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HAZOP Procedure

The document outlines the objectives and methodology of a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study conducted on a power plant. The objectives were to identify safety hazards, operability problems, and recommend improvements. The study involved dividing the plant into nodes, using guidewords to identify potential deviations, recording worksheets, and developing recommendations. Documentation such as P&IDs, specifications, and procedures were referenced. Safety hazards, causes, consequences, and existing safeguards were evaluated for each node and guideword combination.

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N Kannan
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160 views4 pages

HAZOP Procedure

The document outlines the objectives and methodology of a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study conducted on a power plant. The objectives were to identify safety hazards, operability problems, and recommend improvements. The study involved dividing the plant into nodes, using guidewords to identify potential deviations, recording worksheets, and developing recommendations. Documentation such as P&IDs, specifications, and procedures were referenced. Safety hazards, causes, consequences, and existing safeguards were evaluated for each node and guideword combination.

Uploaded by

N Kannan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The objectives of the HAZOP study were to identify and evaluate safety hazards and to identify
operability problems which, although not hazardous, could compromise the plant’s ability to
achieve design intent and productivity. In particular, the objectives of the study were to:

 Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the design and
operation of the systems;

 Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;

 Identify existing engineering and procedural safeguards that will reduce the
consequences related to the hazards;

 Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and

 Recommend additional safeguards and improvements, where necessary.

HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

Basis
The basis for the study was primarily the P&IDs issued for review, marked-up with additional
information, where applicable

In order for the team to fully understand the intent of the power plant, a process description
presentation was given, and this was noted in the HAZOP for each Node. The study team has
made a field visit and they the explained the process on the site.

Documentation
The following documentation was made available during the HAZOP study and
used as reference during meetings. (Note that not all documents were available for
every section.)

 Process Description and operating philosophy, e.g. annual uptime/downtime schedule


and emissions limits;
 Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs);
 Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs);
 Interlock Logic Diagram or interlock description;
 Specifications for interface (battery limit) conditions;
 Material Safety Data Sheets and other material data and specifications;
 Equipment Process Datasheets/Drawings and
 Unit Plot Plan.
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
The HAZOP study was conducted in accordance with the project HAZOP Procedure [1].
The procedure is briefly explained in the following paragraphs.

Nodes for Study


The power plant was divided into 5 sections, comprising 32 nodes in total, for convenient
study. Annex B includes a list of nodes and their descriptions. The design conditions and
the referenced drawing numbers are also included in the node list. Minor P&ID corrections
were marked up on the master P&IDs but not recorded in HAZOP. The Nodes are marked on
the Master P&IDs, presented in Annex F.

Guidewords / Parameters
The guidewords and parameters used for the study are presented in Table 4.1. Each node
was considered in detail to identify any potential problems of safety or operability that may
arise due to deviations in the process parameters. The possible Causes and
Consequences of each deviation were identified and the HAZOP team then evaluated the
adequacy of existing safeguards. Where necessary, additional safeguards were
recommended as Actions.

Table 1.1: HAZOP Guidewords/ Parameters and Related Deviations


Deviations Guide Word Parameter Comment


No/Less Flow No/Low Flow
More Flow More/High Flow
Reverse/Misdirected Reverse Flow
Flow
High Pressure More/High Pressure
Low Pressure Less/Low Pressure Includes vacuum
High Temperature More/High Temperature
Low Temperature Less/Low Temperature
High Level High Level Includes interface high level
Low Level Low Level Includes loss of level and
interface low level

 Deviations Guide Word Parameter Comment
Contamination/ As well as Composition
Additional Phase
Composition change/ Other than Composition
Loss of phase
Start-up Hazards Others
/Shutdown /
Maintenance Hazard
Utility Failure Others Includes instrument air, service
air, power, demin water, process
water
Others

Worksheets
The session proceedings were recorded. The records were projected on a screen for
comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions. .For this study, a full
recording approach was adopted for all guidewords/deviations listed in Table above, whereby
every deviation considered by the team was recorded even when no significant causes or
consequences were found. For guideword “Others”, however, recording by exception was
adopted (i.e. where an entry is recorded only when the team makes a recommendation or the
issue is considered significant).

The completed worksheets are included in Annexure.

Recommendations
A number of recommendations were identified during the HAZOP study, which, in the team’s
opinion, will improve the safety or the operability of the facility.
HAZOP Premise
Some assumptions were made regarding the basis of the HAZOP study procedure, and
these were agreed by the HAZOP study team. The main items are listed below:
 In cases of parallel equipment (with duty and standby/spare equipment) inside the
train, the study was conducted for one set of equipment. The actions from this study will
therefore apply for the corresponding parallel systems as well. The study has, however,
considered the impact of simultaneous operation of parallel systems, including the control
requirements and the effect of trip of one system on the other.

 Hazards/ Deviations resulting from a double jeopardy (two simultaneous failures)


 were not considered, as the probability of such failure is remote.

 A single check valve was deemed to be an acceptable safeguard against reverse


flow, unless the team felt that failure of the valve would lead to unacceptable
consequences, or the differential pressure was so high that leakage would be inevitable.

 Equipment/ machinery was assumed to be designed, manufactured, commissioned, and


inspected with no defect.

 Rupture of equipment was not considered except for tube rupture/ seal leak.

 Plant was assumed to be well maintained.

 Manual block valves that are not frequently operated were assumed to be in their
normal position and to be functioning properly.

 Operators were assumed to be well trained and provided with suitable documentation to
assist in normal operations and emergency procedure.

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