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FIRST DIVISION

I
THE PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 2406()2
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

PERALTA, CJ., Chairperson,

CAGUIOA,
REYES, J.C., JR.,
-versus- LAZARO-JAVIER, and
GAERLAN,* JJ.
Promulgated:

RAYMUNDO RAPIZ y
SEP 1 6 2020
CORREA,
Accused-Appellant.
I
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------x

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal assails the Decision 1 dated February 7, 20 8 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08109 entitled "People ojfthe Philippines
v. Raymundo Rapiz y Correa" which affinned appellant's conviction for
simple rape, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DE JED. The

assailed January 29, 2016 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, B anch 275,

• Designated as additional member vice J. Mario V. Lopez.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and concun-ed in by Presiding J ustice Romeo F.

Barza and Associate Justice Mario A. Lopez (now a member of this Court), all members of the First
Division, CA rollo, pp. 96-1 02.
 Decision 2 G.R. No. 240662

Las Pifias City, in Criminal Case No. 15-1121 , is MODIFIED in that the
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are INCREASED to
1>75,000.00 EACH; and appellant is further ORDERED to PAY
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Except as otherwise modified herein,
the rest of the assailed Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.2

Facts

The Charge

Raymundo Rapiz y Correa (appellant) was charged with the rape of

AAA3 in Criminal Case No. 15-1121, viz.:

That on or about the 2 nd day of April 2015, in the City of Las Pifias,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design and by means of force, threat, and
intimidation and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with complainant AAA, against her will and
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275,
Las Pifias City. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 5 Trial on the
merits ensued.

Proceedings before the Trial Court

Prosecution's Version

On April 2, 2015, AAA (complainant) and appellant were left all alone
in the latter's house. When she heard appellant call for her, she immediately
approached but he suddenly pointed a deadly weapon at her. She got shocked
and was unable to react when he undressed her and himself too. He asked her
to lie down on the bed, after which, he got on top of her and inserted his penis
into her vagina. He threatened to kill her and her mother if she would tell her
mother about the incident. Before her mother arrived, appellant tightly held
her hands, went outside, and sharply stared at her. She could not do anything
but cry. 6

2
/d.atl0I.
3 The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or
compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be
disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v.
Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)) and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-20 15 dated September 5,
2017.
4
CA rollo, p. 43.
5 Id. at 44.
6
Id.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 240662

On April 3, 2015, appellant brought her near a balete tree. There, he

hugged her, kissed her on the lips, fondled her breasts, and touched her
vagina. He lay near her and slept. They went back to appellant's house by 11
o'clock in the evening. 7

On April 4, 2015, around 11 o'clock in the evening, aJDpellant told her

to go to the Canon Vulcanizing Shop where he was working. When she got
there, appellant locked the door of the shop. He proposed td court her, but
she refused because she thought he is her uncle, that is, she believed that he
and her mother are cousins. Appellant got mad and no long€r talked to her.
They were able to go home by 1 o'clock in the morning. 8

On April 6, 2015, around midnight, appellant promised to buy her

a pair of slippers and dress in Baclaran. They later went there, but he did
not make good his promise. He just made another promiss to buy for her
another time. He then took her to a zoo and kissed her there. They went
home afterwards. 9

On April 7, 2015, her mother, BBB, filed a comp~aint before the

barangay against appellant's live-in partner. The reason for the complaint
was that complainant and appellant's live-in partner had apparently gotten
into a fight. Appellant's live-in partner was jealous wheneJ er complainant
conversed with appellant. Complainant attended the heariing before the
barangay where she disclosed that appellant had inserted his penis into
her vagina three (3) to four (4) times already and it all happened in
appellant's house. 10

Medico-legal officer Police Senior Inspector Reah Mjfoba Cornelio,

M.D. (Dr. Cornelio) examined complainant and made the following findings:

XXX

HYMEN: Presence of deep healed lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions

and deep healing laceration at 6 o'clock position. 11 I
XXX

Conclusion
Medico-legal evaluation shows clear evidence of recent blunt enetrating
trauma to the hymen. 12

Defense's Version

7
Id. at 44
8 Id. at 44-45.
9
ld.at45 .
10 Id.
11 Id.
12
Id. at 46.
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 240662

Appellant Raymundo Rapiz testified that complainant's mother BB~

had falsely accused him of raping her daughter because he refused to lend
her Pl,500.00. BBB needed the money so she and complainant could go back
to Mindoro. 13

He worked at a vulcanizing shop owned by a ce1iain Jonivie Canon and

her husband, Antonio Canon (Spouses Canon). He used to reside in Montanes
Compound at No. 358, Barrio Talon, Angela Road, Las Piiias City. The
compound was owned by Antonio Jesus Montanes. On March 20, 2015, he
chose to move and live in the vulcanizing shop because he was ashamed of
the behavior of complainant and her mother. Both allegedly arrived at the
compound on March 3, 2015, fighting and cursing each other - "Narinig ko
pa yung sigaw nya doon na 'Tang ina ka. Kahit hubaran kita sa kalsada
pagpilahan kita sa mga lalaki wala kang magagawa' ." 14

Complainant and her mother were supposed to help him wash his
clothes, but it never happened. Instead, BBB made complainant work as a
canteen helper near the vulcanizing shop. BBB even told every man in the
canteen to treat complainant as if she were his wife. 15 ·

The spouses Canon testified on appellant's character. They knew him

to be industrious, very helpful, and accommodating to his relatives. They
believed that appellant could not have raped complainant because he had a
live-in partner, a certain Ana. In the later part of March 2015, appellant
approached Antonio Canon and told him the latter stories on how BBB would
do everything to put him in jail. Eventually, BBB's wish happened. 16

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision 17 dated January 29, 2016, the trial court found appellant
guilty as charged. The trial court observed that complainant could write her
name but did not know how to read. She could only count up to ten (10)
in Filipino and up to thirty (30) in English. She gave a truthful and accurate
narration on how appellant sexually ravished her. By reason of appellant's
moral ascendancy over her, being her mother's cousin, he was able to
unduly influence and intimidate her into having sexual relations with him.
The inconsistencies in complainant's testimony were badges of truth. Her
testimony on her sexual ravishment was corroborated by Dr. Comelio's
medico-legal. The supposed inconsistency as to the actual time the rape
incident took place, i.e., "April 2, 2015 at 4 o'clock in the afternoon" was
indicated in the request for genital examination issued by Police Senior
Inspector Joylene Bulan while "April 2, 2015 at 9:10 o'clock in the morning"
was indicated in Dr. Cornelio's medico-legal report - - - Refers to a trivial, if

13
Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 47.
17
Id. at 43-56.
 s
1
Decision .R. No. 240662

not irrelevant, detail. For time is not an element of rape. Appellant's denial is
a weak defense when pitted against complainant's positive and categorical
testimony. Further, BBB 's alleged resentment against appellant for the latter's
supposed refusal to lend her money is too shallow a reason, nay, motivation
to falsely charge appellant with rape. 18 The trial court decree<il:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the court

finds Raymundo Rapiz guilty with moral certainty of rape under Article
266-A paragraph l(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353, without the possibility of parole. He is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts of
PS0,000.00 as indemnity and PS0,000,00 as moral damages, with the
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 19

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of
conviction. He argued: a) the trial court en-ed in gi{ing weight to
complainant's and BBB's inconsistent and incredible testiimonies on the
circumstances sun-ounding the rape incident; b) the prosecution was unable to
prove that the alleged rape actually happened on April 2, 2015 because
complainant, on cross, testified that it happened on March 16, 2015. Further,
there was a conflict between complainant's testimony and BBB 's, i.e.
complainant said she immediately informed her mother about the incident,
while BBB asserted she learned of the incident only on April 9, 2015; c)
complainant's actions during and after the alleged rap~ incident were
inconsistent with those of a real rape victim: she could ha~e resisted and
shouted for help considering she was already a twenty (20) year old
woman. She even visited appellant at the vulcanizing shop two (2) days
later and went with him to Baclaran on the following day; and d) his
defense of denial has more weight considering the incredibl~ testimonies of
complainant and her mother. 20

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through A sistant Solicitor

General Bernard Hernandez and Senior State Solicitor Ma. Z rayda Tejones-
Zufiiga, countered that complainant's testimony sufficiently eJtablished all the
elements of rape. She is a credible witness because no womaljl would concoct
a story of defloration and allow the examination of her private parts in the
process. The medico-legal report materially corroborated complainant's tale
of sexual ravishment. Time is not an element of the crimkl of rape, thus,
whether the incident happened on April 2, 2015, or on another date is
immaterial. The inconsistencies between the testimonies of complainant and
her mother hinge on minor details which do not deviate from the fact that the

18
Id. at 47-56.
19
id. at 56.
20
Id. at 39-40.

r(
_ _J_
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 240662

rape incident did occur. Also, the alleged grudge that BBB had against him is
too trivial a reason to impel her and complainant to falsely charge him with
rape. Appellant's story that he was in the vulcanizing shop at the time the rape
happened does not hold water because the vulcanizing shop is only about eight
(8) meters away from his house. Nor can his defense of denial be accorded
credence. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages should be
increased from PS0,000.00 to P75,000.00 each. Complainant should also be
awarded P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 21

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision22 dated February 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals

affinned in the main, with modification increasing the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00 each and awarding exemplary
damages of P75,000.00.

The Present Appeal

Appellant now seeks anew a verdict of acquittal. Both appellant23 and

the OSG 24 manifested that, in lieu of their supplemental briefs, they were
adopting their respective briefs in the Court of Appeals.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting appellant of rape?

Ruling

We acquit.

The general rule is that the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution
for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. The
rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can
be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only the offended
party's testimony.25

Yet, the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused

demands no less than a moral certainty of his guilt free of reasonable doubt.
More, the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The

21
Id. at 70-85.
22
Supra note I.
23
Rollo, pp. 17-19.
24
Id. at 22-24.
25
Peopl e v. Umanifo, 784 Phil. 581, 586.(2016).
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 240662

testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and

unavoidably, her own credibility must also be put on trial. 26

The crime of Rape is defined and penalized under Artidle 266-A of The
Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is comm itted:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: I
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years Jr

age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mention~d above be
present.

X X X X

The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC

are: (1) the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidatibn upon her; or
she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or she iJ under 12 years
of age or is demented. The RTC and the CA both found th t complainant's
testimony clearly established appellant's carnal knowledge of her against
her will by employing threat and intimidation.

There being only one witness to her harrowing exper ence, the Court
1
must go over complainant's testimony with close scrutin . Complainant
testified on what happened to her on April 2, 2015:

Fiscal Castillo
1
Q: You said that you got frightened. What did you do when you got
frightened after your Tito Raymundo threatened you to kill you i±'you don' t
go near him?

Witness:

A: I did not do anything. I just remained silent.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: After you go near your Tito Raymundo, what did he do next.

Witness:

26
People v. Rondina, 737 Phil. 410,419 (20 14).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 240662

A: He removed all my clothes

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What were you then wearing?

Witness:

A: I was wearing a short and at-shirt.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: How did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: He held both of my hands and then he cover[ed] my mouth.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What [did] he [use] in covering your mouth?

Witness:

A: His hands, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand?

Witness:

A: His right hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand [did] he [use] in holding your hand?

Witness:

A: Left hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Now, how did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: HINAW AKAN NIYA NGA PO.

XXX
Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please demonstrate it to the Honorable Court?

Witness:
Decision 9 I .R. No. 240662

A: He used both of his hands in removing my clothes.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which [was] [removed] first, your t-shirt o[f] your shorts?

Witness:

A: My T-shirt, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And after your T-shirt was remove [d] by your Tito Raymundo, what did
he do next?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] also my bra, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And what else did he do after removing your bra?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] my shorts, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: While your Tito Raymundo [was] removing your clothes, rel fening to
your t-shirt, bra and your sho1ts, what were you doing?

Witness:

A: Nothing, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout?

Witness:

A: Because I was frightened at that time, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not rw1 away?

Witness:

A: NATAKOT NA NGA PO AKO KAMI LANG PONG DALAWA

NUON. I
X XX

Q: What did your Tito Raymundo do after removing your t-shirt, bra and
your shorts?

I
Decision 10 G.R. No. 240662

Witness:

A: BINABOYNIYA PO AKO.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your answer "BINABOY"? What exactly did he

do to you?

Witness:

A : PINASOK NIYA PO YONG ARI NIYA SA ANO KO PO.

XXX

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "ANO"?

Witness:

A: PINASOK NIYO PO YONG TETE NIYA SA HARAPAN KO PO.

XXX

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "HARAPAN"?

Witness:

A: BINABOY NIYA PO AKO DAHIL MAY GUSTO PO SIYA SA AKIN.

XXX

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please point to the Interpreter what part of your body were you
referring when you said "HARAPAN KO PO" ?

Witness:

A: Here. (And the witness is referring to her vagina).

Court:

So there was this insertion of the penis to the vagina of the witness.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What did you feel Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo inserted
his penis in your vagina?

Witness:

A : It was painful. There was pain.

 Decision 11 G.R. No. 240662

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And for how long the male organ of your Tito Raymundo remained
inside your vagina?

Witness:

A: NANGHIHINA NA PO AKO NUON NOONG SINUOT NIYA PO.

XXX

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout to call the attention of the people outside while
your Tito Raymundo [was] inserting his penis into your vagina?

Witness:

A: Because he was threatening me, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: In what manner was he threatening you then?

Witness:

A: He tightly [held] my hands and I could not go outside the house. KASI
PO PAG LUMABAS PO AKO PAPATAYIN NIYA PO AKO.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What was your position Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo
[was] inserting his penis into your vagina? I
Witness:

A: I was lying, Prosecutor.

XXX

Q: Why were you then lying when your Tito Raymundo was removing your
t-shirt, bra and shorts?

Witness:

A: NAGHIHINA NA NGA PO AK0. 27

In reviewing the foregoing testimony, we adhere to the guidelines laid

down in People v. XXX, 28 viz.:

Specifically, for the review of rape cases, the Court has cbnsistently
adhered to the following established principles: a) an accusati1n of rape

27 CA ratio, pp. 48-5 I.

28 828 Phil.770, 782-783 (2018).

I
Decision 12 G.R. No. 240662

can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Following these principles, the Court has also refined how rape is
proved. The credibility of the complainant is the single most important issue
in the prosecution of rape cases. The categorical and candid testimony of
the complainant suffices, and a culprit may be convicted solely on the
basis of her testimony, provided that it hurdles the test of credibility. It
should not just come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should
likewise be credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward
and in accord with human experience. Where the discrepancies and
contradictory statements on important details in the testimony
seriously impair its probative value, cast serious doubt on its
credibility, and erode the integrity of the testimony, the Court should
acquit the accused.

It is true that the Court accords great respect to the trial court's
findings on witnesses' credibility. This is because trial provides judges with
the opportunity to detect cues and expressions that could suggest sincerity
or betray lies and ill will, not reflected in the documentary or object
evidence. The exception, of course, is when the trial court and/or the CA
overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the
outcome of the case. (Emphasis supplied)

Stated differently, where the credibility and reliability of witnesses and

their respective testimonies are key, then:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must
acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you
are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the
accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which
you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that
evidence of the guilt of the accused.29

While we believe complainant's claim of sexual intercourse with

appellant, the prosecution evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that this was the result of or was accomplished through force or
intimidation or moral ascendancy.

It is the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

the elements of the crime of rape, which includes as above stated that an
accused had carnal knowledge of a complainant through force or
29 R. v. lake, 2005 NSCA 162 (Can Lil), <http://canlii.ca/t/1 m8c8>, retrieved on 2019-07-01.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 240662

intimidation. Lack of consent through any of the modes mentioned in the

RPC or case law as where moral ascendancy is involved is not to be
presumed.

However, where an accused alleges consent to the sexual act as a

defense, it is his burden of evidence to prove this allegation by substantial
evidence. Thus:

Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative defense needs

convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses
attesting to the consensual romantic relationship between the offender and
1
his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden shifts to the appellant to prove his defense by
substantial evidence.... Fmihermore, even assuming arguendol that there
was some form of amorous relationship, such averment will not hecessarily
rule out the use of force or intimidation by appellant to have sex !against her
will.30

Here, appellant did not raise the affirmative defense oficonsensual sex.
He in fact denied having carnal knowledge of complainant. Hence, it
behooves the prosecution to prove each of the elements o~ rape beyond a
reasonable doubt, especially that the sex between complainant and accused
occurred through force, intimidation or moral ascendancy. This the
prosecution evidence distinctly failed.

First. Complainant mentioned that appellant threateried her with a

weapon. Interestingly, the type of weapon was neverl identified by
complainant. She never described how it was used to threaten her. Instead, she
proceeded to describe how she felt weak and felt that she had no other choice
1
but to comply with appellant's directives. As her testimony progressed, there
was no longer any mention of the purported weapon. Did appellant continue
to threaten her with it? Did appellant bring it with him when they went to the
bedroom? What did appellant do with the weapon while he {vas raping her?
We will never know.

Surely, a person who has been threatened with a weapon will definitely
remember what was used on him on her, especially in cases Jhere a person is
threatened to do something against his or her will, more so in the heinous
crime of rape. Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must c01Je not only from
the mouth of a credible witness, but must also be credible, re! sonable, and in
accord with human experience. A credible witness must, ther~fore, be able to
narrate a convincing and logical story. 31 In this case, the weawon disappeared
from the narrative without any logical explanation. Such omiJsion leads us to
conclude that the "weapon" was contrived by complainant to , ive color to her
claim that she was threatened by appellant.

30 People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004); People v. Nogpo, 603 Phil. 722 (2009); People v. Pascua,
453 Phil. 946 (2003).
31 Sps. De Leon v. Bank ofthe Philippine Islands, 721 Phil. 839, 850 (2013).

I
Decision 14 G.R. No. 240662

Second. Intimidation is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person

against whom it may be employed, and its presence is basically incapable of
being tested by any hard and fast rule. Intimidation is normally best viewed in
the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time and occasion
of the crime. 32 ·

Complainant's claim that she was intimidated into submitting herself

to appellant's lewd designs is likewise incredible. True, appellant is her
mother's cousin and exercises moral ascendancy over her. But, complainant
was already 20 years old at the time and she was of sound body since she was
able to work as a helper at a nearby canteen. She may be illiterate, but the
same cannot be considered as equivalent to mental retardation. She is of
sufficient mental aptitude and is perfectly capable of at least resisting
appellant's advances, if indeed his advances were unwanted.

The rule is that in making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough

evaluation based on history, physical, and laboratory examination made by a
clinician is necessary.33 The reason for this requirement is well-explained in
both medical and psychology literature: mental retardation is a recognized
clinical syndrome usually traceable to an organic cause, which determinants
are complex and multifactorial. 34 As the boundaries between normality and
retardation are difficult to delineate, proper identification requires competent
clinical evaluation of psychosomatic parameters in conjunction with medical
and laboratory tests.35

Here, the record is bereft of any evidence that a comprehensive medical

evaluation was had to properly determine complainant's mental status. There
is as well no allegation about deficiencies in her mental state.

In the absence of a weapon, appellant' s threat of killing her would have

been an idle threat, or at least considerably less threatening. Complainant
never once mentioned that appellant forcibly held her or pushed her to a lying
position. Appellant only laid his hands on her when he covered her mouth and
seemingly took his time in taking off her clothes. Also, nowhere is it indicated
in her testimony that appellant continually threatened to kill her if she did not
comply with his wishes. Not once did she resist appellant's advances. We note
that appellant threatened complainant only once and before he made his move
on her. We simply find it implausible that a single threat, a weak one at that,
would immediately deprive a woman of her free will and immediately subject
her to the whims and caprices of a man without even giving the slightest
resistance.

Admittedly, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry
out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may
appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others

32
See People v. Mateo, 588 Phil. 543, 558 (2008).
33 People v. l amarroza, 359 Phil. 440, 448-449 ( I 998).
34 Ibid.
35
!bid.
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 240662

may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Resistance is not an

element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within
her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as
the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is
beside the point. 36 But in this case, complainant's total passivity is baffling.
Her nan-ation of the events simply does not make sense and makes her
testimony incredible.
I
Nor can moral ascendancy be considered to have supplanted force and
intimidation in this case. For moral ascendancy can only be considered if rape
of minor was committed by a close kin or a relative withih the third civil
degree by consanguinity or affinity. People v. Gacusan 37 explains:

Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy replaces t olence or

intimidation in rape committed by a close-kin cited People v. Corpuz.

In Corpuz, the accused was the live-in partner of the victiun's mother.
The victim, AAA, was 13 years old when accused Corpuz started raping
her. The repeated rape incidents made AAA pregnant.

Accused Corpuz admitted his sexual encounters with AAA. He

insisted, however, that he never forced himself to AAA since he even
courted her. Similarly, he admitted that he was the father of AAA's child.

Nonetheless, this Court affirmed his conviction and held that:

[I]n rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father,

stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the daughters of his

common-law paiiner. Fraga tried evading his conviction by shifting from
his defense of alibi to lack of force or intimidation. While lthis Court
affirmed Fraga's conviction since force and intimidation was sufficiently
proven, it also emphasized that:

[A]ccused-appellant sta1ied cohabiting with complainants'

mother in 1987. As the common-law husband of their mother[ he
gained such moral ascendancy over complainants that any rriore
resistance than had been shown by complainants cannot
reasonably be expected.

In People 1~ Robles, accused Robles raped his common-law wife's

daughter. This Court affirmed his conviction and likened Rotiles' moral
ascendancy over the victim to that of a biological father; thus:

Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused, stepfath .r of the 12

year--old complainant, and threat of bodily harm rendered c4mplainant
subservient to appellant's lustful desires ... Actual force or intimidation need
not even be employed for rape to be committed where the ovef powering
influence of a father over his daughter suffices. (citations omitted)

36
People v. Bisora, 810 Phil. 339, 344(2017).
37 809 Phil. 773, 785-787 (20 I 7).
Decision 16 G.R. No. 240662

Complainant is a full grown 20-year old woman at the time of her

alleged sexual ravishment. More, appellant is not even considered a close kin
under the law, being her mother's cousin. Verily, moral ascendancy cannot be
taken into account and considered as substitute for threat or intimidation.

Indeed, rape is essentially a .crime committed through force or

intimidation, that is, against the will ofthe female. It is also committed without
force or.intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and showr{
to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent
is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes
of the law of giving consent. The female must not at any time consent; her
consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or
if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from
being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.38 Here,
there is no doubt that complainant had impliedly given her consent for
appellant to have carnal knowledge of her. Her actions, or lack thereof for that
matter, speaks for itself.

Third. The reasonable doubt on the nature of complainant and

appellant's sexual congress is reinforced by their subsequent actuations. Time
and again, this Court has emphasized that a woman's conduct immediately
after the alleged assault is of critical value in gauging the truth of her
accusations. It must coincide with logic and experience.39 Here, complainant's
actuations whenever she was with appellant are not those of a woman whose
virtue had been outraged. ·

Complainant admitted that the following day, on April 3, 2015, she had
gone to rendezvous with appellant to a balete tree. There, he hugged her,
kissed her on the lips, fondled her breasts, and touched her vagina. He lay near
her and slept. She never mentioned that she was threatened or forced to go
with him. There is reasonable doubt that she voluntarily submitted to
appellant's ministrations while shielded by the balete tree from prying eyes.

Again, on April 4, 2015 , around 11 o'clock in the evening, she

voluntarily went to the vulcanizing shop. She did not state that appellant
threatened or compelled her to go to there in the middle of the night. When
she got there, appellant locked the door of the shop and proposed to court her
- which can be construed as an attempt to formalize, or at least put a label on,
their relationship. She refused mainly because he is her alleged uncle, which
caused appellant to get mad and stop talking to her. Again, the Court observes
that the actuations of both parties are those of lovers trying to determine if
they should move forward and have a deeper connection after their physical
communion with each other.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2015, appellant promised to buy her a pair of

slippers and dress in Baclaran. When they went there, he did·not make good
his promise, but made another promise to buy for her another time. He then
38
People v. Amarela, et al., 823 Phi I. 1188, 1211-1 2 12 (2018).

t(
39
People v. Laurente, 406 Phil. 337,348 (2001).
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 240662

took her to a place with many animals and kissed her there. ffhis time, there
is no doubt that complainant went with appellant willingly - this little
excursion could even be considered a date. Complainant 1was apparently
comfortable and at ease in appellant's company that she would allow herself
to be seen in public with him and even be kissed by him.

Taking into account all the foregoing considerations, the Court

concludes that there is reasonable doubt on the element of force, threat or
intimidation in this case. There is no moral certainty as to the crime of rape to
speak of.

Reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence adducedlor from the lack
of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged.
While no test definitively determines what is reasonable dou~t under the law,
the view is that it must involve genuine and irreconcilable contradictions
based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts constituting the
elements of the crime. 40

It has been repeatedly ruled that in criminal litigation, lthe evidence of

the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cann@t draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the
prosecution. Thus, its failure to discharge its burden in t~is case entitles
appellant to an acquittal41 as a matter of right. Surely, where the evidence of
1

the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense itself is
equally weak, an accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in
view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. 42

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated February 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 08109
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RAYMUN~O RAPIZ y
CORREA is ACQUITTED of rape on ground of REASON.ABLE DOUBT.

The Director of the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinll pa City, Metro

Manila is ordered to immediately RELEASE RAYMUNDO RAPIZ y
CORREA from detention unless he is being held in custody for some other
lawful cause; and to REPORT to this Court his compliance within five (5)
days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

40 People v. Ramos, 369 Phil. 84, IOI (1999).

41
People v. Tionloc, 805 Phil. 907,920 (2017).
42
Astorga v. People, 480 Phil. 585 , 596 (2004).
Decision 18 G.R. No. 240662

WE CONCUR:

Chairperson

/7/;~-~
VO ~ssociate Justice

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SAMUEL H. GAERL~N
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.