Civil Law Review PFR2

PFR1 (Effectivity - Domicile)
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Effect and Application of Laws
A. When do laws take effect?
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
Section 18, RAC. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
SECTION 1, EO 200. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
➢ The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby (Pesigan v. Angeles)
In the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated
Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the
Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation
and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in
the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby (Supra).
➢ Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law
must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties.
For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law
there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act
shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term
"publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to
make known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make
the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the
effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special
effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (People v. Veridiano)
➢ Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material
for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect
(Tanada v. Tuvera).
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
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which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized
to all concerned (Supra).
➢ [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a

primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
x x x
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.
x x x
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what
the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law (Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix).
➢ All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws (Maralita v. Military Shrine
Services).
B. Ignorance of the Law
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
The Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides
that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its
acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides
further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith". Article
1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other
real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could
transmit the title thereto."
x x x
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis (Kasilag v. Rodrigues)..
C. Retroactivity
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
ARTICLE 22, RPC. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same.

same.
NOTE; Also see Arts. 2252-2269, NCC.
➢ Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the
first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights
do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin (Uson v. Del Rosario).
➢ Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent (Acosta v. Plan).
➢ As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches
to or arises from procedural laws (Sps. Dacudao v. Gonzales).
D. Acts executed against mandatory or prohibitory laws
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Article 301, NCC. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted
to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
However, support in arrears may be compensated and renounced, and the right to demand the
same may be transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title.
➢ Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank
within one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB
Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the general class of
prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having
been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly,
it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other (BPI v. IAC).
E. Waiver of rights
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
➢ This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not
applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the
estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will.
The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of
any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other
claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate (De Borja v. De Borja).

estate (De Borja v. De Borja).
➢ Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are

contrary to morals, if not against the law. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these
contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the
right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived.
x x x
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first
place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
Additionally, the intention to waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly (Asian Cathay Finance v. Sps. Gravador).
F. Repeal of Laws
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
SECTION 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
➢ The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the
requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the
Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing
increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is
untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing
laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money
are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million The only
reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is
that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention
of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a
more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally
applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated (Guingona v.
Carague).
G. Duty to render judgment
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws.
ARTICLE 5, RPC. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be Repressed but

ARTICLE 5, RPC. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be Repressed but
Which are Not Covered by the Law, and in Cases of Excessive Penalties. — Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
H. Applicability of custom
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
➢ The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive
or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time
that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from
the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To
hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is
necessarily negligent, is to go far.
x x x
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice

of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of
the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time
of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents
or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for
years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection
or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable
and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under
the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not
(Martinez v Van Buskirk).
I. Legal periods
Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
Sec. 31, RAC. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month"
of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four
hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.

hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.
➢ The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period,
the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to
Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal
holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which
stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act,
event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday
or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is
neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day
as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view.
(Amigos v. CA).
➢ In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, with the approval of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular
30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that, whereas
the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the
term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days." (NAMARCO v. Teczon)
J. Binding effect
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law
and to treaty stipulations.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
➢ While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of
foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack
of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of
the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered
without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any
agreements entered into a foreign country.
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and
under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The
lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the
divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent
children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief (Barreto-Gonzales
v. Gonzales).
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,

➢ It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage (Van Dorm v. Romillo).
➢ American jurisprudence provide that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion
x x x
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that
he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons (Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera).
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
➢ For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree
of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the
Civil Code (Tenchavez v. Escano).
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

K. Human relations
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
➢ The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
x x x
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to
the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case. x x x (Ardiente v. Sps. Pastorfide).
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
➢ This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children,
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his
flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical
sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the
urgings of a sick mind.
x x x
there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only
to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.

conditions prejudicial to their development.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order
or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused
Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for
proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young
children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not be
condoned (People v. Ritter).
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of
acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any
government or private charitable institution.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages
in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress
of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make
such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and

therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and
a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with
the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but
the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action
may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
L. Prejudicial question
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
➢ A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution
of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in a criminal case.
x x x
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The
preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar (Donato v. Luna)
➢ The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted
for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second
spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner,
as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent
Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy
(Landicho v. Relova).
Civil Personality

Civil Personality
A. Persons and Personality
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent
in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to
do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements. (32a)
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is
not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law.
Persons - any being, natural or artificial, capable of possessing legal rights and obligations
(Paras, 2016)
Kinds of Persons
i. Natural - human beings created by God through the intervention of parents

ii. Juridical - artificial beings created by legal fiction
Elements of Civil Personality
i. Juridical Capacity - fitness to be the subject of legal relations
NOTE: Civil personality is simply the aptitude of being the subject of right and obligations.
It is synonymous with juridical capacity.
ii. Capacity to Act - the power to do acts with legal effects
Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act
Inherent Acquired
Lost only through death May be lost through other means or circumstances
Cannot be limited/restricted Can be limited or restricted by certain circumstances
B. Commencement and termination of personality
1. Natural Persons
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of
less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will. (32a)
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time
and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Section 12, Art. II, 1987 Constitution. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Article 5, PD 603. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall
commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the
requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 256, RPC. Intentional Abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusión temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the
pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prisión mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent
of the woman.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman
shall have consented.
ARTICLE 257, RPC. Unintentional Abortion. — The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum
and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence,
but unintentionally.
ARTICLE 258, RPC. Abortion Practiced by the Woman Herself or by Her Parents. — The
penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a
woman who shall practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person
should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of
prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they
act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders
shall suffer the penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
ARTICLE 259, RPC. Abortion Practiced by a Physician or Midwife and Dispensing of

Abortives. — The penalties provided in article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period,
respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge
or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any
abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
➢ The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action the right
to privacy, and a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion falls within that right to
privacy. A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without respect to the stage of
pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although the state has legitimate interests in

pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although the state has legitimate interests in
protecting the health of pregnant women and the “potentiality of human life,” the relative
weight of each of these interests varies over the course of pregnancy, and the law must
account for this variability.
In the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not regulate the abortion decision; only the
pregnant woman and her attending physician can make that decision. In the second trimester,
the state may impose regulations on abortion that are reasonably related to maternal health.
In the third trimester, once the fetus reaches the point of “viability,” a state may regulate
abortions or prohibit them entirely, so long as the laws contain exceptions for cases when
abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother (Roe v. Wade).
➢ Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since
no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that
the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb (Geluz v. CA).
➢ A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced
heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code) (Quimiging v. Icao).
➢ It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet
unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of an unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case
of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence
to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the
mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a
year, and until Antonia became enceinte a second time, when the idea entered the defendant’s
head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to
evince the father’s resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the
mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous"
in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues (De Jesus v. Syquia).
➢ Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the
fiction is indulged.

fiction is indulged.
x x x
the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical
persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or
juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of
similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons
(Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Flarante).
➢ As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662
is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Dumlao v. Quality Plastics).
➢ Presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory —
that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability (Joaquin v. Navarro).
2. Juridical Persons
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
➢ Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so
far as their property is concerned (Smith Bell v. Natividad).
Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by
the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions
of this Code concerning partnerships.
Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization.
Article 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest
or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed
of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this
point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the
region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the
principal benefits from the same.
Restrictions on Capacity to Act

A. GENERAL RULE: Presumption of Capacity
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his
mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case (Standard Oil Co. v.
Arenas).
B. Restrictions
1. Minority
i. Age of Majority
Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,

majority commences at the age of eighteen years. x x x Emancipation shall terminate
parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws
in special cases (RA 6809)
➢ the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in
fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida;
and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser
from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith
(Mercado v. Espiritu).
➢ As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and
Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped
from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not
applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of
age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the
one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the
document (Bambalan v. Maramba).
➢ …In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not
constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to
age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
decit.
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in
the belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure
of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the
document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here
Exhibit A contained no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the
minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors
were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive)
misrepresentation.
…to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after
the minor has reached majority age x x x it should be held that in October 1947,
he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this
defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed
from October 1947.

from October 1947.
x x x
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary
responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written
contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they have profited by the money they received (De Braganza v. De
Villa-Abrille).
ii. Suffrage
Section 1, Art. V, 1987 Constitution. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise
of suffrage.
iii. Marriage
Art. 5, FC. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Article 1390(1). The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a contract; x x x
Article 1403(3). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (3)
Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Article 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege
the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted
intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their
action upon these flaws of the contract.
Article 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar
as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
Article 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter
into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following articles.
Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without
capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those
referred to in article 290.
Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the
annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact that he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to
demand the thing or price thus returned.
Article 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays
a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be
no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good
faith.

faith.
iv. Criminal Liability
ARTICLE 12, RPC. The following are exempt from criminal liability:
2. A person under nine years of age;
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.
NOTE; When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in

conformity with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit
him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said article 80.
ARTICLE 13, RPC. The following are mitigating circumstances: 2. That the offender is
under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.
NOTE: See also Sec. 189-204, PD 603.
2. Insanity
i. Effect on marriage
Art. 45, FC. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage: (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
ii. Effect on contracts
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented
persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Article 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to
in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable
iii. Criminal liability
ARTICLE 12, RPC. The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an
insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
NOTE: When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals
or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
➢ In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude
that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the
ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proven.
It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue."
That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to

That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to
make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to
overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof
that may be offered (US v. Vaquilar).
➢ in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is

necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern,
or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. x x x
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive

evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed
that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to
be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved (People v. Maranan).
NOTE: See also Rule 101, Rules of Court
3. Others
i. Deaf-mutism
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented
persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
ii. Prodigality
Section 2, Rule 92. Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.
iii. Interdiction
ARTICLE 34, RPC. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as
to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage
his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
ARTICLE 41, RPC. Reclusión Perpetua and Reclusión Temporal — Their accessory
penalties. — The penalties of reclusión perpetua and reclusión temporal shall carry with
them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case
may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
iv. Family Relations
Art. 151, FC. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such

compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
v. Alienage
vi. Absence - Read Art. 381 - 396, NCC
vii. Insolvency
viii. Trusteeship
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under

administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they may take part by virtue of their profession;
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
Article 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they
represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which
are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the
lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other
manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by
the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
1. Juridical person
Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the
domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
2. Natural persons
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
➢ ... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ...
The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which
may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person
has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such
abandonment or loss.
x x x
... A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for 'greener pastures' as the saying goes,
to improve his life, and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
the place of his professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has
the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the
officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not
forsaken him. …
x x x
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear
is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a
resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga,
Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through
the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us
Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends
and relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already transferred our
residence to other places (Abella v. COMELEC).

PFR2 (Void and Voidable Marriages)
Saturday, 10 October 2020 1:00 pm
VII. Marriage
A. Concept and Nature
1. Definition
Marriage - is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. (Art. 1, FC)
2. Nature
i. Inviolable institution
ii. Nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
iii. Not subject to stipulation
Xpn. Marriage settlements within the limits provided by the FC.
3. Breach of Promise to Marry

4. Not subject to stipulation
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their
legitime (Art. 221, NCC)
B. Law Governing Validity
1. General Rules on Contracts
(1) As to form - The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. (Art. 17, NCC)
(2) As to substantive requirements
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad (Art. 15,
NCC)
x x x
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country (Art. 17, NCC)
2. Special Rule in Marriage
GR: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country
Xpn. 1. Where either or both are below 18

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriage

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriage
3. Lack of consent due to mistake in identity
4. Psychological incapacity
5. Incestuous marriages
6. Marriages that are void by reason of public policy
NOTE; Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
C. Requisites
Kinds/effect of compliance
Absence of any Void

Essential/Formal Requisite Xpn. If solemnizing officer have no authority but either or both parties
believed in good faith that such SO have the authority
Defect in any Essential Voidable as provided in Art. 45

Requisite
Irregularity in any Formal No effect as to validity of the marriage but the parties responsible for
Requisite irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Essential Requisites
1. Legal capacity
(1) Gender - male AND female
(2) Age - at least 18 years of age
(3) Parental Consent, if 18-21 years old
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer
Formal Requisites
1. Authority of solemnizing officer
(1) Who are authorized
1) Members of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction

➢ SC, CA, SB, CTA - jurisdiction is entire country
➢ RTC, MTC, MeTC, MCTC - within territorial jurisdiction
2) Priests, rabbis, ministers of any church, provided they are
a) Duly authorized by the church or religious sect,
b) Registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar, and
c) One of the parties member of church or sect
3) Ship captain or airplane captain
a) In articulo mortis
b) Between passengers and/or crew members
➢ Authority can be exercised not only during voyage/flight, but also during
stopovers
4) Military commander of a unit
a) Commissioned officer
b) Assigned chaplain to unit is absent
c) In articulo mortis
d) Within the zone of the military operations
5) Consul general, consuls or vice-consuls for Filipinos abroad
a) Marriage celebrated abroad
b) Between Filipino citizens
6) City/Municipal Mayors

6) City/Municipal Mayors
➢ Can exercise authority even outside territorial jurisdiction. Mere irregularity.
(2) Effect of absence of authority
GR: Void
Xpn. If either or both spouses believed in good faith that said solemnizing officer have the
authority.
2. Marriage ceremony
Form
Marriage ceremony which will take place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses of legal age. (Art. 3[3], FC)
No prescribed form or religious rites that is required. What is necessary is that the parties
appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than 2
witnesses, of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. (Art. 6, FC)
Place
GR: In open court, church, chapel or temple or office of consul (Art. 8, FC).
Xpn. 1. Marriages in articulo mortis
• Ship at sea
• Plane in flight
• Zone of military operation
2. House or designated place if parties requested in writing to the solemnizing officer in
a sworn statement to that effect
NOTE: Art. 8 is merely directory, not mandatory (Sempio-Diy).
Marriage certificate - best documentary evidence of a marriage.
The declaration mentioned above shall be contained in the marriage certificate
Normal Signed by contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the SO
Articulo When party is in the point of death and unable to sign, it is sufficient that name
mortis of such party is written by one of the witnesses attested by the SO
NOTE: 1. Marriage certificate is not an essential or formal requisite

2. It shall be the best evidence that a marriage exists
Other proof that can be presented In the absence of a MC
1. Testimony of witnesses
2. Couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after alleged wedlock
3. Birth and baptismal certificate of children born during alleged union
4. Mention of such ceremony in subsequent documents (Rabuya, 2017)
Duties of Solemnizing officer
It shall be the duty of the SO to:
1. Issue the original marriage certificate to either of the contracting parties

2. Send the duplicate/triplicate to the Local Civil Registrar, not later than 15 days after

2. Send the duplicate/triplicate to the Local Civil Registrar, not later than 15 days after
the marriage
3. Retain in his file
1) The quadruplicate of the marriage certificate
2) Original of the marriage license
3) In proper cases, affidavit of the contracting parties regarding solemnization in a
place other than those mentioned in Art 8.
3. Marriage license
Where to apply
GR: Local civil registrar of city/municipality where either party habitually resides.
Xpn. 1. Marriages where ML is not required
2. Consul general, consul or vice-consul, in case of Filipino citizens abroad
Requisites for Issuance (Art 11-19, FC)
1. Application under oath

2. Birth certificate, if not available, baptismal certificate
➢ If foregoing cannot be presented: residence certificate, affidavit of two witnesses,
or
➢ Certification of parents
➢ Or if the LCR is satisfied by merely looking at the parties
3. If either or both parties is/are previously married, the following shall be attached in the
application
1) Death certificate of deceased spouse
2) Judicial declaration of annulment, nullity of marriage or divorce
4. Parental consent, manifested in writing by personally appearing before LCR or an
affidavit before 2 witnesses attested by authorized official, if either or both parties are
18-21 years old
5. Parental advice, if either or both parties are 21-25 year old
➢ If no parental advice, issuance of the ML shall be 3 months after the 10-day
publication of application
6. Certificate of Marriage counselling
➢ If no certificate, issuance of ML suspended for 3 months after 10-day publication
7. Family planning certificate
8. Posting of notice for 10 consecutive days in the bulletin board of the LCR and a
conspicuous place in the building
9. Payment of fees
Where valid
Anywhere in the Philippines
Period of validity
120 days from issuance.
Duties of Civil registrar
1. Preparation of required document by this title

2. Administer oath to all interested parties without any charge (Art. 24, FC)
3. Enter, in a registry book, all applications for license, chronologically in accordance with the
dates of application. (Art. 25, FC)
Marriages exempt from ML requirement

1. In case where either or both parties are at the point of death
➢ Solemnizer must execute that:
i. He performed the marriage in at the point of death
ii. He took steps to ascertain the ages, relationship and absence of legal
impediment (Rabuya, 2017)
2. If the residence of either/both parties is located that there is no means of transportation

to enable personal appearance before the LCR
i. Either or both parties residence is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable him or her to appear personally before the LCR
3. Man and woman who have lived exclusively for at least 5 years without any legal
impediment to marry each other
➢ Parties must execute an affidavit stating:
i. They have been living as husband and wife for atleast 5 years, and
ii. They are without legal impediment to marry each other (Rabuya, 2017)
4. Articulo mortis
1) Ship at sea
2) Airplane on flight
i. He performed the marriage in articulo mortis
5. Muslim or ethnic cultural community, if in accordance to their customs, rites or practices

6. If solemnized abroad, and ML is not required in that country. Except if marriage is
celebrated before the Philippine consular officials.
D. Presumption of Marriage
Article 220, NCC. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents
over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.
E. Void Marriages
• Inexistent from the beginning

• Can be attacked collaterally
• Can be questioned even after death of either party
• Action or defense for the declaration of nullity of a marriage is imprescriptible
• Any proper interested party may attack a void marriage
➢ ONLY for those marriages not covered by AM 02-11-10-SC, or those celebrated under the
Civil Code
➢ For marriages covered by AM 02-11-10, as a general rule, only the husband and wife may
can file a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Except in cases of bigamy where the
husband and wife of the prior marriage, not of the subsequent marriage, which has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of nullity.
Art. 4, FC. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
The following marriages are void from the beginning

The following marriages are void from the beginning
1. Contracted by any party below 18, even with parental consent

2. GR: Solemnized by a person not legally authorized to perform marriages
Xpn. If either or both parties believed in good faith that such SO has authority
3. GR: Bigamous/Polygamous marriages
Xpn. Those falling under Art. 41 (Voidable Bigamous Marriage by reason presumptive death)
➢ The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void (Art. 40, FC)
• Not applicable BEFORE promulgation of the FC. Meaning, declaration of nullity of

previous marriage not required in subsequent marriages celebrated under the NCC.
• Even if prior marriage is void, but a party fails to secure a judicial declaration of
nullity, the subsequent marriage is also void and such party is liable for bigamy.
➢ Where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, and in cases of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage, provided:
1) spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
2) spouse present instituted a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Art. 41, FC)
➢ Requirement of judicial declaration of presumptive death applicable only on

marriages celebrated under FC. Under the NCC, no declaration is needed as
long as the period of absence is satisfied.
➢ Non-compliance with the declaration requirement renders the marriage void.
The party may also be liable for bigamy.
➢ If presumptively dead spouse not really absent and JDPD was obtained by
reason of extrinsic fraud, remedy of aggrieved spouse is to file for the
annulment of the declaration of presumptive death.
Effect of reappearance
The subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the

affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless previous marriage have been
annulled or declared void.
i. Children of the subsequent marriage before its termination shall be considered

legitimate.
ii. The property regime of the subsequent marriage shall be dissolved and liquidated
➢ If one of the spouses in bad faith, his share shall be forfeited in favor of
◊ Common children, or
◊ Children of guilty spouse from prev. marriage, or
◊ Innocent spouse
iii. Donations by reason of the marriage shall remain valid

➢ Xpn. Those in favor of the guilty spouse are revoked by operation of law
iv. Innocent spouse may revoke designation of guilty spouse as beneficiary in any
insurance policy if other spouse in bad faith
v. The spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate/intestate succession

➢ If both in bad faith, ONLY disqualified in intestate succession,
➢ If both parties to the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, marriage shall be void and
all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor
of the other are revoked by operation of law.
4. GR: Those solemnized without a valid marriage license
Xpn. Those exceptions provided above
5. Those contracted by mistake of one party as to the identity of the other

6. Subsequent marriage that are void under Art. 53
➢ Requirement under Sec. 52
i. Judicial declaration of nullity or annulment
ii. Partition and distribution of property by the spouses
iii. Delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
Other void marriages
1. Psychological Incapacity - A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity - no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage.
➢ Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness (Republic
v. CA and Molina)
NOTE: The court laid down in this case guidelines in the interpretation of Art. 36, namely:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological

ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71

of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence,
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve
such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless

General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
➢ Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages ("new Rules"). 15
Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages —
x x x
(d) What to allege. —A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity (Choa v. Choa)
➢ The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. (Republic v. Quintero-
Hamano)
➢ Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness
(Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz).
➢ While the Court previously held that "there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician," yet, this is qualified by
the phrase, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity." The psychologist's findings must still be subjected to a careful and
serious scrutiny as to the bases of the same, particularly, the source/s of information,
as well as the methodology employed. (Garlet v. Garlet).
While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared

➢ While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the
supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by means of
psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific
aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality. (Bakunawa v. Reyes-Bakunawa)
➢ Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and

to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or
her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables
him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable. (Kalaw v. Fernandez).
2. Incestuous Marriages - Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
3. Against Public Policy - The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
➢ Includes: (1) uncles and nieces, (2) aunts and nephews, and (3) first cousins (Rabuya,
2017)
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;*
➢ A marriage between a step-brother and a step-sister is void under the NCC.

However, under the FC, such marriage is allowed.
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;*
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;*
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;*
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.*
➢ Even if the surviving spouse did not conspire to the killing, marriage is still void
➢ The killing must be brought by the desire to marry the other spouse
➢ Law does not require prior conviction to render marriage void
*In the NCC, the following are specific grounds for nullity of marriage, now they are
categorized under marriages void by reason of public policy
Effect of nullity
1. The judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage retroacts to the date of its
celebration insofar was the vinculum between the spouses is concerned. It is considered as
having never to have taken place (Rabuya, 2017)
2. GENERAL RULE: Children of void marriages are considered illegitimate (Art. 165, FC)

2. GENERAL RULE: Children of void marriages are considered illegitimate (Art. 165, FC)
Xpn. Even if the marriage is void ab initio, the children are still considered legitimate:
i. If the marriage is void by reason of psychological incapacity

ii. If the marriage is void by non-compliance with the requirements of Art. 52
3. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
□ In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered
in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
□ If one of the spouses in bad faith, his share shall be forfeited in favor of
 Common children, or
 Children of guilty spouse from prev. marriage, or
 Innocent spouse
2. Donations by reason of the marriage shall remain valid
□ Those in favor of the guilty spouse are revoked by operation of law
3. Innocent spouse may revoke designation of guilty spouse as beneficiary in any insurance
policy
4. The spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
5. If both parties acted in bad faith, all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of
law.
6. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
7. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
i. Adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children should
choose to remain
ii. Children below 7 are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless court decides
otherwise
iii. In case no majority, court will decide
8. Parental authority and custody is to the mother
Xpn. If declared void by reason of psychological incapacity, parental authority and

custody of children shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court.
Prescription
Action or defense for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall not prescribe (Art. 39, FC)
Procedure for Declaration of Nullity
a. Requisites for valid remarriage

Art. 40, FC. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void
b. Support and custody pendente lite
Art. 49, FC. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions
in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their
choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
c. Safeguards against collusion
Art. 48, FC. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. x x x
d. No confession of judgement
Art. 48, FC. x x x In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall
be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
F. Voidable Marriages
• Considered valid until set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.
• Defects can generally be ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
▪ Xpn. If ground is: (1) physical inability to consummate marriage, or (2) affliciton of STD
found to be serious and incurable.
• Subject to prescriptive period, as provided
1. Void v. Voidable
Void Marriages Voidable Marriages
As to nature Inexistent from time of Valid until annulled

performance
As to susceptibility of Cannot be convalidated Can be convalidated either by:

convalidation
1. free cohabitation
2. prescription
As to effect of property No community property; only co- ACP exists unless other system is agreed
ownership upon
As to effect of children Illegitimate Legitimate if conceived before annulment
Xpn.
1. Article 36
2. Article 53
As to how marriage may a. May be attacked directly or a. Cannot be attacked collaterally

be impugned collaterally b. Can no longer be impugned after
b. Can still be impugned even after death of one of the parties
death of parties

2. Grounds for annulment - MUST exist at the time of the celebration
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
a. Who may give consent: Father, Mother, or person having legal charge of the party (in
that order)
b. If party is illegitimate, consent of mother is required (Rabuya, 2017)
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
▪ Any of the following circumstances (EXCLUSIVE LIST!!!) shall constitute fraud referred to in
Number 3 of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of

a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing
at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage.
NOTE: No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or

chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
➢ Refers to impotency or physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse; NOT
sterility or the inability to procreate.
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
3. Who can seek/Prescription/Convalidation
Ground Who can file Period of Prescription Convalidation or

Ratification
Lack of parental Party under Within 5 years after attaining 21 Free cohabitation after
consent age reaching 21
Parent/ Before party reaches 21

Guardian
Insanity Sane spouse Before death of other party Free cohabitation after
regaining sanity
Guardian of Before death of other party

insane spouse

insane spouse
Insane spouse During lucid interval or after

regaining sanity; before death of
other party
Fraud Injured party within 5 years from knowledge of Free cohabitation after
fraud knowledge of fraud
Force, intimidation, Injured party Within 5 years from cessation of Free cohabitation after
or undue influence cause cessation of cause
Impotence of one Potent party Within 5 years after marriage Cannot be ratified.
party
STD Healthy party Within 5 years after marriage Cannot be ratified.
4. Procedure in annulment
a. Support and custody pendente lite
Art. 49, FC. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a
written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate
visitation rights of the other parent.
b. Safeguards against collusion
Art. 48, FC. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. x x x
c. No confession of judgement
Art. 48, FC. x x x In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
5. Effects of annulment
Same as effects of declaration of nullity of marriage. Except as to legitimacy of the children. Children
are considered legitimate prior declaration of annulment.
6. Marriage when one spouse is absent
Art. 41, FC. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)
Art. 42, FC. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a

terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)
Art. 43, FC. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered
legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith
as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44, FC. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void
ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor
of the other are revoked by operation of law.
7. Marriage dissolved abroad
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
➢ Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure.
(Republic v. Manalo)..
➢ In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry (Republic v.
Orbecido).
8. Illegal marriages
Art. 4, FC. x x x An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Art. 16, FC. x x x Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period (3 months) shall subject
the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the marriage.
ARTICLE 351, RPC. Premature Marriages. — Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one
days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been
pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and fine not exceeding 500
pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or
dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred
and one days after the legal separation.
ARTICLE 352, RPC. Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the marriage law.

PFR3 (Legal Separation - Rights/Obligations of Spouses)
Saturday, 17 October 2020 1:00 pm
VIII. Legal Separation
A. Concept and Historical Background
a. Distinguished from separation in fact
Legal Separation Separation in fact
Can be effected ONLY by decree of court Parties can separate without a court order
Results in dissolution of the property regime Property regime remains the same
Guilty spouse can no longer inherit from the GR: Parties are still heirs of each other
innocent spouse, and former's share in the net
profits of the property regime is forfeited Xpn. If the innocent spouse disinherits the guilty
spouse in his or her will.
b. Agreement to separate
Article 221, NCC. The following shall be void and of no effect: x x x (3) Every collusion to obtain a
decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
c. Distinguished from absolute divorce
Legal Separation Divorce
Marriage bond NOT severed Marriage bond severed
Causes must exist only after the celebration of the Causes may exist after celebration of
marriage marriage
Only separation from bed and board Parties may marry again
i. Divorce decreed abroad (refer to Art. 26 of FC)
ii. Muslim divorce (under the Muslim Code)
ARTICLE 45. Definition and forms. – Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible
means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
(c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (li’an);
(e) Redemption by the wife (khul’);
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or
(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
ARTICLE 46. Divorce by talaq. – (1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in
a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has
totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during
one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the
expiration of the prescribed ‘idda.

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the
right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of cohabitation
without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall
become irrevocable (Talaq bain sugra).
ARTICLE 47. Divorce by Ila. – Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any
carnal relations (ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four
months, she may be granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and
hearing.
ARTICLE 48. Divorce by zihar. – Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his
wife to any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually
refrain from having carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation.
The wife may ask the court to require her husband to perform the expiation or to
pronounce a regular talaq should he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right
of seeking other appropriate remedies.
ARTICLE 49. Divorce by li’an. – Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery,
a decree of perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after
the parties shall have performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li’an).
ARTICLE 50. Divorce by khul’. – The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce
her dower or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul’) from the
marriage bond, petition the court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and
after fixing the consideration, issue the corresponding decree.
ARTICLE 51. Divorce by tafwid. – If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the
right to effect a talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she
may repudiate the marriage and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were
pronounced by the husband himself.
ARTICLE 52. Divorce by faskh. – The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a
divorce by faskh on any of the following grounds :
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at
least six consecutive months;
(b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for
at least one year;
(c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his
marital obligation in accordance with this code;
(d) Impotency of the husband;
(e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make
the continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family;
(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article; or
(g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by
faskh either at the instance of the wife or the proper wali.
ARTICLE 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. – A decree of faskh on the ground
of unusual cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:
(a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this
does not result in physical injury;
(b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to
force the wife to live an immoral life;
(c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising
her legal rights over it;
(d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or
(e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.

(e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
ARTICLE 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. – A talaq or faskh, as soon as it

becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this
code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case
the talaq has been affected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half
thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be
dissolved and liquidated.
ARTICLE 55. Effects of other kinds of divorce. – The provisions of the article immediately
preceding shall apply to the dissolution, of marriage by ila, zihar, li’an and khul’, subject
to the effects of compliance with the requirements of the Islamic law relative to such
divorces.
B. Grounds for Legal Separation
Art. 55, FC. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
a. Sexual infidelity - elimination of double standards (Sempio-Diy)
➢ Article 97, NCC. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the
wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; x x x
b. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality - compare with Art. 46 (instances
that constitute fraud).
c. Attempt on life of the other spouse
➢ Article 97, NCC. A petition for legal separation may be filed: x x x (2) An attempt by one spouse
against the life of the other
C. Who can ask for legal separation?

C. Who can ask for legal separation?
➢ Article 99, NCC. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the
Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal
separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic.
➢ Article 100, NCC. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties
to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
D. When may petition be filed
Art. 57, FC. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause.
E. Effect of pendency of action

a. Right of consortium
Art. 61, FC. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other. x x x
b. Administration of property
Art. 61, FC. x x x The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal
partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and
duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
c. Support and custody pendente lite
Art. 62, FC. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49
shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common
children.
Art. 198, FC. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment
granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in
case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
d. Cooling-off period
Art. 58, FC. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition.
F. Defenses (Art. 56, FC)
a. Consent
b. Condonation
c. Recrimination
d. Both Parties have given ground for Legal Separation
e. Collusion
➢ Art. 60, FC. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
f. Prescription
➢ Art. 57, FC. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause.
G. Court Procedure
Art. 58, FC. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition.
Art. 59, FC. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly
improbable.
Art. 60, FC. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
H. Effect of Decree of Legal Separation
a. Personal relations
Art. 61, FC. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other.
Art. 63, FC. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall
be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; x x x
b. Custody of children
Art. 63, FC. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: x x x (3) The custody
of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article
213 of this Code; x x x
c. Property relations
Art. 63, FC. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: x x x (2) The
absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article
43(2); x x x
Art. 64, FC. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke
the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation
of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the
places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good
faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be
respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take
effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the

The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the
time the decree of legal separation become final.
d. Support
Art. 198, FC. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment
granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in
case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
e. Use of surname
Article 372, NCC. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
f. Right to inherit
Art. 63, FC. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: x x x (4) The
offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
g. Cost of litigation
Art. 94, FC. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: x x x(10) Expenses of litigation
between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
Art. 121, FC. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: x x x (9) Expenses of litigation between
the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
I. Reconciliation
a. How done
Art. 65, FC. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly
signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.
b. Effects of reconciliation
Art. 66, FC. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following
consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property
and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless
the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court’s order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.
Art. 67, FC. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding
Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;

(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the
same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named
therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of
creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not
listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the
creditor’s claim.
IX. Rights and Obligations of Spouses
A. Obligation to live together
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. (Art. 68, FC)
When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to
bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the
court for relief. (Art. 72, FC)
➢ Injury contemplated is physical, moral, emotional, or psychological.
B. Family Domicile
GR: The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
(Art. 69[1], FC)
➢ Article 110, NCC. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Xpn. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
Xpn to xpn. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of
the family.
C. Management and Family Support
The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. (Art. 70, FC)
The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from:
i. the community property,

ii. in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties.
iii. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied
from the separate properties.
Family support In proportion to their separate properties, in case of (iii) above
Creditors Spouses are solidarily liable
Art. 71, FC. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
D. Exercise and profession
Art. 73, FC Art. 117, NCC

Art. 73, FC Art. 117, NCC
Either spouse may exercise any legitimate Article 117. The wife may exercise any profession or
profession, occupation, business or activity without occupation or engage in business. However, the
the consent of the other. The latter may object husband may object, provided:
only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
(1) His income is sufficient for the family,
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide according to its social standing, and
whether or not:
(2) His opposition is founded on serious and
(1) The objection is proper; and valid grounds.
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior In case of disagreement on this question, the
to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit parents and grandparents as well as the family
accrued prior to the objection, the resulting council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement
obligation shall be enforced against the is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever
separate property of the spouse who has may be proper and in the best interest of the
not obtained consent. family.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the

rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

PFR4 (Property Regime)
Tuesday, 3 November 2020 3:13 pm
A. Marriage Settlement
a. When made; modifications
In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before
the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136
(Art. 76, FC)
i. Art. 66 - effects of reconciliation

ii. Art. 67 - revival of property regime after reconciliation
iii. Art. 128 - abandonment without just cause
iv. Art. 135 - valid causes for JSP
v. Art. 136 - voluntary agreement for JSP
b. Form
The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be:
i. in writing,
ii. signed by the parties and
iii. executed before the celebration of the marriage. (Art. 77, FC)
NOTE: They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry
where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties.
c. Celebration of marriage
Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in

consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do
not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (Art. 81, FC)
d. Who may enter into?
Minor valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent

to the marriage are made parties to the agreement,
Person sentenced with civil indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court
interdiction or other disability to be made a party thereto
B. Which law governs property relations
GR: In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage
and their residence. (Art. 80, FC)
Xpns. (1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the
Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but
affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities

affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities
for its extrinsic validity.
C. Donations propter nuptias
a. Definition
Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. (Art. 82, FC)
b. Who may be donors?
c. What may be donated by the spouses
i. Present property (irrevocable)
GR: The spouses cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-
fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. (Art. 84, FC)
Xpn. If spouses agree that regime is absolute community of property. They can donate
more than 1/5 of present property.
ii. Future property (revocable)
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary

succession and the formalities of wills. (Art. 84, FC)
iii. Encumbered property
Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. (Art.

85, FC)
• In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than
the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the
deficiency.
• If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee
shall be entitled to the excess.
iv. Donations in the marriage settlement
x x x Stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid.
(Art. 81, FC).
d. Void donations by the spouses
GR: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void. (Art. 87, FC)
Xpn. Moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.
NOTE: The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
e. Revocation of donation propter nuptias
1. Revocation of donors

A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except
donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as
required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions
of the Civil Code on donations in general. (Art. 86, FC)
Prescriptive period
Marriage NOT celebrated 1. Written donation - 10 years

2. Oral donation - 6 years
Marriage declared void ab initio 1. Written donation - 10 years

Marriage without parental consent 4 years
Resolutory condition is complied 1. Written donation - 10 years

Marriage is Annulled 4 years
Act of ingratitude of donee 1 year from knowledge
2. By operation of law
(1) Upon termination of a voidable bigamous marriage, donations in favor of the guilty
spouse is revoked by operation of law
(2) If both spouses to the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, all donation by
reason of the marriage is revoked by operation of law
(3) If the marriage does not take place, unless not dependent to the celbration of the
marriage.
D. Absolute Community of Property (ACP)
a. When applicable
The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime.
(Art. 75, FC)
NOTE: In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the
system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
b. Commencement
The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that
the marriage is celebrated. (Art. 88, FC).
NOTE: Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any
other time shall be void.
c. Waiver
i. During marriage

GR: No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property
during the marriage can be made. (Art. 89, FC)
Xpn. In case of judicial separation of property.
ii. After marriage
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the
marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and
shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. (Supra)
NOTE: The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to
rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their
credits.
d. Suppletory rules
The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the
spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (Art. 90, FC)
e. What constitutes
Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property
shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter. (Art. 91, FC)
Any winnings (in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law) therefrom shall form part of the community property.
(Art. 95, FC).
Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved
that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (Art. 93, FC)
f. What is excluded
(1) GR: Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any.
Xpm. Unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form
part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part
of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
g. Charges of ACP
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
➢ Support shall be given to the spouses even if not living together. Except, when one
spouse left without valid reason
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the

spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community
property;
Minor repair - those for mere preservation of the property or those caused by
ordinary wear and tear
Major repair - those caused by extraordinary events
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational
course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this
Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
NOTE: If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those
falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
h. Ownership
The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the
spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (Art. 90, FC)
Article 206, NCC. The ownership, administration, possession and enjoyment of the common
property belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the courts shall settle the
difficulty.
i. Administration and enjoyment
(1) Joint administration
The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
(2) Sole administration
(1) Incapacity
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in

the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole

the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration.
NOTE: These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of

the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be

void.
NOTE: However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the

part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(2) Separation in fact

(3) Abandonment
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings
j. Effect of separation de facto
In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s
share. (Art. 100[3], FC)
Art. 239, FC. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other
and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other
spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition
may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall
describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto
cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to
and approved by the court.
k. Effect of abandonment
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. (Art. 101, FC)
NOTE: A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period
of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
l. Dissolution
The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Art. 99, FC)

m. Effects of dissolution
(1) For cause other than death
Liquidation procedure
i. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
ii. The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets.
In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 94.
iii. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
iv. GR: The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute
its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife
Xpn. 1. Unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the

marriage settlements, or
2. unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in
this Code.
NOTE: For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
v. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
vi. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
(2) Termination due to death
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated
in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse.
NOTE: If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (Art. 103, FC)
n. For marriages before FC
Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by
the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective

the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective
capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be
considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the
capital and duration of each. (Art. 104, FC)
o. Support during ACP liquidation
E. Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG)
a. What constitutes CPG?
i. Definition
Property regime where the husband and wife place in a common fund:
(1) the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
(2) those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
(3) those by chance (Art. 106, FC)
CPG ACP
Each spouse retains his or her property All the properties owned by the spouses at
before the marriage, and only the fruits and the time of the marriage becomes
income of such properties becomes part of community property
the CPG
Upon dissolution and liquidation, net remainder Upon dissolution and liquidation, the net
of the properties is equally divided profits of the partnership is divided
equally, after separate properties are
returned
CPG Ordinary Partnership
No judicial personality Judicial person
Commences at the precise moment the Commences at the time of the agreement
marriage is celebrated
Regulated by law Regulated by the agreement of the parties and

only subsidiarily by law
Purpose is not particularly for profit Purpose is ordinarily for profit
Profits are generally divided equally Usually divided in proportion to the capital
contribution
Dissolved upon death of one spouse May continue despite death of a partner
No liquidation and division of profits until There can be division of profits even without
dissolved dissolution
ii. Presumption
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (Art. 106, FC)
b. When CPG commences and applies
i. Marriages under FC
The CPG between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is

The CPG between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community
regime at any other time shall be void.
ii. Marriages before FC
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (Art. 105[2], FC)
Art. 256, FC. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
iii. When applicable
In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application (Art. 105, FC)
iv. Suppletory rules
The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in
all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements. (Art. 108, FC)
c. What are included?
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
➢ Test is the origin of the money invested in the purchase

➢ Rules on life insurance
 If premium paid with conjugal funds, proceeds is conjugal
 Otherwise, separate
➢ According to Tolentino
 If insurance is taken on own life of one spouse with the other spouse as
beneficiary, the proceeds belong to the later, but the latter, who is deemed as
a donee of the premiums paid, must return 1/2 of the premiums to the
conjugal funds.
 If jointly insured in a single policy, surviving spouse gets the proceeds without
obligation to return any part to the conjugal funds because there is deemed
to be a reciprocal donation
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or
owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each
kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However,
losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. (Art. 117, FC)
i. If property bought by installments
Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses

Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses
and partly from conjugal funds:
(1) belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage
(2) belongs to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the
marriage (Art. 118, FC)
NOTE: In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
ii. Credit due
Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the
spouses:
(1) The sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse.
(2) However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 119, FC)
d. What is excluded?
i. Brought as exclusive property

ii. Acquired by gratuitous during marriage
Art. 113, FC. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive
property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to
the right of accretion when proper.
Art. 115, FC. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar
benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be
proper in each case.
iii. Acquired by redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of
the spouses
iv. Purchased with exclusive money
e. Administration of exclusive property
i. By the spouse-owner
The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their
exclusive properties. (Art. 110[1], FC)
ii. By the other spouse
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive
property to the other:
(1) by means of a public instrument

(2) such instrument shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the
property is located (Art. 110[2], FC)
The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be

transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;

(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;

(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a
criminal case. (Art. 142, FC)
f. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property
A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with
regard to the same. (Art. 111, FC)
The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be
turned over to the owner-spouse. (Art. 112, FC)
g. Improvements on CPG property
h. Charges upon and obligations
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either
spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one
of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or
other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
i. With consent
ii. Without consent
iii. Personal debts
GR: The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership. Neither
shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
(Art. 122, FC)
EXCEPTION: Except those personal debts incurred insofar as they redounded to the benefit
of the family.
NOTE: However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if;
1. the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or

2. if it should be insufficient;

2. if it should be insufficient;
At the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
iv. Winnings from gambling
Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of Borne by loser spouse
chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling
whether permitted or prohibited by law
Winnings therefrom Form part of the

conjugal partnership
property
i. Ownership, administration, enjoyment and disposition
i. Joint administration
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly. (Art. 124, FC).
NOTE: In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
ii. Sole administration
1. Incapacity
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in

the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration.
NOTE; These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of

the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be

void.
NOTE: The transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2. Separation in fact
In the absence of sufficient conjugal property, the separate property of both

spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present
shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. (Art. 100[3], FC).
3. Abandonment
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions

administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions
as the court may impose. (Art. 101, FC)
NOTE: A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left
the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period
to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
4. Pendency of legal separation proceeding
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or
conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have
the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (Art.
61, FC).
iii. Disposition and encumbrance
GR: Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the other. (Art. 125, FC)
Exception: Either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations
from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress.
j. Effect of separation de facto
The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal
partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause,
shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall,
upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. (Art. 127, FC)
k. Effect of abandonment
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. (Art.
128, FC)
l. Dissolution
The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: x x x (2) The
absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by

the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 43 (Art. 63[2], FC)
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage
in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse; (Art. 50, in relation to Art. 43[2])
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.
m. Effect of dissolution
(1) Causes other than death
Liquidation process
i. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
ii. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an
asset thereof.
iii. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for:
a) the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or
b) for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has
been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
iv. The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets.
NOTE: In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
v. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be

delivered to each of them.
vi. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
funds, if any.
vii. GR: The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife
Exception 1. unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the

s marriage settlements or
2. unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share
as provided in this Code.
viii. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition
in accordance with Article 51.
ix. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,

(2) Termination due death
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the
death of the deceased spouse.
NOTE: If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
n. For marriages before FC
Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously,
the respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such
proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which
partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (Art. 132, FC)
o. Applicability of Rules of Court
The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the
appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not
expressly determined in this Chapter. (Art. 132, FC)
p. Support during CPG Liquidation
From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is
delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them. (Art. 133, FC)
➢ If liabilities >> assets, surviving spouse not entitled to support
F. Regime of Separation of Property

a. When applicable
(1) In the marriage settlements
Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations
during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions
of this Chapter shall be suppletory (Art. 143, FC).
(2) When mandatory
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property/conjugal

partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.

the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made,
any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage (Art. 103/130, FC)
(3) Reconciliation in legal separation
In case of reconciliation, the final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the
separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already
effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
(Art. 66[2], FC).
b. Property covered
Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or
partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the
absolute community. (Art. 144, FC)
c. Administration
i. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate
estate, without need of the consent of the other.
ii. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry
and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or
her separate property. (Art. 145, FC)
d. Family expenses
i. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of
insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.
ii. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary.
(Art. 146, FC)
G. Judicial Separation of Property
a. When possible
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. (Art. 134, FC)
b. For sufficient cause
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
NOTE: Causes 1-3 requires presentation of final judgment against the guilty spouse

NOTE: Causes 1-3 requires presentation of final judgment against the guilty spouse
c. Voluntary separation of property
The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties. (Art. 136, FC)
NOTE: All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as
well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of
the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other
persons with pecuniary interest.
d. Effects of judicial separation of property
(1) Liquidation of CPG or ACP
Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. x x x (Art. 137, FC)
(2) Support pendente lite
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children.
(Art. 137, FC)
(3) Regime after JSP
After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions
on complete separation of property shall apply. (Art. 138, FC)
(4) Binding effects on parties
The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. (Art. 139, FC)
The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors.
(Art. 140, FC)
e. Revival of property regime after JSP
The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a
motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the
separation of property in any of the following instances:
i. When the civil interdiction terminates;

ii. When the absentee spouse reappears;
iii. When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said
administration;
iv. When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation
resumes common life with the other;
v. When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof;
vi. When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and
resume common life; or
vii. When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to
the revival of the former property regime.

NOTE: No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. (Art. 141, FC)
f. Transfer of administration of exclusive property
The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by
the court to the other spouse:
i. When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;

ii. When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
iii. When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or
iv. When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a
criminal case. (Art. 142, FC)
NOTE: If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any
other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
H. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage
a. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (Article 147, FC)
➢ For this article to be applicable:
1. Both are capacitated to marry each other

2. Live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
3. Union is without benefit of marriage or their marriage is void
➢ Rules
Wages/Salaries Property
Owned in equal shares, even if only GR: Properties acquired while they lived together
one of the parties earned the wages shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
and the other did not contributed joint efforts, work or industry, thus, owned in
thereto equal shares

Xpn. If there is proof of actual contribution
Xpn to Xpn. A party is deemed to have

contributed if his or her efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
➢ Special rules for void marriages
If one of the parties to a void marriage acted in bad faith, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor (in the order given) of the following
i. Common children
ii. Surviving descendants of party in bad faith
iii. Innocent party
b. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (Art.
148, FC)
➢ Applicable in
i. Bigamous marriages
ii. Adulterous relationships
iii. Relationships in a state of concubinage
iv. Both man and women are married
v. Multiple alliances of the same married man
➢ Rules
Wages/Salaries Property
Belongs to the GR: Properties acquired by both through their actual joint contribution
earner exclusively of money, property and industry shall be owned by them in common
proportion to respective contribution.
Xpn. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership

and no presumption of equal shares.
➢ If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share to the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership.
➢ If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor (in the order given) of the following
i. Common children
ii. Surviving descendants of party in bad faith
iii. Innocent party

iii. Innocent party
➢ If both acted in bad faith, they will be considered as if they were in good faith.
➢ NOT applicable in same-sex marriages

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PFR1 (Effectivity - Domicile)

Saturday, 19 September 2020 7:24 pm

Effect and Application of Laws

A. When do laws take effect?

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➢ [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

B. Ignorance of the Law

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

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NOTE; Also see Arts. 2252-2269, NCC.

➢ Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

D. Acts executed against mandatory or prohibitory laws

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➢ Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are

G. Duty to render judgment

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It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice

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And article 11, the last part of which reads:

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(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

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(1) Freedom of religion;

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A. Persons and Personality

i. Natural - human beings created by God through the intervention of parents

Elements of Civil Personality

i. Juridical Capacity - fitness to be the subject of legal relations

ii. Capacity to Act - the power to do acts with legal effects

Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act

Cannot be limited/restricted Can be limited or restricted by certain circumstances

B. Commencement and termination of personality

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ARTICLE 259, RPC. Abortion Practiced by a Physician or Midwife and Dispensing of

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Article 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

Restrictions on Capacity to Act

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Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,

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iv. Criminal Liability

2. A person under nine years of age;

NOTE; When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in

NOTE: See also Sec. 189-204, PD 603.

ii. Effect on contracts

iii. Criminal liability

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➢ in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive

NOTE: See also Rule 101, Rules of Court