Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6098            August 12, 1911

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee,

Emilio Pineda for appellant.

TORRES, J.:

On April 20, 1907, the Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Surigao
against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging that the defendant, a mercantile copartnership company organized
under the laws in force in these Islands and domiciled in this city of Manila with a branch office in Surigao,
continues to operate as such mercantile copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa & Co.,; that the said
defendant, knowing that it had no title or right whatever to two adjoining parcels of land, which belong to the
domain of the Government of the United States and were placed under the administration and control of the
Government of these Islands, has been occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years, more or less,
having constructed on the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and built warehouses of light material for the
storage of coal — all for its exclusive use and benefit; that of the said two parcels of land, the parcel B has an
area of 11 centares, approximately, and the parcel A, 84 centares, more or less, and their situation, metes and
bounds, together with other details thereunto pertaining, are set out in the judgment of the court; that these
lands, situated in Bilang-bilang, in the pueblo of Surigao and the province of the same name, belonged to the
late Spanish Government in the Philippines and are now the property of the Government of the United States
and were placed under the control of the Insular Government, which, by virtue of the treaty of Paris, has
succeeded the former in all its rights; that, since the year 1901, the defendant has been requested repeatedly by
the Attorney-General, in representation of the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion
over the same and to deliver to it the said property, and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co., on
February 25, 1903, recognizing the Insular Government's ownership, agreed to return the land, but that later,
after several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to continue occupying the said land and
refused to return it to the Insular Government; wherefore the Attorney-General asked the court to enter
judgment declaring the Insular Government to be the owner of the land claimed, and to order that the plaintiff
be placed in possession of the same, together with the fruits collected by the defendants since it took such
possession, and those awaiting collection, and to sentence the defendant to pay the costs.

Counsel for the defendant, Aldecoa & Co., in liquidation, answering the preceding complaint, set forth that it
denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint, with the exception of those which it expressly admitted
in its answer; and that it admitted paragraph 2 of the complaint, that is, the fact of the defendant's being a
mercantile copartnership company, organized under the laws in force in these Islands. As a special defense, it
alleged that it held and possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the lands claimed by the
plaintiff in paragraph 1 of the complaint. The defendant therefore prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor,
by absolving it from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff, together with the other relief solicited.

The provincial fiscal of Surigao presented a motion on November 3, 1908, for the purpose of amending the
preceding complaint, with the permission of the court, by inserting, between paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
complaint, a separate paragraph, as follows: "that Aldecoa and Company's possession of the lands here in
question, was in fact interrupted during the years 1900, 1901, and 1902;" but, in view of the ruling of the court
by an order of November 5, 1908, directing the plaintiff, within three days to specify the facts that constituted
the alleged interruption of the defendant's possession of the lands in question, the provincial fiscal presented, on
the 6th of the same month, a new written motion whereby be requested permission to amend the previous
complaint by inserting between the said paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original complaint, a separate paragraph, as
follows. "That the municipality of Surigao, in the year 1900, and through the mediation of Captain Kendrick,
removed the posts and wire which enclosed the property here in question, the sole sign of possession that the
defendant then had to the said lands." Inasmuch as no objection whatever was raised to the amendment
requested, the court granted the same by an order of December 7, 1908.
The case came up for hearing on the 1st of December of that year and, after the presentation of testimony by
both parties, the documents exhibited being attached to the record, the court, on December 10, 1909, rendered
judgment and found that the land in question was public land and belonged to the State, and ordered the
defendant to return it to the plaintiff might have the crops and the buildings on the land, upon the payment of an
indemnity therefor, or might compel the defendant to pay him the value of the land, as provided by article 361
of the Civil Code. Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment, and by a written motion of the 4th of
January asked for a rehearing of the case on the grounds that the said judgment was unwarranted by the
evidence and was contrary to law. This motion was disallowed, exception thereto was taken by the appellant
and, the required bill of exceptions being filed, in which was set out, at the request of the provincial fiscal, the
latter's exception to the order issued by the judge on January 24, while in Cagayan, Province of Misamis,
granting an extension of time for the presentation of the bill of exceptions, it was certified and transmitted to the
clerk of this court.

The demand of the representative of the Government is for the recovery of possession of two united parcels of
land, belonging to the public use and domain, which are at present occupied by the defendant Aldecoa & Co.
The latter claims to have the full and absolute ownership of the said land and to have held it as owner since
1889, by virtue of a verbal permit from the politico-military governor of Surigao.

From the proceedings had and by the testimony of a large number of competent witnesses, one of whom was
introduced by the defendant party itself, it was clearly proved that, in 1889, the land in litigation, as well as
Bates Avenue, was, during the extraordinary high tides, usually covered by sea water that would extend to the
other side of the said avenue, as far as the warehouse of Aldecoa & Co. that was erected there, and, at the
ordinary low tides, as far as the wall built along the shore by the aforesaid firm and designated by the numbers
5, 6, and 7 in the plan, Exhibit A. This plan, according to the agreement between the parties, exactly represents
the land in litigation.

It was likewise proved that nearly all the land in question was low land and swampy in certain places, with
aquatic bushes growing upon it; that it had been gradually raised by the action of the sea, which in its ebb and
flow left sand and other sediment on the low ground; that the retaining wall erected to prevent the sea water
from reaching the said warehouse, that is on the opposite side of Bates Avenue, contributed in a large measure
toward raising the level of the land; and that, furthermore, between the years 1889 and 1890, there were two
piers on the said land, one named Carloto, alongside of which the vessels used to lie that called at Surigao
during their voyages.

It is, then, incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the State, inasmuch
as at the present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land formed by the action
of the sea.

Treating of the sea coasts and shores as property of the public use and domain, partida 3, title 28, law 3, says:

The things which belong in common to all the living creatures of this world, are; The air, rain water, the
sea and its shores; for every living creature may use them, according to its needs, etc.

Law 4 of the same title and partida says, among other things:

And by the seashore is understood all that space of ground covered by the waters of the sea, in their
highest annual tides, whether in winter or summer.

The Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, extended to these Islands by the royal decree of the 8th of the same
month and year and, together with the decree ordering its enforcement, issued by the Gobierno General on
September 21, 1871, was published in the Official Gazette of the 24th of the same month, which law was not
substituted nor repealed by that of June 13, 1879, promulgated in Spain and not extended to these Islands,
provides, in article 1, that:

The following are part of the national domain open to public use:

xxx           xxx           xxx

2. The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by
international law. . . .
 3. The shores. By the shore is understood that space alternately covered and uncovered by the movement
of the tide. Its interior or terrestial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the
tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms or tempests.

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not
necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos, pr private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

ART. 17. The use of the shores also belongs to the public under the police supervision of the civil
authorities; all persons may fish thereon, wash, bathe, embark and disembark on pleasure trips, spread
and dry clothes and nets bathe cattle, remove sand, and collect stones, shells, plants, shellfish, and other
products of the sea, and do other things of a like nature. these rights may be restricted by virtue of the
regulations necessary for the coast defense or police supervision, or in the interest of public utility or
decency.

ART. 18. In no place on the coasts, shores, ports, or entrances of rivers, nor on the islands referred to in
article 3, shall new works of any kind whatever be constructed, nor any building be erected, without
proper permission, in accordance with the provisions of this law and with those of the law regarding
ports.

On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced to occupy the land and shore herein concerned, prior to the
enforcement of the Civil Code in these Islands, it is unquestionable that the issue pending decision must be
determined in accordance with the provisions of the said Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the
shores, as well as the lands united thereto by the accretions and alluvium deposits produced by the action of the
sea, are of the public use and domain.

Excluding the space occupied by Bates Avenue, that lies between the defendant's buildings and the shore and
the lands added to the latter by the action of the sea in the sitio called Bilang-bilang, all this said land, together
with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for public uses. So that the defendant, in
construction on the two aforementioned parcels of land a retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and
warehouses for the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit, did all this without due and competent
authority and has been illegally occupying the land since 1901 by the representative of the Insular Government,
Aldecoa & Co., by a letter of February 25, 1903, acknowledged that the land belonged to the Government and
consented to vacate it, although it afterwards persisted in its claim that it was the owner of the land and refused
to vacate and place it at the disposal of the Insular Government, whose representative, in view of the defendant's
changed attitude in the matter, was forced to bring this action to recover its possession.

Aldecoa & Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of the two united parcels A and B, belonged to
them in fee simple, on account of their having begun to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then
politico-military governor of Surigao. Although the record does not show the nature of the permit obtained, yet
it is inferred from the document Exhibit C I that the said permit was a verbal authorization to occupy the land
on condition that the defendant should later on prepare title deeds thereto, and that this authorization was
granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and benefiting the merchants of Surigao, in view of the
backward condition of things in those regions at the time. It is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did not
obtain or solicit permission from the Government to establish themselves there and erect thereon their buildings
and works, nor did they endeavor to obtain any title of ownership to the said land, as one of their witnesses,
Juan Y. Aldecoa, testified. Furthermore, in the said letter or document Exhibit C I, the attorney then
representing the defendant prayed that in case of sale or total or partial lease thereof Aldecoa & Co. should be
given preference to any other party, on account of the important improvements they had made on the land.

It is true that, notwithstanding the fact that the lands which become an adjacent part of the shores through the
accretions occasioned by the action of the sea, when they are no longer covered by such waters, or are not
necessary for the purposes of public utility, for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, may be declared by the Government to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto; but
the defendant has not proven that it obtained for itself, in conformity with the provisions of article 4 of the said
Law of Waters, such declaration of ownership, and competent authorization obtained from the Insular
Government is indispensible in order that private person may construct works on the seashore and thereby
secure lands for his profit and benefit, pursuant to article 5 of the same law, inasmuch as article 18 strictly
prohibits the construction of any works or the erection of any building at any place on the coasts and shores,
without proper authorization.

Aside from the verbal permission alleged, but not duly proven, and leaving aside the fact that the same is not
admissible in official and administrative proceedings, it has in no wise been proved that Aldecoa & Co.
obtained from the Insular Government any authorization whatever to erect a retaining wall, to construct a pier
and warehouses, and to lay a railway wall, to construct a pier and warehouses, and to lay a railway on the land
in question, which belonged to the state and was destined to public uses, as the defendant must have very well
known; nor could any right whatever be created in its favor, and to the prejudice of the State, by its having filled
in, without the proper permission, the aforementioned land for the purpose of raising the level thereof.

The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, the twentieth day of its
publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th of November of the same year, confirms the provisions of the
said Law of Waters, since, in its article 339, it prescribes that:

Property of public ownership is —

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed
by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

Article 341 of the same code provides:

Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the requirement of the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State property.

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant
whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are
for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such lands, thrown up by the
action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being
dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the provision of
article 1936 of the Civil Code.

The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretions and alluvium deposits
occasioned by the sea, where the occupant or possessor is a private person and holds without previous
permission or authorization from the Government, granted in due form, although he may have had the intention
to hold it for the purpose of making it his own, is illegal possession on his part and amounts to nothing more
than a mere detainer of the land, which is out of the sphere of the commerce of men, as belonging to the public
domain and being allotted to public uses and for the use of all persons who live at the place where it is situated.

The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of the Philippines
the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which they now claim to be the
owners; wherefore, the occupation or possession which the allege they hold is a mere detainer that can merit
from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession.

The politico-military governor of Surigao having had no authority or power to grant the possession or
ownership of the said two parcels of land, could not have authorized their occupancy under a title of ownership.
At the most, he may have, as alleged, verbally authorized the defendant to construct a pier, to fill in with earth
the passageway necessary to enable the same to be reached from Bates Avenue, to erect a retaining wall to
prevent the sea water, which used to inundate the said avenue, from flowing inward as far as the defendant's
warehouses, and to build warehouses on the high land, raised by the action of the water near the shore; but such
verbal authorization, even admitting that it was actually given, and the material occupation enjoyed by the
defendant during more than ten years, have not created rights such as could legitimize a detention to the
prejudice of the public, and of the State which represents the community, the sole entity entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the land and shore usurped, for the very reason that such shores and lands belong to the national
domain, are intended for public uses and are not susceptible of prescription, as they do not pertain to the
commerce of men.

The subject of this suit, as has been seen, is a tract of land that is a continuation of the shore at the sitio of
Bilang-bilang and was formed on that shore by alluvium deposits occasioned by the action of the waters of the
sea, that is, was land reclaimed from the sea, as fully proven by the record in this case; therefore the present
issue is identical with that decided in the case of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden (6 Phil. Rep., 732) relative to a tract of
land formed by the action of the sea and which has become a part of the so-called Sangley Point, in the Province
of Cavite, and consequently the findings and doctrine established in that decision are properly applicable to this
action, as may be seen by a perusal of that case.

The land in question, together with the shore of which it forms a part, is not, considering its conditions,
comprised within the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that it can not be deemed to be
agricultural public lands, nor mangrove-swamp land, inasmuch as it is unquestionable, as the record shows it to
have been proven, that the disputed property is land which was reclaimed from the sea through accretions
produced by the action of the water upon a high part of the shore, and is, therefore, land intended for public
uses. This classification loses none of its force from the fact that a part of the land is swampy, because this
circumstance does not divest it of its true character as land gained from the sea by accretion.

Mangrove-swamp land, which is generally situated inland at a certain distance from the seashore, although it is
usually inundated by the waters of the sea, especially at high tide, can not be confounded with the land formed
by the action of the sea and which forms the shore line thereof; and for this reason, the decisions rendered in the
cases of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572), and Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
Rep., 175), wherein due consideration was given to the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, have no
application to the present action, which solely concerns land formed by the action of the sea, and the shore that
is a part of it, both intended for public uses, while the references made by the appellant party apply to building
lots, fisheries and nipa lands that were inundated by sea water and which, though covered with a good deal of
water, could not be said to be navigable ways. The land in question, on the contrary, together with its adjacent
shore, borders on water of great depth, the Pacific Ocean, for, besides the pier constructed at the place by the
defendant and appellant, there were two others, and all intended for the service of the steamships that plied the
high seas and were accustomed to enter the said port and there anchor alongside of these piers.

Under no consideration could the land herein concerned, together with the shore upon which it is formed, be
classed as agricultural land susceptible of appropriation, and as such form the basis for the allegation of the
possession of an imperfect or prescriptive title thereto, because, as aforestated, so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any
private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority — a requisite
which the defendant and appellant was unable to prove for the purpose of legalizing his possession.

However, on the supposition that the defendant, Aldecoa & Co., began to occupy the said land and shore after
first obtaining verbal permission from a politico-military governor, constructing thereon a pier, warehouse, and
retaining wall, it is right to hold, as did the lower court in his judgment, that it acted in good faith, and under
such a supposition, the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code must be complied with.

For the foregoing reasons, in the course of the explanation of which the errors attributed to the judgment
appealed from have been disposed of, it is our opinion that such judgment should be fully affirmed, as it is in
accordance with the law. The costs shall be assessed against the appellant. So ordered.

Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant and appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO
VALERIANO, oppositors and appellees.

David S. Ignacio for Appellant.

Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee
Director of Lands.

Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.

SYLLABUS

1. PROPERTY; LAND FORMED BY ACTION OF THE SEA. — Land formed by the action of the sea is
property of the state; Francisco v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private
person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay.

2. ID.; ID.; WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE; DECLARATION NECESSARY. — Until a
formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the legislature, to the
effect that land is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue
to be part of the public domain; not available for private appropriation or ownership.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for
the registration of a parcel of land.

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in
barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by
alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the application, the Director
of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his
opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the
reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor- in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having
acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged that he was holding the
land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by
the President.

It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from
the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question
was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which borders it on the
southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and
that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said
possession was disturbed by oppositor Valeriano.

On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb
and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain.
In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the land of the applicant-
appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public domain.

"II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court nevertheless erred in not
declaring the same to be the property of the applicant-appellant, the said land not being necessary for any public
use or purpose and in not ordering at the same time its registration in the name of applicant-appellant in the
present registration proceedings.

"III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the applicant-appellant by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain and became the private
or patrimonial property of the State.

"IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel from claiming
the land in question as a land of the public domain." cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual
deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil
Code), which provides that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters." cralaw virtua1aw library

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the
accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.

Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to
accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the
sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake." 7 C.J.
1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)

Moreover, this Tribunal has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the
cases of Ker & Co. v. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay,
where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco v.
Government of P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow
of the tides of the Manila Bay).

Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been
gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or
purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters
of 1866 reads thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form
part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad v. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off.
Gaz., 2905, it was there held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the
sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coast-
guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain." (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)

The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde v.
Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo’s Digest, Vol. I, p. 52).

". . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine
whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters." cralaw virtua1aw library

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or
for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.

Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having
possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, this Court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen
years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of
the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of
those who live nearby." cralaw virtua1aw library

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, and Gutiérrez David, JJ.,
concur.