayangan, uno de los mas antiguos en Tayabas. No tenemos delante
la fecha exacta de la fundacion de dicho pueblo, y no tenemos tiempo ahora para hacer
investigacion historica. Pero afortunadamente hemos logrado salvar de la devastacion causada por
la reciente guerra una parte sustancial de nuestra biblioteca privada, y uno de los libros salvados es
el celebrado Diccionario Geografico, Estadistico e Historico de las Islas Filipinas publicado en
Madrid por Fr. Manuel Buzeta y Fr. Felipe Bravo en 1950, segun el pie de imprenta, de dos
volumenes. En el 2.º tomo, pp. 70 y 71, se da una descripcion del pueblo de Guinayanga, con
buena copia de datos historicos, geograficos, sociales y economicos. Comienza la descripcion de
esta manera: "Pueblo con cura y gobernadorcillo, en la Isla de Luzon, provincia de Tayabas, dioc,
de Nueva caceres"; . . "tiene como unas 1,500 casas, en general de sencilla construccion,
distinguiendose como de mejor fabrica la casa parroquial y la llamada tribunal de justicia, donde
esta la carcel. ." Considerando que podemos tomas conocimiento judicial de que en tiempo de
España el municipio y la parroquia eran la culminacion de un lento y largo proceso de civilizacion y
cristianizacion, podemos, por tanto, presumir que mucho antes de 1850 — 50, 70 o 100 años — el
pueblo de Guinayangan ya era una unidad geografiva, civil y espiritual, en toda regla, y con
caracteres definitivos de viabilidad urbana. Tambien cabe perfectamente presumir que sus
habitantes poseian sus respectivos solares a titulo de dueños, al igual que lo que ocurria en otros
municipios debidamente organizados. No cabe presumir que el Estado les permitiera ocupar
indebidamente sus solares, sin que tomase contra ellos la accion de que habla el articulo 8 del
referido Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880; y ya hemos visto que no consta en autos que el solar en
cuestion haya sido jamas confiscado por los agentes del Fisco o Tesoro, o declarada ilegal la
posesion sobre el mismo, a tenor de lo ordenado en el mencionado Decreto. Asi que desde
cualquier angulo que se vea el presente asunto, cae perfectamente bajo las normas de posesion
inmemorial establecidas en el asunto de Cariño.
III. Demostrado ya que el terreno en cuestion es privado, resulta forzosa la conclusion de que el
solicitante tiene derecho a que se confirme su titulo bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de
Terrenos No. 496, de acuerdo con el sistema Torrens. Es doctrina firmemente establecida en esta
jurisdiccion que un extranjero tiene perfecto derecho a que se registre a su nombre un terreno
privado, bajo el sistema Torrens, y que las disposiciones de la ley de terrenos publicos son
inaplicables a terrenos privados (veanse Agari contra Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, 42 Jur. Fil.,
150; Tan Yungquip contra Director de Terrenos, 42 Jur. Fil., 134; Central Capiz contra Ramirez, 40
Jur. Fil., 926). En el primer asunto citado el solicitante era un japones llamado Ichisuke Agari y la
solicitud se estimo por tratarse de un terreno privado, adquirido en tiempo de España mediant
composicion con el estado. En el segundo asunto el solicitante era un chino y se estimo la solicitud
por la misma razon, habiendose probado una posesion conocida y recordada de 30 a 40 años con
anteriorida a la presentacion de la solicitud, es decir, un tiempo mas corto que el del presente caso.
Lo propio sucedio en el tercer asunto citado, siendo españoles los dueños de la finca. Confirmese,
por tanto, la sentencia apelada.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence
with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p.
41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were
no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347
and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega,
all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization
and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of
.265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens
when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice
and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that
they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant
action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon,
they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely
to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference
to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands
within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back
to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not
Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from
acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not
been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over
the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is
not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of
title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare
it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied
for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12,
1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions
essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are
sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
(Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:

The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and
disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2)
reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house
of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means
of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the
vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of
great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such
that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land
in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in
the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or
reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing
cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years
prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as
saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No.
1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there
is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30)
years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when,
according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in
their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked
to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945,
but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its
perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short
of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-
interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise
be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves
scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in
the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act

No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation
for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter,
it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent
...
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in

the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively
shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of
the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period
of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land
and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
(National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not
confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able
to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to
prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta
Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were
inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister
Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were
part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground
of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports
petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends.
The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land
registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on
appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely
on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title
under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not
present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial"
or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the
"titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their
claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since
time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated
in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been
a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v.
Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed.,
594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began
in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act,
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be
either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos
v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court
of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant
for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification
from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for
more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the
property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the
contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under
the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title

to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . .
., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial
possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning,
and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra).
Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than
eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-
interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No.
15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of
partition of his estate among his heirs — in such manner as to remove the same from
the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever,
with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such
filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an
imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner
that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application,
as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of
the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of
Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the
then 1973 Constitution which reads:

citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private
land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine
laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same,
the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he
shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a
natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration
of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view
of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of
the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as
his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of
the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with
by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration
of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the
transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the
property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the
names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the
location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his
intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case
since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance
therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration
court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is
only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has
become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of
Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree
of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified
persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can
agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not
challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when
they acquired the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to
a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:

of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents
have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents'
name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also
been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read
into the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason
why we should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the
dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which
took effect on 16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case:
i.e., the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while
they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as
citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a
situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is
difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at
the subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P.
Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation
on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an
amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national
becomes transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously acquired by such
foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses,
that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified
persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can
agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not
challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when
they acquired the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to
a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:

of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents
have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents'
name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also
been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read
into the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason
why we should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the
dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which
took effect on 16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case:
i.e., the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while
they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as
citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a
situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is
difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at
the subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P.
Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation
on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an
amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national
becomes transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously acquired by such
foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses,
that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
February 11, 1913
ACT NO. 2259
THE CADASTRAL ACT
SECTION 1. When, in the opinion of the Governor-General (now the President), the
public interests require that the title to any lands be settled and adjudicated, he may to
this end order the Director of Lands to make a survey and plan thereof. (As amended by
Sec. 1850, Act No. 2711.)
The Director of Lands shall, thereupon, give notice to persons claiming an interest in the
lands, and to the general public, of the day on which such survey will begin, giving as full
and accurate a description as possible of the lands to be surveyed. Such notice shall be
published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, and a copy of the notice in the
English and Spanish languages shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the chief
municipal building of the municipality, township or settlement in which the lands, or any
portion thereof, are situated. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the president of
such municipality, township, or settlement, and to the provincial board. (As amended by
Sec. 1851, Act No. 2711.)
SECTION 2. The surveyor or other employees of the Bureau of Lands in charge of the
survey shall give reasonable notice to the day on which the survey of any portion of such
lands is to begin, and shall post such notice in the usual place on the chief municipal
building of such municipality, township, or settlement in which the lands are situated, and
shall mark the boundaries of the lands by monuments set up at proper places thereon.
(As amended by Sec. 1852, Act No. 2711.)
SECTION 3. (Repealed by Act No. 2711.)
SECTION 4. It shall be lawful for surveyors and other employees of the Bureau of Lands
to enter upon the lands whenever necessary for the making of such survey or for the
placing of monuments. (As amended by Sec. 1853, Act No. 2711.)
It shall be the duty of every person claiming an interest in the lands to be surveyed, or in
any parcel thereof, to communicate to the surveyor in charge upon his request therefor
all information possessed by such person concerning the boundary lines of any lands to
which he claims title or in which he claims any interest. (As amended by Sec. 1584, Act
No. 2711.)
Interference with surveys and monuments. Any person who shall interfere with the making
of any survey undertaken by the Bureau of Lands, or shall interfere with the placing of
any monument in connection with any such survey, or shall deface, destroy, or remove
any monuments so placed, or shall alter the location of any such monument, or shall
destroy or remove any notice of survey posted on the land pursuant to law, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than thirty days or both. (As amended by Section 2753, Act No. 2711.)
SECTION 5. When the lands have been surveyed and platted, the Director of Lands
represented by the Attorney-General (now Solicitor General), shall institute registration
proceedings, by petition against the holders, claimants, possessors, or occupants of such
lands or any part thereof, stating in substance that the public interests require that the
titles to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that such titles be so settled
and adjudicated.
The petition shall contain a description of the lands and shall be accompanied by a plan
thereof, and may contain such other data as may serve to furnish full notice to the
occupants of the lands and to all persons who may claim any right or interest therein. (As
amended by Sec. 1855, Act No. 2711.)
If the lands contain two or more parcels held or occupied by different persons, the plan
shall indicate the boundaries or limits of the various parcels as correctly as may be. The
parcels shall be known as "lots" and shall on the plans filed in the case be given separate
numbers by the Director of Lands, which numbers shall be known is "cadastral numbers."
The lots situated within each municipality, township or settlement, shall, as far as
practicable, be numbered consecutively, beginning with the number "one" and only one
series of numbers shall be used for that purpose in each municipality, township, or
settlement.
In cities or townsites, a designation of the land holdings by block and lot numbers may be
employed instead of the designation by cadastral numbers and shall have the same effect
for all purposes as the latter. (As amended by Sec. 1856, .Act No. 2711.)
SECTION 6. After final decree has been entered for the registration of a lot, its cadastral
number shall not be changed except by order of the Court of First Instance. Future
subdivisions of any lot shall, with the approval of said Court, be designated by a letter or
letters of the alphabet added to the cadastral number of the lot to which the respective
subdivisions pertain. The letter with which a subdivision, is designated shall be known as
its "cadastral letter": Provided, however, That subdivisions of additions to cities or town
sites may, with the approval of the court, be designated by block and lot numbers instead
of cadastral numbers and letters.
All subdivisions under this section shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
section forty-four of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six and the provisions of
section fifty-eight of the said Act shall be applicable to conveyances of lands so
subdivided.
SECTION 7. Upon the receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing
of the petition, the Chief of the General Land Registration Office shall cause notice thereof
to be published twice, in successive issues of the Official Gazette, in the English
language. The notice shall be issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, and shall be in form substantially as follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Court of First Instance, Province of __________
Cadastral Case No. _____
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. _____
NOTICE OF HEARING
To (here insert the names of all persons appearing to have an interest and the adjoining
owners so far as known), and to all whom it may concern:
WHEREAS, a petition has been presented to said Court by the Director of Lands., praying
that the titles to the following described lands or the various parcels thereof be settled
and adjudicated (insert description), you are hereby cited to appear et the Court of First
Instance to be held at _____, in the Province of _______, on the day of ___, 19___, at
___ o'clock, to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof,
and to present evidence, if any you have, in support of such claims.
And unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be
recorded and the titles to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with
the prayer of the petition and upon the evidence before the Court and you will be forever
barred from contesting such petition or any decree entered thereon.
WITNESS _____, Judge of said Court, this __ day of ____, 19 __.
ISSUED at Manila, Philippines, this __ day of _____, 19__
ATTEST:
_________________
Chief of the General
Land Registration Office
(As amended by See. 3, Rep. Act No. 96., and Sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 1151.)
SECTION 8. The return of said notice shall not be less than thirty days nor more than
one year from the date of issue. The Chief of the General Land Registration Office shall
also. within seven days after the publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as
hereinbefore provided, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed to every person named
therein whose address is known. Said official shall also cause a duly, attested copy of the
notice to be posted, in a conspicuous place on the lands included in the petition and also
in a conspicuous place upon the chief municipal building of the city, municipality,
township, or settlement in which the lands or a portion thereof are situated, by the sheriff
of the province, or by his deputy, or by such other person as may be designated by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, fourteen days at least before the return day
thereof. A copy of the notice shall also be sent by registered mail to the Mayor of the city,
municipality, township, or settlement in which the lands are situated and to the Provincial
Governor. The court may cause other or further notice of the petition to be given in such
manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. (As amended by Sec. 4 of Republic
Act No. 96.)
SECTION 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands, whether named
in the notice or not, shall appear before the Court by himself, or by some person in his
behalf and shall file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as
may be allowed by the Court. The answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant
or by some person in his behalf, and shall state whether the claimant is married or
unmarried, and, if married, the name of the husband or wife and the date of the marriage,
and shall also contain:
(a) The age of the claimant.
(b) The cadastral number of the lot or lots claimed, as appearing on the plan filed
in the case by the Director of Lands, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be.
(c) The name of the barrio and municipality, township, or settlement in which the
lots are situated.
(d) The names of the owners of the adjoining lots as far as known to the claimant.
(e) If the claimant is in possession of the lots claimed and can show no express
grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors in interest, the answer
shall state the length of time he has held such possession and the manner in which it has
been acquired, and shall also state the length of time, as far as known, during which his
predecessors, if any, held possession.
(f) If the claimant is not in possession or occupation of the lands, the answer
shall fully set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition.
(g) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value.
(h) The encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of the adverse
claimants as far as known.
SECTION 10. The governor of the province shall, upon the request of the court, detail an
officer or employee of the province to assist the defendants in action brought under this
Act in the preparation of their pleadings and evidence, without cost to them: Provided,
however, That the court may in its discretion, detail any of its employees to perform such
service, and in case of the failure of the provincial governor to make suitable provision for
the assistance of the defendants as above set forth, the court may, with the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, employ for such purpose the necessary personnel, to be paid
out of provincial funds. The officer or employee detailed, or the person employed to assist
the defendants, shall prepare their answer, which shall be sworn to before such officer,
employee or person. No fees shall be charged for the preparation, acknowledgment and
filing of answer, nor shall a documentary stamp be required. The court shall, at some
convenient date prior to the expiration of the time for filing the answer, cause such general
notice to be issued to all persons interested as may be necessary fully to inform them of
the purposes of this section and their rights with respect thereto.
SECTION 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province
in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in
writing and filed with the record of case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the
same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall
be governed by the same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in
the same manner as in ordinary cases in cases in the same court and shall have the
same effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such
decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said
persons which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for
registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and except as herein otherwise
provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it
hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act, and to the
titles and certificates of title granted or issued hereunder.
Provided, however, That in deciding a cadastral case the court shall set aside from the
cadastral proceedings all lots that have not been contested and shall award such lots to
the claimants in a decision which shall become final thirty days after the rendition of the
same, without prejudice to going on with the preceding as regards the contested lots.
Every decision shall set forth the civil status of the respective claimant, the name of the
spouse if married, the age if a minor, and if under disability, the nature of such disability.
(,As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3080.)
SECTION 12. In case of the death of any judge, who may have begun the trial of an action
brought under the provisions of this Act, before the termination of the trial or in case of
his inability for any other reason to terminate such trial, the Secretary of Justice may
designate another judge to complete the trial and to decide the case. Such other judge
shall have the same power as the judge who began the trial to decide all questions arising
in connection with the case and to decide the case upon the evidence appearing in the
record.
SECTION 13. Whenever in an action brought under the provisions of this Act a new trial
is ordered, the court shall specify the lot or lots with reference to which the new trial is
ordered, and the case shall remain closed as to all other lots, if any, included in the action.
SECTION 14. In the event of an appeal to the Supreme Court from any decision or order
of the Court of First Instance in an action brought under the provisions of this Act, only
the lots claimed by the appellant shall be affected thereby. The decision of the Court of
First Instance shall be final as to all remaining lots, if any, included in the action, and upon
the expiration of the time for the filing of a bill of exceptions, final decree for such
remaining lots may be entered and certificates of title therefor issued.
SECTION 15. Except as otherwise ordered by the court, a separate certificate of title shall
be entered and a corresponding duplicate certificate issued for each separate parcel or
holding of land included in tile petition.
SECTION 16. After the entry of the final decree of registration of any lot, the designation
of the lot by its cadastral number, or block and lot number as the case may be, together
with the name of the municipality, township, or settlement and province in which the lot is
situated, shall be a sufficient description of said lot for all purposes. The cadastral letter
of a subdivision of a lot added to the cadastral number thereof shall, together with the
name of the municipality, township, or settlement and province, be a sufficient description
of each subdivision. In deeds of conveyance or other documents evidencing the transfer
of title to lands, or creating encumbrances thereon, the cadastral numbers or the block
and lot numbers, as the case may be, shall be written in words and figures.
SECTION 17. In all proceedings under this Act, the fees of the several registers of deeds
for the making and entering of a certificate of title, including the issue of one duplicate
certificate, and for the registration of the same, including the entering, indexing, filing, and
attesting thereof, shall be as follows and no other fees shall be lawful:
When the value of property does not exceed fifty pesos, fifty centavos.
When the value of the property exceeds fifty pesos but does not exceed two hundred
pesos, one peso.
When the value of the property exceeds two hundred pesos but does not exceed five
hundred pesos, two pesos.
When the value of the property exceeds five hundred pesos, six pesos.
For the purposes of this section the value of the property shall be its last assessed value,
or, in default thereof, its market value.
The fees authorized under this section shall be payable to the register upon the delivery
of the titles to the owners thereof: Provided, however, That such fees may be payable to
the provincial treasurer or his deputies when these deliver said titles by delegation to the
register. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3080.)
SECTION 18. (a) One-tenth of the cost of registration proceedings and the cadastral
survey and monumenting had under this Act shall be borne by the Insular Government;
one-tenth shall be paid by the province concerned, and one-tenth by the city, municipality,
municipal district, township, or settlement in which the land is situated, the City of Manila
to be considered for this purpose, both as a province, and municipality; and the remaining
seven-tenth shall be assessed and collected against each and all of the lots included in
a cadastral proceeding and shall be apportioned in accordance with the square root of
the area thereof, but in no case shall less than five-pesos be taxed against each lot:
Provided, That when the province, a municipality, municipal district, township, or
settlement has not sufficient funds to pay this obligation, its share may be paid in five
equal installments within five years, without interest. The amount thus taxed against each
of the lots or parcels of land shall be considered a special assessment of taxes against
the respective parcels, shall constitute a first lien upon the land, and shall be collected by
the Director of Lands or his duly authorized representatives in equal installments within a
period of five years, bearing interest at the rate of six per centum per annum. The first
installment shall become due and payable at the same time as the general land taxes for
the year next succeeding the year in which the assessment of the costs shall be received
by the provincial treasurer, and shall be collected in the same manner as such general
land taxes. Each succeeding installment shall become due and payable at the same time
as the general land taxes for the corresponding current year and shall be collected in the
same manner. The Director of Lands shall for this purpose send to the officer in charge
of such collection a copy of said assessment of costs: Provided, however, That the
amounts representing the proportional shares of the costs taxed against lots surveyed at
the request and expenses of their owner and for which a plan other than the cadastral
plan has been made by a duly authorized surveyor prior to the decision in the cadastral
proceeding, or which have been registered in accordance with the provisions of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled. "The Land Registration Act" or
surveyed, patented, or leased under the Public Land and Mining Laws, prior to the
decision in the cadastral proceeding, or have been declared to be public land by the court,
shall not constitute a lien against said lot nor shall be collected from the owners thereof:
Provided, further, that the owner of any lot may, if he so desired, pay any installment of
the costs taxed against his lot at any time before the same becomes due.
(b) In case of the sale, transfer, or conveyance, for a pecuniary consideration, of

any property, or part thereof, registered by virtue of a decree issued in a cadastral
proceeding, prior to the payment of the total amount of the costs taxed against such
property in accordance with the preceding paragraph, endorsed as an encumbrance of
lien upon each cadastral certificate of title, the vendor or his legal representatives shall
pay such costs in their entirety in case the order apportioning the costs has already been
issued in the cadastral proceeding in which the property being sold, transferred, or
conveyed is included, and the register of deeds concerned shall demand of the vendor,
before registering the deed for such sale, transfer, or conveyance of said property, that
he exhibit a receipt signed by the Director of Lands or his duly authorized representative,
showing that such encumbrance or lien has been paid: Provided, however, That in cases
of sale, transfer, or conveyance of the property in. which the order apportioning the costs
has not yet been issued, the register shall endorse on the certificate of transfer issued by
him the encumbrance or lien appearing on the former certificate as guarantee of the
payment of the costs above referred to.
(c) The costs of the registration proceedings under the provisions of this Act shall
consist of a sum equivalent to ten per centum of the cost of the survey and monumenting
of the land. The amount of the costs of the proceeding so taxes shall be for all services
rendered by the General Land Registration Office and the clerk or his deputies in each
cadastral proceeding, and the expense of publication, mailing, and posting notices, as
well as the notices of the decision and the order apportioning the costs shall be borne by
the General Land Registration Office.
(d) All amounts collected by the Director of Lands or his duly authorized
representatives from the owners of the various lots as costs of proceedings, survey, and
monumenting in accordance with this section, shall be covered into the Insular Treasury:
Provided, however, That the various lots and owners thereof, and in such event the
payments required to be made by said owners shall be made as herein provided and shall
be covered into the provincial or municipal treasury as a part of the general funds of the
province or municipality.
(e) Upon the collection of the amount of the cost of the registration proceedings,
or part thereof, in each cadastral proceeding in accordance with this Section, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall forward to the Insular Auditor and the Insular
Treasurer a statement of such collection, and the latter is hereby authorized and
empowered to pay to the General Land Registration office a sum equal to the amount of
said cost of proceedings collected, and the sums necessary to make such payments, are
hereby appropriated, such sums to be credited to the appropriation for the General Land
Registration Office for disbursement in other cadastral registration proceedings. (As
amended by Sec. 2, Act No. 3081, and Secs. 3 and 5, Rep. Act No. 1151.)
SECTION 19. Whenever in proceedings under this Act the Court is of the opinion that the
interests of justice require or the parties themselves petition that a partition be made of
lands included in the petition and held by various persons in common or jointly, the court
may order that partition be made and for that purpose may appoint two or more
disinterested and judicious persons to be commissioners, commanding them to make
partition of the lands and to get off to each of the parties in interest such part and
proportion of the lands as the court shall order. By agreement between the co-owners or
co-tenants of lands included in the petition, lands not so included but held by said co-
owners or co-tenants in the same manner and by the same tenure may, with the approval
of the court, be included in the same partition proceedings, and in such cases the court
may order a survey to be made of such lands.
SECTION 20. Before making the partition, the commissioners shall take and subscribe
an oath before any officer authorized to administer oaths, that they will faithfully perform
their duties as such commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the proceedings
in the case.
SECTION 21. Except as herein otherwise provided, the commissioners and the court in
making the partition shall be governed by the provisions of sections one hundred and
eighty-five, one hundred and eighty-six, one hundred and eighty-seven, one hundred and
ninety, one hundred-and ninety-one of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
commissioners shall receive such compensation as the court may determine, but not to
exceed three, pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the
performance of the duties.
SECTION 22. The order of the court effecting the partition shall state definitely, by
adequate description, the particular portion of the estate which is apportioned t each party
in interest and shall have the same force and effect as the final judgment in partition
proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure.
SECTION 23. The guardian of minors and persons of unsound mind shall represent them
in the partition proceedings authorized by this Act. Where no guardian is appointed, or
where he fails to appear, the court may appoint a guardian "ad litem" to represent the
minors or persons of unsound mind in the proceedings. Such guardian or guardian "ad
litem" may, on behalf of his ward, and with the approval of the court, do and perform any
act, matter, or thing respecting the partition of the estate, including amicable partition
thereof which such minor or person of unsound mind could do in the partition proceedings
if he were of age or of sound mind.
SECTION 24. The proceedings in partitions authorized by this Act shall be regarded as a
part of the land registration case in connection with which the partition is ordered, and no
special fees shall be charged by the clerk of the court for any service performed by him
in such partition proceedings, but the compensation of the commissioners appointed and
additional expenses incurred in connection with the partition, including the costs of
additional surveys, may be taxed as cost in the case and apportioned among the parties
interested in the partition to such an extent and in such a manner as the court may deem
just and equitable. Upon the order taxing and apportioning such costs becoming final, an
execution may issue therefor as in partition proceedings under the Code of Civil
Procedure unless the court directs that payment be made in installments as provided in
section eighteen of this Act.
SECTION 25. If the property partitioned under the foregoing provisions constitutes the
estate, or part of the estate, of a deceased person, which has not been settled by
administration proceedings under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs
or devisees of such deceased person shall, for the full period of two years from the date
of the order effecting the partition, be jointly liable to the creditors of the deceased for his
debts: Provided, however, That no heir or devisee shall be liable for a greater amount
than the value of the property received by him as his share in the estate: And Provided,
further, That for the purpose of contribution between the heirs or devisees themselves,
the amount of the debts of the estate for which each shall be liable shall bear the same
proportion to the value of his share of the estate as the total amount of the legal debts
paid by the heirs or devisees demanding contribution bears to the total value of the estate.
Any heir or devisee who, under a final judgment rendered in an action brought under this
section, pays more than his proportionate share of the debts of the estate shall, with
reference to the excess, be subrogated to the rights of the creditors under such judgment
against each of the other heirs or devisees to the extent of their respective proportionate
shares of the debts so paid by him: Provided, further, That the provisions of this section
shall not be construed to modify the provisions of existing law as to the order in which the
heirs or devisees are liable to pay the debts of the deceased.
The judgment rendered in any action brought under this section by a creditor against the
heirs or devisees of a deceased person shall, if favorable to the plaintiff, specify the
maximum amount for which each heir or devisee shall be liable under such judgments.
SECTION 26. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Act, the rules of construction
laid down by sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 123 of the
Land Registration Act shall apply. The word "court" as used in this Act shall mean the
Court of First Instance.
SECTION 27. In the event that the Philippine Legislature shall pass an Act transferring to
the Courts of First Instance the jurisdiction now conferred upon the Court of Land
Registration, the word "court" used in this Act shall be construed to mean the respective
Courts of First Instance and the word "clerk" to mean the Clerk of the respective Courts
of First Instance, or the Chief of the General Land Registration Office if that office shall
have been created and the powers and duties now performed by the clerk of the court of
Land Registration transferred to that office. (Amended by Secs. 1, 2, 3 and 5, Rep. Act
1151.)
SECTION 28. The surveyors employed to make surveys for registration purposes, or to
prepare maps and plats of property in connection therewith, shall give due notice in
advance to the adjoining owners, whose, addresses are known, of the date and hour
when they should present themselves on the property for the purpose of making such
objections to the boundaries of the properties to be surveyed as they consider necessary
for the protection of their rights. (As amended by Sec. 1859, Act No. 2711.)
Surveyors shall report all objections made by adjoining property owners and occupants
or claimants of any portion of the lands at the time of the survey and demarcation, giving
a proper description of the boundaries claimed by such owners, occupants or claimants.
(As amended by Sec. 1859, Act No. 2711.)
Surveyors shall define the boundaries of the lands, surveyed for registration purposes, by
means of monuments placed thereon and shall indicate on the maps or plats the
respective boundaries as designated, both by the applicant for the survey and adverse
claimants of adjoining properties; but the work of survey and demarcation of the
boundaries of the lands as occupied by the said applicant need not be suspended
because of the presentation of any complaint or objections. (As amended by Sec. 1860,
Act No. 2711.)
If, in any registration proceeding involving such survey, the court shall find the boundary
line designated by an adverse claimant to be incorrect and that designated by the
applicant to be correct, the expense of making any extra survey over that required by the
applicant shall be assessed by the court as cost against the adverse claimant. (As
amended by See. 1861, Act. No. 2711)
Private surveyors employed in making survey as hereinabove contemplated shall be

subject to the regulations of the Bureau of Lands in respect to such surveys and shall
execute the same in accordance with current instructions relative thereto as issued by the
Director of Lands. Promptly upon completing their work, it shall be their duty to send their
original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plate of the property in
question to the Bureau of Lands, for verification and approval. (As amended by Sec. 1862,
Act No. 2711.)
Except as hereinbelow provided, no private surveyor shall be qualified to make a survey

to be used in registration proceedings unless he shall have passed either the appropriate
civil service examination provided for surveyors or a special examination prepared by the
Bureau of Lands for the purpose of determining his competency for such work. When so
requested by the Director of Lands such special examination may be given under the
supervision of the Bureau of Civil Service upon the dates and at the places of scheduled
civil service examinations, the papers being returned to the Director of Lands for rating
by him. (As amended by Sec. 1863, Enact Act No. 2711.)
Surveyors who have held the office of assistant in one of the technical corps of engineers
of public works, forests, mines, and agronomist during the Spanish Government and
surveyors holding an academic diploma issued by a duly authorized and recognized
university, college of school who furnished satisfactory proof to the Director of Lands that
they have practiced surveying in the Philippine Islands prior to June First, nineteen
hundred and nine, shall be exempted from the examination hereinabove required,
excepting those who, having taken the said examination, failed to obtain a rating of fifty
per centum therein. "Surveyors, holding an academic diplomas," as herein used, shall
include all those who with similar diplomas under the Spanish Government, were
considered as surveyors or as entitled to practice to said profession in the Philippine
Islands. (As amended by Sec. 1863, Act No. 2711.)
A private surveyor possessing the prescribed qualifications shall, upon application to the
Director of Lands, be given a certificate authorizing him to make surveys as contemplated
in this article; and without such certificate no private surveyor shall make any survey for
Land registration purposes. (As amended by Sec. 1864, Act No. 2711.)
When the Director of Lands shall find that any certified private surveyor submits any plan
or survey made by him which is defective, incorrect and substantially erroneous, owning
to incompetency, inexperience, bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; or fails to forward
within a reasonable length of time to the Bureau of Lands for verification any surveys work
contracted by him to the prejudice and detriment of the clients; or that he is guilty of any
fraud, deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in the exercise of his profession or of
disregarding the instruction, rules and regulations issued by the said Bureau concerning
the survey in preparation of his plans, the said Director may, after due investigation,
suspend or cancel the certificate of such surveyor; but the latter may, within thirty days
after receiving notice of such action, take and appeal to a committee composed of the
Department Head, the Judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance for the
Ninth Judicial District, and duly authorized surveyor appointed by the Governor-General.
Pending appeal the right of the surveyor shall be suspended, and the action of said
committee shall be final. (Sec. 1865, Rev. Adm. Code, as amended by Sec. 1, Act No.
3092.)
SECTION 29. The short title of this Act shall be "The Cadastral Act."
SECTION 30. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 11, 1913
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 27059. February 14, 1928.]
BUENAVENTURA BALBOA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CECILIO L.

FARRALES, Defendant-Appellant.
Ernesto Garagoza,, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Alejo Labrador,, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. VESTED RIGHTS, DEFINED. — A vested right is some right or interest in property

that has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some person as present interest.
2. HOMESTEADERS; TITLE TO HOMESTEAD. — When a homesteader has complied with

all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public
land, he acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable
owner thereof. Where the right to a patent to land has once become vested in a
purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued. The execution and
delivery of the patent, after the right to a particular parcel of land has become
complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even
without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the Government.
Such land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can deprive him of that
vested right.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J.:
The material facts in this case, as disclosed by the record, may be briefly stated as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Sometime in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filed with the Bureau
of Lands an application for homestead, No. 10619, under the provisions of Act No. 926,
covering a tract of land situated in the barrio of Culis, municipality of Hermosa,
Province of Bataan, containing 14 hectares, 49 ares and 77 centares.
(2) Five years thereafter, or in 1918, Balboa submitted final proof, showing his
residence upon, and cultivation of said land, as well as his compliance with all of the
other requirements of section 3 of said Act No. 926, which final proof was approved by
the Director of Lands on February 15, 1918 (Exhibit 3). On July 1, 1919, said Act No.
926 was repealed by Act No. 2874.
(3) On September 10, 1920, or over a year after Act No. 2874 had gone into effect, the
homestead patent for said land, otherwise known as certificate of title No. 91 (Exhibit
A) was issued in favor of Buenaventura Balboa by the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands.
(4) On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in consideration of the sum
of P950, sold said land to the defendant Cecilio L. Farrales (Exhibit 2); and on October
16, 1924, the latter secured in his name transfer certificate of title No. 650 of said land
(Exhibit B).
On March 6, 1926, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the purpose of having
said sale declared null and void on the ground of lack of consent on his part and fraud
on the part of the defendant, and on the further ground that said sale was contrary to,
and in violation of the provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874.
After a careful consideration of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause the
Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, judge, arrived at the conclusion that the deed of sale in
question (Exhibit 2) had been duly executed by the plaintiff. He held, however, that
said deed was null and void, in view of the fact that it was executed before the lapse of
five years from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title in favor of
Buenaventura Balboa, in violation of the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No.
2874.
The pertinent parts of the decision read as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Como cuestion basica, se discute en el presente asunto la validez del documento

Exhibit 2, o sea el traspaso hecho por el demandante al demandado referente al terreno
en cuestion. El demandante sostiene que, bajo el articulo 116 de la Ley No. 2874, el
traspaso es nulo por cuanto tuvo lugar el 11 de agosto de 1924, esto es sin haber
transcurrido todavia los cinco años siguientes a la fecha en que fue expedido el
certificado de titulo No. 91 que lo fue el 10 de septiembre de 1920; el demandado, por
el contrario, sostiene, como punto de discusion legal, que el documento de traspaso
Exhibit 2 no cae bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No. 2874, sino dentro de las
disposiciones de la Ley No. 926 y que bajo esta Ley no existia tal limitacion de venta
dentro de los cinco años siguientes a la fecha de la expedicion del titulo de homestead,
y que habiendo sido la solicitud de homestead aprobada el 15 de febrero de 1918, aun
contando los cinco años siguientes, resultaria que desde el 15 de febrero de 1918 hasta
el 11 de agosto de 1924 han transcurrido mas de cinco años.
x x x
"De lo expuesto, el Juzgado llega a la conclusion de que el Exhibit 2 es nulo e ineficaz,

por cuanto que la venta fue otorgada fuera de lo prescrito en el articulo 116 de la Ley
No. 2874, que procede declarar nulo dicho documento Exhibit 2, y, consiguientemente,
el certificado de transferencia de titulo 650."
cralaw virtua1aw libra ry
In accordance with the foregoing conclusion the trial judge rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to return to the
plaintiff the land in question, and the plaintiff to return to the defendant the price
received for said land, aggregating P652.69, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent.
From that judgment both parties appealed.
The principal question raised in this appeal is whether the validity of the sale of the land
in question should be determined under the provisions of Art No. 926 or under those of
Act No. 2874. In other words, which of the two Acts — 926 and 2874 — shall be applied
in determining whether the sale in question is valid or not?
The land in question was acquired by Buenaventura Balboa as homestead under the
provisions and pursuant to the requirements of Act No. 926. He filed his application and
complied with all of the requisites to the acquisition of said homestead, in conformity
with the provisions of said Act No. 926. In 1918 and prior to the repeal of said Act he
submitted his final proof, showing his residence upon, and cultivation of the land, as
well as his compliance with all of the other requirements of the law, and said final proof
was approved by the Director of Lands on February 15, 1918. In other words,
Buenaventura Balboa, had shown, to the satisfaction of the Government, that he had
performed all of the acts required. of an applicant for home stead, and, under the
provisions of section 3 of Act No. 926, he became entitled to a homestead patent or
certificate of title to the land covered by his application.
Section 3 of Act No. 926 provides, inter alia, that upon the filing of final proof by the
applicant and the approval thereof by the Director of Lands, "he (the applicant) shall be
entitled to a patent" or certificate of title. Therefore, on February 15, 1918, after
Buenaventura Balboa had submitted his final proof and after the same had been
approved by the Government, and while Act No. 926 was still in force, he became the
owner of the land and "entitled to a patent." At least on that date his right to the land,
as owner, ripened into a vested right. It was no longer expectant as depending on the
continuance of existing circumstances, or contingent as depending on some events or
the performance of some conditions.
"Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become
the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest." (12 C. J., sec.
485, p. 955.)
Vested right "is some right or interest in property which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy." (Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed.
Rep., 15, 20.)
The fact that the homestead patent or certificate of title No. 91 was issued on
September 10, 1920, after the repeal of Act No. 926, and under the provisions of
section 116 of the repealing Act No. 2874, cannot prejudice the vested right acquired
by Buenaventura Balboa under the provisions of the former Act. The issuance of the
certificate of title was a mere ministerial act, and the certificate, an outward symbol of
his vested right to the land, of which he was virtually recognized as owner by the
Government on February 15, 1918.
In the case of United States v. Freyberg (32 Fed. Rep., 195), where the right of a
homesteader was involved, it was held that where the right to a patent for land has
become vested in a purchaser the Government holds the legal title in trust for the
purchaser until the patent is issued. Again in the case of Stark v. Starr (6 Wallace [U.
S. ], 402), the Supreme Court of the United States held that where the right to a patent
is once vested, it is treated by the Government, when dealing with public lands, as
equivalent to a patent issued.
"A party who has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a
patent for a particular tract of public land acquires a vested interest therein, and is to
be regarded as the equitable owner thereof." (Wirth v. Branson, 98 U. S., 118.)
"Where the right to a patent has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it
is equivalent, so far as the Government is concerned, to a patent actually issued. The
execution and delivery of the patent after the right to it has become complete are the
mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty." (Simmons v. Wagner, 101
U. S., 260.)
The moment the plaintiff had received a certificate from the Government and had done
all that was necessary under the law to secure his patent, his right had become vested
before the patent was issued. His right had already vested prior to the issuance of the
patent, and his rights to the land cannot be affected by a subsequent law or by a
subsequent grant by the Government to any other person. (Herron v. Dater, 120 U. S.,
464.)
The delay in the issuance of the patent cannot affect the vested right of the
homesteader. (Murphy v. Packer, 152 U. S., 398; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279;
Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431; McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia, 42
Phil., 749.)
A perfected valid appropriation of public lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract

from the body of the public domain and, so long as such appropriation remains valid
and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A perfected
homestead, under the law, is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and
conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant of the right to present
and exclusive possession of said land. A valid and subsisting perfected homestead,
made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statute, has the effect of a
grant of the present and exclusive possession of the land. Even without a pa-tent, a
perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that
the paramount title to the land i~ in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or
inherited.
In the United States and in each and every State of the Union vested rights are
safeguarded by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that
no State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The state has no power to divest or to impair vested rights, whether such an attempt
to do so be made by legislative enactment, by municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the state. This result follows from prohibitions contained in the
constitutions of practically all the states. Before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment there was no prohibition in the Constitution of the United States which
would prevent the states from passing laws divesting vested rights, unless these laws
also impaired the obligation of contract, or were ex post facto laws; but vested property
rights are now protected against state action by the provision of the fourteenth
amendment that no state ’shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.’" (12 C. J., sec. 486, pp. 956, 957.)
Section 3, paragraph 1, of the Jones Law provides: "That no law shall be enacted in
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, etc." Thus, in this jurisdiction, vested rights are also protected from
impairment by express constitutional provision. Therefore, the right vested in
Buenaventura Balboa by Act No. 926 cannot be divested, impaired or restricted by
section 116 of Act No. 2874. Said right should be governed entirely and exclusively by
the provisions of Act No. 926, under which it was acquired.
Now, the vested right of Buenaventura Balboa to his homestead land necessarily carries
with it the right to alienate and dispose of the same. The only prohibition contained in
Act No. 926 against alienation of homestead acquired under said law, appears in section
4 thereof, which reads as follows: "No lands acquired under the provisions of this
chapter shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to the issuance of a patent therefor." It follows, therefore that the sale of the land in
question by the plaintiff Buenavenutra Balboa to the defendant Cecilio L. Farrales does
not infringe said prohibition, and consequently said sale is valid and binding, and should
be given full force and effect.
Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of homestead land during the
period of five years subsequent to the issuance of the patent or certificate of title upon
which rests the decision of the court a quo, cannot be invoked to annul the sale in
question. Said prohibition, if applied in the present case, would impair and diminish the
vested rights acquired under Act No. 926, contrary to the uniform doctrine followed in
the United States, and in violation of the express provisions of section 3 of the Jones
Law.
The right, title and interest of the appellant having become vested under the provisions
of Act No. 926, his rights cannot be affected by any law passed subsequent thereto.
The provisions of Act No. 2874 cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the
vested right acquired by the appellant before its adoption.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby
reversed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the defendant be absolved from all
liability under the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
STREET, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur and wish to point out the difference between the present case and that of
Beach v. Pacific Commercial Co. and Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (49 Phil., 366), which turned
upon the interpretation of the same provisions of law as those that are decisive of the
present case, namely, section 4 of Act No. 926 and section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The difference is that in the Beach case an attempt was made to seize the property
under process of law to satisfy an obligation created within five years after the issuance
of a patent; and we held that, under section 116 of Act No. 2874, the property was
exempt. In the case before us the owner of the land, in the exercise of his power as
such, had voluntarily alienated the property; and the court now holds that the act of
alienation was effective notwithstanding the immunity conferred by section 116 of Act
No. 2874. Though the distinction thus involved may appear to be somewhat refined, I
believe it to be sound, and I have no hesitation in giving my adherence to the present
decision, especially in view of the fact that soon after Act No. 2874 was passed the
Attorney-General ruled that a voluntary alienation of a homestead, under the conditions
involved in this case, would be valid. A ruling contrary to that now made by us would
have the undesirable effect of interfering with rights that have been acquired in good
faith by purchasers relying upon the interpretation thus placed upon the law by the
Attorney-General.
In the opinion in Beach v. Pacific Commercial Co. and Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, supra, we
used the following language in calling attention to the difference between the situation
then before the court and that presented in the case now before us: jgc:chanrobles .com.ph
"The error underlying the contention of the appellee possibly has its origin in a failure to
distinguish between two entirely different ideas expressed in section 116 of Act No.
2874. The first has reference to the power of the homesteader to encumber or alienate
the homestead by his voluntary act, while the second has reference to the subjection of
the property to the satisfaction of debts against the will of the homesteader. There
might possibly be something in the contention of the appellee that the homesteader’s
right became vested when he submitted his final proof if the case were one where he
had attempted to alienate the property by voluntary exercise of the power of an owner;
but we are not called upon to pass upon this point. We are here concerned exclusively
with the power of the creditor to seize the property of the owner against his will. That
the property cannot be so taken follows in our opinion necessarily from the language of
section 116." cralaw virtua1aw library
Our present decision recognizes the validity of this distinction suggested in the
paragraph above quoted, and it will thus be seen that there is no inconsistency between
the decision now made and the conclusion reached in the case cited.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68291 March 6, 1991
ARCADIO, MELQUIADES, ABDULA, EUGENIO, APOLONIO, all surnamed YBAÑEZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VALENTIN O.
OUANO, respondents,
Dominador F. Carillo for petitioners.

Pableo B. Baldoza for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which this court treated as a petition for review
on certiorari in its resolution of August 22, 1984 seeks to nullify the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated June 29, 1984, modifying the decision of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao Oriental, dated June 8, 1981, ordering the herein
petitioners to vacate the property in controversy; to return its possession to private respondent and
to pay P10,000.00 representing proceeds of the land from January 4, 1975, and attorney's fees.
Records show that private respondent Valentin Ouano, a claimant-occupant of Lot No. 986, Pls-599-
D situated at sitio Bagsac, barrio of Manikling, Governor Generoso (now San Isidro), Davao del
Norte, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 48 ares and 78 centares which was surveyed on
March 13, 1958, as evidenced by the "Survey Notification Card" issued in his name, filed on
February 27, 1959, a homestead application1 with the Bureau of Lands. The said application,
recorded as Homestead Application No. 20-107001, was approved in an order dated March 3, 1959
issued by the District Land Officer, Land District No. 20, for and by authority of the Director of Lands.
Three (3) years thereafter, or on September 5, 1962, a "Notice of Intention to Make Final Proof was
made by Valentin Ouano to establish his claim to the lot applied for and to prove his residence and
cultivation before Land Inspector Lorenzo Sazon at the Bureau of Lands, Davao City at 10:00 o'clock
A.M. appending thereto an affidavit attesting that a copy of his intention to make final proof relative
to his Homestead Application No. 20-10701 was posted at the Municipal building of the Municipality
of Gov. Generoso (now San Isidro), Davao, on the bulletin board of the barrio where the land applied
for is located, and in a conspicuous place on the land itself on the 5th day of August, 1962 and
remained so posted for a period of thirty days, until September 5, 1962.2
On the said date, or on September 5, 1962, Valentin Ouano made his "Final Proof" before Land
Inspector Lorenzo Sazon pursuant to Section 14, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
The following year, or on March 4, 1963, an order for the issuance of patent was issued by the
Bureau of Lands.
On April 15, 1963, an "Original Certificate of Title No. P-15353" was issued to private respondent
Valentin Ouano over Homestead Patent No. 181261 which was transcribed in the "Registration
Book" for the province of Davao on October 28, 1963. 3
On January 4, 1975, after 19 years of possession, cultivation and income derived from coconuts
planted on Lot No. 986, private respondent Valentin Ouano was interrupted in his peaceful
occupation thereof when a certain Arcadio Ybanez and his sons, Melquiades, Abdula, Eugenia
Numeriano, Apolonio and Victoriano, forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with spears,
canes and bolos.
Because of the unwarranted refusal of Arcadio Ybanez, et al. to vacate the premises since the time
he was dispossessed in 1975, private respondent Valentin Ouano filed on September 24, 1978 a
complaint for recovery of possession, damages and attorney's fees before the then Court of First
Instance (now RTC) of Davao Oriental against Arcadio Melquiades, Abdula, Eugenia Numeriano,
Apolonio, Victoriano and Servando, all surnamed Ybanez,4 docketed as Civil Case No. 671, seeking
to enjoin the Ybanezes from further the coconuts therefrom and restore to him the peaceful
possession and occupation of the premises. In his complaint, Valentin Ouano, then plaintiff therein,
alleged that he has been in lawful and peaceful possession since 1956 of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 986, Pls-599-D situated in Bagsac, Manikling, Governor Generoso (now San
Isidro), Davao Oriental, to which an Original Certificate of Title No. P-(l5353)-P-3932 was issued in
his name; that petitioners, then defendants therein, unlawfully entered his land on January 4, 1975
and started cultivating and gathering the coconuts, bananas and other fruits therein, thereby illegally
depriving him of the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the premises.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that plaintiff Valentin Ouano, now private respondent, has
never been in possession of any portion of Lot No. 986 as the same has been continously occupied
and possessed by petitioners since 1930 in the concept of owner and have introduced valuable
improvements thereon such as coconuts and houses; that Lot No. 986 was the subject matter of
administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Lands in Mati, Davao Oriental which was
consequently decided in their favor by the Director of Lands on the finding that Valentin Ouano has
never resided in the land; that it was declared by the Director of Lands that the homestead patent
issued to private respondent Valentin Ouano was improperly and erroneously issued, since on the
basis of their investigation and relocation survey, the actual occupation and cultivation was made by
petitioner Arcadio Ybañez and his children, consisting of 9.6 hectares which cover the whole of Lot
No. 986 and portions of Lot Nos. 987, 988 and 989; that based on the ocular inspection conducted, it
was established that Valentin Ouano did not have a house on the land and cannot locate the
boundaries of his titled land for he never resided therein. 5
The trial court, after hearing, rendered on June 8, 1991 its decision6 in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1 — The defendants are ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 986, PLS-599-D, situated at
Sitio Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Governor Generoso and to return the possession thereof
to the plaintiff Valentin Ouano together with all the improvements therein;
2 — To pay unto the plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00, the proceeds of the sale of copra from
January 4, 1975 to the present;
3 — To pay attorney's fees of P7,500.00;
4 — To desist from entering the property again after they have turned it over to plaintiff; and
5 — To pay the costs of this suit.7
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On June 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division promulgated a
decision,8 affirming the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the award of Pl2,000.00
representing the proceeds of the land from January 24, 1975 was reduced to P10,000.00 and the
amount of P7,500.00 as attorney's fees was fixed at P5,000.00. 9
Hence the instant recourse by petitioners.
At the outset, it must be noted that in assailing the appellate court's decision which affirmed that of
the trial court, petitioners relied on the Order dated July 19, 1978 issued by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands resolving the protest filed by them on January 3, 1975, later amended on February
6, 1975, against the Homestead Application No. 20-107001 of Valentin Ouano over Lot No. 986, Pls-
599-D, docketed as B.L. Claim No. 2809, D.L.O. Confect No. (XI-7)102.
Petitioners claimed that the complaint for recovery of possession, damages and attorneys fees
against them should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of private respondents, as
patentee-respondent in the protest case before the Bureau of Lands, to exhaust administrative
remedies which is tantamount to a lack of cause of action under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court; that the decision or order on a question of fact by the Bureau of Lands that Patent No. 101201
issued to private respondent was improperly and erroneously issued should have been respected by
the trial court and the appellate court; that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title must not be a
sword for an offense nor should it be allowed to perpetrate fraud.
We find the contentions unmeritorious.

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private
respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their
answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, 10 issued pursuant to the investigatory
power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a
defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the
operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act,
now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not allow a collateral attack on the
Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. 11 The rule now finds expression in Section 48
of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. 12 The settled rule is that a
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the
ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct
and not by a collateral proceeding.13 The validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be
threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose. 14
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant
to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under
a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public
land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. 15
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land
patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act,
now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility.
Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to
the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance
of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration
cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it,
and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the
land applied for to the applicant.16 This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the
homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and
cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of
the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government thru the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would
arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government's system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
In the instant case, the public land certificate of title issued to private respondent attained the status
of indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer
open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the protest before the
Bureau of Lands against the Homestead Application of private respondent on January 3, 1975, or 12
years after, can no longer re-open or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground of actual
fraud. No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law
serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to
act.17
In rendering judgment restoring possession of Lot No. 986 to private respondent Ouano, the duly
registered owner thereof, the trial court merely applied the rule and jurisprudence that a person
whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the
decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.18
Although petitioners may still have the remedy of reconveyance, assuming that they are the
"owners" and actual occupants of Lot No. 986, as claimed by them before the trial court, this remedy,
however, can no longer be availed of by petitioners due to prescription. The prescriptive period for
the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title. 19
While there is no dispute that the Director of Lands has the authority to conduct an investigation of
any alleged fraud in securing a homestead patent and the corresponding title to a public land
notwithstanding the status of indefeasibility attached to the certificate of title of private respondent,
and such investigation cannot be enjoined by a writ of prohibition, it must be observed however, that
whatever may be the result of the factual finding in this administrative proceedings under Section 91
of the Public Land Law is not decisive of the issue as to who has a better right of possession
(possession de jure) over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671. The action instituted by private
respondent before the trial court partakes of the nature of an accion publiciana which is basically
intended for the recovery of possession, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding
before a Court of First Instance (now RTC).20
On the other hand, in the case of the administrative investigation under Section 91 of the Public
Land Law, the sole and only purpose of the Director of Lands is to determine whether or not fraud
had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be
filed by the Government.21 It is not intended to invalidate the Torrens certificate of title of the
registered owner of the land. Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by virtue of a
judgment of a court of law in a direct proceedings for reversion, the Torrens certificate of title thereto
remains valid and binding against the whole world.
In resolving the basic issue of an accion publiciana, the trial court acted within its sphere of
competence and has correctly found that private respondent Ouano has a better right of possession
over Lot No. 986 than petitioners who claimed to own and possess a total of 12 hectares of land
including that of Lot No. 986. Records indicate that petitioners have not taken any positive step to
legitimize before the Bureau of Lands their self-serving claim of possession and cultivation of a total
of 12 hectares of public agricultural land by either applying for homestead settlement, sale patent,
lease, or confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title by judicial legalization under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Law, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and P.D. 1073, or by administrative legalization
(free patent) under Section 11 of Public Land Law, as amended. What was clearly shown during the
1âwphi1
trial of the case was that petitioners wrested control and possession of Lot No. 986 on January 4,
1975, or one (1) day after they filed their belated protest on January 3, 1975 before the Bureau of
Lands against the homestead application of private respondent, thus casting serious doubt on their
claim of prior possession and productive cultivation.
What is more, it was only in 1975 that petitioners came to know and realize that they do not have
actual possession of the so-called 12 hectares because, as testified by Ernesto Domanais, son-in-
law of Arcadio Ybanez, three (3) hectares of their land were found to be in possession of a certain
Rodolfo Beneguian; and that petitioners did not object when said portion of land was removed from
their occupation thereby reducing their purported claim of 12 hectares to only nine (9) hectares. 22 It is
relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses a 12-hectare public agricultural
land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively declare and to prove before a court of law that
one actually possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who stand
on equal footing under the Public Land Law (CA 141, as amended) as any other pioneering
claimants.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, dated June 29, 1984, is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Exhibit "A", Records.
2
Exhibit "C", Records.
3
Exhibit "F", Records.
4
Rollo, pp. 29-32.
5
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6
Rollo, pp. 21-28.
7
Rollo, p. 28.
8
Associate Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, ponente, Associate Justices Ramon Gaviola,
Jr. and Eduardo P. Caguioa, concurring (Rollo, pp. 18-20).
9
Rollo, pp. 18-20.
10
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
Magay, et al. v. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456 (1976); Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
11
590; Director of Lands v. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184; Samonte, et al. v. Sambilon, et al., 107 Phil.
198.
Section 38, Land Registration Act, now Section 32, P.D. 1259; Pamintuan v. San Agustin,
12
43 Phil. 558; Reyes, et al. v. Director of Lands, et al., 50 Phil. 791,
13
Section 48, P.D. 1529; Legarda, et al. v. Saleeby, supra.
14
Venancia Magay v. Eugenio Estiandan, G.R. L-28975, February 27, 1976, supra.
15
El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, et al., 60 Phil. 17 (1934); De los Reyes v. Razon, 38 Phil. 480
(1918).
16
Sumail v. Judge of the CFI of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946 (1955).
17
Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 436 (1989).
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 69622, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA
18
587; Director of Lands, et al, v. Register of Deeds, et al., 92 Phil. 826 (1953).
19
Caro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76148, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 401.
20
Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286.
21
Pinero v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386.
22
TSN, January 14, 1981; Records, pp. 24, 32-37.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46548 June 21, 1940
ARMESTO RAMOSO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE OBLIGADO, ET AL., respondents.
Armesto Ramoso in his own behalf.

Macario M. Peralta for the respondents.
MORAN, J.:
An appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
One Feliciano Capinpin was owner of a homestead granted him on September 21, 1921, and
registered in the office of the registrar of deeds of Nueva Ecija under title No. 1080. He died, and his
widow, Luisa Jarduela, and son by the first marriage, Geronimo Capinpin, sold the property to
respondent Juan Obligado on May 17, 1930. When the cadastral proceedings were opened in
Nueva Ecija, the widow, without the son, claimed the property, and the court awarded it to her on
December 10, 1929, the final decree of registration and the original title having been issued on
December 8, 1930, and January 7, 1931, respectively. On October 26. 1934, the widow transferred
the property to her lawyer, Armesto Ramoso, the herein petitioner, in whose favor transfer certificate
of title No. 8550 was issued. The question now is whether Armesto Ramoso, under his transfer
certificate of title, is entitled to the property as against the first transferee, Juan Obligado.
A homestead patent, once registered under the Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a
Torrens title and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
a cadastral case. Any new title which the cadastral, court may order to be issued is null and void and
should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to make corrections of technical errors in
the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned
by two or more coowners. (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin et al., 43 Phil., 558; El Hogar Filipino vs.
Olviga et al., 60 Phil., 17, 18.) Accordingly, the order of registration issued by the cadastral court in
favor of the widow is null and void, and, consequently, no valid transfer could have been made by
her in favor of the petitioner, Armesto Ramos. In other words, the latter has no right to the property.
It is argued, however, that, if in a cadastral proceeding, the court may order the partition of the
property already registered, then it may also validly award the property in favor of the supposed sole
heir of the person in whose favor the title was issued. This conclusion is wrong. Awarding the
property to a supposed sole heir is not ordering its partition. If, according to the registered title, the
property belongs to several owners, the cadastral court may order partition among them. But when
the registered title belongs to only one person, the cadastral court cannot, if that person is dead,
order the registration of the property in favor of the heirs or its partition among them, for that would
presuppose a declaration of heirs, a function which devolves upon probate courts. We do not mean
to say that the cadastral court cannot do so in connection with undersigned lands, the actual
ownership of which it must determine. But when the ownership has already been determined and a
registered title has already been issued, the cadastral court cannot adjudicate anew the ownership
of the property and order the issuance of an original title to successors in interest. Such successors
in interest, either by inheritance or by contract, are entitled only to a transfer certificate of title which
can be issued in proceedings that are not proper in a cadastral court. The issuance of an original title
to the successors in interest is in fact equivalent to setting aside the original title issued in favor of
their predecessor in interest. And this cannot be done by the cadastral court.
It is true that this is a question of jurisdiction of the cadastral court, which the Court of Appeals may
not entertain. But there is no showing that the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals on this matter and has taken, the proper steps to have the case certified to this Court.
Under this circumstance, this court will confine itself to reviewing the pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals on the question of jurisdiction and such other questions of law as have been properly raised
by the petitioner.
In the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals, it is held that the herein petitioner acted in bad
faith in acquiring the property from Luisa Jarduela, for, prior to the acquisition, he knew that the
property had already been sold to Juan Obligado. This is a question of fact which we will not review.
And the finding of the Court of Appeals on this matter is another ground for holding that the petitioner
has no right to the property.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17943 June 22, 1922
FLORENTINO PAMINTUAN, petitioner,

vs.
Honorable PRIMITIVO SAN AGUSTIN, Auxiliary Judge of the Second Judicial District, the
SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA,
NICOMEDES ESPINOSA, ROSA ESPINOSA, EUSEBIA ESPINOSA, and FRANCISCA
DAVID, respondents.
Cavanna, Aboitiz and Agan for petitioner.

Felix Bautista for respondents.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, requiring the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance
to certify to this court the record in land registration case No. 11732, and as much of the record of
cadastral case No. 132, as pertains to lot No. 625, of the cadaster of Mabalacat, Province of
Pampanga. The petitioner further prays that upon said records being so certified, all proceedings
had in said cadastral case in relation to said lot No. 625, be declared null and void. By order of this
court dated November 30, 1920, a preliminary injunction was issued, directing the respondents to
return the possession of the land in question to the petitioner and under another order dated August
29, 1921, the records mentioned were certified to this court.
An examination of the records before us shows that in land registration case No. 11732, and under
the date of April 19, 1917, the aforesaid lot No. 625, was decreed in favor of Florentino Pamintuan,
the petitioner herein, by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and that certificate of title No. 540
covering the said lot was thereupon issued to him in June, 1918.
In the meantime cadastral case No. 132, was instituted. This case embraced the district in which the
lot in question was situated and the lot was given its cadastral number in the proceedings and was
marked on the plans as land in regard to which registration proceedings were pending under Act.
No. 496. Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of the cadastral case, and
the Court of First Instance in a decision dated April 29, 1919, awarded it to the respondents
Nicomedes, Maria, Mercedes, Rose and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of
certificate of title No. 540. The person to whom the land had been adjudged subsequently conveyed
their interest to the respondent Francisca David, in favor of whom the Court of First Instance issued
a writ of possession, placing her in possession of the land. The possession was restored to the
petitioner by virtue of the preliminary injunction issued by this court on November 30, 1920. It may
be noted that no final decree has as yet been issued in the cadastral case in regard to the lot.
Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the adjudication of the land in favor of the Espinosa until
the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of title
for cancellation. He then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance, asking that the decision
of the court in regard to the lot in the cadastral case be set aside and that the writ of possession
issued by virtue of said decision be recalled. This motion was denied by the court on November 16,
1920.
We are of the opinion that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to decree in a
cadastral case land already decreed in another land registration case. Cadastral proceedings are
authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259. The scope and purpose of this Act is expressed in its title:
"An Act providing of land titles." What is understood by "settlement and adjudication" is very clearly
indicated in section 11 of the Act, which reads as follows:
SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convinient place within the province in which
the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and
filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner
as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration, and shall be governed
by the same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same
manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting
interest shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the person entitle
to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for
original certificates of title in favor of said persons, which shall have the same effect as
certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under the Land Registration
Act, and except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration
Act, as now amended, and as it hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to
proceedings under this Act, and to the titles and certificate of title granted or issued
hereunder.
As will be seen the "settlement and adjudication" of a land title under the Cadastral Act is exactly that
provided for in the land Registration Act No. 496, i.e., a proceeding culminating in the issuance of a
final decree and a Torrens certificate of title in favor of the owner of the land.
The title to the land is therefore fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of the
Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would be by a similar
decree in cadastral case and, obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to
provide a special proceeding for the settlement and adjudication of titles already settled and
adjudicated. It is, indeed, more than doubtful if the Legislature. would have the power to enact such
a provision had it so desired; the landholder who possesses a settled and adjudicated title to his land
cannot be deprived of that title through another settlement and adjudication of a similar character.
The intention of the Legislature to exclude land already registered form the operation of the
Cadastral Act is further indicated by the provision of section 18 of the Act to the effect that, no
apportionment of any part of the costs and expenses of cadastral proceedings can be made against
such lands.
We hold that in cadastral case the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to
the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided, such
corrections, do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction
cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.
The petition is granted, and the proceedings in the court below in regard to lot No. 625 of the
cadaster of Mabalacat are declared null and void, with costs against the respondents Nicomedes
Espinosa, Maria Mercedes Espinosa, Eusebia Espinosa, and Francisca David, jointly and severally.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 782
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 782 - AN ACT TO GRANT FREE PATENTS TO OCCUPANTS
OF PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND SINCE OR PRIOR TO JULY FOURTH,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIVE
Section 1. Any provision of law, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any natural
born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares, and who
since July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-five or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors in interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition, shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Act, to have a
free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
The application shall be accompanied with a map and the technical description of the land
occupied along with affidavits proving his occupancy from two disinterested persons residing in
the municipality or barrio where the land may be located.
Sec. 2. The Director of Lands upon receipt of the application shall cause notices of the same to
be posted in conspicuous places in the capital of the province, the municipality and the barrio
where the land applied for is situated for a period of two consecutive weeks, requiring in said
notices everyone who has any interest in the matter to present his objections or adverse claims, if
any, before the application is granted.
Sec. 3. At the expiration of the time provided in the preceding section, the Director of Lands, if
satisfied of the truth of the statements contained in the application and in the affidavits attached
thereto and that the applicant comes within the provisions of this Act, shall issue the
corresponding title in favor of the applicant for the tract of land applied for if there had not been
any objections or adverse claims registered in his office.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 21, 1952
Eighth Congress
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6940 March 28, 1990
AN ACT GRANTING A PERIOD ENDING ON DECEMBER 31, 2000 FOR FILING APPLICATIONS
FOR FREE PATENT AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE TO ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER CHAPTERS VII AND VIII OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA 141, AS AMENDED)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
Section 1. Paragraph 1, Section 44, Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition,
who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares."
Section 2. Section 45, Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby, further
"Sec. 45. The President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, shall from time to time fix by proclamation the period
within which applications for free patents may be filed in the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office or region specified in such proclamation, and upon the expiration
of the period so designated, unless the same be extended by the President, all the land
comprised within such district, chartered city, province, municipality or region subject thereto
under the provisions of this Chapter may be disposed of as agricultural public land without
prejudice to the prior right of the occupant and cultivator to acquire such land under this Act
by means other than free patent. The time to be fixed in the entire Archipelago for the filing of
applications under this Chapter shall not extend beyond December 31, 2000, except in the
Provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Bukidnon, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental,
Sulu, Mt. Province, Benguet, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Maguindanao, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan
where the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, shall determine or fix the time beyond which the filing
of applications under this Chapter shall not extend: provided, that the period shall apply only
when the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares. The period fixed for any
district, chartered city, province or municipality shall begin to run thirty (30) days after the
publication of the proclamation in one (1) newspaper of general circulation in the city,
province or municipality concerned. A certified copy of said proclamation shall be furnished
by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources within thirty (30) days counted from
the date of the presidential proclamation to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office and to the provincial board, and municipal board or city council and
barangay council affected, and copies thereof shall be posted on the bulletin board of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office and at conspicuous places in the
provincial building and at the municipal building and barangay halls or meeting place.t shall
moreover be announced by government radio whenever available in each of the barrios of
the municipality."
Section 3. Section 47, Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further
"Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2000 within which to take advantage of the benefit of this
Chapter: provided, that this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: provided, further, that the several periods of time designated by
the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President."
Section 4. Any law or executive order or part thereof contrary to or inconsistent with this Act is
hereby deemed repealed accordingly.
Section 5. If any provision of this Act or the applicability of such provision to any person or
circumstances shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Act and the applicability of
such provision to the persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 28, 1990
An Act to Amend Commonwealth

Act Numbered Six Hundred Ninety-
One Entitled “An Act to Provide for
the Free Distribution, Under Certain
Conditions, of Lots of Twenty-Four
Hectares Each of Agricultural Land
of the Public Domain”
Republic Act No. 63
Congress of the Philippines
17 October 1946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ninety-one is hereby
“SEC. 1. Any citizen of the Philippines who is more than eight years of age and who does
not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines, nor who shares in the
benefits of any free distribution of any public land since the occupation of the Philippines
by the United States, may apply for the cultivation of a lot of agricultural land of the public
domain, which is neither occupied nor reserved for public purposes, having an area of not
to exceed twenty-four hectares, and a residential lot of not to exceed one thousand six
hundred square meters and obtain free title to the same, as provided for herein, giving
preference to those who are indigents as well as those who have any dependents to
support.”
SECTION 2. Section two of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 2. For the purposes of this Act, the Director of Lands shall take steps for the
classification and survey of agricultural lands of the public domain, especially those
bordering on national highways. The lands thus classified shall be subdivided into lots of
not less than eight nor more than twenty-four hectares each, depending upon the location
of the lots and the crop adaptability of the soil, and into residential lots of not less than six
hundred nor more than one thousand six hundred square meters each in suitably located
residential sites, and in order to speed up the survey and subdivision work, the services of
private surveyors duly qualified may be employed in which case the Director of Lands shall
impose the condition that not more than five thousand hectares in superficial area shall be
assigned to a surveyor, nor more than ten thousand hectares to a partnership or group of
surveyors. The survey work shall be given to the best bidder and same shall not be
adjudicated until the surveyor or partnership or group of surveyors shall have furnished a
bond satisfactory to the Director of Lands in sum equivalent to thirty per centum, at least,
of the total value or amount agreed upon for the survey work, to answer for its faithful
performance.”
SECTION 3. Section seven of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 7. No certificate whatever shall be issued nor shall any deed of ownership of the
land applied for be extended until at least one-fourth of the land has been improved and
cultivated. The period in which cultivation of the said land shall be made shall not be less
than one year nor more than five years, from the date of approval of the application. The
applicant, during the period, shall notify the Director of Lands, as soon as the said applicant
is in readiness to acquire the title. If on the date of said notification the applicant proves to
the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has settled (and resided) for at least one
year in the land itself or in the residential section of the same colony site and has cultivated
continuously at least one-fourth of the land since the date of approval of the application,
and subscribes to an affidavit that no part of the said land has been transferred or
encumbered, and that he has fulfilled all the requisites set forth in this Act, he shall then be
entitled to a free title to the said land.”
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: October 17, 1946.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Tel. Nos.: (632) 929-6626 to 29 * (632) 929-6252
929-86-20 * 929-66-33 to 35 929-70-41 to 43
DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-12
SUBJECT: RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF FREE PATENTS TO

RESIDENTIAL LANDS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10023
Pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10023, otherwise known as An Act Authorizing the
Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands ("RA 10023"), mandating the Director of the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue the
implementing rules and regulations of this Act, the following rules and regulations specifically
pertaining to residential lands are hereby promulgated:
Section 1. Scope of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. - This implementing rules and
regulations, hereinafter referred to as the IRR, shall only cover applications for free patents
pertaining to untitled public alienable and disposable lands which have been zoned as residential. It
shall also cover zoned residential areas in proclaimed townsite reservations.
Section 2. Definition of terms. - For purposes of RA 10023, the following terms and phrases as used
in this IRR are defined and understood as follows:
2.1 Filipino Citizen - as enumerated in Article IV Section I of the 1987 Constitution, the
following are citizens of the Philippines:
2.1.1 Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
1987 Constitution;
2.1.2 Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
2.1.3 Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching he age of majority; and
2.1.4 Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
In addition, a person with dual citizenship as provided for in Republic Act No. 9225 and its
implementing rules and regulations shall be considered a Filipino citizen.
2.2 Actual occupant - any person who, either by herself or himself or through her or his
predecessor-in-interest, is occupying, living in, inhabiting or staying in a structure, the
primary purpose of which is to serve as the residence of such person, situated on the parcel
of residential land and subject of the free patent application. This is subject to the
requirements under subsections 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 below.
2.2.1 For purposes of this IRR, persons employed in distant locations, either foreign
or domestic, in public or private service, such that they are not able to stay at their
place of residence for long periods of time, are deemed actual occupants.
2.3 Residential lands - all lands that have been identified and zoned as residential through
the appropriate ordinance by the Local Government Unit (LGU) having jurisdiction over the
area. These include residential lands within areas zoned as mixed residential and
commercial or mixed residential and industrial.
2.4 Alienable and Disposable lands - Lands of the public domain classified as agricultural
that may be acquired through grant or confirmation of title.
2.5 Townsite reservations - proclaimed areas specifically reserved for the establishment of a
new town as provided for in Chapter XI Title V of C.A. 141 or the Public Land Act as
Amended.
2.6 Highly urbanized cities (HUC) - as defined in Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code (LGC), cities with a minimum population of two hundred
thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the
latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50, 000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer. Provided that, any future changes in
qualifications for classification as HUC by the concerned government agency at the time of
filing of the application will prevail.
2.7 First class municipalities - municipalities with an average annual income of Fifty Five
Million Pesos (P55, 000,000.00), as provided for in Department Order No. 23-08 of the
Department of Finance, dated July 29, 2008 (DO 20-08). Provided that, any future changes
in qualifications for classification as first class municipality by the concerned government
agency at the time of filing of the application will prevail.
2.8 Second class municipalities - municipalities with an average annual income equal to or
more than Forty Five Million Pesos (P45, 000,000.00), but not exceeding Fifty Five Million
Pesos (P55,000,000.00), as provided for in DO 23-08. Provided that, any future changes in
qualifications for classification as second class municipality by the concerned government
agency at the time of filing of the application will prevail.
2.9 Use for Public service - utilization of parcels of land exclusively by the government or any
of its instrumentalities in providing basic services to the general public, such as, but not
limited to, market places; town, city, provincial, or barangay halls; hospitals, clinics, and
health centers; police stations; outposts; jails; and the like.
2.10 Public use - utilization of parcels of land for structures which are open to the general
public, including, but not limited, to public plazas, parks, resort, playgrounds, public parking
lots, and the like.
2.11 Disinterested person - any person who has no claim over the parcel of land subject of
the free patent application and who does not stand to benefit from titling and registration or
any other transaction over such parcel of land. A person is also disinterested when her or his
relation to the cause or to the parties is such that she or he has no incentive for exaggerating
or giving false color to her or his statements, or for suppressing or perverting the truth or for
stating what is false.
2.12 Predecessor-in-interest - a person who, before having lawfully transferred the parcel
subject of the application to the applicant, has held and possessed the same in her or his
own right and under a color of title acquired through any of the modes of acquisition
recognized by the Civil Code. She or he has formerly occupied this parcel of land in the
concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of ownership, but relinquishes her or his right
over the same in favor of the applicant.
2.13 Actual residence - utilization of and presence in a residential structure on the parcel
subject of the application with the intention to reside, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention, either continuous or interrupted or intermittent, as long as the applicant possesses
such structure and the parcel on which it stands in the concept of an owner.
2.14 Continuous possession and occupation - used either by the applicant herself or himself,
or through her or his predecessor-in-interest, of the parcel subject of the application in the
concept of an owner. This may be actual possession or occupation, or constructive
possession that provides for non-residence, but with the desire to come back as soon as
practicable. The possession and occupation, whether actual or constructive, must be without
interruption, except when prevented by force majeure or circumstances beyond human
control, or not of intermittent character while it continues. A person who lawfully recovers
possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed, for all purposes which may redound to her or his
benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption.
2.15 Bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership - claim for the parcel subject of the
application that is legally adequate as proof of possession and as acceptable to the
community to separate that particular parcel as being owned by the applicant to the
exclusion of others. It means that the applicant holds the property by virtue of or through any
of the modes of acquisition recognized by the Civil Code. It also refers to a state of mind
which is manifested by the acts of the applicant, done with honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable or unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud
and its absence should be established by convincing evidence.
2.16 Accomplished application - a proper application form completely and duly filled in with
the requisite information and that which does not require any additional inputs other than
those already provided in the form, together with all other requirements enumerated under
Section 5 of the IRR.
2.17 CENRO - the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) having jurisdiction over the parcel subject of
the application, which shall accept the accomplished application submitted by the applicant.
In the National Capital Region, the Regional Office shall perform the functions of the
CENRO. Where portions of the parcel subject of the application are spread over two (2) or
more areas under the jurisdiction of more than one (1) CENRO, the parcel shall be divided
such that the portions shall be the subject of separate free patents applied for in the
corresponding CENRO where they are located.
2.18 PENRO - the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) having jurisdiction over the parcel subject of
the application, which has the power to approve or disapprove such application. In the
National Capital Region, the Regional Executive Director shall perform the functions of the
PENRO. Upon approval of the application, the PENRO shall issue the patent over such
parcel of land.
Section 3. Qualifications. - Applicants for the issuance of a residential free patent shall possess the
following qualifications, namely:
31. Filipino citizenship, as defined in subsection 2.1. In case of doubt, the CENRO or the
land investigator concerned may ask for proof of citizenship such as, but not limited to, a
copy of the birth certificate, passport, decree or order of naturalization, or certificate of dual
citizenship.
3.2 Actual occupation , actual residence and continuous possession and occupation of the
parcel subject of the application, either by herself or himself or through her or his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least ten
(10) years prior to the filing of the application.
There shall be no age requirement for applicants as long as minor applicants, aged below eighteen
(18) years old, are duly represented by their legal guardians. The heirs of a deceased applicant may
substitute the applicant provided that they themselves possess the required qualifications. There
shall likewise be no limit as to the number of applicants which may be filed under RA 10023,
provided that the limitations as to the size of the parcel as stated in Section 4 shall not be exceeded.
No application shall be approved for any individual whose total landholding would exceed a total of
an accumulated twelve (12) hectares, including agricultural lands, should the application be granted.
Section 4. Coverage. - The IRR covers all residential lands that have been identified and zoned
through the appropriate ordinance of the LGU concerned, provided that the land applied for its not
needed for public service and/or public use.
4.1 For highly urbanized cities, the area shall not exceed two hundred (200) square meters.
4.2 For other cities, the area shall not exceed five hundred (500) square meters.
4.3 For first class and second class municipalities, the area shall not exceed seven hundred
fifty (750) square meters.
4.4 For all other municipalities, the area shall not exceed one thousand (1000) square
meters.
In the determination of the size limitation of the parcel subject of the application, the above
classifications of LGUs at the time of filing of the accomplished application shall be considered.
All CENROs shall secure a copy of approval zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities within
their jurisdiction for identification of zoned residential areas. They shall secure area certifications
from the LGU planning offices that the areas identified and zoned as residential lands are not
needed for public use or public service. The LGU zoning at the time of filing of the application shall
be considered for purposes of complying with the zoning requirement.
Section 5. Requirements for applications. - The application form accompanied application by the
requirements enumerated below shall constitute an accomplished application for the issuance of free
patents for residential lands.
5.1 Copy of approval plan based on an actual survey conducted by a licensed geodetic
engineer or copy of cadastral map showing the parcel of land applied for. For purpose of
securing the approval of a survey, the application number is not necessary.
5.2 Copy of technical description of the parcel of land subject of the application. LMB form
700-2A or LMB form 700-2B may be used.
5.3 Simplified sketch of the land parcel showing the adjacent lots, corners and natural or
manmade features that defined the boundaries of the land
5.4 Affidavit of two (2) disinterested persons residing in the barangay of the city or
municipality where the land is located, attesting to the truth of the facts contained in the
application to the effect that the applicant thereof has, either by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and occupied,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, the subject land for at least ten (10)
years
5.5 For isolated applications, a certification from the Regional Trial Court that there is no
pending land registration case involving the land parcel being applied for.
Section 6. Procedure in the CENRO for processing applications. - Applications for residential free
patent shall be filed in the CENRO whose jurisdiction covers the area where the parcel of land
subject of the application is situated. This may also include on-site acceptance of accomplished
applications by the CENRO or any of his authorized representatives. The CENRO may also
authorize any public office to accept applications and to prepare applications and documents for
processing.
6.1 No application shall be accepted/processed without submitting the complete

requirements including the approved plan and technical description. A preliminary
assessment of compliance with the qualifications and documentary requirements based on
the checklist may be made before acceptance of the application and the commencement of
the 120-days period.
6.2 Posting of Notice. - Upon receipt of an accomplished application, the CENRO concerned
shall cause the posting of notices for 15 days in two (2) conspicuous places within the
municipality or city, preferably in the location of its office, or any other place that can be
readily seen, such as, but not limited to, public bill boards, public plazas,
municipal/city/barangay halls and market places. The CENRO shall issue the certificate of
posting of notice after the 15 day period has elapsed.
6.3 The CENRO is required to process the application, including the publication thereof,
within a non-extendible period of one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of filing of the
accomplished application. The 120-days period starts the moment that an accomplished
application leaves the hands of the applicant and is turned over the CENRO or any
authorized representatives thereof. The period for verification with the records (e.g.
determining whether or not a patent had already been issued for the parcel in question) is
included in the 120-days period. The CENRO may provide for acceptance and processing of
applications by batch (by date or by geography) to comply with the 120-day processing
period.
6.4 Upon approval of the CENRO, the application and the complete records of the
application shall be forwarded to the PENRO for her or his approval and signature.
6.5 Should the CENRO determine that the application is incomplete in requirements, she or
he shall reject the application without prejudice to re filing.
6.6 The investigator shall conduct an ocular inspection on the parcel of land applied for and
shall determine the qualifications of the applicant as well as verify the claims of the applicant
on the land. The land investigator is authorized to subscribe proofs, affidavits and oaths of
any kind required or necessary in connection with the application for residential free patent.
6.7 In case an opposition is filed, the 120-day period for processing shall be deemed
interrupted. The CENRO shall notify the applicant on the opposition and shall subject the
application to the regular claims and conflict procedures of the DENR.
6.8 The CENRO shall fast track the resolution of all claims and conflicts arising from
residential free patent applications within 120 days and shall notify the conflicting parties
within 15 days from the date of resolution. The CENRO shall apply alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms in the resolution of claims and conflicts.
6.9 The CENRO shall establish a computerized data base and system of record keeping with
respect to all public land applications and patents arising from the implementation of this Act.
Section 7. Procedure in the PENRO. - Upon the recommendation of the CENRO concerned, the
corresponding PENRO shall have a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of such
recommendation to either approve and sign the patent or disapprove the application.
In case of approval, the PENRO shall notify the applicant within 15 days and forward the patent to
the Registry of Deeds.
In case of disapproval, the PENRO shall notify the applicant within 15 days and remand the entire
records to the CENRO for appropriate action.
The PENRO may disapprove the application without prejudice to re-filing on the grounds of non-
compliance with documentary requirements. He/she may disapprove an application with prejudice to
refilling on grounds of non-qualification of the applicant and when the land applied for should
undergo claims and conflict resolution procedures.
The disapproval of the application by the PENRO may be appealed to the Secretary of the DENR
though appropriate channels.
Section 8. Other Pending Applications. - Pending miscellaneous sales applications falling within the
purview of RA 10023 prior to the order of award may be converted to applications for residential free
patent. Provided, that the applicant is informed and his/her consent is obtained.
All pending miscellaneous sales application after the order of award and those applicants thereof
who have commenced payment on any of the required equal annual installments shall be given the
option to continue with the miscellaneous sales application or to convert their application into an
application under RA 10023, provided that an affidavit of relinquishment of rights to the MSA and of
forfeiture of previously paid installments shall be executed.
The conversation of pending Miscellaneous Sales Applications shall comply with the area limits
specified in Section 4.
The CENRO shall issue an order cancelling the miscellaneous sales application and converting the
MSA to a residential free patent application.
Townsite sales applications falling within the qualifications of R.A. 10023 and before the bidding has
been conducted, may also be converted to residential free patent applications. Provided, that the
applicant consents to the conversation and provided further, that the applicant relinquishes any other
type of claim through an affidavit. And provided further, that the conversation shall comply with the
area limits specified in Section 4.
Section 9. Removal of Restrictions. - The following restrictions under Chapter XIII, Title VI of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 shall not be applicable to patents issued under RA 10023, to wit:
"Section 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five
years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds."
"Section 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance."
"Section 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, and solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or charitable purposes or for
a right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title,
interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or
individual sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land.
The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, any acquisition of such
land, rights thereto or improvements thereon by a corporation, association, or partnership prior to the
promulgation of this Decrees for the purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding; Provided,
That no final decision of reversion of such land to the State has been rendered by a court; And
Provided, further, That such acquisition is approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources within six
(6) months from the effectivity of this Decree."
"Section 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent on such land, shall encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this
Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the
free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent
improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his
own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in
violation hereof, shall be null and void."
"Section 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines
with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that
were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except o
persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts; Provided, further, That
in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations,
or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated
within the period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government."
Section 10. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Implementing
Rules and Regulations is declared null and avoid, no other section, provision, or part thereof shall be
affected and the same shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. - All orders, circulars, memoranda and other issuances inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed and/or amended accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity. - This order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the publication thereof in a
newspaper of general circulation and acknowledgement of receipt of a copy from the Office of the
National Administrative Register.
Approved:
HON. HORACIO C. RAMOS

Secretary
Recommending Approval:
ATTY. ALLAN V. BARCENA

Director, Land Management Bureau

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila
Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two
thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10023
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF FREE PATENTS TO RESIDENTAL

LANDS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
Section 1. Qualifications. - Any Filipino citizen who is an actual occupant of a

residential land may apply for a Free Patent Title under this Act: Provided; That in
highly urbanized cities, the land should not exceed two hundred (200) square meters;
in other cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500) square meters; in first class and
second class municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred fifty (750) square
meters; and in all other municipalities, it should not exceed one thousand (1,000)
square meters; Provided, further, That the land applied for is not needed for public
service and/or public use.
Sec. 2. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all lands that are zoned as residential areas,
including townsites as defined under the Public Land Act; Provided, That none of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705 shall be violated.
Zoned residential areas located inside a delisted military reservation or abandoned

military camp, and those of local government units (LGUs) or townsites which preceded
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) law,
shall also be covered by this Act.
Sec. 3. Application. - The application on the land applied for shall be supported by a
map based on an actual survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer and
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and a
technical description of the land applied for together with supporting affidavit of two (2)
disinterested persons who are residing in the barangay of the city or municipality where
the land is located, attesting to the truth of the facts contained in the application to the
effect that the applicant thereof has, either by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and occupied, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, the land applied for at least ten (10) years and
has complied with the requirements prescribed in Section 1 hereof.
Sec. 4. Special Patents. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and
subject to private rights, if any, public land actually occupied and used for public
schools, municipal halls, public plazas or parks and other government institutions for
public use or purpose may be issued special patents under the name of the national
agency or LGU concerned: Provided, That all lands titled under this section shall not be
disposed of unless sanctioned by Congress if owned by the national agency or
sanctioned by the sanggunian concerned through an approved ordinance if owned by
the LGU.
Sec. 5. Removal of Restrictions. - The restrictions regarding encumbrances,

conveyances, transfers or dispositions imposed in Sections 118, 119,121, 122 and 123
of Chapter XII, Title VI of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, shall not apply to
patents issued under this Act.
Sec. 6. Period for Application. - All applications shall be filed immediately after the
effectivity of this Act before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR. The CENRO is mandated to process the application within one
hundred and twenty (120) days to include compliance with the required notices and
other legal requirements, and forward this recommendation to the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), who shall have five (5) days to
approve or disapprove the patent. In case of approval, patent shall be issued; in case of
conflicting claims among different claimants, the parties may seek the proper judicial
remedies. Ï‚Î·Î±Î¿blÎµÎ½Î¹rÏ…Î±llÎ± Ï‰lÎ¹brÎ±r
Sec. 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Director of the Land Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act, and shall see to
it that such are gender responsive.
Sec. 8. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive order, executive issuance's or
letters of instruction, rules and regulations or any part thereof inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed, amended or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or parts of this Act
shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid by any competent court, other parts of this
Act shall be thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Sec. 10. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15) after its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general education.
Approved
(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5618 and Senate Bill No. 3429 was
finally passed by the House of Representatives and Senate on December 18, 2009.
(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives
Approved: March 9, 2010
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

1Penned by Justice P. Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurred in by Justices A. Austria-Martinez

2 Penned by Judge E. Terencio.

3 Penned by Judge R. Barrios.

8 Id. at 16; but see 103.

12 G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604.

13 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 1995 at 182.

14 G.R. No. 127060, 19 November 2002, 392 SCRA 190.

17 380 Phil. 156 (2000).

19 See Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 357 (1997).

21 Supra note 19.

23 See Rollo, at 35.

24 Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-27088 July 31, 1975

Leonardo A. Amores for petitioners-appellants.

Reyes and Cabato for respondents-appellees.

In this review, petitioners-appellants press that the Court of Appeals erred —

... IN DECLARING THE SALE BETWEEN LACAMEN AND LARUAN TO BE NULL

... IN APPLYING STRICTLY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 118 AND 122 OF

... IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

Indeed, in a like case, 27 it was ruled that —

Without pronouncement as to costs.

Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., concurs in the result.

1 Record on Appeal at pp. 2-3.

2 Annex A, Petitioners Complaint below Record of Appeal, at p. 7.

3 Equivalent to 8,616 square meters.

4 Annex A, Petitioners' Complaint below, Record on Appeal, at p. 10.

8 Idem, at pp. 11-17.

9 See Sale de Porkan v. Yatco, 70 Phil. 163-165.

12 Brief, Petitioners-appellants, at pp. 5-6.

13 Record on Appeal, at p. 20.

14 See Palad v. Saito, 55 Phil. 836, 837.

18 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., 177.

19 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.

20 Vda de Lima v. Tio, L-27181, April 30, l970, 32 SCRA 518.

21 Nielson & Company, Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601,

23 Record on Appeal, 20, 21.

24 Record on Appeal, at p. 22.

27 Miguel v. Catalino, L-23072, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 234.

G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,

Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.

. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

The following things are property of public dominion:

[G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.]

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES,

Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney s fees and costs.

6. Records, pp. 1-6.

8. Court of First Instance Decision, p. 40; Rollo, p. 98.

9. Go Ong v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270 (1987).