Proliferation Challenges after Iraq

The report of an Eisenhower National Security Series workshop

Workshop co-organizers
Robert S. Litwak
Mitchell B. Reiss

Report by Daniel Freeman

December 2003
 Contents

Contributors ........................................................................................................ i

Introduction

Robert S. Litwak and Mitchell Reiss ............................................................ iii

Iran

Michael Eisenstadt ......................................................................................... 1

Robert Einhorn .............................................................................................. 3

North Korea

Stephen Kim .................................................................................................. 6

Henry Sokolski .............................................................................................. 9

Pakistan

Peter Lavoy .................................................................................................. 11

George Perkovich ........................................................................................ 13

Iraq: Making WMD Disarmament Stick

Jonathan B. Tucker ...................................................................................... 15

Tim Trevan ................................................................................................... 19

The Global Nonproliferation Regime: Can It Deal with the Hard Cases?

Joseph Pilat .................................................................................................. 22

Gary Samore ................................................................................................ 24

Institutional Sponsors ..................................................................................... 27

i
 CONTRIBUTORS
Robert Einhorn is a senior adviser in the International Security Program at CSIS. He served for
twenty-nine years at the U.S. Department of State, including as Assistant Secretary for Nonprolif-
eration from 1999-2001.
Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has
written widely on Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli security and proliferation issues. His most recent
publication is (edited with Eric Mathewson) U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the
British Experience (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 2003).
Daniel Freeman studies history and international relations at Harvard University. He has served as
a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson Center and at Harvard's Olin Center for Strategic Stud-
ies.
Stephen Kim is an analyst at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where his work fo-
cuses on North Korea's nuclear program. He previously worked at the CNA Corporation and is
author of Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953-1960
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001).
Peter R. Lavoy is Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict and Assistant Professor at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He served as Director of Counterproliferation
Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2000.
Robert S. Litwak is Director of the Division of International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. He is author of Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washing-
ton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000) and served as
Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council staff from
1995-1996.
George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
A longtime analyst of proliferation and international security affairs, he is the author of India's
Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
Joseph F. Pilat is with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
He has served in the Pentagon and the Congressional Research Service and taught at Georgetown
University, Cornell University and the College of William and Mary. His most recent book is 1995:
A New Beginning for the NPT ? (New York: Plenum Press, 1995).
Mitchell B. Reiss is Dean of International Affairs, Director of the Reves Center for International
Studies, and Professor of Law and of Government at the College of William & Mary. He has
served at the National Security Council and as a consultant to the Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories. He is the author of Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain
Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) and Without
the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
Gary Samore is the Director of Studies and Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. Prior to joining the IISS, Dr. Samore served

i
as the Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council
from 1996-2000 and in various capacities in the US Department of State from 1987-1996.
Henry Sokolski directs the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC and is
Co-editor with Patrick Clawson of Nuclear Iran: Devising A Strategy Beyond Denial (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, forthcoming). He served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy at the
Defense of Defense from l989-1993.
Tim Trevan was formerly Special Advisor to the Chairman of UNSCOM and Spokesman for the
Commission from January 1992-September 1995. He has served as a British diplomat in Yemen
and at the Chemical Weapons negotiations in Geneva.
Jonathan B. Tucker is a Senior Researcher specializing in chemical and biological weapons at the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington,
DC office. He is the author of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New York: Grove
Atlantic, 2001) and the editor of Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). In February 1995, he served on an UNSCOM
biological weapons inspection team in Iraq.

ii
 INTRODUCTION
ROBERT S. LITWAK AND MITCHELL B. REISS protocol)? Can signatories be persuaded not to
defect from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
The Iraq war was a precedent-setting case in (NPT)? Does the Security Council have the po-
which forcible regime change was employed to litical will, especially after Iraq, to squarely ad-
achieve nonproliferation objectives. Yet the use dress "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
of this policy instrument belies a larger failure or act of aggression," in accordance with the UN
of international efforts to halt the spread of Charter? What happens if this assault on the in-
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. ternational nonproliferation regime cannot be
Iraq thus raises questions not only about indi- mended? Will military preemption or preventive
vidual countries pursuing weapons of mass de- war become a more frequent policy tool?
struction (WMD), such as North Korea and Iran. To address these questions confronting the United
It also prompts questions about the continuing States and the international community in the
vitality and effectiveness of the international aftermath of "major combat operations" in Iraq,
nonproliferation regime. During the 1990s, nu- the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Reves Cen-
merous countries sought to arm themselves with ter of International Studies of The College of
the world's most lethal weapons: Thirteen coun- William and Mary organized a daylong workshop
tries pursued biological weapons and sixteen on June 24, 2003 in Washington. The meeting,
countries had chemical weapons; twenty-eight held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, convened
countries had ballistic missiles. Evidence showed some forty top nonproliferation specialists from
a growing trade and cooperation among many of government, academia, and the broader policy
these countries in WMD technologies. In Janu- community. The workshop was supported by and
ary 2001, the Defense Department published Pro- part of the U.S. Army's Eisenhower National
liferation: Threat and Response, which warned: Security Series.
"In virtually every corner of the globe, the United
States and its allies face a growing threat from The workshop participants explored nonprolif-
the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, bio- eration strategies to address the nuclear crises
logical, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their with North Korea and Iran, the challenge of en-
delivery systems." suring durable WMD disarmament in Iraq, the
nuclear challenge in Pakistan (a front-line state
What steps can be taken to halt and reverse this in the war on terrorism), and prospects for re-
trend? Can export controls be fortified or have forming the international nonproliferation re-
sub rosa networks between unprincipled nuclear gime. Expert presentations on each topic were
suppliers and "rogue" states effectively doomed followed by general group discussion. Daniel
a supply-side solution? Is it possible to strengthen Freeman prepared a summary report, which was
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) updated by the presenters.
safeguards (even as some technical experts ques-
tion the utility of the "enhanced" 93+2 safeguard

iii
 IRAN
MICHAEL EISENSTADT, WASHINGTON a mistake to assume that such concerns are the
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY main impetus behind the Iranian nuclear program.
Eisenstadt traced Iran's desire for nuclear weap- Considerations relating to power, prestige, and
ons to both regime-specific and regime-neutral influence, among others, would also motivate a
factors - that is, to motivating factors particular successor regime. Although it is not axiomatic
to the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) regime and that any Iranian government would pursue a
to factors that would influence decision-making nuclear weapon option, it likewise cannot be as-
regardless of the political character of the regime. sumed that regime change would eliminate the
The IRI regime's strong interest in security self- motivations that underlie proliferation in Iran.
reliance may be understood, in terms of regime Turning to Iran's short-term nuclear capabilities,
specificity, both as a reaction against the Shah's Eisenstadt noted that Iran is pursuing both the
dependence on the West and as an application of plutonium and enriched uranium routes to secur-
the lessons of the international arms embargo that ing the fissile material for nuclear weapons. Iran
crippled Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. The weak is developing its fuel cycle capabilities; a Febru-
economy that plagues the IRI regime is also a ary IAEA visit revealed a 160-centrifuge pilot
powerful motivating factor in the Iranian nuclear plant with components for an additional thou-
program, as the regime has found a conventional sand centrifuges and floor space for fifty thou-
military buildup to be economically unfeasible sand. While the Iranians claim that this facility
and thus sees nuclear proliferation as a "short- will simply produce fuel for the country's planned
cut" to regional power status. Finally, there are nuclear reactors, this capability is cause for con-
the specific security concerns of the IRI regime, cern; it is generally agreed that reactor-grade plu-
which was for years threatened by Baathist Iraq tonium can be used in a nuclear weapon and that,
and continues to perceive threats from Israel, barring this, a pressurized water reactor can pro-
Pakistan, and the United States. This sense of duce military-grade plutonium under certain con-
insecurity has been exacerbated by the ongoing ditions. The reactor near Bushehr, then, may be
American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq a major source of fissile material for the Iranian
and the continued US naval presence in the Per- nuclear weapons program upon the reactor's ex-
sian Gulf. pected completion within the next two years.
Still, much of the impetus for Iran's nuclear weap- Still, completion is not synonymous with full
ons program is less regime-specific, dating not operation; there will likely be some startup prob-
to the inception of the Islamic Republic but to lems with the hybrid reactor, which combines
the government of the pro-Western Shah, who Russian reactor components with a German con-
built a research reactor in Tehran. The same na- tainment structure, before it comes fully online.
tionalistic motivations of power, prestige, and While acknowledging that Iran's anticipated ca-
influence that characterized the Shah's attempts pacity to cross the nuclear threshold does not
at proliferation motivate the Islamic regime to- necessarily imply an immediate decision to do
day. These common factors are more than a so, Eisenstadt expressed skepticism on this point;
matter of Iranian security concerns; while any if Bushehr goes online within the next year, Iran
"grand bargain" in which Iran agreed to abandon may have enough fissile material for its first
or freeze its nuclear program would have to ad- weapon in as little as two to three years. Al-
dress Iranian geopolitical concerns, it would be though some estimates are more optimistic, not

1
forecasting an Iranian nuclear weapon until the consensus for action in the Security Council and
end of the decade, Eisenstadt stressed that the other international institutions is difficult to
time to act against Iranian proliferation is now. achieve even when there is fairly definite scien-
tific evidence of infractions. Moreover, 93+2
Eisenstadt saw the options available to Ameri-
would do nothing to prevent Iran from creating
can policymakers as delay, an enhancement of
an infrastructure that, while technically in com-
nonproliferation safeguards, a diplomatic full-
pliance with IAEA regulations, would enable Iran
court press on Iran, an encouragement of politi-
to quickly proliferate should it decide to break
cal change in Tehran, and preventive action. He
out of or withdraw from the NPT at a later date.
was not particularly optimistic that any of these
policy avenues will be able to forestall Iranian The major hurdle faced by the current attempts
proliferation if the IRI regime is truly determined at a diplomatic full-court press on Iran is the dis-
to acquire a nuclear arsenal; he expressed a grow- crepancy between the American and European
ing sense of resignation that the best the US can perceptions of the endgame. The Bush
hope for is the somewhat unlikely combination administration's stated position that an Iranian
of successful American delay tactics with inter- bomb is unacceptable is ambiguous about
nal Iranian governmental reforms facilitating a whether the US would accept an Iranian build-
political deal. up of a nuclear infrastructure that stops just short
of weapons production or whether the current
Any near-term delaying tactics should focus on
focus on the Additional Protocol is simply a point
Bushehr, which has yet to be completed. The
of departure for further American efforts at Ira-
Bush administration was probably disappointed
nian nonproliferation. Still, there is little pros-
that the 2003 IAEA visits to nuclear facilities in
pect of Iranian acceptance - or even international
Iran have failed to yield an IAEA declaration of
acceptance - of a solution that fully addresses
Iranian NPT non-compliance and a subsequent
the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons
Security Council resolution preventing Russia
program. Seeing full dismantlement of the pro-
from completing Bushehr. This course of events
gram as essentially impossible, Eisenstadt was
may still be forthcoming should additional in-
skeptical that even his second-choice solution, a
formation arise in the latter half of 2003, but
freeze on further Iranian nuclear development,
Eisenstadt was not optimistic, noting that Rus-
would be feasible. Furthermore, any sort of
sia has veto power over Security Council resolu-
"grand bargain" would be encumbered by the
tions. Barring a Security Council resolution on
political necessity of linking the nuclear issue to
Bushehr, the United States should press Russia
Iran's involvement in terrorism, Iran's efforts to
to follow through on an agreement whereby Iran
obstruct the Arab-Israeli peace process, and Ira-
promises to immediately return the spent fuel
nian objections to American efforts to encour-
generated by Bushehr for reprocessing in Rus-
age political change in Iran.
sia.
Though a new Iranian regime, however reform-
Enhanced safeguards, in the form of the IAEA's
ist, would probably still desire a nuclear arsenal
Additional Protocol 93+2, are the current focus
because of the broad support in Iran for prolif-
of international efforts on Iranian nonprolifera-
eration, there is nonetheless some opportunity for
tion. While 93+2 would be a step forward in
nonproliferation through Iranian political change.
that it would aid in the detection of Iranian NPT
A reformist leadership in Iran might be more sen-
violations, the key lesson of Iraq is that prolif-
sitive to the cost of nuclear proliferation and, if
eration can occur "even [with] the most intru-
that cost proved high enough, might be willing
sive inspectional monitoring regime" and that a
to postpone the actual production of nuclear

2
weapons. Still, even barring this, a true reform- anticipates for its heavy water production raises
ist government would probably act more respon- questions about the integration of the uranium
sibly as a nuclear power. Thus, though political program. Thus, Iranian nuclear efforts may face
change in Tehran might not resolve the problem unanticipated delays. Despite some estimates
of Iranian proliferation, such reform might make that Iran could produce enough highly enriched
an Iranian nuclear weapons state more manage- uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon by the end
able. of 2005, Iran probably will not reach this thresh-
old until several years later.
Finally, preventive action is beset by a number
of potential costs both in domestic Iranian poli- In its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the Ira-
tics and in the international community. A U.S. nian government is motivated by a sort of "magi-
military strike invoking the new preemption doc- cal sense about how nuclear weapons are going
trine would incur geopolitical difficulties and to solve [its] security problems" that is devoid of
would risk strengthening the hardliners in Tehran systematic, strategically logical thinking. The
by inciting an anti-American backlash. Given hypothetical nuclear policy of a more represen-
the risks, solid intelligence and flawless execu- tative, less theocratic regime in Tehran is an un-
tion, with a certainty of delaying the Iranian pro- known. Still, a representative government would
gram for years, would have to be the prerequi- probably be more responsive to the needs of the
sites for any military action. While recent press Iranian people and might thus be willing to forgo
leaks regarding the Iranian nuclear program are nuclear weapons if the perceived economic and
encouraging, American experiences in both North political costs to Iran were high enough.
Korea and Iraq call into doubt whether U.S. in-
Dismissing as a policy option an invasion and
telligence capabilities are adequate to support a
occupation of Iran like those in Afghanistan and
preventive military option. As a result, while he
Iraq, Einhorn said that the only American mili-
admitted that it might be possible under certain
tary option worth considering is a surgical strike
conditions, for the time being, Eisenstadt viewed
against Iranian nuclear sites with the objective
the prospect of preventive action more as a bar-
of delaying or terminating the program. Like
gaining chip and a spur to diplomacy than as a
Eisenstadt, however, Einhorn highlighted the
viable option.
dependency of this option on highly reliable in-
Eisenstadt concluded by noting that the Iranian telligence and suggested that Iran may already
nuclear program cannot be fully addressed with- have satellite enrichment facilities or a second-
out dealing simultaneously with North Korean ary uranium conversion facility unknown to
capabilities. As long as North Korea is a pro- American policymakers. Failure to destroy such
ducer of fissile material, there will be a risk of sites would undermine any preventive military
export to Iran and other aspiring nuclear powers. action.
ROBERT EINHORN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC The Bush administration's political multilateral
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES approach to Iranian proliferation has made sig-
nificant progress in its efforts to use the IAEA to
Einhorn noted that Iranian centrifuge enrichment expose Iranian intentions and engender interna-
efforts are further advanced than American ana- tional pressure on the regime to halt its nuclear
lysts previously estimated. It is unclear how well program. Iranian Atomic Energy Organization
synchronized the various elements of the Iranian (IAEO) head Gholamreza Aghazadeh's recent
program are; the disconnect between the timing calls for negotiation on ambiguities in the Addi-
of the heavy water facility and the timing Iran tional Protocol suggests that this pressure is hav-

3
ing some effect. Another positive development finally, Iran could remain technically in compli-
is the IAEA's demand that Iran, as a show of good ance with the NPT while it developed its nuclear
faith, not begin uranium centrifuge operations; capabilities and then withdraw from the treaty
centrifuge operations would contaminate facili- and use for its weapons program any fissile ma-
ties, hindering the IAEA's sample-based inspec- terial that had been produced
tions. Meanwhile, the Russian government,
Einhorn expressed support for the third princi-
while erratic and elusive in its statements, ap-
pal policy option, which would allow Iran to
pears to be maintaining its guarantee of fresh fuel
pursue its ambitious nuclear power program but
for the Bushehr reactor so long as the Iranians
deny it fuel cycle capabilities. Iran would have
promise to return the spent fuel. Russia has set
to sign and implement the Additional Protocol
no other preconditions for fuel supply, but addi-
as well as return the spent fuel produced by its
tional IAEA evidence of Iranian violations of
nuclear reactors to the fuel's countries of origin.
safeguards obligations could tip the balance and
While this solution would trigger Iranian protes-
prompt Russia to halt its participation in the
tations that Iran would be unacceptably depen-
Bushehr project. Similarly, further IAEA evi-
dent on foreign fuel sources and vulnerable to a
dence might also spur the European Union to
US-led international embargo on nuclear fuel
suspend its current trade negotiations with Iran,
shipments to Iran, these concerns could be cre-
hopefully underscoring to Tehran the price it will
atively addressed. For example, the international
pay if it continues its efforts at proliferation.
community might provide a multilateral guaran-
Einhorn identified three alternative strategies for tee of fuel cycle services to Iran at market rates
the international community. The first is a "zero- so long as it respects its NPT obligations and
tolerance" policy on Iranian proliferation that forgoes fuel cycle capabilities. By taking at face
seeks to end entirely the Iranian nuclear program value Iran's implausible desire for nuclear power
by dismantling the Bushehr reactor and Iran's despite its fossil fuel resources, this approach has
nascent fuel cycle facilities, among other sites. the potential to stop the Iranian weapons program
This strategy is the closest to the declared posi- while providing Tehran a way to save face. None-
tion of the Bush administration, which, while theless, any policy will also have to address the
saying the Additional Protocol is necessary but security concerns that partially motivate the pro-
not sufficient, has not fully articulated what gram in the first place; the United States will need
would constitute a satisfactory agreement. to convincingly reassure Tehran that the US is
not a threat.
The second principal policy option, which is clos-
est to most European governments' current posi- No solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge can
tion, would allow Iran to pursue its nuclear power be reached in a political vacuum. The Bush
and fuel cycle programs so long as it adhered to administration's policy on Iranian proliferation
the Additional Protocol. Iranian submission to will be bound up in concerns about Iranian har-
the Addition Protocol, with full implementation boring of Al Qaeda, support for Hezbollah, ef-
taking a few years, would likely be sufficient for forts to destabilize postwar Iraq by manipulating
much of Europe. Such a solution, however, is Shi'i there, and opposition to the Middle East
problematic. The United States would continue peace process, among other issues. Einhorn thus
to harbor suspicions that Iran's safeguarded fuel stressed the merits of an US-Iranian modus viv-
cycle activities concealed efforts at proliferation; endi, whether written or oral, that deals with the
Iran could import materials ostensibly for its le- Iranian nuclear program in the broader context
gal fuel cycle facilities and then divert these of US-Iranian relations. Iran, under such an ar-
materials to a clandestine nuclear arms program; rangement, would refrain from destabilizing the

4
reconstruction of Iraq, end support for Hezbollah, report and is concerned about the potential
and curb Al Qaeda activity in Iran. The US, in rise of another nuclear weapons state on its
turn, would provide assurances that it would not border. Moscow is exploring methods of
attack Iran, agree to respect Iranian interests in constraining the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle
Iraq, take steps to drop the extant US sanctions so that enriched uranium cannot be diverted
on Iran, and cease blocking nuclear vendors from into a clandestine weapons program. Along
participation in the Iranian power program. these lines, Russia is attempting to negoti-
ate an agreement for the return of spent fuel
An agreement to respect Iranian sovereignty by
from the Bushehr reactor and is pressing Iran
no means requires an American statement of neu-
to accede to the Additional Protocol.
trality on the Iranian political evolution toward a
more representative, progressive government. „ The European Union has also been shaken
The United States would have to refrain from by the revelations about Iran's uranium en-
providing material support to the Iranian oppo- richment activities and the construction of a
sition or engaging in other physical attempts to heavy water plant. The EU has linked a pro-
destabilize the regime in Tehran, but Washing- posed trade agreement to Iran's acceptance
ton would not have to cease its rhetorical and of the IAEA's Additional Protocol.
moral support for Iranian reformers and for po-
„ The EU and U.S. positions may diverge over
litical change in Iran. Still, even this program,
the adequacy of the Additional Protocol in
with its emphasis on mutual concessions, prob-
addressing the Iranian nuclear challenge. The
ably has little more than a one in two chance of
EU may consider Iran's accession to the Ad-
success.
ditional Protocol as the solution to the prob-
DISCUSSION lem, while the United States is likely to re-
gard this as being "too little" and to press for
„ The IAEA's revelations about Iran's centri- significant constraints on Iran's possession
fuge program to enrich uranium suggest a of fuel cycle technology.
clandestine weapons program, but it is not
clear that the Tehran regime has made a de- „ External pressure (e.g., the threat of an air
cision to acquire nuclear weapons. A key travel ban) is a necessary component of a
question is whether the program can be strategy to address Iran's nuclear challenge.
"walked back." But the United States should leave the Tehran
regime a way out of the crisis if it changes
„ The IAEA report has led to increased inter- its behavior.
national cooperation between the United
States, the European Union and Russia to „ Among the constraints on a preemptive U.S.
address the challenge posed by the Iranian military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastruc-
nuclear program. ture is concern that it could trigger a retalia-
tory response, including terrorism.
„ Russia, the key supplier of nuclear technol-
ogy to Iran, was embarrassed by the IAEA

5
 NORTH KOREA
STEPHEN KIM, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE The circumstantial evidence that has emerged
NATIONAL LABORATORY from defector testimony indicates that North
Korea is engaged in reprocessing without con-
Dr. Kim's views are his own and do not reflect cern for basic worker or environmental safety.
the positions of the Lawrence Livermore National In one account, yellow smoke emitted by the In-
Laboratory or the Department of Energy. stitute 501 experimental plant typically caused
Kim cautioned against over-reliance on the the plant's workers severe pain and trouble
worst-case scenario assessments of some breathing. Another defector recalled workers
policymakers and specialists that North Korea's jumping into uranium solution in their underwear
nuclear weapons program is fairly advanced, cit- to remove a piece of cloth plugging a valve:
ing the absence of hard knowledge about the pro- "They were passed off as our model - that is, as
gram to support such a claim. At the same time, paragons who sacrificed their own bodies with-
it cannot be said that the program is not advanc- out hesitation, all for nuclear development."
ing or advanced. Secretary of Defense Donald The future prospects of the North Korean nuclear
Rumsfeld has said that "the existence of nuclear program depend on the country's ability to con-
weapons in North Korea is at the minimum prob- struct functional reactors and produce fissile
able" and that fuel rod reprocessing could yield material as well as on its ballistic missile capa-
the materials for further weapons construction bilities. First, though various think tank assess-
in "a relatively short period of time"; similarly, ments differ on how long it will take North
the CIA has publicly announced that large-scale Korea's reactors to become operational, there is
nuclear weapons production, at a rate of fifty a consensus that the completion of one 200 MW
bombs per year, could begin in North Korea as and one 700 MW thermal reactor was years away
early as 2005. However, while IAEA monitor- at the time of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Once
ing devices have clearly been removed, it is un- operational, the two reactors could produce ap-
clear at this point whether or not North Korea is proximately 275 kg of plutonium per year, 55 kg
actually reprocessing the approximately eight from the 200 MW and 220 kg from the 700 MW
thousand spent fuel rods from its 5MW research reactor. As the amount of plutonium used per
reactor. Similarly, despite a North Korean bomb is dependent both on North Korea's tech-
official's April 2003 claim to Assistant Secretary nical capabilities and on its desired yield, the 275
of State James Kelly that North Korea has a se- kg figure does not translate into an assessment
cret nuclear program, the facilities in question of how many nuclear weapons North Korea could
have not been located. Much remains unknown: or would produce.
how much, if any, plutonium North Korea has
separated from the fuel rods; whether or not North North Korea's ballistic missile program boasts a
Korea has an additional reprocessing plant; stockpile of about 600-750 missiles. However,
where, if additional uranium enrichment facili- this figure says little about North Korea's launch
ties exist, North Korea has hidden them; where capability, the number of missiles it could fire in
North Korea has built underground bases; a war; launch capability is dependent on the
whether there are other facilities; and finally, country's launch facilities and on its manpower,
whether or not North Korea has taken the spent among other logistical factors. Furthermore, a
fuel rods and, if it has, where it has taken them. March 2002 accidental explosion at a North
Korean launch site may have severely crippled

6
operations, according to South Korean govern- sale or of North Korean threats of a sale will dra-
ment sources. Defense Ministry officials have matically increase.
estimated that North Korea would have difficulty
Kim identified the regional powers with a stake
launching another missile for at least a year. Still,
in the current stalemate as Russia, Japan, South
North Korea has exhibited proficiency in the
Korea, and China, in order of increasing rel-
design and production of effective multi-stage
evance. First, while Russia has the least at stake
ballistic missiles; accuracy improvements and
in the fate of the North Korean nuclear program,
other steps forward are anticipated.
President Putin has directly involved himself in
Given the likelihood that North Korea already the crisis, having released with Chinese Presi-
has a small nuclear arsenal, its failure to test a dent Hu Jintao a joint statement that excludes
nuclear device thus far might be attributed to one force as a solution to the problem. What's more,
of two reasons. First, as North Korea would only Kim Jong-Il's visit to Moscow may have curried
test a weapon if it had enough material left over favor with Putin, who announced on June 20 that
for several additional bombs, it is possible that "Under no circumstances should North Korea be
the state simply did not want to "waste" a bomb driven into a corner…If North Korea has prob-
with a test. This would, after all, be somewhat lems and concerns over its security…it should
consistent with the United States decision to only be given these security guarantees." But despite
test a single device before actually using atomic Russia's ability to offer oil and rail transport
bombs in wartime. Alternatively, North Korea routes to the Kim regime, Russia has little real
may simply have confidence in the accuracy of leverage over North Korea; Moscow's principal
non-nuclear tests and calculations to verify bomb hope for gaining a more significant role lies in a
yield. hypothetical souring of Sino-North Korean rela-
tions, in which case Russia might assume China's
Many policymakers fear that North Korea's en-
role as mediator.
demic economic crisis could prompt the
Pyongyang regime to raise funds by selling spe- Japan exercised restraint in its response to North
cial nuclear material or a completed nuclear Korea's 1998 testing launch of a Taepodong bal-
weapon to another state or non-state actor, but listic missile over its territory, but the Tokyo gov-
Kim thought this unlikely. Admittedly, North ernment has taken concrete steps, including a
Korea has a longstanding history of arming other measure to improve U.S.-Japanese military co-
nations for cash; according to US government ordination, since North Korea's 2002 admission
sources, North Korea sold about $580 million that its spies had abducted Japanese citizens de-
worth of ballistic missiles to Middle Eastern cades earlier. Within Prime Minister Koizumi's
states in 2001 alone. However, Kim Jong-Il is cabinet, there is an apparent divide between
not a blind risk-taker. So long as he can raise Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka,
significant revenues by selling missiles, narcot- who laid the groundwork for Koizumi's visit to
ics, and other more common contraband, he will Pyongyang and emphasizes such dialogue, and
have little reason to sell fissile material from his the more hawkish Deputy Chief Cabinet Secre-
country's limited supply. Even if Kim Jong-Il did tary Shinzo Abe. Abe has joined Defense Secre-
intend to put fissile material on the market, it is tary Ishiba in urging Koizumi to be more coer-
unlikely North Korea would actually do so be- cive and on June 15 asserted that "there is no
fore it had acquired a much larger arsenal than it one in the world who believes you can solve
probably has at the moment. However, if Kim gangster troubles through dialogue." Abe's ar-
Jong Il is able to gather a significant quantity of gument that the time has come for Japan to re-
fissile material, then the probability of an actual think its fundamental values suggests a debate

7
unprecedented in the history of the modern Japa- Zedong as one of his political heroes; finally, Roh
nese republic. Nationalists have profited in the has claimed that to become a full democracy,
political and social spheres from ongoing reports South Korea will have to repeal its domestic ban
that North Korean guided missiles threaten Ja- on the Communist Party. By compromising
pan, threats that have fostered in the polity a feel- South Korea's pro-American and anti-commu-
ing of helplessness suggestive of the drifting nist foreign policy mantle in this way, Seoul risks
Taisho period of the 1920s and early 1930s. being excluded from the diplomatic wrangling
that surrounds the North Korean nuclear crisis;
Though South Korea, as the traditional object of
what's more, by looking the other way and, at
Pyongyang's expansionist aims, should be most
times, assenting to anti-American and pro-North
concerned by North Korean nuclear proliferation,
Korean sentiments at home, Roh's government
Seoul's behavior in the present crisis has been
is constraining US policy options, thereby ob-
overly conciliatory. Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine
structing the resolution of the standoff.
Policy has worked to undermine the mainstays
of modern South Korean statecraft: anticommu- Finally, China, whose oil and coal exports ac-
nism and a pro-American foreign policy. The count for 80 percent of North Korean energy pro-
opposition Grand National Party is badly divided;duction, is the most important of the regional
critics of North Korea are silenced; the South powers with a stake in the North Korean crisis.
Korean public knows little about Kim Jong-Il and Beijing has emphasized the importance of dia-
North Korea more generally; and even officials logue in resolving the standoff but remains deeply
in Seoul refuse to contemplate preventive mili- concerned both by the North Korean nuclear pro-
tary strikes against the North. There are occa- gram and ostensibly by the threats posed by refu-
sional appeals for a more hard-line policy, such gees from North Korea to the stability of its own
as Army Chief of Staff Nam Jae-Joon's "clarify- Communist political system. Also, unlike Seoul,
ing" label of Pyongyang as Seoul's "main enemy," Beijing sees relations with the United States as a
a term that had been removed from the Defense paramount consideration in decision-making
Ministry lexicon under the Kim Dae-Jung admin- about the crisis. Nonetheless, the official posi-
istration, and National Assembly Speaker Park tion of the Chinese government seems to differ
Kwan-Yong's calls for the government not to from the views of the Chinese public; a recent
oppose proposals of economic sanctions against survey of Chinese opinion revealed that 57 per-
the North. Nonetheless, even Park's request was cent want their government to back North Korea
followed by rebukes accusing the Roh adminis- in the event of another Korean War, 89 percent
tration of undercutting the Sunshine Policy and oppose the United States' military threats to
general pan-Korean nationalism. Pyongyang and U.S. policies toward North Ko-
rea more generally, and 54 percent characterized
In this polarized political environment, ROK
Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions as an internal
President Roh has himself been inconsistent, of-
matter than should be resolved domestically.
fering a different message to the international
community than he does to the Korean public. Despite such pro-Pyongyang dynamics in the
Though fairly pro-American in his spring 2003 general Chinese public, Beijing is unlikely to
visit to Washington, he has since stated that he oppose economic sanctions if Washington moves
regretted his enthusiasm; in Japan, Roh passed forcefully to impose them. Indeed, Jiang Zemin
over the United States to praise Japan as South did not oppose sanctions in 1994, and though he
Korea's best friend and touted dialogue as the has since ceded the title of president to Hu Jintao,
only acceptable means of resolving the standoff Jiang retains broad power and influence over
with North Korea; in China, he praised Mao Chinese military decisions and government

8
policy in general. The "Shanghai Bang," or nuclear facilities; here, the element of surprise
Shanghai faction, which Jiang controls, maintains might be hindered by the stated positions of Seoul
a numerical majority in key government bodies. and Tokyo, as simply sidestepping South Korea
Five of the nine members of the Chinese Com- might unacceptably jeopardize the fifty-year-old
munist Party's Politburo, including Jiang protégé US-ROK alliance.
Zeng Qinghon, are members of the Shanghai
In terms of short-term, less comprehensive op-
Bang. Jiang and two other Shanghai members
tions, Kim suggested psychological operations
outnumber Hu on the four-member Central Mili-
that would address some stability concerns by
tary Commission, of which Jiang remains presi-
communicating to North Korean officials and to
dent. Finally, though Hu heads the North Ko-
various embassies that any collapse of the Kim
rean Crisis Leading Group, it was Jiang who or-
Jong-Il regime need not bring down the North
dered the group's March 2003 formation; Vice
Korean state with it. U.S. policymakers might
President Zeng Qinghon, a Jiang confident who
also gain rhetorical ground by stressing North
has good personal relations with the North Ko-
Korea's terrible human rights record, financing
rean leadership, is the group's deputy chief. All
lecture tours by prominent North Korean defec-
in all, Jiang has positioned himself to maintain
tors. Finally, the United States might highlight
effective control in much the same way Deng
the DPRK's inability to feed its own people even
Xiaoping did after formally ceding the reins to
as it pursues an expensive nuclear weapons pro-
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang; the foreign policy
gram. To this end, humanitarian aid might be
paradigms that developed under Jiang's leader-
delivered not at Pyongyang, but at Panmunjom,
ship will probably continue under Hu Jintao.
where North Korea would have to visibly retrieve
Kim articulated a broad range of U.S. options it; if Pyongyang refused, it would exhibit the
for addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis. callous intransigence of Kim Jong-Il's govern-
First, the United States might simply acquiesce, ment.
but this option is bound up in the question of
whether or not the US could live with a nuclear
HENRY SOKOLSKI, NONPROLIFERATION
North Korea. Second, Washington might seek a POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
temporary freeze on the North Korean nuclear Sokolski noted that our diplomatic efforts with
program, as it did with some success in the 1994 Iran and North Korea bear an oft-ignored resem-
Agreed Framework. Third, the Bush adminis- blance to the American experience with Vietnam
tration might pursue a sanctions regime. Here, in that the natural urge to solve these problems
the policymakers would have to decide whether by redoubling our exertions in a losing campaign
the sanctions would simply block exports of mis- may actually end up making matters worse. This
siles, drugs, and counterfeit currency or whether impulse toward over-the-top, counterproductive
imports would also be interdicted; they would action has been aggravated by exaggerated per-
also have decide whether it would be feasible to ceptions of the North Korean nuclear threat.
undertake a selective blockade unilaterally or Take, for example, the argument that the Ameri-
whether it would be more advisable to enlist help can alliances with Seoul and Tokyo will crumble
from Seoul and Tokyo; finally, they would have if Pyongyang acquires more nuclear weapons, as
to evaluate whether a blockade could even be South Korea and Japan will need their own
successful - that is, whether U.S. forces could nuclear arsenals as a hedge. This line of reason-
accurately detect the export of fissile materials ing is flawed in its assumption that alliance rela-
or components. Fourth, the United States might tionships turn on the size of an opponent's nuclear
conduct a preventive strike on North Korean arsenal; after all, NATO did not collapse with

9
the growth of the Soviet stockpile. Another compliance under the pretense that it was for
flawed contention is the argument that if the peaceful purposes. Such violators should, as a
standoff with North Korea is not solved imme- rule, be expelled from the IAEA and cut off from
diately, Pyongyang will export fissile material or receiving any additional nuclear technology or
even warheads to terrorist groups or other coun- goods. In addition, unless they return to NPT
tries. According to the CIA, Pyongyang has had compliance, violators of the treaty should be
nuclear weapons for nearly a decade, and there placed under UN sanction. At the very least, the
is no indication that North Korea has exported UN Security Council should authorize the inter-
nuclear materials thus far. However mistaken, diction of any nuclear export or imports to or
these sorts of prognostications have encouraged from a violating state. More comprehensively,
extreme positions among political decision-mak- the global nonproliferation regime must target
ers, who are increasingly divided between oppo- problem states' fuel cycle capabilities, which are
site but mutually desperate approaches that particularly essential to rapid breakout. Along
Sokolski termed "bombing" and "groveling." these lines, the Bush Administration's Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI), is an important step
In a bid for more comprehensive thinking about
in the right direction. Sokolski suggested that
the problems posed by the North Korean and Ira-
the PSI should be made a country-neutral policy
nian nuclear programs, Sokolski suggested that
and applied equally not only to North Korea and
one might think about them - and even about
Iran, but also to Pakistan, India, and Israel. By
nuclear terrorism - as "lesser included threats,"
fostering international institutional legitimacy in
to borrow from the Cold War lexicon. There is a
this way, the global regime may be able to build
possibility that there are even greater nuclear
the PSI into an effective compliment to the NPT.
menaces in the international system. The dan-
ger, then, is that a weak policy of halfhearted DISCUSSION
threats, cajoling, deals, grand bargains, and pro-
tocols would ultimately send the message to other „ The North Korean nuclear issue is embed-
potential proliferators that one can legally toe the ded in the broader issue of that country's fu-
edge of the nuclear weapons breakout threshold ture political evolution. North Korea is a
without penalty from the international commu- failed state with a collapsing economy and
nity. Such behavior might even garner rewards, large-scale starvation. Even the military is
given the incentives for "compliance" written into reportedly experiencing reduced food ra-
the NPT. In such an environment, states like tions.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, „ While experts debate whether the North
South Korea, and Taiwan would probably start Korean regime can survive, Kim Jong Il is
to "hedge their bets" by developing their own evidently planning for the long-term (with a
nuclear weapons options. report that he is even grooming his son to
Given the threat of such a hyper-proliferated succeed him).
world, it needs to be made clear that there is a „ Negotiations have two advantages: first, they
price for violations of the nonproliferation re- may yield a satisfactory resolution of the
gime. Sokolski favored a proposal whereby a North Korean nuclear crisis; second, they are
state that violates or withdraws from the NPT the predicate for tougher steps if negotiations
has to relinquish the technology it gained for fail.

10
 PAKISTAN
PETER LAVOY, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE Thus, if Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons,
SCHOOL India might be able to draw out any limited con-
flict into a war of attrition, which India, with its
Dr. Lavoy's views are his own and do not reflect greater conventional forces, would be sure to win
the positions of the Naval Postgraduate School eventually. By raising the stakes of all-out war,
or the Department of Defense. the Pakistani nuclear arsenal ensures that con-
The Pakistani leadership is confident in its de- ventional military engagements remain limited,
terrence posture. The military government has an area where the operational readiness of
integrated nuclear, conventional, and sub-con- Pakistan's armed forces gives Islamabad certain
ventional military capabilities, as well as diplo- advantages.
matic maneuvers, into a coherent security policy The asymmetrical tactics of Pakistan's sub-con-
that proved effective in the 2002 Indian-Pakistani ventional force capabilities, from state-sponsored
standoff. Many in Pakistan believe that terrorism to proxy war, are the least well-under-
Islamabad deterred war and Indian aggression not stood facet of Pakistani deterrence strategy. Pa-
only in 2002 but also in 1984, 1986-87, 1990, kistan is probably involved in the ongoing vio-
1998 and 1999. lence in Kashmir, though the exact nature and
The nuclear weapons component of Pakistan's scope of this involvement is a matter of consid-
deterrence strategy is based on rough parity with erable controversy. Indian intelligence officials
India. Drawing upon David Albright's fissile accuse Islamabad of fomenting violence and in-
material production statistics and upon conver- surrection in nearly every other Indian state as
sations with Indian and Pakistani officials, Lavoy well, but it is difficult to assess to what extent
placed the median estimates of Pakistani and In- this unrest is simply a product of India's internal
dian nuclear arsenal sizes at about sixty and sev- social, political, and ethnic cleavages, an ambi-
enty weapons, respectively, a point of relative guity that makes Islamabad's asymmetric tactics
parity. However, Pakistan enjoys an advantage all the more effective.
over India in missile delivery system capability, Finally, though not a direct military deterrent per
having prioritized this area of development in se, diplomacy is nonetheless an important ele-
the wake of American sanctions and suspension ment of Islamabad's deterrence strategy.
of F-16 delivery. In addition to its aircraft-based Pakistan's military and political coordination and
delivery systems, Pakistan has six separate bal- cooperation with the United States has encour-
listic missile systems, all designed expressly for aged Washington to keep pressure on New Delhi,
delivering nuclear weapons to targets in India. which, in turn, finds itself less politically able to
These missiles have ranges from 80 kilometers launch even a limited war on Pakistan.
all the way to 2400 kilometers.
However effective Pakistan's deterrence mecha-
Pakistani conventional forces, which constitute nism has become since the 1998 nuclear weap-
90 percent of Islamabad's deterrence posture, ons tests, there are several problematic areas in
work in concert with nuclear weapons in the Islamabad's long-term strategy with respect to
country's overall security strategy. India has an India: Pakistan's perception of Indian objectives,
approximate advantage over Pakistan of two-to- its support for high-risk "defensive" confronta-
one in most conventional military categories. tions, and its application of such asymmetrical

11
measures as support for the infiltration and vio- creasingly suffering growing ethnic, Shi'i-Sunni
lent activities of anti-India extremists, support sectarian, ideological, and socio-economic cleav-
that New Delhi calls state-sponsored terrorism). ages in the wake of the country's economic and
First, some Pakistani officials believe that India political difficulties. Like New Delhi, Islamabad
will settle for nothing less than a weak, compli- has developed mechanisms over the years for
ant Pakistani state along the lines of Bangladesh managing the natural social divisions within its
or Nepal. It follows that in order to survive in borders. However, this fragmentation may prove
the long term, Islamabad must defeat, divide, or more destabilizing when compounded with
otherwise severely cripple India, a mentality that Pakistan's present economic difficulties and the
necessarily sees relations with India as a constant decline of its education system and social ser-
state of war. Secondly, as some Pakistani offi- vices more generally. As a result, there is a pos-
cials see no other course of action consistent with sibility, albeit a small one, of social revolution,
Pakistan's independence and its "dignity," the especially if the Musharraf regime is not able to
Pakistan army has a history of taking extremely manufacture a smooth transition to democracy
high risks to exploit perceived Indian weak- within a few years. Alternatively, India might
nesses, a policy exemplified by its conduct in the exploit Pakistani social divisions by pursuing the
1999 Kargil crisis in Kashmir. Such risk-taking kinds of asymmetrical tactics Pakistan is accused
is a common characteristic of weak states' poli- of employing in India. Though India has thus
cies towards larger neighbors. Finally, in accor- far refrained from making state-sponsored ter-
dance with this policy framework, Pakistan's has rorism and proxy wars major elements of its
pursued, as an aspect of its deterrence mecha- policy towards Pakistan, there is some historical
nism, the unwise strategy of supporting violent precedent for such asymmetrical tactics in Indian
autonomy movements in Indian-held Kashmir. aid to the Bengali freedom fighters of East Paki-
This is especially problematic given the increas- stan. An Indian decision to revive this sort of
ing polarization in India between Muslims and policy would be fraught with the same risks that
Hindus, the rise in attacks on Muslims in recent Pakistani sub-conventional force strategies in
years, and the increasingly violent message of India face now, but India's own domestic insta-
Indian mullahs, whose extremism is mounting bility may nonetheless encourage New Delhi to
despite India's traditionally moderate Muslim follow this course.
community. Pakistan, which lent support to the
The state of civil-military relations within Paki-
1989 resumption of the insurrection in Kashmir,
stan may also undermine the country's security.
views the current ethnic, religious, and social
Musharraf's military dictatorship has put the fi-
fragmentation in India as additional strategic
nal nail in the coffin of civilian control of the
opportunities that might be exploited. Of course,
armed forces. This presents a challenge to Paki-
one might counter that the Indian government
stani stability in that there is no real mechanism,
has itself encouraged some tensions within In-
martial or civilian, in place for deciding Presi-
dia for New Delhi's own purposes, but this can-
dent Musharraf's successor. This is especially
not change the fact that India will take counter-
confusing in the broader context of the reshap-
measures if New Delhi perceives a Pakistani chal-
ing of Pakistan's political elite, which is increas-
lenge to Indian interests. This is a reality that
ingly populated by religious leaders, fostering
officials in Islamabad apparently fail to grasp.
resentment among rank-and-file observant Mus-
Still, it may be Pakistan's internal fragmentation lims.
that poses the greatest threat to Pakistani secu-
Finally, allegations of corruption and other prob-
rity. On a social level, Pakistani society is in-
lems within the military itself also put Pakistan's

12
security at risk. For instance, the absolute politi- each rationalizes its nuclear arsenal on the
cal power of the Pakistani army may have eaten grounds of deterring the other, neither India nor
away at military professionalism as current and Pakistan has accepted the mutuality of nuclear
former army officers have seized major positions deterrence. Pakistan is a non-status quo power
in business, government, and social services. that desires to remove Indian control over
Though such officers tend to be trustworthy and Kashmiris and does not rule out military opera-
efficient, their growing monopolies in the non- tions to accomplish this. While India would ac-
military spheres of power continue to present cept the status quo in Kashmir as a formal reso-
distractions from the officers' principal duties lution, New Delhi also insists it is not deterred
military professionals. As the military draws its from militarily punishing Pakistan for actions that
members from the nation it serves, the ethnic, India blames on Islamabad. Thus, neither state
sectarian, and socio-economic cleavages that accepts that nuclear weapons foreclose the use
threaten Pakistani society may also eventually of force in the Indo-Pak relationship.
weaken the armed forces, which thus far have
Finally, the Pakistani state itself faces an uncer-
avoided this sort of fragmentation. Finally, many
tain future. If the Pakistani state were to fall into
high-ranking military officers, including mem-
dysfunction or be compromised by major social
bers of the general staff, have apparently been
cleavages, the state's capacity to manage its
left out of the decision-making processes on such
nuclear establishment with sufficient discipline,
important strategic issues as the 1999 Kargil cri-
rigor and investment could be undermined. A
sis; when a decision proves strategically unsuc-
degraded state apparatus, paired with social up-
cessful - even disastrous - it compounds the bit-
heaval, would increase the risk that nuclear weap-
terness of those excluded from decision-making,
ons or materials could be diverted. More likely
further fragmenting the upper ranks of the Paki-
than "loose nukes" would be scenarios under
stani military. Once Musharraf is out of power
which Pakistani personnel shared their expertise
and thus no longer able to hold the various sides
in clandestine procurement, the design of equip-
together, there is a risk that bureaucratic infight-
ment such as gas centrifuges, or even the design
ing will damage military stability and Pakistani
of nuclear weapons themselves.
security
In short, all three proliferation problems have
GEORGE PERKOVICH, CARNEGIE their origins in the flawed regime in Islamabad;
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE the Pakistani state must undergo a regime change,
Perkovich identified three proliferation chal- but one of a much different nature than the one
lenges posed by Pakistani nuclear capabilities. the recent US-led intervention will have brought
First, Pakistan might sell, distribute, or otherwise to Iraq. First, while it is true that the Pakistani
export to another state or a non-state actor the army's obsessions with nuclear weapons and with
technical knowledge necessary for nuclear weap- deterring India have exacerbated the present cri-
ons development. This would be most likely to sis and that Musharraf, as a military dictator, has
occur if Islamabad believed that such prolifera- failed to implement the reforms he promised, the
tion would pay off in technology, financing or army must nonetheless play an important role in
political support that would strengthen Pakistan's any future Pakistani state. The question is
hand against India. whether and how the Pakistani Army can con-
tribute to reforms whereby the Army would be-
A second Pakistani proliferation issue lies in the come genuinely subsidiary to elected civil insti-
possibility that a conventional war with India tutions and leaders. This is not something that
might escalate to nuclear weapons use. While American policymakers have considered seri-

13
ously. Secondly, the dramatically anti-Indian DISCUSSION
instincts that characterize Pakistan's strategic
culture are bound up in a sense of Pakistani na- „ The United States could provide Pakistan the
tionalism; in working to reform Islamabad's stra- necessary technical assistance to improve the
tegic culture, policymakers must understand that safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear
tension in India has a "ripple effect" in Islamabad. arsenal in order to prevent theft, unautho-
When intolerant Hindu fanatics campaign against rized nuclear use and nuclear transfer. Pre-
and, in extreme cases such as the violence in venting nuclear leakage is one of the great-
Gujurat, conduct pogroms against Muslims, est legacies Musharraf could leave.
Pakistan's most militant groups claim vindica- „ The United States is engaged on several
tion in their own brand of anti-Hindu extrem- major issues of concern with the Pakistani
ism. The interplay between Hindu and Muslim government. In Pakistan, there is a belief that
extremism in the two countries is a growing if Islamabad provides Washington assistance
threat. on its top priority - presently terrorism - this
assistance will ease US pressure on Pakistan
over other contentious issues, including that
of nuclear proliferation.

14
 IRAQ: MAKING WMD DISARMAMENT STICK
JONATHAN B. TUCKER, MONTEREY Baghdad's refusal to provide documentary or
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES physical evidence to back up this assertion. Ac-
cordingly, it was assumed that all prohibited
Tucker began his presentation by noting the fail- weapons whose destruction UNSCOM could not
ure to date of Coalition forces to find evidence verify remained in Iraq's arsenal-a questionable
of Iraq's alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass assumption, but one that Bush administration
destruction (WMD), which the Bush adminis- policymakers favored because it supported their
tration used as the primary rationale for invad- case for war. After Iraq finally admitted weap-
ing Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from ons inspectors in late 2002 from UNSCOM's
power. Since hidden caches of chemical or bio- successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Veri-
logical arms or bulk agent may yet be discov- fication and Inspection Commission
ered, the jury is still out on the status of Iraq's (UNMOVIC), US intelligence agencies inter-
pre-war WMD programs, but it is increasingly cepted Iraqi communications that suggested the
unlikely that they posed an "imminent" threat. dispersal and concealment of WMD in defiance
Regardless of the final outcome of the weapons of the inspection regime. Finally, during the war
hunt, Tucker argued that one can draw useful les- itself, Coalition forces discovered caches of Iraqi
sons from Iraq's past behavior as a determined chemical protective suits and auto-injectors for
proliferator and the international efforts to con- administering nerve agent antidotes, indicating
tain its WMD programs. that the Iraqi military was prepared for offensive
Before the recent war, intelligence assessments chemical warfare operations. Yet this conclu-
that Iraq retained large stockpiles of chemical and sion was at odds with the failure of postwar oc-
biological weapons were based on circumstan- cupation forces to find any deployed chemical
tial evidence rather than on hard data, Tucker weapons.
said. US intelligence agencies suffered from a The mystery surrounding Iraq's pre-war WMD
lack of human sources within Iraq, a weakness capabilities will probably be resolved only
compounded by the withdrawal of United Na- through in-depth interviews with former Iraqi
tions Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspec- weapons scientists, Tucker said. To date, how-
tors in December 1998. Accordingly, the US in- ever, Iraqi weapons scientists who have been
telligence community based its estimates of Iraqi taken into Coalition custody have been treated
WMD production during the 1998-2002 period harshly and held incommunicado. Fearing legal
on extrapolations from UNSCOM data, defec- prosecution for war crimes or retribution from
tor reports of uncertain reliability, and evidence Saddam Hussein loyalists, they have been reluc-
that Iraq was importing dual-use equipment and tant to speak freely. Full cooperation and reli-
materials and rebuilding commercial facilities, able testimony from Iraqi weapons scientists will
such as chemical and vaccine plants, that had be forthcoming only if they are guaranteed physi-
been used in the past for illicit weapons produc- cal security and granted immunity from prosecu-
tion. tion.
US intelligence analysts also doubted the Iraqi Given the current lack of conclusive intelligence,
government's claim that it had unilaterally elimi- Tucker identified four competing hypotheses
nated its stocks of anthrax and VX nerve agent about the fate of Iraq's WMD. The first hypoth-
after the 1991 Gulf War, particularly given esis is that Saddam Hussein was telling the truth

15
when he said that Iraq had unilaterally eliminated likely, of a negotiated settlement to the war that
all its WMD programs after the 1991 Gulf War. would leave Saddam in power. The threat of
This explanation seems unlikely, however, given severe American or Israeli retaliation also pro-
Saddam's dogged refusal to cooperate fully with vided a strong deterrent to Iraqi WMD use.
UN inspectors despite the cost of years of crip-
From a strictly military standpoint, Saddam may
pling international sanctions. Unilateral disar-
have concluded that escalation to non-conven-
mament would also be inconsistent with
tional warfare would not affect the outcome of
Saddam's worldview, which saw possession of
the conflict. The grounding of the Iraqi air force
WMD as a vital tool for achieving his strategic
early in the war eliminated the most effective
ambitions as leader of the Arab world and the
means of delivery for chemical and biological
dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Saddam
agents, and Coalition forces were well equipped
also viewed non-conventional arms as the guar-
with gas masks, suits, antidotes, and other de-
antor of his own political survival, and he did
fenses against such weapons. Biological agents
not hesitate to use chemical weapons to suppress
could not be employed for defensive purposes
the Kurdish uprising in 1988.
because of their relatively long incubation peri-
The second hypothesis is that Iraq retained a ods compared with the rapid pace of the Coali-
"strategic reserve" of WMD, as the Bush admin- tion offensive. Similarly, the use of persistent
istration claimed, but did not employ it during chemical weapons, such as mustard gas or VX
the war. Caches of chemical and biological weap- nerve agent, would have slowed but not halted
ons or bulk agent may have been buried at un- the Coalition advance. It is possible, however,
marked sites in the Iraqi desert or hidden at other that Saddam considered using chemical and/or
remote locations to avoid discovery by UN in- biological weapons as a last resort but hesitated
spectors. Because the inspectors left the country until it was too late. Once the Coalition's special
shortly before the war began, the Iraqi regime forces operations and intense bombing campaign
may not have had time to recover its concealed had disrupted Iraq's military communications and
weapons (particularly if they were in the form of command-and-control, effective Iraqi use of
bulk agent) and employ them against Coalition WMD became impossible.
forces. It seems unlikely, however, that during
The third hypothesis is that Iraq had a hidden
the ten days that Coalition forces took to fight
WMD arsenal that, shortly before the war, was
their way from Kuwait to Baghdad, Iraq could
secretly transferred to a sympathetic country such
not have retrieved weaponized stockpiles under
as Syria or Syrian-controlled Lebanon. Tucker
such a scenario.
argued that this scenario was unlikely for two
A related possibility is that hidden WMD stocks reasons. By harboring Iraqi weapons, the Syrian
existed but the Iraqi government made a deliber- government would be risking a grave military
ate decision not to use them. Saddam may have confrontation with the United States, with no
calculated that restraint would serve him well clear offsetting benefit. Moreover, the large cara-
politically and that any use of WMD against van of trucks needed to transport a militarily sig-
Coalition forces would expose his earlier disar- nificant stockpile of chemical weapons (i.e., hun-
mament claim as an outright lie, costing him sup- dreds of tons) would almost certainly have been
port among the Iraqi public and the broader Arab detected by U.S. reconnaissance satellites.
world. Resort to non-conventional weapons
The fourth hypothesis is that Iraq eliminated its
would also have alienated France and Russia,
existing WMD stockpiles and replaced them with
Iraq's key supporters on the UN Security Coun-
a breakout capability to produce chemical and
cil and ruled out any possibility, however un-

16
biological weapons on fairly short notice. This riods. Another advantage of maintaining a
explanation sidesteps many of the weaknesses breakout potential while eliminating active stocks
of the full disarmament hypothesis. Retaining a of chemical and biological agents is that it en-
breakout capability would be consistent with the abled Saddam to frustrate the efforts of UN weap-
testimony of Iraqi General Hussein Kamal, the ons inspectors, while appearing to be in compli-
mastermind of Iraq's WMD programs, who de- ance with Security Council resolutions and un-
fected to Jordan in August 1995. During an in- dermining the US case for war.
terview in Amman with UNSCOM executive
Tucker noted that the four contending hypoth-
director Rolf Ekeus, Kamal asserted that Iraq had
eses are not, of course, mutually exclusive. It is
destroyed its stocks of chemical and biological
possible that in addition to breakout capability,
weapons but preserved seed cultures of
Iraq maintained a small strategic reserve of bulk
biowarfare agents and precursor materials for
or weaponized chemical or biological agents. A
chemical weapons, as well as recipes, computer
final judgment on this point will have to await
files, and blueprints, to facilitate the swift recon-
the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, which is
stitution of its chemical and biological arsenals
currently conducting an in-depth investigation of
once UN sanctions were lifted. In the event of a
Iraq's pre-war WMD programs. With respect to
crisis or imminent war, Iraq would have been able
Saddam's nuclear program, however, the Bush
to produce a militarily significant stockpile within
administration's pre-war assessment was almost
about a month's time. Such a rapid breakout strat-
certainly exaggerated. It is true that an Iraqi
egy would also be consistent with Iraq's efforts
nuclear scientist revealed after the war that he
after 1991 to preserve its WMD design teams,
had been ordered to bury key components of a
conduct additional research and development,
gas centrifuge (a device used for uranium enrich-
and import equipment that could be used either
ment) in his rose garden in April 1991, with the
for peaceful industry or for weapons production.
declared intent of rebuilding the nuclear program
From a technical standpoint, Tucker said, a rapid at a future date. Nevertheless, a rapid-breakout
CBW breakout capability would minimize the strategy would not be feasible in the nuclear area
operational problems associated with Iraq's crude because production of atomic weapons requires
preparations of biological agents (anthrax and large quantities of plutonium or highly enriched
botulinum toxin) and chemical nerve agents uranium (HEU). Using gas-centrifuge technol-
(sarin, cyclosarin, and VX). Because Iraqi scien- ogy to refine enough HEU to make one or more
tists could not produce chemical or biological bombs would require the construction and op-
agents in highly pure or stabilized form, the weap- eration of hundreds of centrifuges over a period
ons tended to deteriorate rapidly and had a shelf- of many months or years.
life of only several weeks or months. Accord-
Whatever the fate of Iraq's WMD turns out to
ingly, any stocks of anthrax slurry or nerve agent
be, Saddam Hussein was the archetype of a "de-
left over from the 1991 period would have lost
termined proliferator" for whom the incentives
all military utility. Iraq's nerve agents also con-
to develop WMD outweighed the disincentives.
tained acidic impurities that were highly corro-
Iraq's non-conventional weapons programs were
sive and caused stored munitions to leak, posing
driven both by real security concerns, such as
serious hazards and logistical problems. Given
the need to deter attack from Iran and Israel, and
these drawbacks, Iraq may have decided to pro-
Saddam's personal ambitions, which included the
duce chemical and biological weapons on a "just
pursuit of regional hegemony and the desire to
in time" basis to meet immediate combat require-
bolster his domestic standing and ensure the sur-
ments, rather than stockpiling them for long pe-
vival of the regime. In general, Saddam took the

17
long view and valued his own survival above all Iraqi officials with hard evidence of gaps or in-
other objectives. For this reason, he discounted accuracies in their "full, final, and complete"
the enormous costs to the Iraqi people of retain- declarations, the Iraqis simply acknowledged the
ing his prohibited WMD programs in defiance errors and issued a revised declaration, admit-
of the international community, resulting in ting only what was absolutely necessary-a strat-
twelve years of harsh economic sanctions and egy that came to be known as "cheat and retreat."
two wars.
Iraq's concealment effort also utilized sophisti-
Tucker drew some policy lessons from Iraq's cated methods of deception and denial. Decep-
elaborate measures to conceal its WMD capa- tion techniques were intended to make WMD
bilities from UN inspectors and the outside world. programs appear to be legitimate industrial ac-
First, Iraq's weapons programs were highly com- tivities, while denial techniques sought to con-
partmentalized, so that only the most senior Iraqi ceal the very existence of illicit production though
officials had broad knowledge of the entire ef- camouflage, electronic emission control, and
fort and most scientists knew only about their personnel or communications security. For ex-
own specialized area of expertise. This system ample, Iraq buried high-voltage power lines and
aimed to prevent WMD programs from being removed security fences from its uranium enrich-
compromised by defections or penetration by ment plant to minimize telltale "signatures" of
foreign intelligence services. In addition, the suspicious activity that could show up in satel-
Iraqi regime established a massive concealment lite images. Iraq's concealment strategies also
apparatus involving thousands of individuals involved cutting corners on safety and environ-
from the General Intelligence Service, the Mili- mental protection, such as eliminating special-
tary Industrial Commission, and the two secu- ized biocontainment systems (e.g., roof ventila-
rity services directly responsible for protecting tors and air filters) that might indicate produc-
the regime: the Special Security Organization and tion of biological warfare agents.
the Special Republican Guard.
Most of Iraq's pre-1991 chemical and biological
Iraqi concealment operations involved moving weapons production took place in dual-use in-
WMD and related equipment from place to place, dustrial plants that did not require elaborate con-
one step ahead of UN inspectors, as David Kay's cealment measures, Tucker explained. These
nuclear inspection team discovered in June 1991 facilities were ostensibly designed to manufac-
when they found themselves chasing trucks car- ture legitimate products, such as pesticides, fer-
rying giant magnets employed for uranium en- tilizers, animal feed supplement, and vaccines,
richment. Iraq dispersed and duplicated elements but they were secretly diverted to the production
of its WMD programs, devised numerous code of warfare agents. Moreover, Iraq's chemical and
names that were frequently changed, and moved biological agents were loaded into standard mu-
key items of equipment under the cover of dark- nitions such as 122mm rockets, artillery shells,
ness. The Iraqi security services also kept UN and 500-pound aerial bombs. Given the world-
inspectors under intensive surveillance in an ef- wide availability of dual-capable industrial plants
fort to determine the targets of "surprise" inspec- and the fact that developing countries have a le-
tions in advance. Even as the Iraqi regime con- gitimate need to manufacture vaccines and agri-
cealed key WMD components and equipment, it cultural chemicals, a determined proliferator can
made calculated concessions by unilaterally de- always retain a breakout capability to produce
stroying nonessential or outdated materials and chemical or biological agents on demand. In
equipment, or surrendering them to the UN in- addition, technologies that can support deception
spectors. Whenever the inspectors confronted and denial operations (such as pollution controls,

18
encrypted communications, and self-sterilizing of its regional security environment. Several
fementers) are spreading rapidly and are bound nearby countries, including Iran, Israel, Syria,
to fall into the hands of aspiring proliferators. Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, are believed to possess
chemical and/or biological warfare capabilities,
Tucker suggested that despite the removal of
and Israel has an undeclared nuclear arsenal. If
Saddam Hussein, the recent US-led war has not
Iraq's security concerns are ignored, they could
fully eliminated the risk of WMD proliferation
spur a future government in Baghdad to reac-
in Iraq. He identified several short-term threats
quire WMD in the name of self-defense. An
that Coalition forces must address if their non-
American security guarantee for Iraq would be a
proliferation efforts are to be successful. First,
good start toward reducing such proliferation
the physical remnants of Iraq's WMD programs
incentives. Tucker argued, however, that the
must be eliminated by finding and securing
United States must ultimately address Iraq's
pathogen collections, feedstocks for chemical
WMD-rich neighborhood and promote regional
weapons, and radiological and fissile materials.
approaches to nuclear, chemical, and biological
Second, it is important to monitor dual-use in-
disarmament in the Middle East.
dustrial facilities in Iraq that could be converted
fairly readily to WMD production. An ironic les- TIM TREVAN, FORMER UNSCOM WEAPONS
son of the Iraq War is that intrusive UN inspec- INSPECTOR
tions proved to be quite effective at containing
Iraq's WMD programs. Accordingly, UNMOVIC Expressing general agreement with Tucker's as-
inspectors should be invited back into Iraq to sessment, Trevan argued that to effect a real, last-
monitor Iraq's dual-use plants on an ongoing ba- ing WMD disarmament in Iraq, coalition forces
sis, as authorized under UN Security Council will have to address both the means and the mo-
Resolution 715 (1993) and subsequent resolu- tives underlying the Iraqi proliferation efforts.
tions. Such monitoring would have to continue The international nonproliferation regime will
until Iraq's transition to democracy is complete have to eliminate Iraq's capacity to produce
and the new government has demonstrated a clear WMD, both in material and in human-technical
commitment to the nonproliferation regime. terms, at the same time that it works to address
Tucker projected a timeframe of about five years the regional security concerns that would spur a
until UN monitoring could be lifted. new Iraqi regime to recommence a WMD pro-
gram in the first place.
The Coalition must also attend to the intellec-
tual legacy of Iraq's WMD program by securing To curtail Iraq's means of proliferation, coalition
technical documentation and preventing the re- forces must track down what WMD materiel
cruitment by regional proliferators or terrorist presently exists in the country, enlisting former
networks of any of the roughly 3,000 Iraqi sci- Iraqi weapons scientists to aid in the search, and
entists and technicians who were formerly en- must begin an aggressive monitoring system to
gaged in WMD development and production. detect future attempts at proliferation. Still,
International research grants for peaceful science Trevan identified significant obstacles to the
and technology research in Baghdad would pro- WMD recovery efforts. Trevan suggested that
vide temporary employment for the former weap- before the outbreak of the war, Iraqi WMD could
ons scientists and help to prevent defections have existed in bulk agent format rather than as
motivated by financial desperation. filled ammunitions. Bulk agents would have
been easier to hide, as they could be stored in
Finally, American policymakers must address tanker trucks and driven around the country ahead
Iraq's legitimate security concerns in the context of inspectors, then easily buried in the desert

19
when desired, making them very difficult to lo- tivities and affiliations.
cate. Once formed into filled munitions, on the
Some of the proliferation motives of the Saddam
other hand, WMD take up a far greater volume
regime have already been addressed by the very
and are thus much more difficult to move or con-
fact of Saddam's removal from power. Such per-
ceal. WMD recovery efforts may also face ob-
sonal factors as Saddam's desire for power and
struction from the compartmentalization of the
his desire for a historical legacy as the leader who
Iraqi program. Iraqi weapons scientists may be
united the Arab world against Israel and the West
able to tell the international nonproliferation re-
were significant forces behind Iraq's WMD pro-
gime exactly what was achieved in terms of
grams. These factors were indeed unique to
WMD research and development - and even what
Saddam's regime. Still, regional security con-
weapons were produced and in what quantity -
cerns and other regime-nonspecific factors might
but it is unlikely that the scientists have much
drive a future Iraqi regime to seek WMD; the
knowledge about weapons concealment opera-
proliferation of other states in the region "sets
tions, which were probably handled by Iraqi se-
up a regional prisoners' dilemma for any country
curity officers. As low-level personnel involved
faced with the question of acquiring WMD."
in the task may have been executed for security
Hedging against the risk of WMD threats from
reasons, coalition forces will need high-level se-
its neighbors, in other words, a future Iraqi re-
curity officers with a more comprehensive view
gime might decide to develop WMD even as it
of the program to complement any specific tech-
recognizes that the best-case scenario would be
nical intelligence supplied by former Iraqi weap-
a region free of WMD entirely. The key, then, is
ons scientists; scientists will know what to find,
to somehow change the decision-making process,
but only former security personnel will know
to take measures to force would-be proliferators
where to find it.
out of the "prisoners' dilemma" mindset. Such
The comprehensive archives that Saddam's re- measures might include aiding in the buildup of
gime allegedly maintained on its weapons pro- conventional forces, framing a regional security
gram may also prove be a valuable source of the arrangement, providing US security guarantees,
intelligence needed to effect full WMD disarma- and other carrot-and-stick frameworks of offered
ment. Though Iraq frequently claimed that docu- incentives and threatened sanctions.
ments had been destroyed, Saddam's Iraq readily
Inspections, Trevan stressed, are ineffective in
provided copious WMD documentation when-
stemming the tide of WMD proliferation. The
ever it was in its interest to do so. It is quite
UNSCOM inspections in Iraq were the most
possible that the archives were destroyed over
powerful conceivable - save the inclusion of a
the course of the war, but if they still do exist,
military component, which would only exacer-
they are most likely wide-ranging and well orga-
bate matters by legitimizing the use of force on
nized.
the proliferator's side - and even those inspec-
In terms of Iraq's human-technical means of pro- tions could not prevent Iraqi acquisition of the
liferation, Trevan stressed the importance of con- means of proliferation. This leaves proliferators'
trolling the activities of Iraq's former scientists, motives, but even here, little can be done about
presenting subsidized research employment of the complex regional security environment that
those scientists as one promising way of prevent- frequently stimulates would-be proliferators.
ing their defection for purely financial reasons. Regime-change can address regime-specific,
Still, as there are non-financial reasons for de- personal factors, but such a policy is largely pow-
fection, Trevan suggested a scientist-monitoring erless when it comes to broader systemic fac-
regime that would account for the scientists' ac- tors. Iraq must consider the varying degrees of

20
threat posed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Tur- DISCUSSION
key, Iran, and Syria. Iran, however, must also
consider Russia and Pakistan; Pakistan adds „ The nonproliferation regime cannot prevent
China and India, China adds North Korea and determined proliferators from acquiring pro-
Taiwan, and North Korea adds South Korea and scribed unconventional capabilities. Onsite
Japan to the equation. While China's standout inspections, as demonstrated by the
power and consistency may offer some sort of UNSCOM experience in the 1990s, can be
key to the solution, the result nonetheless remains an effective nonproliferation tool, but their
an immensely complex set of interlocking secu- utility should not be oversold. Effective in-
rity environments that would be extremely diffi- spections require, most notably, good intel-
cult to alter in any meaningful way. With the ligence and cooperation by the target state.
outlook grim on altering the means or motives „ The UNSCOM inspections probably led the
of proliferation, Trevan proposed that Saddam Hussein regime to retain a rapid
policymakers start considering long-term objec- breakout capability instead of large stocks
tives that seek not the unlikely outcome of a of weaponized agents.
nonproliferated word, but rather effective secu-
rity strategies for coping with the highly prolif- „ In the post-war period, the discovery of re-
erated world that seems likely to arise. sidual weapons and this breakout capability
will rely on information from former Iraqi
scientists. The United States is sending a
mixed message to these scientists - on the
one hand soliciting their knowledge of the
Iraqi program, while, on the other, intimi-
dating them with threats even if they coop-
erate.

21
 THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME:
CAN IT DEAL WITH THE HARD CASES?
JOSEPH PILAT, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL its successes a few years before. Indeed, the past
LABORATORY dozen years have seen many efforts to resolve
nonproliferation problems by external means,
Dr. Pilat's views are his own and do not reflect efforts that, by sidestepping the exposed flaws
the positions of the Los Alamos National Labo- in the international nonproliferation regime,
ratory, the National Nuclear Security Adminis- made the regime seem increasingly ineffective
tration, or the Department of Energy. and unnecessary. The threat of four nuclear
Pilat noted that there was some cause for opti- weapons states arising from the Soviet collapse,
mism about the prospects of the global nuclear for instance, was met not by existing capabili-
nonproliferation regime as recently as 1997 and ties of the nonproliferation regime, but by such
early 1998. At that time, the emergence of four external approaches as cooperative threat reduc-
nuclear powers from the Soviet collapse had been tion, lab-to-lab collaboration, and the concept of
averted; there were unprecedented levels of co- the international science center. In effect, the
operation between Western nuclear powers and Clinton administration's counter-proliferation ini-
former Soviet states; Argentina, Brazil, and South tiatives and the second Bush administration's
Africa had scrapped their nuclear weapons pro- preemption doctrine were and are simply at-
grams; the NPT had been extended indefinitely tempts, in this tradition, to attain new nonprolif-
in 1995; the Additional Protocol offered a solu- eration tools to make up for the shortcomings of
tion to the IAEA safeguard loopholes that had the global nonproliferation regime. This was
been exposed by the Iraqi nuclear program's suc- what the Agreed Framework with North Korea
cesses in the early 1990s; and the Comprehen- largely attempted to do in 1994. In this context,
sive Test Ban Treaty was finally concluded. Pilat noted the European foreign policy
establishment's reactions to the Agreed Frame-
Around the time of the 1998 nuclear tests in In- work; Europe's reactions were initially very nega-
dia and Pakistan, however, concerns began to tive, predicting the demise of the NPT and mul-
mount about the "hard cases" of proliferation in tilateral nonproliferation efforts in general, but
South Asia, Saddam's Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, later developed into a greater acceptance of what
and the September 11 attacks highlighted the the Agreed Framework could offer "at least at
growing threat of nuclear and radiological ter- the margins of the regime."
rorism. Increased technology diffusion, difficul-
ties with export controls, and "virtual prolifera- While the impression at the time of the Agreed
tion" hedging strategies, in which states built a Framework that the regime was becoming in-
rapid NPT breakout capability without actually creasingly irrelevant may have been exaggerated,
the regime continues to face challenges on many
crossing the nuclear threshold, all further threaten
the nonproliferation regime. There are also grow- fronts. The NPT has been unable to deal with
ing concerns, especially in the traditional non- the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests.
proliferation and arms control communities, The regime was unable to prevent North Korea's
about the effects of American "rogue state" poli- withdrawal from the NPT, calling to mind the
cies. massive withdrawal forecasts of the 1995 and
2000 NPR Review Conferences. The present
Still, the international nonproliferation regime's concerns about Iranian proliferation highlight the
recent failures have been no more decisive than

22
difficulties inherent in NPT Article IV, which of the NSG as a component of the global non-
essentially permits a regime such as that in Tehran proliferation regime.
a path to a rapid breakout capability that does
While the hope in the early 1990s was that the
not necessarily violate the letter of the regime's
UN Security Council would act to pick up the
obligations. The recent U.S. Nuclear Posture
slack in the regime, there has been very limited
Review (NPR) has prompted fears in the US and
consensus on nonproliferation enforcement and
abroad that the NPR could undermine the regime
a patent unwillingness by most states to use force
and nonproliferation efforts more generally. (Pilat
against noncompliant states. The same paraly-
noted that the NPR and the issues it raised were
sis that gripped the Security Council on Iraq
complex, and that he could not address them in
seems to have taken hold over the issue of North
his remarks.) Given the limited international con-
Korea as well.
sensus on how NPT compliance should be en-
forced, there is also widespread concern about It is often difficult to predict the long-term sig-
U.S. preemption doctrine and the elevated pros- nificance of "shocks" on the global nonprolif-
pect of U.S. unilateral action to forestall prolif- eration regime. The threat of nuclear weapons
eration. use in South Asia, for example, was a widely held
concern a year ago; it remains a significant is-
Pilat argued that expectations for the capabili-
sue, but its magnitude has diminished in the eyes
ties of strengthened safeguards may be too high,
of the international community. Future shocks
given the inherent limitations of any onsite in-
to the regime include the potential for nuclear
spection regime and the specific capabilities af-
weapons tests in North Korea, a North Korean
forded to the IAEA under the Additional Proto-
sale of WMD to a non-state actor or to another
col. It remains to be seen whether the newly pro-
state, a Japanese withdrawal from the NPT be-
posed measures and the IAEA's greater interest
cause of a perception that the regime has not ad-
in integrated safeguards significantly strengthen
equately addressed the North Korean prolifera-
the regime. Thus far, ratifications of the model
tion threat, and a preemptive Israeli strike on Ira-
Additional Protocol have been limited. The first
nian nuclear facilities. Finally, there is a great
state to provisionally apply integrated safeguards
deal of talk about a "second nuclear coming," a
was not a "hard case" but rather Australia.
significant rise in nuclear power generation
The debate over the efficacy of Security Council worldwide. Pilat expressed skepticism on the
resolution 1441 inspections in Iraq has raised lin- likelihood of this prospect but noted that in the
gering doubts about the nonproliferation regime's event of such a development, Iran would be more
credibility. The IAEA's handling of the Iranian important than Iraq to the future of the nonpro-
nuclear program will be a proving ground for the liferation regime.
agency; its claim to have been deceived by Iran
The present concerns about the ability of the re-
was a significant first step, but the linkage of
gime to address the risks posed by civil nuclear
"success" in Iran to Iranian acquiescence to the
facilities recall the 1970s view that "every nuclear
model Additional Protocol and enhanced safe-
reactor" was a proliferation threat. Pilat traced
guards remains problematic. Also troubling is
this renewed focus on misusing technologies that
what seems to be a gradual breakdown of the
can have civil and military application, exempli-
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which has been
fied by the case of Iran, both to the arguments of
compromised by Russian activities, by French
the 1970s and to the post-September 11 issue
announcements of future plans, and by lateral
linkage of proliferation with terrorism. Controls
proliferation. This development has triggered sig-
over nuclear and dual-use exports may become
nificant concerns about the future effectiveness

23
increasingly tenuous, especially if their ostensible different WMD nonproliferation institutions met
successes in effecting supplier restraint have pri- with failure when it was realized that the result
marily been the consequence of a weak nuclear would be a "least common denominator" equal-
market. Should supplier restraint decrease, it ization that substantially weakened many facets
might trigger a vicious cycle where, in combina- of the regime; efforts at remaking the regime
tion with lateral proliferation, it underscored to would probably meet a similar end today. While
supplier states the futility of export controls, ef- a revised Baruch Plan, a realpolitik cartel ap-
fecting an even greater increase in nuclear sup- proach, a new international inspections author-
ply to would-be proliferators. ity, and other proposed alternatives to the exist-
ing nonproliferation regime all have merits, any
In effect, there may be a revival of the 1970s
attempt to supplant the old regime with one of
nuclear supply debate, which was fueled by dis-
these schemes would face great political impedi-
cord among supplier states and by the demands
ments. The current regime will have to be re-
of consumer states. In the context of Iran, there
formed, not replaced.
may also be rekindled scrutiny of the NPT's Ar-
ticle IV loopholes and, relatedly, of general safe- Without a regime-strengthening reform program,
guards efficacy. The international community the regime will continue to erode, and states like
will have to assess whether the regime's safe- Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey might become
guards remain credible and whether they success- the next decade's "difficult case" proliferators,
fully build confidence in peaceful nuclear energy with the prospect of a "second coming of nuclear
development. energy" further complicating matters. While
declining to make specific policy recommenda-
In this uncertain climate, Pilat speculated, "re-
tions on reform, Pilat emphasized the need to
gime change" may not only refer to North Korea
consider reinterpreting Article IV of the NPT.
or Iran, but also to the NPT and the IAEA. Ameri-
Proliferation may be a natural force of geopoli-
can military action, even as part of a coalition
tics, he concluded, but the US and the interna-
operating under UN Security Council approval,
tional community are not powerless to prevent
will probably not be able to fully solve the host
or manage it.
of problems facing the global nonproliferation
regime today; even improved safeguard technolo- GARY SAMORE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
gies would prove insufficient. This is not to FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
suggest that American strategists should not ex-
plore counter-proliferation and other military The global nonproliferation regime is not only
options. Indeed, given the disheartening state of ill-equipped to deal with the "hard cases," Samore
the regime, American military responses may argued, but can actually make it more difficult to
prove the best measures available - however in- deal with them. Afraid of detracting from the
complete their results. In this context, the focus regime's credibility, the international community
on preemptive regime change "looks very ratio- often ends up unproductively constrained in its
nal and seems very understandable." interactions with proliferators. Policymakers
should instead use the regime to buttress the case-
Some argue that only comprehensive institutional specific policies that are necessary in dealing with
changes within the regime itself have the poten- the hard cases. At the same time, policymakers
tial to achieve a full solution. However, the op- should try to use the hard cases to mobilize sup-
tions for institutional reform of the global non- port for regime-strengthening measures, much as
proliferation regime are not promising. An early the nonproliferation community was able to mar-
1990s move to standardize the provisions of the shal political support for the Additional Proto-

24
col after the 1991 Gulf War by pointing to the same time, however, the Framework was even
case of Iraq. more stringent than the NPT in requiring a full
cessation of North Korean plutonium production
While the global nonproliferation regime has
whether or not it was under IAEA safeguards.
been "irrelevant" to South Asia and thus unable
In effect, the Agreed Framework repaired a weak-
to stop proliferation there, the region may none-
ness in the NPT, but only at the significant cost
theless be the easiest of the hard cases in that its
of delayed full compliance. As North Korea is
nuclear developments have not undermined the
unlikely to accept the NPT requirement that it
NPT more generally. India and Pakistan will not
yield its undeclared nuclear weapons, and the
join the NPT as non-nuclear states, nor will the
United States is unlikely to accept the NPT's per-
NPT be revised to permit them membership as
mission of North Korean plutonium or enriched
nuclear weapons states. Nonetheless, if the Com-
uranium production under safeguards, any agree-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or Fissile
ment resolving the current crisis will not con-
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) were actually
form to the boundaries established by the NPT
implemented in South Asia, the regime could
regime.
impede further nuclear weapons development by
limiting additional nuclear weapons design and As in South Asia, the NPT's irrelevance in North
fissile material accumulation. Still, this imple- Korea has not significantly damaged the global
mentation remains unlikely for the time being. nonproliferation regime; even within Northeast
More promising is the prospect that the regime's Asia, the regime's failures have thus far been
constraints on nuclear suppliers might serve as a confined to North Korea. Still, there is a long-
model for the South Asian states, most notably term risk that South Korea and Japan will pur-
Pakistan, to emulate in creating their own export sue a nuclear or other WMD deterrent capability
control systems; to "limit the damage" of South should North Korean proliferation continue to
Asian proliferation in this way should be appear unchecked. In effect, if the United States
policymakers' top priority in the region. At any does not maintain credible security guarantees
rate, the regime's failures in South Asia have not to Japan and South Korea, the entire Northeast
damaged the regime elsewhere; the subcontinent Asian NPT regime may collapse and take the
has always been an isolated geopolitical unit, and broader global regime with it.
India and Pakistan's emergence as overt nuclear
As with Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War,
weapons states has not caused new nuclear weap-
policymakers might seek to use the example of
ons programs or defections from the NPT in other
North Korean proliferation to mobilize support
regions of the world.
for strengthening the global nonproliferation re-
The global nonproliferation regime is also of lim- gime; President Bush's Proliferation Security
ited relevance to North Korea, which continues Initiative (PSI), which calls for the multilateral
to violate the NPT, as it has for over a decade, interdiction of WMD shipments and shipments
and has "de facto special status" within the re- of missile-related equipment, is an interesting
gime. The Agreed Framework was a unique in step in this direction. The authorization of inter-
that raised nonproliferation standards for North diction under international law presents some
Korea in some areas and lowered them in others. problems, but North Korea' s missile systems and
The Framework delayed implementation of full- potential as an exporter of fissile material present
scope safeguards in North Korea until a "signifi- a compelling case for such a mechanism.
cant portion" of the light water reactor project
Finally, Iran is unique among the hard cases in
had been completed, allowing North Korea a
that the short-term implementation of the NPT
"nuclear hedge," whether real or imagined; at the

25
in Iran may actually undermine long-term non- nuclear arsenal and now also by the forthcoming
proliferation efforts there. Indeed, American and threat of Iranian proliferation; however, the tech-
European efforts to pressure Iranian compliance nical barriers to proliferation in the Middle East,
with its NPT safeguard obligations and its ac- particularly in the Arab countries, are high. Iran
ceptance of the regime's Additional Protocol have and North Korea aside, the political barriers in
been "very successful." At the same time, Ira- Northeast Asia and the technical ones in the
nian compliance with these limited demands Middle East should be enough to forestall pro-
would undercut international backing for more liferation in those regions in the short term.
comprehensive nonproliferation objectives in Should the international community fail to check
Iran, such as ending Iran's enrichment program, the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs
which would go beyond the requirements of the in the meantime, however, multiple nuclear pow-
NPT. Nonetheless, even the experience of Iran ers might arise in Northeast Asia and the Middle
could be used to strengthen the regime. The un- East, a development that would greatly destabi-
precedented scope of Iran's exploitation of the lize the two regions and destroy the global non-
NPT exemplifies the flaw in the current interna- proliferation regime.
tional understanding of Article IV; the NPT might
be reinterpreted or adapted to prohibit any de-
DISCUSSION
velopment of a rapid break-out capability under „ A major challenge facing the NPT regime is
the guise of a civilian nuclear energy infrastruc- the fact that the technology transfer provi-
ture. sion of Article IV permits determined cheat-
Despite the problems posed by the hard cases, ers to acquire the wherewithal for a clandes-
Samore argued that the danger of nuclear prolif- tine weapons program while remaining tech-
eration is actually limited, noting that Europe, nically in compliance with the treaty.
Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan „ To address this problem, Article IV should
Africa are not of concern in terms of nuclear de- be reinterpreted to block the transfer of ura-
velopment and that two South Asian states al- nium enrichment and reprocessing technol-
ready have proliferated. This leaves Northeast ogy. Nuclear technology transfers should per-
Asia and the Middle East, which together pose haps be prohibited for states that fail to adopt
some the greatest threats the regime has faced. the Additional Protocol.
Though the technical barriers to proliferation in
Northeast Asia are fairly low - Japan, Taiwan, „ The international community should con-
and South Korea could all develop nuclear arse- sider the creation of a new entity, separate
nals relatively quickly if they decided to do so - from the IAEA, to enforce the safeguards
the political barriers impeding such a decision provisions and ensure that signatory states
remain high. In the Middle East, on the other are in compliance with their NPT obliga-
hand, the political will to proliferate is far greater, tions.
fueled by longstanding concerns about the Israeli

26
 INSTITUTIONAL SPONSORS
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the living, national memorial to Presi-
dent Wilson established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center
establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. It is a nonpartisan
institution, supported by public and private funds, engaged in the study of national and world af-
fairs.
Chairman of the Board of Trustees is the Honorable Joseph B. Gildenhorn, who previously served
as U.S. ambassador to Switzerland (1989-1993). President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson
Center is Lee Hamilton, who served as a member of Congress for 34 years and currently serves as
vice chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
WENDY AND EMERY REVES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
The Wendy and Emery Reves Center for International Studies was established at the College of
William and Mary in 1989 to raise awareness and understanding of international affairs, both on
campus and in the community. The Center promotes the goals of international cooperation and
conflict resolution advocated by Emery Reves through rigorous academic programs, overseas study
opportunities, student-faculty research projects, and a host of special programs designed to address
current issues in international relations and cultural studies.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES
The Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series seeks to explore new ways to employ more
effectively our Nation’s capabilities to meet the range of security challenges we face in the 21st
century.
The Series is a full year of programs and activities that address the critical security issues of our
time. The Eisenhower Series is unique. It significantly broadens beyond traditional audiences that
dialogue on national security; the media, corporate and economic policy representatives, academia
and think tanks, all departments of the U.S. government, non-governmental and international orga-
nizations, the diplomatic community, members of Congress and their staffs, foreign officials and
specialists are all invited and have the opportunity to contribute. Indeed, to ensure diversity of
opinion and balanced inquiry, The Army partners with co-sponsors from each of these sectors in the
conceptualization, planning, and execution of each Eisenhower Series event. This approach is a
more effective means of exploring the complex security situations of our time.
The Series culminates annually with the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference in
Washington, D.C. At the conference, a distinguished array of national security decision makers
assemble for two days to make presentations, participate in panel discussions, and field questions
in a setting which promotes extensive discourse-focused by a single unifying theme.

27
 Eisenhower
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