Sayyid Abu’l A‘la Mawdūdī

ISLAM’S POLITICAL ORDER

THE MODEL, DEVIATIONS AND MUSLIM RESPONSE

al- Khilāfah wa al-Mulūkīyah

Translated by Tarik
Jan
Edited by Anis Ahmad
 IPS Press is the publishing arm of Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad – an
independent think tank dedicated to promoting policy-oriented research.
Pakistan Affairs, International Relations and Faith and Society are some of the
major study areas at IPS.

Islam’s Political Order

The Model, Deviations and Muslim Response
Sayyid Abu’l A‘la Mawdudi

Translated by Tarik Jan Edited by

Anis Ahmad

© IPS Press 2018 Published by

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Rawalpindi
ToC
Acknowledgments
Editor ’s note
Preface
Introduction
From Caliphate to Monarchy
Chapter One
The Political Teachings of the Qur ’ān
Chapter Two
Principles of Islamic Governance
Chapter Three
Al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah and its Characteristic
Chapter Four
From the Rightly Guided Caliphate to Monarcy
Chapter Five
The Difference between the Caliphate and Monarchy
Chapter Six
The Rise of Religious Differences and their Causes
Chapter Seven
Abū Ḥanīfah’s Accomplishment
Chapter Eight
The Caliphate and its Related Issues: Abū Ḥanīfah’s
Approach
Chapter Nine
Imām Abū Yūsuf and his work
 Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Professor Khurshid Ahmad, Chairman

Institute of Policy Studies, and Dr Anis Ahmad, General Editor of the
Mawdudi Essential Project, for their assistance in making this
controversial but important book available to English readers. Their
cooperation was more than on one count. They discussed the
manuscript, argued on my approach, differed on my insistence to
have an abridged edition, and came up with constructive ideas to
facilitate the project.
Second, the support staff in the Institute of Policy Studies,
people in the IT and composition sections who helped as much as
they could without dragging their feet on it.
Tarik Jan
 Editor’s note
As a normal practice, foreign words and expressions, which
are often few, receive italicization in the text with a glossary at the
end or in the beginning of a book. In such cases, italicized words
may even look nice and do not detract from the uniformity of the text.
Their excessive use, however, as in the present case, would have
marred the visual landscape of the text, mutilating its uniformity.
Still another practice followed is to italicize foreign
expressions and then highlight them by their meanings placed in the
parenthesis. In our view, the latter form is overdone and makes no
sense. It is enough if we give parenthetical expression to a foreign
word without its italicization, for when it is parenthesized we succeed
in expressing its foreignness. At the same time, it averts the need for
a glossary at the end saving the reader the inconvenience of flipping
pages over to the glossary. The transliteration key used is traditional.
This remarkable work of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi
(1930-1970), when published, for the first time, initiated an
intellectual discourse in the region. His view-point on policy
measures taken by the third khalifah al-rashid invited strong criticism
from the traditional ‘ulama. The Mawlana’s purpose was not to
criticize the third caliph, as such, but to trace logical and historical
roots of the ultimate tragedy the Ummah faced in the form of
transition from Khilafah to a hereditary succession which was totally
a foreign phenomenon to Islam.
We have abridged the original Khilafat wa Mulukiyat,
especially chapters 4 and 5, without blunting its edge or impairing its
thesis. We have taken out its appendix for we thought there was no
need to defend the sources when the text spoke for itself. We hope
this will augment its usefulness without detracting from the fervor
and taste of the original.
Today when an ongoing debate is taking place on the nature
of Islamic state, “political Islam” and relation between state and
“religion” this research work of the Mawlana provides a resume of
how the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh), visualize
modern Islamic state.
 This translation, with minor abridgment, was made possible
with the devotion professional excellence and cooperation of my very
dear colleague, for over past forty years, Tarik Jan who not only kept
the real spirit and vigor of the original work alive in his beautiful
translation but also helped in making the text more elaborate for the
reader.
Prof. Dr. Anis Ahmad Ph.D
May 20, 2017
 Preface

The central theme of this book relates to the nature of the

Islamic caliphate and its makeup. How did it actualize itself in the
first century of Islam? What were the causes that led to its shift to
monarchy? And finally when the change did take place, what was
the Ummah’s reaction to this change?
To explain it, I have compiled all those pertinent Āyat (verses)
of the Qur’ān that have relevance to the primary political issues
enabling the readers to have a glimpse of the Islamic state that the
Qur’ān wants to have.
The second chapter deals with the principles of Islamic
governance in the light of the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and the precepts
and sayings of the prominent Ṣaḥābah (raḍi Allahu ‘anhu).
The third chapter speaks of the distinguishing characteristics
of the pious caliphate as known in the history.
The fourth chapter delineates the causes that led to the shift
from the caliphate to monarchy. While the following two chapters
discuss the difference between the caliphate and monarchy, the
change that the monarchy caused and the way the caliphal fall led to
schismatic polarization and conflicts among the Muslims, followed by
the ‘ulamā’s effort to bridge the cleavages wrought by the change in
the system of governance as typified by Imām Abu Ḥanīfah’s and
Abū Yūsuf’s works.
Some contents of this book invited adverse criticism from
different segments of society which I have tried to answer in the
appendix at the end [now dropped in the English version]. The
readers can arrive at their own conclusion by comparing the two.
Abu’l A‘lā
Lahore
27 Ṣafar 1386 A.H./1965
 Introduction
From Caliphate to Monarchy
Anis Ahmad

The contemporary discourse on Islam in general addresses

issues relating to Islamic governance, role of “religion” and religious
scholars (‘ulamā and mujtahidīn), the status and role of women in
power-sharing and non-Muslim minorities in the Islamic political order.
Historical analyses of such issues undertaken by both Western
Orientalists and Muslim scholars carry an obvious cultural baggage.
Some of the classical Western studies still influence the intellectual
pursuits of later writers. William Muir’s The Caliphate, its Rise,
Decline and Fall (1915), betraying the nineteenth century Christian
bias, remains a source for many of their misgivings. They avoid
considering Thomas Arnold’s The Caliphate (1924) because it
negates the notion that the caliphate (Khilāfah) was a Muslim
counterpart to papacy. Julius Wellhausen’s The Arab Kingdom and
its Fall (1927) is still a source of inspiration for many Western
students of early Islamic history. Most of the research work follows
the traditional Orientalist approach, looking into the emergence of
Islamic culture and civilization as the Arab thirst for power and empire
building. Some like Sha‘bān’s Islamic History a New Interpretation
(1999) pursue a tribal and ethnic interpretation of the rise of Islam.
Philip K. Hitti’s History of the Arabs (1937), though a comprehensive
effort to look into the total impact of Islam in space-time, failed to rise
above the basic misconception of interpreting Islam as Arab history
and culture. Consequently, the Islam’s ascendance in most of the
Orientalist works is viewed as the rise of the Arab power. Arabization
or ‘urubah is projected as the dominant character of Islamic
civilization[1].
The fact is that Islam did not emerge as a movement for
Arabization. On the contrary, the revolutionary message of the
Qur’ān and the Sunnah challenged, contested, and Islamized the
traditional tribal culture. The Qur’ān substituted tribalism and
nationalism with a moral base. “We created you all from a male and a
female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know
one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most
Allah-fearing of you”. (al-Ḥujurāt 49:13)
The Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) reaffirmed the same in his last
sermon. While referring to the above Qur’ānic Āyah (verse), he
condemned ethnic, racial, linguistic, and geographic nationalisms.
Transcending the inherent Arab ideology of tribal nationalism,
the new principle, introduced by him was the unity of humans based
on ethical values and behavior, that is, taqwā (Allah-consciousness).
Consequently, whoever excels in ethical behaviour was superior to
others irrespective of colour, race or ethnicity. This transformation of
the Arabs into a color blind, classless, and internationalist Muslim
community (Ummah) or a globalized humanity is often overlooked by
Western writers when they talk about Islam as an Arab
phenomenon, and the Prophet (upon him be peace) as an Arabian
prophet and statesman.
The Prophetic model (uswah) of governance was part of his
revelatory role in restructuring a morality-based civilization, which
the Muslims took as the ideal for its later institutional development.
The concept of the realm of the sacred and the secular, a dualism in
space-time, has been a foreign idea in the Islamic vision of life.
The term secular in its modern political sense, first used in the
English language towards the middle of the sixteenth century,
denoted the doctrine that God or divine guidance and providence,
has no role in public policy and management of the people’s affair.[2]
The separation between “religion” and state has been
essentially a Christian concept and not necessarily a fruit of
modernity. Lewis’ view on this aspect of Christianity is right when he
says: “The founder of Christianity lead his followers to render unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things,
which are God’s, and for centuries Christianity grew and developed
as a religion of downtrodden until Caesar himself became a
Christian and inaugurated a series of changes by which the new faith
captured the Roman Empire and some would add was captured by
it. The founder of Islam was his own Constantine and founded his
own empire. He did not therefore create - or need to create - a
church. The dichotomy of regnum and sacrerdoium so critical in the
history of western Christendom had no equivalent in Islam.”[3]
 In the same continuation, Lewis refers to a comment made by
Imām Khomeini “Islam is politics or it is nothing”.[4] He further
elaborates the de jure and de facto position of integration of these
two aspects in the Islamic history. “In the Islamic state, as ideally
conceived and as it is indeed exerted from medieval through to
Ottoman times almost into the nineteenth century, there could be no
conflict between Pope and Emperor; in classical Middle Eastern
Islam, the two mighty powers which these two represented were one
and same, and the caliph was the embodiment of both”.[5]
The role of ‘ulamā or scholars throughout the Islamic history
has not been like that of the Christian clerics but of knowledgeable
persons who with their rational and scientific approach interpret the
Qur’ān and the Sunnah and offer their views based on these two
sources. They do not share in divinity nor are supposed to be
innocent or immune from error. There is no possibility of their role as
mediators between a common follower of Islam and his Allah. They
do not carry any ecclesiastical authority. The ‘ulamā are not clergy in
the strict sense of the term.
Nevertheless, governance is a core issue addressed by Islam
in its Scripture as well as in the Prophet’s noble example. “The first
question that arose on Muhammad’s death was whether any state
should survive it at all.” [6] The later history and the ongoing
discourse on Khilāfah and monarchy show how crucial this question
has been.
Contrary to the tradition in Arabian and in other contemporary
civilizations, like the Roman Christian world, Muslim India, and
Persia, Islam came forward for the first time in the history of
humanity, with a social re-organization realized on the “religion”
basis rather than on lineage. “Allah was the personification of state
supremacy. His Prophet, as long as he lived, was His legitimate
vicegerent and supreme ruler on earth. As such, Muḥammad, in
addition to his spiritual function, exercised the same temporal
authority that any chief of a state might exercise”.[7]
Thus, not only at the historic but also at the conceptual level
consensus exists on the integration of “spiritual religious” and the
temporal functions of the Prophet. This consensus comes from
classical Muslim scholars as well as modern-day Muslim thinkers of
all shades and by implication of the leadership, Khalīfah, amīr,
mas’ūl or imām of the Muslim community, after the Prophet (‘alayhi
as-salām).
Realization of state, and integration and unification of
otherwise two separate institutions enjoys therefore a consensual
(ijmā‘i) position in the past fifteen centuries of Islam. The twentieth-
century Shi‘i scholar Imām Khomeini in his doctrine of Vilāyat al-
Faqīh, the famous 1969 lecturers in Najaf, makes this point clear.
Later in his book al-Hukūmat al-lslāmiyah (Islamic Government),[8] he
confirmed that Islam as a “religion” must include a governmental
system. “The separation of religion from government and its
relegation to a system of worship and ritual is completely alien to the
spirit and teachings of Islam, a perversion perpetuated and
reinforced by imperialism and U.S. agents in order to subjugate and
exploit the lands of Islam.”[9]
The translation of Imām Khomeini’s concept of an Islamic
state into the Iranian model, in terms of its impact, is no less
important than the creation of Pakistan in 1947 as a de jure Islamic
state. Iqbāl, Jinnāh and Mawdūdi shared together in their dream and
vision of Pakistan as a “premier Islamic state,”[10] as declared
specifically by the founder of the country Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
The founder was clear about the nature of this new state. He
repeatedly mentioned that the state would be directed by the
principles of Islamic social justice, fair play and consultation or
shūrā,[11] the divine guidance of the Sharī‘ah[12] and the Prophetic
model. He invited experts to help the state in realization of this goal.
While inaugurating the State Bank of Pakistan, he specifically asked
the bank officials to work out an economic model based on Islamic
social justice so that we free ourselves of Western capitalism, which
is known for its exploitation and inequity causing a widening gap
between the poor and the rich.[13]
To bring Pakistan on the world map was indeed a gigantic
task accomplished by the father of the nation Muhammad Ali
Jinnah. But to develop a blue-print of an Islamic political system
and spell out a scheme for transformation of the new state into an
Islamic republic was a task of a different kind that only Iqbāl or
Mawdūdi could have taken up. Wilfred Smith realizing the enormity
of the task makes a very perceptive comment: “Pakistan came into
being as already an Islamic state not because its form was ideal but
because, in so far as, its dynamic was idealist.... To set up an
Islamic state therefore was the beginning not the end of an
adventure. To achieve an Islamic state was to attain not a form but a
process.”[14]
For the Westernized intellectuals steeped in a secular-liberal
tradition, Islam as the ideology of state was a utopia. Utopian
goals, in their view, reflect nostalgia for re-establishing a “once
existing” but no more relevant golden age of the past. They reject
existence of an Islamic polity in the Qur’ān.[15]
Ideology, in their understanding, has rhetoric of its own,
which is simultaneously rational and emotive. It is assumed that
ideology, as it is defined, tries to motivate people, mobilize and
forge them into one single force and as such generates an
authoritarian tendency, which they say is self-evident truth. To them,
Pakistan as an ideal Islamic state is just a slogan, a utopia and an
unachievable goal.
A major confusion, perhaps, of the Westernized secular
mindset is that it regards Islam, like other world religions, a set of
certain rituals, ceremonies, festivals and dogmas. In the backdrop of
the decline of Christianity as a political force in the West and
subsequent rise of rationalism, scientism, logical positivism,
modernism, liberalism and post-modernism, they feel uncomfortable
in accepting Islam as state ideology. Their belief in dualism of sacred
and profane makes it difficult for them to accept the unified approach
of Islam in which state and “religion” are not two separate entities
but two sides of the same coin representing an organic unity.
The newly created society and state in Pakistan necessitated
loud thinking to crystallize i ts own understanding of the basic issues
yet to be defined in its constitution as objectives of state and society.
The founding father could only provide in his over a dozen post-
August 11, 1947 statements, policy guidelines, and directives on the
Islamic character of the future political order in the country.
Development of specific details was a task for the academicians,
scholars, legislators, and intellectuals of the country. Sayyid
Mawdūdi responded to these issues with the vigour of a scholar and
the vision of a strategist and a futurist.
Mawdūdi (1903-1979) was a prolific writer. But it is because of
his very candid exposition, systematic approach, and structural
discussion that he has been considered as the most influential
twentieth-century revivalist thinker of Islam.[16] His works cover a
vast area of Islamic disciplines like exegesis of the Qur’ān (tafsīr),
socioeconomic thought, history, education, law, politics, and world
affairs. Besides, he was an ideologue par excellence, social
reformer, statesman, and the founder and leader of one of the
leading revivalist movement of the Islamic world: the Jamā‘at-i Islāmi
with its independent organizational set ups in Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka. His works have been
translated and published in over twenty-four languages during his
lifetime, playing a key role in creating a global Islamic resurgence.
He also pioneered a movement for Islamization of knowledge,
questioning the epistemic foundations of social and applied
sciences.[17] The impact of his revolutionary writings still needs
assessment. His emphasis on Islam as a complete way of life
transformed the common vision of Islam from a traditional “religion”
into a dynamic, spiritual, moral, social, economic and political
movement and a major agent for change. His monumental work
Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, a unique exposition of the meaning and message
of the Qur’ān has a simple non-polemical and non-theological
format, yet its logical and scientific language has made impact on the
minds of millions of Muslims as well as non-Muslims the world over.
His contributions in the area of contemporary Islamic political thought
remain seminal and path breaking.
The three Abrahamic faiths share the role of “religion” in state.
Judaism feels proud of the political role played by the Old Testament
prophets David and Solomon, who symbolize the integration of the
so-called secular and religious functions and authority. Later,
Judaism as a minority faith and culture also learnt how to survive,
interact and influence the majority faith, culture and political power.
Zionism consequently played a decisive role in the formulation of
policies in Europe, the United States, and a major player in the state
of Israel. The strategic role of the Jews as a minority pressure group
in the United States and in Europe does not call for elaboration. It is
quite at home in developing a working relationship with the centers
of power, may those be religious or secular at the global level.
Christianity in its different phases in history has suffered from
an inherent dilemma of church and state. At times, the Church was
an embodiment of the Divine as much as the Civil Authority. Itself a
victim of persecutions, prior to Christianization of Roman Empire,
soon it claimed validity of its faith, and was unwilling to
accommodate other deities or the public rites associated with the
Roman culture. With the extension of support of Emperor
Constantine (280-337 C.E.), Christian Church became an
institutionalized wing of Roman government. The emperor enjoyed
broad responsibility of ensuring the unity of faith and directing
imperial resources toward essentially religious ends. Among the
early ideologues, Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430) encountered
the ever-increasing role of state. The dilemma of Christianity,
however, mirrors in the compromise of Saint Augustine’s principled
position that state should strictly confine itself to protection of
peaceful persons from religiously motivated attacks along with his
own opinion that armies of the Roman state should suppress and
persecute heresy.[18]
The collapse of Roman Empire in the West exposed
Christianity to new challenges. Christian Church as the major source
for trans-European political, cultural and spiritual unity, without a
political authority had to evolve its own institutional role. Thomas
Aquinas (1224-1274) viewed secular political power responsible for
promotion of virtue and justice among its subjects irrespective of
their religious commitment. At the same time, he also considered
secular government responsible for promotion and diffusion of the
true religion of Rome, a goal, which only a true Christian ruler could
achieve.
The sixteenth-century reformation heralded by Martin Luther
(1483-1546) also highlighted the role of state as an agent of
confessional enforcement, in a state of affairs where Catholicism and
Protestantism were having perpetual clash and conflict. It was in this
age of religious intolerance and persecution that Baruch Spinoza
(1632-1677) and John Locke (1632-1704) advocated for tolerance,
freedom of views and religion neutral role vis-à-vis state. In North
America, George Washington (1732-1799) and John Adams (1735-
1826) recognized the role of religion in dissemination of morality and
virtue yet their emphasis remained on freedom of the individual and
freedom for established churches. First amendment (1789) stated:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
Thomas Jefferson used the phrase “separation of church and
state” for the first time in his letter to Connecticut Baptists in 1802.[19]
The ground reality, however, remains that every dollar bill printed by
the so-called secular United States carries a creedal statement “in
God we believe.” With its pride in secularism, the secular U.S. has
exempted religious institutions from taxation, and legislature pays
chaplains from tax money, which very much circumscribes the
dictum of separation between state and religion.
As a continuation of the Abrahamic tradition, Islam
scripturally, historically, and conceptually defined itself as a natural
middle path for humanity. The Qur’ān repeatedly talks about Islam as
din al-fitrah and the final messenger of Allah Sayyidnā Muḥammad
(‘alahyi as-salām) as one sent to humanity (kāffatan lin-nās).
Nevertheless, it recognizes the right of others to live by their own
doctrines, creeds and faith (lakum dīnukum wa liya dīn) and
principle of tolerance and abstaining use of force in matters related
to choice of religion (lā ikrāha fi al-dīn).
Referring to Allah’s Power, Authority and Guidance the Qur’ān
uses a comprehensive, term hukm (authority, sovereignty, legal and
political power) for Allah the Exalted. “All authority to govern, hukm,
belongs to Allah, He has commanded that you serve none but Him,
this is the manifest din (the right way of life).” (Yūsuf 12:40). The
term sovereignty here connotes more than its political and legal
dimensions. It complements the basic and seminal principle of
tawhīd, Oneness, Uniqueness and Transcendence of Allah. By
implication Allah’s authority and power is not in the masjid (mosque),
a “sacred” place alone. In fact, Islam does not recognize separation
between sacred or holy space and time and an unholy or secular
and profane space and time.
 When the Qur’ān declares: “This day I have perfected your
dīn for you and have given you My bounty in full measure and has
been pleased to assign for you Islam as your dīn (way of life),” (al-
Mā’idah 5:3). The completion of dīn does not stand for the rituals
alone. It refers to the din’s relevance with state, society, individual as
well as the whole of humanity.
Historically the Messenger of Allah combined the functions of
a prophet, a statesman, a judge, and a military commander. His
successors, al-Khulāfā al-Rāshidīn, also combined in their conduct
the political, “religious,” civil and legal roles. However, after around
forty years of the Prophet’s death, a significant shift in the political
arena exposed the Muslim community to apparently an aberration,
and a deviance in the form of the introduction of hereditary
succession. This began with the first Umayyad ruler Mu‘āwiyah,
when he nominated his son Yazīd as his successor.
This issue has attracted attention of the Muslim political
thinkers, jurists and theologians throughout the past fifteen
centuries. In the recent history of the Muslim Ummah, particularly
with the decline and disintegration of the symbolic Khilāfah al-
Uthmāniyah (1924) Muslim intellectuals vigorously deliberated on the
concept of Khilāfah, its need, viability and legitimacy in the context of
the dynamics of an Islamic state.
Egyptian scholar ‘Ali ‘Abdul Rāziq (1888-1966)[20] questioned
the scriptural foundations of not only Khilāfah but also of an Islamic
political system. Rashid Ridā (1865-1935) came up with a historic
approach, calling for the revival of Khilāfah. Indian scholar Abu’l
Kalām Azād (1888-1958) also addressed the issue at a historical
level. The fall of Khilāfah and the systematic secularization of state in
Turkey was not a normal event. Muhammad Rashid Rida considered
realization of an Arab Khilāfah or dawlah indispensable for
maintaining temporal and spiritual authority, thus given the title
caliphate or Grand Imamate (Imāmah al-‘Uzmā). During this period,
other Muslim scholars came with notions such as “al-Islam din wa
dawlahaa” a combination of din with state, attributed to ‘Abdul
Razzāq al Sanhūri (1895-1971). In this intellectual climate, perhaps
the most comprehensive and persuasive discussion on Islamic
political order, conceptual and historical, was offered by Mawdūdi
(1903-1979) in his several academic treaties.
The political response of the Muslim Ummah in South Asia
against the British imperialism was diverse. Territorial nationalism,
conceptualizing Muslims and Hindus as one nation, came from none
but the Rector of Deoband Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957). It
was contested by Allama Iqbal (1872-1938), Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), and Sayyid Mawdūdi. Allama
Iqbal, who once praised the Himalayas and traced his Brahmin
origin, publicly rejected the Madani’s views, and advocated two-
nation theory. Jinnah emerged as the key champion of the two-
nation theory and this vision was supported by renowned Islamic
scholars, specifically Shabbīr Ahmad ‘Uthmāni (1887-1949), Sayyid
Sulaymān Nadvi (1884-1953) and Abu’l A‘lā Mawdūdi (1903-1969).
In order to articulate the concept of Muslims and Hindus as two
nations, Mawdūdi’s book Mas’alah-i Qawmiyat (1938) was widely
circulated by the Muslim League leadership in order to support and
validate its political and ideological stand of two-nation theory, from
an academic and Islamic legal viewpoint.
A logical corollary of the emergent situation was to address
afresh the concept of Islamic society and state in a futuristic context.
Mawdūdi wrote a series of articles later published in a book entitled
Musalmān aur mawjuda siyasi kashmakash (Muslims and the
current political struggle) in order to help Muslims understand the
issues involved, affecting their identity and political destiny. The
complexity of the issue called for more than one person to address
it. Nevertheless, if we look critically, perhaps, most of the academic
works of Sayyid Mawdūdi were in one way or another a systematic
response to this socio-political challenge that the Muslim Ummah
encountered after the fall of the Uthmāni Khilāfah and struggle for
freedom from British rule in India.
Mawdūdi’s concept of the Islamic state has two equally
important dimensions. A powerful and lucid academic discourse
based on solid objective and scientific research spelling out the
contours of an Islamic political order. Second, a systematic effort to
look into the history of the Muslim Ummah, discussing the
arrangement needed so as to develop a deep understanding of the
ground realities of the Ummah’s intellectual, ethical, social and
political crisis. His interpretation of Islam as a complete way of life
leads him to draw from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah the principles of
polity and society. His outstanding work Four Key Concepts of the
Qur’ān (Qur’ān ki char bunyādi istalāhen) sets the direction for his
future elaborations and comprehensive treatises on the Islamic
political order. His other writings such as Mas’ala-i khilāfat, Delhi,
1922, Islam ka siyāsi nizām, Lahore, 1939; Islami hukumat kis tarah
qa’im hoti hay, Lahore 1941; Islami hukumat mayn dhimiyun kay
huqūq, Lahore 1948; Islami dastūr ki tadwin and Islami dastūr ki
bunyādain, Lahore 1952 led to the crystallization of his views,
reflected in his later works such as Islami riyāsat, Lahore 1962 and
Khilāfat wa mulūkiyat, Lahore, 1965.
While addressing the issue of the caliphate and kingship, its
historical development and impact on the Muslim society, he did not
confine his discourse to a historical résumé. His treatment of the
issue cannot be separated from the intellectual crisis in which he
found the Muslim Ummah in the twentieth century. The Muslim world
particularly countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen and Iran in the second half of the
twentieth century were struggling to discover their Islamic roots.
Army dictatorships substituted the overseas colonizers in several
Muslim countries. People contested their legitimacy in most of these
countries. The yearning of the Muslim masses for the revival of the
caliphate and for building their political system on the pattern of al-
Khilāfah al-Rāshidah called for a fresh look on the issue.
Should state be religion-neutral?
Sayyid Mawdūdi’s major contribution lies in addressing
invariably some of the most challenging questions on Islamic political
order. Secular Western mind finds it very difficult to reconcile with
the political role of “religion”. They define religion in its classical
Western and Eastern understanding as personal faith, a set of
rituals, ceremonies, offerings, devotions and festivals while they take
society and state as separate entities. State, they assume, must
remain religion neutral, if not anti-religion.
The secularists’ argument against religion’s role in state,
politics and society is that if a state has a religion it becomes
partisan interfering with people’s faith. Second, such a state would
not be able to ensure religious equality to all its citizens when it may
succumb to bias and unfairness towards its non-Muslim citizens.
They further claim that if the Pakistani state has Islam as its
“religion,” it may create problems of interpretation. In other words,
which interpretation of the Qur’ānic text or of Ḥadīth will it follow?
Therefore, summing up the issue, the secularists plead that state
should have nothing to do with religion.
Before we respond to these questions, it will be in the fitness
of things to point out that the historical process of transition from
Khilāfah to Mālikiyah (kingship) when reflected through the mirror of
Islamic history should not be interpreted as a total distancing or
separation of “religion” from state. State even when annexed by
istila’ (naked force) by the mulūk (kings and monarchs) continued to
define itself as an Islamic state. It remained committed to the
supremacy of the Sharī‘ah, presence of independent Islamic
judiciary, promotion of Islamic social norms, independent Islamic
educational and social institutions.
This continued to be the official policy, even under monarchy
whose Islamic legitimacy people often publicly questioned.
Relevance of religion to state and society was not the issue; the
cause of contention was how to check transfer of power through
succession and revive shūrā’s decision-making system.
Having said so, it has to be acknowledged that the shift from
caliphate to monarchial absolutism did represent a serious deviation
from the qualitative, merit-based, consultative (shūrāwi) political
order of Islam, which believed in public accountability of the rulers
before Allah and the people. That is why most of the treatments on
the subject assign first priority to Sovereignty of Allah in an Islamic
political order. This does not mean elected representatives in a
parliament or legislature shall have no role to play. Indeed
lawmaking is an ongoing process in any developing and growing
society. However, the principles that go into lawmaking, and which
define the purpose and objective of law, human life, society and
state, are provided in the case of Muslim community, by the Sharī‘ah
(divine command). For example, the Sharī‘ah declares that killing of
one person unjustly is like killing the whole of humanity while saving
one single soul is like saving the life of all humanity (al-Mā’idah
5:32). In the light of this universal Qur’ānic principle a legislature
shall have to develop laws and regulations in order to promote and
protect life of its citizens irrespective of their religious affiliation,
colour or racial origin.
It is a historical reality that Islamic law based on principles of
Sharī‘ah (usūl al-fiqh) in economic, social and legal matters did
remain operative even when political deviance resulted into kingship
and monarchy under the Umayyad, ‘Abbāsid, Mamlūk, Fātimīd, and
‘Uthmāni or even Mughal rulers. Therefore, historically “religion” and
state dichotomy has not been a central issue for Islam in its history
prior to the advent of European colonial rule in Muslim lands.
Islam “dīn” or religion
A more basic question raised by Mawdūdi, in this respect is -
can Islam be regarded a religion like Hinduism, Judaism or
Christianity? Referring directly to the Qur’ān, in his seminal work
Four key concepts of the Qur’ān (2006), he holds the view that the
Arabic term madhhab, synonymous with the English word “religion”,
is not used even once in the Qur’ān or in the Prophetic Sunnah. The
Qur’ān, invariably, in about ninety-eight places uses the term dīn in
its comprehensive connotation of commands, directives and
teachings dealing with personal and family life, worship, social
relations, economy, political system, law and financial accountability.
This leaves no ambiguity in the mind of a perceptive reader of the
Qur’ān and Sunnah about the supremacy of the Sharī‘ah or
sovereignty of Allah the Exalted.
The term “religion” in its traditional Eastern and Western
connotation bears little relevance to Islam. Islam is a complete way
of life, with its own cultural, ethical, legal social, political and
economic system as it has its own distinct form and expression for
prayer, worship and devotion. All are parts of an integrated whole.?
State and religion dichotomy
The suggestion that the advent of mulūkiyah (kingship) was a
de-facto separation between “religion” and state, or a form of
secularization of state is out of tune with the reality of the Muslim
experience and based on a total misunderstanding of the notion. To
begin with, Islamic state is an ideological state and as such, it cannot
be religion-neutral. It is responsible for making it convenient for its
citizens to live by the Islamic principles and teachings. The Qur’ān
explicitly states that “(Allah will certainly help) those who when We
bestow upon them authority in land (tamkīn fi al ard) shall establish
(system of) prayers, (system of) Zakāh, enjoin good (ma‘rūf) and
forbid evil (munkar)”. (al-Ḥajj 22:41). Here the Qur’ān has specified
four basic obligations and responsibility of an Islamic state namely
establishment of a system of public piety through prayer (Ṣalāh), a
system of just and sharing economy through Zakāh; realization of
ma‘rūf (good and ethical behaviour) in public policy and eradication
and frustration of unethical practices or nahi ‘an al-munkar.
Operationalization of these four state obligations is called by the
Qur’ān as establishing Allah’s rule (ḥākimiyah) and of ‘adl al ijtimā‘i
(social justice).
In the realm of law, the Qur’ān makes the political
authority.responsible for implementation of justice in civil as well as
criminal matters. The Qur’ānic political system makes no plea for
any privileged class based on divine right to rule. There is no place
for any “clergy” to execute anyone in the name of Islamic Sharī‘ah. It
is no more than a myth that the so-called theocratic ‘ulamā are
allowed to take law in their hands. In Islam, it is state alone, which
can implement criminal penalties and civil punishments. The political
teachings of the Qur’ān include how to dispense justice within the
framework of the Sharī‘ah. Islamic laws relating to inheritance,
family, economic transactions, crime and punishment are integral
part of the directives and commands of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah
or along with processes for dispensation of justice (adab al-Qāḍi).
With explicit commands in all these above areas of law, the Qur’ān
makes state and society equally responsible for implementation of
total Islamic system of life. Amr bi al-ma‘rūf is both public and private
responsibility. It is in this sense that Islam has no separation
between the so-called secular and the religious. Iqbal correctly
remarks, “The essence of tawhīd as a working idea is equality,
solidarity and freedom.” The state from Islamic standpoint is an
endeavour to transform these principles into space and time forces,
an aspiration to realize them in definite human organization. It is in
this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the
sense it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can
always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. All
that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being. There is
no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter
constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit. All is holy ground.
As the prophet so beautifully puts it, “The whole of this earth is a
masjid.” The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the
spiritual in a human organization.[21]
Does it mean that if state is not religion neutral, then non-
Muslim citizens will face discrimination? The Qur’ān specifically in
the context of non-Muslims directs believers to “observe justice
(i‘dilū) as it is near to piety and Allah consciousness (al-Māi’dah 5:8).
State has an obligation to protect life, honour, property, rational
behaviour, religious and cultural freedom of its non-Muslim citizens.
[22]
State cannot differentiate between a Muslim and non-Muslim as
member of the civil society. However, it does not mean that violating
all norms of reason, logic and fairness a person by virtue of being a
citizen may be appointed to perform a duty for which he may not
meet requisite qualifications, for example, leading prayers in the
masjid, or adjudicating Sharī‘ah matters without conviction,
expertise, knowledge, skill and trust in it. Second, it is in line with the
true spirit of democracy to allow the majority law reflects the values
the community believes. At the same time, minority has every right to
live according to its own faith and values, guaranteed under the
Qur’ānic principle of lā ikrāha fi al-dīn (there is no compulsion in
religion). However, minority has no right to dictate majority not to
legislate public law in keeping with the people’s will. Genuine
plurality is an integral part of the Islamic system.
Religious equality
The Islamic political order subsumes not only religious
freedom but considers religious liberty within and outside the Islamic
state as an inalienable right of its citizen. We are not aware of any
other ideological or “religious” state, which would be committed to
the inalienable right to faith and practice for people of other faiths, to
the extent of taking up arms for restoration of their rights. The Qur’ān
declares that “[t]hose who were unjustly expelled from their homes
for no other reason than their saying ‘Allah is our Lord.’ If Allah was
not to repel some through others, monasteries and churches and
synagogues and masajid, wherein the name of Allah is much
mentioned would certainly have been pulled down. Allah will
certainly help those who will help Him” (al-Ḥajj: 22:40). By
mentioning specifically four places of worship namely, churches,
synagogues, temples or monasteries and masājid, the Qur’ān has
left no ambiguity in the minds of its readers that if religious liberty is
denied to the followers of other religions, it is for the Islamic state to
take all necessary steps for the restoration of their rights.
This protection of “religious” freedom is not a favour to anyone
but an obligation of an ideological Islamic state. Any one who will
read the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s hadith will discover for himself
that the Prophet has gone to the extent of saying: “Beware!
Whosoever is cruel and hard on such people (non-Muslims), or
curtails their rights or burden them with more than they can endure,
or realize anything from them against their free will, I shall myself be
a complainant against such a person on the Day of Judgment.”[23]
Muslim and Islamic State
Modern Muslim political discourse often draws a line between
an Islamic and a Muslim state. The former, it says, implement
rigorously the Sharī‘ah penalties and punishments while the later is a
Muslim majority state ruled by not-so-good or ideal Muslim rulers.
Only three out of fifty-seven O.I.C. member states call themselves
Islamic. Others call themselves kingdoms (mamālik), people’s
republics or simply an emirate ruled by a chief (amīr). On a closer
look, the difference does not appear substantial for three simple
reasons:
In the case of the earlier Muslim history, the political authority
embodied the so-called “religious” and “political” functions. The
rightly guided caliphs were also knowledgeable mujtahidīn (jurists) in
matters of law. With the Umayyad political take over, the state still in
principle remained Islamic, though it was taken over per force (bil
istilā) by a mālik (hereditary claimants to power). Second, the state
remained Islamic because its laws were based on the Sharī‘ah,
neither the Umayyads nor the ‘Abbasids or later aspirants for power,
suppressed the Sharī‘ah laws, though occasionally in a few areas
they tried to influence the judiciary leading to an obvious tension
between the two. The Sharī‘ah laws, however, determined economic
and social life. State appointed chief justice (qāḍi al-quḍā) as well as
local judges, who adjudicated matters according to one or another
recognized school of law. It is historically incorrect to think that with
the change of the caliphate to mulūkiyah, the law of land changed
and Islamic laws confined to personal laws of the Muslims.
Conferment of Islamic laws to the so-called “Muslim personal law”
was an imposition by the overseas colonialists, who occupied
Muslim lands.
Third, a formal and strong link between the less pious
(exceptions allowed) and observant ruler and the people remained
through the institution of Friday sermons in which a prayer was made
for the monarch for being supposedly “shadow of Allah on earth,” a
statement which calls for a critical look, nevertheless speaks for the
Islamic character of state.
Then what is the problem? Why do we have this ongoing
political discourse from Yazid’s time to the British raj in Pakistan and
elsewhere? Mawdūdi and before him others, like Rashid Rida,
pleaded for an Islamic state in order to bring back those essential
features and characteristics, which were suppressed, modified or
replaced by certain other features under the kings and monarchs in
the past centuries.
Mawdudi in his Khilāfat wa Mulūkiyat has tried to address the
issue at three levels. First, he tries to identify in the Qur’ān and the
Prophet’s Sunnah the normative foundations of an Islamic political
and social order. It is here that theoretical and applied dimensions of
concept of sovereignty, vicegerency, limits of obedience to the
authorities, rights and obligations of the public servants, and more
importantly, the role of the shūrā (interactive decision making) and
implementation of social justice (‘adl) is deliberated.
Having dilated on the intellectual and normative foundations
and the framework of an Islamic political order, Mawdūdi compares
the post-rightly guided caliphate period with the ideal contained in
the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. He finds certain obvious deviations
from the ideal. Making a departure from the romantic and
traditionalist interpretation of history re-enforced at the intellectual
level by Shibli Nu‘māni (1847-1914) in his classic al-Māmūn (1887),
Mawdūdi applies principles of historical criticism in understanding the
causes of transition from the caliphate to monarchy. Source criticism
in the Islamic intellectual tradition had been the feature of the Muslim
scholars from early days, encouraged by the Prophet himself.
However, the romantic approach in history and conservative
traditionalism did not encourage intellectuals to develop a critique of
the monarchial period of the after-fall caliphate.
Mawdūdi breaks this “taboo” but with extreme respect for
such personalities, while being critical of their policies and decisions,
which became instrumental in changing the course of events and the
trend of society. He bases his analysis on the touchstone of the truth
provided by the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.
This critical work highlights causes and reasons for the
transition from ideal to the incidental, which shows a departure from
certain basic norms such as decision making done on the shūrā
principle, direct election or selection of the ruler based on ahliyah
(capability and qualifications) and not on hereditary succession and
public accountability of the expenditure of funds. Despite the
preceding three shortcomings, independence of judiciary and the
institutions of iftā (legal opinion) and qaḍā (judicial edicts) and
madāris (schools) were practically engines of change thanks to their
ongoing practice of ijtihād (independent) in various areas of life
which helped in broadening the Sharī‘ah application in economy,
social and financial matters as well as in art and architecture.
The social norms, economic practices, family system and
personal laws, inheritance law, evidence law, as prescribed by the
Qur’ān and the Sunnah continued to operate even under the
greatest usurpers of political power. This peculiar situation resulted
into a legal dilemma for the jurists. Even scholars like Imām Ibn
Taymiyah (1263-1328) hesitated in endorsing rebellion against a
Muslim ruler who may have obvious weakness but who maintains
public prayers and takes care of the people’s welfare.
The issue became more complex with the political decline,
disintegration of Muslim political authority and rise of European
imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The
oppressive colonizers, who in the secular European tradition
imposed secular laws on Muslim lands, replaced not-so-good-
Muslim rulers. The abolition of the Ottoman caliphate turned out to
be the last blow to the concept of the global Islamic state and Muslim
Ummah.
The new challenge was perhaps no less serious than the
earlier one. The basic issues at conceptual and applied levels
though were not completely new, the European secular model
concentrated on the people’s sovereignty along with the final
authority of the crown or the President in certain cases.
The source of law for the European nations was mainly the
pronouncement of the crown or customary law in which their
religious scriptures had practically no role to play. The distribution of
power in the legislative bodies was based on secular principles and
on show of hands. Morality was important but confined to personal
realms.
For the Muslims, the pain of colonization added to the already
existing concern and desire to revive the Muslim caliphate. The
colonizers were generally considered more undesirable than the
corrupt Muslim rulers were. Emergence of movements for restoration
of Islamic political order was therefore a natural phenomenon in the
length and breadth of the Muslim world during this period.
Methodological level
Sayyid Mawdūdi’s Khilāfat wa Mulūkiyat, in this context,
presents a bold step forward in examining critically the past.
Unconventional as he is, with openness of mind and with due
reverence for the companions of the Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām),
rising above the bias of sect or madhab (school of thought), he
makes a distinction at a methodological level between the norm and
deviation, between essential and incidental, central and peripheral,
permanent and the changing.
Progress, development and advancement is a dynamic
process in which instead of re-inventing a wheel an existing wheel is
improved, perfected and made to excel on other wheels. Progress is
neither a matter of rejection of the past nor a matter of holding to the
past. It calls for capturing the normative foundations and universal
principles of good governance while applying an innovative approach
in order to discover appropriate viable system of power sharing,
realization of justice and peace and observance of human rights of
the people in the present and future context.
The post-colonial challenges faced by the Muslim world have
been multidimensional. For some elitist Muslim, Western secular
political model, thanks to its apparent success in delivering political
liberties to the people in Europe and America deserves to be
embraced in the Muslim world as well. They hypothesize that the
values of freedom of expression, civil society, security and fair play
are essentially a heritage of the Muslims; therefore, their adoption
does not violate any Islamic norms. They further add that secular
political system also provides space for personal religious practices.
One can go to church or masjid without any hindrance while at
collective and social levels a political order should have no religious
interference.
The Islamic revivalist and innovative school of thought
represented outspokenly by Mawdūdi, on the contrary, holds that the
norms and values contained in the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s Sunnah
have universal relevance and applicability. Therefore, an Islamic
political order is essentially a matter of translation of these norms
and values in a progressive political order. An Islamic state, however,
shows no reluctance in adapting processes and measure, which
does not conflict with the Islamic norms and values.
The conceptual confusion that a state may be called Muslim
instead of Islamic is perhaps due to a basic error in defining a
Muslim. Some people think that like the neighbouring Indian Hindus
a person is also Muslim by virtue of being born in a Muslim family.
Two basic conditions as manifested in the confusion of faith and to
be fulfilled by anyone who wants to be Muslim, are namely
acceptance of undisputed authority and sovereignty of Allah, and
second, total acceptance of the Prophetic conduct and behavior as
the model to be imitated. If a person with his apparent Muslim name
acts contrary to both the above requirements, his Islam becomes
doubtful. A “Muslim State” which does not subscribe to the above
two basic principles can be neither Muslim nor Islamic.
Similarly, Islamic state versus Muslim state dichotomy
appears to be based on certain misgivings. For example, it is
assumed that the Islamic state is utopian and idealist while a Muslim
state stands for a pragmatic, liberal and westernized socio-political
order with ceremonial observance of Islam. This is a contradiction in
terms. A Muslim is Muslim only when he or she observes Islam. It is
true for the state as well. It has to be de jure Islamic, and in the
process of evolution becomes a de facto Islamic state. It is ideal but
viable and a manifest reality.
In the Jewish tradition, a Jew is defined as one born of a
Jewish mother. A Jew remains a Jew whether he is Karl Marx,
Sigmund Freud or Martin Buber or a terrorist Menachem Begin or a
confirmed atheist. This is not so with Islam. Islam means conscious
acceptance of obligations and responsibilities as a Muslim. Simply
gene, race or cast, as in Hinduism, does not inherit Islam for
example. Similarly, an Islamic state, being ideological refers to a
conscious, dynamic process of becoming. Its identity lies in its
Islamicity. Thus, a Muslim state cannot be other than a de-jure
Islamic state.
An apparently very intelligent point is made that if we call a
state Islamic, we will end up in differences of opinions on all policy
matters. But if we call a state Muslim it will only mean it is Muslim by
name, though it may not follow and implement Islamic teachings. We
fail to understand the logic of this self-contradictory position. If the
intention of a people is not to observe and apply Islam in state why
to call it even Muslim? In fact, in Islam difference of opinion,
contrary to many other faiths, is welcome. Islam assumes that
research-based differences of opinion are a pre-requisite to people’s
progress. We are not aware of any constitution of a country, which
does not provide for more than one interpretation. Does it mean that
since there is room for difference of opinion therefore constitutions
should be a set aside? Or, if in a criminal case lawyers differ in their
interpretation of law, should the law be suspended. Possibility of
different interpretations is a sign of maturity and dynamism. The
secret of progress and development lies in constructive
disagreement, critical views and an ongoing educative process
through intellectual interaction. If we stop people from disagreeing on
various issues, we may create worse kind of a totalitarian society or
a “secular theocracy”. Islam rejects this exclusivist approach of the
secularists and wants its followers to interpret the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah, with proper tools, in order to find solutions for emerging
problems in a growing and developing socio-political order. Since
scriptural texts are interpreted with the help of a scientifically
developed methodology, which makes use of lexicography, external
and internal criticism, understanding the context, identification of the
core and the periphery, the cause (‘illah) and the wisdom (ḥikmah),
specific and general and so on, the textual study provides a variety
of possible applications in solution of emerging problems. This
process is dynamic and not static. It is progressive and not
retrogressive. It is modern and futuristic and not backward and
conservative.
Return to the scriptural foundations in the West, on the
contrary, has a different hermeneutical history. The Jewish and
Christian fundamentalists are known for their return to scriptural
foundations in the name of literalism and fundamentalism. The
doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible led to literal application;
consequently no rational, critical analyses of the Bible was allowed
by those who called for going back to the Bible.
In the Islamic framework, the whole enterprise is different.
The call for going back to the Qur’ān whether by Ibn Taymiyah
(1263-1328) or Iqbal and Mawdūdi simply means liberating the
Muslim mind from the traditional corpus of law “fiqh wa al Qanūn”
and conduct of fresh interpretation of the texts of the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah in order to address modern and contemporary issues
through ijtihād. As a methodology, it is not to be confused with
imitation and adoption of Western secular culture and law in the
name of modernity, post-modernity or enlightenment. It stands for
use of professional skills in discerning the intent and purpose of the
manifest and implied legal commands, directions and teachings of
the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and discovering their relevance and
application in an emergent situations. It is not a free lance, personal
opinion but a professional exercise of reasoned judgment founded
on the two non-variable principles namely the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah. The process being dynamic leads to an ever-expanding
meaning of the same text. While the text remains non-variable,
concentration on its meaning should reveal new dimensions.
 Mawdūdi, like Ibn Taymiyah, is concerned with the institution
of the state and the supremacy of the Islamic Sharī‘ah. The caliphate
for him provides an historical model, successfully exercised in
Madinah. He wants to capture the spirit of this ideal and glorious
period, in order to evolve a new and modern setup, with Sharī‘ah as
its source of inspiration. The use of the term Madinah as the model
of a viable Islamic state never stand for a literal reproduction of
society and state as it once was. On the other hand, it means
learning from this experience while using most modern available
means for the development of a Sharī‘ah-based political order
capable of meeting the problems of our time and translating their
eternal and universal values into contemporary idiom and context. It
is the technology of the times, which is to be harnessed in the
service of principles and values, therein lie the dynamism of the
Islamic model.
The lesson from the Madinah model is that the most efficient
means of the age have to be harnessed to better the statecraft. We
need to capture its spirit and make our system more efficient in order
to follow the model of al-Khulafā al-Rāshidīn. A warning, however, is
needed in areas where the Qur’ān and the Sunnah are specific;
there is no scope of wild interpretations in the name of modernity
and innovation. Ijtihād is a dynamic process aimed at discerning
guidance from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah to reach solutions for
modern problems, not to subvert its teachings to pander to modernity
whims.
Some secularists also assert that the state is not supposed to
make a people pious and ethical; it is the individual conviction, which
makes a people moral. The problem with this approach, in our view,
is twofold. First, it does not elaborate what it means by piety. Even if
piety for some means wearing a specific kind of dress or speaking in
a civil tone, state does have a role in it. If piety means observance of
ethical conduct in economy, political policies, educational system,
cultural activities, social relations and everyday transactions, then
state cannot leave these matters for the individual judgment.
If state has no role or authority in policy-making on economic,
educational, cultural and social matters, society shall end up in a
state of anarchy. This does not reduce the importance of personal
piety and individual conscience. Nevertheless, family, education,
society and state are the four stakeholders, which have equal
importance in building an ethical vision and moral conduct and
behaviour of citizens. That is why the Qur’ān makes state
responsible for ensuring implementation of ethical and moral
measures (ma‘rūf) in economy, in family, and application of justice
(‘adl) and equity in social, economic, political and legal matters.
The concept that “religion” is a personal relationship between
a person and his or her God is not new either. This was common
among the Greek, Romans, Indians, and the Jewish and Christian
religious traditions. Islam is perhaps the only faith, which has taken a
social approach and not an individual-centred approach of one’s
salvation. Piety, birr (goodness) and taqwa (Allah-consciousness),
while intensely personal and of internalized nature, have a distinct
and quantifiable manifestation in human behaviour. To that extent,
they represent measurable, behavioural social categories and not
confined to an individual heart. “Righteousness does not consist in
turning your face toward the East or the West. True righteousness
consists in believing in Allah and the Last Day, the Angels, the Book
and the Prophets and in giving away one’s property in love of Him to
one’s relatives, the orphans, the poor, and the wayfarer, and to those
who ask for help, and in freeing the necks of slaves and in
establishing prayer and dispersing Zakah. True righteousness is
attained by those who are faithful in their promise once they have
made it and by those who remain steadfast in adversity and
affliction, and at the time of battle (between truth and falsehood).
Such are the truthful ones, such are the Allah fearing”. (al-Baqarah
2:177). This Qur’ānic definition of what is virtue, righteousness and
moral conduct (taqwā), not only specifies its nature but also provides
a scale and measure for quantification and quality assurance of
human behaviour and conduct. It is not true with reference to Islam,
to say that virtue and ethical attitudes is something abstract,
invisible, non-measurable and non-tangible. Individual as much as
civil society and state are responsible for establishment of an ethical
and moral social order embodying virtue and righteousness at
individual and collective levels.
 If state policies do not take care of contracts and promises it
makes, if it does not take care of minimizing the gap between those
who have and those who have not, if it does not use the same scale
in dispensing justice to the poor and the rich, the polity becomes a
mockery. The state, the society as well as the individual are to share
in the burden, of immorality and unethical behaviour. Therefore, in
the context of Islamic morality, “religious” values are not a domain of
the individual alone nor relative and left to the personal will of an
individual and his or her motivation. State and society have legal,
constitutional, and moral obligations to make sure that good (ma‘rūf)
prevails and evil and excess (munkar) are eradicated from state,
society and individual’s behaviour. State is a major player in
implementing Islamic moral norms, laws and values in society as
stated very clearly in the Qur’ān “Those if We give them authority in
land would establish Ṣalāh (prayers), Zakāh (poor-due) and enjoin
what is good and forbid what is wrong…” (al-Ḥajj 22: 41).
State in the Islamic thought, therefore, is not value neutral,
neither secular nor theocratic. It is morality-centered, not situational
or relativistic but representative of universal values of justice, peace,
equity, fraternity, coherence or in the single term tawhīdi. The
foundational role of shūrā (mutual consultation) or interactive
decision-making does not allow state to turn into kingship. It does not
welcome conservatism, dogmatism, kingship, and authoritarianism. It
has the potential to address socioeconomic problems humanity is
facing today.
Khilāfat wa Mulūkiyat, is more than a systematic treatment of
the issue from a historical critical view point: it is an exercise in
discovering Islamic foundations of a modern democratic order.
Mawdūdi is critical of the so-called classical and glorious periods of
the Umayyad, ‘Abbāsid, Fātimīd, Mamlūk, ‘Uthmāniyah or even
Mughal periods and consider them as a clear violation of the political
norms of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. To him, mulukiyah is a
deviation from the historical paradigm of the Khilāfah al-Rāshidah.
This makes him a champion of an Islamic political order, which he
calls as “theo-democracy.”
Striking at the very roots of dictatorial and hereditary
monarchical systems, Mawdūdi addresses the core issue of the real
source of political authority. In the Western secular democratic
model, the electoral college, at a hypothetical level, enjoys ultimate
authority. In Islamic framework of thought, the doctrine of tawhīd
(monotheism) implies that the real sovereign is Allah. People are the
instrument for the realization of the Islamic ethical and political
values. They have to seek guidance from these primary sources in
the development of modern solutions, legislature, and strategic need
to respond to change.
While kingship represents concentration of power in a person,
Islamic political order empowers morality and law for the realization
of peace, harmony and justice in society. Sharī‘ah (divine
commands) should not be confused with the corpus of Islamic law,
developed in different periods by the jurists (fuqahā) and proclaimed
as law of land in various parts of the world. Islamic political order is
founded, as underscored by Mawdūdi, on the Qur’ānic principle of
shūrā, ijmā’ and ijtihād through an ongoing interaction at different
levels in society. The will and aspirations of the people interact with
the guiding principles of the Sharī‘ah in order to improvise viable
solutions needed for development, progress and sustainability of a
society.
His concept of al-Khilāfah appears at variance with the
historical view of the caliphate put forth by Rashid Ridā or Abdul
Kalām and others. His concept of popular caliphate focuses on a
dynamic role of the people, elected representatives and legislators in
creation of a just and moral social order. This fresh approach of
power sharing by the competent and capable persons focuses on
qualitative aspects of the political order and transcends the
quantitative character of secular democratic order.
Khilāfat wa Malūkiyat paves the way for a representative
political order wherein supremacy of law, norms, and values prevails
over the classical Greek or even modern Western view of the simple
majority rule.
Misconceptions about the Islamic state develop when
intellectuals try to read in the Muslim history clash and conflict, which
existed in the European Christian context. They try to discover
imaginary conflict between religious and secular, sacred and profane
in Islam while this dichotomy is non-existent in the case of Islam.
 In conclusion, we can say that kingship (mūlūkiyah)[24] or
dictatorships are alien concepts in Islam. Islamic state is neither
theocracy nor secular democracy. It has its own norms and values,
which invalidate separation between state and “religion” or between
the sacred and profane. It is not a reproduction of the so-called
‘Abbasid or Umayyad rulers. Islamic state stands for a shūrāwi
(consultative), ādil (just), and an ethical sociopolitical order of its
own.
 Chapter One

The Political Teachings of the Qur’ān

1. The Worldview
To understand the polity the Qur’ān creates, it is import to reflect on
how it visualizes the universe from the perspective of political
philosophy. This should give us the following points:
a) Allah the Exalted is the Creator of this whole universe
including humans and the natural resources humans make
use of in this world.
And He it is who has created the heavens
and the earth in truth.
(al-An‘ām 6:73)
Say: “Allah is the creator of everything. He is
the One, the Irresistible.”
(al-Ra‘d 13:16)
O people! Fear your Lord Who created you
from a single being and out of it created its mate;
and out of the two spread many men and women.
Fear Allah in Whose name you plead for rights, and
heed the ties of kinship. Surely, Allah is ever
watchful over you.
(al-Nisā’ 4:1)
It is He who has created for you all that is on
earth.
(al-Baqarah 2:29)
Is there any Creator, apart from Allah, Who
provides you’re your sustenance out of the
heavens and earth?
(Fāṭir 35:3)
Did you ever consider the sperm that you
emit?
Do you create a child out of it, or are We its
Creators?
It is We Who ordained death upon you and
We are not to be frustrated.
 Had We so wished, nothing could have
hindered Us from replacing you by others like
yourselves, or transforming you into beings you
know nothing about.
You are well aware of the first creation; then,
do you learn no lesson from it?
Have you considered the seeds you till?
Is it you or We Who makes them grow?
If We so wished, We could have reduced
your harvest to rubble, and you would have been
left wonder-struck to exclaim: “We have been
penalized; nay; we have been undone!”
Did you cast a good look at the water that
you drink?
Is it you who brought it down from the clouds
or is it We Who brought it down?
If We had so pleased, We could have made
it bitter. So why do you not give thanks?
Did you consider the fire that you kindle?
Did you make its tree grow or was it We
Who made it grow?
(al-Wāqi‘ah 56:58-
72)
b) Allah is the Creator of His creation,
Sovereign and the Controller.
To Him belongs all that is in the heavens and
all that is in the earth, and all that is in between,
and all beneath the soil.
(Ṭā-Hā 20:6)
To Him belongs all who are in the heavens
and all who are on the earth: All are in obedience to
Him.
(al-Rūm 30:26)
Who created the sun, and the moon, and the
stars, making them all subservient to His
command? Lo! His is the creation and His is the
command. Blessed is Allah, the Lord of the whole
Universe.
(al-A‘rāf 7:54)
He governs from the heavens to the earth.
(al-Sajdah 32:5)
c) To none but Allah belongs the sovereignty of this
universe; there is none to share His powers.
Are you not aware that the dominion of the
heavens and the earth belongs to Allah.
(al-Baqarah
2:107)
Nor has taken any partner in His kingdom.
(al-Furqān 25:2)
His is the Praise in this world and in the
Hereafter. His is the Command and to Him will all of
you be returned.
(al-Qaṣaṣ 28:70)
Judgement lies with Allah alone.
(al-An‘ām 6:57)
The creatures have no other guardian than
Him; He allows none to share His authority.
(al-Kahf 18:26)
Tell them: “Truly, all power of decision rests
solely with Allah.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:154)
All power belongs to Allah both before and
after
(al-Rūm 30:4)
His is the dominion of the heavens and the
earth, and to Him are all matters referred (for
judgment).
(al-Ḥadīd 57: 5)
Is then the One Who creates like one who
does not create? Will you not, then, take heed?
(al-Nahl 16:17)
Then have those whom they associate with
Allah in His Divinity ever created anything like
 Allah did?
(al-Ra‘d 13:16)
Say to them (O Prophet): “Have you ever
seen those of your associates upon whom you call
apart from Allah? Show me, what have they
created in the earth? Or do they have any
partnership (with Allah) in the heavens? Or have
We given them a Book so that they have a clear
proof (for associating others with Allah in His
Divinity)?” Nay, what these wrong-doers promise
each other is nothing but delusion.
Surely Allah holds the heavens and the
earth, lest they should be displaced there, for if they
were displaced none would be able to hold them
after Him. Surely, He is Most Forbearing, Most
Forgiving.
(Fāṭir 35:40-41)
d) All attributes of sovereignty and powers are vested in
Allah; there is none to share them in this universe: He alone
overpowers everything. Free from deficiency and error, He is
conscious of every moment. None can dare go out of His
dominion and control; cause and consequence flow from
Him; none but He can cause hurt or give profit. Without His
authorization – nothing happens. Nor anyone without His
permission can plead for any person. He can punish and
forgive anyone. He is answerable to no one. His decree is
non-stoppable; nobody can ward it off. All these attributes of
power are His alone.
He has the supreme hold over His servants.
He is All-Wise, All-Aware.
(al-An‘ām 6:18)
He knows both what is hidden and what is
manifest. He is the Supreme One, the Most High.
(al-Ra‘d 13:9)
He: the Kind, the Holy, the All-Peace, the
Giver of security, the Overseer, the Most Mighty,
the Overpowering.
 (al-Ḥashr 59:23)
(Allah) Ever-Living, the Self-subsisting by
Whom all subsist, there is no God but He. Neither
slumber seizes Him, nor sleep; to Him belongs all
that is in the heavens and all that is in the earth.
Who is there who might intercede with Him save
with His leave? He knows what lies before them
and what is hidden from them.
(al-Baqarah
2:255)
Blessed is He in whose Hand is the
dominion of the Universe, and Who has power over
everything.
(al-Mulk 67:1)
Holy is He Who has full control over
everything, and to Him you shall all be recalled.
(Yā Sīn 36:83)
all that is in the heavens and the earth is in
submission to Him — willingly or unwilling.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:83)
Indeed all honour is Allah’s He is All-
Hearing, All-Knowing.
(Yūnus 10:65)
Say to them: “Who can be of any avail to you
against Allah if He should intend to cause you any
harm or confer upon you any benefit?
(al-Fatḥ 48:11)‫۔‬
If Allah afflicts you with any hardship, none
other than He can remove it: and if He wills any
good for you none can aver His Bounty. He
bestows good upon whomsoever of His servants
He wills. He is All-Forgiving, All-Merciful.
(Yūnus 10:107)
Whether you disclose whatever is in your
hearts or conceal it, Allah will call you to account for
it and will then forgives whomsoever He wills, and
chastise whomsoever He wills. Allah has power
over everything.
(al-Baqarah
2:284)
How well He sees; how well He hearts! The
creatures have no other guardian than Him; He
allows none to share His authority.
(al-Kahf 18:26)
Say: “None can protect me from Allah, nor
can I find a refuge apart from Him.
(al-Jinn 72:22)
(who is it) that grants asylum, but against
Whom no asylum is available?
(al-Mu’minūn
23:88)
He it is Who creates for the first time and He
it is Who will create against, and He is the Ever-
Forging, the Most Loving — the Lord of the
Glorious Throne, the Executor of what He wills.
(al-Burūj 85:13-
16)
Indeed Allah decrees as He wills.
(al-Mā’idah 5:1)
Allah judges and no one has the power to
reverse His judgement.
(al-Ra‘d 13:41)
None shall question Him about what He
does, but they shall be questioned.
(al-Anbiyā 21:23)
For none may change His words; (and were
you to make any change in His words) you will find
no refuge from Him.
(al-Kahf 18:27)
Is not Allah the Greatest of all sovereigns?
(al-Tīn 95:8)
Say: “O Allah, Lord of all dominion! You
bestow dominion on whomever You please, and
 take away dominion from whomever You please,
and You exalt whom You please, and abase whom
You please, In Your Hands is all good, Surely, You
are All-Powerful.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:26)
The earth is Allah’s, He bestows it on those
of His servants He chooses.
(al-A‘rāf 7:128)
2. The Divine governance
Primed by this concept of the universe, the Qur’ān says that
the real sovereign of humanity is the same who is the master of the
universe and runs its affairs. Because of it, He alone qualifies to rule
humans; decree is His and none else’s. The difference, however, is
that in the universe He enforces His will and calls for no
acknowledgement from anyone. Even humans in their unwilled
spheres of life (like the physiological functioning of their bodies) are
subject to His will as are the particles of matter from the earth to
galaxies. In the self-willed sphere of human life He does not enforce
His sovereign writ but through revealed books. The last of them is
the Qur’ān, which calls them to accept His sovereign will. The Qur’ān
has dealt with this subject thoroughly at different places.
a) That the Lord of the universe is the real Lord of humanity
and He alone should be accepted as one who creates and
nourishes everything (al-Rabb):
Say: “Surely my Prayer, all my acts of
worship, and my living and my dying are only for
Allah, the Lord of the whole Universe.
He has no associate. Thus have I been
bidden, and I am the foremost of those who submit
themselves (to Allah).”
Say: “Shall I seek someone other than Allah
as Lord when He is the Lord of everything?”
Everyone will bear the consequence of what he
does, and no one shall bear the burden of another.
(al-An‘ām 6:162-
164)
 Surely, your Lord is none other than Allah,
Who created the heavens and the earth.
(al-A‘rāf 7:54)
Say, “I seek refuge with the Lord of mankind;
the King of mankind, The True God of mankind.
(al-Nās 114:1-3)
Ask them: “Who provides you with
sustenance out of the heavens and the earth? Who
holds mastery over your hearing and sight? Who
brings forth the living from the death and the death
from the living? Who governs all affairs of the
Universe? They will surely say: “Allah.” Tell them:
“Will you, then, not shun (going against reality)?
Such, then, is Allah, your true Lord. And what is
there after Truth but error? How, then, are you
being turned away?
(Yūnus 10:31-32)
The judgment on whatever you differ rests
with Allah.
(al-Shūrā 42:10)
He has command that you serve none but
Him. This is the right way of life, though most
people are altogether unaware.
(Yūsuf 12:40)
They ask: “Have we any say in the matter?
Tell Them: Truly, all power of decision rests solely
with Allah.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:154)
Lo! His is the creation and His is the
command.
(al-A‘rāf 7:54)
As for the thief – male or female, cut off
hands of both. This is a recompense for what they
have done, and an exemplary punishment from
Allah. Allah is all- Mighty, all-Wisdom.
But he who repents after he has committed
wrong, and makes amends, Allah will graciously
turn to him. Truly, Allah is all- Forgiving, all-
Compassion.
Do you not know that to Allah belongs the
dominion of the heavens and the earth? He
chastises whom He wills and forgives whom He
wills. Allah is all-Powerful.
(al-Mā’idah 5:38-
40)
And it is disliked by you; it may well be that
you dislike a thing even though it is good for you,
and it may well be that you like a thing even though
it is bad for you. Allah knows and you do not know.
(al-Baqarah
2:216)
Allah knows the mischievous from the
righteous, and had Allah willed, He would indeed
have imposed on you exacting conditions; but He is
All-Powerful, Most Wise.
(al-Baqarah
2:220)
He knows what lies before them and what is
hidden from them, whereas they cannot attain to
anything of His knowledge save what He wills them
to attain.
(al-Baqarah
2:255)
When you divorce women and they
complete their waiting term, do not hinder them
from marrying other men if they have agreed to this
in a fair manner. That is an admonition to everyone
of you who believes in Allah and the Last Day; that
is a cleaner and purer way for you. For Allah knows
whereas you do not know.
(al-Baqarah
2:232)
Thus, does Allah command you concerning
your children: the share of the male is like that of
two females. If (the heirs of the deceased are) more
than two daughters, they shall have two-thirds of
the inheritance, and if there is only one daughter,
she shall have half the inheritance. If the deceased
has any offspring, each of his parents shall have a
sixth of the inheritance; and if the deceased has no
child and his parents alone inherit him, then one-
third shall go to his mother; and if the deceased has
brothers and sisters, then one-sixth shall go to his
mother. All these shares are to be given after
payment of the bequest he might have made or any
debts outstanding against him. You do not know
which of them, your parents or your children, are
more beneficial to you. But these portions have
been determined by Allah, for He indeed knows
everything, is cognizant of all beneficent
considerations.
(al-Nisā’ 4:11)
People ask you to pronounce a ruling
concerning inheritance from those who have left
behind no lineal heirs (kalālah). Say: “Allah
pronounces for you the ruling: should be a man die
childless but have a sister, she shall have one half
of what he has left behind; and should the sister die
childless, (but have a brother), he shall inherit her.
And if the heirs are two sisters, they shall have two-
third of what he has left behind. And if the heirs are
two sisters and brothers, then the male shall have
the share of two females. Allah makes (His
commandments) clear to you lest you go astray.
Allah has full knowledge of everything.
(al-Nisā 4:176)
But those related by blood are nearer to one
another according to the Book of Allah. Allah has
knowledge of everything.
(al-Anfāl 8:75)
 The alms are meant only for the poor and
the needy and those who are in charge thereof,
those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to
free those in bondage, and to help those burdened
with debt, and for expenditure in the Way of Allah
and for the wayfarer. This is an obligation from
Allah. Allah is all- Knowing, all-Wisdom.
(al-Tawbah 9:60)
Believers! At three times let those whom
your right hands possess and those of your children
who have not yet reached puberty ask leave of you
before entering your quarters: before the Morning
Prayer and when you take off your clothes at noon,
and after the Night Prayer. These are the three
times of privacy for you. If they come to you at
other times then there is no sin for them nor for
you, for you have to visit one another frequently.
Thus does Allah clearly explain His directives to
you. Allah is all-Knowing, all-Wisdom.
And when your children attain puberty let
them ask leave to come to you like their elders
used to ask leave. Thus does Allah clearly explain
to you His signs. He is all-Knowing, all-Wisdom.
(al-Nūr 24:58-59)
Believers! When believing women come to
you as Emigrants (in the cause of faith), examine
them. Allah fully knows (the truth) concerning their
faith. And when you have ascertained them to be
believing women, do not send them back to the
unbelievers. Those women are no longer lawful to
the unbelievers, nor are those unbelievers lawful to
those (believing) women. Give their unbelieving
husbands whatever they have spent (as bridal-
dues); and there is no offence for you to marry
those women if you give them their bridal-dues. Do
not hold on to your marriage with unbelieving
women: as for the return of the bridal-due you gave
 to your unbelieving wives and the unbelievers may
ask for the return of the bridal-due they had given
to their believing wives. Such is Allah’s command.
He judges between you. Allah is all Knowing, most
Wise.
(al-Mumtaḥinah
60:10)
3. Allah’s legal governance
For these reasons, the Qur’ān makes a decisive statement
that people should obey Allah the Exalted and His laws followed. To
leave Him and follow others or one’s own self (nafs) is shirk
(polytheism) and thus prohibited.
(O prophet), it is We Who have revealed
this Book to you with Truth. So serve only Allah,
consecrating your devotion to Him.
(al-Zumar 39:2)
Tell them, (O Prophet): “I am bidden to serve
Allah, consecrating my devotion to Him, and I am
bidden to be the first of those who surrender to
Him.
(al-Zumar 39:11-
12)
We raised a Messenger in every community
(to tell them): “Serve Allah and shun the Evil
One.”[25]
(al-Naḥl 16:36)
Yet all they had been commanded was that
they serve Allah, with utter sincerity, devoting
themselves exclusively to Him.
(al-Bayyinah
98:5)
(O people), follow what has been revealed to
you from your Lord and follow no masters other
than Him.
(al-A‘rāf 7:3)
Were you indeed to follow the vain desires of
people after the true knowledge has come to you,
none will be your supporter against Allah, and none
will have the power to shield you from His
punishment!
(al-Ra‘d 13:37)
And then We sent you, (O Prophet), on a
clear high road in religious matter. So follow that
and do not follow the desires o those who do not
know.
(al-Jāthiyah
45:18)
Divorce can be pronounced twice: then,
either honourable retention or kindly release should
follow. (While dissolving the marriage tie) it is
unlawful for you to take back anything of what you
have given to your wives unless both fear that they
may not be able to keep within the bounds set by
Allah. Then, if they fear that they might not be able
to keep within the bounds set by Allah, there is no
blame upon them for what the wife might give away
of her property to become released from the
marriage tie. These are the bounds set by Allah; do
not transgress them. Those of you who transgress
the bounds set by Allah are indeed the wrong-
doers.
(al-Baqarah
2:229)
O Prophet, when you divorce women,
divorce them for their waiting-period, and compute
the waiting period accurately, and hold Allah your
Lord in awe. Do not turn them out of their homes
(during the waiting period) nor should they go away
(from their homes) – unless they have committed a
manifestly evil deed. Such are the bounds set by
Allah; and he who transgresses the bounds set by
Allah commits a wrong against himself. You do not
know: maybe Allah will cause something to happen
to pave the way (for reconciliation).
 (al-Ṭalāq 65:1)
And he who does not find a slave (to free),
shall fast for two months consecutively before they
may touch other, and he who is unable to do so
shall feed sixty needy people.
All this is in order that you may truly believe
in Allah and His Messenger. These are the bounds
set by Allah; and a grievous chastisement awaits
the unbelievers.
(al-Mujādilah
58:4)
And those who do not judge by what Allah
has revealed are indeed the unbelievers.
(al-Mā’idah 5:44)
And those who do not judge by what Allah
has revealed are indeed the wrong-doers.
(al-Mā’idah 5:45)
And those who do not judge by what Allah
has revealed are indeed the transgressors.
(al-Mā’idah 5:47)
(If they turn away from the Law of Allah) do
they desire judgement according to the Law of
Ignorance? But whose judgement can be better
than Allah’s for those who have certainly of belief?
(al-Mā’idah 5:50)
(O Messenger), have you not seen those
who claim to believe in the Book which has been
revealed to you and in the Books revealed before
you and yet desire to submit their disputes to the
judgment of ṭaghūt (the Satanic authorities who
decide independently of the law of Allah), whereas
they had been asked to reject it. Satan seeks to
make them drift far away from the Right Path.
(al-Nisā’ 4:60)
4. The Messenger’s position
The Divine laws, which the preceding Āyāt (verses) call for
compliance, are given to humanity through Allah’s Messenger, who
communicates His guidance to fellow humans and explicates them
by his mouth and deeds. Thus, the Messenger implements God’s
legal sovereignty and for that reason alone, his obedience is Allah’s
obedience. Allah enjoins the believers to accept what the Messenger
enjoins them to do or forbids them not to do. Even a fraction of
uneasiness that one may feel in one’s heart in following the Prophet
can compromise one’s belief.
(And tell them that) We never sent a
Messenger but that he should be obeyed by the
leave of Allah.
(al-Nisā’ 4:64)
He who obeys the Messenger thereby obeys
Allah.
(al-Nisā’ 4:80)
As for him who sets himself against the
Messenger and follows a path other than that of the
believers even after true guidance had become
clear to him, We will let him go to the way he has
turned to, and We will cast him into Hell – an evil
destination‫۔‬
(al-Nisā’ 4:115)
So accept whatever the Messenger gives
you, and refrain from whatever he forbids you. And
fear Allah: verily Allah is Most Stern in retribution.
(al-Ḥashr 59:7)
But no, by the Lord, they cannot become
true believers until they seek your arbitration in all
matters on which they disagree among themselves,
and then do not find the least vexation in their
hearts over your judgement, and accept it in willing
submission.
(al-Nisā’ 4:65)
5. Supreme law
The Qur’ān declares Allah’s and His Messenger’s say as
supreme law that the believers can only comply with and not violate.
A Muslim is not free to make independent decisions where Allah and
His Messenger have given their verdict. Anything contrary to it is
opposite to belief.
It does not behove a believer, male or
female, that when Allah and His Messenger have
decided an affair they should exercise their choice.
And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger
has strayed to manifest error.
(al-Aḥzāb 33:36)
They say, “We believe in Allah and in the
Messenger, and we obey”, but thereafter a faction
of them turns away (from obedience). These indeed
are not believers.
When they are called to Allah and His
Messenger that he may judge (the disputes) among
them, a faction of them turns away.
(al-Nūr 24:47-48)
When those that believe are called to Allah
and His Messenger in order that he (that is, the
Messenger) may judge their disputes among them,
nothing becomes them but to say: “We hear and we
obey.” Such shall attain true success.
(al-Nūr 24:51)
6. Al-Khilāfah
The Qur’ān describes the best governance for humans as one
that accepts Allah’s and His messengers’ legal superiority, and
abdicates their right to govern in deference to the Real Sovereign
and accept their role as Khilāfah (vicegerent). Obviously, in this
caliphal capacity his powers, whether explicatory, judicial, or
administrative will be governed by the limits set in paragraphs 3, 4
and 5 above.
Then We revealed the Book to you, (O
Muḥammad), with Truth, confirming whatever of the
Book was revealed before, and protecting and
guarding over it. Judge, then, in the affairs of men
in accordance with the Law that Allah has revealed,
and do not follow their desires in disregard of the
Truth which has come to you.
 (al-Mā’idah 5:48)
(We said to him): “O David, we have
appointed you vicegerent on earth. Therefore, rule
among people and do not follow (your) desire lest if
should lead you astray from Allah’s Path.
(Ṣād 38:26)
7. The nature of the caliphate
The Khilāfah (caliphate), as expounded by the Qur’ān,
underscores the fact that they should use whatever Allah has gifted
to humans in the permissible limits. Thus, humans are not
unboundedly autonomous in their use but are the deputies of the
Real Master.
Just think when your Lord said to the angels:
“Lo! I am about to place a vicegerent on earth.”
(al-Baqarah 2:30)
We assuredly established you in the earth
and arranged for your livelihood in it.
(al-A‘rāf 7:10)
Have you not seen how Allah has subjected
to you all that is in the earth?
(al-Ḥajj 22:65)
And do call to mind when He made you
successors after the people of Noah.
(al-A‘rāf 7:69)
And call to mind when after ‘Ād He made
you their successors.
(al-A‘rāf 7:74)
(Moses) said: “Your Lord will soon destroy
your enemy and make you rulers in the land. Then
He will see how you act.
(al-A‘rāf 7:129)
Now We have appointed you as their
successors in the earth to see how you act.
(Yūnus 10:14)
This Khilāfah (caliphate) will qualify itself to be valid and just
only when it subordinates itself to the will of the real Master. Any
violated act that concretizes itself into an autonomous system of
governance free from the Divine ordination will be rebellious and not
a caliphal manifestation.
It is He Who made you vicegerents in the
earth. So whoever disbelieves will bear the burden
of his unbelief. The unbelievers’ unbelief adds
nothing but Allah’s wrath against them. The
unbelievers’ unbelief adds nothing but their own
loss.
(Fāṭir 35:39)
Have you not seen how your Lord dealt with
‘Ād of Iram, known for their lofty columns, the like of
whom no nation was ever created in the lands of
the world? And how did He deal with Thamūd, who
hewed out rocks in the valley? And with Pharaoh of
the tent pegs who transgressed in the countries of
the world.
(al-Fajr 89:6-11)
And directed him: “Go to Pharaoh, he has
rebelled, and say to him: ‘Are you willing to be
purified, that I may direct you to your Lord and then
you hold Him in awe?” “Then Moses (went to
Pharaoh and) showed him the Great Sign; but he
denied it as false and disobeyed, and then he
turned back to have recourse to his craftiness, and
gathered his people and declared: “I am the
supreme lord of you all.”
(al-Nāzi‘āt 79:17-
24)
Allah has promised those of you who believe
and do righteous deeds that He will surely bestow
power on them in the land even as He had
bestowed power on those that preceded them. And
that that He will firmly establish their religion, which
He has been pleased to choose for you, and He will
replace with security the state of fear that they are
in. Let them serve Me and associate none with Me
 in My divinity. Whoso thereafter engages in
unbelief, such indeed are the ungodly.
(al-Nūr 24:55)
8. The collective Khilāfah
a) A person, a family, or a class of people cannot
lay claim to this caliphate unless it is givening to them by the
community of believers. Surah al-Nūr:55
“layastakhli.fan.na.hum fil arḍ” is self-evident. According to its
import, every member of the believers’ community has an
equal share in the Khilāfah (caliphate). No person or group has
the right to usurp the caliphal rights of the believers and invest
his person with them. Nor can anyone arrogate to himself this
caliphate in the name of a prerogative received from Allah.
This distinguishes Islamic caliphate from monarchy, class-
based government and theocracy, giving it thus a democratic
face of its own kind.
b) But what stands it apart from Western
democracy is its essence. Western democracy is built on
popular sovereignty while in the democratic caliphate of Islam
people themselves agree to Allah’s sovereignty and willingly
restrict their powers within the confines of Allah-given laws.
9. The limit of obeying the state
The state that comes up out of the effort to run this caliphate
can only be given loyalty in matters that fall within the realm of m‘arūf
(goodness). Thus, in violating the Sharī‘ah there is neither obedience
nor cooperation.
O Prophet, when believing women come to
you to and give you their pledge that they will not
associate anyone with His divinity, that they will not
steal, that they will not commit illicit sexual
intercourse, that they will not kill their children, that
they will not bring forth a calumny between their
hands and feet, and that they will not disobey you
in anything known to be good, then accept their
allegiance and ask Allah to forgive them. Surely,
Allah is Most Forgiving, most Compassionate.
 (al-Mumtaḥinah
60:12)
Rather help you one another in acts of
righteousness and piety, and do not help one
another in sin and transgression. Fear Allah: Surely
Allah is severe in retribution.
(al-Mā’idah 5:2)
And do not pay any heed to the wicked and
the unbelieving.
(al-Dahr 76:24)
10. Shūrā
The whole affairs of this caliphal state from its origination to its
effort to restructure life, including the election of its head and the
expository and administrative affairs are managed by mutual
consultation. Whether this consultation is effectuated through direct
or elected representation is not material.
Who conduct their affairs by consultation.[26]
(al-Shūrā 42:38)
11. The characteristics of its decision-makers
In the elections of those who will run this caliphal state, the
following merits have to be sought.
a) They should believe in the principles that subsume this
caliphate, for its management cannot be entrusted to its
opponents.
Their affairs are run by mutual consultation.
(al-Shūrā 42:38)
Believers! Obey Allah, and obey the
Messenger, and those invested with authority
among you.
(al-Nisā 4:59)
Believers! Do not take for intimate friends
those who are not of your kind.[27]
(āl ‘Imrān 3:118)
Do you imagine that you will be spared
without being subjected to any test? Know well that
Allah has not yet determined who strove hard (in
His cause), and has not taken any others instead of
His Messenger and the believers as his trusted
allies?[28]
(al-Tawbah 9:16)
b) That they should not be victimizers, law breakers and
sinners, oblivious of Allah in their lives and violators of the
limits. Rather, they should be Allah fearing and pious. If an
oppressor or a law-violator appropriates Khilāfah to himself, his
Imāmah will be invalid in the eyes of Islam.
“Recall when Abraham’s Lord tested him in
certain matters and when he successfully stood the
test, He said: Indeed I am going to appoint you a
leader of all people.” When Abraham asked: “and is
this covenant also for my descendants?” the Lord
responded: “My covenant does not embrace the
wrong-doers.”[29]
(al-Baqarah
2:124)
Shall We then treat alike those that believe
and act righteously and those that create mischief
on earth? Or treat alike the God-fearing and the
wicked?
(Ṣād 38:28)
And obey not the one whose heart We have
permitted to neglect the remembrance of Us, one
who follows his own desires, whose case has gone
beyond all bounds.
(al-Kahf 18:28)
And do not follow the bidding of those that
go to excesses and spread mischief in the land
rather that set things right.
(al-Shu‘arā 26:151-
152)
Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah
is the most God-fearing of you.
(al-Ḥujurāt 49:13)
c) They should not be simpletons nor ignorant but should be
knowledgeable, wise, and understand problems, capable
 enough mentally and physically to run the caliphal affairs:
Do not entrust your properties — which Allah
has made a means of support for you.
(al-Nisā’ 4:5)
They (said: “By what right shall he rule over
us when we are more worthy than he to dominion,
for he is not very wealthy? He said: “Allah has
chosen him over you and has endowed him
abundantly with both intellectual and physical
capacities.
(al-Baqarah
2:247)
And We strengthened his kingdom, and
endowed him wisdom and decisive judgment.
(Ṣād 38:20)
Joseph said: “Place me in charge of the
treasures of the land. I am a good keeper and know
my task well.”
(Yūsuf 12:55)
Whereas if they were to convey it to either
the Messenger or to those from among them
entrusted with authority, it would come to the
knowledge of those who are competent to
investigate it.
(al-Nisā’ 4:83)
Ask them “Are those who know equal to
those who do not know?”
(al-Zumar 39:9)
Allah commands you to deliver trusts to
those worthy of them.[30]
(al-Nisā’ 4:58)
12. The foundational principles of the constitution
The constitution of the Islamic state will rest on the following
foundational principles
a). The command structure
Believers! Obey Allah subḥanahū wa ta‘āla
and obey the Messenger, and those invested with
 authority among you; and then if you were to
dispute among yourselves about anything refer it to
Allah and the Messenger if you indeed believe in
Allah and the Last Day.
(al-Nisā’ 4:59)
This Āyah explicates six constitutional aspects:
1. The obedience to Allah and His Messenger has
priority over obedience to anything else.
2. Obeying people in authority is conditional to
obedience the believers owe to Allah and His Messenger.
3. People-in-authority should be from among the
believers.
4. People have the right to express themselves against
the government and its functionaries.
5. That in case of a dispute between the people and the
government the ultimate arbiter is Allah’s law and His Prophet’s
Sunnah.
6. The caliphal system should have a free institution
powerful enough to ward off governmental and people’s
pressure and decide conflictive issues in the light of Allah’s law
and His Prophet’s Sunnah between the government and the
people.
a). The executive prerogatives and powers should
necessarily be limited by the ḥudūd (boundaries) of Allah as
prescribed by Allah’s law and His Prophet’s Sunnah, which
cannot be bypassed in policy formulation or in any executive
order that may fall within the definition of deviation from norm
or sin. The moment it transgresses the constitutional
jurisdiction it disqualifies itself to receive the masses’
obedience. Besides, this executive branch must come into
being through the consent of the shūrā and work through it as
explained above.
The Qur’ān, however, do not give definitive details about the
mode of elections or the shūrā; their form can vary in order to cohere
with civilizational contingencies.
b). Legislature has to have the structure as well as the
nature of a consultative body (see subhead 10), though its
 lawmaking powers will be prescribed by the limits set under
Allah’s sovereignty and legal status of the Sunnah (see
subhead 3 and 5).
As for the affairs for which clear injunctions have been laid
down by Allah and His Prophet or have been circumscribed and
bonded by principles laid down by them, the legislature can interpret
and explicate them and suggest subordinate rules and regulations
for their enforcement but cannot change them. The rest of the
human affairs for which no clear-cut instructions are available in the
supreme law, lawmakers can make laws consistent with the Islamic
spirit and its general principle. The absence of an injunction on such
matters in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah by itself is an indication that
Allah has left them to the believers’ discretion.
c). Judiciary should be free from all kind of interventions
and pressures so that it could give its verdict motivated by laws
and its spirit of juristic fairness and equity. It has perforce to
stay confined to the parameters as defined by the Qur’an and
the Sunnah.
Judge, then, in the affairs of men in
accordance with the Law that Allah has revealed,
and do not follow their desires.
(al-Mā‘idah 5:48)
And do not follow (your) desire lest it should
lead you astray from Allah’s Path.
(Ṣād 38:26)
And when you judge between people, judge
with justice.
(al-Nisā’ 4:58)
13. The purpose of state
The Islamic state must work for two supreme objectives. First,
human life should not suffer from wrong; injustice in all form should
be eliminated.
Indeed, We sent Our Messenger with Clear
Signs, and sent down with them the Book and the
Balance[31] that people may uphold justice. And We
sent down iron,[32] wherein there is awesome power
and many benefits for people, so that Allah may
 know who, without even having seen Him, helps
Him and His Messengers. Surely Allah is Most
Strong, Most Mighty.
(al-Ḥadīd 57:25)
Second, it should establish by persuasion and where
necessary by force the system of Ṣalāh (prayers) and Zakāh (poor-
due) the pillar of Islamic life. It should encourage righteousness
among the masses, as it alone is the purpose behind Islam’s arrival
and curb evil-doing as Allah hates it most.
(Allah will certainly help) those who, were
We to bestow authority on them in the land, will
establish prayers, render Zakāh (poor-due), enjoin
good, and forbid evil. The end of all matters rests
with Allah.
(al-Ḥajj 22:41)
14. Fundamental rights
Muslims or non-Muslims who accept its sovereignty have the
following basic rights that are obligatory for the state to uphold:[33]
a).. Preservation of life
Do not kill any person whom Allah has
forbidden to kill, except with right.
(al-Isrā’ 17:33)
b)..Preservation of the right to own
Do not usurp one another’s possessions by
false means.
(al-Baqarah
2:188, al-Nisā
4:29)
c).. The right to personal dignity
Believers, let not a group (of men) scoff at another group, it
may well be that the latter (at whom they scoff) are better than they;
nor let a group of women scoff at another group, it may well be that
the latter are better than they. And do not taunt one another, nor
revile one another by nicknames. It is an evil thing to again notoriety
for ungodliness after belief. Those who do not repent are indeed the
wrongdoers.
 Believers, avoid being excessively
suspicious, for some suspicion is a sin. Do not spy,
nor backbite one another. Would any of you like to
eat the flesh of his dead brother? You would surely
detest it. Have fear of Allah. Surely Allah is much
prone to accept repentance, is Most
Compassionate.
(al-Ḥujurāt 49:11-
12)
d).. The right to privacy
Enter not houses other than your own
houses until you have obtained the permission of
the inmates of those houses.
(al-Nūr 24:27)
Do not spy, nor backbite one another.
(al-Ḥujarāt 49:12)
e).. The right to raise voice against excesses
Allah does not like speaking evil publicly
unless one has been wronged.
(al-Nisā 4:148)
f).. Amr bil ma‘rūf wa nihi ‘an al-munkar – the right to
enjoin good and forbid wrong.
This includes the right to question and criticize people in
power.
Those of the Children of Israel who took to
unbelief have been cursed by the tongue of David
and Jesus, the son of Mary, for they rebelled and
exceeded the bounds of right.
They did not forbid each other from
committing the abominable deeds they committed.
Evil indeed was what they did.
(al-Mā’idah 5:78-
79)
We delivered those who forbade evil and
afflicted the wrongdoers with a grievous
chastisement because of their exceeding the
bounds (their evil doing).
 (al-A‘rāf 7:165)
You are the best nation brought forth for
humanity. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is
wrong, and believe in Allah.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:110)
g).. The right to form group
The caliphal state allows such freedoms provided these are
employed in the spread of goodness and not for discord and
divisions in society.
And from amongst you there must be a party
who will call people to all that is good and will
enjoin the doing of all that is right and will forbid the
doing of all that is wrong. It is they, who will attain
true success.
And do not be like those who fell into
factions and became opposed to one another after
clear guidance had come to them. A mighty
chastisement awaits them.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:104-
105)
h)..The right to freedom of conscience
and belief
There is no compulsion in religion.
(al-Baqarah
2:256)
Will you, then, force people into believing?
(Yūnus 10:99)
(For though killing is sinful) wrongful
persecution is even worse than killing.[34]
(al-Baqarah
2:191)
i) The right of protection against religious
hurt
Do not revile those other than Allah whom
they invoke.
(al-An‘ām 6:108)
 Explaining it, the Qur’ān says that academic discussion on
religious beliefs is allowed subject to well articulation and due
respect.
Argue not with the People of the Book
except in the fairest manner.
(al-‘Ankabūt
29:46)
j) The right to be held responsible for one’s own
wrong and not for other’s wrong.
Everyone will bear the consequence of
what he does, and no one shall bear the burden of
another.[35]
(al-An‘ām 6:164)
k) The right to demand fair legal proceedings
No person shall be prosecuted unless there is evidence for it
and the legalities are met with.
When an ungodly person brings to you a
piece of news, carefully ascertain its truth, lest you
should hurt a people unwittingly and thereafter
repent at what you did.
(al-Ḥujarāt 49:6)
Do not follow that of which you have no
knowledge.
(al-Isrā’ 17:36)
And when you judge between people, judge
with justice.
(al-Nisā’ 4:58)
l).. The restitution of the right to basic
needs
And in their wealth there was a rightful share
for him who would ask and for the destitute.
(al-Dhāriyāt
51:19)
m).. Equal treatment for all citizens
The state must treat its subjects equally, with no
discrimination amongst them.
 Indeed Pharaoh transgressed in the land
and divided its people into sections. One group of
them the humiliated, and slew their sons and
spared their daughters. Truly, he was among the
mischief-makers.
(al-Qaṣaṣ 28:4)
15. The government right as against the citizens
In the caliphal administration, the state has the following rights
over the citizens:
a)..Its obedience is binding
Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and
those invested with authority among you.
(al-Nisā’ 4:59)
b).. That they should abide by the laws and must not
cause disorder.
Make no mischief on the earth after it has
been set in good order.
(al-A‘rāf 7:85)
Those who wage war against Allah and His
Messenger, and go about the earth spreading
mischief[36] – indeed their recompense is that they
either be done to death, or be crucified, or have
their hands and feet be cut off from the opposite
sides or they be banished from the land. Such shall
be their degradation in this world; and a mighty
chastisement lies in store for them in the World to
Come.
(al-Mā’idah 5:33)
c).. That they should cooperate in its good works.
Help one another in acts of righteousness
and piety, and do not help one another in sin and
transgression.
(al-Mā’idah 5:2)
d).. That they should come to the assistance of the
government in defending the state.
Believers! What is amiss with you that when
it is said to you: “March forth in the cause of Allah,”
 you cling heavily to the earth? Do you prefer the
worldly life to the Hereafter? Know well that all the
enjoyment of this world, in comparison with the
Hereafter, is trivial.
If you do not march forth, Allah will chastise
you grievously and will replace you by another
people, while you will in no way be able to harm
Him. Allah has power over everything.
It will matter little if you do not help the
Prophet, for Allah surely helped him when the
unbelievers drove him out of his home and he was
but one of the two when they were in the cave, and
when he said to his companion: “Do not grieve.
Allah is with us. Then Allah caused His tranquility to
descend upon him, and supported him with hosts
you did not see, and He humbled the word of the
unbelievers. As for Allah’s Word, it is inherently
uppermost. Allah is all-Powerful all-Wisdom.
March forth whether light or heavy, and
strive in the way of Allah with your belongings and
your lives. That is best for you if you only knew it.
(al-Tawbah 9:38-
41)
16. The principles of external politics
For the foreign policy of this Islamic state, the Qur’ān has the
following guidelines:

a). To observe respect for agreements made with

other nations

Should it become necessary to annul agreement, the other

nation must be informed of your intent.

And fulfill the covenant, for you will be called

to account regarding the covenant.
(al-Isrā’ 17:34)
 And fulfill the covenant which you have
made with Allah and do not break your oath after
having firmly made them, and after having made
Allah your witness. Surely, Allah knows all that you
do.
And do not become like the woman who,
after having painstakingly spun her yarn, caused it
to disintegrate into pieces. You resort to oaths as
instruments of mutual deceit so that one people
might take greater advantage than another might,
although Allah puts you to the test through this.
Surely, on the Day of Resurrection He will make
clear the Truth concerning the matters over which
you differed.
(al-Naḥl 16:91-
92)
Behave in a straight manner with them so
long as they behave with you in a straight manner
for Allah loves the God-fearing.
(al-Tawbah 9:7)‫ا‬
In exception to those who associate others
with Allah in His Divinity are those with whom you
have made treaties and who have not violated their
treaties nor have backed up anyone against you.
Fulfil your treaties with them till the end of their
term.
(al-Tawbah 9:4)
And recall when you were encamped at the
nearer end of the valley (of Badr) and they were at
the farther end and their caravan was below you
(along the seaside). Had you made a mutual
appointment to meet in an encounter, you would
have declined.
(al-Anfāl 8:42)
And if you fear treachery from any people
(with whom you have a covenant) then publicly
throw their covenant at them. Allah does not love
the treacherous.[37]
(al-Anfāl 8:58)
b) Honesty and righteousness in human affairs
Do not make your oaths a means of
deceiving one another.[38]
(al-Naḥl 16:94)
c) International justice
And do not let the enmity of any people
move you to deviate from justice. Act justly, that is
nearer to Allah-fearing.
(al-Mā’idah 5:8)
d) To respect geopolitics of the nonaligned nations
They wish that you should disbelieve just as
they disbelieved so that you may all be alike. Do
not, therefore, take allies from them until they
emigrate in the Way of Allah; but they turn their
backs (on emigration), seize them and slay them
wherever you come upon them. Take none of them
for your ally or helper.
Unless it be such of them who seek refuge
with a people who are joined with you by a
covenant, or those who come to you because their
hearts shrink from fighting either against you or
against their own people. Had Allah so willed, He
would certainly have given them power over you
and they would have fought against you. If they
leave you alone and do not fight against you and
offer you peace, then Allah does not permit you to
harm them.
(al-Nisā’ 4:89-90)
e) Peace loving
If they incline to peace, incline you as well to
it.
(al-Anfāl 8:61)
f) To avoid creating mischief on earth and to
establish one’s supremacy.
 As for the Abode of the Hereafter, We shall
assign it exclusively for those who do not seek
glory on earth nor want to cause mischief. The
God-fearing shall have the best end.
(al-Qaṣaṣ 28:83)
g) Friendly attitude toward non-aggressive nations.
Allah does not forbid that you be kind and
just to those who did not fight against you because
of religion, nor drove you out of your homes. Surely,
Allah loves those who are equitable.
(al-Mumtaḥinah
60:8)
h) Reciprocal attitude of goodness
Can the reward of goodness be any other
than goodness?
(al-Raḥmān
55:60)
i) Not to exceed while responding to a hurt caused
by others.
Thus, if someone has attacked you, attack
him just as he attacked you, and fear Allah and
remain conscious that Allah is with those who
guard against violating the bounds set by Him.
(al-Baqarah
2:194)
If you take retribution, then do so in
proportion to the wrong done to you. But if you can
bear such conduct with patience, indeed that is
best for the steadfast.
(al-Naḥl 16:126)
The recompense of evil is evil the like of it.
But he who forgives and makes amends, his
reward lies with Allah. Surely He does not love the
wrong-doers. There is no blame against him who
avenges himself after he has been wronged.
Blame attaches only to those who subject
people to wrong and commit excesses on earth. A
 painful chastisement awaits them.
(al-Shūrā 42:40-
42)
17. The characteristics of an Islamic state
The profile of the Islamic state emerging from the preceding
sixteen points drawn from the Qur’an is as follows:
1. This state comes into being with a conscious
commitment of a free people to surrender themselves to the
will of Allah and accept al-Khilāfah in place of sovereignty
[located in a single being or a group, or people in general]
binding themselves to enforce Allah-given laws as enunciated
in the Qur’ān and exemplified by the Prophet (‘alayhi as-
salām).
2. This state agrees in principle with the notion that
sovereignty rests with Allah. But in concretizing this concept its
route is altogether different as instead of authorizing a priestly
class to play the caliphal role, it entitles the believers under its
territories to exercise vicegerency [and establish justice within
the divine parameters].
3. It agrees with present-day democratic dispensation
that to form, change and run the government belongs to the
people alone but then it stops here. It denies them absolute
sovereign will to shape its internal and external policies and to
use its material and natural resources as they desire. It binds
them to the supremacy of Allah and His law so that the state
could function within specified parameters, which can be
tempered with neither by its judiciary nor legislature nor people
unless they decide to forego Islam by breaking their pledge.
4. It is an ideological state and as such, those who
believe in its ideology can only run it. Others can stay as its
citizens with all those civic rights that Muslims have provided
they abide by its laws.
5. This state is not defined by race, colour, language or
geography but by certain principles, which can be accepted by
anyone living anywhere on the planet, and thus by accepting
those principles can enter this system without facing any
discrimination. No matter whether established in Africa or
America, Europe or Asia and whether by blacks or whites or
yellow, any governance that comes into being because of such
principles will be Islamic.
There is no hitch to such a state to evolve into a global
Islamic order. But even if there is more than one such state in
different parts of the world they could be still described as
equally Islamic. Such states would be free from nationalistic
rivalries and would have brotherly cooperation with one
another, with the potential to turn into a federal global state.
6. Such an Islamic state would subordinate politics to
morality, relegating selfish interests to piety and Allah-
consciousness. It is moral excellence of a person, his mental
and physical abilities, which determine the qualifying criterion
for a seat in the shūrā as well as among the government
functionaries.
Likewise, every segment of its internal system has to be
subsumed by trust, honesty and across the broad justice for
all. Its foreign policy has to be run by absolute openness,
respect for agreements, truthfulness, peaceful coexistence,
justice and fair play.
7. This state is not ordained to act as a police officer
with the exclusive task of maintaining law and order and
patrolling the borders. In fact, it is a purposive state, which has
to enforce social justice, spread goodness, and eradicate evil.
8. The Islamic state has to create equal opportunities
and accord equal rights and status to its citizens. It has to
ensure supremacy of law, cooperation in goodness and
withhold support to evil. Besides, it must instill in its citizens
and functionaries a sharpened sense of accountability before
Allah; stress on obligations rather then clamouring for rights;
convergence of individuals, state, and society on one objective;
creating a moral environment and making sure that the basic
necessities of life are not denied to anyone are some of the
primary concerns of this state.
9. The Islamic system creates such a balance between
the individual and state that neither the state by its powers can
reduce the individual to a helpless subject nor can the
 individual by his unbounded freedoms become headstrong and
start opposing the collective good.
On the one hand, this state provides fundamental rights to its
citizens; and on the other, it binds the government not to bypass the
supreme law and instead subject itself to shūrā (consultative body).
This equation helps in creating a favourable environment in which
there is ample space for the individual to grow in his human
potential. At the same time, it binds the individual to a moral code of
conduct to obey the government that abides by the laws of Allah, to
cooperate with it in acts of goodness, to avoid tampering with the
system, and to stand for its defence by his or her wealth and life.
 Chapter Two

Principles of Islamic Governance

In the last chapter, we described the political teachings of the

Qur’ān. The Prophetic mission was to translate them into life
situations. The society that came into being after the advent of Islam
and the state that emerged in the wake of Hijrah (emigration) rested
on these teachings. The distinguishing features of this Islamic
governance, which stood it apart from other systems, were the
following:
1. Supremacy of the divine law
The primary principle of this state acknowledges sovereignty
as a divine prerogative. The system of governance which sprouts up
from this principle is al-Khilāfah (the caliphate), is run by the
believers. Bonded as it is to divine laws as sourced in the Qur’ān
and the Prophetic Sunnah, it is not free to function autocratically. The
following Āyāt (verses) in this respect are clear:
Believers! Obey Allah and obey the
Messenger, and those invested with authority
among you; and then if you were to dispute among
yourselves about anything, refer it to Allah and the
Messenger if you indeed believe in Allah and the
Last Day; that is better and more commendable in
the end.
(al-Nisā 4:59)
(And tell them that) We never sent a
Messenger but that he should be obeyed by the
leave of Allah. If whenever they wronged
themselves they had come to you praying to Allah
for forgiveness, and had the Messenger prayed for
their forgiveness, they would indeed have found
Allah All- Forgiving, All-Compassionate.
(al-Nisā 4:64)
 But no, by your Lord, they cannot become
true believers until they seek your arbitration in all
matters on which they disagree among themselves,
and then do not find the least vexation in their
hearts over your judgement, and accept it in willing
submission.
(al-Nisā 4:65)
He who obeys the Messenger thereby obeys
Allah; as for he who turns away, We have not sent
you as a keeper over them!
(al-Nisā 4:80)
(O Messenger), We have revealed to you
this Book with the Truth so that you may judge
between people in accordance with what Allah has
shown you. So do not dispute on behalf of the
dishonest.
(al-Nisā 4:105)
Surely, We revealed the Torah, wherein
there is Guidance and Light. Thereby did Prophets
– who had submitted themselves (to Allah) – judge
for the Judaized folk; and so did the scholars and
jurists. They judged by the Book of Allah for they
had been entrusted to keep it and bear witness to
it. So, (O Jews), do not fear human beings but fear
Me, and do not barter away My signs for a trivial
gain. Those who do not judge by what Allah has
revealed are indeed the unbelievers.
(al-Mā’idah 5:44)
And therein, We had ordained for them: “A
life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for
a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a
tooth, and for all wounds, like for like. But
whosoever foregoes it by way of charity, it will be
for him an expiation.” Those who do not judge by
what Allah has revealed are indeed the
wrongdoers.
 And We sent, Jesus, the son of Mary, after
those Prophets, confirming the truth of whatever
there still remained of the Torah. And We gave him
the Gospel wherein is Guidance and Light, and
which confirms the truth of whatever there still
remained of the Torah, and a Guidance and
Admonition for the God-fearing.
Let the followers of the Gospel judge by
what Allah has revealed therein, and those who do
not judge by what Allah has revealed are the
transgressors.
(al-Mā’idah 5:46-47)
(O people), follow what has been revealed to
you from your Lord and follow no masters other
than Him. Little are you admonished!
(al-‘Arāf 7:3)
Those whom you serve beside Him are
merely idle names that you and your fathers have
fabricated, without Allah sending down any
sanction for them. All authority to govern rests only
with Allah. He has commanded that you serve none
but Him. This is the Right Way of life, though most
people are altogether unaware.
(Yūsuf 12:40)
Say: “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger.
But if you turn away, then (know well) that the
Messenger is responsible for what he has been
charged with and you are responsible for what you
have been charged with. But if you obey him, you
will be guided to the Right Way. The Messenger
has no other responsibility but to clearly convey
(the command).”
Allah has promised those of you who believe
and do righteous deeds that He will surely bestow
power on them in the land as He bestowed power
on those that preceded them, and that He will firmly
establish their religion which He has been pleased
to choose for them, and He will replace with
security the state of fear that they are in. Let them
serve Me and associate none with Me in My
Divinity. Whoso thereafter engages in unbelief,
such indeed are the ungodly.
(al-Nūr 24:54-55)
It does not behove a believer, male or
female, that when Allah and His Messenger have
decided an affair they should exercise their choice.
And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger
has strayed to manifest error.
(al-Aḥzāb 33:36)
Whatever (from the possessions of the
townspeople) Allah has bestowed on His
Messenger belongs to Allah, and to the Messenger,
and to his kinsfolk, and to the orphans, and to the
needy, and to the wayfarer so that it may not
merely circulate between the rich among you. So
accept whatever the Messenger gives you, and
refrain from whatever he forbids you. And fear
Allah: verily Allah is Most Stern in retribution.
(al-Ḥashr 59:7)
The Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) has explicated this
principal feature of the Islamic state on different occasions.
To abide by the Book of Allah is binding on
you. Follow the things it has allowed and discard
the things it has proscribed.[39]
Allah has assigned certain obligatories, do
not waste them; [He has] ordained certain
prohibitions, do not violate them; [He has] drawn
certain boundaries, do not transgress them; and for
certain things He has observed silence without
being amnesiac, do not probe them.[40]
He who follows the Book of Allah would not
go astray in the world nor would he be damned in
the hereafter.[41]
 I have left [behind] two things, which if you
hold fast you will never go astray – Allah’s Book
and the Sunnah of His Messenger.[42]
Embrace the thing I have enjoined on you,
and stop from the things I have restrained you from.
[43]

2. Justice among the people

The second principle on which this state rests called for equal
treatment in accordance with the Qur’ān and the Sunnah horizontally
as well as vertically – from an ordinary citizen to head of state.
The Qur’ān asked the Prophet to say:
And I have been commanded to establish justice among
you.
(al-Shūrā 42:15)
Expressed differently, it asked the Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām)
to say that my commission is to do justice to all; it is not his job to
discriminate favouring some and excluding others. My relationship
with humans is even. I stand with those who are truthful and just and
I am against those who are unjust.
In my faith there are no discriminatory laws – everyone
whether native or alien, big or small, noble or of low birth are
governed by laws. Ḥaqq (truth) is for everyone and so is falsehood.
What is sin is for one is sin for others and so is Ḥarām (disallowed)
and Ḥalāl (allowed). My own person is not exception to Allah’s laws.
The Prophet himself explains this universal application of the divine
laws:
Nations before you were destroyed because
they punished people of lesser origin in accordance
with law, while they spared individuals of high birth.
By Him who holds Muhammad’s life, even if
Fātimah had committed theft I would have chopped
her hand off.[44]
Caliph ‘Umar said:
I have seen myself Allah’s Messenger giving
justice to others against his own self.[45]
3. Equality among the Muslim
 From justice among the people springs another distinguishing
feature of this state that speaks of the Muslims’ equal rights
irrespective of their colour, race, ethnicity, and region. None can
have the privileged position over anyone else. The Qur’ān says:
Surely, the believers are none but brothers
unto one another
(al-Ḥujurāt 49:10)
Human beings, We created you all from a
male and a female, and made you into nations and
tribes so that you may know one another. Verily the
noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-
fearing of you.
(al-Ḥujurāt 49:13)
While explaining this stated principle, the Prophet says:
Allah does not look at your faces and wealth
but at your heart and deeds.[46]
Muslims are brethren to each other. None
has superiority over the other save on taqwā (Allah-
consciousness). [47]
O people hear me! Your God is one. Neither
the Arab had superiority over the non-Arab (‘ajami)
nor the non-Arab over the Arab nor the black have
precedence over the white nor the white over the
black except the righteous ones.[48]
He who testifies that there is no God but
Allah, turned his face towards our qiblah and made
Ṣalāh like us, and ate our dhabīḥah [slaughtered
meat] is a Muslim. He has the same right that a
Muslim has and has the same obligations that a
Muslim has.[49]
The believers are equal in their blood; they
are one as opposed to others. And even an
ordinary person among them can take responsibility
on their behalf.[50]
A Muslim is not liable to jizyah.[51]
4. The government’s responsibility and accountability
 The fourth principle on which this state rests pertains to the
government and its powers and the revenues in the exchequer. The
Qur’ān declares the three as trust belonging to Allah and Muslims,
which is not assignable to the people who are not God-fearing,
honest and just. Nor can the trustees for their ends violate the trust.
The trustees are accountable to Allah and the believers. The Qur’ān
says:
Allah commands you to deliver trusts to
those worthy of them; and when you judge between
people, judge with justice. Excellent is the
admonition Allah gives you. Allah is All-Hearing, All-
Seeing.
(al-Nisā 4:58)
The Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) says:
Beware, everyone among you is a ra‘iy
(having responsibility for others) and everyone is
answerable about his subjects. And the chief
among the Muslims who rules is also a ra‘iy and
answerable for his subjects.[52]
Any ruler who spearheads the affairs of his
subjects among the Muslims and dies while he
used to cheat them [in performing his job and ill-
spent public money] Allah will proscribe paradise
(Jannah) on him.[53]
A ruler who assumes governmental responsibilities
and then withholds commitment to his job and lacks sincerity
he would not go to Jannah along with the Muslims.[54]
The Prophet (‘alayhi as-salam) spoke to Abū Dharr:
O Abū Dharr, you are a weak person and the
governmental assignment is a trust (given to him).
On the Day of Judgment, it will bring disgrace and
shame except for him who fulfils its demands and
discharges his obligation that comes from it rightly.
[55]
A ruler who does business with his subjects
commits a worst usurpation.[56]
 A person who holds office in our government
and has no wife may marry; if he has no servant,
may have one (to himself); if he has no house, may
have one; if he has no mount (to ride), may have
one. Anyone who exceeds it, he is a usurper or a
thief.[57]
Says Abū Bakr:
He who is a ruler will have a severe
reckoning and he will have the possibility of a great
chastisement. And he who is not a ruler will face a
light accountability; for him is the likelihood of a
lesser punishment, since the rulers (and the
functionaries) have greater chances of committing
excesses on the Muslims. And he who puts
Muslims to hardship indulges in treason against
Allah.[58]
‘Umar says:
If a goat’s offspring dies on the bank of the
river Euphrates, I feel scared for being questioned
by Allah.[59]
5. Shūrā
The fifth important principle on which this state rests pertains
to the electoral consensus on the caliph’s election obtained through
mutual consultation and the people’s consent. The caliph thus
elected will run its affairs through consultation.
The Qur’ān enjoins:
Who conduct their affairs by consultation.
(al-Shūrā 42:38)
And take counsel from them in matters of
importance.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:159)
‘Ali is reported to have said he asked the
Messenger of Allah that if after him they had a
problem for which the Qur’ān had no injunction nor
had they heard anything from him, what should
they do?[60]
The Prophet replied:
 Consult fuqahā (jurists) and the pious people
and do not make a decision on the opinion of one
particular individual.
Says ‘Umar:
He who invites people to his imārah
(governance) or to somebody else’s without
consultations with the Muslims then it is not right for
you if you do not kill him.[61]
In another report, ‘Umar says:
Without consultation, there is no caliphate.[62]
6. Obedience in goodness (ma‘rūf)
The sixth principle on which this state rests pertains to
compliance with and obedience to the government, with a caveat
that in evil none had the right to demand obedience. Put differently, it
meant that the obedience to the government and its functionaries is
valid only their decrees have their basis in the Qur’ān and the
Sunnah. They do not have the right to call for compliance if the order
they make violate the divine injunctions nor are the people bound to
obey them.
In the Qur’ān even the bai‘ah (allegiance oath) given to the
Prophet was conditional on obedience in m‘arūf (goodness).
And that they will not disobey you in
anything known to be good.
(al-Mumtaḥināh
60:12)
Said the Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām):
A Muslim is bound to listen and obey his
amīr even when he dislikes his decree unless
asked to do wrong. And when asked to do wrong,
there is no listening and obedience.[63]
There is no obedience when it involves
violation of the commands of Allah. Obedience is
only in what is ma‘rūf. [64]
This subject has repeatedly occurred in the Prophetic sayings.
At some places, he said he who deviates from Allah’s path, for him
there is no obedience. At other places, he said when it violates
Allah’s injunctions there is no obedience for anyone.
He also said:
He who does not comply with Allah’s
command for him there is no obedience (from the
people).
Likewise, he said:
If a (state) functionary ordains someone to
do wrong, do not obey him.[65]
In one of his addresses, Abū Bakr said:
He who has been made responsible for any
matter pertaining to Muhammad sal.lal lahu ‘alayhi
wa-sallam (peace and salutations be on him) and
did not follow the Book of Allah while performing his
duty, upon him is Allah’s curse.[66]
On this basis, he declared in his very first official
address as the caliph:
Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His
Messenger. And when I disobey Allah and His
Messenger, you are free not to obey me.[67]
‘Ali said:
It is the duty of a Muslim ruler to run the
affairs of the state in the light of the laws revealed
by Allah and prove his custodianship of the trust
(reposed in him). If he continues discharging his
obligation in this way, then the people are bound to
listen to him and obey. And when he calls them to
his assistance, they should respond.[68]
On yet another occasion, ‘Ali said:
In obeying Allah the Exalted you are obliged
to do as I tell you irrespective of the fact whether
you like it or not. And if I enjoin you to do something
in violation of Allah’s injunction, then in sin there is
no obedience for you. Only in goodness is
compliance, only in goodness is compliance, only in
goodness is compliance.[69]
7. Forbiddance of power aspirations
This state also believes that for high-powered jobs in general
and the caliphal office in particular he who aspires and struggles for
them disqualifies to have them.
The Qur’ān says:

As for the abode of the Hereafter, We shall

assign it exclusively for those who do not seek glory
on earth nor want to cause mischief.
(al-Qaṣaṣ 28: 83)
The Prophet (‘alayhi was-salām) said:
By Allah, we do not assign our government’s
office to him who seeks it and lusts for it.[70]
To us, he who asks for (public office) among
you is the greatest of all usurpers. [71]
We do not appoint anyone in our government
as āmil (functionary) who aspires for it.[72]
O Abdul-Rahmān ibn Samurah, do not ask for
a job in the government because if it is granted to you
in response to your aspiring for it, you will be
consigned to it by Allah. And if you got it without
asking for it, Allah will help you in performing your
responsibilities.[73]
8. The purpose of the state
In this state the ruler and his administration are bound to
implement the Islamic agenda without any change in it. It shall
spread goodness and extirpate evil according to Islam’s moral
standards. The Qur’ān spells out the justification for an Islamic state:
(Allah will certainly help) those who, were
We to bestow authority on them in the land, will
establish Prayers, render Zakāh, enjoin good, and
forbid evil. The end of all matters rests with Allah.
(al-Ḥajj 22:41)
The Qur’ān says:
And it is thus that We appointed you to be
the community of the middle way so that you might
be witnesses to all mankind and the Messenger
might be a witness to you.
(al-Baqarah
2:143)
 You are now the best nation brought forth for
mankind. You enjoin what is right, forbid wrong, and
believe in Allah.
(āl ‘Imrān 3:110)
The Qur’ān also describes the assignment given to
Muhammad (‘alayhi as-salām) and the prophets before him:
Establish this religion and do not split up regarding it.
(al-Shūrā 42:13)
The Prophet’s whole struggle against non-Islamic forces was
wedded to the objective of making the whole life surrendered to
Allah’s will. (al-Anfāl 8: 39)
Like the rest of the peoples of the past prophets, Allah has
also enjoined on Muslims to follow steadfastly Allah, and realign their
lives on the divine pattern (al-Bayyanah: 5). That is why the
Prophetic state bonded itself to the supreme task of restructuring life
in the light of the divine guidance and desisted allowing infusion of
non-Islamic elements into it so that duplicitous attitudes in Muslim
society are averted. The Prophet warned his companions and his
successors:
He who deduces something from our religion
that does not belong to its genus [of ideas and
spirit] is worth contempt.[74]
Beware, stay away from novelties (in
religion) for every novelty is a bid‘ah (wrong) and
every bid‘ah is a deviation.[75]
He who respected the one who introduces
bid‘ah, helped in demolishing Islam.[76]
We also come across this prophetic
statement to the effect that Allah dislikes three
persons most. Among them is one who desires to
graft jāhiliyah on Islam.[77]
9. The right and obligation of “amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-
munkar”
Last among the principal features of this state that assured its
right direction was binding its citizen to the task of exhorting good
and avoid evil, to support the spread of goodness in society and do
utmost in rooting out evil and in chartering the state towards the well-
being of its people.
The Qur’ānic institutions are as under:
Help you one another in acts of
righteousness and piety, do not help one another in
sin and transgression.
(al-Mā’idah 5:2)
Believers, fear Allah, and speak the truth.
(al-Aḥzāb 33:70)
Believers! Be upholders of justice, and
bearers of witnesses to Truth for the sake of Allah,
even though it may be against yourselves or
against parents and kinsmen.
(al-Nisā’ 4:135)
The hypocrites, be they men or women, all
are alike. They enjoin what is evil, and forbid what
is good, and withhold their hands from doing. They
forgot Allah, so Allah also forgot them. Surely, the
hypocrites are wicked.
Allah has promised Hell-Fire to the
hypocrites, both men and women, and to the
unbelievers. They shall abide in it a sufficient
recompense for them. Allah has cursed them, and
theirs is a lasting torment.
Your ways are like the ways of those who
have gone before you. They were mightier than you
in power, and more abundant in riches and
children. They enjoyed their lot for a while as you
have enjoyed your lot, and you also engaged in idle
talk as they did. Their works have come to naught
in this world, and in the Hereafter, they are surely
the losers.
Have they not heard the accounts of those
who came before them – of the people of Noah and
‘Ād and Thamūd, and the people of Abraham and
the dwellers of Madyan (Midian), and the cities that
were overturned? Their Messengers came to them
with Clear Signs. Then, it was not Allah Who
caused them any wrong; they rather wronged
themselves.
The believers, both men and women, are
allies of one another. They enjoin good, forbid evil,
establish Prayer, pay Zakāh, and obey Allah and
His Messenger. Surely, Allah will show mercy to
them. Allah is All-Mighty, All-Wise.
(al-Tawbah 9:67-
71)
Who enjoin what is good and forbid what is
evil, and who keep the limits set by Allah.
(al-Tawbah
9:112)
The Prophet’s pronouncements on the
subject are as follows:
He who sees a wrong should bolt it out by
hand. If he cannot do it, he should seek its change
through his word of mouth. If he cannot do even
this much, then he should condemn it in his heart
(thinking it bad and harbouring desire to prevent it).
And this will be the weakest state of imān (faith).[78]
After them will come inept people, who will
say things but will not act accordingly. And they will
do things for which they have not been told. Thus,
he who wages jihād against them by hand is a
believer (mū’min). And he who wages jihād against
them by mouth is a believer. And he who wages
jihād against them in his heart is a believer. And
imān less than this have no merit.[79]
The best of the jihād is to say a just word (or
of truth) before a tyrant ruler.[80]
When people see oppression perpetuated by
a tyrant and do not withhold him from doing so,
then it will not be surprising if Allah sends
punishment on them.[81]
 After me, some people will install themselves
as rulers, he who supports them in their lies and
lend them help in their oppressive acts he is not of
me and I am not of him.[82]
Soon you will have rulers who will have in
their hands your sustenance. They will talk but lies
to you and will do but wrongdoing. They will not be
satisfied with you unless you praise them for their
bad deeds and confirm them in their lies. Thus, you
talk truth to them as long as they bear with it. Then,
if they turn deaf and kill someone as a result
thereof, he is a martyr (shahīd).[83]
He who tries to please a ruler by saying
something that may annoy his Provider goes out of
the pale of Allah’s religion.[84]
 Chapter Three

Al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah and its Characteristic

In the last pages, we dealt with the Islamic principals of

governance, which provided the basis for the caliphal regime after
the Prophet’s death. The social setup instituted under the Prophet’s
direct guidance gave everyone a feel as to the nature of the Islamic
governance and the difference it makes to his or her lives.
Although the Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) had withheld his
decision to nominate his successor but the people knew [by their
internalizing the Islamic system] that Islām called for the participatory
caliphate (Khilāfah). It was because of such an ambience that post-
prophetic period neither saw dynastic kingship installed itself nor did
anyone strive for personal hold on power; instead, four successive
individuals came into power through people’s consent. The Muslims
Ummah named their style of governance as al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah
(the rightly guided caliphate), the sole end of their aspirations and
ideals.
1. Electoral Khilāfah
To succeed the Prophet, ‘Umar proposed Abū Bakr’s name,
which won for him people’s pledge of support.
Before his death, Abū Bakr nominated ‘Umar as his successor
and after summoning the people to Masjid al-Nabawi addressed
them:
“Are you happy with the person I have nominated
as my successor? By Allah, while thinking over the
matter, I spared no effort. I have not given succession to
any of my relatives but to ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb. So listen
to him and follow him.”
Responding, people assured Abū Bakr: “We will listen to him
and follow him.”[85]
In ‘Umar’s last hajj a person said that if ‘Umar died, he would
give his pledge to a certain person, for Abū Bakr’s nomination
popped up suddenly and it succeeded. [86]
 On hearing it, ‘Umar said he would warn people about “those
who are planning to seek domination over their affairs.” Thus after
reaching Madinah, the first thing he did was to explain the situation
that led to Abū Bakr’s sudden succession in Saqīfah Bani Sā‘dah.
Elaborating the matter he said:
“If I had not taken this course and the gathering
had dispersed without resolving the succession issue,
people would have made a wrong decision making it
difficult for us to accept it or change it later. If [our] act
succeeded, it should not serve as a precedent. Among
you, there is none to equal the stature and standing of
Abū Bakr. Now, any person who gives his pledge to
another person without the Muslims’ consent, he as well
as the nominee, who receives his pledge will qualify
himself for execution.”[87]
Following the rule he laid out, ‘Umar appointed an electoral
college to decide the succession issue and said before his death:
“He who seeks rulership (imārah) without the Muslims’
consent should be killed. At the same time, he excluded his son for
caliphal nomination so the Khilāfah does not become a dynastic
office.[88] His appointed electoral body had six persons who in his
view were the most liked and influential in the Islamic Ummah.”
After deliberation, the electoral colleges deputed ‘Abdul-
Raḥmān ibn ‘Auf to nominate the caliph. He made mass contact
including the hajj caravans to know about their inclination for any
particular person. He found that people preferred ‘Uthmān to others.
[89]
It was on this basis that ‘Uthmān was elected for the caliphal
office, with people pledging support to him in a mass gathering.
When ‘Uthmān met shahādah (martyrdom), some people
approached ‘Ali to succeed him but he refused saying: “You do not
have the right to do so, as this pertains to ahl al-‘aqd and ahl al-Badr
(people who have wisdom and those who participated in the battle of
Badr). Whoever they want to be the caliph will assume the office.
Thus, we will get together to consider the issue.” [90] In al-Ṭabari’s
report ‘Ali’s words are as follows:
 “Giving oath in secret to me will be incorrect. This
should have the people’s assent.”[91]
As death approached ‘Ali, people asked him if they could
pledge their loyalty to his son al-Hasan. His reply was “I can neither
dictate you nor will I stop you. You can make your own choice.”[92] A
person interrupted him while he was making his last will to his sons
urging him to name his successor, which he refused by saying: “I will
leave the Muslims in the same state in which Rasūl Allāh (peace be
on him) left them.” [93]
From these events, it is obvious that the first four caliphs and
the ṣaḥābah (companions) viewed caliphate as an elected office,
which came into being by consultation among the Muslim people and
their free will. In their eyes dynastic monarchy or forcibly captured
power did not constitute caliphate: it was kingship. Abū Musā al-
Ash‘ari articulated the difference between the two in these words:
“Imārah (that is caliphate) comes into being when
it is the outcome of (mutual) consultation. And kingship is
obtained by force.”[94]
2. Shūrāwi governance
The first four caliphs never decided the governmental issues
and lawmaking without consulting people of wisdom and opinion. In
Sunan al-Dārami, Maymūn ibn Mayhrān says that when faced with a
problem Abū Bakr would look for an answer into the Qur’ān first. If
he did not find it there, he would probe the prophetic Sunnah for an
answer. Failing in that, he would summon the community leading
members and the pious ones for advice. Thereafter, whatever
opinion emerged he would abide by it.[95] The same went with ‘Umar.
[96]

In obtaining advice, the four caliphs believed in the shūrā right

to express it. While addressing the inaugural session of the shūrā,
‘Umar elaborated his policy:
“My reason to inconvenience you is nothing else
but to ask you to share the [heavy] load of executing your
affairs that you have placed on my shoulders. I am from
among you. And today, you are the people who will affirm
what is right (ḥaqq). Whoever wants to disagree with me
 may do so, and whoever wants to agree with me may do
so. I do not want you to follow my desire.”[97]
3. Bayt al-māl a matter of trust
For them, bayt al-māl (public treasury) was a trust from Allah
and people, which they were not supposed to spend without
justification. When it came to private needs of the caliphs, they were
vehemently opposed to it. The difference between the caliphate and
kingship was essentially of legitimacy and usurpation. A king feels
himself free to spend public money the way he wants whereas a
caliph feels himself bound as for him it was an inviolable trust. Once
‘Umar asked Salmān al-Fārsi: “Am I a king or a caliph?” Salmān said
forthwith: “If you obtain even a dirham unjustifiably from the people
and spend it without a reason, then you are a king and not a caliph.”
On another occasion, ‘Umar asked people in a sitting: “By
Allah, I am still confused if I am a king or a caliph. If I have become a
king, then I am in trouble.”
A person said: “Yā Amīr al-Mū’minīn, there is a big difference
between the two.” ‘Umar asked him to elaborate. He said a caliph
takes nothing but with justification and spends nothing but with a
reason. By Allah’s grace, you are a caliph. As for the king, he does
excesses on the people – he receives from one unjustifiably and
transfers it to another without his right. [98]
The caliphs’ conduct is illustrative of this attitude. Immediately
after his induction as caliph, Abū Bakr took to the street, as was his
practice with a bundle of cloth on his shoulder to make his living.
‘Umar saw him. Surprised, he asked why he was doing it. His
answer was equally surprising – he had to feed his family. ‘Umar
discounted it. The caliphal responsibility and earning daily living, he
said, cannot go together. He suggested going to Abū ‘Ubaydah, the
head of the public treasury, who keeping in view the living standard
of an average muhājir (émigré) granted Abū Bakr subsistence
allowance. As said by Abū ‘Ubaydah, this allowance would neither
be equal to the richest income among the muhājirūn nor would it
measure the poorest among them. The amount allocated was thus
4,000 dirham a year. But as his death neared, Abū Bakr willed that
out of his legacy 8,000 dirham should be returned to bayt al-māl
(treasury). When they brought the amount to ‘Umar, he could not
help say it: May Allah has His mercy upon Abū Bakr, he has put his
successors into a difficult situation.[99]
Stating the caliph’s right in bayt al-māl ‘Umar said in one of his
speeches:
“In Allah’s money there is nothing Ḥalāl (allowed)
for me other than a two- piece wear for the summer and
a two-piece wear for the winter; that I should take
subsistence for my family equal to an average Qurayshi’s
living. After that, I am just a person among the
Muslims.”[100]
In another speech, he says:
“As for the (public) money, I do not consider
anything right other than three matters: take it with
(genuine) reason; give it justifiably (to others); and
safeguard it against misuse. My relation with your money
is that of an orphan’s guardian with his wealth. If I am not
dependent, I will desist taking anything out of it. And if I
am in need, I will take according to known, acceptable
way.”[101]
‘Ali followed Abū Bakr and ‘Umar’s tradition by maintaining the
same subsistence allowance. Wearing clothes, half up to his knees
and that too patched at places,[102] not once in his life he had the
means to overcome his poverty. A man came to see him in winter
and found him shivering with cold.[103] After his death, his legacy did
not exceed seven hundred dirham, which he saving over the years
for buying a helping hand to himself.[104]
Never would he buy a thing from someone who knew him lest
he charges him less for being amīr al-mū’minīn (commander of the
faithful).[105]
When he was up against Mu‘āwiyah, people suggested him
that he should follow the latter’s proactive policy by winning over
allies through gifts and awards from bayt al-māl. But he refused: “Are
you telling me that I should seek success by wrong means.”[106] His
elder brother ‘Aqīl approached him for a grant from bayt al-māl, but
he refused, saying, “Do you want your brother to give you money of
the Muslims and go instead to hell fire?”[107]
4. The Responsible governance
 What was the concept of these people about governance? As
the rulers of the Muslim people, what did they think about their
position and responsibilities? And what policy did they pursue for
their governments?
They themselves explained their approach towards governance in
their speeches from the pulpit. In his post-allegiance speech in the
Masjid al-Nabawi, Abū Bakr said:
“You have made me your ruler (even though I am
not the best among you), for which I have no strength
unless Allah helps me.
I wanted someone else to bear the load of this
office. Even now if you want, you can elect someone else
from among the companions of Rasūl Allāh. Your pledge
oath to me is no bar in your way.
If you measured me to Rasul Allah’s standards
and held me to expectations that you had from him, I
would surely fail for he was in Allah’s protection against
the shaytān and the revelation from above. If I stay the
course, help me. If I act wrong, straighten me. Truth is
trust (amānah) and lie is usurpation.
He who is weak among you is strong before me
until I restored his right to him, if Allah wills. And he who
is strong among you is weak before me until I obtain from
him what is due on him, if Allah wills.
It has never happened that a nation ceases to
strive in Allah’s way and is not consigned to disgrace
imposed on it.
And that a nation has immoralities and that Allah
will not subject it to difficulties.
Obey me as long as I bind myself to Allah and His
Messenger. And if I divert from Allah and His
Messenger’s way, then you are free from your pledge to
me.
I am a follower and not a new pathfinder.”[108]
‘Umar says in one of his speeches:
“Nobody, his legitimacy notwithstanding, has the
right to demand obedience from people if he follows non-
 Allah…. O people, I will describe to you the rights you
have against me so that you may lay claim against me.
You can hold me to account (if I do not give you your
rights).
Your right on me is that I should avoid taking from
your kharāj and Allah-given fay but lawfully.
And your right on me is that whatever comes to
me (in the form of kharāj and fay), I should not spend it
but with justification.”[109]
When Abū Bakr sent ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āş to Syria and Palestine, his
instructions were:
“O ‘Amr, fear Allah in your hidden and open
deeds. Show regard to Him and do not violate Him for He
eyes your every deed …. Work for the ākhirah
(hereafter).
Seek Allah’s beneficence for your every deed.
Treat your companions as if they were your children. Do
not probe people’s secrets and deal with them on what is
obvious … Stay the course and people will follow
you.”[110]
While deputing governors to provinces, ‘Umar would say:
“I am not appointing you over the Prophet’s
Ummah that you become the master of their hair and
hides. Rather, I put them to your charge so that you
establish prayer (Ṣalāh), decide between people with
truth (ḥaqq) and give them what you owe them with
justice.”[111]
In his post-pledge address to the people, ‘Uthmān said:
“Listen! I am a follower, not a new pathfinder.
Know it that after following Allah and His Messenger,
there are three things that I pledge to abide by. That I will
stick to the ways and means agreed among you before
my induction into the caliphate (Khilāfah).
Second, in matters where there are no agreed
procedural precedents, I will formulate new ones through
consensus with the people of right thinking.
 Third, I will not lay my hands on you unless law
supports my action.”[112]
Likewise, when ‘Ali appointed Qays ibn Sa‘d as governor of
Egypt, he wrote the following caliphal decree to the people over
there.
“Beware! Your right upon us is that we act according to
Allah’s Book and His messenger’s Sunnah and run your affairs
in the light of Allah’s guidance and establish the Prophet’s
Sunnah and do good to you even in your absence.”
After having read this decree, Qays ibn Sa‘d declared:
“If we did not treat you according to the way
[announced], then you are free from your pledge to
us.”[113]
‘Ali wrote to one of his governors:
“Do not allow veils of separation between yourself
and the people. The officials distancing themselves from
the people show narrow mindedness and lack of
knowledge. By such veils, they obscure themselves from
the people’s affairs. Small things become bigger and big
things become smaller for them. Good turns into bad and
bad into good before them. [Eventually] truth intermingles
with falsehood.”[114]
This was not just a rhetorical speech – he acted on it. The
Kūfah bazaars often saw him with a lash in his hand restraining
people from wrong and exhorting them to do good. He would visit the
marketplace to see if traders were measuring and selling goods
properly. Dressed ordinarily, without kingly trappings and security
apparatus none would have taken him as the caliph of the Islamic
world walking before their very eyes.[115]
On an occasion ‘Umar declared in public:
“I have not sent my officials to beat you and
snatch your belongings from you. Rather, I have sent
them to teach you your dīn and the Sunnah of your
Prophet. Anyone who treated otherwise should bring up
his complaint to me. By Allah, I will seek revenge from
him (the wrongdoer).”
 Disturbed, ‘Amr ibn al-‘Ās (the governor of Egypt) stood up
and said: “If a person is the custodian of the Muslim affairs and
punishes someone for a wrong, would you still exact vengeance
from him?” ‘Umar replied: “Yes! By Allah, I have seen Rasūl Allāh
exacting vengeance from his person”[116]
On yet another occasion, ‘Umar summoned his governors
during the hajj and while standing asked the milling crowed around
him that if they were subjected to miscarriage of justice by any of
these officials they should say so. Only one person rose to complaint
against ‘Amr ibn al-‘Ās that he had unjustifiably got him lashed
hundred times.
‘Umar asked him to seek his revenge from the governor. ‘Amr
ibn al-‘Ās protested that the governors should not be subjected to
this humiliation for it would open up the mischief door. But ‘Umar
said he saw the Prophet taking vengeance from himself. “O man, get
up and exact your vengeance.” Eventually ‘Amr ibn al-‘Ās had to pay
two ashrafis for each lash to save his back.[117]
5. Supremacy of the Sharī‘ah
These caliphs would never exalt themselves over the law.
They regarded themselves and common citizenry, including al-
dhimma (non-Muslims under Islam’s protection), as equal. True, the
appointment of the qāḍis lay in the realm of their authority but still
their appointees were free in their verdicts against them. One time a
dispute arose between ‘Umar and Ubayy ibn Ka‘b. Both agreed on
Zayd ibn Thābit to arbitrate between them. The two came to Zayd
who rose to seat ‘Umar in his place but the latter declined and sat
with Ubayy. When Ubayy made his claim, ‘Umar rejected it.
According to the norm, Zayd should have asked ‘Umar to swear by
Allah’s name but the latter’s high moral and political stature gave him
reservations. Seeing him oscillating, ‘Umar himself swore. When the
sitting ended, ‘Umar made his prudent observation: “Zayd cannot
qualify to be a qādi (judge) until he treats ‘Umar and the commoner
alike.”[118]
A similar incident happened between ‘Ali and a Christian
whom he saw selling his lost armour in the bazaar of Kūfah. He did
not forcibly take his armour from him; instead, he lodged his
complaint with the qāḍi. And since he failed to support his claim, the
verdict was given against him. [119]
Ibn Khallikān reports that ‘Ali and a non-Muslim came to Qāḍi
Shuraih’s court for a decision. The latter rose to greet the caliph.
Thereupon ‘Ali said: “This is your first injustice.”[120]
6. A government free from ethnicities and prejudices
Islam early period was marked by yet another characteristic: it
was free from ethnic and tribalistic prejudices and extended equal
status to everyone.
The Prophet’s death saw the rise of tribalistic prejudices like a
storm. Behind the emergence of false prophetic claims and
apostasy, this played a major role, symptomized by the utterance of
a follower of Musaylimah who said: “I know Musaylimah is a liar but
the Rabi‘yah liar is better then the Mudarr’s truthful.” [121]
Supporting another claimant to prophetic claim, Tulayhah an
elder of Banū Ghatafān said: “By Allah, I prefer to follow the prophet
of my allied tribes over the Qurayshi prophet.” [122]
In Madinah itself, when Abū Bakr was being inducted, Sa‘d
ibn ‘Ubādah avoided giving his pledge to him owing to his tribalistic
inclinations. Likewise, Abū Sufyān did not like Abū Bakr’s Khilāfah
(caliphate) on the same grounds and made offer to ‘Ali: “How did a
person from a small tribe of the Quraysh become the caliph? If you
are willing to oppose him, I would fill the valley with the horsemen
and foot soldiers.”
But ‘Ali refused to be tempted and made him speechless by
saying: “Your offer is indicative of your enmity for Islam and the
Muslims. I would not like you to bring horsemen and foot soldiers [to
my support]. Muslims love one another and wish everyone well, even
though they may not be in each other’s proximity. On the contrary,
the hypocrites cut each other’s throats. We consider Abū Bakr
capable enough to hold this office. Had he not been legible we would
have never put him in this office.” [123]
It was to this kind of environment that Abū Bakr and ‘Umar
responded by giving equal status to every tribe, Muslims and non-
Muslims alike. To make it transparent, they gave no preference to
their own clans and tribes. This had a healthy effect in containing the
situation: all prejudices died down, and the universal spirit of Islam
resurfaced in them. In his entire tenure, Abū Bakr gave no office to
any person from his clan. ‘Umar followed the same practice other
than his appointment of Nu‘mān ibn ‘Adi as collector of taxes in
Maysān, a small area close to Baṣrah. He recalled him back after
sometime.[124] From this aspect, the two caliphs had an exemplary
sense of rectitude.
In his last days, ‘Umar developed an acute sense of threat
from parochial interests at work in the tribes, which though had
ebbed under the revolutionary impact of the Islamic movement were
still capable of reasserting themselves and undo the Muslim unity.
Thus, while discussing the issue of his successor with ‘Abd Allah ibn
‘Abbās, he disapproved ‘Uthmān’s candidacy saying: “If I nominate
him as my successor he would put Bani abi Mu‘ayt (Umayyah) on
people’s necks, and they will hurt them by violating Allah’s
commands. By Allah, if I nominated him, ‘Uthmān will do it exactly
the way [I am saying it]. And should that happen, his clan would
perpetuate sins and people will rise to kill him.[125]
So great was his concern that in his last moments he called
for ‘Ali, ‘Uthmān, and Sa‘d ibn abi Waqqās and urged them not to
mount their relatives on the people’s neck in the eventuality of their
election as caliph.[126]
Besides, he left the instructions for the six-member electoral
shūrā that the elected caliph should bind himself not to give
preference to his own clan. [127]
Unfortunately, the third caliph ‘Uthmān could not maintain the
desired standards. During his reign, he gave Banū Umayyah a large
share in the administrative hierarchy along with grants from bayt al-
māl (in order to overcome their sense of alienation), which others
resented.[128] For him, the Qur’ānic injunction of kindness towards
blood relatives called for it. He thus used to say: “‘Umar deprived his
relatives for Allah’s sake, and I benefit them for Allah’s sake.” [129]
On one occasion, he said: “In respect of bayt al-māl, Abū Bakr
and ‘Umar preferred to keep themselves and their relatives starved
while I seek compassion (for them).” [130]
‘Umar’s fear proved true. Rebellion broke loose against him.
In the end, not only did he lose his life, it also regenerated tribalistic
rivalries into life, burning everything associated with the pious
caliphate.
7. Nourishing freedom as a value
Yet another merit of this caliphate was its allowance for
criticism and freedom of speech. The caliphs were easily accessible
to people. They would sit among the members of the consultative
body (shūrā) and join the discussion; they had no party of their own
nor did they have an organized opposition. This made the political
environment free, enabling shūrā members to express themselves in
the light of their belief and conscience. Issues that called for
deliberation were placed before the shūrā, decisions were made on
the strength of reason free from any group pressure, governmental
influence or interest lobbies.
Added to these, they not only faced their people through the
shūrā but also five times a day in congregational prayer, every week
on Friday, and on the occasions of ‘idayn and hajj. Their houses
were not in posh areas of privilege; instead, they lived among the
people with their doors open for everyone to knock at and seek
redress of their problems. They moved in public without the
trappings of power, security and maintaining distance. On all such
occasions, everybody could pick cause with them and hold them
accountable for their alleged misdeeds or neglect of public affairs.
They would not only give people space to speak their minds but also
encouraged them.
Abū Bakr in his first public address asked people to help him if
he followed the straight path, and straighten him if he stray the
course. In one of his Friday addresses, ‘Umar thought of fixing the
dower to 400 dirham; a woman rebuked him for lack of authorization
from the Qur’ān, which allows a woman to ask for a pile of wealth
(qintār) as dower. ‘Umar withdrew his opinion forthwith.[131]
On yet another occasion before a large audience Salmān al-
Fārsi questioned him on his having two garments while everybody
else had one. ‘Umar asked his son ‘Abd Allah to witness that he
gave his share to his father.[132] One time he asked his audience how
they would react if he adopted leniency in certain matters. Bishr ibn
Sa‘d responded we would straighten you up. This made ‘Umar
happy, applauding Bishr for being a man of merit. [133]
 “Uthmān faced the worst criticism, but he never stopped
others from criticizing him. He always defended himself in public.
The Khawārij yelled invectives on ‘Ali; he always showed
forbearance for them. One time they brought five Khawārij to him
who openly abused him. A person among them even swore to kill
him, but he released all of them. He told his followers to answer their
abuses if they wanted to, but avoid bringing them to law unless they
caught them in the act to kill him. Mere verbal opposition was no
ground for prosecution.[134]
This period of the pious caliphate that we described was a
beacon light towards which fuqahā’ (jurists), muḥaddithīn (ḥadīth
scholars) and common men always looked at with admiration and for
guidance and considered it as true Islam in its religious, political,
moral, and collective dimensions.
 Chapter Four

From the Rightly Guided Caliphate to Monarcy

The pious caliphate thus described was not mere political

government but in fact the continuation of the prophetic model
(nabūwah). In other words, it did not confine itself to run the
administration, secure peace, and safeguard the frontiers of the state
but to go beyond the routine and act as educator, benefactor and
guide in the collective life of the Muslims after the prophetic model. It
had upon its shoulder the responsibility to implement the holistic
Islam in its true essence and to train Muslims to spread its message
across the globe. In this, it was not only al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah (the
rightly guided caliphate) but in fact al-Khilāfah al-Murshidah (a
caliphate that guides). The term al-Khilāfah ‘alā-minhāj al-nabūwah
expresses these two aspects. Anyone who understands Islam knows
that Islam objectifies this kind of state and not a political government
(after the secular image).
Now, we will deal with the phases that eventuated into the
shift from the caliphate to monarchy. We will also explain how this
unfortunate change weaned the state away from the Islamic
principles of governance and the catastrophic impact it had on the
collective life of the Muslims.
1. The beginning of change
The drift from the caliphate towards monarchical absolutism
(mulukīyah) took place exactly the way ‘Umar had apprehended.
Close to his death, his heart pined on the possibility that his
successors might change the prophetic policy on tribes and
relations. During his life, the Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) did not allow
anyone from Banū Hāshim other than ‘Ali to share the power
apparatus. Abū Bakr ignored his tribe as well. ‘Umar in his ten-year
tenure accommodated only one person from Bani ‘Adiy that too in a
marginal job but later relieved him. It was because of this policy
transparency and non-partisanship that parochial interests remained
in check. He feared that any policy shift [on this important aspect of
the caliphate] would undermine the Muslim unity and thus the
integrity of the state. His advice to his three prospective successors
– ‘Uthmān, ‘Ali and Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ – specifically stressed that
they should not mount their tribes and relations on the necks of the
Muslims.[135]
Nobody can deny, however, the fact that ‘Uthmān’s
appointees were capable people; their administrative and military
skills brought new territories to the Islamic state extending the
Muslim domain. But all said, they were not the only ones who had
such attributes – there were others as well who had proven their
genius in a far better way. Mere ability to perform could not be the
reason for giving administrative control of a territory as large as
Khurāsān to North Africa to one family along with a high position of a
secretary in the central secretariat. This by itself was objectionable,
though there were some other reasons, which aggravated the
people.
First, the new entrants to power by and large came from the
tulaqā’ (later-day converts). In other words, they belonged to those
Makkan families, which persecuted the Prophet and his message till
their last effort. After the Makkan conquest, the Prophet forgave
them and they accepted Islam. Al-Walīd ibn ‘Uqbah and Marwān ibn
al-Ḥakam belonged to this forgiven group. ‘Abdullah ibn Sa‘d ibn abi
Sarah had turned apostate. He was one among those for whom the
Prophet’s order were to kill them even when found holding the
Ka‘bah’s curtain. ‘Uthmān brought him to the Prophet and asked for
his clemency which out of regard for ‘Uthmān was given to him. With
such a crowd around ‘Uthmān, people were obviously upset.
Second, such individuals were unsuitable to lead the Islamic
movement for even though they had become Muslims, they lacked
certain essentials of moral and spiritual training that only the Prophet
could have given them. True, they excelled in administrative and
military matters but Islam had not come for expansion alone; it was
in its essence a movement for goodness whose leadership called for
a greater moral calibre than were the military and administrative
attributes. Thus in the scale of eminence they were not at par with
the companions and the tabi‘ūn in moral excellence. .
Third, some of these people because of their peculiar
backgrounds and weeknesses were not qualified enough to be given
prominent positions. Their appointment to top slots in the
governmental hierarchy gave a bad feeler to Muslims in general.
For example, al-Walīd ibn ‘Uqbah accepted Islam in the wake
of the Makkan conquest. The Prophet deputed him as zakāt collector
to Banū al-Mustaliq. When he reached their territory, he got
somehow scared and without making contact with the people there
returned to Madinah. His report to the Prophet of non-compliance by
Banū al-Mustaliq obviously infuriated the Prophet. He sent another
military expedition to them. But before the calamity could have
overtaken them, their elders came to Madinah and informed the
Prophet about al-Walīd not approaching them for the taxes. In fact,
as they said, they waited for someone to come and collect Zakāh
from them. The Qur’ānic Āyah revealed on the occasion educated
the Muslims:
Believers, when an ungodly person brings to you a
piece of news, carefully ascertain its truth, lest you
should hurt a people unwittingly and thereafter repent at
what you did.[136]
These were the reasons that caused unrest against ‘Uthmān.
Appointing individuals from the Umayyad in top slots was by itself
politically unwise. But what aggravated the situation was that the
appointees had some questionable problems. Two policy
misformulations, however, had far-reaching impact.
First, he gave Mu‘āwiyah a longer tenure in Damascus
probably because of his past record in good governance. He was an
appointee of ‘Umar. ‘Uthmān extended his domain by bringing under
his control a large territory from Āylah to Byzantine frontiers and from
al-Jazirah to the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea. He
continued in his office for twelve years in the ‘Uthmani caliphate.[137]
This factor alone was responsible in his refusal to submit himself to
‘Ali’s caliphate. By its strategic location, Syria was vital to the
security of the Islamic state. On one side, it bordered eastern
provinces and on the other, it flanked Western provinces. Seated in
the middle the Syrian governor could easily cut them apart.
Mu‘āwiyah’s extended rule over Syria caused alarm in Madinah.
Second, ‘Uthmān brought in Marwān as secretary to the
caliphate. Taking use of the caliph’s soft disposition and his trust in
him, he did a lot of wrong things without the caliph’s knowledge,
eventually tarnishing the caliphate. Equally troublesome was
Marwān’s role in spoiling sahābah’s good relation with ‘Uthmān. He
continually worked on this aspect so that instead of seeking advice
from the sahābah, the caliph becomes dependent on him.[138] Some
aspects of his language did not go well with peoples’ sensibilities.
Leaving other people aside, the caliph’s wife Nā’ilah thought that in
causing problems for her husband Marwān’s role was pivotal. She
even told her husband that if he continued to follow Marwān, he
would get him killed. “This man,” she said, “has neither regard for
Allah, nor does he fear or love Him.” [139]
2. The second phase
The Marwān aspect of caliph ‘Uthmān’s policy was
undoubtedly problematic. The fact, however, remains that other than
a few judgmental errors, ‘Uthman’s caliphal role was astoundingly
great. Islam made such great a stride in his era that despite
dissatisfaction on some of his policies the common Muslims never
thought of rising against him.
It is true that upset by his governor Sa‘īd ibn al-‘Āṣ’ behaviour
in Baṣrah, some people did rise against him but it was a weak
response. Abū Mūsā al-Asha‘ri called for a new bai‘ah to ‘Uthman,
people thronged to affirm their pledge for the caliph.[140] The rebels
knew it; thus instead of an open rebellion, they took the path of
conspiracy against him.
The movement against ‘Uthmān drew its support from a small
pocket of people coming from Egypt, Kūfah, and Baṣrah. They
coordinated their efforts by secret communication and planned to
reach Madīnah surreptitiously to pressurize the caliph. They had a
long litany of allegations against him, mostly unfounded or weak that
could have been easily dismissed by reason. And in fact attempts
were made to satisfy them. Only two thousands in number they
converged on the outskirts of Madīnah. A party they were but they
represented no one other than their impulses. They tried to ally ‘Ali,
Ṭalḥah, and al-Zubayr with them but the three turned them down. ‘Ali
defended ‘Uthmān admirably well in refuting their allegations against
the caliph. The Madinese, both ansār and muhājirūn, also refused to
join them. But bent as they were on mischief, they eventually entered
the capital and demanded the caliph’s resignation. ‘Uthmān’s answer
to them was plain and constitutionally right. He was willing to redress
their legitimate demands, but he would not resign.[141]
3. The issue of helping relatives from bayt al-māl
Whatever help ‘Uthmān extended to his relatives from bayt al-
māl was not reprehensible from the Sharī‘ah viewpoint. Allah forbid,
he never usurped the Muslim money nor did he appropriate what
belonged to Allah. But even here his approach, one can say in
hindsight, was far from prudence and thus created problems in the
people’s perception.
When questioned, ‘Uthmān explained his position in a
meeting convened for discussing his doling out state money to his
relatives. Present were ‘Ali ibn abi Ṭālib, Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ,
Ṭalḥah ibn al-Zubayr, and Mu‘āwiyah ibn abi Sufyān.
“My both predecessors adopted a sterner attitude
towards their own selves as well as their relatives. But
the Messenger of Allah (‘alayhi as-salām) used to help
his relatives. I belong to a clan facing problems in their
living. Thus, in return for the services that I rendered to
this government, I took money from it, and I think I have
the right (to do so). If you think it was not right, then
decide for the return of this money, and I will act
accordingly.”
All of them agreed that he said the right thing.
“Is it right,” they asked, “that you gave money to
‘Abdullah ibn Khālid ibn Asīd and Marwān?”
‘Uthmān admitted that he had given Marwān 15,000 and Ibn
Asīd 50,000 dirham. Thus, he took the amount from the two and
returned it to bayt al-māl. The assembly dispersed on a happy note.
[142]
From these reports, it is evident that Caliph ‘Uthmān’s helping
out his relatives from bayt al-māl was not inconsistent with the
Sharī‘ah. As caliph, he was entitled to a certain emolument, which he
never took and instead gave to his relatives from that accumulated
salary he denied to himself.
Equally true is the fact that he gave his poor relatives loans
from bayt al-māl. Occasionally he would use his discretionary
powers and gave them grants from the khumus for which no detailed
distributive guidance existed in the Sharī‘ah. The mischief makers
were, however, bent on deepening the impression that he favoured
his clan at the expense of public treasury. Obviously, if like Abū Bakr
and ‘Umar he had helped people other than his relatives, he could
have avoided criticism upon himself for this reason alone. Abū Bakr
and ‘Umar subjected themselves to self restrictions and denied
benefit to their relatives, and instead helped others. ‘Uthmān did not
follow this golden principle and unwittingly gave a chance to the
conspirators to instigate circumstances that led to the undoing of his
caliphate.
For forty days, they created a mutinous situation indulging in
activities that Madinah never knew before. They misbehaved with
Umm Habībah the Prophet’s widow. Disgusted by their unwanted
attitude and fearing that they might misbehave with her as well,
Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah left for Makkah. While Madīnah stood shocked
mired in grief, they killed the caliph. For three days, his body
remained without burial; they did not spare his house either and
ransacked it.[143]
This was not only a great injustice to ‘Uthmān but also to
Islam and the rightly guided caliphate. If there had been any weight
to their allegation, they would have joined hands with the Ṣaḥābah to
persuade the caliph to redress them. In fact, ‘Ali had started efforts
towards this end and ‘Uthmān had promised to remedy the situation.
[144]
Nevertheless, even if the wrong had not been corrected, the
Sharī‘ah did not allow rebellion against the caliph and press for his
resignation by mere 2,000 miscreants drawn from Baṣrah, Kūfah,
and Egypt who had no constituency to speak for. Nor were they
empowered by any right to ask for the removal of a caliph, who
represented the whole of the Islamic world, who was mandated by
ahl al-hal wa al-‘aqd according to Islamic norms, and whom the
Islamic world had accepted as their caliph.[145] They not only made
the caliph’s blood but also his household permissible for themselves.
Brutal and inhuman as it were, there was an obvious irony to
their act, for what they considered as ‘Uthmān’s sins were not in fact
sins to have qualified him for death penalty. In fact, ‘Uthmān told
them this very thing in one of his speeches to them. The Sharī‘ah, he
said, allows killing someone in a few specified cases. He had not
committed any such crime. Then why were they intent on making his
blood permissible for them, he asked. [146] But those who criticized
‘Uthmān in the blessed name of the Sharī‘ah themselves violated it
by killing him.
Here, one should not entertain the notion that the people of
Madīnah consented to their savagery. The fact of the matter is that
the miscreants’ arrival in Madīnah was sudden, least expected by
anyone. They took over the city’s sensitive points making its
residents helpless.[147] Besides, nobody thought they would go to the
extent of killing the caliph. So unexpected was the whole thing that
the people failed to formulate their response to the conspirators.
They even suffered from moral contrition on their failure to come to
the caliph’s defence.[148] The primary reason being the caliph himself
would not allow bloodshed in Madīnah to save his government. He
could have summoned the armies from different provinces to smash
the rebellion but he refrained from it. From the ansār Zayd ibn Thābit
offered unqualified support to defend him. ‘Uthmān’s response was
amā al-qitāl falā (bloodshed, no). He gave the same response to Abū
Hurayrah and ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr. Surprisingly enough, there
were at least 700-armed men with him willing to fight for him but he
counseled them restrain.[149]
In fact, at this critical juncture, ‘Uthmān’s chosen path was
worthy of a caliph standing him apart from a king, who would have
resorted to any means to save his power. He would have let
Madinah raised to the ground, its men and women killed, even the
Prophet’s masjid demolished, and his wives abused and humiliated.
But as a pious caliph, he considered his life trivial to other
considerations that a Muslim must hold dear to himself above
everything else. He knew how far he could have gone in saving his
power. To him, the line of demarcation between personal
considerations and the Sharī‘ah demand was absolutely known.
4. The third phase
‘Uthmān’s death engulfed Madīnah in disorder; stricken with
fear and lost in grief, they realized to their discomfort that the
Ummah has been deprived of a fatherly figure and the Islamic state
of its head. Everybody, including even the outside miscreants,
started weighing the situation in the pragmatic context of an empty
caliphal office of a state that stretched itself to the Roman frontiers
on the one hand and to Yemen, Afghanistan and North Africa on the
other. The situation called for an immediate remedy. The caliph had
to be elected that too in Madinah, for it was the centre of the world of
Islam and it was here that ahl al-hal wa al-‘aqd lived, who were
decisive in decision-making concerning the appointment of the
caliph. There was no reason to tarry the matter further nor was it
feasible to approach other parts of the Islamic state further from
Madīnah. The Ummah needed a focal point for convergence and
consolidation at this hour of distention and strife.
Out of the six Ṣaḥābah (raḍi Allahu ‘anhu) ‘Umar had
preferred over others, four of them were still alive. They were ‘Ali,
Ṭalḥah, al-Zubayr, and Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ. Among them, ‘Ali was
the most respected as found out then by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Auf.
[150]
A class by himself, there was none to measure up to him in
the entire Muslim world. A popular vote even according to present
electoral standards would have gravitated towards ‘Ali.[151] All
authentic sources suggest that the Ṣaḥābah and people from other
sectors of Madīnah approached him and said, “This system cannot
hold itself without an amīr. For people, the presence of an Imām is a
must and we do not have a person more suited to this office than
you, either in service to the cause of Islam or in nearness to the
Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām).”
He refused but the people kept on insisting. So careful he was
to the people’s consent expressed through bai‘ah (oath) that he said:
“The oath pledge to me cannot be undertaken in secrecy. Without
people’s consent it is of no consequence.”
Thereafter, in a common gathering in Masjid al-Nabawi ansar
and muhajirūn pledged their support to him, with the exception of
seventeen to twenty of them who refrained from their pledge.[152]
From the preceding, it is obvious that ‘Ali’s succession to the
caliphal office was strictly in accordance with the principles that
animated the pious caliphate. He did not seek power by force nor did
he make any effort to gain it. People by themselves through mutual
consultation brought him into power. A large majority of sahābah
took bai‘ah at his hand. Later aside from Syria, the rest of the Islamic
world agreed to his caliphate.
Some people question the legitimacy of ‘Ali’s succession to
‘Uthmān because of a small discussion over his induction into the
caliphal office. The argument however suffers from weakness. If Sa‘d
ibn ‘Ubādah’s refrain could not invalidate Abū Bakr’s and ‘Umar’s
caliphate how can seventeen-to-twenty refusals to ‘Ali’s nomination
invalidate his caliphate? Besides, the discussion was a mere
negative act per se and in no way affected the issue’s
constitutionality. There was no other candidate the dissenters could
have given their pledge. Also, because of the majority verdict in
favour of his caliphate, it enjoyed legitimacy and was thus
constitutional in the sovereign eye of the Sharī‘ah.
By his induction as caliph, the breached Islamic system had
the chance to repair itself. But three things frustrated the process of
healing and instead pushed it further towards monarchial absolutism.
First, the rebels’ involvement in empowering ‘Ali as caliph
created credibility gap between him and the sahābah. Among them
were those who had killed ‘Uthmān as well as those who were the
motivators and the instigators to this ghastly crime. Thus, their
bringing ‘Ali to power became the cause for a greater fitnah
(mischief).
All said anyone who tries to understand the circumstances
that prevailed in Madinah then, will have the feelings that it was
almost impossible to have excluded the miscreants from the
electoral process. Nevertheless, it was a right decision to have ‘Ali
as the caliph. As to bringing the killers of ‘Uthmān to justice, it could
have only been possible if all the forces had stood in Ali’s favour.
Thus strengthened, he would have nabbed them in time and the
mischief situation averted from further moving to catastrophe.
Second, the self exclusion of certain Ṣaḥābah from giving
bai‘ah to ‘Ali, though prompted by good intentions to avoid mischief,
became instrumental in catalyzing a graver mischief than they had
contemplated. The separatists were prominent Ṣaḥābah; each of
them had a hold on the masses; their exclusivist attitude created
doubt in many a hearts. The solidarity that it called for in the Muslim
ranks failed to take place. And thus, the effort to rehabilitate the
pious caliphate sputtered halfway through.
Third, the demand for retribution of the ‘Uthmān blood which
the two groups had chartered in their stand with Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah,
Ṭalḥah, and al-Zubayr on one side and Mu‘āwiyah on the other,
carried little pith in the constitutional scale. Admittedly, they were
highly venerated, towering personalities but they were not operating
in a jahili system where anyone on anybody’s behalf would rise to
press his claim for revenge. The ransom demand belonged to the
deceased’s family. If the administration was lax in apprehending the
killers and bringing them to justice, other people could have joined
the family members in expediting justice. But under no circumstance
they could have solicited justice in their way when the Sharī‘ah did
not approve it, especially when they were making their recognition of
‘Ali’s caliphate conditional to the fulfillment of their retribution
demand.
If ‘Ali lacked legitimacy in their sight, the alleged legality of
their demand also had no merit in it. Was he a tribal chief who could
have caught anyone he wanted without legal authorization and
punished him? Certainly, that was not the case.
Worse was the method the first group adopted. Instead of
resorting to Madīnah for lodging their demand where the caliph, the
culprits, and the deceased’s inheritors were present, they took the
road to Baṣrah where they assembled an army for avenging
‘Uthmān’s blood. The obvious result was additional 10,000 killed
destabilizing the state further. The Sharī‘ah aside, no law code in the
world could have upheld their method.
Even more unconstitutional was the second group’s attitude
led by Mu‘āwiyah, who instead of seeking revenge of Uthmān’s
blood in his personal capacity rose against Madinah as governor of
Syria, refusing to submit himself to the Madīnah writ. He should have
asked punishment for ‘Uthmān’s killers through due process of law,
but he asked for their deliverance to him so that he could kill them.
[153]
True, he was a relation of ‘Uthmān but that did not accord him
legitimacy in the presence of ‘Uthmān’s immediate family.
Whatever relationship ‘Uthmān had, it was with Mu‘āwiyah ibn
abī Sufyān. The governorship of Syria was not his relations. As
governor, he had no right to refuse obedience to the constitutionally
elected caliph, whose caliphate everybody else accepted.[154] Nor
was he justified to mobilize the regional command against Madinah.
This issue in its right Sharī‘ah context has been discussed by
Qāḍi Abū Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi in al-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān.
“(After ‘Uthmān’s shahādah), it would have made
no sense to leave people without the imam. Thus, the
imamate offer was made to the remainder of the
Ṣaḥābah, who constituted the electoral shūrā named by
‘Umar. They declined. But ‘Ali who deserved it most
accepted the offer so that the Ummah could be saved
from acrimony and bloodshed. When people gave him
their bai‘ah the Syrians made it contingent on
apprehending the killers of ‘Uthmān and subjecting them
to retribution. ‘Ali persuaded them to enter bai‘ah first and
then ask for their right as it would be given to them. But
they said he was not qualified to receive their bai‘ah for
they saw ‘Uthmān’s killers around him all the time.
‘Ali’s stand made sense for if he had sought
vengeance from ‘Uthmān’s killers at that point in time the
tribes would have risen in their support opening a third
battle front for him. Thus, he waited for his government’s
consolidation and the extension of his bai‘ah over the
nation, followed by the institution of the prosecution case
by the inheritors of the killed (caliph) and its resolution
according to the law.
The ‘ulamā of the Ummah agree on this point that
the imam can defer the application of qasās if he thinks it
may lead to uprising and division.
A similar situation surrounded the case of Ṭalḥah
and al-Zubayr. The two had not excluded ‘Ali from the
caliphate nor were they critical of his Islam, though they
thought ‘Uthmān’s killers should be dealt first. ‘Ali stuck to
his view. And he was right.”
While explaining the āyah from al-Hujurāt: 9, that is: fa qātilū al-lati
tabghī hattā tafī’a ilā amri Allah, Qāḍi Abū Bakr says:
 “In the then prevalent circumstances, ‘Ali abided
by this āyah. He fought against those who sought to
impose their views on the imam and were making
demands for which they had no right. For them the right
course was to have accepted ‘Ali’s argument and gone to
the court for their vengeance demand against the killers.
If despite their having followed this course, ‘Ali had failed
to punish the accused, people themselves would have
removed him from his office, saving them thus from the
armed struggle.”[155]
5. The fourth phase
With some 2,000 rebels still in Madīnah, Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr
along with some other Ṣaḥābah called on ‘Ali. After exchanging
pleasantries, they urged him to take action against the killers as their
oath pledge to him, they said, was contingent on the enforcement of
ḥadd.
“Brothers! I am aware of what you said,” Ali responded. “But
how can I apprehend those who have overpowered us. Do you see
any opening for realizing your desire?”
They said no.
‘Ali added: “By Allah! I think the same way. Let the conditions
improve so that people (shaken by the events) return to normalcy
and the restitution of the rights is facilitated.” [156]
After their meeting, the two elders went to Makkah to see
Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah. The three agreed that in order to seek vengeance
for ‘Uthmān’s blood they should raise an army from Basrah and
Kūfah where Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr had a large following. Together
they left for Basrah.
From Banū Umayyah, Sa‘īd ibn al-Āṣ and Marwān ibn al-
Ḥakam joined the group. At Marrul-Zahrā, Sa‘id suggested to his
group that if they wanted vengeance for ‘Uthmān’s blood, they
should kill those who were with them (he was referring to Ṭalḥah and
al-Zubayr). As he said, Banū ‘Umayyah believed that ‘Uthmān’s
killers were not only the outside miscreants but also his Madinan
critics who objected to his policies, or those who were present in
Madīnah but did nothing to prevent his death. Marwān however
opposed them: “No we will make Ṭalḥah, al-Zubayr and ‘Ali fought
each other. The defeated will die its death, while the victor will be
weak enough to fight us.”[157]
Thus, divided against themselves the caravan reached al-
Baṣrah where they succeeded in mobilizing thousands of their
followers.
The news of their convergence in Baṣrah made ‘Ali change
his plan of going to Syria against Mu‘āwiyah: He decided to
checkmate the new alliance. But a large number of the Ṣaḥābah and
their followers who considered inter-Muslim feud disastrous for the
Ummah, refused to go along with him. [158]
The result was obvious: the same rebel group that had killed
‘Uthmān and which ‘Ali wanted to get rid of became his mainstay;
they filled the ranks of his small army. This fact by itself resulted in
his undoing. He lost his standing and the mischief spread further.
Eventually, the worst happened. At the outskirts of al-Baṣrah
the forces led by Sayyidah ‘Ā’isha and ‘Ali came face to face. A large
number of sincere people tried mediation in order to avoid the fight
between the two. And at one point they even succeeded. But the
hostile vested interests were also at work. The killers of ‘Uthmān
who formed the battle line on ‘Ali’s side knew well that reconciliation
between the opposing camps would result in their eventual
elimination while the conspirators in the ‘Ā’ishah army were intent on
the clash between the two in order to weaken them for the benefit of
the third party. Thus before the mediation effort could have born
results they instigated an undeclared war that swept away the peace
effort into a bad patch in history. The battle of Jamal took place over
the heads of the peace seekers on both sides.[159]
In fact, ‘Ali took the peace initiative. Before the battle of
Jamal, he sent his emissary to Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr for a talk. They
came to his camp. ‘Ali reminded them of the Prophet’s saying on the
subject and exhorted them to stay away from war. Affected by his
speech, al-Zubayr left the battle scene while Ṭalḥah shifted himself
from the vanguard formation to the back of the troops. [160] But
unfortunately al-Zubayr was killed by a trailing assassin ‘Amr ibn
Jarmūz, while according to some reports, Ṭalḥah was killed by
Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam.[161]
 The war thus erupted exacted a toll of 10,000 people from
both sides, making it the second misfortune after ‘Uthmān’s
shahādah (martyrdom) that fell to the lot of Islamic history. It brought
the Ummah a step closer to mulukīyah (monarchial absolutism).
The post-Jamal situation made the national scene fractious
with deeper divisions. The Iraqis who constituted the bulk of the
‘Ā’ishah force and got killed in 5,000 numbers at the hands of ‘Ali
could not have been expected to give support to ‘Ali as the Syrian
gave theirs to Mu‘āwiyah.
In the Ṣiffīn battle and the events afterwards the unity found in
the Mu‘āwiyah camp and the discord on the ‘Ali side owed much to
the Jamal incident. Its avoidance, despite the problems created by
‘Uthmān’s death, could have averted the advent of the mulukīyah.
Marwān saw the ineluctable dynamics in the battle of Jamal going in
the monarchists favour. To make sure that the battle does take place,
he accompanied Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr to Baṣrah. Unfortunately, his
expectations fructified in the loss for the Muslim Ummah.
‘Ali’s attitude throughout this period was reminiscent of the
pious caliphs. Never for a moment did he deviate from the Sharī‘ah.
He forbade his army to pursue the fleeing troops or to kill the injured
and enter the opponents’ houses. After overpowering them, he
himself led the funerals of the killed from both sides and gave them
an equal burial. He refused to distribute the belongings of the
opponents as war booty. Instead, he gathered all the goods into a
pile in al-Baṣrah’s central masjid, asking people to take back their
belongings.
Rumours were spread by certain miscreants that he desired
massacre of the Baṣrah people and enslaving their women. He
promptly refuted it:
“People should least fear it from a man of my
conduct, for this kind of treatment is given to
nonbelievers and not the Muslims.”
While entering Baṣrah, he was greeted by abuses and taunts from
women flung at him from every house. His orders to the troops were:
“Beware! Do not violate anyone’s privacy;
avoid hurting women even when they abuse your
elders and the pious ones. We were told not to hurt
 them when they were still non-believers. How we
can now put our hands on them when they are
believers.” [162]
To ‘Ā’ishah who inspired the coalition against him for justice to
‘Uthman’s blood, he was particularly respectful and never caused
her a moment of discomfort. He bade her to Madinah under special
security umbrella. [163]
With al-Zubayr’s sword tucked in his hand, his assassin came
in the hope for reward but in return he gave him the news of hellfire.
Recognizing al-Zubayr’s sword he exclaimed, “How many a time this
sword came to the Prophet’s defense.”[164]
When Ṭalḥah’s son came, he greeted him with respect and
made him sit beside him. He returned his father’s property to him
and said: “I hope that on the Judgement Day between your father
and me the same thing will transpire that Allah the Exalted has said
in the Qur’ān: ‘We will take rancour from their hearts and they will sit
like brothers beside each other on the elevated seats’.”[165]
6. The fifth phase
After ‘Uthmān’s shahādah (18 Dhul Ḥajjah, 35 A.H.), Nu‘mān
ibn Bashir carried his bloodstained shirt and his wife Nā’ilah’s
amputated fingers to Mu‘āwiyah in Damascus. Making use of the
relics, Mu‘āwiyah hung them in a public square to provoke the
Syrians.[166] Obviously, he wanted revenge for ‘Uthmān through
unjustified means. People were already infuriated by his untimely,
unnatural, death. To provoke them further made no sense.
On the other hand, immediately after resuming caliphate, ‘Ali
removed Mu‘āwiyah from the Syrian governorship (Muḥarram 36
A.H.) and substituted him by Sahl ibn Ḥunayf. The Syrian troops
intercepted him close to Tabūk and asked him to go back: “If you
have come from ‘Uthmān, you are welcome. And if you have been
sent by someone else, then go back.”[167] This was a clear signal to
the effect that the Syrian province was unwilling to submit itself to
Madīnah.
In the following month ‘Ali sent another person to Mu‘āwiyah
with a letter but he made no response.
The forebodings were ominous. The Syrian governor was
giving negative signals by his firm stand against the killers of
‘Uthman and not listening to Madīnah excuse for more time until the
situation improves for taking ‘Uthman’s killers to justice.
Almost sixteenth years of continuous governorship of a
strategic province and his good governance gave Mu‘āwiyah a loyal
following. Historians’ narration of Mu‘āwiyah’s removal by ‘Ali gives
one the impression as if he had little sense in him. True, ‘Ali set
aside Mughīrah ibn Shu‘bah’s advice not to provoke Mu‘āwiyah but if
he had not dismissed the latter, it would have been a grave error.
Mu‘āwiyah’s refusal to accept his dismissal exposed his intentions.
Not seeing change in Mu‘āwiyah’s attitude, ‘Ali started
preparing for taming Syria. Situation was not yet out of his reach and
he could have brought Syria to come back into the caliphal orbit. The
Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Egypt were under his control. And Syria
alone did not have the resources and the will to resist the caliphate.
Besides, the Islamic World would not have encouraged it nor the
Syrians would have stood by Mu‘āwiyah for long. But unfortunately
the new alliance between Ṭalḥah, al-Zubayr and Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah,
already mentioned, caused chinks in ‘Ali’s effort to mount attack on
Syria. The emergent situation forced him to turn towards Baṣrah in
Rabī‘ al-Thāni, 36 A.H.[168]
Having finished with Jamal (Jamādi al-Thāni, 36 A.H.), ‘Ali
refocused himself on Syria. Jarīr ibn ‘Abdullah al-Bajalī was deputed
to persuade Mu‘āwiyah to come under the caliphal umbrella and
avoid causing schism in the Ummah. Mu‘āwiyah dilly-dallied the
answer. His mind was already set on defiance. ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ’
advice made him firm. Both thought the Jamal incident had deprived
‘Ali of a united army. Iraq, his stronghold, was wayward while Syria
was solidly behind Mu‘āwiyah.[169] Meanwhile, availing his stay in
Syria, Jarīr met several influential people to convince them that ‘Ali
had no hand in ‘Uthmān’s killing. Upset by Jarīr’s successful moves,
Mu‘āwiyah asked someone to prime a couple of witnesses for
testimony before the Syrians as to ‘Ali’s involvement in ‘Uthmān’s
death. The man brought five witnesses to the effect.[170]
Eventually the two protagonists met at Ṣiffīn – a place close to
the west bank of the Euphrates. Mu‘āwiyah had already made sure
that the river’s water was under his control. With no choice left, ‘Ali
fought his way to the river to break the siege and asked his troops to
let the opponents have the water as well.[171]
In Dhi al-Ḥajjah before the hostilities started off, ‘Ali sent a
delegation to Mu‘āwiyah for final persuasion but his response was
not encouraging.
When in Muḥarram 37 A.H. hostilities were disrupted, ‘Ali sent
another delegation led by ‘Adiy ibn Ḥātim to Mu‘āwiyah to persuade
him to accept ‘Ali’s caliphate as other than him people have given
their consent to his leadership. Mu‘āwiyah’s repeated his previous
stand though with a spin added to it. “He should deliver ‘Uthmān’s
assassins to us so that we kill them. We will then abide by your
suggestion and will merge ourselves with the jamā ‘at (community).”
Mu‘āwiyah followed with another delegation led by Ḥabīb ibn
Maslamah al-Fihri, with a new proposal. “If you claim you are a
nonparty in ‘Uthmān’s death, then those who have indulged in his
murder should be delivered to us. We will kill them, followed by your
resignation from the caliphate so that the new caliph is inducted by
mutual consultation of the Muslims.”[172]
In Ṣaffar, 37 A.H., the battle entered the decisive phase. But
even in a conflict of that magnitude, ‘Ali abided by the Sharī‘ah
demand and asked his troops not to violate it:
Beware! Do not start the war by yourself unless
they attack you. And when you defeat them, avoid killing
the one who flees; do not lay your hand on the injured
nor should you expose anybody’s person, or mutilate the
killed. Nor should you enter a house, snatch their
belongings, or retaliate even when women abuse you.[173]
On the following day of ‘Ammār’s death (Ṣaffar 10), when the
Mu‘āwiyah army was about to flee, ‘Amr ibn al-Āṣ suggested that
their troops should mount the Qur’ān on their spears and shout:
Hādhā ḥaka.mun baynanā wa baynakum – this is the judge between
us.”
Rationalizing his suggestion, ‘Amr said, “This will cause split
in ‘Ali’s camp. Some will say it should be accepted and some will
insist on refusing it. In consequence, we will stay together, and they
will be disunited. If they agreed [to proposal] we will have a lease on
time.”[174]
 This obviously was a game plan. Making the Qur’ān as arbiter
was not their objective. Accordingly, the Mu‘āwiyah army raised the
Qur’ān on their spears and the result came out as was scripted by
‘Amr. ‘Ali tried persuading the Iraqi faction in his army not to be
seduced by the opponents’ trap and let the war go to its desired end,
but they did not listen to his pleas.
Thus left with no alternative, he was forced to make the
mediation agreement with Mu‘āwiyah as suggested by him. But
when the time for appointing the mediators came, he faced the same
dilemma. While Mu‘āwiyah had no problem with his nominee, ‘Amr
ibn al-‘Āṣ, ‘Ali’s choice for ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbās, met opposition from
the Iraqi segment who objected to him for his being ‘Ali’s cousin.
They wanted to have a neutral person. With consensus tilting in
favour of Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari he had him go. ‘Ali rightly felt that Abū
Mūsā did not have in him the material needed for the occasion.[175]
7. The sixth phase
Last chance as it was to save the caliphate from receding into
monarchial absolutism, it was vital that the two arbiters had given
their verdict in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The
chronicles profiled the agreement as under:
Both arbiters must act in the light of what they find
in the Book of Allah. And what they do not find in Allah’s
Book they should act in accordance with the just,
comprehensive, non-controversial Sunnah.[176]
But when in Daūmat al-Jandal the two arbiters sat for
resolving the issue, they never looked into it from the Sharī‘ah
perspective. The Qur’ān had this injunction that if the fight between
two Muslim groups breaks out, the rebel group should be forced to
correct its aberrant attitude.[177]
‘Ammār’s death had identified the rebel group in the light of
the prophetic saying. The corpus of hadith also contained instruction
on obeying the duly inducted amīr. The methodology for blood
revenge was also available in the Sharī‘ah to determine if the blood
revenge issue had been raised rightly or wrongly. The agreement on
mediation did not ask the two arbiters to adjudicate the caliphal
issue.
 But when they met together, ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ asked Abū Mūsā
al-Ash‘ari if he had a solution to the problem?
He said: “In my view we should remove the two
(contenders) and leave the caliphal issue to the Muslims
to decide through consultation.”
‘Amr agreed: “You have come up with the right solution.”
Thereafter the two walked to the audience, consisting of four
hundred people from each side, with some neutral individuals among
them. ‘Amr asked Abū Mūsa to recount the agreed decision to them.
Sensing trouble, ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbās intervened with Abū
Mūsā and suggested that agreed decisions should be announced by
‘Amr.
“I am afraid you have been trapped,” he said.
“I have no such fear. Our decision is unanimous,” replied Abū
Mūsā.
Then he rose to speak. “I and my friend (‘Amr) have agreed to
a point that we remove ‘Ali and Mu‘āwiyah allowing people to choose
their own amīr. I, therefore, dismiss ‘Ali and Mu‘āwiyah. You can now
take the matter in your own hands and decide for yourselves the
amīr you want.
Thereafter ‘Amr spoke: “You have heard what he has said. He
has removed his principal and I too like him seek his principal’s
removal and retain my principal for he is wali to ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān,
the claimant to his blood, by far his most deserving successor.”
That this sent Abū Mūsā into repulsion should not be
surprising. Latching on to him he said: Mā laka lā wa faka Allah,
ghad rata wa fajrata – what have you done? May Allah deprive you
of the ability (taūfīq) to do good – you played deception (on me) and
violated the agreement.”
Equally disturbed Sa‘d ibn abi Waqqāṣ vented his sadness on
Abū Mūsā:
“Woe to you Abū Mūsā. You turned out to be a
very weak (person) before ‘Amr’s vile deceits.”
“What should I do now? This man agreed with me
on a point and then broke it,” exclaimed Abū Mūsā.
“If Abū Mūsā had died before (the agreement) it
would have been better for him,” observed ‘Abd al-
 Raḥmān ibn abī Bakr.
Mired in grief, ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar exclaimed, “Look at the
calamity that this Ummah has fallen into. Its future was confided into
the hands of two such individuals – one cared less about what he
was doing and the other was weak.”[178]
In fact, none of the audiences had any doubt about the
agreement that Abū Mūsā had spelled out in his speech. They also
knew that ‘Amr’s conduct was repugnant to the agreed formula.
The rest is history. ‘Amr went to Mu‘āwiyah and gave him the
glad tiding of the caliphate. And Abū Mūsā overtook by shame and
not having the courage to eye ‘Ali left for Makkah.[179]
While explaining ‘Amr’s role in the incident Ibn Kathīr says
that “he did not consider it wise to leave people without the imam, for
he thought the then prevailing discord among the people might push
them into a long strife. Thus, for expediency sake he retained
Mu‘āwiyah – and ijtihād (one’s reasoned judgment) could be right as
well as wrong.”[180]
Ibn Kathīr is of course entitled to his opinion but any fair-
minded person who reads the whole proceeding from the raising of
the Qur’ān to the agreed formula and the way ‘Amr acted will find it
hard to accept it was “ijtihād”.
Undoubtedly, the Prophet’s Ṣaḥābah enjoy an exalted status
with us and by all means they are worthy of our unqualified respect.
We also think that it will be great injustice and an act of barbarity if
someone, because of their certain judgmental error, forgets their
otherwise unblemished record of services to the cause of Islam and
adopt irreverent attitude to them.
But it will be equally unfair if we club together the errors of
great men in history into ijtihād. Would it be then possible for us to
stop the coming generations from committing such ijtihādāt?
In fact, ijtihād (reasoned judgment) embodies an utmost effort
to find the truth. Should an error take place in the process of finding
the truth, it will still qualify for the reward from Allah. To act, however,
intentionally in the wrong direction does not fall under ijtihād. In fact,
in such matters both immoderation and indulging in excesses
leading to a blanket condemnation of his whole person needs
restrain.
 Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ is an elder of repute; it is equally true that in
Islam’s spread he played a great role. But on these two occasions,
he made judgments which cannot be described anything but
incorrect.
Setting aside the conflicting views on what the two mediators
did, the whole proceedings in Daūmat al-Jandal were contrary to the
agreement of mediation. The two assumed that they had the
authority to dismiss ‘Ali from his caliphal office despite the fact that
he was constitutionally elected. Equally wrong was their assumption
that Mu‘āwiyah was claimant to the caliphate. The fact of the matter
is that until that time he was only clamouring revenge for ‘Uthmān’s
blood.
That is why ‘Ali rejected their decision. In his post-rejection speech,
he said:
“Listen, the two individuals that you made
mediators have set aside the Qur’ānic ruling and have
followed their own thoughts without Allah’s guidance and
have given verdict, which is not based on an explicit
injunction or the past Sunnah. Their views varied and
they did not reach the right decision.”[181]
On reaching Kūfah, ‘Ali started preparation for bringing Syria
back to the fold of his caliphate. His speeches during this turbulent
period reveal a disturbed mind that feared the imminent imposition of
monarchy on the Ummah and how desperately he tried to save the
rightly guided caliphate from man-made systems. In one of his talks,
he says:
“By Allah, if these people became your rulers, they will
follow the ways of Kisrā and Heraclius.”[182]
On another occasion he says:
“Stand up to those who crave absolute powers
so that they could prevail on Allah-created humans and
turn them into their slaves.”[183]
But the Iraqis had lost their resolve; the emergent Khawārij
mischief was compounding the situation. Besides, Mu‘āwiyah and
‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ further succeeded in wresting Egypt and North Africa
from ‘Ali’s fold. The Islamic world was now practically fractured into
two hostile camps. The split situation, however, ended with ‘Ali’s
shahādah in Ramādān 40 A.H., followed by Hasan’s reconciliatory
attitude that cleared Mu‘āwiyah’s passage to absolute power.
With ‘Ali gone and the new players in power, it soon became
obvious even to neutral observers the high stakes that made him
lose his life. This sense of deprivation found its echo in ‘Abdullah ibn
‘Umar’s late-life lamentation: “I have no regrets other than the fact
that I did not support ‘Ali.”[184]
Ibrāhīm al-Nakh‘i says that Masrūq ibn Ajda‘ used to repent
and say istighfār (seeking forgivness from Allah) on his inability to
support ‘Ali.[185]
Same were the feelings of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, who
had a lingering sense of shame on his favouring Mu‘āwiyah over ‘Ali.
During this tumultuous period, ‘Ali’s conduct by and large
remained impeccable, reminiscent of a rightly guided caliph, with a
caveat however which cannot be defended. After the Jamal battle,
he changed his attitude towards ‘Uthmān’s killers. Until Jamal, he
tolerated them because of the compulsive situation he found himself
in and sought time to deal with them. When he sent Qa‘qā‘ ibn ‘Amr
to Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah, Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr, the former assured them
saying: “‘Ali has deferred action against the killers of ‘Uthmān until
he has power to punish them. Your pledge of support to ‘Ali (at this
moment) will make it easier to avenge ‘Uthmān’s blood.”[186]
In a sitting just before the Jamal, Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubayd Allah
accused him of being responsible for ‘Uthmān’s death, which he
countered by saying “l‘an Allah qatalah ‘Uthmān – Allah curse be on
‘Uthmān’s killers.”[187]
But after then, the rebels steadily gained influence over him;
so much so that he gave governorship to Mālik ibn Hārith al-Ashtar
and Muḥammad ibn abī-Bakr the main culprits in killing ‘Uthmān.
This is the only aspect of his governance that constrains us to call it
inappropriate.
Some critics also say that following ‘Uthmān’s practice ‘Ali
gave important posts to his relatives. They cite in this respect the
names of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Ubaydullah ibn ‘Abbās, Qutham ibn
‘Abbās and so forth. But these critics forget that ‘Ali gave offices at
the time when those who were capable to wield them had withheld
their support to him, and others had gone to the opposite side while
the desertion in his own camp was high.
Forced thus, he had to rely on those whom he could trust.
Certainly this situation has no parallel with the ‘Uthmān’s for he had
a large pool of capable people that he could trust, with no
compulsion to depend on his relatives.
8. The last phase
The power transfer to Mu‘āwiyah was still an interim phase,
but but the people who could read the normative change knew that
the dynastic rule was now imminent. Thus when after his bai‘ah
(oath), Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ met Mu‘āwiyah, he greeted him:
“As-salāmu ‘alayk ayyuhal malik – greetings to you O king!”
Mu‘āwiyah felt the pinch and could not help say it:
“What wrong would it have made if you had called
me amīr al-mu’minīn?”
Sa‘d promptly corrected him:
“By Allah, if I had the chance to have this
government the way you had it, I would have refused it.”
[188]
Mu‘āwiyah himself knew it. One time he himself
acknowledged, “I am the first king (among the Muslims).” [189]
With the assumption of power by Mu‘āwiyah, the sole
possibility of rebound to the real caliphate laid in his hands if only he
had amended himself and left the issue of his succession to the
Muslims. Or in case he wanted to avert post-death conflictive
situation he could have called for the assembly of the wise and the
pious to name someone suitable for the Muslim leadership. But
unfortunately by naming his son Yazīd as his successor and
coercing people to accept him, he foreclosed such a possibility.
That done, Mu‘āwiyah wrote to Ziyād the governor of Baṣrah
for his opinion on the matter. Ziyād sent for ‘Ubayd ibn Ka‘b al-
Numyari, asking him to go to Mu‘āwiyah and inform him that Yazīd
had certain weakness in his character which called for caution, and
that making any hasty decision about succession might become
counter productive. ‘Ubayd advised caution to Ziyād for he thought it
might invite hostility from Mu‘āwiyah. Instead, he suggested he
would go to Yazīd and inform him that Amīr al-Mu’mīnīn has sought
advice from Ziyād for his naming Yazīd as his successor, and he
thought people would oppose him, for they did not like some of his
ways. He should thus improve himself so that his succession was
carried through. Ziyād liked ‘Ubayd’s modifier.
In Damascus, ‘Ubayd first met Yazīd and advised him to
improve his ways and later met Mu‘āwiyah to restrain the move for
succession.[190]
After Ziyād’s death (53 A.H.), Mu‘āwiyah began groundwork
for Yazīd’s succession. As a starter, he tried to persuade prominent
individuals like ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar for his bai‘ah to Yazīd. He
refused to support him.
Ignoring objections, Mu‘āwiyah turned to the Madīnah
governor Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam to ask people their opinion on the
succession issue. Marwān presented the proposal to the Madinese,
who consented to the idea in general. But when Marwān spoke to
the people in Masjid al-Nabawi, he faced a distraught audience.
“Amīr al-Mu’mīnīn,” he said, “has spared no effort in finding a
suitable person for you in naming his son Yazīd as his successor.
That Allah has inspired him with this excellent choice. Nor is the
successor idea an innovation. Abū Bakr and ‘Umar had also
nominated their successors.”
Disturbed by the distortion, ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn abī Bakr spoke out:
“You made a lie O Marwān and so has Mu‘āwiyah. You do not
have the well-being of Muḥammad’s Ummah close to your heart. You
want to turn (caliphate) into Caesarism – when a Caesar died his
son took over. This is not the Sunnah of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar. They
never named their sons as their successors.”
Taking courage from ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn abī Bakr, al-Ḥusayn
ibn ‘Ali and others like ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar, ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr
also refused to give their pledge to Yazīd. [191]
In the same period, Mu‘āwiyah summoned delegations from
different regions and sought their consent to Yazīd’s succession.
In response, people made conciliatory speeches praising his
nomination but Aḥnaf ibn Qays remained silent. Taking note of his
silence, Mu‘āwiyah asked: “Abū Baḥr, what do you say?” Forced
thus he said:
 “If we tell the truth we face your wrath. If we lie, we face
Allah’s wrath. Amīr al-Mū’mīnīn, you know everything about Yazīd –
his nights and days, his private and public life, his ins and outs. If
you really think he is good for Allah and this Ummah, then do not
seek anybody’s advice. And if you are convinced he is something
else then while going to the hereafter do not relegate the world to
him. As for we are concerned, our task is to follow what you say.” [192]
After obtaining bai‘ah (oath) from Iraq, Syria and other
regions, Mu‘āwiyah himself came to al-Ḥijāz for it was the heartland
of Islam populated by eminent individuals who mattered and would
have resisted the succession issue. At the outskirts of Madīnah, he
was met by al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Ali, ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, ‘Abdullah ibn
‘Umar and ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr. But the matter did not
materialize, and they left the city for Makkah making his task easy.
Finished with Madīnah, he went to Makkah and asked for
audience with four of them. They met him outside Makkah. His
attitude was of deference to them. He made them part of his
entourage and together they entered the city. Later, in private he
tried to persuade them to give their support to Yazīd’s succession.
‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr was the first to respond:
“You may follow one of three options: Either you
follow the Prophet (ṣal.lal.lahu ‘alayhi wa-sallam) and
name no one as your successor. People will themselves
elect someone as their caliph, as they did by naming Abū
Bakr or you go for the model that Abū Bakr followed
when he nominated a person of ‘Umar’s caliber, who was
not his relative or you follow the way of ‘Umar who
proposed a six-member [electoral] shūrā, which did not
have anyone from his sons.”
Mu‘āwiyah asked the rest about the issue. They said they
agreed with Ibn al-Zubayr. Mu‘āwiyah flushed with anger.
With the last knell driven in the coffin of the caliphate, the
dynastic rule entrenched itself. So lasting was this change that
thereafter Muslims never had the blessed caliphate again.
We have no dispute with Amīr Mu‘āwiyah’s merits, his status
of being a Ṣaḥabi also deserves our respect and so are his services
in bringing the divided world of Islam under one flag and extending
its domain far and wide. Anyone who abuses him does wrong. He
has made, however, certain decisions, which changed the caliphate
into monarchy.
 Chapter Five

The Difference between the Caliphate and Monarchy

We have so far discussed in detail how the caliphate passed

through different phases to jel into monarchial rule. From this
discourse, it becomes obvious that the Muslims’ loss of the rightly
guided caliphate was not an accidental event that suddenly
happened. Some causative factors were at play in its pulverization. It
was also obvious that at each phase there were openings when they
could have averted the fall. But unfortunate as it was for the Muslim
Ummah and in fact the humanity at large, the causative factors
proved stronger than everything else, and none of the openings
could be made use of in making the turn around.
We will now discuss the qualitative difference between the
caliphate and monarchial absolutism. What was the nature of
change that it formulated on the collective life of the Muslim people?
1. The procedural change in the caliph’s induction
The first primary change occurred in the constitutional mode
of the caliph’s induction. The rightly guided caliphate made sure that
no person sought for the caliphal office other than through people’s
consent, the final arbiters of his suitability. In other words, bai‘ah (the
allegiance pledge) should not be the consequence of a person being
in power but the cause of it – something obtained freely without his
effort or conspiracy.
In the rightly guided caliphate, all the four caliphs came into
power through this constitutional mechanism. None manipulated the
situation; rather, they were impelled into the caliphal office. One can
cite ‘Ali’s case – of his desire to be the caliph. But the most one can
say is that he considered himself more qualified for the caliphate
than others. History, however, is bereft of any such evidence that he
ever tried to obtain it. To think himself suitable for the job is thus not
violative of the constitutional mechanism. In fact, all the four caliphs
abided by this Shar‘ī principle: people confered caliphate on them,
not that they forcibly obtained it.
 The mulukīyah (monarchy) had its beginning by the change in
the electoral mechanism. Amīr Mu‘āwiyah’s coming into power did
not encapsulate the principle of consensual caliphate. He sought it
by force without people’s mandate and when he got it, he extracted
post-caliphal oath of allegiance. Denying him oath at that point in
time would not have caused his ouster. Rather, it would have led to
disorder and further bloodshed, which none would have preferred
over peace and order. That explains why after Ḥasan’s abdication
(Rabi‘ al-Awwal, 41 A.H.) the Ṣaḥābah, tābi‘un and the pious of the
Ummah agreed on his allegiance oath, for they saw in it the end to
disorder and conflicts.
Mu‘āwiyah himself understood it. In the beginning of his caliphate
while addressing the Madinans, he said:
“By Allah, while taking hold of your government I
was not unaware of the fact that you were displeased
over my succession to power. In this respect, I know well
what stirs in your hearts. But I have taken (the
government) by the force of this sword. Now if you think
that I am not delivering your right to you, then content
yourselves with the little you have from me.”[193]
Obviously, this heralded the era of despotism and monarchial
rule in which the rulers freed themselves from the caliphal constraint
and where power transfer was dynastic and not through people’s
consent. Bai‘ah became peripheral – neither for the origination of
power nor the causal factor in the removal from office. In the
process, people lost their assertive will, for they knew they were
inconsequential in the power play. And where they dared they were
taught lesson.
Would the government obtained through power become
legitimate once it entrenches itself? Such a discussion is
meaningless for it is not the real issue. The issue that calls for
consideration is whether Islam authorizes the path to caliphal office
by force or through consent – the way the rightly guided caliphs were
inducted into the seat of power, or the way Mu‘āwiyah and his
successors conducted themselves. Obviously, there are two ways to
do a thing. One which is Islam-given; the other which is differently
done and once it takes place, then Islam tells us to bear with it for
otherwise the effort to change it might bring about a situation worse
than before. The two cannot be equated. It would be extremely
unjust to say that Islam considers them equally right. The first is not
merely just but desired. The second is a compromise, tolerated but
not desired.
2. The change in the rulers’ lifestyle
The second change that became evident pertained to
attitudinal changes. Kings in the guise of caliphs went after the ways
of Caesar and Kisrā substituting the lifestyle of the Prophet (‘alayhi
as-salām) and the rightly guided caliphs. They started living in the
opulence of the royal palaces; guarded by the security forces and
intermediaries which distanced them from the people, making it
almost impossible for the common men to reach them.
In consequence, they became dependent on the functionaries
of the state about the plight of the people – a far cry from the way the
rightly guided caliphs conducted themselves, who always preferred
to stay linked with the people. They visited bazaars where people
could see them, touch them and talked to them. They performed
five-time Ṣalāh (prayers) in the masjid with people and in their Friday
sermons would inform the congregation not only about their rights
and obligations in Islam but also about the affairs of the state and its
policies. They encouraged questions, redressed complaints and
never got upset by their accountability. ‘Ali followed the approach
even when there were threats to his life in Kūfah.
The monarchial rule following the Caesar and Kisrā way,
however, brought changes averse to Muslim temper.
3. Change in Bayt al-Māl
The third equally important change occurred in their attitude
was towards bayt al-māl (public treasury). Islam held bayt al-māl as
a trust given to the caliphs by Allah in behalf of the people whose
use was not allowed to be personalized – neither anything added to
it nor expended from it, without respect to the parameters set by the
Sharī‘ah. They were accountable no matter what they did to it. For
his personal living, he could dip into it only to the extent of an
average man’s living and nothing else.
The monarchial rule changed its complexion as well as
character of its dispensation. From trust, it turned into royal property.
People who used to be its owners became its recipients as royal
subjects. The way the royalty and the state functionaries lived was
obscene, possible only because they usurped it.
When ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz restored the rightly guided
caliphate, he began the clean-up operation first with the ruling family.
As a personal example, he surrendered his inherited property that
generated 40,000 dinār worth of yearly income. This included
income from Fadak, which after the Prophet’s death had become
part of the treasury in the caliphal setup. Abū Bakr even refused its
deliverance to the Prophet’s daughter. But when Marwān ibn al-
Ḥakam assumed power, he appropriated Fadak as his personal
property, later inherited by his sons.[194]
This being its dispensation, the incoming revenue also
became questionable erasing the vital distinction between Ḥalāl
(allowed) and Ḥarām (not allowed). In one of his decrees ‘Umar ibn
‘Abdul-‘Aziz spelled out those wrong taxes that his predecessors
extorted from the people.[195] Its reading reveals how ruthlessly they
violated the Sharī‘ah injunctions on the revenue collection. The
greatest injustice, however, was inflicted on the new Muslims who
were subjected to jizyah (social security tax) on the pretext that their
Islam was a simulation to save themselves from paying the tax.
Gross as it was, they preferred taxes over the spread of Islam.
Ibn al-Athīr reports that his tax collectors had informed him
that the dhimmīs were embracing Islam in large numbers settling in
Basrah and Kūfah, which had caused decrease in revenues from
jizyah and kharāj, Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf. Ḥajjāj responded by ordering
their expulsion from the cities and the re-imposition of jizyah on
them. Driven thus out, the new Muslims wept crying yā
Muḥammadah! yā Muḥammadah! So helpless and pathetic a
condition they were in that they found no recourse to the redress of
their plight.
Touched by their plight, the ‘ulamā and jurists rose in protest
and while the new Muslims were being driven out of the cities they
cried too.[196] When ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz became the caliph, a
delegation from Khurāsān came to see him, and complained against
the governor that thousands of people who had embraced Islam
have been re-subjected to jizyah (social security tax) by him. So
great was the governor’s prejudice, they said, that he had been
loudly saying: “A person from my nation is dearer to me than
hundred others.”
Disturbed, ‘Umar dismissed al-Jarrah ibn ‘Abdullah al-Hākmi
from governorship. In his dismissal decree he wrote: “Allah sent
Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh as a da‘iy (caller to the truth) and not as a
tax collector.”[197]
4. The end of freedom
A still vital change involved loss of freedoms for the Muslims,
especially in the exercise of amr bil ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar
(social obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil), even though Islam
had made its discharge binding on the Muslims. For sure, an Islamic
society and state could only have preserved their ethos if the
Ummah’s conscience had maintained its spark and its tongue free –
if they could bring to task the highest office of the land and say what
they thought was right.
The rightly guided caliphate made sure that the freedom value
is not only preserved but also encouraged in the people. Those who
disagreed with them they honoured them; they responded to their
detractors’ criticism in a rightful, sincere way. But in the era of
monarchy their tongues were silenced and conscience muffled. The
mouth could now only be opened for praise or else silent. And if the
stirrings in one’s conscience were strong enough to resist and
inclined towards expressing it, then be ready for incarceration,
lashes and even death. That is why those who refused to abide by
the despotic rule were subjected to the worst kind of punishments so
much so that the whole Ummah got scared of them.
The new policy of governmental intolerance started in Amīr
Mu‘āwiyah’s reign when Hujr ibn ‘Adiy was executed in 51 A.H. He
was a pious Ṣaḥābi – a front runner in acts of goodness, a man of
high calibre among the pious of the Ummah. Seeing ‘Ali abused in
official pronouncements, he deeply felt the hurt like rest of the
Muslims, who bore it in silence. One day he could not take it further
and in response condemned Mu‘āwiyah, while praising ‘Ali.
As long as Mughīrah ibn Shu‘bah held al-Baṣrah’s
governorship he ignored him. But with the administrative merge of
Baṣrah with Kūfah and Ziyād its sole governor, Hujr’s vulnerability
increased. Ziyād used to abuse ‘Ali and in return he would defend
him. In one of the jumu‘ah prayers when Ziyād prolonged it, he
objected to it, which the former did not like. And eventually he
nabbed him along with his twelve companions. To build up the case
against him, he forced a large number of people to testify that “they
formed a group which abuses the caliph openly and invites people to
fight Amīr al-Mū’minīn. Their claim is that the caliphate justifiably
belonged to ‘Ali’s progeny and none else. They cooked rebellion in
the city and drove the city administrator out. They support Abū Turāb
(‘Ali) and send their salutation to him and abuse his opponents.”
Among the witnesses Qāḍī Shurayh’s name was also
included but in a separate letter to Mu‘āwiyah he absolved himself: “I
have heard that among the testimony against Hujr ibn ‘Adiy, my
witnessing is also included. My real witnessing is that he establishes
Ṣalāh (prayer), gives Zakāh (poor-due), frequently performs ‘Umrah
and Ḥajj, calls for goodness and forbids others from wrong. His
blood and property are Ḥarām. You have the discretion to kill him or
forgive him.”
In this way, Hujr and his companions were sent to Mu‘āwiyah
who ordered for their execution. Before their death, the executioners
asked them to repent: “We have been told that if you declare your
separation from ‘Ali and curse him you will be set free; otherwise,
you will be killed.”
None of them agreed. Hujr however added: “I cannot
verbalize something that might annoy my Provider and Master!”
This tragic incident shocked every righteous person. ‘Ā’ishah
and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar were saddened beyond words. She had
already written a letter to Mu‘āwiyah urging him to spare Hujr. Later
on when he came to see her, she reprimanded him: “O Mu‘āwiyah,
you did not fear Allah while killing Hujr.”
Mu‘āwiyah’s governor in Khurāsān Rabi‘ ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārithī
was so overwhelmed by grief on Hujr’s execution that on hearing the
news he cried out: “O Allah, if in your knowledge there is any
remnant of goodness left in me, then raise me from this world.”
Hujr’s death was not an isolated act; it became the state
policy to use force in suppressing dissent. Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam
while he was Madīnah’s governor kicked Miswar ibn Makhramah
because he objected to something he had uttered by characterizing
it as bad.[198]
This policy of repression eventually made Muslims low
spirited and compromising. Those who dared to speak out began to
decrease among them. Sycophancy and selling conscience fetched
higher values in the marketplace while truthfulness and integrity lost
its price. Those with calibre, honest and conscientious felt alienated
from governmental setup and people lost interest in the nation’s
affairs. They ended up as spectators to the incoming and outgoing
administration. The moral state of society declined to unbelievable
low level of degradation. An instance speaks of it. ‘Ali ibn Ḥusayn
(Imām Zayn al-‘Ābidīn) recounts an event that involved him. He says
that after the tragedy of Karbalah a person stole him to his house
and treated him very well. Every time the man saw him he cried,
giving him the impression as if he was the only one in the world who
really cared. At that very moment, a public crier announced ‘Ubayd
Allah ibn Ziyād’s 300-dirham bounty on his head. As he heard it, he
came to him, his eyes brimming with tears, and began to tie his
hands to his neck. Then, while still crying, he took him to Ibn Ziyād
and obtained his reward.[199]
5. The end of the judicial freedom
Among the principles of governance, the judiciary’s
independence from the administration was crucial to its just
functioning. Even though in the rightly guided caliphate the
appointment of the qāḍī was done by the caliphs but once inducted,
they operated free from any pressure other than Allah’s fear and the
compulsions of their conscience. None could dare interfere in the
proceedings of the courts. The qāḍī could summon the caliph and
give decision against him. But when dynastic despotism replaced the
caliphate, the judiciary also suffered. The rulers claimed judicial
immunity not only for themselves but also for their functionaries
including princes, governors and other state dignitaries, making it
difficult to obtain justice against them. This by itself was enough of a
reason for capable upright ‘ulamā to decline royal offers of judicial
occupancy. And he who accepted would invite cynicism from the
people. So great was the administrative encroachment on the judicial
terrain that even governors got the powers to install and remove
qāḍī.[200]
6. The end of the shūrā-based government
Still another important aspect of the Islamic state was its
shūrā-based polity. It ran its affairs with consultation, especially of
people who were knowledgeable, pious, honest, and whom people
believed were capable of giving sound advice. In the rightly guided
caliphate, the best among the Ummah were their advisors; they were
fearless and could give their opinion in a forthright manner. Their
presence as consultants to the government made it sure that it would
run on the right track. People recognized them as ahl al-hall wa
al-‘aqd. But monarchial rule changed this aspect as well. In place of
shūrā, arbitrary personal decisions formed the pattern of policy-
making. Knowledgeable truth seekers distended themselves from
the kings and the kings distanced themselves from such people.
Now their consultative circle included governors, their courtiers and
the nobles among the royal family.
With a change of this magnitude vacuum was created. The
non-presence of an authorized institution that could match its talent
with the evolving larger civilization and make timely decisions that
could have played its role in developing the Islamic laws became a
problematic.
The royal council could make good or bad decisions
concerning administration, internal or external matters and general
policy issues, but it lacked competence to develop law. Even if they
had tried doing so, people’s collective conscience would not have
swallowed it. They knew their position well and the people also
recognized them as wrong doers. In other words, they lacked moral
and legislative competence. To fill this vacuum, the ‘ulamā and jurists
issued religious edicts or interpreted the text in their teaching circles.
Same went with the quḍā who in making court decisions used either
their ijtihād or some scholarly opinion. This helped though in the
growth of law but it did create a kind of a legal anarchy in the state.
For almost a century, there was no codified law that the courts could
have followed and gave uniformed decisions.
7. The rise of racial and nationalistic biases
 The advent of the monarchial governance also saw the
resurfacing of the old jahili social, ethnic and tribalistic biases, which
Islam had so assiduously dissolved to create one Ummah with equal
rights for everyone. The Umayyad government from the beginning
was a partisan setup: it was less Islamic and more Arab in which
there was no common equation between the Arab Muslims and the
non-Arab Muslims. So much so that in violation of the Sharī‘ah, it
imposed jizyah on the new Muslims. This not only scuttled the
chances for the Islamic spread but also gave non-Arabs the feelings
that the Islamic conquests have made them subordinate to the Arabs
and that even if they accepted Islam, they would not be equal to
them.
This further aggravated the matter. Even in Ṣalāh, judicial
occupancy and administrative appointments consideration was given
to a person’s Arab origin. In Kūfah, Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf (perhaps to
ensure proper pronunciation) ordered that none other than an Arab
should be made the imam of the Ṣalāh.[201] When they arrested Sa‘id
ibn Jubayr and brought him to Ḥajjāj he reminded his favour to him
that it was he who made him imām, a non-Arab.[202]
The rise of the Sh‘ūbiyyah (‘Ajami nationalism) and the spread
of the ‘Abbāsid message against the Umayyads in Khurāsān owed
much to such non-Islamic attitudes. The ‘Abbāsid made use of their
hatred against the Arabs, and the non-Arabs supported them hoping
that the revolution thus engineered would help them break the Arab
hold in the Islamic domain.
The Umayyad narrow-mindedness was not peculiar to non-
Arabs alone; once they ignited parochial and ethnic prejudices, the
fire spread among the Arabs as well, and split them along the
tribalistic line. The old feuds between ‘Adnāni and Qahtāni, Yamani
and Mudari, Azd and Tamīm, Kalb and Qays resurfaced again. The
administration itself used one tribe against another and their
governors openly favoured their own tribes at the expense of other
identities and interests. Because of these disastrous policies, the
inter feuds between Yamani and Mudari aggravated to such an
extent that by making them fight against each other Abu Muslim
Khurāsāni succeeded in overthrowing the Umayyad dynasty. Ibn
Kathīr says that when the ‘Abbāsid’s forces assaulted Damascus the
capital was rife with Yamani-Mudari prejudicial warfare. Even
masājid (mosques) were not spared. In the central masjid two imams
used to lead separate prayers and made separate khutbah (pre-
Ṣalāh speech). None from these groups was willing to make Ṣalāh
with others.[203]
8. Marginalization of law
The greatest calamity that befell Muslims in the monarchial
era was the breach from the Sharī‘ah rule, though the very purpose
of the Islamic state was its uniform application over all aspects of life,
without discrimination to any class of people – enemy or friend,
Muslim or non-Muslim, a law-abiding citizen or a rebel. The Sharī‘ah
insists on observing its parameters.
The rightly guided caliphs without exception followed the
Sharī‘ah. For example, ‘Uthmān and ‘Ali even under most distressing
circumstances did not overstep the Shar‘ī parameters, for the four
caliphs knew their limits: they were not monarchial absolutists.
But with the advent of monarchy the kings became selective
with the Sharī‘ah; in many cases subjecting it to their personal
considerations. True, they retained majority of the Islamic laws, the
courts also made decisions in their light and the daily run of the
affairs conducted accordingly, but they never subordinated their
politics to them. In this respect, they cared less for the limits of Ḥalāl
(allowed) and Ḥarām (disallowed).
Imām al-Zuhrī says that during the Prophet and the rightly
guided caliphs’ era the kāfir (nonbeliever) could inherit from neither a
Muslim nor a Muslim from a kāfir. Mu‘āwiyah allowed Muslims to
inherit from a non-Muslim relative but denied inheritance to a kāfir
(nonbeliever) from a Muslim. ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz restored the
sunnah by retracting the violation. Hishām ibn ‘Abd al-Malik,
however, brought it back.[204]
Ibn Kathīr says that even in diyah (blood-money) matters,
which allowed equal diyah to both Muslim and contractual non-
Muslims, Mu‘āwiyah altered the Sunnah by making it half for the
non-Muslim while the other half he appropriated to himself.[205] Yet
another bad practice was introduced by him to continue criticizing
the ‘Ali for not taking action against the killers of caliph ‘Uthman but
also ordered his governors to follow the practice from the pulpits in
the masājid.
‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Azīz, when he came into power, stop the
practice of criticising ‘Ali by the following Qur’ānic āyah (al-Nahl: 90)
in the Friday khutbah:
Innal.lah ya’ muru bil ‘adl. wal. ihsān wa ‘itā zil qurbā wa
yanhā…
Even in distributing war spoils, there was a departure from the
clear injunctions of the Book of Allah and the Prophet’s Sunnah,
which allows one-fifth share to treasury and the remainder four
shares to the combatants involved in the war. The new policy laid
down that from the war spoils gold and silver should be sifted for the
ruler and the rest distributed according to the Sharī‘ah.[206]
All this arbitrary use of power was the manifestation of a new
governmental mindset that the governors and the military
commanders were now free to enforce their writ the way they
wanted. Expediency overruled the Sharī‘ah.
9. Yazīd’s reign
Yazīd’s succession carried this practice of ignoring the
Sharī‘ah in political matters further, with serious consequences for
the Muslim Ummah. Three events in this period had cataclysmic
repercussions on the world of Islam.
The first event relates to al-Ḥusayn’s shahādah (martyrdom).
True, he was going to Iraq in response to the people’s request to
unseat Yazīd. And the Yazīd government perceived it as an act of
open rebellion. We would ignore this question whether al-Ḥusayn’s
rising against Yazīd was Islamically right or not.[207] Although we do
not find a single opinion among the Ṣaḥābah and later Muslims
(tābi‘ūn) that his rising was unjustified and that he was out to do a
prohibitory act. Among the Ṣaḥābah who tried to stop him were of
the view that they considered it unwise. But even when we accept
the governmental view as correct, the fact was that he had no army
with him.
All that he had was his family members, thirty-two riders and
forty footmen. Nobody in his sanity would describe it as army. As
against him, ‘Umar ibn Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ led an army of 4,000
soldiers. There was no need to engage this small group and kill
them. They could have encircled and captured them. Al-Ḥusayn
himself said that he would like to go back to Madīnah or that he
might be allowed to go towards a certain border or that he should be
taken to Yazīd. But his proposals were turned down. They wanted to
take him to Ibn Ziyād the governor of al-Kūfah but he had his
reservations. He knew the brutality committed by Ibn Ziyād with
Muslim ibn ‘Aqīl. Thus, they made him fight. Left alone, his
companions all killed, they still attacked him. When he fell wounded
on the ground, they slaughtered him, and his body trampled over by
the horses.
Suppose for a moment that Yazīd’s perception was correct
and that Ḥusayn did rebel against him. Even then, was there no law
in Islam to deal with rebellion? All the authentic fīqh books carry law
on the subject. For example, in Hidāyah Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr (bāb al-
bughāh) alone one can read it. Everything done in Karbalah was
Ḥarām and extremely savage.
What Yazīd said and did in his court in Damascus is subject to
conflicting reports. But we will set aside all those reports and take
the following one as true that he had teary eyes when he saw
Husayn’s and his companion’s heads and said: “I would have been
content with your obedience without killing Ḥusayn. Allah’s curse be
on Ibn Ziyād. By Allah, if I were there, I would have forgiven
Ḥusayn.” He is also reported to have said: “By Allah, Ḥusayn if I
were there facing you, I would have never killed you.”[208]
All said, what punishment did he give to his insane governor
on this savage act? Ibn Kathīr says neither he punished Ibn Ziyād
nor did he remove him, nor did he write a reprimand to him.[209]
The second calamitous event pertained to the battle of Harrah
in 63 A.H., the last days of Yazīd. Briefly stated the people of
Madīnah after having declared Yazīd as fāsiq (violator), fājir (sinner),
and zālim (tyrannical) ousted his governor from the city and instead
asked ‘Abdullah ibn Hanzalah to lead them.
When Yazīd heard about it, he entrusted Muslim ‘Uqbah al-
Murri with 12,000 troops to vacate the city from the rebels’ hold.
His instructions for the occasion were clear: Give them three
days to submit; if they did not, then war against them; and when the
rebellion was smashed free Madīnah to the troops for three days.
 Imām al-Zuhrī says 700 prominent individuals and 10,000
common people were killed. Worse, the savage military (consisting
of non-Muslims) entered homes and violated their privacy. Ibn al-
Kathīr adds that women were also harassed and their privacy
violated.[210]
Conceded that the Madinese revolt was unjustified, but did
Islam justify such a treatment to a rebellious Muslim population or
even to non-Muslims and hostile nonbelievers?
Hence, the situation was particularly disturbing. Madīnah was
not just another city: it was the Prophet’s city about which he had
said, as reported in al-Bukhari, Muslim, and Aḥmad’s Musnad, that
one who did wrong to Madīnah, Allah would punish him.
He also said he who terrifies the people of Madīnah, Allah will
terrify him. Upon him will be the curse of Allah, angels and the whole
of humanity. At the Judgment Day, Allah will not accept anything in
return for this sin.
A second group forbids it merely because it may not lead to
cursing Yazīd’s father or someone from among the Ṣaḥābah.[211]
The third incident relates to their attack on the Ka‘bah as
already stated by Ḥasan Baṣri. The same army that vandalized the
Prophet’s city and raped pious Muslim women was unleashed on
Makkah to punish this time ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr. They brought
catapults to stone the Ka‘bah, demolishing one of its walls. Reports
also exist saying that they fireballed the Ka‘bah. But the fire, as
some reports tell us, could have other causes as well. However,
stoning the Ka‘bah has consensus.[212]
These events obviously proved that the Umayyad dynasty
gave priority to nothing but their hold on power. And from that they
were willing to go as far as they could. In their calculus nothing was
sacred.
10. The Banī Marwān era
The Banī Marwān era was marked by the deepening
separation between dīn and politics. In fact, they could do anything
to obtain their political goals. If it damaged the Sharī‘ah, they gave a
hoot to it.
Ironically, ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān was an eminent faqīh
(jurist). Before he stepped into power, he was ranked in knowledge
with jurists of Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab, ‘Urwah ibn al-Zabayr and
Qabīsah ibn Dhuwayb’s calibre. When on Yazīd’s behest the Ka‘bah
was stoned, he lodged a strong protest. Power, however, changed
him.
On reaching Damascus, the first thing he did was to depute
Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf to Makkah to fight ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr who, with
least regard to the occasion for Ḥajj, stoned the Ka‘bah. This was a
twofold offensive act, for it violated the Makkan as well as the Ḥajj
sanctity. The Umayyads proved themselves even worst than the
jāhili Arabs who would avoid hostilities during the Ḥajj.
The catapult stoning, however, was interrupted on ‘Abdullah
ibn ‘Umar’s intervention for a while so that the pilgrims could perform
the Ḥajj rituals. The pilgrims, however, could not go to Minā nor to
‘Arafāt. As soon as the pilgrims performed Ṭawwāf
(circumambulation), Ḥajjāj called for their expulsion from the
sanctuary, and resumed flinging stones on the Ka‘bah.[213]
Ḥajjāj was undoubtedly the harshest punishment that ‘Abd al-
Malik and his son al-Walīd imposed on the people for twenty long
years, with license to play with their lives and properties. His
involvement in arranging diacritical symbols on the Qur’ānic words is
his singular contribution that humanity will praise forever. The
conquest of Sind (present-day Pakistan) is also among his
achievements that brought Islam to South Asia. All said, even the
whole good deeds of a person cannot compensate for killing a
Muslim without justifiable reason, not to talk of the savage act he
perpetuated in his long rule.
Ironically, it was for this savage governor that ‘Abd al-Malik willed to
his sons:
“Treat Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf well, for it is he who has
paved the way for our rule, subjugated our enemies, and
smashed those who rose against us.”[214]
His will is symptomatic of the mindset with which those people
ruled the Muslim World. Their only concern was their hold on power
for which they were willing to go to any extent even while violating
the Sharī‘ah.
11. The blessed reign of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz
 ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-Aziz ruled only for two and a half years but it
is the only relief in the 92-year Umayyad’s dark rule. What brought a
change in his life was an incident in the year 93 A.H., when he was
the governor of Madīnah. In compliance with al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd al-
Malik’s order, the young Khubayb ibn ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr was
implanted with fifty lashes, followed by the pouring of cold water on
his head in winter and making him stand on the Masjid al-Nabawi’s
door whole day long. Not bearing the rigours of the punishment
Khubayb died.[215]
This was a blatant act of savagery in utter violation of the
Sharī‘ah, which ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz had to carry out much against
his disposition. But so saddened and penitent he felt that he
resigned from the governorship. The subsequent days saw him
withdrawn, soaked with Allah’s fear.
In 99 A.H., he suddenly found himself in power because of
Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Malik’s secret will. His succession was as
much a surprise for him as it was for his family. But his agenda was
all laid out. He decided to make a u-turn toward the caliphate as
fashioned by the Prophet’s Sunnah and the rightly guided caliphs.
His post-bai‘ah speech bared it well:
“They put me into the turmoil of the government,
though I did not desire it nor did they consult me on the
issue, nor did they seek consultation with the Muslims. I
therefore free you from the yoke of your allegiance
pledge to me, giving you the choice to make anyone you
like as the custodian of your affairs.”
The crowd responded with their approval for him. Thereafter he said:
“In fact, there is no difference in this Ummah on
(the issue of) their God, their Prophet and their religious
book. Rather, it is about dinār and dirham. By Allah, I
would not give a thing unrightfully to anyone nor would I
hold someone’s due right.
O People, he who obeys Allah, his obedience is
binding (on you). He who does not obey Allah, his
obedience is not binding on you.
[Thus] as long as I obey Allah, obey me and if I
disobey Him, my obedience is not binding on you.”[216]
 [His induction to the caliphate was a sure indicator that he
would not bear with the Umayyad practices]. His first act was to
finish the royal trappings that his ancestors had acquired to show
their kingly ways and made a return to the caliphal ways of the rightly
guided caliphs. Next, he surrendered his estate that he had inherited
from his parents including his wife’s jewelry to treasury. Out of his
40,000-dinār annual income that he had from his estate, he retained
only 400-dinār worth of property annual income to himself that
rightfully belonged to him.[217]
After clearing himself before his Allah and the Ummah, he
declared that anyone who had a claim against the royal family
should come up with proofs of his ownership, and he would
repatriate him.
This obviously created anger and distress in the Umayyads.
They made protests but he refused to budge from his stance. In
desperation, they asked his paternal aunt Fātimah bint Marwān
whom he held in great esteem, to stop him from degrading the royal
family but he refused:
“When the ruler’s own relatives perpetuate
injustice and he does not redress it, then how would he
stop others from their excesses?”
“Your clan threatens you with serious
consequences,” she cautioned him.
“If I fear anything more than the fear of the
Judgment Day, then I pray that I may not have peace
from that thing [the threat],” he said. His answer was as
firm as was his resolve.
Frustrated, she returned to her clan.
So great was his sense of responsibility that after the burial of
Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Malik when he returned, his face bore signs of
distress and sadness. Asked what made him sad, he said:
“There is not a single person in the Ummah of
Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh spreading from East to West
whose right I do not have to restitute without his asking
for it.”[218]
His wife witnesses that when she entered his room she saw
him weeping on his prayer mat. She asked him the reason for his
crying. He said, “I have taken upon myself the affairs of the Ummah
of Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh. And when I think that somewhere there
languishes a hungry person, a helpless patient, an aggrieved
wronged without a reason, a helpless prisoner, an old man, or a poor
with a family – in short, there are [a whole lot] of such people in
every corner of the country, I know my Creator will ask me on the
Judgment Day what did I do for them, while Muḥammad (ṣal.lal.lahu
‘alayhi wa.sal.lam) will be the prosecutor against me. I fear that the
case may not go against me. Thus, out of pity on myself I cry.”[219]
To implement his agenda he appointed capable and honest
officials in place of a heartless administration. He set aside all those
wrong taxes that the Ummayds had levied on the people. He also
removed jizyah on people who became Muslims. Besides, he did
away with the practice of lashing people without legal justification,
with clear instruction not to amputate anybody’s hand or give him
death penalty without informing the caliph.[220]
At the end of his reign, a Khārji group rebelled against him.
Instead of retaliating against them, he wrote: “What is the use of
shedding (one another’s) blood? Why do you not come and have
discussion with me. Should you be right I will give in. And if I am
right, you will accept (my viewpoint). The group elder sent two
persons to have discussion with him.
Initiating the discussion, they said:
“We agree that your ways are different than your
family members’. You also consider their actions as
atrocious. But what sense does make that even though
you consider their actions as atrocious you still do not
curse them.”
‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz responded:
“Is it not enough for their condemnation that I
consider their acts as excesses? After this, why should it
be important to curse them? How many times did you
curse the Pharaoh?”
Every time they raised a question he answered them. At last one of
them asked:
“Can a just man bear with the fact that his
successor is going to be an unjust person?”
 He said no.
“Then, are you going to surrender the caliphate to
(someone like) Yazīd ibn ‘Abd al-Malik when you know
that he would not stay the course of justice?”
“But my predecessor (Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Malik)
has already taken the bai‘ah for his succession. What
can I do now?” he said.
“Do you think that the person who nominated
Yazīd ibn ‘Abd al-Malik to succeed you had the right to do
so and that his decision was justified?” they asked.
This made ‘Umar speechless. When the sitting adjourned, his
court heard him say again and again: “The Yazīd issue has killed
me. I do not have answer to it. May Allah forgive me!” [221]
It was this incident that caused alarms to the Umayyads that
he would not rest until he finished their dynastic rule, transforming it
into shūrā-based caliphate. Thus terrified, they poisoned him after a
short while. With his death, things regressed to their old habitat.
12. The ‘Abbāsids and their promise
The Umayyad government had a magnificent sprawl from
Sindh (present-day Pakistan) to Spain. Apparently there was no
reason to believe that it will go down one day. But based on power
and not anchored in people’s hearts, it was tottering inside. That is
why within a century, the ‘Abbāsids uprooted it. And when it fell not a
single eye wept for it.
The new claimant to the caliphate uprooted the Umayyads
because they succeeded in assuring the common men that since
they belonged to the Prophet’s clan, they would work for them within
the parameters of the Sharī‘ah and establish the ḥudūd of Allah. In
Rabi‘ al-Thāni when Abū al-‘Abbās al-Saffāḥ received bai‘ah
(allegiance oath), he recounted the Umayyad’s excesses followed by
saying:
“I hope that from the family that gave you
goodness you will not have tyranny and injustice and
from where you received felicity you will not have
persecution.”
After al-Saffāḥ, his uncle Dā’ūd ibn ‘Ali assured the
people:
 We are not out to garner wealth for ourselves or
build palaces and stretch canals to them. What has
brought us out is that the Umayyad denied our right and
they persecuted the progeny of our uncle (‘Ali’s family)
and followed bad ways among you by humiliating you;
and usurping your bayt al-māl for unjustified spending.
Now, we have this responsibility from Allah, His
Messenger and al-‘Abbās that we will conduct the affairs
of the government according to the Book of Allah and the
Sunnah of the Prophet.[222]
But no sooner did they receive power they proved by their
deeds that it was all deception.
13. Their deeds
In Mūṣal, when rebellion broke out, al-Saffāḥ sent his brother
Yaḥyā to quell it. As a starter, he announced that whoever would
enter the central masjid would find peace. People in thousands
thronged the place. Then he locked them in and killed them. About
11,000 people were killed on the spot. At night, he heard the wailing
of the women left behind and he ordered them to be killed in the
morning. For three days, Mūṣal was plunged into mass killing and
arson. Neither women nor children nor the old were spared. Yaḥyā
had 4,000 (non-Muslims) Zingis in his army who were allowed to
rape women. Holding the halter of his horse a woman implored
Yaḥyā to stop these atrocious acts. “You belong to the clan of
Hāshim and the progeny of the uncle of Rasūl Allāh. You suffer from
no shame that your Zingi soldiers are raping Arab-Muslim women.”
Stung by shame and remorse Yahyā lured his Zingi troops to
assembly by offering pay increases and got them killed.[223]
Al-Saffāḥ gave Yazīd ibn ‘Umar ibn Hubayrah pledge of safety
in his own handwriting and then got him killed.[224]
The famous Khurāsāni jurist Ibrāhīm ibn Maymūn al-Sā’igh
spearheaded the ‘Abbāsid call for change on their pledge to
establish Hudūd Allah. His work won him the confidence of Abū
Muslim Khurāsāni, becoming part of the latter’s inner circle. But as
the revolution consummated itself, their irreverential attitudes
towards the Sharī‘ah forced al-Sā’igh to press for its implementation
as promised. In return Abū Muslim got him executed.[225]
 In al-Manṣūr’s reign even the ‘Abbasid’s claim that they had
risen to seek revenge for the excesses done to Abu Ṭālib’s clan
proved to be shallow. Al-Manṣūr’s search for Muḥammad ibn
‘Abdullah al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah and his brother Ibrāhīm who were in
hiding ended up in apprehending their whole family, for they would
not reveal their whereabouts. Their properties were sold and they
were moved from Madīnah to Iraq in chains. Al-Manṣūr tortured
them in prison. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥasan was entombed
in the wall alive. Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdullah’s father-in-law was stripped
and lashed 150 times. Later, his severed head was paraded in
Khurāsān as if it belonged to Nafs Zakiyyah.[226] After sometime
when they succeeded in tracing Nafs Zakiyyah to Madīnah, they
hacked off his head, showing it around different places. For three
days, his beheaded body along with his companions’ remained on
the poles. Later, they threw their bodies in the Jewish grave yard
near the Sala‘ mountain.[227]
The rapid succession of these events showed from the
beginning that like the Umayyad’s their politics was also divorced
from religion, and that they felt no shame in exceeding the bounds of
Allah. Their revolution changed only the rulers but not the system;
not one bad practice of the Umayyads they remedied nor did they
restore the noble caliphate of the righteous. Instead, they formalized
the monarchial absolutism into a permanent institution. The only
difference that occurred was in the monarchical shapes, the
Umayyads followed Caesar in Constantinople, the ‘Abbāsids
mimicked Kisrā in Iran.
The shūrā also remained suspended and it formulated the
same disastrous impact in running the state that the ‘Umayyad had.
In usurping treasury they followed the Umayyad’s practices,
with least concerns for the inflow and outflow of funds. Bayt al-māl
became the king’s treasury which knew no accountability.
The judiciary also remained under the administrative and
parochial pressure. In al-Mahdī’s time a case involving his official
and a trader came up for hearing before the Qāḍī ‘Ubayd Allah ibn
Ḥasan’s court. The caliph wanted him to decide in the official’s
favour but he declined and thus was sacked.[228]
 A similar case occurred in Hārūn al-Rashīd’s time involving a
person who had his wife Zubayda’s favour. Qāḍī Hafs ibn Ghayāth,
having decided against him, had to step down.[229]
14. The Shu‘ūbiyah movement and the Zanādiqah
The racial, tribalistic and materialistic prejudices that the
Umayyads ignited flared into a conflagration during the ‘Abbāsid’s
time. In the first place, the ‘Abbāsid uprising by itself was spirited by
racial considerations of a clan’s right to rule over the others. To
ensure their success, they pitted Arab tribes against one another on
the one hand and non-Arabs against the Arabs on the other.
The letter that Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah
ibn Abbās, the leader of the ‘Abbāsid movement, wrote to Abū
Muslim Khurāsāni speaks of this policy exploiting differences among
the different groups to pit the Yamani against the Mudari among the
Arab. Second, if possible, make sure that not a single tongue that
speaks Arabic.[230]
As a result, the reactive shu‘ūbiyah, which simmered inside,
caused by the Arab narrow mindedness in the Umayyad reign,
blasted into a conflagration in the ‘Abbāsid era. Worse, it was not
only against the Arab prejudices but also went against Islam, raising
an aggressive front of Zandaqah (atheism and secularism).
Doubtless, historically the ‘Ajamis carried seeds of racial superiority
in them, considering Arabs inferior. In the early Islamic era when
energized by Islam the desert Arabs trounced them, they felt
humiliated. But the Islamic egalitarianism and sense of justice that
they saw in the lives of the Ṣaḥābah (raḍi Allahu ‘anhu) and tābi‘ūn,
‘ulamā, and fuqahā (jurists) balm their wounds. Charmed by their
noble attitudes and the equal status they had gained for themselves
in the new social setup, they began to melt in the Muslim Ummah.
Had there been a similar administrative policy embracing the Islamic
ideals, there would have been no separatist movement in the non-
Arab Muslims. But first the Umayyads because of their Arab bias
mistreated them and thus aroused in them a reactive bias and then
the ‘Abbāsid’s tooling them for their political objectives gave them
the chance to surface on the power scene and prevail on the
sociopolitical apparatus.
 The non-Arabs supported the ‘Abbāsid cause for they hoped
this would give them a perennial role in the new administration and
thus enabling them to finish Arab domination. Their evaluation of the
situation was correct and they got what they wanted.
Al-Jāhiz says that the ‘Abbāsid government turned into a
Khurāsāni government.[231] In al-Manṣūr’s reign chief of the armed
forces and governorship were by and large given to non-Arabs
ending the Arab domination.[232] Al-Jihshayāri’s list of al-Manṣūr’s
appointees in his Tarikh al-Wuzarā’ is mostly non-Arabs.[233] With
political clout in their hands, they encouraged the shu‘ūbiyah
movement to its full potential, carrying in its fold the seeds of atheism
and loose moral attitudes.
The shu‘ūbiyah movement by itself started with discussions
that the Arabs had no superiority over the non-Arabs but it soon
turned into Arab hate. Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist details all the books
written in condemnation of the Arabs and their tribes, including even
the Quraysh.
The moderate Sh‘ūbi did not go beyond it. But the extremists
among them began to attack Islam itself.
The ‘Ajami aristocracy, ministers, secretaries (kuttāb), and
military commanders gave them secret support. Al-Jāhiz says: “A lot
of people who entertain doubt about Islam got this disease through
sh‘ūbiyah. They were against Islam because the Arabs brought
it.”[234]
These people resurrected the faiths and ideas of Māni,
Zoroaster, and Mazdak. They exalted the ‘Ajami civilization and
praised their statecraft. In the guise of poetry and literature they
promoted loose manners and lewdness, making fun of religion and
its ḥudud. They also seduced people to liquor and sins of the flesh,
ridiculing pious living and lampooning people who reminded others
of paradise and hellfire. Some fabricated ḥadīth to undermine
Muslims’ faith. Thus, when they apprehended Ibn abi al-‘Aujā’, a
Zindīq, he admitted to have fabricated 4,000 ḥadīth altering Ḥalāl
(allowed) and Ḥarām (disallowed). In al-Manṣūr’s time the Kūfan
governor Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn ‘Ali sentenced him to death.
[235]
 A person named Yūnus ibn abi-Farwah wrote a book
condemning Islam and the Arabs; when presented with a copy, the
Caesar of Rome awarded him.[236] Al-Jāhiz in his writings has
detailed a number of ‘Ajami secretaries to the government who
talked ill about the sequential layout of the Qur’ān and its alleged
contradictions. They also refuted ḥadīth and created doubts about
their authenticity. In praising the Ṣaḥābah (companions) their tongue
twisted. When Qāḍī Shurayh, Ḥasan al-Baṣri and al-Sha‘bi were
exalted they hurled accusations on them. But they had all praise for
Ardshayr Bābakān and Naushayrwān for their sagacity and state
craft.[237]
Talking of the famous ‘Ajamis of this era, Abū al-A‘lā al-Ma‘arri
says they were all zindīq, including Di‘bil, Bashshār ibn Burd, Abū
Nūwās, Abū Muslim Khurāsāni, and so forth.[238]
This zandaqah (secularism and atheism) was not confined to
mere perversion of beliefs but also to freedom from moral
compulsions. Ibn ‘Abdi Rabbihi says people knew well that liquor,
fornication and corruption were the necessary companions of
atheism.[239]
The Manṣūr reign (136-158 A.H./754-775 C.E.) saw this
mischief blooming into a perfidious social and moral threat with
potential to undermine Muslim society and state. His successor al-
Mahdī perceived its threat potential. Making a digression from his
clan’s policies, he decided to crush this movement with a
concomitant effort by the ‘ulamā, which he prompted, to engage
them in discussions and write books to counter their views.[240]
Besides, he established a permanent department under ‘Amr al-
Kaluāzi, assigned with the task of exterminating the zanādiqah
(atheists and secularists).[241] His instructions to his son al-Hādī
speak of his concern:
If ever this government fell into your hands, do not
spare any effort in exterminating the Māni followers. They
first invite people towards apparent goodness such as
staying away from lewdness, piety in worldly life and
deeds for the hereafter, followed by exhorting them that
eating meat is forbidden, taking bath (ghusal) is
disallowed and so is killing animals. Later, they drive
 them to belief in two gods. And eventually, they declare
marrying sisters and daughters as allowed together with
taking bath with urine. Besides, they steal children so
that they could be brought up in disbelief and perversion.
[242]
Al-Mahdī’s preceding statement shows that the ‘Ajami
zanādiqah (atheists) though had become apparently Muslims but in
secret they were engaged in the revival of their old religions. Al-
Mas‘ūdi says the zanādiqah were spreading their ideas through
translations from the Persian language, mostly within by Ibn abi
al-‘Aaujā’ Ḥammād ‘Ajrad, Yaḥyā ibn Ziyād, and Muti‘ ibn Iyās.[243]
15. The Ummah reaction
In short, these were the changes that swamped the Muslim
society by the transposition of the rightly guided caliphate with the
monarchial absolutism. This also gives a fair idea of the
consequences that the Ummah may face when an individual, clan or
a group aspires for power and forcibly imposes it on the people. An
individual may not even know the results that his ambition may
crystallize nor may he have the intention to cause hurt to the
Ummah; nevertheless, their natural outcome is bound to impact the
sociopolitical and moral environment in due course of time.
All said, it will be wrong to deduce that the political
vicissitudes led to the elimination of the Islamic system of life. Some
people make a surface reading of history by concluding that Islam
lasted for thirty years only. But the situation is contrary to their floppy
surmise. In the following we will discuss briefly how the collective
conscious of the Muslim Ummah responded to the distortion in its
political system and saved Islam’s collectivity.
16. Split in leadership
We have already explained the merits of the rightly guided
caliphate and how it can be described as the true successor to the
Prophet (upon him be peace). The caliph was not only true to Islam
but also a model guide. His work did not confine itself to running the
state machinery and consigning troops to the battlefield. Rather, his
was an extended role that saw to it that Allah’s dīn in its fullness was
established. His person invited in himself the sole central leadership
who led the Muslim Ummah in the fullness of their faith – that is: dīn
and values, morality and spirituality, law and Sharī‘ah, culture and
civilization, education and upbringing, da‘wah and its spread. Like
Islam which is wholesome, the caliphal leadership was also all-
embracing in which Muslims had full trust.
The supervened monarchial absolutism was incapable of
giving that kind of inclusive leadership nor were the Muslims inclined
to give it the same moral status. The kingly misdeeds were so
hideous that it emptied monarchy of any moral worth. Doubtless,
they could bend people’s necks and they did it by all means. They
could also force millions of people by intimidation and material
seduction to serve their wish, and that they did without any remorse.
But whether they could find a place in their hearts as their religious
leaders was far fetched. The new situation, therefore, splintered the
Muslim leadership into two parts.
17. The political leadership
A vital part of leadership fell in the political realm appropriated
by the kings. Sustained by ruthless power, people reluctantly
accepted it. This leadership was after all not non-Muslim to have
demanded total rejection by the Ummah. They believed in Islam and
its laws. Nor did they deny the finality of the Qur’ān and the
Prophet’s Sunnah. Other than their politics which was free from the
Islamic restraints they ran the state affairs according to the Sharī‘ah.
Perhaps this softened the people to accept their writ in so far as it
assured peace in the state, secured the frontiers, sustained the jihād
against enemies of Islam, established the Friday Ṣalah, maintained
the societal structure, arranged for Ḥajj and enforced the Sharī‘ah
laws through the country. For these objectives if the Ṣaḥābah,
tābi‘ūn (second generation), and later people accepted their
governance it was in this sense, and not because that they
considered them as the rightful rulers or their governance as moral
equal to the pious caliphate. Rather they were the de facto rulers to
whom the masses surrendered.
18. Religious leadership
The second tier of leadership was headed by the Ṣaḥābah
(companions), tābi‘ūn (second generation), taba‘ tābi‘ūn (third
generation), fuqahā’ (jurists), muḥaddithūn (ḥadīth scholars) and the
pious of the Ummah. The people accepted their leadership in the
realm of their dīn without any reservation. Though not organized nor
led by any titular head or any authoritative council to decide
emergent matters, it presented a composite scene. They all worked
in their individual capacity with no power to prevail other than moral.
But since they were inspired by the same sources of the Qur’ān and
the Sunnah, their mental mould was the same, though their
temperaments and backgrounds were different. That is why even
though they were scattered as atomized individuals they were in a
position to provide the Ummah with a unified moral and intellectual
leadership.
19. The Linkage between the two leaderships
The two leaderships had little in common; their relationship
was marked by hostility to indifference. Thus, whenever the political
leadership sought to help religious leadership, it was either
conditional or too small. At the same time, the religious leadership
was not prepared to pay the price either of conscience or character.
Added to this was the people’s attitude, which looked at the ‘ulamā-
royalty liaison with disdain. Anyone who courted favour lost its place
of respect in the Ummah’s heart. Thus, indifference to royalty and
fortitude against its wrath became the hallmark of the religious
leadership. Commoners aside, even those who had sold themselves
to kings were not willing to accept such ‘ulamā who under kingly
pressures would abject themselves before power and still be the
emblem of the Ummah’s Islamic aspiration.
Thus, from the middle of the first century after Hijrah the two
had parted their ways,[244] each playing its role in its own orbit.
Whatever the ‘ulamā did in the realms of tafsīr (exegesis), ḥadīth
(Prophetic tradition), fīqh (law), usūl (jurisprudence) and other
religious sciences they did it by themselves free from state
patronage – in fact, many a time inspite of the state opposition to
their work.
Also, the ‘ulamā role in the field of the Muslim moral
rehabilitation and restructuring their mindset was free from any
governmental influences. The Islamic spread, which was
phenomenal, took place because of their efforts. The kings of course
secured for them territories, which gave Islam access to millions of
peoples. But influencing their minds and hearts was left to the pious
of the Ummah who because of their ennobling characters enhanced
Islam’s appeal to the masses.[245]
These are servious charges. True, a Ṣaḥābi can make
judgemental errors. However, one must not forget that contrary to
what al-Baṣri says about Mu‘āwiyah’s doomed hereafter, the Prophet
had prayed for his exalted status. In al-Bukhārī’s ghazwah al-Bahr’s
ḥadīth he has also been given the glad tiding of Paradise. It was
because of his exalted status, that the caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz
punished those who talked ill of Mu‘āwiyah.
 Chapter Six

The Rise of Religious Differences and their Causes

The downfall of the rightly guided caliphate carried in its

swath religious differences, which in the absence of the caliphate
gelled themselves into permanent sectarian schism and discord. To
add to the calamity, monarchial absolutism (mulūkiyah) had no
institution to resolve such differences.
In its incipience, this mischief did not appear to be ominous. It
was just an irruption boiled over owing to some administrative and
political shortcomings at the time of the caliph ‘Uthmān.
At its back, the irruption had no ideology or philosophical
outlook. But when ‘Uthmān’s life came to a sudden end, followed by
civil war and bloody conflicts involving ‘Ali and Mu‘āwiyah in the
battles at Jamal, Ṣiffīn, the subsequent arbitration episode (taḥkīm)
and Nahrwān, certain questions began to plague the minds causing
intense discussions. For example, people wanted to know who had
the truth in those wars. If a party in dispute is viewed as right, then
on what bases? Who is grounded in untruth and what makes him
false (bāṭil)? And if someone maintains silence or is neutral in the
conflict between the parties, then what justification has he? In
response to such questions some definitive thoughts emerged
which, though political in their origin, later got themselves situated in
a theological context, with doctrinal underpinnings. That this paved
way for these political groups to gradually descend into the mould of
religious sects is thus not far from the truth.
It was possible to bring these group around into the
mainstream Islam but the schismatic bloodshed, which accompanied
political and theological differences and its continued spill over in the
Umayyad’s and ‘Abbāsid’s dynastic rule, turned them into
hardheaded splits, marked by intense partisan feelings. This posed a
serious threat to the Muslim unity: inter-factional disputatious
polemics became common raising new political, theological, and
philosophical issues while splitting further each sect into small sub-
sects. The Iraqi capital Kūfah was the largest theatre of conflicts as
it was here in Iraq that the battles of Jamal, Ṣiffīn, and Nahrwān took
place; it was here that the tragic death of al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Ali occurred;
and it was here again that the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids used
excessive force to crush their opponents.
In this calamitous period of conflicts and schisms, the myriad
of sects that emerged had their origin in four main schools of thought
– Shi‘ah, Khawārij, Murji’ah, and Mu‘tazilah. We will describe them
here briefly.
1. The Shi‘ah
In the beginning ‘Ali’s supporters were called Shi‘ān-i ‘Ali
(supporters of ‘Ali). Later, the nomenclature was changed to a
simpler description of the Shi‘ah only.
After the Prophet’s death, some people of Banū Hāshim along
with some companions (Ṣaḥābah) considered ‘Ali as worthy of the
caliphate and excelled over others especially ‘Uthmān. Also, there
were some people who by virtue of ‘Ali’s blood relationship with the
Prophet preferred him to the caliphate than others. But these
thoughts had not yet consolidated themselves into a creed or a sect.
Such people were also not opposed to the caliph in power and even
accepted the earlier three caliphs.
Their coalescence into a party with specific ideas occurred
subsequent to the battle of Jamal, Ṣiffīn, and Nahrwān. Ḥusayn’s
martyrdom brought consolidation to their ranks adding fuel to their
simmering passions. Besides, the Umayyad’s use of brutal force
caused hatred among the Muslims; the persecution of ‘Ali’s family
members and their allies by the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid created a
sympathy wave in the masses for them. That in return gave an
exaggerated impetus to the Shi‘i call (da‘wāh), with Kūfah becoming
the seat of their power. Their chief concepts were as under:
The phrase imāmah (imamate), which they used for
the Khilāfah, as they said, was not for the Ummah to decide. It
is the prerogative of the Prophet to appoint the imām. In other
words, it is not an electoral office decided by the Ummah.[246]
The imām should be innocent, free from minor and
major sins. Besides, he is infallible and anything he says is
binding on others.[247]
 ‘Ali was nominated by the Prophet and he was imām
because of the clear edict in his favour.[248]
The imām will appoint his successor, for the Ummah
has no say in this matter.[249]
The Shi‘i sub-sects agreed among themselves that
the progeny of ‘Ali held exclusive right to the imāmah.[250]
After this all-inclusive agreement on the concept of imāmah,
the Shi‘i splintered among themselves on its certain aspects. For
example, the moderates believed that ‘Ali was superior in his
makeup over others. Anyone who fights him and carries grudge
against him is the enemy of Allah. He will always stay in Hellfire and
he will share the fate of the nonbelievers (kāfirūn) and hypocrites
(munāfiqūn). They also said that if ‘Ali had refused to acknowledge
the caliphate of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān and had not given his
pledge to them and prayed Ṣalāh after them, they would have
considered them as the dwellers of Hell.
Other than the prophetic office, they reckoned nothing
different between the Prophet and ‘Ali.[251]
The extremists among the Shi‘is, on the other hand,
considered ‘Ali’s predecessor in caliphate as usurpers. Those who
put them in the caliphal office were the wrongdoers for they
disregarded the Prophet’s alleged will on succession. The harder
among them also charged the first three caliphs and those who
supported them with disbelief.
The softest stance among them was that of the Zaidiyyah who
followed Zaid ibn ‘Ali ibn Ḥusayn (d.122 A.H./740 C.E.). They
considered ‘Ali as superior to others but it was also part of their belief
that in the presence of the superior the lesser in stature could be the
imām. Besides, they held that there was no clear-cut prophetic
injunction in ‘Ali’s favour. That is why they accepted Abū Bakr’s and
‘Umar’s caliphate as legitimate. Nevertheless, they held that when it
comes to the imāmah, he should be from the stock of Sayyidah
Fātimah provided he rises against the kings as claimant to the
imāmah.[252]
2. Khawārij
The Khawārij were quite the opposite of the Shi‘is and formed
the next major group in prominence. They emerged when ‘Ali and
Mu‘āwiyah agreed to resolve their differences through arbitration
(taḥkīm). Before, they stood behind ‘Ali. Nevertheless, arbitration
alienated them from him saying that by agreeing to human arbitration
in preference to Allah he had turned apostate. The subsequent
period saw them exceeding the bounds in pursuit of their ideas.
Inclined as they were towards violence in waging war against those
who held different views than their’s including unjust governments,
they caused a great deal of protracted bloodshed. For a long time
they stayed distended from the mainstream. Eventually, the
‘Abbasids ended their power spread. Their largest power base
remained Iraq where in the region of al-Batā’ih, between Baṣrah and
Kūfah, they had a string of campsites. Summarized their beliefs are
as under:
They considered Abū Bakr’s and ‘Umar’s caliphate as
just but of ‘Uthman, they thought he deviated from the path of
justice and truth at the last leg of his rule and thus qualified
himself to be killed or removed. Even ‘Ali, in their perception,
whom they supported first, committed a capital sin when he
agreed to human arbitration. Besides, both arbitrators (‘Amr ibn
al-‘Āṣ and Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī) and those who proferred their
names as well as those who were involved in the Jamal battle,
like Ṭalḥah, al-Zubayr, and Sayyidah ‘Ā’ishah, committed a
capital sin.
To them sin was disbelief (kufr) and anyone who
indulged in major sin and did not repent was a nonbeliever
(kāfir). That is why they not only declared them nonbelievers
but also cursed them in public. [In their vituperative and kāfir-
calling mindset], they did not spare the common Muslims
either, for not only their lives were soiled with sins but they also
took the above named as their leaders and derived the Shar‘ī
injunctions from their reported ḥadīth.
About the caliphate, they held it could only come into
being through free electoral process.
They disagreed with the notion that only the
Qurayshites qualified themselves to be the rulers. Any
righteous Muslim who had the consent of other Muslims could
become the caliph.
 They thought that as long as the caliph delivered
justice and stayed the right path his obedience was binding on
society; but if he deviated, he could be removed and even
killed.
Among the primary sources of Islam, they believed in
the Qur’ān but in matters of ḥadīth and ijmā‘(consensus), their
thinking was different than that of the mainstream Muslims.
A large group among them (known as al-Najdāt) considered
state unnecessary. The Muslims, they advocated, should themselves
collectively follow Islam in their lives. If, however, they felt the need
for the caliphate they might do so.
Their largest group known as Āzāriqah viewed everyone else
as polytheist (mushrik). The Khawārij, they said, must not respond to
the call for Ṣalāh made by someone other than them, nor must they
eat the flesh of an animal slaughtered by a non-Khawārij or marry
others or inherit from people other than themselves. To kill their
women and children and to deprive them of their belongings were
justified in their sight. They also considered their own group
members, who withheld themselves from such a jihād, as
nonbeliever (kāfir). Cheating their opponents in their view was
allowed (Ḥalāl). So perverse they were in their extremism that non-
Muslims were safer at their hands than the Muslims were.
The softest among them in their posture were Ibādiyah who
though called common Muslims as nonbelievers but refrained from
describing them as polytheists (mushrikūn). To them, they were non-
mū’min, whose testimony they accepted, married among them, and
considered inheritance from both ends as valid. They also avoided
calling their territories as dār al-ḥarb (the land of fight) or dār al-kūfr
(the land of disbelief) for they considered them as dār al-tawḥīd. The
power centres were, however, exception, which they condemned as
usual. They did not like attacking Muslims unannounced and
preferred declared war against them.[253]
3. Murji’ah
From the extreme contradictory views of the Shi‘is and
Khawārij, a third group arose known as Murji’ah. They represented a
cross section of the people who kept themselves away from ‘Ali’s
dispute for they were either neutral or considered civil war as harmful
to the Muslims, or they were confused about the party that carried
the truth. They knew for a fact that Muslims spilling each other’s
blood was a grave evil but they were unwilling to criticize any of the
contending parties. For them, it was for Allah to sift the truth from
untruth on the Judgment Day. To that extent, their views were not
different from the general mass of the Ummah. But when the Shi‘is
and the Khawārij began raising issues of belief (imān) and disbelief
(kūfr) in support of their extreme views and an unending polemical
fight started declaring others as nonbelievers, this neutral stratum of
society also reacted by providing theological support to their posture:
Faith (imān), they said, is the effort to cognize the
existence of Allah and His messenger and hold belief in them.
Deeds are not part of it. Thus, a person stays a believer
(mū’min) even when he discards obligatory part of Islam and
indulges in capital sins.
Salvation is tied to belief only. No violation of the
Sharī‘ah can hurt a person who can receive Allah’s mercy
provided he stays away from shirk and dies on his belief in the
oneness of Allah (tawḥīd).[254]
A group of the Murji’ah extended it into a doctrine that except
shirk (polytheism) even the worst of the sins Allah would eventually
forgive.[255] And some others extended it further by saying that if a
person carries belief in his heart and declares his disbelief openly in
dar al-Islam where he fears none, or embraces Judaism or
Christianity or even worships an idol, he still will be a believer –
Allah’s friend and the dweller of Paradise.[256] The spread of these
ideas encouraged people to indulge in all kinds of sins. The false
assurance of Allah’s forgiveness emboldened people to violate any
norm they wanted and thus created a serious moral crisis in society.
Similar to this thinking was the concept that raising arms to
force compliance of amr bil mar‘ūf and nahi ‘an al-munkar (stressing
goodness and stopping wrong) was an impetus to disorder in
society. People might condemn each other and that would be a
legitimate act but to speak out against the wrong perpetuated by the
government would be illegitimate.[257]
Abū Bakr al-Jassas is very bitter about it and says that by
spreading such concepts they strengthened the hands of the
oppressors and greatly weakened the Muslim will to resist
deviationists and usurpers.
4. Mu‘tazilah
In this turbulent period a fourth school of thought emerged
which is remembered in Islamic history as i‘tazāl (who separates or
dissents). The first three groups were parented by pure political
antecedents and later they invented for themselves a new theology
to sustain their politics. Their growth was though apolitical but it
succeeded in infusing into the political issues a few definitive
concepts and joined the prevailing intense debate that went on in the
Islamic world, especially Iraq. The founder of this new thought was
Wāsil ibn ‘Aṭā (d.130 A.H./748 C.E.) and ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd (d.144
A.H./761 C.E.) who agitated them first in Baṣrah. Summarized their
ideas are as follows:
To them the appointment of the imām (or the state)
had a binding status in the Sharī‘ah, though a few among them
thought that there was no compulsion for having the imām. If
the Ummah stays the course of justice, the imām has little
relevance.[258]
.The majority of them believed that the imāmah was
an elective office effectuated by their collective will.[259] Some of
them added further conditionality to it. They held that the
imāmah should reflect unanimity. In a discordant situation, the
appointment of the imām was invalid.[260]
They denied imāmah to any particular group. For
them any righteous, capable Qurayshi, an Arab or a non-Arab
was qualified to hold the office.[261] Some Mu‘tazilah went
further than that and maintained that a non-Arab was better for
the imāmah than others were. It would be still better, they said,
if people made a freed slave as the imām, for if the imām had a
following, then his removal from the office in the face of his
oppressive policies would become difficult.[262] In other words,
they were more concerned about his easy removal than the
stability of the imāmah.
They also held that offering Ṣalāh after a wicked
imām was invalid.[263]
 Among their main concepts amr bi a- ma‘rūf wa nahi
‘an al-munkar had primacy. Rebelling against a government
that has strayed from justice and truth was binding (wājib) in
their perception, provided it could lead to a successful
revolution.[264] That is why they participated in the rebellion
against the Umayyad caliph al-Walīd ibn Yazīd (125-126
A.H./743-744 C.E.) so they could replace him with Yazīd ibn al-
Walīd, for he subscribed to the Mu‘tazilah school.[265]
In the stormy conflict between the Khawārij and
Murji’ah on the constitutive nature of disbelief (kūfr) and belief
(imān), their verdict was that a sinning Muslim was neither a
nonbeliever nor a mū’min but somewhere in the middle.[266]
Besides these concepts, the Mu‘tāzilah also gave their verdict
on differences among the companions as well as on issues of the
past caliphates. Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ held that between the contenders of
the Jamal battle and Ṣiffin one of them was a violator (fāsiq), but he
was not sure who committed fisq. Thus, Wāṣil would say that if ‘Ali,
Ṭalḥah, and al-Zubayr had to witness even for a sack of vegetable,
he would not accept it, for they could be violators (fāsiqūn).
‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd viewed both parties as fāsiq.[267] He was very
harsh on ‘Uthmān. So much so that a few among them did not spare
caliph ‘Umar either.[268] Besides, many Mu‘tāzilah considered ḥadīth
and ijmā‘(consensus) as invalid sources of the Islamic law.[269]
5. The mainstream Muslims
Among these conflicting extremities the mainstream Muslims
stayed glued to those very incontrovertible concepts and principles
that existed since the days of the rightly guided caliphate and which
were embraced by the companions (Ṣaḥābah), later Muslims
(tābi‘ūn) and the general mass of the Muslim Ummah as true Islam.
Hardly eight-to-ten percent of the Muslim people were
influenced by this schism; the rest stayed the course of the majority.
On the beliefs of these emergent sects, different jurists and ḥadīth
scholars though did express themselves through their edicts and
attitudes on their certain aspects but none tried to formulate and
expound the majority viewpoint on the contentious issues agitated by
these schismatic groups in a methodical way before Abū Ḥanifah.
 Chapter Seven

Abū Ḥanīfah’s Accomplishment

We have already discussed how in the wake of monarchy

Muslim leadership splintered into two kinds of leadership and its
concomitant ill consequences. We have also talked about the
distorted face of the political leadership, led by feudal aristocracy
and royalty, and the religious leadership manned by the ‘ulamā and
the pious.
We would like to give now a brief profile of the religious
leadership, the people who staffed it and the way they solved the
burning problems of that turbulent era. For this purpose, we will take
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah as a representative of that group and discuss his
role as a jurist followed by his disciple Abū Yūsuf’s work, who helped
accomplish his unfinished agenda.
1. Brief life event
Abu Ḥanīfah’s name was al-Nu‘mān ibn Thābit. According to
authentic reports, he was born 80 A.H. (699 C.E.) in Kūfah. ‘Abd al-
Malik ibn Marwān was then the Umayyad caliph while Ḥajjāj ibn
Yūsuf was the Iraqi governor. He spent fifty-two years of his life
under the Umayyads and eighteen years under the ‘Abbasids. When
Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf died, he was fifteen years old. By the time ‘Umar ibn
‘Abdul-‘Azīz came into power he was in the prime of his youth. He
saw the turbulent years of Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab, Khālid ibn
‘Abdullah al-Qasriy, and Nasr ibn Sayyār’s governorship of Iraq. He
himself fell victim to the Umayyad governor Ibn Hubayrah’s
despotism. He saw the ‘Abbasid movement priming before his very
eyes. Kūfah, his hometown, was the hub of its activities, and even
when the ‘Abbasid movement succeeded, the city remained as the
new rulers’ seat of governance until Baghdad was built. He died in
the reign of caliph al-Manṣūr in 150 A.H. (767 C.E.).
His family came from Kabul, present-day Afghanistan. Some
people have recognized his grandfather’s name as Zutā others as
Zautā. The legend says his grandfather was a prisoner of war,
brought to Kūfah. Later, he became Muslim and decided to stay in
Kūfah under the patronage of Banī Taym Allah. He took to trade.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that he had cultivated friendly
relation with ‘Ali whom he would occasionally send gifts.[270] Abū
Ḥanīfah’s father followed the family tradition. Imām himself says his
father had a bakery in Kūfah.[271]
Concerning his education, Abū Ḥanīfah himself says that in
his younger years he studied the art of recitation, ḥadīth, grammar,
literature, poetry and scholastics, which were in vogue at that time.
[272]
Later, he specialized in scholastics, and soon made his mark in
it. Zufar ibn al-Hudhayl, his famous student, says that the Imām told
him: “In the beginning I interested myself with scholastics and had
reached a point that people began to talk of me.”[273] In another
report, he himself says:
“I was a person who had mastered the contentious
issues of scholastics theology. There was a time when I
was mostly engrossed in debates and rhetoric. And since
Baṣrah was the seat of contentious issues, I visited it
over a twenty time. Sometime I would prolong my stay in
the city for a period of six months to a year and would
engage different groups of Khawārij, Ibādiyyah,
Suffriyyah, and Hashwiyyah in arguments.”[274]
One can presume that Abū Ḥanīfah must have mastered
philosophy, logic and the conflicting issues of the then prevailing
schools of thought for without such a grounding he could not have
dared enter the field of scholastic theology. Later in his life, his
contribution to the development of law and his fame as a
distinguished legal mind owed much to his early education in logic
and use of reason.
For a long time, he kept himself engaged in scholastic
wrangling and polemical disputes until he found himself disgusted
with it. Gradually, the usefulness and glamour of fiqh (Islamic law)
lured him. Among the then existing schools, ahl al-Ḥadīth had no
attraction for him. Kūfah was the metropolis of the Iraqi ahl al-Rāi’y
(people of opinion) and thus he joined it. This school of thought
originated with ‘Ali ibn abi Tālib and ‘Abdullah ibn Mas‘ūd (d.32
A.H./652 C.E.). After them, their disciples Shurayḥ (d.78 A. H./697
C.E.), ‘Alqamah (d.62 A.H./814 C.E.) and Masrūq (d.63 A.H./682
C.E.) created a niche for themselves in fiqh, known all over the
Islamic world. They were followed by Ibrāhīm Nakha‘i (d.95 A.H.)
and Ḥammād ibn abī Sulaymān (d.120 A.H.), whose tutelage Abū
Hanifah sought and stayed with him for about eighteen years. But
eager as he was to learn, he did not confine himself to his Kūfan
teachers. He performed Ḥajj (pilgrimage) frequently in order to meet
and exchange views with experts on fiqh and ḥadīth from all over the
Islamic world.
In 120 A.H., when his teacher Ḥammād died, people
belonging to his school of thought unanimously crowned him as his
successor. There on that august seat for thirty years he performed
the great task of expounding knowledge and giving verdicts on
emergent issues that serve as the basis of the school named
Ḥanafiyyah. Some people say he responded to sixty-thousand legal
queries; other says eighty-three thousands, which were compiled in
his life time under separate heads.[275] His students number seven to
eight hundred who spread themselves across the Muslim world and
became the source of knowledge and the centre of their affection
and respect. Out of them at least fifty of his students became judges
in the ‘Abbasid reign; their madhhab (school of jurisprudence)
became the law of a large part of the Islamic world. From the
‘Abbasid to Saljūk empires and ‘Uthmāniyah to the Mughal empires it
remained their core law. Today, from China to Turkey, millions of
Muslims follow it.
For his living, Abū Ḥanīfah pursued trade – his parental
occupation. In Kūfah, he used to sell khazz (a particular kind of
cloth). Gradually, he turned it into a big business, making the cloth in
his own factory.[276] His house of business not only sold cloth in
Kūfah but also in areas far off. Soon recognition came to him as a
businessperson of moral integrity and rectitude. People’s trust in him
increased to an extent that they would deposit their cash with him
turning his business house into a kind of a bank. At the time of his
death, the deposits in trust with him amounted to 500 million dirham.
[277]
His vast experience in financial and business matters gave him a
rare insight into the discipline that stood him out among his
contemporaries and later-day law scholars. In the formulation of the
usūl al-fiqh (jurisprudence), his business experience paid off. So
great and known was his acumen in worldly affairs that in 145 A.H.,
when al-Manṣūr decided to build Baghdad, he asked Abū Ḥanīfah to
execute the project, which he accomplished in four years.[278]
In his personal life he was the emblem of piety and
trustworthiness. One time he sent his partner to sell cloth outside
Kūfah. The part of the lot had a quality problem and he specifically
instructed him to let the buyer know about it. Somehow, the man
forgot it. Abū Ḥanīfah gave the entire amount of about 35,000 dirham
in charity.[279] Historians have recounted numerous such incidents
involving purchase transactions where inexperienced sellers would
ask for a less amount and he would insist on giving them the real
market price.[280] So greatly were his contemporaries impressed with
his high sense of morality that they speak of him in the noblest
possible terms. ‘Abdullah ibn Mubārak, the dean of the ḥadīth
scholars, says: “I have not seen a person of Abū Ḥanīfah’s rectitude.
What can be said of a person who was offered world and its
possessions and he rejected them; who was lashed several times
and he still refused to compromise; and whom high offices that
people hanker after failed to seduce.”[281]
Qāḍī ibn Shuberumah says: “The world leapt after him but he
ran away from it; and the world ran way from us and we crazed after
it.”[282]
Ḥasan ibn Ziyād says: “By Allah! Abū Ḥanīfah never accepted
a gift or endowment from the influentials.”[283] Hārūn al-Rashīd once
asked Abū Yūsuf about Abū Ḥanīfah, he said:
“By Allah! He literally stayed away from the things
Allah forbade. People were not his focus; often silent,
people would find him lost in reflection and avoided
unnecessary talk. If somebody asked him a question and
if he knew its answer, he would respond. Amīr al-
Mū’minīn, I know only this much that he would save his
faith and self (nafs) from wrongdoing. Unmindful of the
people, we often found him engaged with his own person
and never talked ill of others.”[284]
With money, he was generous to a fault and spent it,
especially on people of knowledge and needy students. For this, he
had earmarked a substantial amount of money from the fund
generated by his business, which he dished out on a yearly basis.
While helping them he would say: “Spend it on your needs and do
not even feel indebted to anyone but Allah, for I did not give you a
thing from my own pocket. This is Allah’s beneficence given to me
for your need.[285] A large number of his students depended on him,
including the renowned Abū Yūsuf. He provided a safety net to his
family for they were poor and wanted their son to discontinue his
education and work for living.[286]
Such was the person who addressed himself to the important
issues that arose in the first half of the second-century Hijrah
following the dissolution of the rightly guided caliphate.
2. Abu Ḥanīfah’s views
Here, we will take first those issues which the Imām
responded to in the written from.
He himself never wrote a book. Thus, one has to go to other
credible sources for the nature of his work. There were, however,
some issues like the one raised by the Khawārij, Murji‘ah and
Mu‘tazilah to which, contrary to his practice, he himself made a
written response. In consequence, we have from him a brief but very
pertinent creedal formulation of the mainstream Muslim Ummah (ahl
al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah). It is thus natural that we give priority to
his writings on the subject.
We have already stated the composition of the schismatic
difference that arose at the juncture of ‘Ali’s caliphate and the
beginning of the Umayyad dynastic rule. We have also talked about
the four sects that emerged because of those differences and their
extreme views on some of the issues which they articulated in
theological formulations making them as their article of faith. These
views which were contrary to the complexion of the Muslim society,
the Islamic state, the sources of the Islamic law, and the Ummah’s
past collective decisions called for a systematic treatment so that
their negative impact could be invalidated. It was not that the
mainstream Muslim had no opinion on such issues. Far from it, the
opinion was well determined, as the common people firmly stuck to it
and the great jurists often expressed it by their word and deeds.
What Abū Ḥanīfah did was to reduce it in writing in an un-blurred
way.
 2.1. The exposition of the mainstream creed
Abū Ḥanīfah’s book al-Fiqh al-Akbar[287] deals with the
position of the rightly guided caliphs. The book became important
when against the backdrop of the emergent heresy and the various
sects that rose from it began to question their legitimacy such as
whether their caliphal status was valid or not? An adjunct to this
question was who among them was superior. Yet another question
asked was whether after assuming the caliphal office they remained
Muslims? These questions by their nature did not simply state a
historical opinion on some individuals in the past but in fact led to a
single most important question: was the electoral process used for
the election of these caliphs legitimate? Thus said, was it a justified
constitutional mode of electing head of the Islamic state? Besides,
once the caliphate’s legal status is diluted, the question that still roll
the mind will be whether their consensual decisions can be counted
as part of the Islamic law. Also, what status the decisions of that
particular caliph will have? Can we consider their decisions as legal
precedents?
Further, the legality or illegality of their caliphate, the presence
or non-presence of their belief (imān) as well as the superiority of
one over the other obviously led to this ultimate question: should
present-day Muslims have confidence in the Islamic society
fashioned under the direct supervision of the Prophet (‘alayhi as-
salām)? Should they have trust in its credibility to absorb the
nuances of his teachings and later transmit them to future
generations with responsibility and rectitude? Also, should the
Muslim Ummah feel itself bonded to its collective decisions?
Second, what status the Ṣaḥābah (companions) should be
accorded in view of a group’s opposition that considered almost all of
them as usurpers, deviant, and worst kāfir (nonbeliever)? This was
also not a question of historical import but had serious implications.
The Ṣaḥābah were the transmitters of the Prophetic practices. Can
we accord those practices the status of a source of the Islamic law?
Equally important was the third question relating to belief –
what constituted it? What separated belief from disbelief and the
effects of sin and its consequences? On these questions Khawārij,
Mu‘tazilah, and Murji’ah had strong debates. These questions were
also not theological but had the potential to influence the
composition of the Muslim society in a profound way. For no matter
what answer was given, it had a legal implication affecting the
collective rights of the Muslim people. Besides, it posed a serious
problem to the authority of the Islamic state: how could a
government manned by a sinful group manage the religious and
political affairs of the state like establishing Ṣalāh (prayer), setting up
justice courts, and waging jihād? Abū Ḥanīfah’s attempt to formulate
the mainstream position on these issues was as under.
2.2. The rightly guided caliphate
“After Rasūl Allāh (ṣal.lal.lahu ‘alayhi wa sallam) the best
among the people is Abū Bakr Siddique, followed by ‘Umar ibn al-
Khattāb, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and ‘Ali ibn abi Tālib. They were all on
the truth and stayed with the truth.”[288]
In ‘Aqidah al-Tahwiyah, it is further expounded:
“After Rasūl Allāh (sal.lal.lahu ‘alayhi wa-sallam), we
exalt Abū Bakr Siddique over the entire Ummah and affirm the
first Khilāfah for him, followed by ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb,
‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and ‘Ali ibn abī Ṭālib. And they are the
rightly-guided khulāfā’ and leaders of the pious.”[289]
It may be of interest to note that Imām Abū Ḥanīfah in his
person was inclined towards ‘Ali over ‘Uthmān.[290] At the same time,
he believed that between the two none could be exalted over the
other.[291] But since the Ummah had given its choice for ‘Uthmān, he
submitted to it by going along with the collective belief that the
sequence of superiority would be determined by the caliphal
sequence.
2.3. The Ṣaḥābah
“We remember,” he says, “Ṣaḥābah with nothing but
reverence.”[292]
‘Aqidah al-Tahāwiyah further explicates it:
“We love all the Ṣaḥābah of Rasūl Allāh
(ṣal.lal.lahu ‘alayhi wa-sallam); we neither exaggerate in
our love for a particular Ṣaḥabi nor do we abuse or curse
any of them.
We dislike those who harbour ill for them and who
recall their names with hatred. We call them to our
 memory with nothing but goodness and reverence.”[293]
Abū Ḥanīfah do express himself on the factional feuds among
the Ṣaḥābah but even then he is circumspect. He thinks ‘Ali had the
truth as opposed to others who fought against him.[294] He however
stops here and avoids condemning the other party.
2.4. Belief defined
“Belief”, he says, “is the name of affirmation and
witnessing.”[295] In al-Wasiyyah, the Imām explains it: “Belief is the
affirmative pronouncement by one’s mouth while the heart witnesses
it.” Adding to this, he says: “Neither affirmation alone is belief nor is
ma‘rifah belief. Further he says: “Deeds are separate from belief and
belief is separate from deeds. The rationale is that sometimes a
believer’s belief fails to translate into deeds but his belief does not
leave him … For example, it can be said that Zakāh (poor-due) is not
obligatory on a beggar but one cannot say that belief is not binding
on him.”[296]
Thus, he repudiates the Khawārij concept that one’s deeds
are constitutive of a person’s belief and sin is for sure the equivalent
of the absence of belief.
2.5. The difference between sin and a nonbeliever
“We cannot declare,” he says, “a Muslim a nonbeliever no
matter how great a sin he commits unless he thinks it was all right to
do it. (By this) we do not invalidate his imān (belief). Rather we
consider him a real believer, for to us a believer may be a fāsiq
(violator), but not a kāfir.[297]
In al-Wasiyyah, the Imām puts this subject in the following
vein:
“The sinners of the Ummah of Muḥammad (upon him be
peace) are all believers, not kāfir.”[298]
There is a further explanation to it in ‘Aqidah al-Tahāwiyah:
“A person does not expel himself from faith unless he
repudiates that very thing whose affirmation in the first place
brought him into the pale of faith.[299]
This creed and its social consequences are brought into sharp
focus by the discussion he had with the Khawārij. A large group of
them came to see him. They began saying suppose there were two
funerals at the gate of the masjid – one pertained to a drinker who
died while drinking; the other related to a woman who became
pregnant owning to fornication and then out of shame committed
suicide.
The Imām asked: “Which religion did they belong? Were they
Jews?”
They said no.
“Were they Christian?” he asked.
They said no.
“Were they Magians?”
They said no again.
“Then to which nation do you belong?” he asked.
“The nation that witnesses Islam by pronouncing Kalimah
(creedal pronouncement),” they said.
“Tell me, was this witnessing one third or one fourth or one
fifth of their faith?” the Imām asked.
“The faith they professed had no one third or one fourth,” they
said.
“In your perception how much of the pronounced Kalimah will
be constitutive of a person’s faith?” he asked.
“The whole faith,” they said.
“When you are yourselves declaring the dead as
believers, then what is the point in asking me?”
“We want to know if the deceased were the dwellers of
Paradise or Hellfire.”
“If at all you want to know, I will repeat what Allah’s
prophet Ibrāhīm said about the sinners worst than them.
Allah, he who follows me is mine, and he who
disobeys me, then (for him) you are the Forgiving the
Merciful.[300]
And, I would say the same that another prophet of
Allah (‘Isā) said about people who were even worst than
the deceased were.
If you punished them, they are your created
beings; and if you forgive them you are the Mighty and
the Wise.[301]
Yet another prophet of Allah, Nūh said:
 To hold these people answerable falls within
Allah’s domain if only you had understood; and I am not
of those who repel the believers.”[302]
His response made the Khawārij admit their wrong stand.[303]
2.6. The end of the sinful believer
“We do not say that the sinful state is not harmful to the
believer. Nor do we say that he will not be sent to Hell and nor
do we say that he will stay in Hellfire forever, if he is a fāsiq
(violator).”[304]
“And we do not say like the Murji’ah that our good
deeds will be per force accepted and our sins
forgiven.”[305]
Adding to it, ‘Aqidah al-Tahāwiyah says:
“We do not rule on anyone among the ahl al-
Qiblah as to his being the dweller of Paradise or Hell. Nor
do we brand them for their disbelief, apostasy or
hypocrisy unless there is evidence to its actual
occurrence. We leave the matter of their intention to Allah
alone.”[306]
2.7. The consequences of the ‘aqīdah (creed)
The Imām thus formulates a balanced ‘aqīdah (creed) in the
face of the Shi‘i and Khawārij and Mu‘tazilah and Murji‘ah extremism
which saves the Muslim society from conflict and polemics on the
one hand and an unfettered immorality and the encouragement to do
wrongs on the other.
When one considers the turbulence of his times, his exercise
in steering the society away from extremism turns out to be a great
accomplishment. He demonstrated to these schismatic sects that the
Ummah rejects their extreme views torn from the Islamic grid and
affirms its belief in the early Islamic society shaped by the Prophet
(‘alayhi as-salām) and the collective decision it made as well as
those it elected as caliphs and considers their decisions
constitutionally valid. It also affirmed its faith in the whole corpus of
the Sharī‘ah, transmitted by the Ṣaḥābah to the Ummah in history,
generation after generation.
For sure this ‘aqīdah was not the invention of Imām Abū
Ḥanīfah; it had a prior existence as the mainstream Muslim Ummah
subscribed to it during the past one hundred fifty years. What Abū
Ḥanīfah did was to reduce it in writing helping Muslims know their
position in the face of the conflicting diehard views of the
marginalized sects.
3. The codification of the Islamic laws
Abū Ḥanīfah’s greatest accomplishment, however, was his
striving to fill in the horrible vacuum that surfaced after the demise of
the rightly guided caliphate and the subsequent cessation of the
shūrā institution. We have already talked about its serious
repercussions elsewhere.
During the century that followed the demise of the rightly-
guided caliphate, the reflective section of the Muslim society felt a
great loss in the freezing of the creative lawmaking that spanned
thirty years of legal activism, the hallmark of the early caliphate.
Added to it was the ever-growing expansion of the political frontiers
of the Islamic state from Sindh (present-day Pakistan) to Spain in
Europe. The Muslim society had become polyglot with several ethnic
identities. The growth of civilization also problematized trade,
commerce, industry and agriculture along with constitutional, civil
and criminal related aspects that called for Islamic redress. On the
international front this great Islamic state had relations with almost
every nation that mattered creating war and peace, diplomatic and
commercial relations, land and sea travel-related problems. For the
Muslims who had their own worldview and life concepts, it was
imperative that they find answers to the emergent problems. In short,
caught between the challenges of a new era and the absence of a
constitutional entity primarily caused by monarchial absolutism that
could have undertaken the exercise of lawmaking, the Muslim
scholars and the fuqahā’ had to respond to the challenge.
This loss was felt by all, from the caliph downward to
governors, state functionaries and judges, for it was not worth the
salt of everyone to make laws in emergent situations at the spur of
the moment through personal ijtihād (independent thought). And
even if it had created law, it would have given rise to a whole
plethora of contradictory and conflicting laws which instead of solving
the problem would have compounded the situation. Only a state
could have set up a lawmaking institution but the Umayyad and the
‘Abbasid caliphs knew for a fact that they suffered from a credibility
problem which no amount of effort on their part would have solved it
or made the masses to accept it as part of the Islamic laws. They
also knew that they did not have the moral face to deal with the
jurists who did not want to associate themselves with a government
they considered as usurpers. In fact, Ibn al-Maqaffa‘ at one point did
suggest to al-Manṣūr in his al-Risālah al-Ṣaḥābah to a broad-based
council of eminent scholars to offer solutions to the new problems
followed by its presentation to the caliph, who would give his own
decision on each issue and that could be the law.
Tantalizing as the proposal was, al-Manṣūr however knew his
worth. His decision could not have had the sanctity and the moral
force of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar-made laws. And even if he had
ventured to do so, his laws would not have last beyond his life.
Rather he knew well that not a single citizen would follow his laws in
spirits, as none would consider them Islamic laws.
Under these circumstances, Abū Ḥanīfah thought of
chartering a new path for his self by setting up a private lawmaking
body; free from the governmental influences.
For sure, his idea was innovative as well as daring, which only
a person of his mental ability and character could have thought of –
a person who believed in himself and his potential to cash in on his
credibility with the Muslim masses. He knew that if he ever
undertook such an unusual exercise of lawmaking, people would
embrace it even in the absence of any political sanction behind it for
the simple reason that they believed in his Islamic scholarship, his
rectitude and above all his sincerity to his faith. And seeing people
accepting such laws, empires would adopt them as well. Abū
Ḥanīfah was not a claimant to oracular knowledge. But he believed
in himself. He also knew the ability of his coworkers, and the
temperament of the Muslim people and the way things were moving.
He ventured to do the impossible. Later developments validated his
deep insight. Within a short span of fifty years, his visualized
scenario materialized – his law became the law of the land.
The members of his legislative body were drawn from his own
students whom he had trained in the theories of lawmaking, research
methodology, and analogical reasoning. Besides, they had the
benefit of receiving education in the Qur’ān, Ḥadīth, fiqh, and other
auxiliary disciplines like lexicography, grammar, literature, history
and siyar from the great scholars of their time. These students were
themselves specialists in different disciplines. Some were experts in
analogical reasoning; some were the repositories of ḥadīth and the
judgments of the Ṣaḥābah and the caliphs while others were
grounded in exegeses, grammar, and maghāzī. Once Abū Ḥanīfah
himself described their excellence:
“These are thirty-six people. Among them twenty-
eight have the ability to perform as qāḍī (judge); six have
the ability to give edict (fatwā); and two among them are
competent enough to train qāḍīs and muftīs.”[307]
According to al-Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Makki (d.568
A.H./1172 C.E.), Abū Ḥanīfah’s prominent biographer, the
methodology followed by this lawmaking body was astoundingly
elaborate and painstakingly perfect:
Abū Ḥanīfah formulated his school of thought
(madhhab) after consultation with his graduate students.
The passion that he had for Islam and the highly intense
relationship that he had with Allah, His Messenger, and
the Muslim Ummah made him not to undertake this
exercise in his individual capacity. He would bring up
every issue before them and expose its aspects to them
in order to have their response and then cap it with his
opinion. Sometimes an issue would take a month long
discussion and even more. Eventually when the
convergence of views would surface, Abū Yūsuf would
write it down in Kitāb al-Usūl.[308]
Ibn al-Bazzāz al-Kardari the author of al-Fatāwā al-Bazzāziyah
(d.827 A.H./1224 C.E.) says:
“His students would make a detailed exposition of
a problem from all [possible] angles of discipline, while
the Imām would listen to their views with rapt attention.At
the end, when the Imām would give his concluding
observations silence would prevail as if he alone was
present in the meeting.”[309]
 ‘Abdullah ibn Mubārak says that once for three days
continuously they debated an issue. On the third day in the evening
when he heard the shouts of Allāhu Akbar (God is Great), he came
to know that the discussion had been formalized.[310]
In these sittings, the scribes would write down the Imām’s views and
subsequently read to him. Of the process his student Abū ‘Abdullah
says:
“I used to read the Imām’s views to him. While
recording the proceedings of these sittings Abū Yūsuf
would also write down his own views (on a problem).
Thus while reading out to the Imām I would confine
myself to his wordings. One day, I forgot to do so and
read out the other view as well. The Imām asked whose
opinion was the other one.”[311]
We also knew from al-Makki’s statement that they classified
the proceedings of these sittings and catalogued into books and
chapters during the Imām’s lifetime.
Abū Ḥanīfah was the first person who codified the science of
this Sharī‘ah. Nobody else did this work before. Abū Ḥanīfah
catalogued it into books and chapters under separate heads.[312]
As we said elsewhere, al-Makki reveals that this lawmaking
body ruled on 83,000 legal problems. They did not only discuss
problems that people faced but also anticipated problems that could
emerge in the future and offered solution by lawmaking. These
projected problems related to almost every sphere of law.
International law[313] (for which the term used was al-Siyar),
constitutional law, civil and criminal law, evidence law, procedural
code, mercantile law, marriage, divorce, inheritance, ‘ibādāt
(worships) – all these laws which this lawmaking body generated by
its discussions are found in books later compiled by Abū Yūsuf and
Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shaybānī.
The codification of law had its effect. The jurists, the
mujtahidūn (people qualified to independent thought), and the muftīs
who were doing their work in their personal capacity lost its worth
before the person of Abū Ḥanīfah’s knowledge and depth, who with
a team of experts and their systemic approach distilled laws from the
Qur’ān, Sunnah, and the decisions made in the past. Thus, the
moment his work appeared the Muslim masses, state functionaries,
and the courts to refer to it per force, for it was timely, people were
waiting for it. The famous jurist Yaḥya ibn Ādam (d.203 A.H./818
C.E.) says that the views of the other jurists paled before Abū
Ḥanīfah’s work. Its influence spread fast all over the nation; the
caliphs, state officials and jurists began making their decisions based
on it.[314] By the time the caliph al-Mamūn (d.218 A.H./833 C.E.)
came into power it had become the established law of the land.
When a rival jurist to Abū Ḥanīfah counselled Prime Minister
Faḍl ibn Sahl to abolish the Ḥanifi fīqh, he called for a meeting of the
wise for the decision, who constrained him not to do so.
“This will not work,” came the united reply. “The
whole country will turn against you.”
In their view, the person who had suggested the idea
was mentally retarded.
Ibn Sahl agreed and said he did not subscribe to the idea nor
would the caliph.[315]
Thus, an important event in history took place – the law
developed by a private legislative assembly became the law of
nations and empires owing to the moral stature of its framers.
Conjoined to this development, it inaugurated a new approach
in lawmaking for the coming Muslim jurists who would follow Abu
Ḥanīfah’s method even though they were different in their ijtihādī
methodology and its results.
 Chapter Eight

The Caliphate and its Related Issues:

Abū Ḥanīfah’s Approach

As opposed to other jurists, Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s views in the

realm of politics are relatively comprehensive covering almost every
aspect of state and leadership. Here, we will talk about his thought.
1. Sovereignty
Whatever may be the concept of state, it revolves around the
issue of sovereignty – that is, who is sovereign? Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s
view on this vital area of inquiry was a reflection of Islam’s
incontrovertible stance on Allah’s sovereignty for He is the Real
Sovereign; that the Prophet as His deputy on this Earth is bonded to
His will, and that the Sharī‘ah given by them is the Supreme Law to
be followed. Since Abū Ḥanīfah was a man of law, he articulated his
views in legal jargon rather than of a political discourse:
“Whenever I come across an injunction in the
Book of Allah, I grasp it. And when I do not find it there, I
resort to the Sunnah of Rasūl Allāh and his precedents
which are known among the credible people, received by
them from equally trusted sources. When I fail to find an
injunction in the Book of Allah or in the Prophet’s
Sunnah, I turn to the Ṣaḥābah (companions), and follow
their word (i.e. ijmā‘). And in the event of differences
among them, I take the saying of a Ṣaḥābi that sounds
preferable to me and leave the rest. But outside them, I
do not go after other’s views … As for the other people’s
[objection to my ijtihād] if they have the right to ijtihād
(independent thought) so do I have.”[316]
Says ibn Hazm:
“All the companions of Abū Ḥanīfah agree on this
point that his method accepted even a weak ḥadīth in
preference to analogical reasoning (al-qiyās) and opinion
(rā’iy).”[317]
 Obviously, this shows that Abū Ḥanīfah considered the Qur’ān
and Sunnah as the final authority in lawmaking. His belief (‘aqidah)
rested in declaring Allah and His messenger as the originator of legal
sovereignty. According to him, qiyās and rā’iy had their role in
lawmaking only when there was no clear-cut injunction from Allah
and His messenger on a subject. His preference to the sayings of
the Ṣaḥābah also had the same reason that he thought there was a
possibility of a prophetic practice behind them. In case of a
conflictive situation on issues among the Ṣaḥābah, he would opt for
one of them after weighing their views. He would make sure that his
rā’iy (opinion) should not be different from the cumulative practice of
the Ṣaḥābah, for it carried the possibility of an unintentional violation
of the Sunnah. He did of course use qiyās to find out which say of
the Ṣaḥābah was close to the Sunnah. Ironically, he was accused in
his lifetime of preferring qiyās over injunction, which he refuted often.
“By Allah, he foisted a lie on me who said that I
prefer qiyās over injunction (nass). How could qiyās
(analogical reasoning) have validity in the presence of an
injunction?”[318]
Caliph al-Manṣūr once wrote to him voicing the allegation
against him of giving preference to qiyās over ḥadīth. He wrote back:
“Amīr al-Mū’minīn, what has reached you is not
true. I first act on the Book of Allah, followed by the
Sunnah of Rasūl Allāh (ṣal.lal.lahu ‘alayhi wa sal.lam),
followed by the decisions made by Abū Bakr, ‘Umar,
‘Uthmān and ‘Ali (Allah be pleased with them), followed
by the decisions of the rest of the Ṣaḥābah. However,
where there is a disagreement among them, then I resort
to qiyās.”[319]
2. The right way to instituting caliphate
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah viewed forced occupation of the caliphal
office and its subsequent validation through oath of allegiance under
duress as a prohibitory act (Ḥarām). A genuine caliphate comes into
being only when people qualified to give their opinion (ahl al-rā’iy)
agree to its institution. He expressed this view at a time when
mouthing it had a higher probability of losing one’s head. Al-
Manṣūr’s hājib (chamberlain) Rabi‘ ibn Yūnus is on record to have
said that the caliph called for Imām Mālik, Ibn abī Dhi’b, and Imām
Abū Ḥanīfah and confronted them with the question: “What do you
think of this government that Allah the Exalted has granted to me?
Do you think I deserved it?”
Imām Mālik replied: “If you had not deserved it, Allah would
not have given it to you.”
Ibn abī Dhi’b said:
“Allah gives kingdom to anyone whom he likes.
But the kingdom in the ākhirah (hereafter) is given to one
who seeks it with Allah’s beneficence. You will have His
beneficence if you are obedient to Him; otherwise, your
disobedience to Allah will distance His beneficence from
you. The fact of the matter is that the caliphate is
established by the confluence of the pious. He who
forcibly occupies it, for him there is no taqwā (Allah-
consciousness). … You and your helpers are excluded
from Allah’s beneficence and are the deniers of truth.
Now if you seek Allah’s protection and through your good
deeds strive to have His pleasure, then you will have this
thing; otherwise, you are your own seeker.”
Abū Ḥanīfah says when Ibn abi Dhi’b was giving his views I
and Imām Mālik grabbed our clothes for we thought he could be
beheaded and our clothes might get stains from his spilled blood.
Thereafter, al-Manṣūr turned towards Abū Ḥanīfah and asked for his
views. He said:
“He who seeks truth for salvation stays safe from
Allah’s rage. If you probe your conscience, you will know
by yourself that you did not call us for Allah’s sake but
you wanted us to say something supportive of you so
that the people may know about it. The fact of the matter
is that you inducted yourself in the caliphal office in a
situation that did not have behind it even a gathering of
two individuals capable of giving formal legal opinion,
while the caliphate comes into being as a consequence
of the Muslims’ confluence, with their consultation. Abū
Bakr withheld making decisions for almost six months
 until he received the allegiance oath from the people of
Yemen.”
The conversation over the three left. Al-Manṣūr gave three
sacks of dirham to Rabi‘ and asked him to go after them. If Mālik
accepts dirham, give him the sack, he was told. But if Abū Ḥanīfah
and Ibn abi Dhi’b accept the sacks, then chop their heads off.
Imām Mālik accepted the caliphal gift. When Rabi‘ arrived at
Ibn abi Dhi’b’s house, he refused to have it saying he did not
consider this money even permissible for al-Manṣūr, how can he
have it for himself. Abū Ḥanīfah’s response was equally non-
compromising. He would not touch it, he said, even if they had his
head severed.[320]
3. The conditionalities for the caliphate
Until Abū Ḥanīfah’s time, the essential qualifications of a
caliph had not been discussed in details the way later scholars like
al-Māwardi and Ibn Khaldūn spelled them out, for these were well-
known and thus there was no need to give them a theoretic
framework. For example, that a caliph has to be a Muslim, male,
freed man, knowledgeable and of sound mind and body were by
then well established. However, there were two aspects which were
then current and called for a methodological clarification. One,
whether an oppressor and a violator of the Sharī‘ah could be a
rightful caliph? Two, if it was essential for one’s candidature for the
caliphal office to be a Qurayshite?
3.1. The leadership of the oppressor and moral violator
There are two aspects to Imām’s opinion on the subject. First,
one has to look into the then prevailing environmental context.
Extreme posturing on two festering strains of thought in general tore
Iraq in particular and the Islamic world in general. On the one side, it
said that the leadership of the oppressor and the morally corrupt was
illegitimate and that nothing done under its stamp could be beneficial
for the Muslim Ummah. On the other hand, it said that once an
oppressor and a morally corrupt person obtained power, his imāmah
and caliphate become de jure. Abū Ḥanīfah presented a balanced
view between the two extremes.
In al-Fīqh al-Akbar, he says:
 “Making Ṣalāh after any believer pious or impious is
[321]
valid.”
While explaining the Ḥanafiyyah position, al-Tahāwi says:
“And Ḥajj and Jihād will continue under the rulers of the
Muslim Ummah until the Judgment Day, their being good or
bad notwithstanding. Nothing can invalidate or interrupt these
worships – Ḥajj and Jihād.”[322]
For Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, however, ‘adālah (justice) was
essential to the caliphate. No person with a tyrannical bent of mind
and morally corrupt can become caliph or a qāḍī or jurist or a state
functionary.
If he becomes one, his imāmah will be bāṭil (invalid) and
people are not bound to obey him. Nevertheless, if after having
secured imāmah by force, Muslims continue to live by the Sharī‘ah in
their collective existence, his governance will have legal validity and
whatever decisions his appointed judges will make they will have a
binding effect. The famous Ḥanafī scholar Abū Bakr al-Jassās in his
Aḥkām al-Qur’ān has dealt with this aspect of the problem at length.
He says:
“It is not justified for an oppressor to be a prophet
or his deputy or a qāḍī. Nor is it justified for an oppressor
to be a state official, whose edict in matters of religion by
virtue of his situation has a binding effect on the people,
for example, a muftī or a witness or someone who
narrates a ḥadīth from the Prophet. The verse lā yanālu
‘ahadi al-zālimīn[323] suggests this aspect that people
whose saying in matters of religion count, they must be
pious and just. … This verse proves that the imāmah of a
morally corrupt is invalid (bāṭil) – he cannot be the caliph.
And if a person imposes himself (on the people) despite
the fact that he is corrupt, his obedience is not binding on
them. A similar statement comes from the Prophet that in
violation of Allah’s command, there is no obedience. This
verse also alludes to this aspect that no corrupt individual
can be an office holder (a judge or a magistrate). And if
he becomes one, his decrees will have no sanctity to be
complied with. Nor can his testimony be acceptable, or
 his narration from the Prophet be counted. Nor will his
edict, if he is a muftī, have any binding force.”[324]
Explaining it further, al-Jassās says that this constitutes Abū
Ḥanīfah’s position on the subject. He discounts the allegation that
Abū Ḥanīfah justified the imāmah of the corrupt.
Some people conjecture that Abū Ḥanīfah justified the
imāmah and caliphate of a morally corrupt person. … If this is not an
intentional lie foisted on him, then it is a gross misimpression about
him.
For Abū Ḥanīfah says and other Iraqi jurists, whose opinion
matter, also hold the same view that if the qāḍī is just then even
when he is appointed by an unjust ruler, his court rulings will become
operative. [This equally applies to] the prayers. If people perform
prayer after these unjust rulers, it will still be valid, notwithstanding
their moral corruption. This stand (on the issue) is perfectly sound.
But any rationale developed thereof that Abū Ḥanīfah considered a
morally corrupt individual as qualified to have imāmah will be wrong.
[325]
Both Imām al-Dhahabi and al-Muwaffaq al-Makki cite Abū
Ḥanīfah on this point:
“An imām who misuses public money (fay) or
while issuing the command violates the dictates of
justice, his imāmah will be bāṭil and his edict invalid.”[326]
From these excerpts, it becomes evident that contrary to
Khawārij and Mu‘tazilah, Abū Ḥanīfah cognized the difference
between de jure and de facto aspects of the problem. According to
the Khawārij and Mu‘tazilah, if an imām was not just and pious, then
the affairs of the whole Muslim society and state go awry – neither
Ḥajj could be performed nor would the Friday and other
congregational Prayers be valid, nor would the courts or other social
and political institutions function. Abū Ḥanīfah rectifies their error by
saying that if the rightful (de jure) imām is not available, then even
under the de facto ruler who himself is unjust and morally corrupt,
the system as well as the Muslims’ collective life will continue.
As opposed to extremism of the Khawārij and Mu‘tazilah, the
other extreme, as represented by the Murji’ah and some jurists of the
mainstream ahl al-Sunnah held that the imāmah of a morally corrupt
is as good as that of a rightful ruler confusing the separation
between de facto and de jure governance. Abū Ḥanīfah tried to
rectify this extremism as well, for if he had not, Muslims would have
accepted any bad governance perpetuated by unjust, morally corrupt
rulers without even bothering to change it or be worried about its
nature and consequence. Abū Ḥanīfah condemned this kind of
thought and declared the imāmah of such a people as false.
3.2. The conditionality of the caliph being the
Qurayshite
Whether the caliph should necessarily be a Qurayshite was
yet another issue that plagued the sociopolitical scene. Imām Abū
Ḥanīfah favoured the Qurayshite entitlement to the caliphate[327] not
because he thought it was a Shar‘ī position but because he cognized
the then prevailing ground reality. And he is not a loner in his view. In
fact, the whole ahl al-Sunnah agrees on this point.[328] Ibn Khaldūn
has expounded the issue with the same dexterity that he is known
for. To him, the real power behind the Islamic state was the Arabs,
and if they could agree to something, it was the Quaryshi-based
caliphate. Any other entrant to this office would have caused schism
and conflict, endangering the very institution and the system that
sustained it.[329] The Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) knew its perils and
that is why he instructed the Muslim people to have imām from the
Quraysh.[330] Had it been grounded in the Sharī‘ah and not
expediency, ‘Umar would not have expressed his deathbed desire to
have named Sālim as his successor, freed slave of Huzayfah who
had died by then.[331]
In fact, the Prophet while advising Muslims to keep the
caliphate within the Quraysh had clearly said that this office would
stay with them as long as they had certain specific qualities in them.
[332]
Obviously, one can easily conclude from this that in the absence
of those specified qualities, the caliphate could go to others as well.
This is the crux of the difference between Abū Ḥanīfah and ahl al-
Sunnah and the Khawārij and Mu‘tāzilah, who insisted on giving the
caliphate to a non-Qurayshi. Rather, they thought that it could be
better to give the caliphate to a non-Qurayshi. In their eyes, the real
importance was of democracy, though it might have led to anarchy.
On the contrary, ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah sought stability of the
state in the participatory system of the caliphate.
4. Bayt al-Māl
Among wrongs committed by the monarchial absolutism of his
time, he was highly critical of their unbridled spending and their
appropriation of the people’s properties. To him, persecutory decrees
and usurpation of the public treasury were enough to disqualify the
imām and his imamate as we have stated elsewhere citing al-
Dhahabi.
Abū Ḥanīfah also decried the caliph’s acceptance of foreign
gifts as his personal possession. He suggested their consignment to
the public treasury, for it was because of his office as the caliph of
the Muslim Ummah and the international status of respect thus
acquired due to the collective power of the Muslim people that he
received gifts. Nobody would have sent him gifts in his status of a
commoner.[333] Abū Ḥanīfah was also critical of non-justifiable
spending and endowments to the favourites. This accounts for his
refusal to accept caliphal gifts.
When he was having conflict with the caliph al-Manṣūr, the
latter bitterly asked him why he had refused to accept his gifts.
Abū Ḥanīfah’s response was forthwith: “Amīr al-Mū’minīn,
when did you give me something from your personal holding that I
refused to accept it. If you had given me from your personal account,
I would have certainly accepted it. [On the contrary], you doled out
the Muslim money to me from the treasury on which I do not have a
claim. I neither fight in [the people’s] defence to qualify for a soldier’s
share nor am I from among their children to have a child’s share nor
am I from among the beggars to have a beggar’s share.”[334]
Again when al-Manṣūr got him lashed thirty times for his
refusal to accept the office of the high qāḍī and in consequence his
body was bloodied, the caliph’s uncle Abdul-Ṣamad ibn ‘Ali was
greatly disturbed. Reprimanding al-Manṣūr, he said: “What have you
done? You have drawn over your head 100,000 swords. He is the
jurist of Iraq nay of the entire people of the East.”
Realizing his mistake, al-Manṣūr sent him the compensatory
amount of 30,000 dirham, 1,000 dirham for each lash. But Abū
Ḥanīfah refused to take the compensatory amount. Al-Manṣūr felt
bad about it but other than suggesting that he should accept the
amount and dispose it off in charity, he could do nothing. Abū
Ḥanīfah stuck to his grove and nonchalantly said: “Does he have
anything rightful in his possession?”[335]
When confined to his deathbed, he instructed his family not to
bury him in that part of Baghdād which al-Manṣūr wrongfully
appropriated to build the city. When al-Manṣūr heard about his will,
he raged: “Ah Abū Ḥanīfah! Who can save me from your hold in life
and death?” [336]
5. Separation of judiciary from the administration
About judiciary, he held the view that in dispensing justice it
should not only be free from administrative interference and pressure
but should have also the power to interdict even the caliph on
violating people’s rights. In his last days when Abū Ḥanīfah had the
feeling that the government would not spare his life, he gathered his
disciples around and spoke, among others, on the human rights
issues.
“Should the caliph involve himself in a crime that
violates human rights then the next in stature to the
caliph – the chief qādi – must enforce the edict on
him.”[337]
His refusal to accept office in the governmental hierarchy,
during the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid periods, especially in the judiciary,
was primarily because he saw the court’s lack of writ on the caliph
and his functionaries. He also feared that they might use him as an
instrument of oppression and forced to make wrong decision
effectuated by the caliph and his family.
He was first forced to accept office in the Umayyad’s reign by
the Iraqi governor Yazīd ibn ‘Umar ibn Hubayrah. These were the
turbulent times of the 130 A.H. The Umayyads were fast losing their
popularity with the masses and their discontent was finding
expression in an underground movement determined to overthrow
the Umayyad setup. Ibn Hubayrah wanted to refurbish the waning
Umayyad’s image by installing in public offices the big names of law
and jurisprudence like Ibn abī Laylā, Dā’ūd ibn abī al-Hind, and ibn
Shuburmah. To meet this end, he also offered Abū Ḥanīfah the
pivotal role in the administration with absolute powers to oversee any
governmental decree issued by the governor or money dispensed
from the public treasury. The Imām as usual declined the offer. Ibn
Hubayrah locked him up in state penitentiary and threatened to lash
him. The other fuqahā’ pleaded with Abū Ḥanīfah to follow their
footstep by accepting the job offer and avoid calamity to his person.
His answer was true to his character:
“Even if he asks me to count for him the doors of
the Wastt masjid, I will not do it. He desires that he will
write death for someone and I should stamp it. By Allah, I
will not join him in this responsibility.”
Ibn Hubaryah offered him some other jobs as well but he
refused to accept them. Eventually he asked him to serve as Kūfah’s
qāḍī swearing to lash him if he declined. But if Ibn Hubayrah was
insistent, Abū Ḥanīfah was adamant. His response was provocative.
“Getting lashed at his hand,” he said, “was far easier than
punishment in the life hereafter.” Then swearing back, he said: “By
Allah, I will never accept (his job offer). He may kill me.”
Ibn Hubayrah got him lashed twenty or thirty times. Some
reports say he continued to lash him ten times a day for ten to
eleven days. But Abū Ḥanīfah did not budge an inch from his
principled stand. Eventually someone told Ibn Hubayrah that Abū
Ḥanīfah might die. Angered, he exclaimed in desperation if someone
could advise Abū Ḥanīfah to ask for time to reconsider the matter.
When informed of Ibn Hubayrah’s suggestion, he said he should be
allowed to consult his friends. Released, he went straight to Makkah
and refused to return to Kūfah until the Umayyad’s fall from power.
[338]
In the ‘Abbasid era, al-Manṣūr was favourably inclined to
induct him in the chief qāḍī office. But it did not materialize. When al-
Nafs al-Zakiyyah and his brother Ibrāhīm rose against al-Manṣūr, he
supported them openly which turned the latter against him. In al-
Dhahabi’s word, al-Manṣūr was so angry with him that he burned in
rage without fire.[339] What compounded his problem was Abū
Ḥanīfah’s popularity with the masses. He knew the kind of hate the
Umayyads invited against themselves by killing Ḥusayn and how
easily their rule was terminated. He therefore planned to bind him
with chains of gold and use him for his ends rather than kill him. His
repeated offers for the highest judicial office of the state to Abū
Ḥanīfah aimed at neutralizing him. But he dodged him.[340] When al-
Manṣūr increased his pressure, he gave his reasons for declining the
former’s offer. In one of his sittings with him, he explained his stand
in a very soft way:
“For the judicial office you need someone strong
enough to enforce laws on you, your princes and the
military commanders. I do not find this strength in me.
When you call me to come [your scare overwhelms me]
and I regain myself only when I return home safely.” [341]
On another occasion, they had a harsh exchange of words.
Addressing the caliph, he said:
“By Allah even if I accept this office with consent, I
will not qualify to come up to your expectations not to talk
of being forced to accept it. If I made a verdict against
you and you threatened to drown me in the River
Euphrates or to alter the given decision, I will prefer to
drown myself rather than change the verdict. Besides,
you have a large number of courtiers. They need a qāḍī
who take care of their interests as well.”[342]
His open refusal convinced al-Manṣūr that he was not the
kind who could have been lured into the golden cage. This time he
resolved to brute force. He subjected him to lashing along with
incarceration and denial of food. Later, he confined him to a house
where he died. Some say he died a natural death others say he was
poisoned. [343]
6. The right to free expression
Abū Ḥanīfah gave equal importance to free expression in an
Islamic state for which the Qur’ān and the Sunnah use the
expression of “amr bil ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar.” Mere right to
free expression could create problems for a society; it could also be
contrary to morality, honesty and even humanity, which no law
tolerates. But by restricting it to forbidding evil and spreading
goodness, Islam declares it not only as the right way to express
one’s self but also an obligation.
Abū Ḥanīfah strongly espoused it for he had witnessed its
seizure by the rulers of his times. Its continual denial confused
people even about its obligatory nature. On the one hand, the
Murji’ah were emboldening people to sin, the Hashviyah believed
that amr bil ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar against the government
was a fitnah (mischief), while the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid
governments crushed the Muslim spirit to criticize the wrongdoings
of the high ups and their usurpation of the Sharī‘ah. Abū Ḥanīfah
through his word and practice tried hard to resuscitate the Ummah in
these aspects. Al-Jassās says that to the famous Khurāsāni jurist
Ibrāhīm al-Sā’igh’s inquiry, Abū Ḥanīfah said amr bi al- ma‘rūf was
an obligation that must be discharged, for the Prophet (‘alayhi as-
salām), as narrated by Ibn ‘Abbās, has said “the best of the shuhadā’
(martyrs) was Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abdul-Muṭṭalib and second the person,
who would rise up before a tyrannical ruler to stop him from doing
wrong and in consequence killed.”
So greatly Abū Ḥanīfah’s word affected Ibrāhīm that on his
return to Khurāsān, he tried to restrain Abū Muslim Khurāsāni (d.
136 A.H./763 C.E.) from savagery and in result, the latter got him
killed.[344]
When Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdullah, Nafs Zakiyyah’s brother, rose in
revolt (145 A.H./763 C.E.) against the ‘Abbasid’s usurpation of
power, Abū Ḥanīfah openly supported him, even though al-Manṣūr
was in Kūfah at that time. The city was cordoned off by the security
forces because of Ibrāhīm’s advance towards the city.
Abū Ḥanīfah’s famous student Zufar ibn al-Huzayl says that
the former was actively engaged in opposing al-Manṣūr. Fearful of
their lives, Zufar approached him: “You will not stop unless we all
have noose around our necks.”[345]
In 148 A.H., the people of Mūṣal rose for the second time in
revolt against the ‘Abbasids. In the previous aborted rebellion, al-
Manṣūr had spared their lives and properties on condition that they
would avoid becoming part of any mischief against the state, and
that should they fail to abide by it, they would liable themselves to be
killed and their properties confiscated by him. Now that they revolted,
al-Manṣūr called for a meeting of the eminent jurists, including Abū
Ḥanīfah, and asked their opinion on the issue of the Mūṣal people
violating their pledge to the caliph and whether it gave him the right
to punish them making their lives and properties permissible for him.
Majority of the fuqahā’ were of the opinion that since the
people had a contract with al-Manṣūr he could kill them and
appropriate their properties. Nevertheless, if he forgave them it
would be befitting his exalted status.
During the conversation, Abū Ḥanīfah remained quiet. Taking
note of his silence, al-Manṣūr turned towards him:
“Yā Sheikh, what is your say in this matter?”
“The people of Mūṣal made those things permissible for you
which were not theirs (that is their blood) and you made them to
accept a condition that you had no right to force down their throats.
Tell me, if a woman offers herself to someone without matrimony,
would she become permissible (Ḥalāl) for that person? If a person
tells someone to kill him, would his killing become permissible for
that person?” He replied.
“No,” al-Manṣūr said.
“Then, hold your hand from killing the people of Mūṣal. Their
blood is not allowed to you!”
This upset al-Manṣūr so much that he dispersed the meeting.
Then he talked to Abū Ḥanīfah in private. “What you said is true. But
you should not issue verdicts that might compromise your imām’s
authority and encourage the rebels.”[346]
He also used his right to expression against judicial decisions
that he thought involved misapplication of law or violation of a
procedure. To him, respect for the courts did not mean to let them
make wrong decisions. For his criticism of the courts’ wrong rulings,
he was debarred once from expressing his opinion on legal matters.
[347]
In his defence of free expression, he would go to the extent of
allowing it even against a legitimate imamate and its just rule. He
thought that to criticize it, to curse the ruler or to express one’s intent
even to kill him did not call for punishment unless he rises in arms
against him or creates problems of law and order in the land. He
builds his rationale on the incident related to caliph ‘Ali when they
apprehended five people on the charge of openly abusing him in
Kūfah. One among them even threatened to kill Amīr al-Mū’minīn.
‘Ali ordered their release. They told him that one of them declared to
kill him.
“Should I get him killed because he says so?”
They were abusing him, they said.
 “If you want you can also abuse them (in return),” said he.
Abū Ḥanīfah also derived his rationale from ‘Ali’s declaration
against the Khawārij. “We will not stop you from coming to the
masjid. Nor will we deprive you of your share in the conquered
wealth unless you raise arms against us.”[348]
7. Revolt against a tyrant government
An issue that plagued the minds in that era related to armed
rebellion against a morally corrupt and tyrant ruler: whether it would
be justified to rise against him? The mainstream Muslims ahl al-
Sunnah themselves differed on the matter. A large chunk of alh al-
Ḥadīth believed that only verbal condemnation of oppression should
be enough but not rebellion, even though the ruling regime indulges
in killing without justification, violates people’s rights, and openly
commits immorality.[349]
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah not only declared an oppressive regime as
bātil (invalid) but also liable to be opposed and risen against
provided such an effort could lead to the induction of a just and
morally upright individual. Abū Bakr al-Jassās explains Abū
Ḥanīfah’s position on the issue:
“His school of thought is known for its stand on
armed uprising against the tyrants and victimizers. That
is why al-Auzā‘i had said we bore with everything Abū
Ḥanīfah said until he came out with the sword (that is, he
got convinced about armed uprising against the tyrants)
and this was intolerable for us.
Abū Ḥanīfah used to say that to exhort for
goodness and forbid evil should be done through mouth
in the beginning and later wājib (compulsory) with sword,
if the regime showed no inclination to change itself.”[350]
At another place, al-Jassās cites Abū Ḥanīfah on the authority
of ‘Abdullah ibn Mubārak. This was the time marked by Abū Muslim
al-Khurāsāni’s excesses against people. The Khurāsāni jurist
Ibrāhīm al-Sā’igh came to see the Imām and talked with him on the
subject of amr bi al-ma‘rūf. The Imām himself narrated it later to ‘Abd
Allah ibn Mubārak:
“When we agreed that amr bi a-ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an
al-munkar obligatory, Ibrāhīm suddenly said ‘extend your
 hand so that I pledge my support to you.’ On hearing it,
the world turned dark before me. (Ibn Mubārak says I
asked him why?) He said he had invited me towards one
of Allah’s Ḥaqq (right) and I refused to accept it. At the
end, I said if a single person stood for the (discharge of)
obligation, they will kill him and nothing good will come
out of it. However, if he gets support from the pious
people along with a leader who could be trusted in
upholding the word of Allah, then there is no excuse in
not doing it.
Afterward whenever Ibrāhīm came to me, he
would insist on my taking up the challenge like the harsh
moneylender. I would tell him a single person could not
accomplish this task. Even prophets did not have the
strength to do it unless charged to this task by the
heavens. This obligation is unlike ordinary obligatories,
which even a single individual can discharge. But by its
nature, this task entailed losing one’s life. I fear he would
get himself killed by a fiat. And when killed, his death
would discourage others as well from pursuing this
course.”[351]
7.1. Imām’s conduct in the matter of uprising
For sure, the cited conversation between Abū Ḥanīfah and
Ibrāhīm al-Sā’igh exposes the Imām’s stand on this crucial issue.
Nevertheless, we will fail to understand his whole position unless we
know the way he conduced himself during the uprisings of his time.
7.2. Zayd ibn ‘Ali’s uprising
The first uprising was instigated by Zayd ibn ‘Ali, whom the
Shi‘i sect Zaydiyah considers as their originator. A great scholar, a
jurist and a pious of his time, he was the grandson of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Ali
ibn abī Ṭālib and the brother of Imām al-Bāqir. Even Abū Ḥanīfah
benefited from Zayd’s scholarship. In 120 A.H. (738 C.E.) when
Hishām ibn ‘Abd al-Mālik ousted Khālid ibn ‘Abdullah al-Qasri from
the governorship of Iraq, he summoned Zayd from Madīnah to
witness against him. His visit stirred Kūfah for it was after a long time
that an eminent member of the ‘Ali clan had come to the city, the
centre of ‘Ali’s followers. His presence electrified the crowd. Fed up
with the Umayyad’s draconian policies, they needed someone like
him – pious, scholar and a jurist, scion of the ‘Alawī family. They
assured Zayd that 100,000 people in Kūfah would stand by him
should he decide to lead them against the Umayyads. What gave
credence to their enthusiasm was the personal pledge given to him
by 15,000 people, asking him to enter their names in his register.
Meanwhile, when preparations for the uprising were underway in
secret, the Umayyad governor got wind of it. To counteract the
government move, Zayd made a hasty uprising call in 122 A.H. (740
C.E.), before its scheduled time. But when the battle line was drawn,
the Kūfan Shi‘is deserted him with only 218 peoples standing beside
him. During the battle, an arrow struck him and lost his life.[352]
In Zayd’s uprising, Abū Ḥanīfah’s sympathies were with him.
He not only financially assisted him but asked people to join his
effort.[353]
He likened his uprising to the Prophet Muḥammad’s battle
with the nonbelievers at Badr.[354] By which he meant that as the
Prophet (‘alayhi as-salām) was rightly on truth so was Zayd. But
when Zayd’s envoy came to him for support, he said: “If I had known
that people will not desert him and will stand by him with conviction, I
would have joined him and struggled along with him for he is the true
imām. But I fear that these people would betray him as they betrayed
his grandfather (Ḥusayn). I would though help him with money.”[355]
This stand is consistent with his theoretical formulation
against the oppressive regimes. He knew well the psychology of the
Shi‘is in Kūfah. He was also familiar with their poor history of
waywardness and betrayal since the time of caliph ‘Ali. Dā’ūd ibn ‘Ali
(the grandson of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbās) also had a negative view of
the Kūfans and tried to persuade Zayd not to follow the collision
course against the Umayyads.[356]
Further, Abū Ḥanīfah knew that the anti-Umayyad movement
remained confined to Kūfah and had no following in other parts of
the empire lending strength to Zayd’s effort. Another reason that
accounts for his not joining Zayd’s uprising was his relatively
unknown status among the masses at that time, which would not
have played a decisive role in tilting the scale for Zayd. Until 120 A.
H., Ḥammād had the exclusive leadership of the school of ahl al-
rāi’y, and Abū Ḥanīfah was his student. By the time Zayd decided to
rally support against the Umayyad, his takeover of this school was
hardly a year and a half old. He had yet to be exalted to the rank of
“the jurist of the East.” Nor he had the influence he earned later for
himself.
7.3. Al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah’s uprising
The second uprising was led by Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullah (al-
Nafs al-Zakiyyah) and his brother Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdullah in 145 A.H.
(763 C.E.). They came from the family of Ḥasan ibn ‘Ali. By then Abū
Ḥanīfah was in the prime of his influence.
The two brothers spearheaded the covert movement. Even al-
Manṣūr gave his pledge of loyalty to al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah.[357] The
movement went underground when the ‘Abbasid came into power
and continued spreading their message in Khurāsān, al-Jazīra, Ray,
Tabaristān, Yemen and North Africa. Nafs Zakiyyah himself stayed in
al-Ḥijāz; his brother Ibrāhīm shifted to Baṣrah in Iraq. According to
Ibn al-Athīr, in Kūfah alone they had 100,000 people ready to come
out in their support.[358] Al-Manṣūr was already aware of their covert
movement and was scared of its spread as the ‘Abbasid movement
ran parallel to it and succeeded in establishing the ‘Abbasid rule.
Aware of its organization and strength, al-Manṣūr was bent on
crushing it.
When in the month of Rajab 145 A.H., al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah
rose in revolt from Madīnah, al-Manṣūr left the Baghdād construction
site and reached Kūfah. Gripped by fear, he was not sure if the
‘Abbasid rule would continue.
For him in the extirpation of the opposition movement was the
survival of his rule. Many a time he would exclaim in desperation “By
Allah! I do not know what to do?” News of the uprising were coming
from Baṣrah, Persia, Ahwāz, Madā’in and Sawād. And it appeared
as if the rebels’ hands would reach him soon. For almost two
months, he wore the same clothes and would not have a wink of
sleep sitting on the prayer rug, asking for forgiveness and help from
Allah.[359] He kept his horses ready for escape from Kūfah should the
situation call for it.[360]
Abū Ḥanīfah’s response to the uprising this time was different.
Al-Manṣūr used to be in Kūfah in those days with curfew clamped all
over the city, but it did not scare Abū Ḥanīfah into indifference.
Instead, he openly supported the movement for restoring the
caliphate. His disciples were apprehensive of the law agencies
catching them for he instigated people to pledge their support to
Ibrāhīm.[361]
He considered participation in the uprising as equal to fifty-to-
seventy nonobligatory Ḥajj in its reward from Allah.[362] To a person
named Abū Ishāq al-Fazāri he said his brother’s support to Ibrāhīm
was superior to his Jihād against the nonbelievers.[363] Abū Bakr al-
Jassās, al-Muwaffaq al-Makki and Ibn al-Bazzāz al-Kardari, author of
Fatawā al-Bazzāziyah, have recorded these statements of Abū
Ḥanīfah. According to these juristic opinions, hauling up a Muslim
society from an Islamically derailed governance is far superior to
fighting the nonbelievers outside.
The most dangerous thing he did was to stop al-Manṣūr’s
military chief and his confident Ḥasan ibn Qahtubah from fighting
Nafs Zakiyyah and Ibrāhīm. Ḥasan’s father Qahtubah was a brilliant
military-man who together with Abū Muslim’s political acumen
succeeded in laying down the ‘Abbasid reign. He replaced his father
after his death. Among his generals, al-Manṣūr had great trust in
him. To al-Manṣūr’s misfortune, he fell to Abū Hanifah’s scholarship
and personal piety.
Once Ḥasan opened up to Abū Ḥanīfah saying that in view of
his sins committed during his generalship under al-Manṣūr, was
there still a chance for his forgiveness from Allah? The Imām gave
him hope: “If you assure Allah that you really regretted your past
misdeeds and that in the future if asked to kill an innocent Muslim,
you will die instead and that you pledge to Allah you will not regress
to your past misdeeds, then it will be your atonement.”
Ḥasan pledged to the Imām that he would abide by it. Soon
after when Nafs Zakiyyah and Ibrāhīm rose against the ‘Abbasid, al-
Manṣūr asked Ḥasan to war against them. He came to Imām Abū
Ḥanīfah and told him about the new moving order.
Said the Imām, “The hour has come to show you have really
repented. If you stayed put to your pledge, your repentance would
stay as well. Otherwise, you will be held accountable before Allah for
your past and what you will do now …”
 Ḥasan renewed his pledge and declared before the Imām that
even if they killed him, he would not go on this campaign.
Thus, when he faced al-Manṣūr, he told him bluntly. “Amīr al-
Mū’minīn, I will not go for this campaign. If what I did so far in your
obedience was owing to Allah’s will, then it is enough for me and if it
was in violation of Allah’s will, I will not go beyond it and indulge in
more sins.”
Enraged, al-Manṣūr ordered his arrest. Faced with the serious
situation, Ḥasan’s brother Ḥamīd interjected. “Since the last year his
ways have been unusual. It appears his mind has gone hay wire, I
will myself go on this campaign.”
Later al-Manṣūr checked with his trusted circles of people to
find out whom did Hasan go for advice. They told him he often went
to Abū Ḥanīfah.[364]
Abū Ḥanīfah’s conduct was consistent with his well-
formulated thesis that if there were probabilities of a successful
change towards the restoration of the caliphate, then an uprising
against an oppressive regime was not only justified but also a
compulsion (wājib). Interestingly enough, Abū Ḥanīfah was not a
loner in his view. Imām Mālik had a similar view. Asked how could
they join al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah’s uprising when they have already
pledged their loyalties to al-Manṣūr, Mālik’s response was that their
pledge to al-Manṣūr was extracted by force and thus any pledge by
force or a divorce (ṭalāq) under duress is not valid (bāṭil).[365] It was
because of his edict that a large number of people became part of
Nafs Zakiyyah’s effort to dislodge al-Manṣūr. Later, he had to pay for
it. The ‘Abbasid governor Ja‘far ibn Sulaymān got him whipped,
dislocating one of his arms from his shoulder.[366]
8. Abū Ḥanīfah is not unique in his view
Here it would be wrong to think that on the uprising issue Abū
Ḥanīfah’s views were unique among ahl al-Sunnah. The fact of the
matter is that in the first Hijrah prominent elders held the same view
that Abū Ḥanīfah expressed later through his words and deeds. In
his post-allegiance speech, Abū Bakr said:
“Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His
Prophet. But if I disobey Allah and His Prophet, then you
are not bound to follow me.”[367]
The second caliph ‘Umar said:
“He who gives his pledge to someone without
consultation with the Muslims deceives himself as well as
the one whom he gave his pledge and qualified his
person to be killed.”[368]
At the time of Ḥusayn’s uprising against the established
government of Yazīd a large number of the Prophet’s companions
were still alive and so were the whole group of the jurists belonging
to the second generation. But we do not have on record of a single
Ṣaḥābi or a tābi‘i who described his uprising as Ḥarām.
Even those who tried to persuade Ḥusayn did it on grounds
that the Kūfans were not reliable and that they might not come out in
his support exposing him to serious consequences for his life. In
other words, their opinion on the issue was similar to Abū Ḥanīfah’s
– that the uprising against an Islamically-derailed governance by
itself was not wrong, though it would be pertinent to probe the matter
from all aspects whether it would be possible to replace a distorted
system with a pious one?
Imām Ḥusayn received a large mail from the Kūfans, which he
misread as support to his cause. Swayed by their effusive emotions
he thought he would be able to bring about a successful revolution.
He left Madīnah in the face of opposition from well-wishing Ṣaḥābah,
who tried to persuade him from going to Kūfah. Based on his father
‘Ali and his brother Ḥasan’s experiences with the Kūfans who
betrayed them, their argument was that they were untrustworthy.
Thus, the difference between Ḥusayn and the Ṣaḥābah was
of tactical nature and not of validity or invalidity of his desire to
challenge the system.
Likewise, when during the oppressive reign of Ḥajjāj ibn
Yūsuf, ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn Ash‘ath rebelled against the Umayyads,
prominent fuqahā’ (jurists) like Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr, al-Sha‘bi, Ibn abi
Laylā and Abū al-Bakhtarī stood by him. Ibn Kathīr says a whole
regiment of the qurrā’ (‘ulamā and fuqahā’) was with him. Even those
who lagged behind in supporting him did not question the validity of
his uprising. The speeches made by such jurists before Ibn Ash‘ath’s
army speak of their view. Ibn abi Laylā said:
 “O believers, he who witnesses oppression, sees
people prompted to evil doing, and feels bad about it
from his heart has acquitted himself and saved. And if he
disapproves of it, he will be recompensed and his rank
superior to the first one.
But he who opposes such people by (the force of)
his sword in order to elevate the word of Allah and to
humiliate the word of the oppressors is the finder of the
true path, his heart blazed by the light of conviction.
So war against those who have violated the
sanctity of Ḥalāl (allowed) and Ḥarām (disallowed) and
innovated new ways in the Ummah, who are disregard
truth (Ḥaqq) and give no respect to it, who follow tyranny
(zulm) and do not consider it bad.”
Al-Sha‘bi said:
“Fight them and do not think that to fight them is a
bad thing. By Allah, I do not know of another group on
the face of this planet who is more tyrannical and unjust
in its decision-making than these are. So let not
complacency takes over you in the fight against them.”
Sa‘id ibn Jubayr said:
Fight them for they are unjust in governance and
rebellious in their attitudes towards religion; they
humiliate the weak and waste their prayers.[369]
As against these fuqahā’, those who refrained from giving
support to Ibn Ash‘ath did not consider the uprising as invalid but
viewed it as ill-timed. Thus, when Ḥasan al-Baṣri was asked about
the legitimacy of the rebellion, he said:
By Allah! Allah did not impose Ḥajjāj on you
without a reason. Rather, it is a punishment for you,
which you should not oppose by sword but by patience,
and implore forgiveness from Allah.[370]
This sums up the opinion of the first-century pious Muslims.
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah grew up in this environment of righteous
indignation and non-conformism with the ruling elite. The second
opinion of avoiding armed rebellion if it had small chance to succeed,
by the stance of the mainstream ahl al-Sunnah began inviting
attention at the end of the second-century Hijrah. It started gaining
ground not because it was based on some clear-cut injunctions that
were hidden from the first-century elders or that Allah forbid they had
adopted a stance contrary to the injunctions. In fact, they were two
reasons for its becoming popular. First the power-crazed rulers had
preempted all avenues to peaceful change, which convinced the
practitioners of power to abandon it. Second, the consequences of
the armed uprising without exception had not been pleasant: it
inclined people to resignation.[371]
 Chapter Nine

Imām Abū Yūsuf and his work

Abū Ḥanīfah’s self-imposed alienation from the centres of

power caused tension between the Ḥanafiyyah and the ‘Abbasids,
which continued even after his death when his renowned disciple
Zufar ibn al-Hudhayl (d.158 A.H./775 C.E.) spurned the ‘Abbasid
offer of the qāḍī position in the judicial hierarchy and then fearing
possible retaliation went into hiding.[372] As a matching response,
from al-Manṣūr to Hārūn al-Rashīd’s early period, the ‘Abbasid made
sure to reduce the Ḥanafiyyah influence. Their adversarial
relationship can be seen in the attitudes of al-Manṣūr and his
successors who were inclined to plug the legal vacuum, created by
the emergent new realities, by some other codified law. Both al-
Manṣūr and al-Mahdī tried to launch Imām Mālik ibn Anas as a great
jurist in their reigns.[373] In his 174 A.H. Ḥajj, Hārun al-Rashīd even
expressed his desire to have Mālik’s book al-Muwattā’ as the law of
the land.[374]
With developments like these, when everything was going
against the Ḥanafiyyah school of thought, it threw up an exceptional
man who by his legal acumen stamped out the legal anarchy of the
‘Abbāsid empire, and gave a constitutional frame to the empire,
making Ḥanafī jurisprudence the law of the land. This was the
person of Abū Hanifah’s great disciple – Imām Abū Yūsuf.
1. Life History
Born in 113 A.H. (731 C.E.) his real name was Ya‘qūb.
Though domiciled in Kūfah, he came from the Arab tribe of Bajilah
and had a maternal link with the anṣār of Madīnah. After his early
education, he opted for specialty in jurisprudence (fiqh) and joined
the academic circle of ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn abi-Laylā followed by
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s, which turned into a lifelong affiliation. His
parents were extremely poor and had insufficient means to help him
continue his education. When Abū Ḥanīfah came to know about his
parents’ poor financial status he not only sponsored Abū Yūsuf’s
education but also his family’s needs. Abū Yūsuf himself says that
he never had to ask for money from Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, who would
periodically dish out the requisite amount of money to his family,
taking away the worry load from his mind.[375]
From the beginning, Abū Ḥanīfah thought highly of his
student. Thus, when Abū Yūsuf’s father wanted to take him out of
the school, the Imām stopped him, saying, “Abū Ishāq, this boy, if
Allah willed, will become a great man.”[376]
2. Academic excellence
Besides Abū Ḥanīfah, he acquired knowledge from some of
the great men of learning of his time, obtaining from them excellence
in ḥadīth, tafsīr, maghāzi, Arabic history, diction, literature and
rational theology (kalām), especially in ḥadīth, which he knew well
and committed to his memory. Scholars like Yaḥyā ibn Mu‘īn, Aḥmad
ibn Ḥanbal, and ‘Ali ibn al-Madini rated him very high.[377] His
contemporaries unanimously thought of him as peerless among Abū
Ḥanīfah’s students. Ṭalḥah ibn Muḥammad says he was the greatest
among the jurists and none reached his calibre.[378] Dā’ūd ibn al-
Rashīd says if Abū Ḥanīfah had produced only him as his student
that would have sufficed for his pride.[379] Abū Ḥanīfah himself
thought of him highly as a great scholar, who had acquired
knowledge more than any body else.[380] Once he became seriously
ill diminishing hope for his recovery. The Imām visited him and while
coming out said: “If this young man died, he would leave behind no
jurist (faqīh) greater than himself on this planet.”[381]
3. The compilation of the Ḥanafī fiqh
Like Imām Abū Ḥanīfah and in line with the Ḥanafī stance, he
remained indifferent to power for almost sixteen years concentrating
on the scholarly pursuits of his mentor. This showed itself in his effort
to compile books topically on almost all aspects of the law that
incorporated the decisions made by the legislative body (majlis) of
Abū Ḥanīfah and his own.[382] When these books spread across the
nation, they influenced not only academics in different sections of
society but also the courts and official circles in the government
hierarchy paving way for the Ḥanafī fiqh to prevail as there was no
other legal corpus to have met the emergent needs of the ‘Abbasid
empire. Although Imām Mālik’s al-Mawattā’ soon made its
appearance, it was neither comprehensive nor was its compilation
systematic enough to have answered the needs of a sprawling state.
[383]
A spin off of Abū Yūsuf’s work was that even before he could
have saddled the government seat, the Ḥanafī fiqh had made its way
into the people’s mind, waiting for formal declaration to its being the
law of the land.
4. Justice department
Perhaps Abū Yūsuf would have followed his mentor’s isolation
from the government if only his economic situation was not that
strait. Abū Ḥanīfah’s death deprived him of his financial support
leaving him to his own wits. Soon he was penniless.
Pushed to adversity, he sold the roof beam of his wife’s
house to avert hunger. This enraged his mother-in-law, who
barraged him with insults, forcing him to reconsider his attitudinal
indifference to the government job. Forced thus in 166 A.H., he went
to see the caliph al-Mahdī, who appointed him as qāḍī of the eastern
Baghdād. He continued in this office even in al-Hādī’s time. By the
time Hārūn al-Rashīd came into power, the two had developed a
relationship of trust and companionship, which slung him into the
high seat of chief justice becoming its first occupant in the Muslim
history.[384] It is of interest to note that the chief justice office not only
related to law enforcement and its interpretation but also
administrative in so far as he made appointment for the courts
across the nation. In this sense, the ‘Abbasid chief justice was a far
different entity than the present-day chief justice. He guided the state
in its internal and external affairs, giving him a far greater stature
than an ordinary chief justice had. He was more or less a minister for
law.
Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf’s elevation to this office formulated three
important consequences for the development of the Hanafi law:
One, he got a wider spread of influence giving him a
chance to deal directly with the affairs of the greatest state of
its time and thus apply the Ḥanafī law to real life situations,
making it more functional as a system as compared to the
limited circle of teaching and writing books.
Two, since he had the power to appoint qāḍīs all over
the nation, it obviously gave him the chance to draw upon the
 pool of Ḥanafī jurists, which in turn paved the way for the
Ḥanafī law to become the law of the land.
Three, because of his great moral and scholastic
influence he bonded the Muslim state to a written constitution
that had been run since the Umayyad times in the absolutist
tradition of the kings without a constitutional template.
Fortunately, this is still available with us under the name of
Kitāb al-Kharāj.
5. His lofty character
Before we talk about his constitutional work, it is necessary to
dispel a misunderstanding about him. His biographers have spun
stories giving others the impression as if he was a sycophant and
created legal pretenses for the kings to pursue their selfish interests,
which, they imply, was the reason for his close relations with them.
This is not tenable, for a person can have access to the kings by
tampering with the Sharī‘ah but he would not have moral influence
over them. Now if we look into those incidents involving him with the
caliphs, ministers, and army chiefs mentioned in authentic histories,
it becomes difficult to believe that a sycophant could have shown
such courage and fortitude.
In al-Hādī’s reign when he was just a qāḍī in eastern Baghdād
he ruled against the caliph.[385]
A similar incident took place in Hārūn al-Rashīd’s time when
an old Christian sued the caliph disputing his ownership over a
garden. Abū Yūsuf not only instituted the hearing before the caliph
but also made him to take oath in countering the plaintiff’s claim. Still
until his death, he regretted his omission of not making the caliph
stand beside the plaintiff [in the court].[386]
He declared Hārūn’s prime minister ‘Ali ibn ‘Isā as
untrustworthy on reason that he heard him say “anā ‘abd al-khalīfah
(I am the slave of the caliph).” If he was really a slave, he said, then
his testimony was not acceptable and if he has lied to please [the
caliph], he is not dependable.[387] The same kind of moral
punishment he gave to one of the commanders of Hārūn.[388]
‘Abd Allah ibn al-Mubārak says that Abū Yūsuf would go right
up to the inner sanctum of the palace (where even the prime minister
had to go on foot) and the caliph would himself greet him.[389]
 Once Hārūn was asked how he had given such a high place
of honour to Abū Yūsuf, he replied: “I tested him in every field of
knowledge and found him perfect. Besides, he is trustworthy, a man
of strong character. Show me a person equal to his merits.”[390]
In 182 A.H., when he died Hārūn al-Radhīd walked with his
funeral, led the prayer and buried him in his own family graveyard.
He described his death as a collective grief for Muslims across the
land.[391] His work Kitāb al-Kharāj is a monument to his greatness.
The tone of its preface does not suggest of a sycophant.
6. Kitāb al-Kharāj
In Hārūn al-Rashīd, Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf had found a caliph who
carried mixed traits in his person: he was a fierce soldier, a king who
lived in opulence and still a God-fearing religious man. Abū al-Faraj
al-Isfahānī makes a comprehensive statement on him in a single
sentence: “While listening to a speech of exhortation and warning
none could match his mellowed temperament – he would weep
copiously; and in rage he would be singularly ruthless.”[392] It
redounds to Abū Yūsuf’s credit that without inciting the weak aspects
of Hārūn al-Rashīd’s person he began influencing the religious man
in him by his knowledge and piety until the hour came when the
former himself asked him to write a book of constitution for the state
so that it could run accordingly. Kitāb al-Kharāj was a response to
the caliph’s desire. As the Imām says in his preface to the book:
“Amīr al-Mū’minīn has desired that I should write a
comprehensive book on the collection of land revenue
(kharāj), tithe (‘ushr), charities (ṣadaqāt) and social
security tax (Jizyah) and other related aspects, whose
flow and distribution fall under his realm of authority. …
He has questioned me on some of the issues involved
and wanted me to answer them in details so that he
could take action on them.”
In his book, he has frequently referred to the questions
formulated by Hārūn al-Rashīd suggesting as if it was a
questionnaire sent to the ministry of law on some of the important
issues relating to constitutional, legal, administrative and
international aspects of the then prevailing situation so that it could
serve as a permanent code of law for the state. The name of the
book is seemingly deceptive as if revenue receipts are its only
concern but its scope is wider as it discusses almost every aspect of
the state. Leaving aside other matters, we will focus on the subject of
the nature of the state and how should it run.
6.1. Reversion to the pious caliphate
The first thing that strikes Kitab al-Kharaj’s reader is Abū
Yūsuf’s sincerity: he sets himself to the task of deflecting the caliph
from following the Romans and Persian practices of statecraft
adopted by the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids, and prod him to follow the
pattern of the pious caliphate.
He never tells him to give up the practices of his
predecessors, but at the same time, he never invokes the
precedents set by the Umayyads or even the practices of Hārūn’s
ancestors. In every matter, he either builds his rationale from the
Qur’ān and the Sunnah or he brings out the precedents relating to
the era of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, and ‘Ali. Among the later
caliphs when he invokes their precedents, it is not from al-Manṣūr or
al-Mahdī but from the ‘Umayyad caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul-‘Azīz. What
it means is that in framing the ‘Abbasid’s constitution he ignores the
whole era of almost 132 years from ‘Ali ibn abī Ṭālib to Hārūn al-
Rashīd. Written as a moral exhortation by a truthful jurist in his non-
governmental capacity, it would have carried little significance. But
when we see that it has been done by a chief justice and minister of
law in his official capacity on a task assigned to him by the caliph, its
significance increases.
6.2. The governance concept
In the beginning of his book, he presents the governance
concept to the caliph as follows:
“O Amīr al-Mū’minīn! Allah the Exalted, Who alone
deserves laudation, has placed a heavy load on you. Its
reward is of a great magnitude and so is its punishment:
He has reposed the Ummah leadership in you [and
because of that] you help build lives of a large number of
people. He has made you their guardian by installing you
as their head and through them He tests you. He has
made you responsible to run their affairs. What is based
on other than Allah’s fear has little stay; Allah overturns it
 and makes him fall who thinks of it and helps it happens.
All custodians will have to account for themselves before
their Creator the way a shepherd is answerable to the
herd master.… Do not walk the crooked path for your
herd will follow it as well. … Treat everyone in Allah’s
Sharī‘ah as equal whether he is close to you or farther.
… You must not go tomorrow before Allah’s tribunal as
one involved in excesses, for the Master of the
Judgement Day will decide peoples’ fate on their deeds
and not on their worldly status. … Be fearful of neglecting
your herd, for the Master of the herd will severely take
you to task [for negligence].”[393]
Afterwards in the book, he keeps giving incremental
reminders to Hārūn al-Rashīd that he was not the master of the
Muslim lands but the vicegerent of the Real Master.[394]
If he becomes a just ruler, he will have the best of the ends.
And if he turns into an unjust ruler, he will face the deadliest
consequences.[395]
At one place, he tells him of ‘Umar’s saying: “Not a single
person, who is a rightful claimant to a position, has the status to
command obedience in violation of Allah’s will.”[396]
6.3. The Democratic Spirit
Abū Yūsuf favoured not only the caliph’s answerability to Allah
but also to the people. To support his viewpoint, he stacks up
citations from the ḥadīth and the companions and shows that the
Muslims have the right to question their rulers and the government
functionaries, and that in the freedom of accountability lies benefit for
the ruled as well as the ruler.[397]
Amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar (ordering good and
prohibiting evil) is the Muslims’ right as well as their obligation. To
close its doors means that the Ummah invites upon itself punishment
from the above.[398]
The ruler should have the disposition to listen to truth. There
is no harm greater than his irritable temper and lack of patience.[399]
Muslims have the right to question their rulers for the violation
of their rights which the Sharī‘ah allows them. Above all, they can
question their rulers about the use of the revenues placed in trust
with them.[400]
6.4. The obligations of the caliph
The caliph’s obligations as he extrapolated them are as
under:
- To establish the parameters set by Allah.
- To retrieve the rights of the people after due probe and
then return them to the people.
- To revive the practices of the pious rulers (discarded by
past brutal governments).[401]
- To stop oppression and to alleviate people’s complaints
after due process of investigation.[402]
- To command people to obey Allah’s injunctions and to
stop them from committing sin.
- To implement Allah’s law on everyone, including one’s
self and others, without any consideration to whom it affects.
[403]
- To obtain revenues with justice and spend them
judiciously where called for.[404]
6.5. Obligations of the Muslim citizen
He also lists people’s obligations concerning their rulers:
- Obey your rulers and avoid disobedience to
them.
- Do not raise arms against them.
- Do not speak ill of them.
- Bear with their harshness.
- Do not deceive them.
- Do goodness to them with sincerity.
- Strive hard in preventing them from doing bad.
- And help them in their good works.[405]
6.6. Bayt al-Māl
Abū Yūsuf describes treasury (bayt al-māl) as trust that
belongs to Allah and the people. He frequently reminds the caliph
about what ‘Umar said on the subject – for the caliph public treasury
is akin to the orphan’s property for his guardian. If he is a person of
means, he should not, as the Qur’ān says, take a penny from the
orphan’s property and instead manage his property freely for Allah’s
sake. And if he is a person of lesser means, he should take rightfully
a measured amount considered just by everyone.[406]
Abū Yūsuf also allude to the caliph ‘Umar’s conduct
concerning public exchequer which he spent with extreme caution,
more than one treats his own money. In this respect, he cites an
incident of ‘Umar sending a qāḍī, a wālī, and a revenue official to
Kūfah. He allowed them to have one goat a day from bayt al-māl for
their families. “Daily procurement of a goat,” he cautioned, “from the
[same] land for the government functionaries may soon cause its
ruination.”[407]
Abū Yūsuf also suggests the caliph to restrain state
functionaries from using public property for personal use.[408]
6.7. Principles of collecting revenues
In imposing taxes, Abū Yūsuf lays down the following
principles:
Impose tax only on the surplus wealth of the people.
Seek their consent on taxing them.
Do not burden a person beyond his ability to bear.
Take tax from the rich and spend it on the poor.[409]
In assessing taxes and their rates make sure that the
administration does not squeeze them to death.
In obtaining taxes avoid oppressive means.[410]
The government should not subject citizens to undue
taxation, nor permit the landowners or officials to take anything
from the people.[411]
A dhimī (non-Muslim citizen) who embraces Islam must
not be subjected to Jizyah.[412]
Abū Yūsuf alludes to the practices of the rightly-guided
caliphate as a model for emulation. For instance, he reminds Hārūn
al-Rashīd of an incident involving caliph ‘Ali when he asked his ‘āmil
(collector) in front of the people to be strict in collecting full kharāj
from them. But later, he called for his ‘āmil in private and told him not
to beat them or make them stand in the sun. Nor should they be
subjected, he cautioned, to hardship to the extent that they sell their
clothes, materials or animals.[413]
He also cites caliph ‘Umar’s practice that he would cross-
examine his revenue official to assure himself that in levying taxes
they have not burdened them beyond their ability to pay. Whenever
the state received revenues, he would call for people’s
representatives to testify that the taxes’ collection from a Muslim or a
non-Muslim was fair free from excesses against his person and
property.[414]
6.8. The rights of the non-Muslims
For the non-Muslim subjects (al-dhimma) of the Islamic state,
Abū Yūsuf repeatedly cites three principles of caliph ‘Umar:
Contractual obligations made with them must be
fulfilled.
Defending the Islamic state is not their responsibility
but Muslims’.
They must not be burdened for Jizyah and other state
revenues beyond what they can easily pay.[415]
He also adds that the poor, the blind, the aged, and the
monks are exempt from paying Jizyah and so are the workers in
religious institutions, women, and children. There is no Zakah on the
dhimma properties and cattle. They must not be subjected to
physical torture for obtaining Jizyah from them.
Should they fail to pay their stipulated amount, they can only
be imprisoned. It is Ḥarām (disallowed) to obtain from them more
than their owed amount. Among the dhimma, those who are
handicapped and unable to support themselves should be taken
care of by the state.[416]
Abū Yūsuf cites historical instances to convince Hārūn al-
Rashīd that it serves the state well if a policy of accommodation and
generosity is adopted towards the dhimma. It was because of such
largesse of spirit that in ‘Umar’s time the Syrian Christian preferred
Muslims to their faith-mates Romans.[417]
6.9. The land laws
Concerning land revenues, Abū Yūsuf declares it illegal to
install someone on the tiller’s land with powers to collect whatever he
can in addition to the government’s share of the revenues. He
describes it as extremely oppressive, which must not be resorted to
for it can lead to a country’s decimation.[418]
Likewise, he also declares as one of the prohibited acts to
dispossess someone of his land and give it to other as state grant.
He says: “An imām is not empowered to dispossess a Muslim or a
dhimmī of his belongings unless the law sanctions it or gives him a
known binding right.” To him, snatching people’s belongings and
giving it to others as a grant amounts to highland robbery.[419]
About state grants, he says these should be given for
cultivation or as reward to those who have served the community
interests only when such lands are not under cultivation or owned by
someone with none to claim their title. Such grants must remain
confined to a certain reasonable limit. Further, if lands are not put to
agricultural use within three years, the grants should be retracted.[420]
6.10. End to tyranny
Advising Hārūn al-Rashīd he cautions that to appoint cruel
and corrupt people in the governmental setup or even use them
elsewhere is Ḥarām (disallowed) for him. Whatever excesses they
would indulge in, their consequences would have to be shared by
him [on the Judgment Day].[421]
Repeatedly he says that the caliph should employ pious and
Allah-fearing individuals as functionaries. People selected for
administrative jobs must be screened for their ability as well as their
morals. Once selected, their work should be monitored so that if they
deviate and resort to repressive measures or indulge in wasting
public money or corruption, the caliph should know in time and hold
them to account.[422]
He also tells Hārūn to attend public grievances himself. Even
if he spares a day in a month for easy access to people and solve
their problems, the government functionaries would know that their
misdeeds could reach the purview of the caliph and thus correct
themselves.[423]
6.11. Judiciary
Judiciary, Abū Yūsuf says, should be wedded to dispensing
justice. He who is entitled to punishment and spared punishment and
he who does not deserve punishment and punished are equally
wrong in the sight of Islamic law and morality. In doubt, there is no
punishment. To err in forgiveness is better than erring in punishment.
In dispensing justice, consideration should not be given to one’s
status in society nor intervention in the process be allowed.[424]
6.12. Safeguarding personal freedom
 Abū Yūsuf says that nobody should go to prison on mere
allegation. The state must make sure that the accused receives just
prosecution with supporting evidence or released. He advises the
caliph that those incarcerated should also receive a thorough probe
and released for wanting evidence. All governors should have
standing instructions not to incarcerate anyone without a fair trial on
mere allegation.[425]
He goes even further and suggests that an accused should
not be punished. According to the Sharī‘ah, a person’s back is safe
(from the stripes) unless the court calls for lashing him.[426]
6.13. Reforming the prisons
His suggestions for improving prison system include, among
others, that an incarcerated person has the right to be fed and
clothed by the government treasury. He severely criticizes the
Umayyad and the ‘Abbasid’s way of taking the prisoner’s out on the
street to beg for food with chains around their hands and feet. Abū
Yūsuf asks the caliph to stop this humiliating practice; the
government, he stresses, should feed the prisoners and cloth them.
Equally shameful is the practice of burying an uncared for
prisoner without a coffin and burial prayer. Their proper burial, he
says, should be the state concern.
Last, he suggests that the prisoners other than killers should
not be manacled.[427]
7. The real value of Abū Yusūf’s work
This is the summary of those constitutional proposals which
Imām Abū Yūsuf as minister for law and head of judiciary submitted
to an absolute ruler some twelve hundred years ago. When placed
before the fundamental principles of the Islamic state and the
practices of the rightfully-guided caliphs as well as the teaching of
his teacher Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, his suggested measures pale before
them. We do not find in his suggestions even a reflection of the
electoral caliphate. There is also no allusion in them to shūrā-run
government. Likewise, there is no concept in his suggestions of a
ruler’s loss of right to rule if he is an oppressor, and that the people
have the justification to strive for his removal and bring about a
better setup. In short, his suggestions fall behind the original ideal of
an Islamic state. But that does not mean that his state concept is
defined by his suggestions enunciated in his work Kitāb al-Kharāj or
that he had no impulse to go beyond his suggestions. In fact, as a
realist this was the maximum he could expect from the ‘Abbāsid. He
did not want to go for an all-embracing concept of the Islamic state,
which could be perfect as an idea but in the situation then prevailing,
it had little chance of implementation. Instead, he wants to have a
reform scheme that had the minimum essence of an Islamic state
and at the same time realizable.
[1]
For an excellent treatment of the concept of ‘Urubah, see Ismā‘il Rāji al-Fārūqi,
On Arabism Urubah and Religion (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962).
[2]
Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong, Western Impact and Middle Eastern
Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 96.
[3]
Bernard Lewis, Islam in History, Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East
(New Delhi: Arya Books, 1998), p. 261.
[4]
Ibid. p. 262.
[5]
Ibid. p. 263.
[6]
Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a
World Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974) vol. 1, p. 187.
[7]
Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 120; also see
chapter four. “Politics and War’ in Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosmorth, The
Legacy of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 165.
[8]
Ayatullah Khomeini, Islamic Government (New York: Manor Books Inc. 1979).
[9]
Sami Zubaida, Islam the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements
in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tawris & Co. Ltd., 2001), p.16.
[10]
“This Dominion which represents the fulfillment in a certain measure, of the
cherished goal of 100-million Muslims of this sub-continent came into existence on
August 14, 1947. Pakistan is the premier Islamic state and the fifth largest in the
world.” See, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and Statements
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1993) p. 155.
[11]
“It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for
us by our great law-giver the Prophet of Islam. Let us lay the foundation of our
democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles. Our Almighty has taught
us that “our decisions in the affairs of the state shall be guided by discussion and
consultation” (al-Shūrā 42:38). Speech at Sibi Darbar, Feb 14, 1948, Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements, 1993, p.142.
[12]
“Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan speaking at a
reception given to him on the holy Prophet’s birthday by the Bar Association of Karachi
said that he would not understand a section of the people who deliberately wanted to
create mischief and made propaganda that the Constitution of Pakistan would not be
made on the basis of Sharī‘ah. The Quaid-i-Azam said the Islamic principles today are
as applicable to life as they were thirteen hundred years ago”. Address to the Bar
Association Karachi Jan 25, 1948 Speech, Statement and Messages of the Quaid-i-
Azam, edited by K.A. Yusufi, (Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996) vol. IV, p. 2669.
[13]
“I shall watch with keenness the work of your research organization in evolving
practices comparable with Islamic ideals of social and economic life. The economic
system of the west has created almost insolvable problems for humanity and to many
of us it appears that only a miracle can save it from disaster that is now facing the
world…. The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in
achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must workout our
destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true
Islamic concept of equality of mankind and social justice.
We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the
message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and
prosperity of mankind.” Emphasis added.
The Civil and Military Gazette July 2, 1948, Khurshid A.K. Yusufi, ed. Speech,
Statement and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam (Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996) vol. IV, p.
2787
[14]
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York: Mentor Books, 1957)
p. 218-219.
[15]
John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1984), p.68.
[16]
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton University Press,
1957), p.236.
[17]
Malik Badri, “A Tribute to Maulana Mawdudi’, The Muslim World, (Oct, 2003) vol.
93, No. 3 & 4, p. 501.
[18]
Gary J. Nederman, “Religion and State” in Maryanne Cline Horowitz, ed., New
Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 2005),
vol.5, p. 2079.
[19]
Martin R. Marty, “Religion & State” in New Dictionary of history of ideas, Vol. 5 p.
2086.
[20]
‘Ali Abdul Raziq, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, (Cairo, 1922).
[21]
M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Shaikh M.
Ashraf, 1977) p. 154-155.
[22]
Syed Abu’l A ‘l a Mawdūdi, Islamic Law and Constitution, Chapter eight “Rights
of non-Muslims in an Islamic State,” tr. ed. Prof. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic
Publications., 1980) pp. 273-300.
[23]
Abu Dā’ūd, Sunan, “Kitab al-Jihād”, quoted by Mawdūdi, Islamic Law, p. 279.
[24]
Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib, p. 30.
[25]
Ṭāghūt is one who rebels against Allah and is worshipped beside Allah,
irrespective of the fact whether he is worshipped by force or willingly. It also does
not matter if he is a human or a devil or an idol or else. Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn
Jarīr al-Ṭabri, al-Jāmi‘ al-Bayān fi Tāwīl al-Qur’ān (Cairo: al-Matba‘h al Amiryah,
1324 A.H.) vol. 3, p.13.
[26]
For a detailed exposition of this Āyah, see Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, vol. 4, pp. 508-
510.
[27]
The word used is bitānah. Abū al-Qāsim Mahmūd ibn ‘Umar al-Zamakhshari
(d.538 A.H./1144 C.E.) explains it: “A pious biṭanah and walījah is one’s close
friend and a dear companion whom he trusts and consults for his vital interests.”
See al-Kashshāf an Haqā’iq al-Tanzīl (Cairo: al-Matb‘āh al-Bihiyyah, 1343 A.H.)
vol. 1, p. 162.
[28]
In the preceding Āyah, the word used is walījah explained in footnote 3 on the
authority of al-Zamakhshari. Its other meaning comes from Abū Qāsim Ḥusayn ibn
Muḥammad al-Rāghab al-Asfahāni: “Every person can be called walījah whom
someone trusts while he is not from amongst his people. This is a derivative of the
Arab proverb fulā-nun walijah tun fi al-qaūm – that is, a certain person has intruded
himself into these people even though he is not of them. See al-Mufrādāt fi gharīb
al-Qur’ān (Cairo: al-Matba‘h al-Khayriyah 1322 A.H.)
[29]
The famous Ḥanafi jurist Abū Bakr al-Jassas (d.370 A.H./980 C.E.) explains it
as follows: Although the lexicographic meaning of imam stands for any person who
is followed, whether in truth or falsehood, but in this Āyah it refers to a person who
is entitled to be followed and whose obedience is binding (on others). Thus in this
sense, the prophets are invested with Imāmah, followed by the rightly-guided
caliphs, the pious, the ‘ulamā (religious scholars), and the qāḍīs (judges).
Thereafter he says: A cruel person cannot be a prophet nor is it right that he
becomes the prophet’s successor or a qāḍi or an official liable to be followed in
matters of religion … This Āyah proves that a violater’s Imāmah is invalid and he
cannot be the caliph. Should he grab this office people are not bound to follow and
obey him? (Cairo: al-Matba‘h al-Bihiyyah, 1347 A.H.) vol. 1, pp. 79-80.
[30]
“This has the meaning that responsible governmental slots should be given to
those who qualify for them.” See Abū al-Thanā’ Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsi, Ruh al-
Ma‘āni (Cairo: Idārah al-Tabā‘ah al-Muniriyah, 1345 A.H.) vol. 5, p. 58.
[31]
Al-Mizān (balance) means justice as said by Mujāhid and Qatādah. See Ibn
Kathīr, Tafsir al-Qur’ān al-A‘zim (Egypt: Matb‘ah Mustaphā Muhammad, 1937) vol.
1, p. 314.
[32]
Al-ḥadīd (steel) means political power. “It points out to this aspect that if people
deviate (from guidance), they should be corrected by the sword (state power).”
Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakaria al-Rāzi, Mafātih al-Ghayb (Egypt: al-Matb‘ah al-
Sharafiyah, 1324 A.H.) vol. 8, p. 101.
[33]
For a greater discussion on fundamental rights, see my book Tafhimāt,
(Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1996) vol. 3, pp. 248-268. Sixteenth print.
[34]
Fitnah means to force someone to change his religion. See Ibn Jarīr, al-
Jāmi‘…, vol 2, p. 111.
[35]
Anyone who wrongs is responsible for its doing. No other (person) will be held
accountable for it. Nor can anyone else’s wrong be thrown on him other than his
own.” Ibn Jarir, al-Jāmi‘…, vol. 8, p. 83.
For the Qur’ānic Āyahs, also see al-Isrā’:15, al-Fāṭir:18, al-Zumar:7,
al-Najam:38.
[36]
The jurists almost have consensus that “war against Allah and His Messenger”
means those who indulge in acts of highway robbery and organized crimes or arm
themselves to create law and order in the nation. See al-Jassās, Aḥkām …, vol. 2,
p. 493.
[37]
It means that the news about your intent to annul of the agreement with the
other party should be broken to them so that both the parties have equal
information. And if you undertake any action against the other, they should not
have the feeling that you betrayed them. (al-Jassās, Aḥkām…, vol. 3, p. 83).
[38]
“That is: do not formalize agreements with the intention to deceive the other
party to believe you because of your protestations while your intention is to betray
the later at a favourable moment.” (al-Ṭabari, al-Jāmi‘…, vol. 14, p. 112).
[39]
Sheikh ‘Ali al-Muttaqi, Kunz al-Ummāl (Hyderabad: Da’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1955) on
the authority of al-Tabarāni’s, Mu‘ajm al-Kabīr and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad,
hadith 907, 966.
[40]
Al-Khatīb al-Tabrizi, al-Mishkāt al-Masābih, cited on the authority of Dar Qatni,
Bāb al-A‘tisām bi al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah; al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 1, pp. 981-982.
[41]
Al-Tabrizi, al-Mishkāt, ibid.
[42]
Ibid. cited on the authority of al-Muwattā, bāb al-A‘tisām…, ibid; al-Muttaqi,
Kunz, vol. 1, pp. 877, 949, 955, 1001.
[43]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 1, p. 886.
[44]
Muhammad ibn Ismā‘il al-Bukhāri, al-Jām‘i al-Sahih, “Kitāb al-Ḥudūd,” Bāb 11,
12.
[45]
Abu Yūsuf Yaqūb ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ansāri, Kitāb al-Kharāj (Egypt: al-Matb‘ah al-
Salafiyah, 1325 A.H.); Abū Dā’ud al-Tayālisi, Musnad (Hyderabad: Dā’irah al-
Ma‘ārif, 1321 A.H.) ḥadīth 55.
[46]
Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm (Egypt: Matb‘ah
Mustafā Muhammad, 1937) cited on the authority of Muslim and Ibn Mājah, vol. 4,
p. 217.
[47]
Ibid, cited on the authority of al-Tabarani, vol. 4, p. 217.
[48]
Mahmud ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Husayni al-Alūsi, Ruh al-Ma‘āni, cited on the
authority of al-Bayhaqi and ibn Mardūyah (Egypt: Idārah al-Tab‘āh al-Muniriyah,
1345 A.H.) vol. 26, p. 148.
[49]
Al-Bukhāri, al-Jā m‘i, “Kitāb al-Ṣalāh,” Bāb 28.
[50]
Abū Dā’ūd, Musnad, “Kitāb al-Diyāt,” Bāb 11; “Nasā’i, al-Sunan, “Kitāb al-
Qasāmah,” Bāb 10, 14.
[51]
Abū Dā’ūd, Musnad, “Kitāb al-Imārah,” Bāb 34.
[52]
Al-Bukhāri, al-Jām‘i, “Kitab al-Ahkām,” Bāb 1; Muslim, al-Jām‘i, “Kitāb al-
Imārah,” Bāb 5.
[53]
Ibid, Muslim, al-Jām‘i, “Kitab al-Imān,” Bāb 61, “Kitāb al-Imārah,” Bāb 5.
[54]
Muslim, al-Jām‘i, Bāb 5.
[55]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 6, ḥadīth 68, 122.
[56]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, ḥadīth 78.
[57]
Ibid, ḥadīth 346.
[58]
Ibid, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2505.
[59]
Ibid, ḥadīth 2512.
[60]
Al-Tabarāni, al-Aust. In this hadith, the pious people are those who worship
Allah and are not free to do anything they want. To think that it means seeking
consultation with those who pray a lot and ignore other attributes of ahl al-Ra’iy will
be unjustified.
[61]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2577. This saying of ‘Umar means that
imposing one’s self on the people (as head of the Islamic State) is a capital sin,
and the Muslim Ummah should not accept it.
[62]
Ibid, ḥadīth 2354.
[63]
Al-Bukhari, al-Jām‘i, “Kitāb al-Ahkām,” Bāb 4; Muslim, al-Jāmi‘, “Kitāb al-
Imārah,” Bāb 8; Abū Dā’ūd, Musnad, “Kitāb al-Jihād,” Bāb 95; Nasa’i, al-Sunan,
“Kitāb al-Bai‘ah,” Bāb 33; Ibn Mājah, al-Sunan, Bāb al-Jihād, bāb 40.
[64]
Muslim, al-Jāmi‘, “Kitab al-Imārah,” bāb 8; Abū Dā’ūd, Musnad, “Kitab al-Jihād,”
Bāb 95; Nasa’i, al-Sunan, “Kitāb al-Bai‘ah,” Bāb 33.
[65]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 6, ḥadīth 293-296, 299,301.
[66]
Ibid, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2505.
[67]
Ibid, ḥadīth 2282. In another report, Abū Bakr’s words are “If I disobey Allah,
you disobey me.” See Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2330.
[68]
Ibid, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2531.
[69]
Ibid, ḥadīth 2587.
[70]
Al-Bukhari, al-Jām‘i, “Kitāb al-Ahkām”, Bāb 7; Muslim, al-Jām‘i, “Kitab al-
Imārah”, Bāb 3.
[71]
Abū Dā’ūd, Musnad, “Kitāb al-Imārah”, Bāb 2.
[72]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 6, ḥadīth 206.
[73]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 6, ḥadīth 69. One may ask if this is the Islamic principle,
then why did Prophet Yūsuf ask the king for the job. In fact, he was then residing in
a non-Islamic country. He sensed that even if he had asked for the highest job in
the land it would be given to him which he could use for the spread of Allah’s dīn.
Otherwise, he thought, the chance to invite that non-Muslim nation to Allah’s way
would be lost. Since this was an exceptional situation, the general Islamic principle
cannot be applied to it.
[74]
Al-Tabrizi, al-Mishkāt, “bi al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah,” Bāb al-Ahtasām.
[75]
Ibid.
[76]
Ibid.
[77]
Ibid.
[78]
Muslim, al-Jam‘i, “Kitab al-Imān,” Bāb 20; Tirmidhi, Bāb 12; Abū Dā’ūd, al-
Musnad, “Kitāb al-Malāham,” Bāb 17; Ibn Mājah, Bāb 20, Abwāb al-Fitan.
[79]
Muslim, al-Jam‘i, “Kitāb al-Imān,” Bāb 20.
[80]
Muslim, al-Jam‘i, “Kitāb al-Malāham,” Bāb 17; Tirmidhi, “Kitāb al-Fitan,” Bāb 12;
Nasā’i, al-Sunan, “Kitab al-Bai‘ah,” Bāb 34-35.
[81]
Abu Dā’ud, “Kitāb al-Malāham,” Bāb 17; al-Tirmidhi, “Kitab al-Fitan,” Bāb 12.
[82]
Nasā’i’, al-Sunan, “Kitāb al-Bai‘ah,” Bāb 34-35.
[83]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 6, ḥadīth 297.
[84]
Ibid, ḥadīth 309.
[85]
Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabari, Tārikh al-Umum wa al-Malūk, (Cario:
al-Matb‘ah al-Astaqāmah, 1935) vol. 2, p. 618.
[86]
He was pointing to the event in the Saqifah Bani Sā‘idah meeting, when ‘Umar
suddenly rose and suggested Abū Bakr’s name followed by his bai‘ah to him.
There was no consultation prior to his appointment as caliph.
[87]
Al-Bukhari, al-Jām‘i, “Kitāb al-Maharbīn,” chapter 16; Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad
ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musand (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1949) vol. 1, ḥadīth 391, third print.
In al-Musnad, the Caliph ‘Umar’s words are: “He who gives his bai‘ah (pledge) to
someone without consultation with the Muslims has no validity nor of the person
who received his bai‘ah.”
In another report ‘Umar’s words are “A person whom bai‘ah (pledge) is given
without consultation for him it is unjustified to accept it.” See Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bāri
(Cairo: al-Matba‘h al-Khayriyah, 1325 A.H.) vol. 2, p. 125.
[88]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 1, p. 292; Izzudin abi al-Ḥassan ‘Ali ibn Muḥammad al-
Jazāri ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fi al-Tārikh (Cairo: Idārah al-Taba‘tah al-Muniriyah,
1356 A. H.) vol. 3, pp. 34-35; Abū ‘Abdullah Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt al-
Kubrā (Beirut: Dār Sādr, 1957) vol. 3, p.1344. Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ…, vol. 7, p. 49.
[89]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārik , vol. 3, p. 296; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 36; Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 146.
[90]
‘Abdullah ibn Muslim ibn Qutaybah, al-Imāmah wa al-Siyāsah, vol. 1, p. 41 al-
Ṭabari, Tārikh…, vol. 3, p. 45.
[91]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 45.
[92]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 112; Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Ali ibn Ḥusayn ibn ‘Ali al-
Mas‘ūdi, Murūj al-Dhahab (Cairo: al-Matbah al-Bihiyyah, 1346 A.H.) vol. 2, p. 12.
[93]
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, pp. 13-14; al-Mas‘udi, Murūj, vol. 2, p. 42.
[94]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, p. 113.
[95]
‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abdul-Raḥmān, Sunan al-Dārmi, “Bab al-Futiyā wa mā fih min al-
Shaddah.”
[96]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2281.
[97]
Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb, p. 25.
[98]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Tabaqāt, vol. 3, pp. 306-307.
[99]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2280-2285.
[100]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 134.
[101]
Abu Yūsuf, Kitāb, p. 117.
[102]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 28.
[103]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidayah, vol. 8, p. 3.
[104]
Ibid; Ibn Sa‘d, al-Tabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 38.
[105]
Ibid; also, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 3.
[106]
Ibn abi al-Ḥadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balāqhah (Cario: Dār al-Kutb al-Arabiyah,
1329 A.H.) vol. 1, p. 182.
[107]
Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imāmah, vol. 1, p. 71.
Ibn Ḥajar has written in al-Isābah that ‘Aqīl had incurred some loan, which ‘Ali
refused to pay him from bayt al-māl. Thus annoyed, he joined Mu‘āwiyah. See al-
Isābah fi Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah (Cario: Matb‘ah Mustaphā Muhammad, 1939) vol. 3,
p. 487.
[108]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 2, p. 480; Muḥammad ‘Abdul- Mālik ibn Hishām, al-Sirah
al-Nabawiyyah (Cario: Matb‘ah Mustaphā al-Bābi, 1936) vol. 4, p. 311; al-Muttaqi,
Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2261, 2268, 2278, 2291, 2299.
[109]
Abu Yūsuf, Kitāb, p. 117.
[110]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2313.
[111]
Al-Ṭabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 273.
[112]
Ibid, p. 446.
[113]
Ibid, pp. 550-551.
[114]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 8.
[115]
Ibn Kathīr, vol. 8, pp. 4-5.
[116]
Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb, p. 115; Abu Da‘ud al-Tayā lisi, al-Musand, ḥadīth 55; Ibn al-
Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 30; al-Tabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 273.
[117]
Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb, p. 116.
[118]
Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubrā (Hyderabad:
Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1355 A.H.) vol. 10, p. 136.
[119]
Ibid.
[120]
Abu’l ‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A‘ayān wa Anba Abna al-
Zamān (Cario: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1948) vol. 2, p. 168.
[121]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 2, p. 508.
[122]
Ibid, p. 487.
[123]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2374; al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 2, p. 449; Abū
‘Umar Yūsuf ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, fi M’arifat al-
Ashāb, vol. 2, p. 689.
[124]
Nu‘mān ibn ‘Adiy belongs to the first generation of Muslims. His Islam was
older than even ‘Umar’s. He was among those who left Makkah for ‘Abyssinia
along with his father ‘Adiy. When ‘Umar appointed him as a tax collector for
Maysān, his wife accompanied him. There he composed a few couplets in his
wife’s memory, which incidentally had an allusion to liquor. ‘Umar did not like it and
removed him from the job deciding never to give him an appointment again. See
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, p. 296. (Hyderabad: Dāirah al-Ma‘ārif, 1336
A.H.); Yāqūt al-Hamāwi, Mu‘jam al-Buldān, (Beirut: Dār Sādir, 1987) vol. 5, pp.
242-245.
[125]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 2, p. 467; Shah Wali Allah, Azūlatah al-Khifā, p.
224.
Some people ask if ‘Umar had revelation to make him swear by Allah that what he
said was sure to come.
The answer is that any person who has the ability to see beyond the present can
forecast the future based on what he sees in the situation and then by arranging its
elements logically, can predict with the mathematical precision of two plus two
equal to four, without revelation. ‘Umar knew that the tribalistic prejudices were
deep rooted in the Arabian society. He also knew that even after 25-30 years of
Islamic spread, parochialism though subdued could still stage a comeback. Thus,
he believed that even a small change made in Abū Bakr’s and ‘Umar’s policy by
their successors in favouring their tribes for governmental jobs can trigger
parochialism, which none would be able to contain unless by a bloody revolution.
[126]
Al-Tabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 219; also ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, pp. 340-344.
[127]
Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ, vol. 7, pp. 49-50, al-Ṭabari, al-Riād al-Nadira fi Manāqib
al-‘Ashrah, (Cairo: al-Matb‘ah Husayniyah, B. 27 A.H.); vol. 2, p. 76, Ibn Khaldūn,
Kitāb al-‘Ibar…, (Cairo: al-Matba‘h al-Kubrā, 1284 A. H.) vol. 2, p. 125., The same
report has been cited by Shah Wali Allah.
[128]
Ibn S‘ad, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 64, vol. 5, p. 36.
[129]
Al-Ṭabari, al-Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 291.
[130]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2324; Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 64.
[131]
Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, narrated by Abu Ya‘lā and Ibn al-Munzir, vol. 1, p. 467.
[132]
Muhib al-Din al-Tabarai, al-Riadh, vol. 2, p. 56; al-Jauzi, Sirah ‘Umar, p. 127.
[133]
Al-Muttaqi, Kunz, vol. 5, ḥadīth 2414.
[134]
al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 10, p. 125.
[135]
Abu J‘afar Muḥammad ibn Jarir al-Ṭabari, Tārikh al Umum wa al-Mulūk, vol. 3,
p. 264. For the event, see p. 42 of chapter 3.
[136]
The exegetes describe al-Ḥujurāt: 6 in the backdrop of this episode. See Ibn
Kathīr, Tafsir…,. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr also holds that al-Ḥujarāt: 6 relates to al-Walīd
ibn ‘Uqbah. For this, see al-Isti‘āb…, vol. 2, p. 603. Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn
Taymiyah is of similar view. See his Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah (Egypt:
Matb‘ah Amiriyah, 1322 A.H.) vol. 3, p. 176.
[137]
Ibn S‘ad, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 7, p. 406; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, p. 253.
This region has now four different states and governments – Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan and Israel. Their total area even today is the same that we had in
Mu‘āwiyah’s time. In ‘Umar’s times, there were four governors appointed by him
and Mu‘āwiyah was one of them. See Imam Ibn Taymiyah, Yazid ibn Mu‘āwiyah
(Karachi: Ibn Taymiyah Academy) pp. 34-35.
[138]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 5, p. 36, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 259.
[139]
Al-Ṭabari, al-Tārikh, vol. 3, pp. 396-397; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, pp. 172-
173.
[140]
Ibn S‘ad, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 32-33; al-Ṭabari, al-Tārikh, vol. 3; p. Ibn S‘ad,
al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, pp. 372.
[141]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 66.
[142]
. Ibid, p. 382; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 29; Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-‘Ibar, vol.
2, p. 144.
[143]
For details see al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, pp. 376-418; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah,
vol. 7, pp. 168-197.
[144]
. Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, pp. 376-377, 384-385.
[145]
‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar gave the same advice. When the resignation call gained
momentum, ‘Uthman asked ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar for the way out of the situation. He
said, “Do not show Muslim the path that when some people get annoyed with their
amīr they dismiss him.” See Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 66. ‘Uthman repeated
this in his response to the allegations framed by the rebels who had surrounded
his house: “Did I take over this country by force without consultation of the Muslims
that you seek to remove me by sword.” Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 68.
[146]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 179.
[147]
Ibid, p. 197.
[148]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt ,vol. 3, p. 71
[149]
Ibid, pp. 70-71.
[150]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 146.
[151]
Imām Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal says that nobody had more qualifications for the
caliphate then ‘Ali, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 130.
[152]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, pp. 450-452; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr says that in the battle of
Ṣiffin ‘Ali had 800 such Ṣaḥābah who were present at Ba‘yt al-Ridwān with the
Prophet. See al-Isti‘āb, vol. 2, p. 423.
[153]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 7, pp. 257-258.
[154]
This fact is historically proven that after the battle of Ṣiffin the whole Arabian
Peninsula and the east and the west sides of Shām, had pledged their loyalty to
‘Ali. Only Syria stood opposed to him because of its being under Mu‘āwiyah’s
domain. Thus, the true constitutional position did not suggest lawlessness in the
world of Islam where nobody abided by the law. See al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, pp.
462-463; ‘Ali ‘Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athīr, Usad al-Ghābah, vol. 3, p. 137-141; Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 229, 251.
[155]
Abū Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Cairo, 1958) vol. 4, pp. 1706-1707.
[156]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 458; ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 100, Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 227-228.
[157]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 5, pp. 34-35; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h, vol. 2, p. 155.
[158]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 233.
[159]
Ibid. pp. 237-239.
[160]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 415; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 122-123; Ibn
Kathīr, al-Bidayah, vol. 7, pp. 240-241, 247; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, p.
207; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h, vol. 2, p. 162.
[161]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Tabaqāt, vol. 3, p. 223; also Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 124,
vol. 5, p. 38; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, pp. 240-241, 247; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-
Isti‘āb, vol. 1, pp. 207-208. Says Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, there is no dispute to the effect
that Marwān killed Ṭalḥah, although the former was in his army. Ibn Kathīr has also
subscribed to this well-known report. See al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 247.
[162]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3; pp. 506, 510, 542; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp.
122, 131-132; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, pp. 244-245; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h,
vol. 2, pp. 164-165.
[163]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 248; al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 547.
[164]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 249; Ibn Khaldūn,
Takmila’h, vol. 2, p. 162.
[165]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 3, pp. 224-225.
[166]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 98, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 227; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 152.
[167]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 103, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 228; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 152.
[168]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 113.
[169]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 561; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, p. 253.
[170]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 2, p. 589.
[171]
Al-Ṭabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 568-569; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h, vol. 2, p. 170.
[172]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, pp. 3-4; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 147-148; Ibn
Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, pp. 257-258; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h, vol. 2, p. 149.
[173]
Al-Ṭabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 6, Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 149.
[174]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 34; Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, p. 255; Ibn al-Athīr,
al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 160; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 272; Ibn Khaldūn,
Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 174.
[175]
Al- Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, pp. 34-36; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 161-162;
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, pp. 275-276; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 175.
[176]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 38; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyh, vol. 7, p. 276; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 175.
[177]
Al-Hujurāt: 9. The Āyah says “But, if one of them transgresses against the
other, then fight the group that transgresses until it reverts to Allah’s command.”
[178]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārīkh, vol. 4, p. 51; Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, pp. 256-257; Ibn
al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 168; ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 283; Ibn Khaldūn,
Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 178.
[179]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 283; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 2, p. 178
[180]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 283.
[181]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 57.
[182]
Ibid, p. 58; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 171.
[183]
Ibid, p. 59; Ibid, p. 172.
[184]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, p. 187; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, pp. 30,
37.
[185]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘ā, vol. 1, p. 37.
[186]
Ibid, vol. 1, p. 371.
[187]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 237.
[188]
Ibid, p. 240.
[189]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 405. Sa‘d ibn abī Waqqāṣ’ stance comes out
pretty well in this episode. During the mischief era, his nephew Hāshim ibn ‘Utbah
ibn abī Waqqāṣ suggested him to stand up as a contender for the caliphate and he
would find 100,000 swords in his support. He responded, “Of the 100,000 swords I
only need one sword which may fall on the nonbeliever but not on a Muslim.” See
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 72.
[190]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 249; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 79; For
some aspects of this episode, see also Ibn Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 3, pp. 15-16.
[191]
Al-Bukhāri has briefly sketched this event in his “Tafsīr sūrah al-Aḥqāf”. Ibn
Ḥajar has given its details in Fatḥ al-Bari on reports from Nasā’i, Isma‘ili, Ibn al-
Munzir, Abū Ya‘lā, and Ibn abī Ḥātim. Ibn Kathīr has also borrowed some of its
details on the authority of Ibn abī Ḥātim and Nasā’i in his Tafsir al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm.
For further extrapolation of the subject see al-Isti‘āb, vol. 2, p. 393; al-Bidāyah, vol.
8, p. 89; al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 250. Ibn al-Athīr writes: “According to some reports,
‘Abd al Raḥmān ibn abī Bakr had died in 53 A.H. If this is correct, then he could
not be present on this occasion.” The authentic ḥadīth, however, contradicts it. Ibn
Kathīr says Abd al -Raḥmān died in 58 A.H.
[192]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 250-251; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 80.
[193]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 132.
[194]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 164; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, pp. 200,208.
[195]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, p. 321; Ibn al-Athīr, Usad, vol. 5, p. 163.
[196]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 79.
[197]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, p. 314; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 158; Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, p. 188.
[198]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, p. 353.
[199]
Ibn S‘ad, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 5, p. 212.
[200]
Jalāl al-Din al-Suyūti, Husan al-Mahādirah (Cairo: al-Matb‘ah al-Sharafiyah,
1327 A.H.) vol. 2, p. 88.
[201]
Ibn ‘Abdi Rabbih, al-‘Iqd, vol. 2, p. 233.
[202]
Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-‘Ayām (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyah,
1948) vol. 2, p. 115.
[203]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 45.
[204]
Ibid, vol. 8, p. 139, vol. 9, p. 232.
[205]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 139. His words are wa-kāna Mu‘āwiyah awal
min qasr ha ila al-nasaf wa ākhaza al-nasaf li nafsihi.
[206]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 7, pp. 28-29; al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 187; Ibn
‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb, vol. 1, p. 118; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 233; Ibn
Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 29.
[207]
I have given my view on this subject in my risālah, Shahādat Ḥusayn. Also,
this issue will receive my comments in chapter 8 of this book.
[208]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, p. 352; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, pp. 298-299.
[209]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 203.
[210]
For details see al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 4, pp. 372-379; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.
3, pp. 312-313; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, pp. 219-221.
[211]
The context to Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal’s quote, as cited by Ibn Kathīr in his
al-Bidāyah…, vol. 8, p. 223, is as under:
One time Imām Aḥmad’s son ‘Abdullah asked him: “What is the
injunction behind sending curse on Yazīd.” He replied: “Why should I
not curse a person who has been cursed by Allah.” Then in proof he
recited the Qur’ānic verse, “Would you then if you were given the
command work corruption in the land and sever your ties of kinship?
Such are they whom Allah curses so that he defame them and made
their eyes blind.” (Muḥammad: 22-23)
Afterward, he said what could be a greater mischief and breaching
relations than Yazīd’s. Aḥmad’s word has been cited by Muḥmmad
ibn ‘Abd al-Rasūl al-Barjanji in al-Aha‘h fi Athrāt al-Sā‘ah and Ibn
Ḥajar al-Haytami in al-Sawā‘q al-Muhariqah. But Safārini and Ibn
Taymiyah say more credible sources in- validate the idea that Imām
Ahmad liked to curse Yazīd. Among the ‘ulamā’ of alh al-Sunnah, Ibn
Jauzi, Qāḍī ibn Y‘alā, Taftāzāni are convinced of cursing Yazīd.
 While Imām al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyah disproved of cursing Yazīd.
My own view is that a person who qualifies to be cursed can be
cursed in a general way (for example, it can be said that the
usurpers and victimizers be cursed) but a particular individual may
not be cursed for if he is alive, it is possible that he may have the
chance to repent. And if he has died, we have no knowledge in what
state of imān he had his end. Thus, we should confine our criticism
to their wrong and avoid cursing them. That will be better. This does
not mean that Yazīd should be now praised and tagged as those
who received Allah’s pleasure and blessing.
One time someone addressed Yazīd as amīr al-mu’minīn in the presence of
‘Umar ibn ‘Abdul ‘Aziz. The latter enraged said: “You call Yazīd as amīr al-
mu’minīn!” He got him lashed twenty times. (Tahzib al-Tahzib, vol. 11, p.
361).
[212]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh., vol. 4, p. 383; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 3, p. 316; Ibn Kathīr,
al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 225; Ibn Ḥajar, Tahzib, vol. 11, p. 361.
[213]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 23; Ibn Kathīr. al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 329; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmalah, vol. 5, pp. 37-38.
[214]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 103; Ibn Kāthir, al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, p. 67; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 3, p. 58.
[215]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, p. 26, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 8, p. 258; also vol.
10, pp. 30-31; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 300.
[216]
Ibn Kāthir, al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, p. 87.
[217]
Ibid, pp. 212-213.
[218]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 164, ‘Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, p. 214.
[219]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 164.
[220]
Ibid, p. 165.
[221]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, pp. 314-315, 321; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, pp.
156, 163.
[222]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, p. 311; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, pp. 155, 157; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 3, pp. 162-163.
[223]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, pp. 333-334, 341; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10,
p. 45; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 3, pp. 132-133.
[224]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, pp. 338-340; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmila’h, vol. 3, pp.
177.
[225]
Al-Tabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, pp. 107-109; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 338; Ibn
Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, pp. 54-55; Ibn Khaldūn, Takmilah, vol. 3, p. 176.
[226]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 68.
[227]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, pp. 161,171-180; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, pp.
370-375; Ibn Kāthir, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, pp. 80, 82.
[228]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 90.
[229]
Al-Kathīb al-Baghdādi, Tarikh al-Baghdād, (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-Sa‘ādah, 1931)
vol. 10, p. 309.
[230]
Tāsh Kubrāzādah, Miftāh al-Sa‘ādah (Hyderabad: Dā’irah al-Ma‘rāif, 1329
A.H.) vol. 2, p. 119.
[231]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 4, p. 295; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 28; Ibn
Khaldūn, Takmil’ah, vol. 3, p. 103.
[232]
Al-Jāhiz, al-Biyān wa al-Tabīīn, (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-Fatuh al Adbiyah, 1332
A.H.), vol. 3. p.181.
[233]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj al-Dhahab (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-Bihiyyah, 1346 A.H.) vol. 2, p.
515; Taqi al-Din Aḥmad ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdul-Qādin ibn Muḥammad al-Maqrizi, Kitāb
al-Salūk (Egypt: Dār al-Kutub al-Misriyah, 1934) vol. 1, p. 15.
[234]
Al-Jahshiyāri, Tārikh al-Wuzurā’ (Viewer, 1926) pp. 139, 153, 155, 157.
[235]
Al-Jāhiz, Kitāb al-Haywān (Egypt: al-Matbāh al-Taqadam, 1906) vol. 7, p. 68.
[236]
Ibn Kāthir, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 113.
[237]
Al-Sharif al-Murtadā, Amāli al-Murtadā: ghurar al-fawā’id wa durar al-qalā‘id
(Egypt: al-Matba‘h al-Sa‘ādah, 1907) vol. 1, pp. 90-100.
[238]
Al-Jāhiz, Thalāth Rasā’il (Cairo: al-Matb‘ah al-Salāfiyah, 1344 A.H.) p. 42.
[239]
Abu A‘lā al-Ma‘ari, Risā lah al-Ghufrān (Egypt: Dar al-Ma‘rāf 1950). p. 199.
[240]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-‘Iqd al-Farid, vol. 2, p. 179.
[241]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, al-Tanūkhi, vol. 2, p. 575,Taqi al-Din Aḥmad ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdul-
Qādin ibn Muḥammad al-Maqrizi, Kitāb al-Salūk, vol. 1, p. 15.
[242]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, pp. 389, 391, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 10, p. 149.
[243]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, pp. 433-434.
[244]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murrūj, vol. 2, p. 515.
[245]
In the third-century hijrah when the ‘Abbāsid began to have their fall, the
religious leadership was still in the hands of the ‘ulamā, fuqahā’, and upright
individuals but the political leadership splintered into two groups, eventually going
into the hands of kings and feudal lord, who became defacto rulers while the
‘Abbāsid caliphs were reduced to mere custodians of a heritage who held neither
religious leadership nor political. They bore a cosmetic religious holiness that they
had acquired because of the caliphate, which enabled them to crown sultāns
(kings) and in return the kings delivered khutabah and issued currency in their
names.
[246]
Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah (Egypt: Matb‘ah Mustaphā Muhammad) p. 196;
al-Shahristāni, Kitāb al-Fasal fi Milal wa al-Hawā wa al-Nihal (London) vol. 1, pp.
108-109.
[247]
Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, (Egypt: Mustaphā Muhammad, n.d.) p. 196; al-
Shahristāni, Kitāb…, vol. 1, p. 109.
[248]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 108, Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, pp. 196-
197.
[249]
Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, p. 197; al-Ash‘arī, Maqalāt al-Islamiīn (Cairo:
Maktab‘ah al-Nahdah al-Misiriyah) first edition, vol. 1, p. 197; al-Shahristāni,
Kitāb…, vol. 1, p. 109.
[250]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 108.
[251]
Ibn abi al-Ḥadīd, Sharh Nahj, vol. 4, p. 520.
[252]
Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, vol. 1, p. 129; Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, pp. 197-198;
al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, pp. 115-117.
[253]
For details see ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādi, al-Farqu Bayn al-Firaq (Egypt:
Matb‘ah al-Ma‘ārif) pp. 55, 61, 63-64, 67-68, 82-83, 99, 313-315. See also, al-
Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol 1, pp. 87, 91-92, 100; al-Ash‘ari, Maqālāt, vol 1, pp. 156-
157, 159, 189-190, al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol 2, p. 191.
[254]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, pp. 103-104; al-Ash‘ari, Maqālāt, vol. 1, pp. 198,
120.
[255]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitab, vol. 1, p. 104.
[256]
Ibn Hazm, al-Fasal fil al-Milal wa al-Hawā’ wa al-Nihal (Egypt: al-Matab‘ah al-
Adabiyah, 1317 A.H.) vol. 4, p. 204.
[257]
Al-Jassās, Ahkām, vol. 2, p. 40.
[258]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol. 2, p. 191.
[259]
Ibid.
[260]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 51.
[261]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol. 2, p. 191.
[262]
Al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 63.
[263]
Al-Asha‘ri, Maqālāt, vol. 2, p. 124.
[264]
Ibid, p. 125
[265]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol. 2, pp. 190, 1993; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūti, Tārikh al-
Khulafā’, (Lahore: Government Press, 1870 A.H.) p. 255.
[266]
‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādi, al-Farqu, pp. 94-55.
[267]
Ibid, pp. 100-101, al-Shahristāni, Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 34.
[268]
Ibid, pp. 133-134; Ibid, p. 40.
[269]
‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādi, al-Farqu, pp. 138-139.
[270]
Ibn al-Bazzāz al-Kardari, Manāqib al-Imām al-A‘ẓam (Hyderabad: Dāirah al-
Ma‘arif, 1321 A.H.) 1st Edition, vol. 1, pp. 65-66.
[271]
Al-Muwaffaq ibn Ahmed al-Makki, Manāqib al-Imām al-A‘ẓam, (Hyderabad:
Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1321 A.H.) vol. 1, p. 162.
[272]
Ibid, pp. 57, 58.
[273]
Ibid, pp. 55, 59.
[274]
Ibid, p. 59.
[275]
Ibid, p. 96, vol. 2, pp. 132-136.
[276]
Al-Yāfi‘i, Mirāt al-Jinān wa ‘Ibrat al-Yaqzān fi Ma‘rifāt mā Yu‘tabar min
Hawādith al-Zamān (Hyderabd: Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1337 A.H.) 1st Edition, vol. 1, p.
310.
[277]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, p. 220.
[278]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, p. 238; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidāyah,vol. 10, p. 97.
[279]
Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Tārikh al-Baghadād, vol. 13, p. 358; Mullā ‘Ali al-Qāri,
Dhayl al-Juwāhir al-Madiy’a, (Hyderabad: Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1322 A.H.) p. 488,
first edition.
[280]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, pp. 219-220.
[281]
Abu ‘Abd Allah Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib al-Imām abi Hanifah wa Sahibiyah,
(Egypt: Dār al-Kutab al-Arabi, 1366 A.H.) p. 115.
[282]
Al-Rāghib al-Isfahāni, Mahādrāt al-Abdā’ (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-Hilāl, 1902) p.
206.
[283]
Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib…, p. 26.
[284]
Ibid, p. 9.
[285]
Al-Baghdādi, Tārikh, vol. 13, p. 260; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, p. 262.
[286]
Ibn Khallikan, Wafayāt al-A‘ayān (Egypt: Maktabah al-Nahfitah al-Misriyah,
1948) vol. 5, pp. 23, 422; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 212.
[287]
Before the term ‘ilm al-kalām gained currency the word fiqh was used for
‘aqā’id, usūl al-dīn and law. The distinction, however, was made in the sense that
‘aqāid and usūl al-dīn were lumped under “al-fiqh al-Akbar”. Imām Abū Ḥanīfah
used this name for his Risālah. Lately, scholars have questioned the authenticity of
some of its parts as later-day interpolation. However, the parts we are discussing
are undoubtedly authentic, for the other sources like Abū Ḥanīfah’s al-Wasiyyah,
Abu Muti‘h al-Balkhi’s al-Fiqh al-Absat, and ‘Aqidah al-Tahāwiyah, in which al-
Tahāwi has narrated from Abū Ḥanīfah and his disciples. Abū Yūsuf and
Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shaybānī gives support to the contents of his al-Fiqh al-
Akbar.
[288]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ al-Fiqh, (Delhi: Tab‘ah Mujtābai, 1348 A.H.) pp. 74-87; al-
Maghnisāwi, Sharh…, (Hyderabad: Da’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1321 A.H.) pp. 25-26.
[289]
Ibn abi al-‘Izz al-Hanafi, Sharh al-Tahāwiya (Egypt: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1373 A. H.)
pp. 403-416.
[290]
Al-Karadari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 72.
[291]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqā’ (Cario: al-Maktabah al-Qudsi, 1370 A.H.), p. 163; al-
Sarakhasi, Sharḥ…, pp. 157-158. Imām Mālik and Yaḥyā ibn Sa‘id al-Qattān held
the same view; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti’āb, vol. 2, p. 467.
[292]
Al- Qāri, Sharḥ, p. 87; al-Maghnisāwi, Sharḥ, p. 26.
[293]
Ibn abi al-‘Izz, Sharḥ, p. 398.
[294]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 83-84; al-Kardani, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 71-72.
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah was not the sole holder of this opinion. In fact, the whole ahl al-
Sunnah had reached consensus on it as reported by Ibn Hajar in his al-Isābah.
See vol. 2, p. 502.
[295]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ, p. 33.
[296]
Mulla Husayn, al-Jauharah al-Munifah fi Sharh Wasiyah al-Imām abī Ḥanīfah
(Hyderabad: Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif, 1321 A.H.) pp. 3, 6, 7.
[297]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ, pp. 86, 89, al- Maghnisāwi, Sharḥ, pp. 27-28.
[298]
Mullā Husayn, al-Jauharah, p. 6.
[299]
Ibn abi al-‘Izz, Sharḥ, p. 265.
[300]
Ibrahīm: 36.
[301]
Al-Mā’idah: 118.
[302]
Al-Shu’arā: 113-114.
[303]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, pp. 124-125.
[304]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ, p. 92; al-Maghnisāwi, Sharḥ, p. 28.
[305]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ, p. 93; al-Maghnisāwi, Sharḥ, p. 29.
[306]
Ibn abi al-‘Izz, Sharḥ, pp. 312-313.
[307]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 246.
[308]
Ibid, p. 133.
[309]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 108.
[310]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 54.
[311]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 109.
[312]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 136.
[313]
Present-day people labour under the misimpression that international law is a
modern instrument and that the first man who founded this new discipline is Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645 C.E.). But anyone who has read Imām Abū Ḥanīfah’s disciple
Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (749-805 C.E.) al-Siyār knows that 900 years
before Grotius this discipline was structured and compiled by Abū Ḥanīfah
covering almost every aspect of international law. Lately, a group of academics
has acknowledged this fact. The Germany’s al-Shaybānī Society of International
Law reaffirms it.
[314]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 41.
[315]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 157-158; al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 106,
107.
[316]
Abu Bakr al-Khatīb al-Baghdādi, Tārikh al-Baghdādi, (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-
Sa‘ādah, 1931), vol. 13, p. 368, al-Makki, Manāqib al-Imām al-A‘ẓam Abū Ḥanīfah,
vol. 1, p. 89; al-Dhahabi, Manāqib, p. 20.
[317]
Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib, p. 21.
[318]
Abū al-Wahād ibn Aḥmad al-Sha‘rāni, Kitāb al-Mizān (Egypt: al-Matba‘h al-
Azhariyah, 1925) third edition, vol. 1, p. 61.
[319]
Ibid, p. 62.
[320]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib…, vol. 2, pp. 15-16. In this report from al-Kardari, I am
unable to empathize with his report that Abū Bakr withheld making decision for
about six month until the bai‘ah from the people of Yemen came.
[321]
Al-Qāri, Sharḥ, p. 91.
[322]
Ibn abi al-‘Izz, Sharḥ, p. 322.
[323]
“My promise is not for the violators” al-Baqarah: 124.
[324]
Al-Jassās, Aḥkām, vol. 1, p. 80.
[325]
Ibid, vol. 1, p. 80-81, al-Sarakhsi in his al-Mabsūt has stated the same view of
Imām Abū Ḥanīfah. See vol. 10, p. 130.
[326]
Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib, p. 17; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 100.
[327]
Al-Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol. 2, p. 192.
[328]
Al-Shahrastāni, Kitāb al-Milal, vol. 1, p. 106, ‘Abd al Qāhir Baghdādi, al-Farqu,
p. 340.
[329]
Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, pp. 195-196.
[330]
Ibn Hajar, Fatḥ, vol. 13, pp. 13, pp. 93, 96-97, Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, vol. 3,
pp. 129, 183, also vol. 4, p. 421; Abu Dā’ūd, al-Musnad, ḥadīth 926, 2133.
[331]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 3, p. 192.
[332]
Ibn Hajar, Fatḥ, vol. 13, p. 95.
[333]
Aḥmad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Sarakhsi, Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr (Egypt: Matb‘ah
Shirkatah Masahamah Misriyah, 1957) vol. 1, p. 98.
[334]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, p. 215.
[335]
Ibid, pp. 215-216.
[336]
Ibid, vol. 2, p. 180.
[337]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 100.
[338]
Ibid, pp. 21, 24; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 41; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-
Intiqā’, p. 171.
[339]
Al-Dhahabi, Manāqib, p. 30.
[340]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 72, 173, 178.
[341]
Ibid, vol. 1, p. 215.
[342]
Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 170; al-Baghdādi, Tārikh, vol. 13, p. 320.
[343]
Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 173-174, 182; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 46; al-Yāfi‘i,
Mirāt al-Jinān, p. 310.
[344]
Al-Jassās, Aḥkām, al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, p.81.
[345]
Al-Khatīb, Tārikh, vol. 13, p. 330; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 171.
[346]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 5, p. 25; al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 17; al-
Sarakhsi, Kitāb, vol. 10, p. 129.
[347]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 1, pp. 160, 166; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqā’, p. 125,
153; al-Baghdādi, Tarikh…, vol. 13, p. 351.
[348]
Al-Sarakhsi, Kitāb, vol. 10, p. 125.
[349]
Al-Asha‘rī, Maqālāt, vol. 2, p. 125.
[350]
Al-Jassās Aḥkām, vol. 1, p. 81.
[351]
Ibid, vol. 2, p. 39.
[352]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, pp. 482-505.
[353]
Al-Jassās, Aḥkām, vol. 1, p. 8.
[354]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 1, p. 260.
[355]
Ibid, vol. 1, p. 260.
[356]
Ibid, pp. 155-156.
[357]
Ibid, pp. 155-156.
[358]
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 5, p. 18.
[359]
Al-Ṭabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, pp. 155-263.
[360]
Al-Yāfī‘i, Mirāt al-Jinān, vol. 1, p. 299.
[361]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 72; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 84.
[362]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 71; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 83.
[363]
Al-Jassās, Aḥkām, vol. 1, p. 81.
[364]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 22.
[365]
A person has claimed that ‘Ali was not superior to other Ṣaḥābah and thus he
did not have the kind of exaltedness that would have won him the people’s
approval for the Khilāfah. Such as assertion is out of place because the best
deciders for the caliphal issue were the people who belonged to that era and not
someone today. The people then made their choice. When ‘Umar fell to the
assassin’s dagger, the shūrā asked ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn ‘Auf to pulse the people’s
choice for the caliphal office. Ibn Kathīr writes: ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn ‘Auf set out to
seek people’s opinion secretly and openly, severely and collectively of the chiefs
and the influentials. He even asked the opinion of the veiled women, the students
in the schools, and the outsiders coming to Madīnah. For three days and nights,
he kept himself engaged in the task. … Then he talked to ‘Ali and ‘Uthmān: I have
solicited people’s opinion about you. I did not find a person who considered
anyone equal to you. … Then, ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ibn ‘Auf spoke (in the prophet’s
masjid): “Brothers! I have sought your opinion both secretly and openly. I did not
find you to prefer anyone over these two. Nor did you endorse ‘Ali or ‘Uthmān.” Al-
Bidāyah, vol. 7, p. 146.
[366]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 6, p. 190; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt vol. 3, p. 285; Ibn
Kathīr, al-Bidāyah , vol. 10, p. 84, Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah, vol. 3, p. 191.
[367]
Ibn Hishām, al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah (Egypt: Matb‘ah Mustaphā al-Bābi, 1936)
vol. 4, p. 311; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 5, p. 248.
[368]
These are the words of al-Bukhārī’s report (Kitāb al-Maharbiin, Bāb rajm al-
hablabā min al-zinā’). In another report, ‘Umar’s words are that he who is given
imārah without shūrā, he should not accept it for it is Ḥarām for him. See Fatḥ al-
Bari, vol. 12, p. 125.
Imām Aḥmad has cited ‘Umar’s words that he who gives his allegiance oath
(bai‘ah) to someone without consultation with the Muslims his bai‘ah will not be
valid nor that of the person whom he gave his bai‘ah. See Aḥmad’s al- Musnad,
vol. 1, ḥadīth 391.
[369]
Al-Ṭabari, Tārikh, vol. 5, p. 163.
[370]
Ibn Sa‘d, al-Ṭabaqāt, vol. 7, p. 164; ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah, vol. 9, p. 135.
[371]
For an exposition of this issue, see my Tafhimāt (Lahore: Islamic Publications,
1996) vol. 3, pp. 300-320, and Tafhim al-Qur’ān, tafsīr Sūrah al-Ḥujurāt, footnote
17.
[372]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 183; Tāsh Kibrizādah, Miftāh al-Sa‘ādah, vol. 2,
p. 114.
[373]
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqā’, pp. 40-41.
[374]
Abu Nu‘aym al-Isfahāni, Hilyah al-Auliyā’, (Egypt: al-Matb‘ah al-Sa‘ādah, 1355
A.H.) vol. 6, p. 332; Kibrizādah, Miftāh, vol. 2, p. 87.
[375]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 212.
[376]
Ibid, p. 214.
[377]
Ibn Khallkān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 422; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Intiqa’, p. 172.
[378]
Ibn Khallkān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 424.
[379]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 232.
[380]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 126.
[381]
Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 424; al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 126.
[382]
Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist (Egypt: al-Matb‘ah al-Rahmāniyah, 1348 A. H.) Ibn al-
Khallikān writes on the authority of Ṭalḥah ibn Muḥammad that Abū Yusūf was the
first person who complied books on all primary aspect of fiqh according to the
Ḥanafī school and thus spread Abu Ḥanīfah’s thought across the Muslim world.
See vol. 5, p. 424.
[383]
The compilation of the Mālikī school that could cater to the needs of an empire
was later accomplished on the model of Imām Muḥammad’s books.
[384]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 211-239; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 5, p. 421.
[385]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 128.
[386]
Al-Sarakhsi, Kitāb, vol. 16, p. 61; al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 243-244.
[387]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, pp. 266-227.
[388]
Ibid, p. 240.
[389]
Ibid; al-Qāri, Dhayl, p. 526.
[390]
Al-Makki, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 232.
[391]
Al-Kardari, Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 130.
[392]
Abū al-Faraj al-Asfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghāni (Egypt: Matb‘ah al-Misriyah Bulāq,
1255 A.H.) vol. 3, p. 178.
[393]
Abu Yūsuf, al-Kharāj, pp. 3-5.
[394]
Ibid, p. 5.
[395]
Ibid, p. 8.
[396]
Ibid, p. 117.
[397]
Ibid, p. 12.
[398]
Ibid, pp. 10-11
[399]
Ibid, p. 12
[400]
Ibid, p. 117
[401]
Ibid, p. 5
[402]
Ibid, p. 6
[403]
Ibid, p. 13
[404]
Ibid, p. 108
[405]
Ibid, pp. 9-12
[406]
Ibid, pp. 36-117
[407]
Ibid, p. 36
[408]
Ibid, p. 186
[409]
Ibid, p. 14
[410]
Ibid, pp. 16, 37, 109, 114
[411]
Ibid, pp. 109, 132
[412]
Ibid, pp. 122, 132
[413]
Ibid, pp. 15-16
[414]
Ibid, pp. 37, 114
[415]
Ibid, pp. 14, 37, 125
[416]
Ibid, pp. 122-126
[417]
Ibid, p. 139
[418]
Ibid, p. 105
[419]
Ibid, pp. 58, 60, 66
[420]
Ibid, pp. 59-66
[421]
Ibid, p. 111
[422]
Ibid, pp. 106-107, 111, 132, 186
[423]
Ibid, pp. 106, 107, 111, 132, 186
[424]
Ibid, pp. 111, 212
[425]
Ibid, pp. 176-175
[426]
Ibid, p. 151
[427]
Ibid, p. 151