FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016.]

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY [MCIAA] ,

petitioner, v s . HEIRS OF GAVINA IJORDAN, namely, JULIAN CUISON,
FRANCISCA CUISON, DAMASINA CUISON, PASTOR CUISON,
ANGELINA CUISON, MANSUETO CUISON, BONIFACIA CUISON,
BASILIO CUISON, MOISES CUISON, and FLORENCIO CUISON ,
respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN , J : p

A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority
of the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the
seller.
The Case
This appeal assails the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61509, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) a rmed the orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, in Lapu-Lapu City (RTC) on September 2, 1997, 2 and
March 6, 1998. 3
Antecedents
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale 4 (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo,
Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Since then until the present, MCIAA remained in
material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject lot through
the CAA, later renamed the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT), and is presently known
as the Air Transportation O ce (ATO). The subject lot was transferred and conveyed to
MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958.
In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original
certi cate of title covering the subject lot (issued by virtue of Decree No. 531167).
Consequently, Original Certi cate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds
of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina,
Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all
surnamed Cuison. 5 The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by
OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot,
and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest. 6
The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-
2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, 7 alleging in
its complaint that the certi cate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents
because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot
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 had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the
name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal
obligation to surrender the certi cate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of
a new one in its name. CAIHTE

At the trial, MCIAA presented Romeo Cueva, its legal assistant, as its sole
witness who testi ed that the documents pertaining to the subject lot were the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale and Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the
BAT; and that the subject lot was utilized as part of the expansion of the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority I. 8
After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, 9 contending that the
Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause
of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that
what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that
the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against
them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their
consent or authority as his co-heirs; that Article 1317 of the Civil Code provided that "no
one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or
unless he has by law a right to represent him;" and that the tax declaration had no
probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.
MCIAA opposed the Demurrer to Evidence in due course. 10
In its order dated September 2, 1997, 11 the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint
insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized
the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing considerations, defendants'
demurrer to evidence is granted with quali cation. Consequently, plaintiff's
complaint is hereby dismissed insofar as it pertains to defendants' shares of
Lot No. 4539, as re ected in Original Certi cate of Title No. RO 2431. Plaintiff,
however, is hereby declared the owner of 1/22 share of Lot No. 4539. In this
connection, the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby directed to effect
the necessary change in OCT No. RO-2431 by replacing as one of the registered
owners, "Julian Cuizon , married to Marcosa Cosef ", with the name of
plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 12

The RTC observed that although it appeared from the Deed that vendor Julian
was the only heir of the late Pedro Cuizon, thereby adjudicating unto himself the whole
of Lot No. 4539, it likewise appeared from the same Deed that the subject lot was
covered by Cadastral Case No. 20, and that Decree No. 531167 had been issued on July
29, 1930; that having known that the subject lot had been covered by the decree issued
long before the sale took place, the more appropriate thing that MCIAA or its
representatives should have done was to check the decreed owners of the lot, instead
of merely relying on the tax declaration issued in the name of Pedro Cuizon and on the
statement of Julian; that the supposedly uninterrupted possession by MCIAA and its
predecessors-in-interest was not sufficiently established, there being no showing of the
improvements introduced on the property; and that even assuming that MCIAA had
held the material possession of the subject lot, the respondents had remained the
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 registered owners of Lot No. 4539 and could not be prejudiced by prescription.
MCIAA moved for reconsideration, 13 but the RTC denied its motion on March 6,
1998. 14
MCIAA appealed to the CA, submitting that: 15
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ONLY THE SHARE OF JULIAN
CUIZON WAS SOLD TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAY BACK IN 1957.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE UN-EXPLAINED,
UNREASONABLE AND TEDIOUS INACTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEES WHICH
CONSTITUTE THEIR IMPLIED RATIFICATION OF THE SALE WHICH THEY
CANNOT NOW CONVENIENTLY IMPUGN IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
THE PHENOMENAL RISE IN LAND VALUES IN MACTAN ISLAND.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
HAS NOT PROVEN POSSESSION OVER SAID LOT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING MOTU-PROPRIO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AS GUILTY OF LACHES AND/OR ESTOPPEL IN THE
FACE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE FROM THE VERY FACTS OF THE CASE ITSELF; IT
SHOULD BE NOTED, MOREOVER THAT IT WAS PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO
INITIATED THE COMPLAINT HENCE THE SAME COULD NOT PROPERLY BE
RAISED AS DEFENSES HEREIN BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VALID PROVISION OF
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE THAT DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES MERELY HOLD THE TITLE IN TRUST FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
AND ARE THEREFORE OBLIGATED TO SURRENDER THE SAME TO PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT SO THE TITLE COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO IT AS THE VENDEE
WAY BACK IN 1957.
In the assailed decision promulgated on February 22, 2006, 16 the CA a rmed
the orders of the RTC issued on September 2, 1997 17 and March 6, 1998. 18
The CA subsequently denied MCIAA's motion for reconsideration 19 on June 15,
2006. 20
Issues
In this appeal, MCIAA submits the following grounds: 21
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
FOLLOWING: DETACa

I. RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LOT

IN 1957 AND PETITIONER'S CONTINUOUS POSSESSION THEREOF.
II. RESPONDENTS' INACTION FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS TO
RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LOT AMOUNTS TO AN IMPLIED
RATIFICATION OF THE SALE.
III. PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE LOT SINCE 1957 IS BORNE BY THE
CASE RECORD.
IV. RESPONDENTS ARE CLEARLY GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, WHICH
LEGALLY BARS THEM FROM RECOVERING POSSESSION OF THE LOT.
In other words, was the subject lot validly conveyed in its entirety to the
petitioner?
In support of its appeal, MCIAA insists that the respondents were fully aware of
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 the transaction with Julian from the time of the consummation of the sale in 1957, as
well as of its continuous possession thereof; 22 that what was conveyed by Julian to its
predecessor-in-interest, the CAA, was the entirety of Lot No. 4539, consisting of 12,012
square meters, not just his share of 1/22 of the whole lot; that the respondents were
guilty of inexplicable inaction as to the sale, which manifested their implied rati cation
of the supposedly unauthorized act of Julian of selling the subject lot in 1957; that
although the respondents were still minors at the time of the execution of the sale, their
rati cation of Julian's act became evident from the fact that they had not impugned the
sale upon reaching the age of majority; that they asserted their claim only after knowing
of the phenomenal rise in the value of the lot in the area despite their silence for more
than 30 years; and that they did not assert ownership for a long period, and did not
exercise physical and constructive possession by paying the taxes or declaring the
property for taxation purposes.
On their part, the respondents aver that they were not aware of the sale of the
subject lot in 1957 because the sale was not registered, and because the subject lot
was not occupied by MCIAA or its lessee; 23 that they became aware of the claim of
MCIAA only when its representative tried to intervene during the reconstitution of the
certi cate of title in 1980; and that one of the co-owners of the property, Moises
Cuison, had been vigilant in preventing the occupation of the subject lot by other
persons.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
Firstly, both the CA and the RTC found the Deed and the Tax Declaration with
which MCIAA would buttress its right to the possession and ownership of the subject
lot insu cient to substantiate the right of MCIAA to the relief sought. Considering that
possession was a factual matter that the lower courts had thoroughly examined and
based their ndings on, we cannot undo their ndings. We are now instead bound and
concluded thereby in accordance with the well-established rule that the ndings of fact
of the trial court, when a rmed by the CA, are nal and conclusive. Indeed, the Court is
not a trier of facts. Moreover, this mode of appeal is limited to issues of law; hence,
factual ndings should not be reviewed unless there is a showing of an exceptional
reason to review them. Alas, that showing is not made.
Secondly, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the
respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share.
Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of
Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the
a rmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence,
the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the
respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had
no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides
that no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the
name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is rati ed, expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party. But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and
effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square
meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in
Torres v. Lapinid: 24
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 . . . even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only
his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or rati cation to bar the respondents' contrary
claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine
of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or
successors-in-interest. 25 Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the
contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was
nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on
the rights of the respondents in the subject lot. aDSIHc

Lastly, MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside
from the absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the
subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the
respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could
deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. 26 The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality
forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity
of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador sur casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. 27
WHEREFORE , the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 8-18; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale (retired/deceased) and
Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap (retired).
2. Id. at 95-99.
3. Id. at 112-113.

4. Id. at 59-61, 9-10.

5. Id. at 63-64.

6. Id. at 95-96.
7. Id. at 65-70.

8. Id. at 96.
9. Id. at 89-92.
10. Id. at 93-94.

11. Id. at 95-99.

12. Id. at 99.
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 13. Id. at 100-111.

14. Id. at 112-113.

15. Id. at 152-153.
16. Supra note 1.

17. Supra note 2.

18. Supra note 3.

19. Id. at 166-175.

20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 29-30.
22. Id. at 30.

23. Id. at 192.

24. G.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014.
25. Article 1439, Civil Code.
26. Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641.

27. Francisco v. Rojas, G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 423, 450-451.

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