EN BANC per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].

[ G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 ]

[7]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
GRACE M. GRANDE, PETITIONER, VS. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, RESPONDENT.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied
DECISION
by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 [8] for being pro forma and for
lack of merit.
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24,
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of
2012 Decision[1] and March 5, 2013 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of
CV No. 96406.
sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. [9] In resolving the appeal, the
appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are: Decision reads:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the
time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED
married to someone else.[3] Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
(on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).[4]The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande
Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname
left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
the Register of Births;
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace
of the children.[5]
Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody
of these minor children;
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only
Antonio, ruling that “[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
custody of [respondent Antonio].”[6] Thus, the court a quo decreed the following: children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s] prayer (Emphasis supplied.)
for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court
forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit: In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause over them absent the most compelling of reasons.[10] Since respondent Antonio failed to
the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the
minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said parental custody over their children.
minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
and Jerard Patrick Grande; taken in conjunction with the universally protected “best-interest-of-the-child”
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the clause, compels the use by the children of the surname “ANTONIO.” [11]
parties’ minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande
who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that
until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday
not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his
evening;
acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.[12] Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of
reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the
minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for
constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children. [13]
the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed
minors outside of the country, without the written consent of the other Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
and permission from the court. reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children of the minors’ surname to “Antonio.” When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
without the consent of their mother. petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
interpretation.[16] Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word “may” in the provision readily
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except
surname of his illegitimate father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to
for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights
confer discretion[17] upon the illegitimate children.
shall remain in force.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 [14] which now reads:
are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court
has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,[18] for instance, this Court allowed even
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her
has been expressly recognized by their fatherthrough the record of birth appearing in from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten Republic,[19] this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed,
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
supplied.)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,[20] We gave due deference to the choice of an
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest,
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in thus:
case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or
may use the surname of the father.
illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the such change.
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of
the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court [15] is enough to establish the paternity
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate
custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
unfit. mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court
will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a supplied.)
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,[21] which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered 8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
follows:
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document.
“Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255.” (Emphasis supplied.)
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents: Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,[22] We held:
xxxx
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage,
as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
the Surname of the Father]. issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law
surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.[23] What is more, this Court has the
instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2. constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies [24] when found contrary to statutes
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has and/or the Constitution.[25] Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly
notarized. Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx xxxx

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Births.

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255
xxxx insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname
upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
To conclude, the use of the word “shall” in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of
or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public anillegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
as follows:
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen
“The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names
pursuant to RA 9255.” changed to “Antonio.”[26] However, since these letters were not offered before and
evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court
to rule for or against petitioner.[27] A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of,
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of the children’s choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
Births shall not be changed or deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision [16]
 Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255; Chartered Bank Employees
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of Association v. Ople, No. L-44717, August 28, 1985, 138 SCRA 273; Quijano v. Development Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 26419, October 19, 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia,
which shall read:
No. L-25659, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.
[17]
 Agpalo, Ruben, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 460 (6th ed., 2009); citations omitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the
[18]
 No. L-51201, May 29, 1980, 97 SCRA 858.
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
[19]
 126 Phil. 1 (1967).
[20]
 G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 76, 83-84.
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows: [21]
 Office of Civil Registrar General (OCRG) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004, issued by the
National Statistics Office-Office of the Civil Registrar General. Approved on May 14, 2004, published on
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and May 18, 2004 on the Manila Times, and took effect on June 2, 2004.
[22]
 G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 453.
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace [23]
 Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935); Molina v. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 545 (1918).
Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody [24]
 The Office of the Civil Registrar General exercises quasi-judicial powers under Rule 13, Title 1, of
of these minor children; NSO Administrative Order 1-93, December 18, 1993, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No.
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights[28] at least twice a week, and may 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration:
only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; RULE 13. Posting of the Pending Application. — (1) A notice to the public on the pending application for
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor delayed registration shall be posted in the bulletin board of the city/municipality for a period of not less
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per than ten (10) days. 
(2) If after ten (10) days, no one opposes the registration, the civil registrar shall evaluate the veracity
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
of the statements made in the required documents submitted.
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of (3) If after proper evaluation of all documents presented and investigation of the allegations contained
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname therein, the civil registrar is convinced that the event really occurred within the jurisdiction of the civil
to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis. registry office, and finding out that said event was not registered, he shall register the delayed report
thereof. 
(4) The civil registrar, in all cases of delayed registration of birth, death and marriage, shall conduct an
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, investigation whenever an opposition is filed against its registration by taking the testimonies of the
Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID. parties concerned and witnesses in the form of questions and answers. After investigation, the civil
registrar shall forward his findings and recommendations to the Office of the Civil Registrar-General for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED. (5) The Civil Registrar-General may, after review and proper evaluation, deny or authorize the
registration.
[25]
 Tan v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 166143-47 & 166891, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 352, 370-371.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, [26]
 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur. [27]
 Rule 132, Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Brion, J., on leave.
[28]
 In family law, the right granted by a court to a parent or other relative who is deprived
Mendoza, J., no part.  custody of a child to visit the child on a regular basis. See DICTIONARY OF
LEGAL TERMS 529 (3rd ed.).
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 23-41. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate
Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
[2]
 Id. at 42-43.
[3]
 Id. at 25.
[4]
 Id. at 10, 25, 44-46, 50.
[5]
 Id. at 79.
[6]
 Id. at 30.
[7]
 Id. at 24-25.
[8]
 Id. at 30.
[9]
 Id. at 31.
[10]
 Id. at 36-38.
[11]
 Id. at 38.
[12]
 Id. at 39.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father Amending for the Purpose
Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the “Family Code of the Philippines,”
signed into law on February 24, 2004 and took effect on March 19, 2004 fifteen (15) days after its
publication on Malaya and the Manila Times on March 4, 2004.
[15]
 Rule 132, Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are: 
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authotirty, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or a foreign country; 
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last will and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
 FIRST DIVISION Gonzales, the Office-in-charge of District II-NCR. In said letter, plaintiff was advised that
her previous request to stay put in her house which is located within the area designated
as Area Center, was previously denied per resolution of the NHA which was signed as early
[ G.R. No. 138823, September 17, 2008 ]
as February 21, 1990 by the former manager of the NHA, Monico Jacob. The plaintiff was
CARIDAD MAGKALAS, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT . told to remove the structure she erected on the area within 30 days and to transfer her
residence to Lot 77, Block 2. It was stressed in said letter that no Judicial Order was
DECISION required to remove the plaintiff's structure pursuant to P.D. No. 1472.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Plaintiff prays that, aside from the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
preliminary injunction, defendants be enjoined from transferring plaintiff's residential
petitioner seeks to set aside and annul the Decision [1] dated March 10, 1999 as well as the
house from its present location to another lot and/or demolishing the same without judicial
Order[2] dated May 14, 1999 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
order; payment of moral damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, for the malicious and
Branch 124, in Civil Case No. C-16464. 
illegal acts of defendants; and payment of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The RTC decision dismissed the complaint for damages with prayer for temporary
At this juncture, it may not be remiss to state that the two other homeowners, Mr. & Mrs.
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner against the
Josefino Valenton, and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan had already transferred to their allocated
National Housing Authority (NHA). The RTC also ordered the NHA to proceed with the
lots at Lot 2, Block 1, and Lot 78, Block 2, respectively.
demolition of petitioner's structure.
On March 25, 1994, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
The undisputed facts, as found by the RTC, are quoted hereunder:
defendants. After hearing and submission of memoranda, plaintiff's prayer for issuance of
x x x plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as
a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in an Order dated April 14, 1994.
TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and
Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.
The Order denying plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,
CA-G.R. No. 33833). On May 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division,
Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
promulgated a Decision denying the Petition. Plaintiff's (petitioner herein) motion for
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss Project with the former to take possession,
reconsideration having been denied in a Resolution dated July 29, 1994, she appealed to
contol (sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition.
the Supreme Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Supreme Court,
During the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG
through the First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 5, 1994, denying the Petition.
No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where
An Entry of Judgment on the aforesaid Resolution was made on December 22, 1994.
plaintiff's structure is located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area
Center was determined in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in
Thereafter, pre-trial conference was scheduled on January 9, January 23, February 16,
all types of residential development.
March 22 and finally on April 25, all in 1996 (an Order dated May 16, 1996 was issued
declaring the pre-trial terminated). During the pre-trial, counsel for plaintiff proposed that
Plaintiff, together with Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan,
the case be decided based on the memoranda to be submitted by the parties, to which
through counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff
counsel for defendants agreed. Hence, a Motion for Leave of Court to allow parties to
and the two other spouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. On January 25,
submit memoranda in lieu of trial was filed by the defendants. Plaintiff filed her comment
1985, the NHA, through its General Manager, sent a letter to the counsel of the plaintiff
thereto. After submission of NHA's Reply and plaintiff's rejoinder, reiterating their
and the two other previously named spouses explaining why the area where their
respective stands, the Court resolved to grant the Motion for Leave. In the same Order,
structures were erected was designated as the area center (open space). The said appeal
the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days
was denied by the NHA. In a letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot
from receipt, on the sole issue of whether or not the NHA can lawfully relocate the plaintiff
Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG
and demolish plaintiff's structure. [3]
No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing petitioner's
complaint. Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
In the same Notice, the NHA informed plaintiff that per Development Program of Bagong
trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said
Barrio, she was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132.
decision and order of the RTC.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of
In the instant petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues:
a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEMOLITION OR RELOCATION OF THE
Trial Court of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-12102. The civil case
PETITIONER'S STRUCTURE WILL VIOLATE THE VESTED RIGHTS OF THE
was filed after the NHA, through Henry Camayo, sent a letter to the plaintiff earlier in the
PETITIONER OVER THE ACQUIRED PROPERTY UNDER THE SOCIAL
month of August, 1985 directing said plaintiff to vacate the premises and dismantle her
JUSTICE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
structure. In an Order, dated July 23, 1981, this civil case docketed as C-12102 was
B. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7279 IMPLIEDLY REPEALED P.D. 1472 AND P.D.
dismissed with the instruction that the parties exhaust the administrative remedies
1315.[4]
available to the plaintiff.
As to the first issue, petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the
property subject of this case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty
Sometime in March, 1994, plaintiff received a letter, dated March 8, 1994 from Ines
(40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and the demolition of her house will
infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution. to her of the lot she is occupying. However, the census, tagging, and plaintiff's petition,
did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere expectancy
Petitioner's contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA's authority to order the relocation that the lot will be awarded to her. The expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the
of petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) NHA, through Ms. Ines Gonzales, sent a letter dated March 8, 1994 informing her that her
No. 1315.[5] Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as petition for the award of the lot was denied. Moreover, the NHA, after the conduct of
a blighted area and was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. studies and consultation with residents, had designated Area 1, where the lot petitioned by
No. 1315 included petitioner's property. The NHA, as the decree's designated administrator plaintiff is located, as an Area Center.[8]
for the national government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle exists to
the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements. [6] Section its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency.
2 of P.D. No. 1315 further states: To be vested, a right must have become a title -- legal or equitable -- to the present or
Section 2. The comprehensive development plan shall consider the upgrading of existing future enjoyment of property.[9]
dwelling units, the relocation of qualified squatter families to a resettlement area nearby;
and the re-blocking, re-arrangement and re-alignment of existing dwelling and other Contrary to petitioner's position, the issuance of a tag number in her favor did not grant
structures to allow for the introduction of basic facilities and services, all in accordance her irrefutable rights to the subject property. The "tagging of structures" in the Bagong
with the provision of national SIR [Slum Improvement Resettlement] and Metro Manila ZIP Barrio area was conducted merely to determine the qualified beneficiaries and bona
[Zonal Improvement Program] Programs. The Authority [NHA] shall maximize the land use fide residents within the area. It did not necessarily signify an assurance that the tagged
of the area and shall provide for a controlled, orderly and structured growth of dwellings in structure would be awarded to its occupant as there were locational and physical
an environment provided with adequate sanitary and other physical facilities. (Words in considerations that must be taken into account, as in fact, the area where petitioner's
bracket ours) property was located had been classified as Area Center (open space). The assignment of
Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1315, the NHA identified Area 1 where petitioner's a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and could not have ripened into a
property was located as part of the Area Center reserved for open space, after studies vested right in favor of petitioner. Her possession and occupancy of the said property could
have shown that the development of the area will affect only three (3) structures not be characterized as fixed and absolute. As such, petitioner cannot claim that she was
compared to six (6) or more structures in the other areas. A stage and recreation center deprived of her vested right when the NHA ordered her relocation to another area.
was expected to be constructed at the Area Center. As a result, petitioner was informed by
the NHA that she would be relocated to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132. However, Petitioner invokes the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution, asserting that a poor and
petitioner adamantly refused to vacate the property claiming she had acquired a vested unlettered urban dweller like her has a right to her property and to a decent living. Thus,
right over the same. Her refusal to vacate and relocate to her assigned lot had hampered her relocation and the demolition of her house would be violative of her right embodied
the development of the entire area. It should be noted that to date, only petitioner had under Article XIII of the Constitution, to wit:
refused to comply with the NHA directive as the other occupants in Area 1 had already Sec. 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
vacated the premises. the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make
available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
To stress, P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate
possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the
demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of State shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Underscoring supplied)
petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in case of her refusal as this is the only way
through which the NHA can effectively carry out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315. Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
The NHA's authority to demolish squatters and illegal occupants was further reinforced by (Underscoring supplied)
P.D. No. 1472[7] which specifically provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The National Housing Authority shall have the power to summarily eject, No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate
without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters' colonies on government consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.
resettlement projects, as well as any illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or Petitioner cannot find solace in the aforequoted Constitutional provisions. Social Justice, as
dwelling unit owned or administered by it. In the exercise of such power, the National the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose
Housing Authority shall have the right and authority to request the help of the Barangay P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
Chairman and any peace officer in the locality. xxx.(Emphasis ours) interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
Inasmuch as petitioner's property was located in the area identified as an open space by equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
the NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the State of promoting
in accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
judicial order. the greatest number."[10]

Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right Moreover, jurisprudence stresses the need to dispense justice with an even hand in every
over the subject property when the NHA recognized her as the censused owner by case:
assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-0063). We quote with approval the trial court's This Court has stressed more than once that social justice - or any justice for that matter -
pertinent findings on the matter: is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It
Plaintiff's structure was one of those found existing during the census/survey of the area, is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of
and her structure was assigned TAG No. 77-0063. While it is true that NHA recognizes the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But
plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure built on the lot, the issuance of the tag never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to
number is not a guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had petitioned the NHA for the award
reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.[11] (Underscoring supplied) favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws
Hence, there is a need to weigh and balance the rights and welfare of both contending existing on the subject. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed
parties in every case in accordance with the applicable law, regardless of their situation in unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The failure to add a specific
life. repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. [13]
In the instant case, the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her structure were in Likewise, in another case, it was held:
accordance with the mandate of P.D. No. 1315 which was enacted primarily to address the Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts
housing problems of the country and to adopt an effective strategy for dealing with slums, must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
squatter areas and other blighted communities in urban areas. Significantly, the "whereas incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
clause" of P.D. No. 1315 states: repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines mandates that the "State shall establish, leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field of housing, to guarantee the into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament
enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living" and directs that "The State shall is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject
promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all the people" xxx. and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
For sure, the NHA's order of relocating petitioner to her assigned lot and demolishing her implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
property on account of her refusal to vacate was consistent with the law's fundamental laws on the subject.[14]
objective of promoting social justice in the manner the will inure to the common good. The We find, as the trial court has found, no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between
petitioner cannot disregard the lawful action of the NHA which was merely implementing Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be read
P.D. No. 1315. It is also worth noting that petitioner's continued refusal to leave the together and harmonized to give effect to their provisions. It should be stressed that
subject property has hindered the development of the entire area. Indeed, petitioner Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and
cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the common welfare. demolition without a judicial order as in fact it provides for exceptions. Pursuant to
established doctrine, the three (3) statutes should be construed in light of the objective to
Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 were be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the said laws, and they should be
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
Housing Act of 1992.[12] She contends that while P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 benefits intended.[15] It is worthy to note that the three laws (P.D. No. 1315, P.D. No. 1472
authorized the NHA to eject without the necessity of a judicial order all squatter colonies in and R.A. No. 7279) have a common objective ─ to address the housing problems of the
government resettlement projects, R.A. No. 7279 discouraged such eviction and demolition country by establishing a comprehensive urban development and housing program for the
without a court order. According to petitioner, R.A. No. 7279, being the later law, impliedly homeless. For this reason, the need to harmonize these laws all the more becomes
repealed the former laws, i.e. P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472, following the legal axiom imperative. Hence, in construing the three laws together, we arrive at a conclusion that
that when a later law is passed with provisions contrary to the former law, an implied demolition and eviction may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in certain
repeal of the former law takes effect. In particular, petitioner cites Section 28 of R.A. No. instances, to wit:
7279 which provides: (1) when the property involved is an expropriated property in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition - Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315,
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following (2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any
situations: homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, P.D. No. 1472,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and (3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
playgrounds; riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279;
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. (4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
Petitioner asserts that the afore-quoted provision of R.A. No. 7279 is inconsistent with pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472, which state as follows:
Sec. 1 (P.D. No. 1315) - xxx. The National Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as the It readily appears that R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the NHA's authority to dismantle
"Authority" is designated administrator for the national government and is authorized to the house of petitioner. Besides, under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279, demolition may be
immediately take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with carried out when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
the power of demolition of their improvements. xxx. implemented. Under P.D. No. 1315, the government has set aside the amount of P40
million for the establishment and upgrading of housing facilities and services in Bagong
Sec. 2 (P.D. No. 1472) - The National Housing Authority shall have the power to Barrio.[16] Thus, on the ground of a much-delayed government infrastructure project about
summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters' colonies on to be implemented, the NHA has the authority to carry out the summary eviction and
government resettlement projects, as well as any illegal occupants in any homelot, demolition of petitioner's structure on the subject lot.
apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by it. xxx.
From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions, we hold that R.A. No. 7279 does not WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the
necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does not contain any provision Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. C-16464 is hereby AFFIRMED.
which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No.
1472. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of statutory SO ORDERED.
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. The rationale behind the rule is
explained as follows:
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Corona, Carpio Morales*, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. even date, petitioner filed the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction
on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the

“civil action” for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379,
EN BANC maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided
under Sec. 2[9] of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil
[ G.R. NO. 165835, June 22, 2005 ]
actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND
against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,[10] as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos.
14[11] and 14-A.[12]
DECISION
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it, was
intended principally as a criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions,
TINGA, J.: petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquino’s issuances after the EDSA Revolution,
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent and cronies,  (2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution[1] dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President
Attachment[2] dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing
and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A.
enforcement of the assailed issuances. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and action.
Prosecution Officer II of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman,
after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with public respondent Office of Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has been
the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. granted jurisdiction only over the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
6713,[3] violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions were for recovery of
(3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law.  Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages
R.A. No. 1379,[4] Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in  relation  to Sec. 11 of or indemnification for consequential damages or other civil actions under the Civil Code or
R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case other existing laws.  According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606
and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.[5]  Petitioner’s wife Clarita over separate civil actions other than those filed against President Marcos, his family and
Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all cronies.[13]  Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action
surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired
they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, property under R.A. No. 1379.
accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through public fatally defective for failing to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2,
respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with R.A. No. 1379, [14] namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation conducted
Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary by the prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that
Attachment[6] against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been violation of the said law and that
unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended.  The petition respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. the Republic of the Philippines.[15]  He argues that only informations for perjury were filed
Carlos F. Garcia, et al.”  It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting and there has been no information filed against him for violation of R.A. No. 1379. 
an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined that Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to certify
a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been
hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his committed and that he is guilty thereof.  The petition is also supposedly bereft of the
incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and required certification which should be made by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other (now Prosecutor) to the Solicitor General.  Furthermore, he opines that it should have
lawful income, if any.[7] been the Office of the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the Office of the
Ombudsman as in this case.  The petition being fatally defective, the same should have
Acting on the Republic’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
Sandiganbayan issued the questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for.  The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued on 2 November In their Comment,[16] respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues raised by
2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic.  On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as petitioner are not novel as these have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan[17] which
respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack categorically ruled that “there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos.
of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379.  On 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.”[18]  Respondents argue that under the
Constitution[19] and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.  The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner’s allegation that the petition for
Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on forfeiture filed against him failed to comply with the procedural and formal requirements
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus: under the law.  It asserts that all the requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly
Sec. 4.  Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all complied with.  An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was conducted by a
cases involving: Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman.  The participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is actually no longer required
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and since the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II prosecute the case as discussed above.[30]
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the present Petition should be
at the time of the commission of the offense: dismissed for blatant forum-shopping.  Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and Position Sandiganbayan on the ground of the Sandiganbayan’s alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: the instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though the Motion to Dismiss in
…. Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending resolution.  Worse, it appears that the Motion to
Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004.
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply[31] and enunciates that the Sandiganbayan’s
…. criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed without subsequent
aforestated law, the petition for forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction.  His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is
Sandiganbayan. a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, the clear intent of which is to
separate the prima facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the litigation of the
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner’s argument that the petition for civil action.  This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants
forfeiture is “civil” in nature and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation being done by the
civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor
encompasses all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these General.
cases are civil or criminal in nature.  The petition for forfeiture should not be confused with
the cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as Petitioner also points out in his Reply[32] to the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman,
these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in that the use of the phrase “violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379” in P.D. No. 1606, as
particular Sec. 4.c thereof.[20]  Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or penal in nature
exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President because the concept of “violation” of certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of
Marcos, his family, and cronies.  It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition for imposition of penalties for such violation.  Hence, when reference was made to “violations
forfeiture as a “civil case,” since it has been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379,” the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is
criminal or penal and that it is only the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby  highlighting respondent
nature.[21] Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction over the “civil case” for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth. 
Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime carries with it the
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,[22] likewise relying on Republic v. corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action
Sandiganbayan to argue that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for for enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court having
forfeiture filed against petitioner.  The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action. 
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379  did not change even under However, petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the
the amendments of ancillary civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action.  Rather, the petition for
forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. 
R.A. No. 7975[23] and R.A. No. 8294[24], although it came to be limited to cases involving Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent civil actions
high-ranking public officials as enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:
colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner belongs.
[25]
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action
and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings against simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution [26] and R.A. No. Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
6770.[27]  The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
which appears to be “illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient” covers the unlawful acquisition recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed
of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379.  Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
[28]
 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.  This authority of the Ombudsman has been transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan.[29]
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
action shall be deemed abandoned. rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-shopping. prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over (2)        Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under
petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary
the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of
whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5)
All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
The petition is patently without merit.  It should be dismissed. Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.[45]

The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan[33] squarely rules on the issues raised In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the
by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s argument—that the Sandiganbayan has no
Office of the Ombudsman.  After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it being “civil” in nature and the Sandiganbayan
and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions—collapses completely.
by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379.  Originally, it
was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v.
then Court of First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee Sandiganbayan, thus:  “[T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem 
resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379.  Upon the creation of the and,  therefore,  civil in nature.”[46]  Then, Almeda, Sr. v. Perez,[47] followed, holding that
Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486,[34] original and exclusive jurisdiction over such the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
violations was vested in the said court.[35]  P.D. No. 1606[36] was later issued expressly merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally  acquired  in  favor of the State.  It noted
repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by that the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil
removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the action.[48]
exclusive jurisdiction of said court.[37]  Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of
the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property
instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil partakes the nature of a penalty.  In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,[49] the Court cited voluminous
Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379. [38] authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal or penal nature of forfeiture
proceedings, viz:
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[39] abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in
the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace consequence of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article.
all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty.  Since this change resulted in the A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention
proliferation of the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is
punishable by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense
cases not being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer
1860[40] and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.[41] the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)

On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, deduced that "In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a
jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan. definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or
[42]
  It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No. 7975[43] and R.A. No. 8249[44] since refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed
both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that
the Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379. ….

Under R.A. No.  8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in "Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine
all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res
occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of
the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature of
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if
including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department property appears, are so far considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the
heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612)
diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine ….
 R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the
“Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.[60]  An implied repeal is one which takes place when
proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal
causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. those of a former law.[61]  As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.  Before such repeal is
and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of . . . that portion of deemed to exist, it must be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former.  The language
case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been
against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the formerly enacted.  An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.  What
forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368) [50] is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. [62]

Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr.  v. Perez.[51]  The Court P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that “[A]ny provision of law,
in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed
of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of respondents, or modified accordingly.” [63]  This is not an express repealing clause because it fails to
particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination. [52]  This  was  reaffirmed  identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause
and  reiterated  in Republic v. Agoncillo[53] and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.[54] which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found in existing and prior laws.[64]
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled
“An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over the
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings forfeiture proceeding and the authority to file the petition for forfeiture.  As P.D. No. 1486
Therefor.”    What acts would constitute a violation of such a law?  A reading of R.A. No. grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which Prosecutor, the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise
would necessitate the imposition of a penalty.  Instead, it provides the procedure for concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such cases.  Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2,
forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired during his R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with each other and the former should be deemed to have
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public repealed the latter.
officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property.[55]  Section 12[56] of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 1487 [65] creating
public officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it the Office of the Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed.  The
does not penalize the officer or employee for making the unlawful acquisition.  In effect, as Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties the Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being vested
unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee. [57] in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.

It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486. 
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the Issued on the same date was P.D. No. 1607[66] which amended the powers of the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty.  The soundness of this Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints [67] and created the Office of the Chief
reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such Special Prosecutor.[68]  P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor
forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
was committed during the respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said
his office.  This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an cases.[69]  P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to
anti-graft court—to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service. [58] file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.[70]

Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.  From this it may
Marcos, his family and cronies. fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law,
not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the
We come then to the question of authority of        the  Office  of  the Ombudsman  to  repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides
investigate,  file   and otherwise.[71]  Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but
prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.  This was the main issue resolved not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[59] Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation
therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate Special Prosecutor.[72]
forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance.  P.D. No. Decree No. 1486
was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. The Tanodbayan’s authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 1630 [73] issued on 18 July
No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings.  Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special 1990.  Among other things, the Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct
Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases.  This may be taken as an preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations
implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases. [74]  The power to conduct
and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and
administrative cases before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative the complaint or initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court,
agency against any public personnel who has acted in a manner warranting criminal and as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed
disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor to in the same case where the forum-shopping is found.[86]
the Tanodbayan.[75]
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.  The present
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861 [76] which granted the petition was filed accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum
Tanodbayan the same authority. The present Constitution was subsequently ratified and Shopping[87] in which petitioner made the following representation:
then the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman ….
created under the Constitution.[77]  The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created
under R.A. No. 6770.[78] 3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the same
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. issues as that in the above-captioned case.
13, Art. XI of the Constitution, include the authority, among others, to:
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has primary jurisdiction over cases 5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been commenced or is pending
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within five (5) days from knowledge
such cases;[79] thereof.

… However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss[88] in
relation to the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan.  The existence of this
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by respondent Office of the
unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties Ombudsman in its Comment.  A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner
involved therein.[80] raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the
instant petition.  In fact, the Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioner’s
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture
1379.  However, the Ombudsman’s exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. 
initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of
only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No.
February 1986.[81]  As regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date,  the 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29
Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such forfeiture October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless,
action—since the authority to file forfeiture proceedings  on or before 25 February 1986 these differences are only superficial.  Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same
belongs to the Solicitor General—although he has the authority to investigate such cases intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. 
for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsman’s It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking.  This is incontestably
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.[82] forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned. [90]  The
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its authority brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
in conducting the investigation of petitioner’s illegally acquired assets and in filing the the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. 
petition for forfeiture against him.  The contention that the procedural requirements under Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 were not complied with no longer deserve consideration in view of the petition at hand.
the foregoing discussion.
Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be reminded that
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.  Forum-shopping is manifest his primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.  As an officer of the
whenever a party “repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, court, his duties to the court are more significant and important than his obligations to his
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the clients.  Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either contravenes his oath of office.[91]  Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must,
pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court.” [83]  It has also been the tenets of the legal profession and the mission of our courts of justice.  For this, he
defined as “an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one should be penalized.  Penalties imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by range from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law. [92]  In the instant case,
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be sufficient to make
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.
would make a favorable disposition.”[84]  Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects
the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De
financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial Jesus is DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
processes.[85]  Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from the finality of this Decision.   Costs
against petitioner. jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”

The 1973 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 5, provided for the creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and
SO ORDERED. defined the jurisdiction thereof.  It states: “The National Assembly shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
Davide, Jr.,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval- corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., “….c. Civil and Criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
[20]

Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. in 1986.”

Rollo, p. 1493, citing Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, 5 SCRA 970 (1962); Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 (1962); Republic v.
[21]

Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579 (1971); and Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

Approved by Associate Justices Greory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Fourth Division. 
[1]
[22]
Id. at 564-584.
Rollo, pp. 35-39.
An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose
[23]
[2]
Id. at 41-42. Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended; 30 March 1995.
[3]
Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; 20 February 1989. An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No.
[24]

1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes; 5 February 1997.
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public
[4]

Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor; 18 June 1955. [25]
Id. at 572-573.

Based on the same Complaint, Case No. OMB-P-A-04-093501 for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
[5]
[26]
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. (1).
to the Best Interest of the Service was also filed against petitioner.  Petitioner further avers that on 21 October 2004,
Atty. Roxas filed another complaint against him with the same respondent Office of the Ombudsman, charging [27]
The Ombudsman Act of 1989; 17 November 1989.
dishonesty, conduct unbecoming of a public officer under E.O. No. 292, perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code
and violation of R.A. No. 3019.  Based on this complaint, Case No. OMB-P-C-04-1230-J for Violation of Art. 183 of the “Sec. 15.  Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
[28]

Revised Penal Code and Violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed against petitioner, his wife, and three sons.  Case No. OMB- and duties: …(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
P-A-04-1030-J was filed against petitioner alone for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Public wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.”
Officer under E.O. 292.  In addition, four Informations for perjury were also filed with public respondent Sandiganbayan
against petitioner.  Rollo, pp. 9-12. [29]
Rollo, pp. 573-577.
[6]
Id. at 59-87. [30]
Id. at 577-579.
[7]
Id. at 61. [31]
Id. at 1470 to 1480.

Id. at 915-938. At the time of filing of respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s Comment on 7 December 2004, the
[8]
[32]
Id. at 1511-1518.
Motion to Dismiss was still pending.  Id. at 581.  At the time of the promulgation of this decision, it could not be
determined from the records if the Motion to Dismiss had already been resolved. [33]
Supra note 17.

Sec. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
[9]
[34]
Creating a Special Court to be Known as “Sandiganbayan” and for Other Purposes; 11 June 1978.
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been Id., Sec. 4, which reads:
[35]

unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall “SECTION 4.    Jurisdiction.—Except as herein provided, the Sandiganbayan shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General to try and decide:
that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt  Practices Act and
Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ Republic Act No. 1379;
commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be
declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election (b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
or within three months before any special election. corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

…. (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations in relation to their office; Provided, that, in case private individuals are accused as principals,
Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to be Known As “Sandiganbayan” and For Other
[10]
accomplices or accessories in the commission of the crimes hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried jointly with the
Purposes; 10 December 1978. public officers or employees concerned.

Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs.
[11]
Where the accused is charged of an offense in relation to his office and the evidence is insufficient to establish the
Imelda R. Marcos, Members of the Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, offense so charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense included in that which is charged.
Dummies, Agents and Nominees; 7 May 1986.
(d) Civil suits brought in connection with the aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of
[12]
Amending Executive Order No. 14; 18 August 1986. the instruments and effects of the crimes, or forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379;
[13]
Rollo, pp. 13-27. (e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code.
[14]
See note 9. Exception from the foregoing provisions during the period of material law are criminal cases against officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all others who fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military
[15]
Rollo, p. 29. tribunals.”
[36]
See note 10.
[16]
Dated 24 January 2005.  Rollo, pp. 1483-1498.
Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
[37]
[17]
G.R. No. 90529, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 667. “SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
[18]
Rollo, p. 1489, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 676. (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
Republic Act No. 1379;
[19]
Art. XI, Sec. 4: “The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and SECTION 1.     Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4.  Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. "(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher (1)  Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
regular courts.
(2)   Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00:
officers and employees. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
"(b)        Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted (1)   On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be
recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil (2)   By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
action had theretofore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with
the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules the Supreme Court has
regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the promulgated and may hereinafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Intermediate Appellate
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the Court shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall represent the People of the Philippines.
jurisdiction.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
armed forces in the active service. said public officers and employees.
[38]
Id. See also Republic v. Sandiganabayan, supra note 17 at 675.
"Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980; 14 August 1981.  Sec. 20 thereof provides: “Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal
[39]
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.” such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to the
[40]
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes; 14 January 1983.  Sec. 1 thereof reads: Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case maybe, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal
“SECTION 1.    Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows: action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be considered abandoned."
[42]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 674-676.
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
[43]
See note 23.
"(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
Republic Act No. 1379; [44]
See note 24.

"(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled [45]
R.A. No. 8249, Sec. 4.
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
[46]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 681.
"(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. 116 Phil. 120 (1962), cited in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., G.R. No. 152154, 18 November
[47]

2003, 416 SCRA 133, 142.

"The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher
than prision correccional or its equivalent. In all other offenses, original and exclusive jurisdiction shall vest in the [48]
Ibid.
appropriate court in accordance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
[49]
116 Phil. 1361 (1962).
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories together with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with [50]
Id. at 1366-1367.
said public officers and employees.
[51]
See note 47.
"Where an accused is tried of any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged,
he may nevertheless be convicted of and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged. [52]
Id. at 1369.

"Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding [53]
148-B Phil. 366 (1971).
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court. The filing of the [54]
G.R. No. 19328, 22 December 1989, 180 SCRA 540.
criminal action shall be deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; PROVIDED, however, That, in cases within the [55]
See Sec. 2, R.A. 1379, supra note 9.
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had been filed separately with a regular court
but judgment therein has not been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil “SECTION 12. Penalties.—Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or
[56]

action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, convey any unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a
otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine.  The same repression shall be imposed upon
notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction." any person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.”
[41]
Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes; 23 March 1983.  Section 1 thereof states: [57]
Supra note 47 at 126.
 Tanodbayan.
See 1973 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 5, supra note 19.  See also Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 197 Phil. 407, 420-421
[58]

(1982). P.D. No. 1630, Sec. 17:  “Sec. 17. Investigation and Prosecution of Cases. –The Office of the Tanodbayan shall have
[74]

the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file
[59]
Supra note 17. information therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases. The Tanodbayan may utilize the personnel of
his office and/or with the approval of the President, designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
[60]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 683. government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist him in the investigation and prosecution of said
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control….
School District No. 45 v. Board of Country Comira, 141 Kan. 108, cited in R. Martin, Statutory Construction (1979)
[61]

171. “Sec. 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
[75]

official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he
[62]
Villegas v. Subido, 148-B Phil. 668, 675-676 (1971). shall conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.”
[63]
P.D. No. 1486, Sec. 16.
[76]
See notes 38 and 39.
[64]
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assoc., Inc. v. Feliciano, 121 Phil. 358 (1965).
[77]
Art. XI, Sec. 7.
[65]
Creating The Office Of The Ombudsman, To Be Known As Tanodbayan.
[78]
17 November 1989.
[66]
Revising Presidential Decree No. 1487 Creating The Office Of The Ombudsman, To Be Known As Tanodbayan.
[79]
R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 15(1).
[67]
“Sec. 10. Powers. –The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:
[80]
Id., Sec. 15 (11).
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether
amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government-owned or controlled [81]
Id.
corporation;
[82]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 682-683.
(b) He shall prescribe the methods by which complaints are to be made, received, and acted upon; he may determine
the scope and manner of investigations to be made; and, subject to the requirements of this Decree, he may determine [83]
Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 155, 167 (1997).
the form, frequency, and distribution of his conclusions and recommendations;
[84]
Sto. Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 355 Phil. 804, 813 (1998).
(c) He may request and shall be given by each administrative agency the assistance and information he deems necessary
to the discharge of his responsibilities; he may examine the records and documents of all administrative agencies; and [85]
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 566, 584 (1999).
he may enter and inspect premises within any administrative agency's control, provided, however, that where the
President in writing certifies that such information, examination or inspection might prejudice the national interest, the Rule 7, Sec. 5, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. v. Paxton
[86]

Tanodbayan shall desist. All information so obtained shall be confidential, unless the President, in the interest of public Development Corporation, G.R. No. 151081, 11 September 2003, 410 SCRA 604, 620-621.
service, decides otherwise;
[87]
Rollo, p. 32.
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn to testimony, or produce documentary or
other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry; [88]
See note 8.

(e) He may undertake, participate in, cooperate with general studies or inquiries, whether or not related to any particular [89]
Rollo, pp. 13- 28.
administrative agency or any particular administrative act; if he believes that they may enhance knowledge about or lead
to improvements in the functioning of administrative agencies.” [90]
Gatmaytan v. CA, supra note 83.

“Sec. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. –There is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of
[68] [91]
Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, supra note 86 at 621.
the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9)
Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and who shall be appointed by Benguet Electrical Cooperative, Inc., v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. No. 93924, 23 January 1991, 193
[92]

the President; …. SCRA 250; Vda. de Tolentino v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 61756, 19 April 1989, 171 SCRA 555; E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine
Ports Authority, G.R. No. 75197, 31 July 1986 [unreported Resolution].
The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations thereof
and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein; ….

The Chief Special Prosecutor, Assistant State Prosecutor, Special Prosecutor and those designated to assist them as
herein provided for shall be under the control and supervision of the Tanodbayan and their resolutions and actions shall
not be subject to review by any administrative agency.”

….

Sec. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he
shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper
administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Sandiganbayan shall make the appropriate recommendations to
the administrative agency concerned.”

[69]
Id.

[70]
Id. On the premise that a forfeiture proceeding under R.A. No. 1379 is a civil action in rem.

[71]
United States v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5, 10-11 (1917), cited in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 683-684.

[72]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17 at 684.

[73]
Further Revising Presidential Decree No. 1487, As Revised By Presidential Decree No. 1607, Creating The Office Of The
 SECOND DIVISION P42,025.00          for actual damages;

[ G.R. No. 110398, November 07, 1997 ] P152,654.55        as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity of his wife;
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO AND VIRGINIA DE LA P90,000.00          as compensatory damages for wrongful death of three (3) victims;
VICTORIA, RESPONDENTS. 
DECISION P300,000.00        as moral damages;
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari  of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming P50,000.00          as exemplary damages, all in the total amount of P634,679.55; and
with modification the Regional Trial Court’s award of damages to private respondents for
the death of relatives as a result of the sinking of petitioner’s vessel. P40,000.00          as attorney’s fees.

In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros To Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his
wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. P12,000.00          for actual damages;
The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m.
on April 22, 1980. P158,899.00        as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;

The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. P30,000.00          as compensatory damages for wrongful death;

At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait P100,000.00        as moral damages;
in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a P20,000.00          as exemplary damages, all in the total amount of P320,899.00; and
result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The
bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of P15,000.00          as attorney’s fees.
private respondents’ families were never found. On appeal, the Court of Appeals[1] affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court with
modification –
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company 1. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff-
(PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of P23,075.00 as actual damages instead of
for the death of Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. P42,025.00;
Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la Victoria, 26.
2. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff-
In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of P150,000.00, instead of P90,000.00, as
74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger compensatory damages for the death of his wife and two children;
manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and
sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a 3. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-
result of the collision, some of the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, appellees Dela Victoria spouses the amount of P50,000.00, instead of P30,000.00, as
however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel compensatory damages for the death of their daughter Elfreda Dela Victoria;
as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred
that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the Hence this petition, raising the following issues:
collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
(1) whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a Don Juan;
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the (2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,[2] finding the crew members of
PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
the trial court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did
not join in the agreement. (3) whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and

After trial, the court rendered judgment on February 21, 1991, the dispositive portion of (4) whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
which reads as follows: unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don
as follows: Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he
purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the
To Ramon Miranda: Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving
Manila on April 22, 1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) on
which the numbers of the tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court
Elfreda de la Victoria appear. found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning
Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not necessarily mean that the of the ship.
alleged victims actually took the trip. Petitioner asserts that it is common knowledge that
passengers purchase tickets in advance but do not actually use them. Hence, private Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating the playing of
respondent should also prove the presence of the victims on the ship. The witnesses who mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship and failing
affirmed that the victims were on the ship were biased and unreliable. to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to 15
minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City.
This contention is without merit. Private respondent Ramon Miranda testified that he
personally took his family and his niece to the vessel on the day of the voyage and stayed In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The Certificate of
with them on the ship until it was time for it to leave. There is no reason he should claim Inspection, dated August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine Coast Guard Commander at
members of his family to have perished in the accident just to maintain an action. People Iloilo City stated that the total number of persons allowed on the ship was 864, of whom
do not normally lie about so grave a matter as the loss of dear ones. It would be more 810 are passengers, but there were actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it sank, 140
difficult for private respondents to keep the existence of their relatives if indeed they are persons more than the maximum number that could be safely carried by it.
alive than it is for petitioner to show the contrary. Petitioner’s only proof is that the bodies
of the supposed victims were not among those recovered from the site of the mishap. But Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan, as the faster
so were the bodies of the other passengers reported missing not recovered, as this Court and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this
noted in the Mecenas[3] case. Court held that even if the Tacloban City had been at fault for failing to observe an
internationally-recognized rule of navigation, the Don Juan was guilty of contributory
Private respondent Miranda’s testimony was corroborated by Edgardo Ramirez. Ramirez negligence. Through Justice Feliciano, this Court held:
was a seminarian and one of the survivors of the collision. He testified that he saw Mrs. The grossness of the negligence of the “Don Juan” is underscored when one considers the
Miranda and Elfreda de la Victoria on the ship and that he talked with them. He knew Mrs. foregoing circumstances in the context of the following facts: Firstly, the “Don Juan” was
Miranda who was his teacher in the grade school. He also knew Elfreda who was his more than twice as fast as the “Tacloban City.” The “Don Juan’s” top speed was 17 knots;
childhood friend and townmate. Ramirez said he was with Mrs. Miranda and her children while that of the “Tacloban City” was 6.3. knots. Secondly, the “Don Juan” carried the full
and niece from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. when the collision happened and that he in fact complement of officers and crew members specified for a passenger vessel of her class.
had dinner with them. Ramirez said he and Elfreda stayed on the deck after dinner and it Thirdly, the “Don Juan” was equipped with radar which was functioning that night.
was there where they were jolted by the collision of the two vessels. Recounting the Fourthly, the “Don Juan’s” officer on-watch had sighted the “Tacloban City” on his radar
moments after the collision, Ramirez testified that Elfreda ran to fetch Mrs. Miranda. He screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of radar
escorted her to the room and then tried to go back to the deck when the lights went out. contact was established by the “Don Juan” while the “Tacloban City” was still 2.7 miles
He tried to return to the cabin but was not able to do so because it was dark and there away. In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the “Don Juan,”
was a stampede of passengers from the deck. had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the
collision with the “Tacloban City.” Indeed, the “Don Juan” might well have avoided the
Petitioner casts doubt on Ramirez’ testimony, claiming that Ramirez could not have talked collision even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.
with the victims for about three hours and not run out of stories to tell, unless Ramirez
had a “storehouse” of stories. But what is incredible about acquaintances thrown together It is true that the “Tacloban City” failed to follow Rule 18 of the International Rules of the
on a long journey staying together for hours on end, in idle conversation precisely to while Road which requires two (2) power-driven vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each
the hours away? to alter her course to starboard (right) so that each vessel may pass on the port side (left)
of the other. The “Tacloban City,” when the two (2) vessels were only three-tenths (0.3) of
Petitioner also points out that it took Ramirez three (3) days before he finally contacted a mile apart, turned (for the second time) 15o to port side while the “Don Juan” veered
private respondent Ramon Miranda to tell him about the fate of his family. But it is not hard to starboard. . . . [But] “route observance” of the International Rules of the Road will
improbable that it took Ramirez three days before calling on private respondent Miranda to not relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper
tell him about the last hours of Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece, in view of the care and skill on her part or even by a departure from the rules.
confusion in the days following the collision as rescue teams and relatives searched for
survivors. In the petition at bar, the “Don Juan” having sighted the “Tacloban City” when it was still a
long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action and in allowing the two
Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is improper for petitioner to even suggest that (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render the collision inevitable when there
private respondents’ relatives did not board the ill-fated vessel and perish in the accident was no necessity for passing so near to the “Tacloban City” as to create that hazard or
simply because their bodies were not recovered. inevitability, for the “Don Juan” could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that the
“Tacloban City,” upon turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signalled
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the its intention to do so by giving two (2) short blasts with its horn. The “Don Juan” gave no
extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and answering horn blast to signal its own intention and proceeded to turn hard to starboard.
the appellate court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[4] which case was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held liable for
it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the gross negligence in connection with the collision of the “Don Juan” and “Tacloban City” and
crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found the sinking of the “Don Juan” leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. . . . [5]
that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although
collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are
different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the
case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to
or, in short, on the record of this case. maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than
it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to the extent.
merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of
its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there can only be one Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private
truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because
Pyrenees, falsehood on the other! in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the
Mecenas couple. Under petitioner’s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14,
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in while the De la Victoria spouses should receive P97,714.28.
jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere”
(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly personal circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare even if private respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case. The
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. [6] In Woulfe v. Associated doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case.
Realties Corporation,[7] the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon
similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles declared in by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of
prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex the question presently presented.[16] The decision in the Mecenas case relates to damages
rel. Tollinger v. Gill,[8] it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final for which petitioner was liable to the claimants in that case.
even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the
judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this In the case at bar, the award of P300,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable considering
wise: “Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in the grief petitioner Ramon Miranda suffered as a result of the loss of his entire family. As a
one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, matter of fact, three months after the collision, he developed a heart condition
even though the parties may be different.”[9] Thus, in J. M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this undoubtedly caused by the strain of the loss of his family. The P100,000.00 given to Mr.
Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity and Mrs. de la Victoria is likewise reasonable and should be affirmed.
of a land title on the principle of “stare decisis et non quieta movere.”
As for the amount of civil indemnity awarded to private respondents, the appellate court’s
Indeed, the evidence presented in this case was the same as those presented in the award of P50,000.00 per victim should be sustained. The amount of P30,000.00 formerly
Mecenas case, to wit: set in De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co.,[17] Heirs of Amparo delos Santos v. Court of
Document Mecenas case This case Appeals,[18] and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court [19] as
Decision of CommandantPhil. Coast benchmark was subsequently increased to P50,000.00 in the case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v.
Guard in BMI Case No. 415-80 dated Exh. 10[10]  Exh. 11-B-NN/X Court of Appeals,[20] which involved the sinking of another interisland ship on October 24,
3/26/81 1988.
Decision of the Minister of National
Exh. 11[11] Exh. ZZ We now turn to the determination of the earning capacity of the victims. With respect to
Defense dated 3/12/82
Ardita Miranda, the trial court awarded damages computed as follows: [21]
Resolution on the motion for In the case of victim Ardita V. Miranda whose age at the time of the accident was 48
reconsideration of the decision of the years, her life expectancy was computed to be 21.33 years, and therefore, she could have
Minister of National Defense dated Exh. AAA (private lived up to almost 70 years old. Her gross earnings for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00
Exh. 13[12]
7/24/84 respondents) per annum, would be P218,077.92. Deducting therefrom 30% as her living expenses, her
net earnings would be P152,654.55, to which plaintiff Ramon Miranda is entitled to
Certificate of inspection dated 8/27/79 Exh. 1-A[13] Exh. 19-NN compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of his wife. In considering 30% as
Certificate of Stability dated 12/16/76 Exh. 6-A[14] Exh. 19-D-NN the living expenses of Ardita Miranda, the Court takes into account the fact that plaintiff
and his wife were supporting their daughter and son who were both college students
taking Medicine and Law respectively.
Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on the Mecenas case. The trial
In accordance with the ruling in Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [22] we think the
court made its own independent findings on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses, such
life expectancy of Ardita Miranda was correctly determined to be 21.33 years, or up to age
as Senior Third Mate Rogelio de Vera, who incidentally gave substantially the same
69. Petitioner contends, however, that Mrs. Miranda would have retired from her job as a
testimony on petitioner’s behalf before the Board of Marine Inquiry. The trial court agreed
public school teacher at 65, hence her loss of earning capacity should be reckoned up to
with the conclusions of the then Minister of National Defense finding both vessels to be
17.33 years only.
negligent.
The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the
age of the deceased). It may be that in the Philippines the age of retirement generally is
total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in
65 but, in calculating the life expectancy of individuals for the purpose of determining loss
our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers
of earning capacity under Art. 2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased
notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be
would have earned income even after retirement from a particular job. In this case, the
attributed to the shipowner.[15]
trial court took into account the fact that Mrs. Miranda had a master’s degree and a good
prospect of becoming principal of the school in which she was teaching. There was reason
to believe that her income would have increased through the years and she could still earn As for the award of attorney’s fees, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
more after her retirement, e.g., by becoming a consultant, had she not died. The gross P40,000.00 for private respondent Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for the de la Victoria
earnings which Mrs. Miranda could reasonably be expected to earn were it not for her spouses is justified. The appellate court correctly held:
untimely death was, therefore, correctly computed by the trial court to be P218,077.92 The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees.
(given a gross annual income of P10,224.00 and life expectancy of 21.33 years). The award would naturally vary or differ in each case. While it is admitted that plaintiff-
appellee Ramon Miranda who is himself a lawyer, represented also plaintiffs-appellees Dela
Petitioner contends that from the amount of gross earnings, 60% should be deducted as Victoria spouses, we note that separate testimonial evidence were adduced by plaintiff-
necessary living expenses, not merely 30% as the trial court allowed. Petitioner contends appellee Ramon Miranda (TSN, February 26, 1982, p. 6) and plaintiffs-appellees spouses
that 30% is unrealistic, considering that Mrs. Miranda’s earnings would have been subject Dela Victoria (TSN, August 13, 1981, p. 43). Considering the amount of work and effort
to taxes, social security deductions and inflation. put into the case as indicated by the voluminous transcripts of stenographic notes, we find
no reason to disturb the award of P40,000.00 for plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda and
We agree with this contention. In Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [23] the Court P15,000.00 for plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses. [27]
allowed a deduction of P1,184.00 for living expenses from the P2,184.00 annual salary of The award of exemplary damages should be increased to P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda
the victim, which is roughly 54.2% thereof. The deceased was 29 years old and a training and P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses in accordance with our ruling in the
assistant in the Bacnotan Cement Industries. In People v. Quilaton, [24]the deceased was a Mecenas case:
26-year old laborer earning a daily wage. The court allowed a deduction of P120,000.00 Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape
which was 51.3% of his annual gross earnings of P234,000.00. In People v. Teehankee, behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or
[25]
 the court allowed a deduction of P19,800.00, roughly 42.4% thereof from the deterrents against such behaviour. In requiring compliance with the standard of
deceased’s annual salary of P46,659.21. The deceased, Maureen Hultman, was 17 years extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in fact that of the highest possible degree of
old and had just received her first paycheck as a secretary. In the case at bar, we hold diligence, from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against
that a deduction of 50% from Mrs. Miranda’s gross earnings (P218,077.92) would be them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless
reasonable, so that her net earning capacity should be P109,038.96. There is no basis for instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. The
supposing that her living expenses constituted a smaller percentage of her gross income Court will take judicial notice of the dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime
than the living expenses in the decided cases. To hold that she would have used only a disasters occur in our waters with massive loss of life. The bulk of our population is too
small part of her income for herself, a larger part going to the support of her children poor to afford domestic air transportation. So it is that notwithstanding the frequent
would be conjectural and unreasonable. sinking of passenger vessels in our waters, crowds of people continue to travel by sea.
This Court is prepared to use the instruments given to it by the law for securing the ends
As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that, at the time of her death, she was 26 of law and public policy. One of those instruments is the institution of exemplary damages;
years old, a teacher in a private school in Malolos, Bulacan, earning P6,192.00 per annum. one of those ends, of special importance in an archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the
Although a probationary employee, she had already been working in the school for two safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by sea.[28]
years at the time of her death and she had a general efficiency rating of 92.85% and it can WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
be presumed that, if not for her untimely death, she would have become a regular teacher. petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages as follows:
Hence, her loss of earning capacity is P111,456.00, computed as follows:
[ gross annual income less To private respondent Ramon Miranda:
net earning capacity (x) = life
reasonable & necessary living
expectancy x
expenses (50%) ] P23,075.00                  for actual damages;
x = [ 2 (80-26) ]   x [P6,192.00 - P3,096.00]
P109,038.96                as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity of 
              3                                   his wife;                    
= 36 x 3,096.00                                                                                                                                     
= P111,456.00              
P150,000.00                as compensatory damages for wrongful death of three (3) 
On the other hand, the award of actual damages in the amount of P23,075.00 was victims;
determined by the Court of Appeals on the basis of receipts submitted by private
respondents. This amount is reasonable considering the expenses incurred by private P300,000.00                as moral damages;
respondent Miranda in organizing three search teams to look for his family, spending for
transportation in going to places such as Batangas City and Iloilo, where survivors and the P300,000.00                as exemplary damages, all in the total amount of P882,113.96; 
bodies of other victims were found, making long distance calls, erecting a monument in and
honor of the four victims, spending for obituaries in the Bulletin Today and for food,
masses and novenas. P40,000.00                  as attorney’s fees.

Petitioner’s contention that the expenses for the erection of a monument and other To private respondents Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
expenses for memorial services for the victims should be considered included in the
indemnity for death awarded to private respondents is without merit. Indemnity for death P12,000.00                    for actual damages;
is given to compensate for violation of the rights of the deceased, i.e., his right to life and
physical integrity.[26] On the other hand, damages incidental to or arising out of such death P111,456.00                  as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
are for pecuniary losses of the beneficiaries of the deceased.
P50,000.00                    as compensatory damages for wrongful death;

P100,000.00                  as moral damages;

P100,000.00                  as exemplary damages, all in the total amount of P373,456.00; 

and

P15,000.00                    as attorney’s fees.

Petitioners are further ordered to pay costs of suit.

In the event the Philippine National Oil Company and/or the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation pay or are required to pay all or a portion of the amounts adjudged, petitioner
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. shall reimburse either of them such amount or amounts as
either may have paid, and in the event of failure of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., to make
the necessary reimbursement, PNOC and/or PNOC/STC shall be entitled to a writ of
execution without need of filing another action.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of legislature. Even
granting that there was, indeed, such omission, this Court cannot supply the same.
[ G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017 ] Following the rule of casus omissus, that is, a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
UMALI VS. TJUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, omitted, this Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even if the
DECISION same may have resulted from inadvertence or it was not foreseen or contemplated for to
do so would amount to judicial legislation. Ergo, this Court has neither power nor authority
to add another member in the JBC simply by judicial construction. [4]
VELASCO JR., J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month
its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability in rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent
the law.[1] Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to December. [5] This is now the
current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly petitioner for the selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court
with this Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not counted by the
Representatives Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month JBC during its En Banc deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the
rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed subject to any further
deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the said body. The disposition as this Court may direct in a proper proceeding. [6] This is the root of the
aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial present controversy that prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition
and Bar Council.[2] for Certiorari and Mandamus based on the following grounds:
I.
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two
representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC TO CORRECT ITS
increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With that, this Court UNWARRANTED DENIAL OF THE VOTES REGISTERED BY [HEREIN PETITIONER] DURING
examined the constitutional provision that states the composition of the JBC, that is, THE EN BANC DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER 2 AND 9, 2016 BECAUSE THE DECISION IN
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: THE CHAVEZ CASE IS DEFECTIVE/FLAWED.
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the II.
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO MANDATE THE JBC TO ACCEPT/COUNT SAID
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a VOTES CAST BY [PETITIONER] BECAUSE THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.) DEFECTIVE/FLAWED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared III.
the said practice of having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the
JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM
preceding "representative of the Congress" in the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF [REPRESENTATIVES] TO PARTICIPATE AND VOTE ON A
leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the [6-MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC. Had it CREATES AN [INSTITUTIONAL] IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS
been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. This Court further OF CONGRESS, AND INSTITUTES AN INHERENT AND CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL
articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term "Congress" must be taken DEFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JBC THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS APPOINTMENTS TO
to mean the entire legislative department as no liaison between the two houses exists in THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].
the workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the Senate and the IV.
House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover,
this Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY REQUIRES PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BY
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that the ex REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JBC
officio members of the JBC consist of representatives from the three main branches of PROCEEDINGS AND ALL APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND
government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].
Secretary of Justice representing the executive, and a representative of the Congress A. THE BICAMERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT WAS BELATEDLY
representing the legislature. It can be deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of DECIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, BUT MUST BE DEEMED AS INCORPORATED
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as AND MODIFYING THE JBC STRUCTURE UNDER SECTION 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE
representing one co-equal branch of government having equal say in the choice of judicial [1987] CONSTITUTION, TO GIVE FULL MEANING TO THE INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS.
nominees. Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC
would negate the principle of equality among these three branches of the government, B. THERE WAS A CLEAR OVERSIGHT AND TECHNICAL OMISSION INVOLVING SECTIONS
which is enshrined in the Constitution. [3] 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION THAT SHOULD BE RECTIFIED BY
[THIS COURT].
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a Resolution dated April
16, 2013, where this Court reiterated that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 C. THE FULL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN THE JBC IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH
Constitution providing for "a representative of the Congress" in the JBC is clear and PARTICIPATING AND VOTING FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE TWO INDEPENDENT
unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Besides, this Court is not CHAMBERS, OTHERWISE THE JBC PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
convinced that the Framers simply failed to adjust the aforesaid constitutional provision,
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND [THE] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBERS IN exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Apart from that, it committed no
THE JBC UPHOLDS THE CO-EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNCIL OF THE THREE grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize, accept and count the petitioner's votes
MAIN BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.[7] during its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 for it merely acted in
As instructed by this Court,[8] both Houses of Congress, through the Manifestation of the accordance with the Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. More so, there is no
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which acts as the People's Tribune in this case, and showing that the petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy other than this
the JBC commented on the Petition. Petition for nowhere herein did he assert that he exerted all efforts to have his concern
addressed by Congress, such as asking the latter to repudiate the rotational arrangement.
The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its alleged unexecutability arising from Thus, for the petitioner's failure to exhaust all remedies available to him in Congress, he
constitutional constraints. It holds that the current practice of alternate representation was deprived the latter of an opportunity to address the matter. Also, the practice and
only arrived at because of time constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both acquiescence of both Houses of Congress to such an arrangement operates as an estoppel
Houses of Congress.[9] And, since the Constitution itself did not clearly state who is the against any member thereof to deny its validity. As regards a writ of mandamus, it cannot
Congress' representative in the JBC, the provision, therefore, regarding the latter's be issued to compel the JBC to count the petitioner's votes for it will not lie to control the
composition must be harmonized to give effect to the current bicameral system. [10] With performance of a discretionary act.[17]
this in view, the OSG believes that it is only proper for both Houses of Congress to be
given equal representation in the JBC as neither House can bind the other for tliere can be The JBC further enunciates that the petitioner has no locus standi to institute this Petition
no single member of either House who can fully represent the entire legislature for to do in his capacity as Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex
so would definitely result in absurdity. [11] Officio Member of the JBC without the requisite resolution from both Houses of Congress
authorizing him to sue as a member thereof, which absence is a fatal defect rendering this
Further, the OSG avers that Chavez's strict interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of Petition dismissible.[18]
the 1987 Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism and sets aside the
inherent dichotomy between the two Houses of Congress.[12] To note, a JBC member's In the same vein, the JBC asseverates that this Petition should also be dismissed as the
votes are reflective of the position and the interest such member wants to uphold, such allegations herein are mere rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which have
that when the representatives from each House of Congress vote for a certain judicial already been exhaustively litigated and settled therein by this Court, more in particular,
nominee, they carry the interests and views of the group they represent. Thus, when only the interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, hence, barred by
one would represent both Houses of Congress in the JBC, the vote would not be the doctrine of stare decisis. Similarly, there exists no substantial reason or even
representative of the interests embodied by the Congress as a whole. [13] supervening event or material change of circumstances that warrants Chavez's reversal. [19]

In the same way, the OSG contends that the bicameral nature of the legislature strictly The JBC likewise insists that it was the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for the JBC
adheres to the distinct and separate personality of both Houses of Congress; thus, no to have only seven members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez, that is, to
member of Congress can represent the entire Congress. Besides, the phrase "a provide a solution should there be a stalemate in the voting. As to the alleged oversight
representative of the Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is and technical omission of the Framers in changing the provision on the JBC to reflect the
qualified by the phrase "ex officio members." The ex officio nature of the position derives bicameral nature of Congress, these are flimsy excuses to override the clear provision of
its authority from the principal office. It, thus, follows that each house of Congress must the Constitution and to disturb settled jurisprudence. As explained in Chavez, Congress'
be represented in the JBC.[14] membership in the JBC was not in the interest of a certain constituency but in reverence to
it as a major branch of government.[20]
Also, the OSG states that the constitutional intent in creating the JBC is to ensure
community representation from the different sectors of society, as well as from the three Last of all, the JBC holds that should this Petition be granted, there would be an imbalance
branches of government, and to eliminate partisan politics in the selection of members of in favor of Congress with respect to the representation in the JBC of the three main and
the judiciary. The focus, therefore, is more on proper representation rather than co-equal branches of the government. For the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article
qualitative limitation. It even insists that when the Framers deliberated on Section 8(1), VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, they were still thinking of a unicameral legislature, equal branch of government. And, even assuming that the current six-month rotational
thereby, giving Congress only one representative to the JBC. However, with the shift from scheme in the JBC created an imbalance between the two Houses of Congress, it is not
unicameralism to bicameralism, "a representative of the Congress" in the JBC should now within the power of this Court or the JBC to remedy such imbalance. For the remedy lies in
be understood to mean one representative from each House of Congress. For had it been the amendment of this constitutional provision.[21]
the intention of the Framers for the JBC to be composed only of seven members, they
would have specified the numbers just like in the other constitutional provisions. As such, Given the foregoing arguments, the issues ought to be addressed by this Court can be
the membership in the JBC should not be limited to seven members. More so, an eventual summed up into: (1) whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Petition even
deadlock in the voting would not pose any problem since the voting in the JBC is not without the requisite resolution from both Houses of Congress permitting him to do so; (2)
through a "yes" or a "no" vote.[15] whether the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him to assail the JBC's
As its final argument, the OSG maintains that while Congress' participation in the JBC may adoption of the rotational representation leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En
be non-legislative, still, the involvement of both Houses of Congress in its every Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (3) whether the JBC acted with grave
proceeding is indispensable, as each House represents different constituencies and would abuse of discretion in adopting the six-month rotational scheme of both Houses of
necessarily bring a unique perspective to the recommendation process of the JBC. [16] Congress resulting in the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations
last December 2 and 9, 2016; (4) whether the JBC can be compelled through mandamus
For its part, the JBC vehemently pleads that the present Petition be dismissed as its to count the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016;
adopted rotational scheme and the necessary consequences thereof are not the proper and (4) whether this Court's ruling in Chavez applies as stare decisis to the present case.
subjects of a certiorari and even a mandamus petition for the same do not involve an
Before delving into the above-stated issues, this Court would like to note that this Petition that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
was primarily filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the JBC En Banc unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the purpose of determining, among specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
others, who will be the possible successors of the then retiring Associate Justices of the money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
Supreme Court Perez and Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
2016, respectively. The list of nominees will then be forwarded to the President as the general interest common to all members of the public.
appointing authority. With the appointments of Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires
(Martires) and Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March 2 and 8, 2017, respectively, this Petition xxxx
has now been rendered moot insofar as the petitioner's prayers to (1) reverse and set
aside the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
to count his votes therein as its ex officio member,[22] are concerned. action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An issue becomes moot and academic prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would [26]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
be of no practical use or value. This notwithstanding, the Court in a number of cases held The legal standing of each member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine Constitution
that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically Association v. Enriquez,[27] where this Court pronounced that:
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v.
and academic if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional Macaraig, Jr. (citation omitted). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when the membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
[23]
 Considering that all the arguments herein once again boil down to the proper Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution on congressional the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
representation in the JBC, this Court deems it proper to proceed on deciding this Petition Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions,
despite its mootness to settle the matter once and for all. particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For
Other Purposes.
Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues in seriatim. In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized
(citation omitted).
On petitioner's locus standi. The petitioner brings this suit in his capacity as the current
Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex OfficioMember of While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the
the JBC. His legal standing was challenged by the JBC for lack of an enabling resolution for Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was
that purpose coming from both Houses of Congress. not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766
and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the the conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [24] With that
definition, therefore, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for
(1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.
[25]
 Otherwise, he/she would not be allowed to litigate. Nonetheless, in a long line of cases, Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested
concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the
have been given standing by this Court. This was succinctly explained in Francisco, Jr. v. Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (citation omitted).
The House of Representatives, thus:
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining the powers of that institution (citation omitted).
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (citation
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In omitted). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is
a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are having a substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or was the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise
any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be inclined to sustain the petitioner's direct resort to this Court not only because it is the
resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him but also by reason of the
allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What constitutional issues involved herein and the urgency of the matter. As correctly pointed
cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the out by the OSG, the Constitution mandates that any vacancy to the office of an Associate
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his Justice of the Supreme Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its
office (citation omitted).[28] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must submit the list of nominees prior to the start of that
It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even period. As the nominations covered by the questioned December 2016 JBC En Banc
without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the deliberations were intended for vacancies created by then Associate Justices Perez and
powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts Brion, who respectively retired last December 14 and 29, 2016, hence, any resort to
affect the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may Congress during that time would already be inadequate since the JBC list of nominees
validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity would be submitted any moment to the Office of the President for the appointment of the
thereof. next Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Since time is of the essence, the petitioner's
direct resort to this Court is warranted.
With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitioner's legal standing as Member of the
House of Representatives and as the Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail the On the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the JBC in adopting the rotational
alternate representation of Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to the non- representation of Congress correctable by certiorari. The petitioner ascribed grave abuse of
counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it discretion on the part of the JBC in its adoption of the rotational scheme, which led to the
allegedly affects adversely Congress' prerogative to be fully represented before the said non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it
body. deprives Congress of its full representation therein. The JBC, on the other hand, believes
otherwise for it merely acted in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution and with
On petitioner's direct resort to this Court via certiorari petition. The JBC questions the the ruling in Chavez. Also, such rotational scheme was a creation of Congress, which it
propriety of the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via the present Petition to assail its merely adopted.
adoption of the rotational representation of Congress resulting in the non-counting of his
votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. The JBC insists that the Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present Rules of Court are the two special
said scheme was a creation of Congress itself; as such, the petitioner's plain, speedy and civil actions used for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
adequate remedy is to appeal to Congress to repudiate the same. Direct resort to this lack or excess of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
Court should not be allowed if there is a remedy available to the petitioner before errors of jurisdiction, which necessarily includes the commission of grave abuse of
Congress. discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.[34] The burden is on the petitioner to prove that
the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but also a grave abuse of
Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Showing mere abuse of discretion is
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court of not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means
Appeals, however, this Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
propriety of certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies and the danger of manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal
failure of justice without the writ. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
resolution of the lower court or agency. [29] quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.[35]
In the same way, as a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be entertained
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and before this Court as the writs may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
those of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[30] In The Diocese of Bacolod ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
v. Commission on Elections,[31] and again in Maza v. Turla,[32] this Court took pains in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this Court, to wit: (1) the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most functions. Thus, they are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. [36]
of first impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this
matter; (4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time Here, it is beyond question that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board,
element presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Neither did it act in any judicial or
constitutional organ; (7) petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and quasi-judicial capacity nor did it assume any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (8) the petition includes questions prerogative in adopting the rotational scheme of Congress, which was the reason for not
that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by counting the votes of the petitioner in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9,
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent 2016. But, despite this, its act is still not beyond this Court's reach as the same is
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. [33] correctible by certiorari if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion even if it is not
exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Now, did the JBC abuse its discretion in
Here, while this Court agrees with the JBC that the petitioner's preliminary remedy to adopting the six-month rotational arrangement and in not counting the votes of the
question the rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate the same, petitioner? This Court answers in the negative. As correctly pointed out by the JBC, in
this, however, cannot be considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is, thus, adopting the said arrangement, it merely acted pursuant to the Constitution and
the Chavez ruling, which both require only one representative from Congress in the JBC. It doctrine which means to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
cannot, therefore, be faulted for simply complying with the Constitution and jurisprudence. established. This is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
Moreover, said arrangement was crafted by both Houses of Congress and the JBC merely provides, thus:
adopted the same. By no stretch of imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
discretion on the part of the JBC. part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts in a country to
With the foregoing, despite this Court's previous declaration that certiorari is the plain, follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision
speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same cannot prosper for the becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
petitioner's failure to prove that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
the rotational scheme. and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The
same is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
On the propriety of mandamus. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that thus, time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
the applicant has a clear legal right to the tiling demanded and it must be the imperative practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The burden is on the petitioner to certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a cases in which the facts are substantially the same. It simply means that for the
corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. As an sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if
extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
not a discretionary one.[37] A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
one. A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
done.[38] On the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.[39] Clearly, the use of discretion and from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability
the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Further, the writ of mandamus of the solemn pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon showing that
does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived
conduct.[40] by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis can the courts be
justified in setting aside the same.[41]
In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the
judiciary may only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the
its rightful members and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such
member during the En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the ruling may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the
questioned period, the lawful representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the majority of members of this Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an
Senate and not of the House of Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. erroneous application of the questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the
Considering that a member of the Senate already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the JBC
discretion not to count the votes of the petitioner for it is mandated by both the in the same way that its co-equal branches are.
Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that Congress will only have one representative
in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus will As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
not lie. clear, categorical and unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or
interpretation. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case. The petitioner strongly that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
maintains that Chavez must be revisited and reversed due to its unexecutability. But the interpretation, only application.[42] The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
JBC insists that the arguments herein are mere rehash of those in Chavez, hence, already 1987 Constitution are to be considered as indicative of the final intent of its Framers, that
barred by the doctrine of stare decisis. Also, there is no cogent reason is, for Congress as a whole to only have one representative to sit in the JBC. This Court,
for Chavez's reversal. therefore, cannot simply make an assumption that the Framers merely by oversight failed
to take into account the bicameral nature of Congress in drafting the same. As further laid
This Court takes another glance at the arguments in Chavez and compares them with the down in Chavez, the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
present arguments of the petitioner. A careful perusal, however, reveals that, although the representation in the JBC as it was not in the exercise of its primary function, which is to
petitioner questioned the JBC's adoption of the six-month rotational representation of legislate. Notably, the JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and
Congress leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
December 2 and 9, 2016, the supporting arguments hereof still boil down to the proper No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
rehash of the arguments in Chavez, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in this under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial
case is inevitable. More so, the petitioner failed to present strong and compelling reason branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the
not to rule this case in the same way that this Court ruled Chavez. matter of its JBC representation.[43]

As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare decisis et non quieta movere is a This Court cannot succumb to the argument that Congress, being composed of two distinct
and separate chambers, cannot represent each other in the JBC. Again, as this Court  Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 132051, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA
[1]

469.
explained in Chavez, such an argument is misplaced because in the JBC, any member of
Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally [2]
 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional [3]
 Id. at 597-606.
authority, but it is not an absurdity. To broaden the scope of congressional representation
in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the [4]
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496.
provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor [5]
 Rollo, pp. 42 & 45. 
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court [6]
 Petition, id. at 9-10.
declines.[44] [7]
 Id. at 11-12.

While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly [8]
 Per Resolutions dated January 17, 2017 (id. at 84-85) and February 14, 2017 (id. at 255-256).
state that the JBC shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in [9]
 Manifestation in lieu of Comment (to the Petition dated December 28, 2016), OSG, id. at 168-169.
the enumeration of who will be the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the
JBC composition to be an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the preparation of a [10]
 Id. at 175.
shortlist since judicial nominees are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote, still, JBC's [11]
 Id. at 183.
membership cannot be increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear violation of the
aforesaid constitutional provision. To add another member in the JBC or to increase the [12]
 Id. at 185.
representative of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional [13]
 Id. at 187.
amendment.
[14]
 Id. at 191, 194 & 198.
In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in accord with the constitutional [15]
 Id. at 199-202, 207 & 210.
mandate of giving Congress "a representative" in the JBC. In the same manner, the
adoption of the rotational scheme will not in any way deprive Congress of its full [16]
 Id. at 217 & 224.
participation in the JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with that constitutional [17]
 Comment/Opposition (On the Petition dated 28 December 2016), JBC, id. at 262-268.
mandate.
[18]
 Id. at 269-271.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is [19]
 Id. at 271-273.
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[20]
 Id. at 273-280.
SO ORDERED. [21]
 Id. at 280-282.

Sereno, C. J., no part. [22]

 Supra note 6, at 83.
Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, and Tijam, JJ., [23]
 Lu v. Lu YM, Sr., G.R. Nos. 153690, 157381 & 170889, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 254, 273.
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of Justice Leonen. [24]
 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, et al., April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 283.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen. [25]
 Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 & 187910, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 360.
Leonen, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Martires, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen. [26]
 G.R. Nos. 160261-160263, et al., November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 136-137.
Reyes, Jr., J., I join the dissent of J., Leonen. [27]
 G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, et al., August 19, 994, 235 SCRA 506.

[28]
 Id. at 519-520.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT [29]

 G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286.

[30]
 Yee v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 385, 394.
Sirs/Mesdames:
[31]
 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1. 
Please take notice that on July 25, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, [32]
 G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017.
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on September 26, 2017 at 1:35 p.m. [33]
 The Diocese of Bacohd v. Commission on Elections, supra note 31, at 45-50.
Very truly yours, [34]
 Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135-209136, et al., July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1, 72.
(SGD)
FELIPA G. [35]
 Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 289.

BORLONGAN- [36]
 Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 34, at 74-75.
ANAMA [37]
 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 182, 198.
  Clerk of Court
[38]
 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 671, 684.

[39]
 Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage, G.R. No. 157660, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 664, 671.
 The promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, however, vested the chief executive with both
[40]
 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 37.
executive and legislative powers. Vetting and appointing of members to the judiciary
[41]
 Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 285, 293-295. became the sole prerogative of the President:
ARTICLE X
[42]
 Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 545, 554. 
The Judiciary
[43]
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 4, at 507-514.
Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be
[44]
 Id. at 515-518.
appointed by the President.
Hoping to unshackle the Republic from the abuses of power during Martial Law but at the
same time wanting to insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics,
DISSENTING OPINION the 1986 Constitutional Commission, through Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, proposed
the creation of an independent body that would vet potential appointees to the judiciary.
LEONEN, J.: [4]
 This body would be represented by the different stakeholders of the legal sector and
would have the mandate of preparing the list of potential judicial appointees to be
This Court is once again tasked to re-examine our interpretation of Article VIII, Section submitted to the President. The proposal became what is now the Judicial and Bar Council.
8(1) of the Constitution, previously the subject of this Court's review in Chavez v. Judicial Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution now provides:
and Bar Council.[1] In the aftermath of Chavez, we see the absurd and unworkable effects ARTICLE VIII
of having only one (1) representative of Congress within the Judicial and Bar Council. Judicial Department

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council[2] sanctioned what was clearly unintended by the ....
Constitution: the periodic disempowerment of one (1) legislative chamber. In doing so, it
weakens Congress itself as a bicameral constitutional department. The subtraction of the Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
critical one (1) vote that determines who gets into the shortlist is achieved by periodically Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
disempowering one (1) chamber. From the time Chavez was promulgated, significant facts Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
have come to light that justifies the abandonment of that precedent. the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
We must do so in this case.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of
This is a Petition for mandamus and certiorari filed by Representative Reynaldo V. Umali four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
(Representative Umali), current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
Justice, questioning the six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement of Congress professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
adopted by the Judicial and Bar Council pursuant to Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, the private sector for one year.
[3]
 which was decided with finality on April 16, 2013. Petitioner claims that the current
arrangement unfairly deprives both chambers of Congress of its full participation in the (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
Judicial and Bar Council. shall keep a record of its proceedings.

An understanding of the process of appointment to the judiciary, especially in its historical (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
context, is important to situate this Court's proper interpretation of the current provisions determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
of the Constitution. the appropriations for the Council.

Before the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the power to nominate and appoint (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
members of the judiciary was vested in the executive and legislative branches. Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
Title X, Article 80 of the Malolos Constitution provides: Based on their understanding of the provision stating that one (1) of its ex officio members
TITLE X  would be "a representative of Congress," both the House of Representatives and Senate
The Judicial Power sent representatives to the Council. Representative Rogaciano A. Mercado sat as ex officio
member from December 10, 1987 to February 23, 1989 while Senator Wigberto E. Tañada
Article 80. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be sat as ex officio member from March 2, 1988 to May 21, 1990.[5] In a previous case,
chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the however, this Court stated that membership in the Council would be altered only in 1994,
Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the Legislative and stating that before then, the House of Representatives and the Senate would alternate its
Executive Powers. representation:
The 1935 Constitution similarly states: [F]rom the moment of the creation of the JBC, [Congress] designated one representative
ARTICLE VIII  to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal
Judicial Department opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and
the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had
Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be only one (1) representative.
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House of Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as
curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow he had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving. [12]
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. There was no showing of the presence of any resolution from any of the legislative
[6]
chambers that authorized or ratified the practice.
The practice of giving each member of Congress one (1) full vote was questioned in 2012
in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.[7] From then on, it became the practice of the House of Representatives to represent
Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council from January to June and for the Senate to
This Court, voting 7-2,[8] stated that the Constitution intended for the Judicial and Bar represent Congress from July to December. [13]
Council to only have seven (7) members; thus, only one (1) representative from Congress
must sit as an ex officio member. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: The present controversy arose from the En Banc deliberations of the Judicial and Bar
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial Council on December 2 and December 9, 2016, for the selection of nominees for the
and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby vacancies of retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion and Jose P. Perez.
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a On both occasions, Representative Umali[14] cast his votes. His votes, however, were not
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 counted due to the present rotational representation arrangement. The votes were instead
Constitution. placed in an envelope and sealed, "subject to any further disposition as the Supreme Court
may direct in a proper proceeding."[15]
This disposition is immediately executory.
Representative Umali filed this present Petition [16] praying that:
SO ORDERED.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration, this Court, voting 10-3,[9] reiterated that "[i]n the
a. The JBC's denial of petitioner Umali's vote as ex-officio member during
[Judicial and Bar Council], any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
the En Banc sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016, be reversed and set
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
aside;
Congress."[10]
b. The JBC be directed to count the votes of petitioner Umali as ex-officio
member during the en bane sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016;
The Minutes of the July 29, 2013 Judicial and Bar Council En Banc meeting reflect their
c. The current six-month rotational representation of Congress by the
actions after the case was promulgated. Representative Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (Representative
Senate and the House of Representatives in the JBC be declared
Tupas) informed the Council that pursuant to Chavez, the House of Representatives and
unconstitutional; and
Senate agreed that their representation would be on a six (6)-month rotational basis, with
d. The JBC be directed to revert back to its prior representational
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) representing Congress from July 1
arrangement where two representatives from Congress are recognized
to December 31, 2013.[11] The Minutes state:
and allowed to vote, or the status quo ante, prior to the Chavez ruling,
[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this
and in accordance with such specific guidelines that the Supreme Court
year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized
will promulgate to ensure full and proper representation and voting by
him and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to
both members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that the representation
thereafter to recognize, accept and count the votes cast by the petitioner
would be on a rotation basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the
Umali in all proceedings of the JBC.[17]
one to represent both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be
The Judicial and Bar Council was directed to file its comment to the Petition. On February
he. In the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the
6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)
meetings, and vice versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to [18]
 entering its appearance for "[t]he Congress of the Republic of the Philippines,
come up with an agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate
represented by the Senate and the House of Representatives" [19] and "[acting] as the
President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It
People's Tribune."[20] On February 10, 2017, the Judicial and Bar Council Executive
should be a communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished
Chair[21] and its regular members[22] filed its Comment[23] on behalf of the Council.
with copies of all notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.
Petitioner argues that Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council[24] did not define the manner by
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of Senate President Drilon
which the Judicial and Bar Council should be reconstituted and that no formal resolution
stating, among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
was issued by the Council to resolve the issue. The Council instead adopted Representative
agreed that Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31,
Tupas' manifestation that the Senate and House of Representatives agreed on a six (6)-
2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both
month rotational representation.[25]
Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices
and information that are being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked
Petitioner points out that Representative Tupas had cautioned the Council that decisions of
Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the agreement between the
Congress should be a communication of both houses. He argues that neither
two Houses of Congress, thus giving a higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Representative Tupas' manifestation nor then Senate President Franklin Drilon's (then
Senate President Drilon) letter conferring Senator PimentePs representation constitute a
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a
plenary act of both Houses of Congress so the present rotational representation cannot be
letter. His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from
adopted by the Council.[26]
the Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement.
He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave.
Petitioner asserts that allowing only one (1) representative of Congress on the Council is
"impractical, absurd and unconstitutional".[27] He explains that the bicameral nature of essence of bicameralism.[47] It explains that when the representatives of the Senate or the
Congress results in both houses having different powers, functions, and decision-making House of Representatives vote for a certain judicial nominee, they carry the interests and
processes. Thus, any communication, action, or resolution from either house should not be views of the group they represent. If there is only one (1) member of Congress in the
interpreted as binding on the whole Congress. He points out that other than this Court's Council, this vote would not be representative of the interests represented by Congress as
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1),[28] there is also no provision in the Constitution a whole.[48]
that expressly mandates a single representation of Congress to any political or
adjudicating body.[29] The genuine and full representation of Congress expresses the voice The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that no member of Congress can represent all
of the electorate to the Judicial and Bar Council.[30] of Congress, which is why Congress has always sent two (2) representatives to the
Council.[49] It points out that the phrase "a representative of Congress" in Article VIII,
Petitioner contends that the distinction between both houses is recognized under the Section 8(1) is qualified by the phrase "ex-officio members" signifying that the member in
Constitution. He claims that denying the House of Representatives' continuous an ex-officio capacity must be qualified to represent the entirety of Congress. [50]
representation in the Council would be denying it of its duty to screen and vote for the
candidates for the eight (8) Associate Justices of the Supreme Court who will compulsorily The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the intent of the Judicial and Bar Council's
retire from 2017 to 2019.[31] The Senate would also be deprived of its duty to screen and composition is for the representation to be collegial and to eliminate partisan politics in the
vote for the two (2) vacant positions in the Supreme Court in 2022. [32] He cites as basis selection of members of the judiciary; thus, "the focus is more on proper representation
the vote for the vacancies left by Associate Justices Perez and Brion that was scheduled in rather than quantitative limitation."[51] It asserts that when the framers deliberated on
December, which deprived petitioner of his chance to vote. [33] Article VIII, Section 8(1), they were still of the belief that legislature would be unicameral.
[52]
 If they had intended for the Council to only have seven (7) members, it would have
Petitioner asserts that the bicameral nature of Congress requires both houses to observe specified the number, as it did in other provisions of the Constitution. [53] It contends that a
inter-parliamentary courtesies and were meant to represent different constituencies. deadlock in the voting is not enough justification to undermine the bicameral nature of the
Because of the shift from National Assembly to a bicameral Congress, Article VIII, Section legislature since voting in the Council is not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote. [54]
8(1) of the Constitution should be interpreted to allow representatives from both chambers
to fully participate and vote in the Judicial and Bar Council. [34] He maintains that Article The Office of the Solicitor General likewise holds that while the function of the Judicial and
VIII, Section 8(1) was not plain and was unambiguous because from 2001 until the Bar Council may be non-legislative, the involvement of both Houses of Congress is
promulgation of Chavez, the Judicial and Bar Council allowed both the House of indispensable since each represents different constituencies and would necessarily bring a
Representatives and the Senate to be given one (1) full vote each. [35] He insists that unique perspective to the Council's recommendation process. [55] It cites statistics from
a verba legis interpretation of Article III, Section 8(1) would deny Congress of its June 2016 to present showing that a large number of appointments were made to the
representation since neither chamber on its own can represent the entirety of Congress. [36] lower courts at a time when the House of Representatives, which represents sectors or
local districts, was not able to participate in the voting process. [56]
Petitioner claims that allowing both the House of Representatives and the Senate to
represent Congress in the Council upholds the co-equal representation of the three (3) The Office of the Solicitor General also cites Aguinaldo v. Judicial and Bar Council[57] to
branches of the government. He explains that under the present composition, there are argue that in the review of the Judicial and Bar Council's rules, it should also include a
actually three (3) representatives from the judicial branch (the Chief Justice, a retired review of the rule on Congress' representation on the Council. [58]
Justice of the Supreme Court, and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines) and
three (3) representatives of the executive branch (Secretary of Justice, the professor of Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, on the other hand, attests that the Petition should be
law, and the representative of the private sector who are all presidential appointees). dismissed since the rotational scheme adopted by Congress is not the proper subject of a
[37]
 Thus, he claims that continuing the present practice results in the legislative petition for certiorari or mandamus. It contends that the controversy does not involve the
department having a disproportionate representation in the constitutional body and Council's exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. [59] It maintains that
diminishes the integrity of the House of Representatives, which represents the people. [38] there was also no grave abuse of discretion when it refused to count petitioner's votes
since this act was authorized by the Constitution and Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.
For these reasons, petitioner argues that the Judicial and Bar Council committed grave [60]
 It argues that the Council's performance of its duties is discretionary; thus, mandamus
abuse of discretion that could be remedied through a writ of certiorari. [39] He adds that a cannot be issued to control the performance of a discretionary act. [61]
writ of mandamus would also be proper to compel the Judicial and Bar Council to accept
and recognize the votes he cast in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc sessions. [40] Respondent counters that the Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since
petitioner did not show that he exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by
Unlike in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,[41] both the House of Representatives and the Congress. It points out that it was Congress, not the Council, which adopted the rotational
Senate were able to comment on the petition, through a Manifestation [42] and Consolidated scheme.[62] Chavez declared that the representation of Congress in the Council would be
Manifestation[43] by the Office of the Solicitor General. for Congress to determine; thus, petitioner should have first asked Congress to repudiate
the rotational scheme agreement.[63] Respondent insists that the practice and acquiescence
The Office of the Solicitor General, for Congress, argues that Chavez should be revisited of Congress to this arrangement operates as an estoppel against any member of Congress
due to its "unexecutability . . . arising from constitutional constraints." [44] It explains that to deny the validity of this agreement.[64] It also points out that petitioner has no locus
the current practice "was arrived at in view of time constraints and difficulty in securing standi to file this Petition in his capacity as Chair of the House of Representatives
the agreement of both Houses."[45] It likewise points out that since the Constitution did not Committee on Justice absent any resolution by the Senate and the House of
identify who should represent Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council, the provision must Representatives authorizing him to do so.[65]
be harmonized to take into account the current bicameral system. [46]
Respondent likewise prays for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground that petitioner's
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the current rotational arrangement sets allegations are mere rehashes of the arguments and dissents in Chavez and are, thus,
aside the inherent dichotomy between the two (2) Houses of Congress and violates the barred by the doctrine of stare decisis.[66] It insists that any issue on the interpretation of
Article VIII, Section 8(1) has already been settled in Chavez.[67] The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v.
Macaraig, Jr. . . . In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the
Respondent reiterates the ruling in Chavez and argues that the framers of the Constitution Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of
intended for the Council to only have seven (7) members to provide a solution when there the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381,
is a stalemate in the voting.[68] It insists that Chavez has also settled the alleged "oversight adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
and technical omission" argued by petitioner when it stated that the membership of Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of
Congress to the Council was not in the interest of a certain constituency but in reverence the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
to it as the third branch of the government.[69] Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions,
particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For
Respondent argues that the grant of the Petition would create an imbalance since Article Other Purposes.
VIII treats each ex officio member as representing one (1) co-equal branch of the In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized
government.[70] It maintains that even assuming that there is an imbalance, it is not for ...
this Court or the Council to remedy the imbalance since the remedy lies in the amendment
of the constitutional provision.[71] While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by
The case presents several procedural and substantive issues. Procedurally, this Court is the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed
asked to determine first, whether petitioner has the locus standi to file the Petition in the without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
absence of a resolution of both Houses of Congress authorizing him for that
purpose; second, whether the Petition is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for ....
addressing the issue of the rotational representation arrangement; and third, whether the
doctrine of stare decisis operates as a bar for petitioner to question the ruling in Chavez v. We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
Judicial and Bar Council. matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
On the substantive issues, this Court is likewise asked to determine, first, whether the
current six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement deprives Congress of its full Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested
participation in the deliberations in the Judicial and Bar Council; second, whether the on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the
Judicial and Bar Council committed grave abuse of discretion in adopting a six (6)-month Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises . . .
rotational representation arrangement absent a plenary action by both Houses of
Congress; and finally, whether the Judicial and Bar Council can be compelled, by writ of To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
mandamus, to count petitioner's votes in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
2016. institution . . .
I
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
Every case brought to this Court must be filed by the party having the standing to file the nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress . . . In
case. The definition of legal standing is settled: such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted[:]
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." having substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly,
the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. [72] if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a
Respondent contends that petitioner has no standing to file this case absent a resolution transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be
from the House of Representatives authorizing him to do so.[73] It anchors its argument denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
on Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez,[74] where this Court stated: privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. [76] (Emphasis supplied; Citations
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate omitted.)
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by Every member of Congress has standing to question acts which affect the powers,
the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed prerogatives, and privileges of Congress. In Pimentel v. Executive Secretary:[77]
without an enabling resolution for the purpose. [75] As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that "to the extent the powers of Congress
Respondent, however, failed to read the entirety of the quoted portion. In Philippine are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
Constitutional Association, the procedural issue on standing was whether Senators could participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution." Thus, legislators have the
question a presidential veto on an appropriations bill despite the absence of a Senate standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
resolution authorizing them to file the case. This Court, in addressing the issue, first Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
acknowledged that previous decisions have required Senators to first submit a Senate action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar
resolution authorizing the filing of the case. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that members of invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered
Congress have standing to question any action that impairs the Congress' powers and into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order
privileges, regardless of whether there was a prior Congressional resolution: the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise
such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal entire government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial
standing to assert such authority of the Senate.[78] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.
Here, petitioner, as a member of Congress and the Chair of the House Committee on Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the
Justice, alleges that the rotational representation arrangement adopted by respondent forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory
Judicial and Bar Council impairs the prerogative of Congress to have full representation circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast
within the Council. Petitioner need not have the required House resolution to file his concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to serve. [84]
Petition. The Office of the Solicitor General is not prohibited from taking a position adverse from
that of the Judicial and Bar Council. Its representation would be on behalf of the Filipino
In any case, parties are vested by this Court with legal standing when constitutional people, instead of a particular government instrumentality.
challenges have become justiciable, consistent with this Court's role in the constitutional
order. While the parties must first establish their right to appear before us on a given Its representation in this case, however, is contradictory. It intends to represent Congress,
question of law, they must, more importantly, present concrete cases and controversies. a government instrumentality, and act as the People's Tribune; that is, it will be taking a
In this instance, the continuing problematic application of Chavez vests petitioner, as the position contrary to that of a government instrumentality. Obviously, the Office of the
current representative of the House to the Judicial and Bar Council, with sufficient standing Solicitor General cannot represent both at the same time.
to raise this issue before us.
Nevertheless, considering that the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, may have been confused when it filed its not be representing the Judicial and Bar Council as mandated and will instead be taking an
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment). It stated before this Court that the Manifestation is adverse position, this Court will presume that it intends to act as the People's Tribune.
filed by "[t]he Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Senate and
the House of Representatives, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) who in this In future cases, however, the Office of the Solicitor General should be more cautious in
case acts as the People's Tribune."[79] entering its appearance to this Court as the People's Tribune to prevent further confusion
as to its standing.
It is unclear whether the Office of the Solicitor General intends to represent Congress or to II
act as the People's Tribune.
Respondent claims that the Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for
The Office of the Solicitor General's mandate is to "represent the Government of the questioning the rotational representation arrangement adopted by Congress. [85]
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer." [80] A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court primarily requires that there
must be no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available before
Thus, as a general rule, the Office of the Solicitor General represents the Philippine filing the petition:
government in all legal proceedings. The rule has exceptions, such as when it takes an Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
adverse position and acts as the "People's Tribune." In Pimentel v. Commission on or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
Elections:[81] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies and appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor General may, as it has in certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
instances take a position adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally require.
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's
position. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
.... thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)
As we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases pending before this Court: Citing the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, respondent contends that the
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner should have first
As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many asked Congress to repudiate the rotational representation agreement. [86]
proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist
from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with This rule, however, applies to administrative agencies, not to Congress. Respondent fails
the Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be to cite any provision of law or Congressional rule that requires petitioner to have his
advised of his position just as well.[82] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) concern addressed by Congress before filing a petition with this Court.
Gonzales v. Chavez[83] further explains:
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the There is also a time element to be considered that would allow the direct resort to this
Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people Court. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,[87] we stated that "a direct resort
themselves of which the individual lawyers in said office are a part. to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time."[88] We further recognized that "[e]xigency in
.... certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this [C]ourt." [89]

Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the Under the Constitution, the President only has 90 days from the vacancy to appoint
members of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Judicial and Bar Council must be able to submit Similarly, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[102]
its list of nominees before the running of the period. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
Article VIII  precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
Judicial Department blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
.... the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours
is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in
Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
thereof. application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. [103] (Citations
This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to comply is considered a culpable violation of the omitted)
Constitution. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[90] Whenever this Court renders its decisions, the intended effects of those decisions to future
[T]he usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative, operating to cases are taken into consideration. The changing membership of the bench likewise
impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4 (1) contributes to the evolution of this Court's stand on certain issues and cases. Ruling by
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the precedent, thus, requires more than a mechanical application:
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the [T]he use of precedents is never mechanical.
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. [91] (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted) Some assumptions normally creep into the facts established for past cases. These
Admittedly, petitioner's prayer to have his vote counted in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En assumptions may later on prove to be inaccurate or to be accurate only for a given
Banc Meetings has already become moot with the appointments of Associate Justice historical period. Sometimes, the effects assumed by justices who decide past cases do not
Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.[92] Nevertheless: necessarily happen. Assumed effects are given primacy whenever the spirit or intent of the
Th[is] Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the law is considered in the interpretation of a legal provision. Some aspect of the facts or the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public context of these facts would not have been fully considered. It is also possible that
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of doctrines in other aspects of the law related to a precedent may have also evolved.
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. [93] (Citation omitted) In such cases, the use of precedents will unduly burden the parties or produce absurd or
An erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision would be considered a grave unworkable outcomes. Precedents will not be useful to achieve the purposes for which the
violation of the Constitution. Judicial appointments are likewise of paramount public law would have been passed.[104] (Citations omitted)
interest. This case will also settle, once and for all, the issue on the interpretation of Article There is also a need to abandon decisions "when this Court discerns, after full deliberation,
VIII, Section 8(1). that a continuing error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent of a constitutional
provision exists."[105] Assuring the public of stability in the law and certainty of court
This issue will once again arise considering that two (2) more justices are set to retire this actions is important. It is, however, more important for this Court to be right. Thus, it
year.[94] There is, thus, a limited amount of time for petitioner to question the lists of becomes imperative for this Court to re-examine previous decisions to avoid continuing its
nominees submitted by respondent to the Office of the President. A direct resort to this error:
Court would be warranted under the circumstances. The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law . . . is desirable. But
III idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important
than anything else is that the court should be right. And particularly is it not wise to
Respondent argues that this Petition is barred by the doctrine of stare subordinate legal reason to case law and by so doing perpetuate error when it is brought
decisis[95] considering that the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) has already been to mind that the views now expressed conform in principle to the original decision and that
settled in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.[96] since the first decision to the contrary was sent forth there has existed a respectable
opinion of non-conformity in the court. Indeed, on at least one occasion has the court
The principle of stare decisis is derived from the Latin maxim "stare decisis, et non quieta broken away from the revamped doctrine, while even in the last case in point the court
movere"; that is, "it is best to adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions put at was as evenly divided as it was possible to be and still reach a decision. [106]
rest."[97] Its function is to ensure certainty and stability in the legal system. [98] Ruling by Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council was not a unanimous decision of this Court. Vigorous
precedent is meant to assure the public of the court's objectivity. [99]Stare decisis provides dissents accompanied not only the main decision but also the resolution on the motion for
the public with a reasonable expectation that courts will rule in a certain manner given a reconsideration. This Petition precisely assails Chavez's outcome and its effect on the
similar set of facts. diminished representation of Congress in the vetting process of judicial nominees. Rather
than dismiss this case on the basis of stare decisis, it would be more prudent for this Court
Courts, however, are cautioned against "blind adherence to precedents." [100] Decisions of to revisit Chavez in order to settle the issue.
this Court previously found to have been valid may become impractical, contrary to law, or IV
even unconstitutional. It then becomes the duty of this Court to abandon that decision:
The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine The doctrine of Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council[107] must be abandoned and revised.
or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if
found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not Under the Constitution, Congress is bicameral in nature. It consists of two (2) chambers:
and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty the Senate and the House of Representatives. Article VI, Section 1 provides:
of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the ARTICLE VI 
law in force.[101] The Legislative Department
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which ....
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Emphasis supplied) Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
The Constitution considers both chambers as separate and distinct from each other. The Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
manner of elections, terms of office, and organization of each chamber is provided for prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
under separate provisions of the Constitution. when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines." [108] Members of martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
the House of Representatives are elected by their respective legislative districts [109] or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report
through the party-list system.[110] The differing nature of its elections affects the scope of in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
its representation. Senators represent a national constituency while the House of a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
Representatives represents only a particular legislative district or marginalized and or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative
underrepresented sector. of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
A Senator's term of office is for six (6) years[111] while the term of office of a Member of the persist and public safely requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
House of Representatives is for three (3) years.[112] In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,[120] this Court, however, ruled that Congress is only
entitled to one (1) seat in the Judicial and Bar Council, pursuant to its interpretation of
Each chamber chooses its own officers.[113] Each chamber promulgates its own rules of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 8(1) provides:
procedure.[114] Each chamber maintains separate Journals.[115] Each chamber keeps ARTICLE VIII
separate Records of its proceedings.[116] Each chamber disciplines its own members. Judicial Department
[117]
 Each chamber even maintains separate addresses.[118] There is no mechanism that
would allow the two (2) chambers to represent the other: ....
There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Senate
President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire Congress of the Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
proceedings for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)
discipline its members. It is the Senate that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its A verba legis interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution leads to an
members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its ambiguity and disregards the bicameral nature of Congress. Chavez presumes that one (1)
members. member of Congress can vote on behalf of the entire Congress.

No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the It is a basic rule of statutory construction that constitutional provisions must be
Senate. No Member of the House of Representatives reports to the Congress of the harmonized so that all words are operative. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives. Secretary:[121]
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
exist separate from the Senate and the House of Representatives. provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
the Senate. By constitutional design, he or she cannot get instructions from the House of purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
Representatives. If a Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate, then any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
he or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the
Senate if the House of Representatives' instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any Senator. construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.[122] (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives. Civil Liberties Union also instructs us that constitutional interpretation should depend on
the understanding of the people adopting it, rather than how the framers interpreted it:
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
House of Representatives may carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Member of the House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as a whole. [119] Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
Thus, there is no Member of Congress that can represent all of Congress. Congress is are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in
represented by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Constitution itself the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
provides for only one (1) instance when both chambers must vote jointly: members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
ARTICLE VII  views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
Executive Department whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it    
than in the framer[s'] understanding thereof.[123] (Emphasis provided, citations omitted) +ROGACIANO M. MERCADO 10 December 1987 to 23 February 1989
Resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission to discern the framers' intent must ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 31 July 1989 to 12 August 1992
always be with the understanding of its context and its contemporary consequences. PABLO P. GARCIA 26 August 1992 to 8 March 1995
[124]
 Records show that Article VIII, Section 8(1) was approved by the Constitutional ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 28 June 1995 to 30 June 1998
Commission on July 19, 1986.[125] On July 21, 1986, the Commission voted to amend the ALFREDO E. ABUEG 31 July 1998 to 29 November 2000
proposal of a unicameral "National Assembly" to a bicameral "Congress." [126] +HENRY P. LANOT 14 December 2000 to 30 June 2001
ALLAN PETER S.CAYETANO 8 August 2001 to 3 March 2003
The change of legislative structure led Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986 to
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN 4 March 2003 to 8 August 2003
remark:
Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the SIMEON A. DATUMANONG 9 August 2004 to 30 June 2007
thinking of this group is, that all the provisions that were being drafted up to that time MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. 8 August 2007 to 30 June 2010
assumed a unicameral government.[127] NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. 29 July 2010 to 30 June 2013
On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened to introduce amendments   1 January 2014 to 30 June 2014
to the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14 only.[128] The entire Article on the   1 January 2015 to 30 June 2015
Legislature, meanwhile, was approved on October 9, 1986.[129] By October 15, 1986, the REYNALDO V. UMALI 3 August 2016 to date
Constitution was presented to the President of the Constitutional Commission, Cecilia From the promulgation of the Constitution, Congress already recognized that "a
Muñoz Palma.[130] representative of Congress" can only mean one (1) representative from each chamber.
This interpretation was so prevalent that from 2001, each member from the Senate and
The chronology of events shows that the provision on the composition of the Judicial and the House of Representatives was given one (1) full vote. [132] This is the representation of
Bar Council had been passed at a time when the framers were still of the belief that there Congress contemplated in the Constitution.
was to be a unicameral legislature. Thus, Section 8(1) provides for only "a representative"
instead of "representatives." The current practice of alternate representation not only diminishes Congress'
representation. It negates it.[133]
However, Section 8(1) must also be interpreted according to the understanding of the
people who ratified it. When a Senator sits in the Council, he or she can only represent the Senate. Likewise,
when a Member of the House of Representatives sits in the Council, he or she can only
Historically, both the Senate and the House of Representatives sent their members to sit in represent the House of Representatives. Congress is not represented at all in this kind of
the Judicial and Bar Council:[131] arrangement.
Ex Officio Members Representing the
  The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is representative of the constituencies and
Senate,
Congress:   sectors affected by judicial appointments. Hence, practicing lawyers, prosecutors, the legal
    academe, members of the Bench, and the private sector are represented in the Council.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA 2 March 1988 to 21 May 1990
Members of Congress are the only officials within the Judicial and Bar Council that are
+RAUL S. ROCO 30 September 1992 to 3 March 1993
elected. The rest of the officials are appointed by the President. Thus, their membership
ALBERTO G. ROMULO 14 April 1993 to 1 August 1995
within the Council is the only genuine representation of the People. Their input in the
+MARCELO B. FERNAN 2 August 1995 to 31 December 1996 possible candidates to the judiciary is as invaluable as that of a member of the legal
+RAUL S. ROCO 1 January 1997 to 30 July 1998 academe or that of the private sector.
+RENATO L. CAYETANO 31 July 1998 to 31 January 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. 1 February 2000 to 29 November 2000 The antecedents of this case only serve to highlight the absurd results wrought by Chavez.
+MIRIAM D. SANTIAGO 10 January 2001 to 14 February 2001 In 2013, then Representative Tupas approached the Judicial and Bar Council to personally
+RENATO L. CAYETANO 16 May 2001 to 28 August 2001 inform it of the agreed representation between the Senate and the House of
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 29 August 2001 to August 2004 Representatives. When told by Chief Justice Sereno that she had already received a letter
  23 August 2004 to 30 June 2007 from then Senate President Drilon informing the Council of the agreed representation,
  6 August 2007 to 23 November 2008 Representative Tupas replied that he was not aware of the letter:
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO 24 November 2008 to 30 June 2013 [Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this
AQUILINO MARTIN DL. PIMENTEL year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized
23 July 2013 to 31 December 2013 him and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to
III
  1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014 discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that representation would be
  1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015 on a rotation basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to
LEILA M. DE LIMA 26 July 2016 to 19 September 2016 represent both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be [him]. In
the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the
RICHARD J. GORDON 19 September 2016 to date
meetings, and vice versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to
   
come up with an agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate
Ex Officio Members Representing the President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It
 
House of should be a communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished
Representatives, Congress:   with copies of all notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.
 Within the Council, the Executive is represented by the Secretary of Justice, considered as
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of the Senate President Drilon the alter ego of the President. The Judiciary is represented by the Chief Justice. Congress,
stating, among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President however, operates through a Senate and a House of Representatives. Two (2) separate
agreed that Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31, and distinct chambers cannot be represented by a single individual.
2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both
Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices Chavez also implied that the framers intended for the Council's membership to be seven
and information that are being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked (7), not eight (8).
Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the agreement between the
two Houses of Congress, thus giving a higher level of comfort than it had already given. Article VIII, Section 8(1), however, does not provide a numerical count for its membership
unlike in other the provisions of the Constitution.[138] Increasing the Council's membership
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a to eight (8) would not violate the provisions of the Constitution.
letter. His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from
the Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement. Chavez also insisted that the Council should have an odd-number representation so that
He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave. one (1) member could function as a tie-breaker.

Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents Judicial nominees, however, are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote. The Council submits
during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as to the President a list of at least three (3) potential nominees who garnered a plurality of
he had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving. [134] (Emphasis the votes. Some nominees may even have the same number of votes, and the Council will
supplied) still include all of those names in the shortlist.
There is no office or officer in Congress that can represent both chambers. Representative
Tupas recognized this difficulty and cautioned the Council that it should never presume The shortlist dated December 2, 2016 for the vacancy of Associate Justice Perez contained
that one (1) chamber can speak for the entire Congress. He proved this point when he told the following names:[139]
the Council that he was unaware of any letter sent by the Senate President. 1. REYES, Jose Jr. C. - 7 votes
2. BRUSELAS,
Chavez forces one (1) chamber of Congress to arrogate upon itself all the powers, - 5 votes
Apolinario Jr. D.
prerogatives, and privileges of the entire Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is 3. DIMAAMPAO, Japar
contrary to its bicameral nature. - 5 votes
B.
4. MARTIRES, Samuel
When members of Congress sit in the Judicial and Bar Council, it may be with the - 5 votes
R.
instruction of their respective chambers, as Representative Tupas demonstrated in the July
5. REYES, Andres Jr. B. - 4 votes
23, 2013 En Banc Meeting. Their votes may likewise be constrained by resolutions and
The shortlist dated December 9, 2016 for the vacancy of Associate Justice Brion contained
actions of the Congressional Committees they represent. They do not just represent
the following names:[140]
themselves. They are "representatives of Congress" "ex officio"[135]
1. CARANDANG,
- 6 votes
Of the two (2) chambers in Congress, the House of Representatives represent Rosmari D.
constituencies on a more local scale. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, 2. BRUSELAS,
- 5 votes
current voting patterns of the Council shows that a large number of appointees were for Apolinario Jr. D.
the lower courts:[136] 3. REYES, Jose, Jr. C. - 5 votes
Court/Tribunal Number of Appointees 4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar
- 4 votes
B.
Supreme Court 1
5. LAZARO-JAVIER,
Court of Appeals 0 - 4 votes
Amy C.
Legal Education Board 1 6. TIJAM, Noel G. - 4 votes
Sandiganbayan 1 7. VENTURA-JIMENO,
- 4 votes
Court of Tax Appeals 1 Rita Linda S.
Ombudsman 0 As demonstrated, no tie-breaker was needed in the preparation of the shortlist. Insisting
that the composition of the Council should be an odd number is unnecessary. The Council
Lower Courts 38
will still be able to discharge its functions regardless of whether it is composed of seven
Chavez deprives Congress its opportunity to fully represent its constituencies, whether at (7) or eight (8) members.
the national or at the local level. V

The purported reasons for having only one (1) representative of Congress to the Council Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, however, did not commit grave abuse of discretion
are illusory. when it adopted the six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement.

Chavez stated that Congress should be represented in the Council by only one (1) member Grave abuse of discretion is defined as:
"not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a [S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
major branch of government."[137] jurisdiction . . . , or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the Mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot be issued
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [141] (Citations omitted) to compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority
Respondent Judicial and Bar Council was merely implementing a prior decision of this v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay:[147]
Court when it refused to count petitioner's votes. A relevant portion of the Chavez's, fallo Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A
states: ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to
Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.[142] exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on
The method of reconstitution was left to the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council, in matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one
recognition of its status as an independent constitutional body. The Council, in turn, way or the other.[148] (Citations omitted)
implemented Chavez by requiring that Congress provide it with only one (1) The difference between a discretionary act and a ministerial act is settled:
representative. In the July 23, 2013 En Banc Meeting, Representative Tupas relayed the The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
instructions of the House of Representatives. Then Senate President Drilon sent the ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
instructions of the Senate through a letter to the Chief Justice. Both the Senate and the in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
House of Representatives did not offer any other type of representation that may have to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
been agreed upon. The Council, therefore, was merely complying with the directive If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
in Chavez. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[143] when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that discretion or judgment.[149] (Citation omitted)
must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of The determination of the qualifications and fitness of judicial applicants is discretionary on
those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[144] the part of the Judicial and Bar Council.[150] A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to
These events, however, highlight the inevitable difficulty in compel the council to withdraw a list originally submitted and to add other nominees that
implementing Chavez's interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1). There is no one (1) have not previously qualified.[151]
office in Congress that could provide the Council with one (1) representative. The Council
has no authority to order Congress to jointly convene for the determination of its sole De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,[152] however, states that a writ of mandamus may be
representative. Thus, the Council would only be able to implement what is practicable, that issued to compel the Council to comply with its constitutional mandate to submit a list of
is, whatever arrangement the Congressional representatives may have agreed upon. nominees to the President before the 90-day period to appoint:
Considering that the Congressional representatives have not yet manifested to the Council The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's
that it was considering another type of arrangement, the Council could not have been mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates
faulted for refusing to count petitioner's votes at a time when Senate was representing whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of
Congress in the Council. the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to
submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise requests that this Court take up the matter of order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
rotational representation in the review of the Council's rules in Aguinaldo v. Judicial and performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
Bar Council.[145] unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in
submitting the list to the President.[153] (Citation omitted)
In Aguinaldo, the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council were docketed as The Judicial and Bar Council has the ministerial duty to count the votes of all its members.
a separate administrative matter to be discussed at a future time. [146] Petitioner, as the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, should be
considered a regular ex officio member of the Council, and his votes in the December 2
This case, however, is a matter of constitutional interpretation. There is, thus, no need to and 9, 2016 En Banc Meetings should have been counted. This relief, however, has already
direct the Judicial and Bar Council to review its own rules to allow for the interpretation of become moot in light of the recent appointments to this Court. In future deliberations,
this constitutional provision. however, the Judicial and Bar Council should have the ministerial duty to separately count
VI the votes of both Congressional representatives in the Council.

The Judicial and Bar Council could have been compelled by a writ of mandamus to count Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition. The doctrine in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
petitioner's votes in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016. Council[154] must be ABANDONED and the Judicial and Bar Council must be DIRECTED to
separately count the votes of both Congressional representatives in the Council in its En
Mandamus is provided for under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: Banc deliberations.
Section 3. Petition for Mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as [1]
 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other [2]
 Id.
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
[3]
 709 Phil. 478 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some [4]
 See I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL No. 29, dated July 14, 1986.
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of  JBC Officials, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-
[5]

the wrongful acts of the respondent. officials> (Last accessed March 6, 2017).
 JBC from January to June while Senate represents Congress from July to December. Justice Bienvenido
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 189 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] citing List of
[6]
Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while Justice Mendoza retires on August 13, 2017. Justice Velasco, Jr.
JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and Consultants, issued by retires on August 18, 2018 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro retires on October 8, 2018. Justice Del
the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council and Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Castillo retires on July 29, 2019, Justice Jardeleza retires on September 26, 2019, Justice Bersamin
Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001. Curiously, the List retires on October 18, 2019 and Justice Carpio retires on October 26, 2019. Two justices will retire in
found in Judicial and Bar Council's website shows that since 1988, Congress has sent two (2) the first half of 2019: Justice Martires retires on January 2, 2019 and Justice Tijam retires on January 5,
representatives to the Council.  2019.

[7]
 691 Phil. 173, 189 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. [32]
 Justice Peralta retires on March 27, 2022 while Justice Perlas-Bernabe retires on May 14, 2022.

 Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Carpio, Velasco,
[8] [33]
 Rollo, p. 20.
Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Sereno, JJ., no part, nominees to the C.J. position. Brion J., no part, on
leave. Abad, J., dissented. Del Castillo, J., joined the dissent of J. Abad. [34]
 Id. at 23.

 C.J. Sereno had no part as chair of JBC. Associate Justice Velasco had no part due to participation in
[9] [35]
 Id. at 24.
Judicial and Bar Council. Associate Justice Brion had no part. Associate Justices Carpio, Leonardo-De
Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe concurred. [36]
 Id. at 27-28.
Associate Justice Abad, Del Castillo and Leonen dissented.
[37]
 Id. at 29-30.
[10]
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 494 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[38]
 Id. at 30.
[11]
 Rollo, p. 45.
[39]
 Id. at 15.
[12]
 Id.
[40]
 Id. at 16.
[13]
 Id. at 260, Comment.
[41]
 691 Phil. 173, 494 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[14]
 Id. at 6. Representative Umali is the current chair of the House Committee on Justice.
 Rollo, pp. 160-245. The Manifestation was verified by Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III
[42]

[15]
 Id. at 10. and Speaker of the House Pantaleon D. Alvarez.

[16]
 Id. at 3-40.  Id. at 425-432. The Counter-Manifestation attached a letter from Senator Richard Gordon, the
[43]

current Chair of the Senate Committee on Justice and Senate representative to the Judicial and Bar
[17]
 Id. at 33. Council, signifying his assent to the Petition filed by Rep. Umali. This Court likewise noted a Letter
(rollo, pp. 426-427) from Secretary of Justice Vitaliano N. Aguirre II stating that while he previously
[18]
 Id. at 160-241. signified his assent to the filing of the Judicial and Bar Council's Comment, he found after further
evaluation that "the arguments of the representative of Mindoro in his petition to be impressed with
[19]
 Id. at 160. merit."

[20]
 Id. [44]
 Id. at 168.

[21]
 Retired Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez. [45]
 Id. at 169.

[22]
 Jose V. Mejia, Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa, and Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. [46]
 Id. at 175.

[23]
 Rollo, pp. 257-290. [47]
 Id. at 185.

[24]
 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. [48]
 Id. at 186-187.

[25]
 Rollo, pp. 15-16. [49]
 Id. at 190-194.

[26]
 Id. at 16. [50]
 Id. at 194-198.

[27]
 Id. at 16-17. [51]
 Id. at 200.

[28]
 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8 (1) provides: [52]
 Id. at 201.

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court [53]
 Id. at 207-209.
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired [54]
 Id. at 209-211.
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
[55]
 Id. at 217-220.
[29]
 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[56]
 Id. at 224-225.
[30]
 Id. at 18.
[57]
 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
[31]
 Id. at 19. Under its current arrangement, the House of Representatives represents Congress in the file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[58]
 Rollo, pp. 227-237. [87]
 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

[59]
 Id. at 262-263. [88]
 Id. at 331.

[60]
 Id. at 264-265. [89]
 Id. at 330.

[61]
 Id. at 268-269. [90]
 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

[62]
 Id. at 265. [91]
 Id. at 692 citing Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20 (1963) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

[63]
 Id. at 266-267.  Associate Justice Martires was appointed on March 2, 2017 vice Associate Justice Perez while
[92]

Associate Justice Tijam was appointed on March 8, 2017 vice Associate Justice Brion. Judicial and Bar
[64]
 Id. at 267. Council, See Newly-appointed Judges/Justices, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
<http://jbc.iudiciary.gov.ph/index.php/announcements/newly-appointed> (Lase accessed July 25,
[65]
 Id. at 269-271. 2017).

[66]
 Id. at 271-273.  Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing Mattel, Inc. v.
[93]

Francisco, 582 Phil. 492 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division] and Constantino v.
[67]
 Id. at 273-275. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 559 Phil. 622 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

[68]
 Id. at 276.  Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while Associate Justice Mendoza retires
[94]

on August 13, 2017.

[69]
 Id. at 277-280.
[95]
 Rollo, pp. 271-273.
[70]
 Id. at 280-281.
[96]
 Id. at 273-275.
[71]
 Id. at 282-284.
 Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 395 Phil. 169, 177 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] citing R.S.
[97]

 David v. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755-756 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc] citing Black's
[72]
Vasan, Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers, p. 227.
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1991, p. 941, RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 2, and Salonga v. Warner Barnes
& Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]. [98]
 Id.

[73]
 Rollo, pp. 269-271.  See Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 677 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
[99]

En Banc].
[74]
 305 Phil. 546 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
[100]
 Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249, 257 (1947) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
[75]
 Id. at 562-536. See also rollo, pp. 269-270.
[101]
 Id.
 Philconsa v. Enriquez, 305 Phil. 563, 562-564 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc] citing Gonzales v.
[76]

Macaraig, Jr., 269 Phil. 472 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc]; United States v. American Tel. [102]
 632 Phil. 657 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
& Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 (1976); Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard
Law Review 1632 (1977); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d  Id. at 686 citing Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 171 (1996) [Per J.
[103]

1307 (1973); and Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (1976). Francisco, Third Division] and Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Harvard University
Press, p. 4 (1982).
[77]
 501 Phil. 303 (2005) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
[104]

 Id. at 312-313 citing Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307
[78]
Banc] citing Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Dissenting
(2000) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. Opinion of J. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 536 Phil. 1, 281 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc], Separate Opinion of Justice Imperial in In the matter of the Involuntary Insolvency of Rafael
[79]
 Rollo, p. 160. Fernandez, 59 Phil. 30, 41 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], and Lazatin v. Desierto, 606 Phil. 271
(2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[80]
 1987 ADM. CODE, Book IV, Title III, chapter 12, sec. 35.
 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 678 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
[105]

[81]
 352 Phil. 424 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]. Banc] citing Urbano v. Chavez, 262 Phil. 374, 385 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].

 Id. at 431-432 citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478; Section 35, Chapter 12 of the
[82]
 In the matter of the Involuntary Insolvency of Rafael Fernandez, 59 Phil. 30 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm,
[106]

Administrative Code of 1987; Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 267 Phil. 476 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
En Banc]; and Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 307 Phil. 592 (1994) [Per C.J. Narvasa, Second Division].
 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] and 709 Phil. 478 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En
[107]

[83]
 282 Phil. 858 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc]. Banc].

[84]
 Id. at 889-891. [108]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 2.

[85]
 Rollo, p. 265. [109]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 5 (1).

[86]
 Id. at 266-267. [110]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 5 (2).
 ....
[111]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 4.
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the
[112]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 7. qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

[113]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16. Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law[.]
[114]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (1).
....
[115]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (4), par. (1).
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
[116]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (4), par. (2). shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
[117]
 CONST., art. VI, sec. 16 (3). be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be[.]
[118]
 The House of Representatives is located in Quezon City while the Senate is located in Pasay City.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 503-504
[119]
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by
(2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
[120]
 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
....
[121]
 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
Article VIII
[122]
 Id. at 162.
....
[123]
 Id. at 169-170.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 501 (2013)
[124]
It may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members . . .
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Article IX
[125]
 I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL No. 34, dated July 19, 1986.
....
 I CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION RECORD, JOURNAL NO. 35, dated July 21, 1986, which reads in
[126]

part With 22 Members voting for a unicameral system and 23 Members voting for bicameralism, the B. The Civil Service Commission
Body approved the proposal for a bicameral legislature.
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
[127]
 II Constitutional Commission Record 434, dated 30, 1986. Chairman and two Commissioners . . .

[128]
 II Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 102, dated October 7 and 8,1987. C. The Commission on Elections

[129]
 III Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 103 dated October 9, 1986. Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners . . .
[130]
 V Constitutional Commission Record, Journal No. 109 dated October 15, 1986.
D. Commission on Audit
 List of Former and Incumbent JBC Chairpersons, Ex Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio
[131]

Secretaries, Consultants and Officers (from 1987 to date), JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners
<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials> (Last accessed July 25, 2017).
....
[132]
 See Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Article XI
 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 506 (2013)
[133]

[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. ....

[134]
 Rollo, p. 259. Section 11. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 507 (2013)
[135]
Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Article XIII
[136]
 Rollo, p. 224.
....
[137]
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 491 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
Section 17 . . .
[138]
 See the following constitutional provisions:
(2) The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must
Article VI be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.
  Shortlist of Nominees dated December 2, 2016, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
[139]

<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Perez_12-2-16.pdf> (Last accessed

July 25, 2017).

 Shortlist of Nominees dated December 9, 2016, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,

[140]

<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Brion_12-9-16.pdf> (Last accessed

July 25, 2017).

 Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278, 280 (1941) [Per J. Moran, First Division] citing Abad Santos vs.
[141]

Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480 (1939) [Per J. Moran, En Banc] and Tavera-Lima, Inc. vs. Nable, 61
Phil. 340 (1939) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

[142]
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 209 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

[143]
 632 Phil. 657 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

 Id. at 686 citing Caltex (Phil), Inc. v. Palomar, 124 Phil. 763 (1966) [Per J. Castro, En
[144]

Banc].

 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016,

[145]

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En
Banc].

[146]
 Id. at 40.

[147]
 595 Phil. 305 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].

 Id. at 326 citing Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997) [Per J. Melo,
[148]

Third Division]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004); Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456,
490 (1912) [Per J. Johnson, First Division].

 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 706-707 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin,
[149]

En Banc] citing Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 664 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second
Division].

 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council, 741 Phil.
[150]

460, 641 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

[151]
 Id.

[152]
 629 Phil. 629 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

 Id. at 706 citing Nery v. Gamolo, 446 Phil. 76 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
[153]

Division], Musni v. Morales, 373 Phil. 703 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

 691 Phil. 173 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc] and 709 Phil. 478 (2013)
[154]

[Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

 SECOND DIVISION AS PER NLRC DECISION DATED NOV. 29, 1993[6]
[ G.R. No. 141600, September 12, 2003 ]          
ROBERTO FULGENCIO VS. NLRC   Name Backwages Additional 
DECISION (as of 4/30/96) Backwages TOTAL
         
CALLEJO, SR., J.: 1. Rolando Laya, Sr. P179,674.60 P54,232.10 P233,906.70
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the September 10, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2. Romulo Magpili   180,637.60   54,232.10   234,869.16
CA-G.R. SP No. 54641 which dismissed outright the petitioners' petition for certiorari for 3. Wilfredo Brun   179,474.62   54,232.10   233,706.72
alleged failure to comply with the formal requirements of the rules, and its January 18, 4. Ramil Hernandez   179,474.62   54,232.10   233,706.72
2000 Resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
5. Eduardo Reyes   179,474.62   54,232.10   233,706.72
As culled from the records, the petition at bar stemmed from the following factual 6. Crisostomo Dorompili   179,474.62   54,232.10   233,706.72
antecedents:
7. Herman Delima   174,489.12   54,232.10   228,721.22
The private respondent Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. was engaged in the installation of 8. Angelito Realizo   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
airconditioning systems in the buildings of its clients.  In connection with such installation 9. Roberto Fulgencio   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
work, the herein petitioners were among those hired by the private respondent to work in
various capacities, such as tinsmith, leadsman, aircon mechanic, installer, welder and 10. Susano Atienza   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
painter. 11. Jorge Cipriano   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
12. Gerardo de Guzman   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
On different dates in 1992, the private respondent served the petitioners with uniformly
worded notices of termination of employment.  As a result, the petitioners joined other 13. Jaime Calipayan   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
employees in filing three separate cases of illegal dismissal against the private respondent, 13. Jaime Calipayan   191,672.48   54,232.10   245,904.58
docketed as NLRC-NCR Nos. 00-03-01930-92, 00-05-02789-92 and 00-07-03699-92.  The
15. Florencio Espina   191,761.77   54,232.10   245,993.87
proceedings in all the cases were subsequently consolidated.
  TOTAL AWARD (as of 4/15/97) 3,600,607.69
On January 22, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the complaints for
lack of merit.[1]  On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
labor arbiter's findings and ruled as follows: Computation of Additional Backwages
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering   5/1/96 - 2/5/97 = 9.16 mos.    
respondent to:
  P165 x 26 days x 9.16 mos. = P39,296.40
  2/6/97 - 4/15/97 = 2.30 mos.    
1. Immediately reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights and privileges; and   P180 x 26 days x 2.30 mos. = 10,764.00
2. Pay them full backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the       P50,060.40
time they are actually reinstated.[2]
The private respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, the   13th Mo. Pay (1/12 of   4,171.70
private respondent filed a petition for certiorari[3] assailing the above-quoted decision with P50,060.40)
the Supreme Court which rendered judgment on September 9, 1996, [4] the decretal portion   Total   P54,232.10
of which reads:
      =========
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one rendered holding that petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proof in the
instant case and therefore ORDERING the reinstatement of private respondents as regular The Labor Arbiter approved the computation in an Order dated August 15, 1997. [7]
employees of petitioner, without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with payment of
backwages from the day they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated.  Meanwhile, on motion of the petitioners, a writ of execution [8] was issued by the Labor
No costs. Arbiter on January 28, 1998, directing the sheriff of the NLRC, as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to accompany complainants Rolando Laya
SO ORDERED. Sr., Romulo Magpili, Wilfredo Brun, Ramil Hernandez, Eduardo Reyes, Crisostomo
The judgment of the court became final and executory on November 18, 1996. [5] The Dorompili, Hernan Delima, Angelito Ralizo, Roberto Fulgencio, Susano Atienza, Jorge
private respondent filed a motion for clarification claiming that it had offered reinstatement Cipriano, Gerardo de Guzman, Jaime Calipay, Carlito de Guzman and Florencio Espino to
to the petitioners on July 13, 1992 but that the latter spurned its offer.  The Court denied the premises of respondent located at Room 306, 20th Century Building, Mandaluyong City,
the said motion.  The case was remanded to the NLRC for implementation.  In due course, for the purpose of reinstating them to their former position and collect from said
the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC computed the benefits due the petitioners respondent the amount of P3,960,668.45 corresponding to complainants' backwages and
and submitted an updated computation on April 15, 1997, viz: attorney's lien.  If you fail to collect sufficient amount in cash, you are further commanded
to satisfy the award from the movable and immovable properties of respondent not
  RE:  UPDATED COMPUTATION OF AWARD exempt from execution and deposit the amount you have with the Cashier of this Office. 
You may also collect your execution fees in the amount of P4,450.60 pursuant to Section THAT THE SAID "PETITION HAS NO SUCH STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES," IN
5, Rule IX of the Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs and likewise to turnover the same to VIOLATION OF RULE 65.
the Cashier or authorized Disbursing Officer of this Office.  You shall return this writ within II
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof with the proceedings endorsed thereon. [9]
Pursuant to the above writ, the sheriff on February 10, 1998 garnished the funds of the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN STRICTLY ADHERING TO
private respondent amounting to P3,960,668.45 which was in the possession of Intel TECHNICALITIES, RATHER THAN IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, IN THE APPLICATION OF
Technology Philippines, Inc.[10] The same amount was subsequently remitted by Intel to THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT.[17]
the Cashier of the NLRC on March 19, 1998.[11] We find the petition meritorious.

On February 13, 1998, the private respondent appealed the January 27, 1998 Order of the It appears that the petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which rendered judgment on June 16, 1998, to wit: showing when they received notice of the NLRC's June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date
We therefore sum up our ruling as follows: when they filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46
of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended.[18] Petitioners also failed to include in their
a) The backwages of the complainant will not be reduced by their salaries obtained petition the required explanation under Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules [19] as to why
elsewhere during the period of their dismissal until the offer of reinstatement was made. personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to.  The petitioners, however,
submit that they raised meritorious arguments in their petition; hence, the dismissal
b) The computation of backwages stopped on July 13, 1992, when the return-to-work thereof by the CA on a mere technicality would cause a miscarriage of justice.  The
[order] was made by the respondent but was refused by the complainants. petitioners, therefore, invoke considerations of substantial justice for this Court to give
their petition due course and pray that the questioned resolutions be set aside.
c) The backwages should be based on the complainants' wage rate in 1992.
For its part, the private respondent asserts that the CA did not commit any reversible error
d) The complainants are awarded 13th Month Pay. in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for it simply applied the express and
... categorical mandate of the Rules.  The private respondent argues that while it is true that
the Rules of Court should be liberally construed, it is also equally true that the Rules
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED but the petition for preliminary injunction is cannot be ignored since strict observance thereof is indispensable to the orderly and
DENIED for being moot and academic.  The Cashier is hereby ordered to release the speedy discharge of judicial business.
amount of TWO HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND THIRTY PESOS AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS
(P202,030.29) for distribution to the individual complainants in accordance with the above We agree that for the petitioners' failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 11,
computation and to remit the balance of the garnished and deposited amount to the Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the petition should be dismissed,
respondent.[12] pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules.  In the case of Solar
The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the above-quoted decision, Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[20] cited in the assailed September 10, 1999
contending that by computing the backwages of the petitioners up to July 13, 1992 only, Resolution of the CA, we indeed underscored the mandatory character of Section 11 of
the NLRC modified the already final and executory decision of the Supreme Court. The Rule 13, thus:
NLRC issued an Order dated May 11, 1999 denying the said motion. [13] On August 31, We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
1999, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes
preliminary injunction[14] with the CA which outrightly dismissed the petition in a Resolution of service and filing, the exception.  Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
dated September 10, 1999,[15] which reads: practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or
Section 3, Rule 46 as amended by the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 which took filing is mandatory.  Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
effect on September 1, 1998 provides that "In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.  In adjudging the plausibility of
order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received." The case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
petition has no such statement of material dates, violating the aforecited rule and is a expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in
the administration of justice.
Also, We note that the petitioners have failed to include in their petition the required Nonetheless, we resolve to give due course to the petition to avert a miscarriage of
explanation on why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to pursuant to justice.  For judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the
Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  Strict compliance with mere mandate of technicalities.  Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a
this rule is mandated. (Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort, et manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to
al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998). resolve the case.[21] In Aguam v. CA,[22] we ruled that:
...  The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a
Petition is hereby DISMISSED outright.[16] power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be
The petitioners instituted the present recourse, assigning to the CA the following errors: exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
I circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law
abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION render or dispense justice.  "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike
FOR CERTIORARI WITH WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE ALLEGED GROUND duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on private respondent believed the aforesaid computation to be erroneous in the light of the
technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper factual circumstances obtaining between the parties, it should have assigned the same as
and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. an error when it filed its petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 114290 assailing the said NLRC
Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of judgment.  The private respondent did not do so.  Although the private respondent filed a
the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure motion for clarification of the decision of this Court in the said case, the said motion was,
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to however, denied by this Court in its Resolution dated October 15, 1997 [29] considering that
help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of entry of judgment had already been made.
action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and It is, therefore, crystal-clear that the manner of the computation of the petitioners'
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases backwages is an issue which was already resolved by this Court in its decision in G.R. No.
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[23] 114290 which had long acquired finality.  Hence, the Court's decision in G.R. No. 114290,
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.  which directed the payment of the petitioners' backwages from the time they were
They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated, has become the "law of the case"
justice.  Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.  which now binds the NLRC and the private respondent.  The "law of the case" doctrine has
In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided been defined as "a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes
by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
and not the other way around.  Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal." [30] The
rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a private respondent, therefore, on appeal to the NLRC in the course of the execution
particular case from its operation.[24] proceedings in the case, is barred from challenging anew the issue of the manner in which
the petitioners' backwages should be computed.  Corollarily, the NLRC can no longer
In this case, the Court finds compelling reasons to disregard the petitioners' procedural modify the ruling of the Court on the matter. Judgment of courts should attain finality at
lapses in order to obviate a patent injustice.  And to avert further delay, we have also some point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. 
opted to resolve the petition on its merits rather than remand the case to the appellate In Hufana v. Genato,[31] we held that:
court, a remand not being necessary where, as in the instant case, the ends of justice It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
would not be subserved thereby and we are in a position to resolve the dispute based on court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
the records before us.[25] upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the
law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
We are convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion decision, continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the order of the Labor Arbiter, for the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence,
in so doing, the NLRC modified the decision of this Court in Raycor Aircontrol Systems, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew since
Inc. v. NLRC.[26] said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest in that aforementioned case
(Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by the principle of res judicata, but at least
It bears stressing that in our decision in G.R. No. 114290, we specifically enjoined the by conclusiveness of judgment (Vda. de Sta. Romana v. PCIB 118 SCRA 335 [1982]).
petitioners' reinstatement coupled with the payment of backwages, from the time of their IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision of the
dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement.  However, the NLRC, in its assailed NLRC dated June 16, 1998 is SET ASIDE.  The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated August
June 16, 1998 Decision, directed the payment of the petitioners' backwages from the time 15, 1997 is AFFIRMED.
of dismissal up to July 13, 1992, thus sustaining the claim of the private respondent that
when the petitioners were directed to return to work on the said date, they refused.  In so SO ORDERED.
doing, the NLRC sought to enforce the final judgment in G.R. No. 114290 in a manner
contrary to the explicit terms thereof.  We cannot and should not countenance such a Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
travesty.  Thus, in Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that: Quisumbing, J., in the result.
It is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated.  Execution not in harmony with the
judgment is bereft of validity.  It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

Corollary thereto, it must be stressed that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes — all the issues between the parties being
deemed resolved and laid to rest. This is meant to preserve the stability of decisions
rendered by the courts, and to dissuade parties from trifling with court processes. One who
has submitted his case to a regular court necessarily commits himself to abide by
whatever decision the court may render. Any error in the decision which has not been
considered in a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal cannot be impugned when
such error becomes apparent only during execution. ...
We note that in its Decision dated June 16, 1998, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's
dismissal of the case and directed the payment of backwages, to be reckoned from the
time of the petitioners' dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement. [28] If the
 SECOND DIVISION floor area of 3,968.56 square meters, the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to
[ G.R. No. 134284, December 01, 2000 ] the building official of Makati, contemplated a 91.65 meter high, 38 storey condominium
AYALA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters.[1] Needless to say, while the
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. first set of building plans complied with the deed restrictions, the latter set exceeded  the
same.
DECISION
During the construction of Rosa-Diana's condominium project, Ayala filed an action with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 139 for specific performance, with
DE LEON, JR., J.: application for a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of a decision rendered Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations under
by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598 entitled, "Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa- the deed of restrictions annotated on its title as well as with the building plans it submitted
Diana Realty and Development Corporation," dismissing Ayala Corporation's petition for to the latter.  In the alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to
lack of merit. Rosa- Diana Realty.

The facts of the case are not in dispute: The lower court denied Ayala's prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to
complete the construction of the building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the annotation
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Ayala) was the registered owner of of a notice of  lis pendens on Rosa-Diana's title.  The Register of Deeds of Makati,
a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 however, refused registration of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that the case
square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 pending before the trial court, being an action for specific performance and/or rescission, 
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. is an action in personam which does not involve the title, use or possession of the
property.[2] The Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the ruling of the Register of
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and  Sy Ka Kieng Deeds saying that an action for specific performance or rescission may be classified as a
married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation
Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special Conditions of Sale thereof for which a notice of lis pendens may be held proper.[3] The decision of the LRA,
were: however,  was overturned by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157.  In G.R.
a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the vendor before No. 112774, We affirmed the ruling of the CA on February 16, 1994 saying
September 30, 1976 for the latter's approval We agree with respondent court that the notice of lis pendens is not proper in this
instance. The case before the trial court is a personal action since the cause of action
b) the construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed thereof arises primarily from the alleged violation of the Deed of Restrictions.
before 1979.  Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the
title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully paid In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of evidence before the trial court. 
Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring that Ayala failed to establish its right to
c) there shall be no resale of the property the relief sought inasmuch as (a) Ayala admittedly does not enforce the deed restrictions
uniformly and strictly (b) Ayala has lost its right/power to enforce the restrictions due to
The Deed Restrictions, on the other hand, contained the stipulation that the gross floor its own acts and omissions; and (c) the deed restrictions are no longer valid and effective
area of the building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot area against lot buyers in Ayala's controlled subdivision.
and the total height shall not exceed forty two (42) meters.  The restrictions were to
expire in the year 2025. The trial court sustained Rosa-Diana's Demurrer to Evidence saying that Ayala was guilty
of abandonment and/or estoppel due to its failure to enforce the terms of deed of
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special restrictions and special conditions of sale against Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng.  The trial
Conditions of Sale.  Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka  Kieng, in  April court noted that notwithstanding the violation of the special conditions of sale, Manuel Sy
1989, were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development and Sy Ka Kieng were able to transfer the title to Rosa-Diana with the approval of Ayala. 
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Rosa-Diana) with Ayala's approval.  As a The trial court added that Ayala's failure to enforce the restrictions with respect to
consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of the subject property, Rosa- Trafalgar, Shellhouse, Eurovilla, LPL Plaza, Parc Regent, LPL Mansion and Leronville which
Diana, on July 27, 1989 executed an Undertaking promising to abide by said special are located within Salcedo Village,  shows that Ayala discriminated against those which it
conditions of sale executed between Ayala and the original vendees.  Upon the submission wants to have the obligation enforced.  The trial court then concluded that for Ayala to
of the Undertaking, together with the building plans for a condominium project, known as discriminately choose which obligor would be made to follow certain conditions and which
"The Peak", Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to register the should not, did not seem fair and legal.
deed of sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its name.  The title
carried as encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions.  Rosa- The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court saying that the "appeal is sealed
Diana's building plans as approved by Ayala were "subject to strict compliance of by the doctrine of the law of the case in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157" where it was stated that
cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and to the restrictions encumbering the x x x Ayala is barred from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions in question pursuant to the
Lot regarding the use and occupancy of the same." doctrine of waiver and estoppel. Under the terms of the deed of sale, the vendee Sy Ka
Kieng assumed faithful compliance with the special conditions of sale and with the Salcedo
Thereafter,  Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building Village Deed of Restrictions. One of the conditions was that a building would be
plans for "The Peak" which were substantially different from those that it earlier submitted constructed within one year. However, Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building as
to Ayala for approval.  While the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for required under the Deed of Sale.  Ayala did nothing to enforce the terms of the contract.
approval envisioned a 24-meter high, seven (7) storey condominium project with a gross In fact, it even agreed to the sale of the lot by Sy Ka Kieng in favor of petitioner Realty in
1989 or thirteen (13) years later. We, therefore, see no justifiable reason for Ayala to vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, Inc."  in ruling against petitioner saying that it is
attempt to enforce the terms of the conditions of sale against the petitioner. jurisprudential under the doctrine of stare decisis.

xxx It must be pointed out that the only issue that was raised before the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was whether or not the annotation of lis pendens is proper.  The
The Court of Appeals also cited C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, "Ayala Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, in its decision, in fact stated "the principal issue to be resolved is: 
Ray Burton Development Corporation" which relied on  C.A. G.R. S.P.  No. 29157  in ruling whether or not an action for specific performance, or in the alternative, rescission of deed
that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in dispute.  Upon a motion for of sale to enforce the deed of restrictions governing the use of property, is a real or
reconsideration filed by herein petitioner, the Court of Appeals clarified that  "the citation personal action, or one that affects title thereto and its use or occupation thereof." [8]
of the decision in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, C.A. G.R.
C.V. No. 46488, February 27, 1996, was made not because said decision is res judicata to In the aforesaid decision, the Court of Appeals even justified the cancellation of the notice
the case at bar but rather because it is precedential under the doctrine of stare decisis." of lis pendens on the ground that Ayala had ample protection should it succeed in proving
its allegations regarding the violation of the deed of restrictions, without unduly curtailing
Upon denial of said motion for reconsideration, Ayala filed the present appeal. the right of the petitioner to fully enjoy its property in the meantime that there is as yet no
decision by the trial court.[9]
Ayala contends that the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No.
29157 that it is estopped from enforcing the deed restrictions is merely obiter From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was aware that the issue as to
dictainasmuch as the only issue raised in the aforesaid case was the propriety of a lis whether petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions has yet to be
pendens annotation on Rosa-Diana's certificate of title. resolved by the trial court. Though it did make a pronouncement that the petitioner is
estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions, it also mentioned at the same time that
Ayala avers that Rosa-Diana presented no evidence whatsoever on Ayala's supposed this particular issue has yet to be resolved by the trial court.  Notably, upon appeal to this
waiver or estoppel in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157. Ayala likewise pointed out that at the time Court, We have affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals only as regards the particular
C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was on appeal, the issues of the validity and continued viability issue of the propriety of the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
of the deed of restrictions and their enforceability by Ayala were joined and then being
tried before the trial court. We see no reason then, how the law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be
applicable in the case at bench.  If at all, the pronouncement made by the Court of
Petitioner's assignment of errors in the present appeal may essentially be summarized as Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be
follows: considered as obiter dicta.  As earlier mentioned, the only issue before the Court of
Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens. The additional
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from enforcing the deed of
I. The Court of Appeals acted in a manner not in accord with law and the
restrictions even as it recognized that this said issue is being tried before the trial court
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the doctrine of
was not necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the annotation of the lis
the law of the case, or  stare decisis, operated to dismiss Ayala's appeal.
pendens.  A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or
II. The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law and departed from the
determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point,
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to
not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself. [10] It is not necessarily limited to
expressly pass upon the specific errors assigned in Ayala's appeal.
issues essential to the decision but may also include expressions of opinion which are not
necessary to support the decision reached by the court.  Mere dicta are not binding under
A discussion on the distinctions between law of the case, stare decisis and obiter dicta is in
the doctrine of stare decisis.[11]
order.
While the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the present petition is not barred by
The doctrine of the law of the case has certain affinities with, but is clearly distinguishable
C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled "Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Inc."
from, the doctrines of res judicata and  stare decisis, principally on the ground that the
under the doctrine of  res judicata,  neither, however, can  the latter case be cited as
rule of the law of the case operates only in the particular case and only as a rule of policy
precedential under the doctrine of stare decisis. It must be pointed out that at the time the
and not as one of law.[4] At variance  with the doctrine of stare decisis, the ruling adhered
assailed decision was rendered, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 was on appeal with this Court. 
to in the particular case under the doctrine of the law of the case need not be followed as a
Significantly, in the decision We have rendered in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton
precedent in subsequent litigation between other parties, neither by the appellate court
Development Corporation[12] which became final and executory on July 5, 1999 we have
which made the decision followed on a subsequent appeal in the same case, nor by any
clearly stated that "An examination of the decision in the said Rosa-Diana case reveals
other court.  The ruling covered by the doctrine of the law of the case is adhered to in the
that the sole issue raised before the appellate court was the propriety of the lis pendens 
single case where it arises, but is not carried into other cases as a precedent. [5] On the
annotation.  However, the appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual
other hand, under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law has been established
findings bereft of any basis in the record to inappropriately rule that AYALA is in estoppel
by the court, that point of law will, generally, be followed by the same court and by all
and has waived its right to enforce the subject restrictions.  Such ruling was immaterial to
courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised. [6] Stare
the resolution of the issue of the  propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens.  The
decisis proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent powerful countervailing
finding of estoppel was thus improper and made in excess of jurisdiction."
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. [7]
Coming now to the merits of the case, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals departed
The Court of Appeals, in ruling against petitioner Ayala Corporation stated that the appeal
from the usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to expressly pass upon the
is "sealed" by the doctrine of the law of the case, referring to G.R. No. 112774 entitled
specific errors assigned in its appeal.  Petitioner reiterates  its  contention that  the  trial
"Ayala Corporation, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents".  The Court of
court's  findings  that Ayala  has waived its right to enforce the deed of restrictions is not
Appeals likewise made reference to C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, "Ayala Corporation
supported by law and evidence. be bound by the deed restrictions when it entered into a contract of sale with spouses
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng. While respondent claims that it was under the impression that
We find merit in the petition. the deed restrictions were no longer being enforced by Ayala, the Undertaking [14] it
executed belies this same claim.  In said Undertaking, respondent agreed to "construct
It is basic that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conclusive and complete the construction of the house on said lot as required under the special
upon the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence. [13] We are constrained, condition of sale." Respondent likewise bound itself to abide and comply with x x x the
however, to review the trial court's findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals chose not condition of the rescission of the sale by Ayala Land, Inc. on the grounds therein stated  x
to pass upon, inasmuch as there is ample evidence on record to show that certain facts x x.
were overlooked which would affect the disposition of the case.
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent
In its assailed decision of February 4, 1994, the trial court, ruled in favor of respondent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
Rosa-Diana Realty on the ground that Ayala had not acted fairly when it did not institute public policy, they must be complied with in good faith.  Hence, Article 1159 of the New
an action against the original vendees despite the latter's violation of the Special Civil Code provides
Conditions of Sale but chose instead to file an action against herein respondent Rosa- "Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
Diana.  The trial court added that although the 38 storey building of Rosa-Diana is beyond and should be complied with in good faith."
the total height restriction, it was not violative of the National Building Code.  According to
the trial court the construction of the 38 storey building known as "The Peak" has not been Respondent Rosa-Diana insists that the trial court had already ruled that the Undertaking
shown to have been prohibited by law and neither is it against public policy. executed by its Chairman and President cannot validly bind Rosa-Diana and hence, it
should not be held bound by the deed restrictions.
It bears emphasis that as complainant, Ayala had the prerogative to initiate an action
against violators of the deed restrictions. That Rosa-Diana had acted in bad faith is We agree with petitioner Ayala's observation that respondent Rosa-Diana's special and
manifested by the fact that it submitted two sets of building plans, one which was in affirmative defenses before the trial court never mentioned any  allegation that its
conformity with the deed restrictions submitted to Ayala and MACEA, and the other, which president and chairman were not authorized to execute the Undertaking.  It was
exceeded the height requirement in the deed restrictions to the Makati building official for inappropriate therefore for the trial court to rule that in the absence of any authority or
the purpose of procuring a building permit from the latter.  Moreover, the violation of the confirmation from the Board of Directors of respondent Rosa-Diana, its Chairman and the
deed restrictions committed by respondent can hardly be denominated as a minor President cannot validly enter into an undertaking relative to the construction of the
violation.  It should be pointed out that the original building plan which was submitted to building on the lot within one year from July 27, 1989 and in accordance with the deed
and approved by petitioner Ayala Corporation, envisioned a twenty four (24) meter high, restrictions.  Curiously, while the trial court stated that it cannot be presumed that the
seven (7) storey condominium whereas the respondent's building plan which was Chairman and the President can validly bind respondent Rosa-Diana  to enter into the
submitted to and approved by the building official of Makati is that of a thirty eight (38) aforesaid Undertaking in the absence of any authority or confirmation from the Board of
storey,  91.65 meters high, building.  At present, the Peak building of respondent which Directors, the trial court held that the ordinary presumption of regularity of business
actually stands at 133.65 meters with a total gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters, transactions is applicable  as regards the Deed of Sale which was executed by Manuel Sy
seriously violates the dimensions indicated in the building plans submitted by Rosa-Diana and Sy Ka Kieng and respondent Rosa-Diana.  In the light of the fact that respondent
to petitioner Ayala for approval inasmuch as the Peak building exceeds the approved Rosa-Diana never alleged in its Answer that its president and chairman were not
height limit by about 109 meters and the allowable gross floor area under the applicable authorized to execute the Undertaking, the aforesaid ruling of the trial court is without
deed restrictions by about 19,105 square meters. Clearly, there was a gross violation of factual and legal basis and surprising to say the least.
the deed restrictions and evident bad faith by the respondent.
The fact alone that respondent Rosa-Diana conveniently prepared two sets of building
It may not be amiss to mention that the deed restrictions were revised in a general plans - with one set which fully conformed to the Deed Restrictions and another in gross
membership meeting of the association of lot owners in Makati Central Business District - violation of the same -  should have cautioned the trial court to conclude that respondent
the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) - whereby direct height Rosa-Diana was under the erroneous impression that the Deed Restrictions were no longer
restrictions were abolished in lieu of floor area limits.  Respondent, however, did not vote enforceable and that it never intended to be bound by the Undertaking signed by its
for the approval of this revision during the General Membership meeting which was held on President and Chairman. We reiterate that contractual obligations have the force of law
July 11, 1990 at the Manila Polo Club Pavilion, Makati, Metro Manila and again on July 12, between parties and unless the same are contrary to public policy morals and good
1990 at the Hotel Mandarin Oriental, Makati, Metro Manila.  Hence, respondent continues customs, they must be complied by the parties in good faith.
to be bound by the original deed restrictions applicable to Lot 7, Block 1 and annotated on
its title to said lot.  In any event, assuming arguendo that respondent voted for the Petitioner, in its Petition,  prays that judgment be rendered:
approval of direct height restrictions in lieu of floor area limits, the total floor area of its a) ordering Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation to comply with its contractual
Peak building would still be violative of the floor area limits to the extent of about 9,865 obligations in the construction of the Peak by removing, or closing down and prohibiting
square meters of allowable floor area under the MACEA revised restrictions. Rosa-Diana from using, selling, leasing or otherwise disposing of, the portions of areas
thereof constructed beyond or in excess of the approved height, as shown by the building
Respondent Rosa-Diana avers that there is nothing illegal or unlawful in the building plans plans submitted to, and approved by, Ayala, including any other portion of the building
which it used in the construction of the Peak condominium "inasmuch as it bears constructed not in accordance with the said building plans, during the effectivity of the
the imprimatur of the building official of Makati, who is tasked to determine whether Deed Restrictions;
building and construction plans are in accordance with the law, notably, the National
Building Code." b) Alternatively, in the event specific performance has become impossible:
(1) ordering the cancellation and rescission of the April 20, 1976 Deed of Sale by Ayala in
Respondent Rosa-Diana, however, misses the point inasmuch as it has freely consented to favor of the original vendees thereof as well as the subsequent Deed of Sale executed by
such original vendees in favor of Rosa-Diana, and ordering Rosa-Diana to return to Ayala Statistics.
Lot 7, Block 1 of Salcedo Village;
B - is equal to the Gross Floor Area of the completed or expanded building in square
(2) ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165720 (in the name of meters.
Rosa-Diana) and directing the office of the Register of Deeds of Makati to issue a new title
over the lot in the name of Ayala; and C - is equal to the estimated Gross Floor Area permitted under the original deed
restrictions, derived by multiplying the lot area by the effective original FAR shown below
(3) ordering Rosa-Diana to pay Ayala attorney's fees in the amount of P500,000.00, for each location.
exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00 and the costs of suit.
We then ruled in the aforesaid case that the development charges are a fair measure of
It must be noted that during the trial respondent Rosa-Diana was able to complete the compensatory damages which therein respondent Ray Burton Development Inc. is liable to
construction of The Peak as a building with a height of thirty eight (38) floors or 133.65 Ayala Corporation.  The dispositive portion of the decision in the said case which is
meters and with a total gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters.  Having been squarely applicable to the case at bar, reads as follows:
completed for a number of years already, it would be reasonable to assume that it is now WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
fully tenanted.  Consequently, the remedy of specific performance by respondent is no February 27, 1996, in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 46488, and its Resolution dated October 7, 1996
longer feasible.  However, neither can we grant petitioner's prayer for the cancellation and are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
rescission of the April 20, 1976 Deed of Sale by petitioner Ayala in favor of the original finding that:
vendees thereof as well as the subsequent Deed of Sale executed by the original vendees (1) The Deed Restrictions are valid and petitioner AYALA is not estopped from enforcing
in favor of respondent Rosa-Diana inasmuch as the original vendees were not even made them against lot owners who have not yet adopted the Consolidated and Revised Deed
parties in the case at bar.  Moreover, petitioner Ayala, having agreed to the resale of the Restrictions.
property by the original vendees, spouses Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, to respondent
Rosa-Diana despite the failure of Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng to comply with their (2) Having admitted that the Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions are the
obligation to construct a building within one year from April 20, 1976, has effectively applicable Deed Restrictions to Ray Burton Development Corporation, RBDC  should be,
waived its right to rescind the sale of the subject lot to the original vendees. and is bound by the same.

Faced with the same question as to the proper remedy available to petitioner in the case (3) Considering that Ray Burton Development Corporation's Trafalgar plaza exceeds the
of  "Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Inc.," a case which is on all fours with floor area limits of the Deed Restrictions, RBDC is hereby ordered to pay development
the case at bench,  we ruled therein that the party guilty of violating the deed restrictions charges as computed under the provisions of the consolidated and Revised Deed
may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, Restrictions currently in force.
for the payment of damages.  In the aforesaid case  it was observed that the Consolidated
and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDR) imposed development charges on constructions (4) Ray Burton Development corporation is further ordered to pay AYALA exemplary
which exceed the estimated Gross Limits permitted under the original Deed Restrictions damages in the amount of P2,500,000.00 attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00.
but which are within the limits of the CRDR's.
SO ORDERED.
The pertinent portion of the Deed of Restrictions reads:
3. DEVELOPMENT CHARGE There is no reason why  the same rule should not be followed in the case at bar, the
remedies of specific performance and/or rescission prayed for by petitioner no longer being
For any building construction within the Gross Floor Area limits defined under Paragraphs feasible.  In accordance with the peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, the
C-2.1 to C-2.4 above, but which will result in a Gross Floor Area exceeding certain development charges would certainly be a fair measure of compensatory damages to
standards defined in Paragraphs C-3.1-C below, the OWNER shall pay MACEA, prior to the petitioner Ayala.
construction of any new building, a DEVELOPMENT CHARGE as a contribution to a trust
fund to be administered by MACEA. This trust fund shall be used to improve facilities and Exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00 as prayed for by petitioner are also in
utilities  in Makati Central District. order inasmuch as respondent Rosa-Diana was in evident bad faith when it submitted a set
3.1. The amount of the development charge that shall be due from the OWNER shall be of building plans in conformity with the deed restrictions to petitioner Ayala for the sole
computed as follows: purpose of obtaining title to the property, but only to prepare and later on submit another
set of building plans which are in gross violation of the Deed Restrictions. Petitioner Ayala
DEVELOPMENT CHARGE = A x (B-C-D) is likewise entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the sum of P250,000.00.

where: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 4, 1997 and
its Resolution dated June 19, 1998 , C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598, are REVERSEDand SET
A - is equal to the Area Assessment which shall be set at Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) ASIDE.  In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered
until December 31,1990. Each January 1st thereafter, such amount shall increase by ten a) ordering respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation to pay
percent (10%) over the Area Assessment charged in the immediately preceding year; development charges as computed under the provisions of the consolidated and Revised
provided that beginning 1995 and at the end of every successive five-year period Deed Restrictions currently in force; and
thereafter, the increase in the Area Assessment shall be reviewed and adjusted by the
VENDOR to correspond to the accumulated increase in the construction cost index during b) ordering respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation to pay petitioner
the immediately preceding five years as based on the weighted average of wholesale price Ayala Corporation exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00, attorney's fees in the
and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor sum of P250,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION paid accordingly.[11]  Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint:[12]  (a)
deleting its prayer to declare  null  and  void  the  Board  Resolution  dated  February  17, 
[ G.R. No. 224834, March 15, 2017 ]
2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from
JONATHAN Y. DEE, PETITIONER, VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED,
implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the
VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, AND ALBERT HONG HIN
2015 ASM.[13] 
KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS DIRECTOR AND
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of
SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Harvest All, et al.' s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should
RESPONDENTS.
have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at P1
Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention such capital infusion in their prayers
G.R. NO. 224871
and, as such, were only made to pay the measly sum of P8,860.00. On the other hand,
Harvest  All,  et  al.  maintained  that  they  paid the  correct  filing  fees, considering that
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST
the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the
PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF
aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS A
on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the government.
DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, [14]
 
INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
The RTC Ruling
GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-
CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, AND BARBARA ANNE C.
In a Resolution[15]  dated  August  24,  2015,  the  RTC  dismissed  the instant complaint
MIGALLOS, RESPONDENTS.
for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay  the  correct  filing  fees.[16] 
Citing  Rule 141 of  the  Rules of  Court,  as amended  by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,[17]  and the
DECISION Court's  pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym,  Sr. (Lu),[18] the RTC found  that the basis for the
computation  of filing fees should have been the PI Billion value of the SRO, it being the
property in litigation.  As such,  Harvest All, et al.should  have paid filing fees in the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
amount of more or less P20 Million and not just P8,860.00.  In this  regard,  the  RTC 
Assailed in these consolidated petitions [1]  for review on certiorari are the Decision[2]  dated
also  found  that  Harvest  All,  et  al.'s payment  of incorrect filing fees was done in bad
February 15, 2016 and the Resolution[3]  dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
faith and with clear intent to defraud the government, considering  that: (a)  when the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the Resolution [4] dated August 24, 2015 of the
issue on correct filing fees was first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO,
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and,
Harvest All, et al. never manifested their willingness to abide by the Rules by paying
accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further
additional filing fees when so required; (b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission  in their
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
complaint  that the SRO was valued at P1 Billion, they chose to keep mum on the meager
The Facts
assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and (c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of
the SRO in the body of their complaint,  they  failed  to  indicate  the  same  in  their 
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert
prayer,  thus, preventing the Clerk of Court from making the correct assessment of filing
Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities,
fees.[19] 
minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C.
Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors.[5]  As per Alliance's by-laws,
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed[20] to the CA.
its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15. [6]  However, in a Special
The CA Ruling
Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the
Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution
indefinitely postponing Alliance's  2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock
In a Decision[21] dated February  I5, 20I6,  the CA reversed the RTC's order  of dismissal 
Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of Pl Billion which was earlier
and, accordingly,  reinstated  the case and remanded  the same to the court a quo for
approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure
further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.[22] Also citing Rule 141 of the
dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the
made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting,
prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies  always  involve  a  property  in 
after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]." [7]  This
litigation. Consequently, it  agreed  with  the RTC's finding  that  the  basis  for  the
prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance
computation of filing fees should have been the PI  Billion value of the SRO and, thus,
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining  Order/Writ  of
Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million
Preliminary  Injunction)[8]  involving  an  intra-corporate  controversy  against  Alliance,
and not just P8,860.00.[23]  However, in the absence of contrary  evidence,  the CA held
and  its other  Board  members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H.
that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith  and  had  no intention  of  defrauding  the 
See, Mary Grace T. Vera- Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C.
government,  as they  merely relied  in  the assessment  of  the  Clerk  of  Court.  Thus, 
Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally claimed that the
in  the  interest  of substantial justice, the CA ordered the reinstatement  of Harvest All, et
subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to
al.'s complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further proceedings, provided
the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise,
that they pay the correct filing fees.[24] 
they will be deprived of their full  voting  rights  proportionate  to  their  existing 
shareholdings.[9] Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of nullity of
The parties moved for reconsideration,[25] which were, however, denied in a
the Board Resolution dated May  29, 2015  indefinitely  postponing  the  2015 ASM, as well
Resolution[26] dated May 25, 2016. Hence, these consolidated petitions.
as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0. [10]  The Clerk of Court
The Issues Before the Court
of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to P8,860.00 which they
 shows  that  no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the
The  primordial issues  raised for the  Court's resolution are: (a) whether  or  not  Harvest assessment of the docket fees. [32] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
All,  et  al.  paid  insufficient filing fees  for  their complaint, as the same should have been Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a
based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO; and  (b)  if  Harvest  All,  et  al.  indeed  paid property  in litigation" and that "there  can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
insufficient  filing  fees, whether or not such act was made in good faith and without any where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly non-determinative 
intent to defraud the government. of the antecedents  involved in that case and, hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence
The Court's Ruling to bind our courts when it  adjudicates  similar cases  upon  the  principle  of  stare 
decisis.  As  it  is evident,  these  passages  in Lu only constitute  an opinion  delivered  by
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint was
partly granted. filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from the
I. actual case before it.

At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et In  Land  Bank  of  the  Philippines v.  Santos, [33]  the  Court  had  the opportunity  to 
al.'s complaint should be based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially define  an obiter  dictum  and  discuss  its  legal  effects  as follows:
holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary  estimation  - both  the  RTC  and  [An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made,  or opinion  expressed, by a judge, in
the  CA  heavily  relied  on  the Court's  pronouncement  in Lu. In Lu, the Court  his decision   upon  a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not
mentioned  that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced directly upon  the question before  him,  or  upon  a point not necessarily
Section 21 (k)[27]  to  Rule  141  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  it  seemed that  "an  intra- involved in the determination of the cause,   or introduced by way  of illustration,
corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that "there  can be no or analogy  or  argument.  It does not embody  the  resolution or determination
case of intra-corporate  controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be of the  court, and  is  made  without argument, or full consideration of the  point.
estimated."[28]  It lacks  the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an   opinion 
with  no  binding force  for  purposes of res judicata."[34]  (Emphasis and
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed underscoring supplied)
out[29]  that the foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
For these  reasons, therefore,  the courts a quo  erred  in applying  the case of Lu.
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate II.
controversy instituted therein, i.e., declaration of nullity of share  issuance,  is incapable 
of pecuniary estimation  and, thus, the correct docket  fees were paid.[30] Despite  such In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect.
pronouncement,  the Court still went on to say that had the complaint therein been filed This is because depending  on the nature of the principal action  or  remedy  sought,  an 
during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because intra-corporate controversy  may  involve  a subject matter which is either capable or
the amendments  brought about by the same "seem to imply that there can be no case  incapable of pecuniary estimation.
of  intra-corporate  controversy  where  the  value  of the  subject matter cannot be
estimated,"[31] viz.: In Cabrera v. Francisco,[35]  the Court laid down the parameters  in determining whether an
The  new  Section  21  (k)  of  Rule  141  of the  Rules  of  Court,  as amended by A.M. No. action is considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions  for  insolvency  or  In  determining whether an  action  is one the subject matter of which   is not 
other cases  involving intra-corporate controversies,  the fees prescribed  under Section 7 capable of pecuniary estimation this   Court has  adopted the criterion of first 
(a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was ascertaining the  nature of the principal action   or remedy sought. If it is primarily
omitted from the  reference.  Said  paragraph refers to  docket  fees  for  filing  "[a]ctions for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not estimation, and whether jurisdiction is  in  the municipal courts  or  in  the [C]ourts of 
involving property." [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic  
issue  is  something other than the  right to  recover a  sum  of money, where 
By referring the  computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an the  money  claim is purely  incidental  to, or a consequence of, the principal
intra-corporate  controversy  always  involves a property in litigation, the value of which is relief sought, this Court has considered such   actions  as  cases  where  the 
always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to subject of the litigation may  not  be estimated in terms  of money, and are
imply that there can be  no  case  of  intra-corporate controversy where the  value of the cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of  [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts). [36]
subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate books. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
This  case  is  a  precise illustration as  to  how  an  intra-corporate controversy may be
If the complaint were  filed  today,  one could safely find  refuge in the express classified as an action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary  estimation.  A 
phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141  that paragraph (a) alone applies. cursory perusal  of  Harvest All,  et  al.'s Complaint  and  Amended  Complaint  reveals 
that  its  main purpose is  to have Alliance   hold its 2015 ASM on the date  set in
In  the  present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, the corporation's  by laws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully
2000 during which  time Section  7, without qualification, was the applicable materialize, so that their  voting  interest  with  the corporation  would  somehow  be 
provision. Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time preserved. Thus,  Harvest  All,  et  al.  sought  for  the  nullity  of the  Alliance  Board
the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015
computing the filing fees  in  intra-corporate  cases,  recognizing that  there  could  be  an  ASM pending completion  of subscription  to the SR0.[37]  Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s
intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated, prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled
such  as  an  action  for  inspection  of  corporate books.  The immediate illustration in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of
Alliance's  impending SRO valued at P1 Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest
All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering  that: (a) Harvest case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect  so  as  to  make 
All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of  the them  applicable to  the  resolution of the instant  consolidated petitions  as they  merely 
SRO; and (b) such mention was  merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the pertained  to a procedural  rule, i.e.,  Rule  141,  and  not  substantive  law.  In  Tan, Jr. v.
severe dilution that their voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 CA,[39]  the  Court thoroughly explained the retroactive  effectivity  of procedural 
ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or rules, viz.:
anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et The general  rule that statutes  are prospective  and  not retroactive does  not  ordinarily 
al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. Clearly apply  to procedural  laws.  It  has  been  held  that  "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is
therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation. one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new
obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches  a new  disability,  in respect  of
At this juncture,  it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC [38]  transactions  or considerations  already past. Hence,  remedial  statutes  or statutes
dated October 5, 2016, which introduced amendments to the  schedule  of  legal  fees  to  relating to remedies or  modes of procedure, which  do not create new or  take 
be  collected  in  various commercial  cases, including those involving intra-corporate away  vested rights, but  only  operate in  furtherance of  the remedy  or
controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read: confirmation of rights  already existing,   do not come within the  legal 
RESOLUTION conception of a  retroactive law, or  the  general rule  against the  retroactive
operation of statutes." The general  rule against giving statutes retroactive operation
xxxx whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract  or  to disturb  vested  rights  does 
not  prevent  the application  of statutes to proceedings  pending at the time of their
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.  No. 04-2-04-SC  enactment  where they neither  create  new  nor  take  away  vested  rights.  A  new
effective 16 August 2004,  incorporated  the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed for statute  which deals  with  procedure only is presumptively applicable to all
petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i)  thereof and, furthermore, provided under actions  - those which have accrued or are   pending.
Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall 
apply  to  petitions  for  insolvency or  other  cases  involving  intra-corporate Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to  actions 
controversies; pending and  undetermined at  the  time  of  their passage.  Procedural  laws are
retroactive  in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural  statutes may
xxxx somehow affect the litigants'  rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative   of
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as follows: any  right of  a  person who  may  feel  that he  is adversely affected. Nor  is  the
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The  
xxxx reason is that  as a general rule no vested   right  may attach to,  nor  arise from,
procedural laws.  It has  been  held  that "a person has no vested right in any particular
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court  is hereby  remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil
DELETED as  the  fees covering  petitions  for  insolvency  are already provided for in this or criminal, of  any  other  than  the  existing  rules  of  procedure." [40]  (Emphases and
Resolution. As for cases involving intra corporate controversies, the  applicable  underscoring supplied)
fees shall  be those  provided under  Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule In view  of the  foregoing,  and  having  classified  Harvest  All,  et al.'s action as one
141 of the Revised Rules of Court  depending  on the nature of the action. incapable of pecuniary  estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should  be made 
to pay the appropriate docket  fees in accordance with  the applicable fees provided 
xxxx under  Section  7 (b) (3) of Rule  141 [fees for all other actions not involving  property]  of
the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with  A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated  October  5,
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official 2016.  The matter is therefore  remanded  to the RTC in order:
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the Court (a)  to  first determine  if Harvest,  et  al.'s payment  of filing fees in the amount of
Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity. (Emphases and P8,860.00, as initially assessed  by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance
underscoring supplied) with  A.M. No. 04-02-04- SC;

Verily, the deletion  of Section  21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application (b) if Harvest All, et al.'s  payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest,  et al.'s
of Section 7 (a) [fees for  actions where  the value  of the subject matter can  be payment  of any discrepancy  within  a period  of fifteen  (15)  days  from  notice, and
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for  actions where  the value  of the after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all  other  actions not 
involving  property] of the  same  Rule  to cases  involving  intra-corporate (c)  if Harvest  All,  et  al.'s payment  of  P8,860.00  is already sufficient, proceed with the
controversies for  the  determination  of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.
serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court's
recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be WHEREFORE,  the petition in G.R. No. 224834  is DENIED, while the petition  in G.R. 
capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to correct No. 224871  is PARTLY  GRANTED.  The  Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the
the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are
obiter dictum) implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter which is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L.  CASE NO. 15-234 is
deemed capable of pecuniary estimation. hereby REMANDED  to the Regional  Trial Court  of Pasig  City, Branch  159 for
further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.
While the Court is not unaware  that the amendments brought  by A.M. No.  04-02-04-SC
dated  October  5, 2016  only  came  after  the  filing  of  the complaint  subject  of this
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, JR.,*  Leonardo-De Castro,  and Caguioa,
JJ., concur.

 Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated February 22, 2017.

*
 RATIO DECIDENDI After appropriate proceedings, the court of first instance rendered a decision, dated
EN BANC October 30, 1966, granting the writ prayed for and ordering "the Chief of Police of
G.R. No. L-26741             July 31, 1969 Dagupan City or any of his officers in charge of the City Jail ... to release the petitioner,
Tessie Astero." Hence, this appeal by the respondent.
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TESSIE ASTERO. TESSIE
ASTERO, petitioner-appellee,  The ratio decidendi of said decision is found in the paragraph immediately preceding its
vs. dispositive part, which reads:
CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY, respondent-appellant.
Under Section 24 of Republic Act 170 (Charter of Dagupan City), the city attorney
Hermogenes S. Decano for petitioner-appellee. (Fiscal) 'shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of
First Assistant City Fiscal Peregrino Cornel and Second Assistant City Fiscal Rafael B. laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make the
Hidalgo for respondent-appellant. necessary complaints against the persons accused.' The wordings of this provision
are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Said section has enjoined the city
fiscal to 'prepare the necessary informations' or 'make the necessary complaints'
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
against persons accused of 'crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws and city
ordinances'. The crime for which the petitioner was charged is a public crime and
On or about August 18, 1966, Leticia del Pilar, a minor 17 years of age, filed with the City not one of those which may be prosecuted under the law upon the complaint of
Court of Dagupan a complaint, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11037 of said the offended party]. Thus, it devolved upon the city fiscal to file, if the evidence
court, charging Lita Mendoza, Susan Dequito, Susana Soriano and herein petitioner Tessie warrants, the complaint or information for corruption of minor against the
Astero with "corruption of a minor", in: petitioner, and this mandatory duty cannot be delegated to the offended party
himself/herself. Thus, it is the considered opinion of this court that the said
That during and between June 27, 1966 and July 2, 1966 in Dagupan City, complaint (Criminal Case No. 11037 of the City Court of Dagupan) and all
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named proceedings thereunder are of no effect inasmuch as the complaint filed by the
accused confederating and mutually helping one another, habitually and/or with offended party in that court is not valid.
abuse of authority or confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously by the use of force, threats and intimidation and by taking advantage The premise to the effect that a public crime, such as that of corruption of minors "is not
of the undersigned (Leticia del Pilar), a minor 17 years of age, who was detained one of those which may be prosecuted ... upon the complaint of the offended party", is
at the Mendoza Hotel, Perez Boulevard, Dagupan City, by their confederates, manifestly erroneous. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, explicitly
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote or facilitate the prostitution or provides that "(a)ll criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or
corruption of the undersigned, to satisfy the lust of several men unknown to her information ...." In fact, as early as U.S. v. Narvas, 2 it was held:
and in order to profit therefrom, to her damage and prejudice in the sum of
P50,000.00.
The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following:

After conducting a preliminary examination, said court issued the corresponding warrant of
Sec 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United
arrest and, in compliance therewith, petitioner was, among others, subsequently
States (now Philippines) against the Persons charged with the offenses.
apprehended and confined in the City Jail of Dagupan. On October 7, 1966, she
commenced, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the present case  1 for habeas
corpus, against the Chief of Police of Dagupan City, upon the ground that said complaint is Sec 3. All public offenses triable in Courts of First Instance or in courts of similar
"null and void ... because": jurisdiction, now established or that hereafter may be established, must be
prosecuted by complaint or information.
A. — Under the City Charter of Dagupan City, it is only the City Fiscal who can
institute criminal action; Sec. 4. A complaint is a sworn written statement made to a court or magistrate
that a person has been guilty of a designated offense.
B. — And, even granting that Leticia del Pilar can institute a criminal action, such
is only true where there is the civil liability involved in the case, which is not so in SEC. 5. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with a public
the instant case, because — offense, presented and signed by the promotor fiscal or his deputy and filed with
the clerk of court.
1. Prostitution of minor is a purely public crime, in which there cannot be
private offended party. Under the provisions of these sections a criminal action or prosecution may be
instituted in the courts specified therein in either one of two ways. In the first
place it may be commenced by any person presenting to a court or to a
2. And, even if Leticia del Pilar were the offended party, her interest in
magistrate the complaint above defined. Such complaint is the process which
the civil aspect has been instituted in criminal case No. 11036, a copy of
begins the action and gives the court or magistrate jurisdiction of the person of
which is hereto attached, wherein she claimed damages arising out of
the defendant and the subject-matter of the action. Where such complaint has
the same act.
been presented no other or further pleading on the part of the government is
 necessary. The prosecution proceeds upon the complaint alone. In the second conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, so that none would have to be made by
place the action may be commenced by the promotor fiscal by presenting to the the City Court.
court and filing with the clerk thereof the information defined and set forth in the
section above quoted. In that case such information is the process which
In other words, we cannot sustain the alleged sole power of said officer to institute
institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon it as the people's
criminal actions in Dagupan City without setting at naught or nullifying the authority of the
pleading. It is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute the action, whether commenced
city court, under section 77 of R.A. No. 170, to conduct preliminary investigations. It is
by complaint or information. This enables him to prevent malicious or unfounded
well settled that the different provisions of a statute should be so construed as to
prosecutions by private persons.3
harmonize the same, and that, "when there are inconsistent provisions in the same
statute, the last in point of time or order of arrangement prevails. 11
Again, pursuant to section 2 of said Rule 110:
It is clear, therefore, that the aforementioned complaint filed by Leticia del Pilar was
Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, perfectly valid; that so was the warrant of arrest issued by the city court, after making the
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the corresponding preliminary examination; and that, consequently, the apprehension and
government or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or confinement of petitioner herein were, likewise, lawful and valid.
execution of the law violated.1äwphï1.ñët

It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from ordered the release of petitioner
As a consequence, in People v. Hernandez, 4 this Court used the following language: herein, without requiring the posting of a bond to secure her appearance before the
appellate court, in violation of Section 20, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, reading:
The fact that the information was filed in court on a complaint by a private
individual is of no consequence for the reason that, as has been held in the case A judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of the officer or person
of United States vs. Yu Tuico (34 Phil. 209), except where the law specifically detaining him, shall not be stayed by appeal. A judgment releasing the person
provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed can be detained shall not be effective until the officer or person detaining has been given
laid by any competent person. ....5 opportunity to appeal. An appeal taken by such officer or person shall stay the
order of release, unless the person detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in
an amount fixed by the court or judge rendering the judgment. The bond shall be
It is true that section 24 of the Charter of Dagupan City (R.A. No. 170) imposes upon its
so conditioned for the appearance of the person detained before the appellate
city attorney the duty to "investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations
court to abide its order in the appeal.12
of laws and city ordinances" and to "prepare the necessary informations or make the
necessary complaints against the person accused ... ." There is every reason to believe
that the conclusion drawn therefrom by His Honor, the trial Judge, was influenced, to a WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the petitioner ordered
considerable degree, by a similar provision in the Charter of the City of Manila, which has re-arrested and re-committed to the custody of respondent herein, unless a satisfactory
been construed to mean that in that city "criminal complaints may be filed only with the bond in an amount to be fixed by the City Court of Dagupan, shall have been furnished,
City Fiscal, who is thereby given by implication, the exclusive authority to institute criminal with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
1äwphï1.ñët

cases in the different courts of said City ... ." 6 It should be noted, however, that, in the
language of Sayo v. Chief of Police:7
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Under the law, a complainant charging a person with the commission of an Zaldivar, J., took no part.
offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with the municipal court or
the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not
Footnotes
make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. .... 1äwphï1.ñët

Special Proceedings No. 526 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
1

This view was reiterated by Chief Justice Moran in Espiritu v. De la Rosa, 8 and quoted with
VIII.
approval, as well as applied to the City of Bacolod, in Montelibano v. Ferrer. 9

4 Phil. 410, 411.

2

Seemingly, the lower court overlooked, however, the fact that, unlike the courts of Manila
and Bacolod, the city court of Dagupan is explicitly vested with the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and Emphasis supplied.
3

may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his
appearance before the proper court." 10 Thus, the legal basis for the exclusive power of 59 Phil. 272, 277.
4

the City Fiscal of Manila or City Attorney of Bacolod to initiate criminal actions in their
respective jurisdictions is wanting in the case of Dagupan. What is more, the express grant
to its city court of the authority to conduct preliminary investigations, necessarily connotes Emphasis supplied.
5

that the City Attorney of Dagupan shares that function with said court, and that,
accordingly, the latter may entertain complaints filed by a person other than said officer. Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, 233.
6

Indeed, the initiation of a criminal action by the City Attorney would imply that he had
80 Phil. 859, 869.
7

78 Phil. 827, 830.

8

Supra.
9

10
Section 77, R.A. No. 170.

People v. Laba, L-28022, July 30, 1969; PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-27117, July
11

30, 1969; State v. City, 109 So. 2d. 368; Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 148 N.
E. 2d. 563.

12
Emphasis supplied.