"I" and "Me" The Self in The Context of Consciousness

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
published: 04 September 2018

doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01656
“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context

of Consciousness
Mateusz Woźniak*
Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self
as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially
in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self.
The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt
to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This
distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the
self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a
subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably
all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting
self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the
problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should
be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by
Edited by: referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what
Wanja Wiese,
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject
Mainz, Germany introduced by Wittgenstein (1958)] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of
Reviewed by: experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure
Jane Elizabeth Aspell,
Anglia Ruskin University,
of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding
United Kingdom and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience
Elmarie Venter, and philosophy.
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
*Correspondence: Keywords: self, consciousness, self-consciousness, sense of self, self-as-subject, self-as-object, predictive
Mateusz Woźniak coding, IIT
mateusz.wozniak@monash.edu;
mgwozniak@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to Almost 130 years ago, James (1890) introduced the distinction between “Me” and “I” (see Table 1
Theoretical and Philosophical for illustrative quotes) to the debate about the self. The former term refers to understanding of the
Psychology, self as an object of experience, while the latter to the self as a subject of experience1 . This distinction,
a section of the journal
in different forms, has recently regained popularity in cognitive science (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011;
Frontiers in Psychology
Liang, 2014; Sui and Gu, 2017; Truong and Todd, 2017) and provides a useful tool for clarifying
Received: 20 March 2018 what one means when one speaks about the self. However, its exact meaning varies in cognitive
Accepted: 17 August 2018
science, especially in regard to what one understands as the self as subject, or “I.”
Published: 04 September 2018
The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and take a closer look at
Citation:
the conceptual distinction between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. I will suggest,
Woźniak M (2018) “I” and “Me”:
The Self in the Context 1
Therefore, whenever I use the term “I” I mean self-as-subject (of experience), and whenever I use the term “Me” I mean self-
of Consciousness. as-object (of experience). This assumption reflects James’ (1890) understanding of these terms (see Table 1). I also assume,
Front. Psychol. 9:1656. following James (1890), that these two categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., if something is an object of experience then it
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01656 cannot simultaneously be a subject of experience, and vice versa.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Woźniak “I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness
TABLE 1 | Quotes from James (1890) illustrating the distinction between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”) and a quote from Wittgenstein (1958) illustrating
his distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject.
Description and illustrative quote
James, 1890 James (1890) on the distinction between “me” and “not-me,” and their relation to “I” (the Thinker):
“We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, and objective person, known by a passing
subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter let us see the words ME and I for the empirical person and the judging
Thought.,” p. 371 “(. . .) it would follow that all that is experienced is, strictly considered, objective; that this Objective falls asunder into two
contrasted parts, one realized as ‘Self,’ the other as ‘not-Self;’ and that over and above these parts there is nothing save the fact that they
are known, the fact of the stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of their being experienced at all. But this
condition of the experience is not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It is only known in
subsequent reflection. (. . .) Each ‘section’ of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness or knowledge of this sort, including and
contemplating its ‘me’ and its ‘not-me’ as objects which work out their drama together, but not yet including or contemplating its own
subjective being. (. . .) The sciousness in question would be the Thinker, and the existence of this thinker would be given to us rather as a
logical postulate than as that direct inner perception” p. 304
James, 1890 James (1890) on “I” (referred to as the Thinker) as a metaphysical issue:
“But who the Thinker would be, or how many distinct Thinkers we ought to suppose in the universe, would all be subjects for an ulterior
metaphysical inquiry,” p. 304
Wittgenstein, 1958 Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinction between the use of “I” as subject and as object:
“There are two different cases in the use of the word “I” (or “my”) which I might call “the use as object” and “the use as subject.” Examples
of the first kind are these: “My arm is broken,” “I have grown six inches,” “I have a bump on my forehead,” “The wind blows my hair about.”
Examples of the second kind are: “I see so-and-so,” “I hear so-and-so,” “I try to lift my arm,” “I think it will rain,” “I have toothache.” (. . .) It is
possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my
neighbor’s. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of
recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache. To ask “are you sure it’s you who have pain?” would be nonsensical.”, pp. 66–67
following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started

by Wittgenstein (1958), that in this context “Me” (i.e., the self as
object) reflects the phenomenology of selfhood, and corresponds
to what is also known as sense of self, self-consciousness, or
phenomenal selfhood (e.g., Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Blanke,
2012; Dainton, 2016). On the other hand, the ultimate meaning
of “I” (i.e., the self as subject) is rooted in metaphysics of
subjectivity, and refers to the question: why is all conscious
experience subjective and who/what is the subject of conscious
experience? I will argue that these two theoretical problems, i.e.,
phenomenology of selfhood and metaphysics of subjectivity, are
in principle independent issues and should not be confused. FIGURE 1 | An illustration of James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958)
However, cognitive science usually follows the Wittgensteinian distinctions between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”). In the
tradition2 by understanding the self-as-subject, or “I,” as a original formulation, James’ (1890) “Me” includes also physical objects and
phenomenological, rather than metaphysical problem [Figure 1 people (material and social “Me”) – they were not included in the picture,
because they are not directly related to consciousness.
illustrates the difference between James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s
(1958) approach to the self]. By following Metzinger’s (2003,
2010) framework of phenomenal self-models, and in agreement
with a reductionist approach to the phenomenal “I”3 (Prinz, “ME” AS AN OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE:
2012), I will argue that what is typically investigated in PHENOMENOLOGY OF
cognitive science as the phenomenal “I” [or the Wittgenstein’s SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
(1958) self-as-subject] can be understood as just a higher-order
component of the self-model reflecting the phenomenal “Me.” The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and
Table 2 presents some of crucial claims of the theory of connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning
self-models, together with concise references to other theories of ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of
consciousness excitement of a certain particular sort (James, 1890,
the self-as-object discussed in this paper.
p. 319, emphasis in original).
2
Wittgenstein (1958) himself did not discuss the issue of phenomenology of the
self. However, his approach to the distinction between the use of “I” as subject James (1890) chose the word “Me” to refer to self-as-object.
and “I” as object can be seen as a starting point for contemporary discussions of What does it mean? In James’ (1890) view, it reflects “all the
phenomenology of the self-as-subject. things” which have the power to produce “excitement of a
3
Whenever I use the prefix “phenomenal” I mean “the conscious experience of.”
certain particular sort.” This certain kind of excitement is
For example, when I write phenomenal “I”, I mean: the conscious experience of self
as subject of experience (“I”). In a similar fashion I use the prefix “metaphysical” nothing more than some form of experiential quality of me-
when I mean “the metaphysical entity of.” ness, mine-ness, or similar - understood in a folk-theoretical

TABLE 2 | Examples of theories of the self-as-object (“Me”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the phenomenal self, with representative quotes illustrating
each position.
Phenomenal self The self understood as a conscious experience of being “me” (or “I”), also investigated as phenomenal
selfhood, self-consciousness, or sense of self.
Metzinger, 2010 Minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS) as a conscious experience (with a specific content) of being a self:
“What does exist is an intermittent process, the experience of being a self, as well as the diverse and constantly
changing contents of self-consciousness. This is what philosophers mean when they talk about the ‘phenomenal self’:
The way you appear to yourself, subjectively, consciously.” p. 26
Metzinger, 2003 Phenomenal self as not necessary for conscious experience:
“(. . .) this phenomenal quality of ‘mineness’ or bodily ‘selfhood’ is by no means a necessary precondition of conscious
experience (. . .)” p. 334
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 Minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS) as a phenomenal property:
“MPS is a phenomenal property, namely the conscious experience of being a self. It is the experience of being a distinct,
holistic entity capable of global self-control and attention, possessing a body and a location in space and time” p. 7
Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 Minimal (phenomenal) selfhood is underpinned by a representational structure:
“. . .minimal selfhood emerges as the result of pre-reflexive self-modeling, i.e., through an organism’s model of the world
that is phenomenologically centered onto the self. Thereby, Metzinger’s (2010) account builds on the proposition that
the brain is a representational system that needs to interpret the world (. . .) For this system-model to be successful, i.e.,
of adaptive value, ‘the self needs to be embedded into the causal network of the physical world’.” pp. 1–2
Salomon, 2017 Minimal (phenomenal) self as a representation of being distinct from the environment:
“The reviewed studies point to the unconscious integration of multisensory signals, supported by predictive models
from motor action as the basis of the minimal self. The correspondences between these exteroceptive and interoceptive
sensory signals allow a fundamental representation of the organism as a discrete agent, allowing a functional
segregation from the environment and conspecifics” p. 97
Christoff et al., 2011 The self understood in a functional way, as a result of self-specifying process:
“Self specifying [process]: any process that specifies the self as subject and agent by implementing a functional
self/non-self distinction” p. 104
Hohwy and Michael, 2017 The representational structure underlying the phenomenal “Me”:
“. . .agents model the self as a hierarchy of hidden, endogenous causes, and further, that the self is identical to these
causes (. . .) The self-model is a hierarchical construct whose levels are linked by message-passing as top-down
predictions are generated and bottom-up prediction errors minimized.”, p. 369
Seth, 2013 Embodied selfhood as grounded in (representations of) specific form of signals:
“emotion and embodied selfhood are grounded in active inference of those signals most likely to be ‘me’ across
interoceptive and exteroceptive domains” p. 570
Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016 Two interpretations of for-me-ness, a deflationary (implicating that there is no phenomenal “I,” only
phenomenal “Me”), and a non-deflationary (implicating that for-me-ness represents the phenomenal “I”):
“The for-me-ness of experience still admits of two crucially different interpretations. According to a deflationary
interpretation, it consists simply in the experience occurring in someone (a ‘me’). On this view, for-me-ness is a
non-experiential aspect of mental life—a merely metaphysical fact, so to speak, not a phenomenological fact. The idea
is that we ought to resist a no-ownership view according to which experiences can occur as free-floating unowned
entities (. . .) In contrast, a non-deflationary interpretation construes for-me-ness as an experiential aspect of mental life,
a bona fide phenomenal dimension of consciousness. On this view, to say that an experience is for me is precisely to
say something more than that it is in me. It is to state not only a metaphysical fact, but also a phenomenological fact.
(. . .) We favor a non-deflationary interpretation”, pp. 36–37
The emphasis was put on theories explaining the self as a form of self-model.
way (this is an important point, because these terms have Let us now reformulate James’ (1890) idea in more
recently acquired technical meanings in philosophy, e.g., contemporary terms and define “Me” as the totality of all
Zahavi, 2014; Guillot, 2017). What are “all the things”? The content of consciousness that is experienced as self-related.
classic formulation suggests that James (1890) meant physical Content of consciousness is meant here in a similar way to
objects and cultural artifacts (material self), human beings Chalmers (1996), who begins “The conscious mind” by providing
(social self), and mental processes and content (spiritual self). a list of different kinds of conscious content. He delivers an
These are all valid categories of self-as-object, however, for extensive (without claiming that exhaustive) collection of types
the purpose of this paper I will limit the scope of further of experiences, which includes the following4 : visual; auditory;
discussion only to “objects” which are relevant when speaking tactile; olfactory; experiences of hot and cold; pain; taste;
about consciousness. Therefore, rather than speaking about, for other bodily experiences coming from proprioception, vestibular
example, my car or my body, I will discuss only their conscious sense, and interoception (e.g., headache, hunger, orgasm);
representations. This limits the scope of self-as-
object to one category of “things” – conscious mental 4
Chalmers (1996) also lists “sense of self,” although it is highly controversial
content. whether it can be treated as a distinctive type of conscious content.

mental imagery; conscious thought; emotions. Chalmers (1996) as the nature of self-relatedness (e.g., whether it is ownership
also includes several other, which, however, reflect states of of, agency over, authorship, etc.). For example, by limiting
consciousness and not necessarily content per se, such as dreams, ourselves to discussing conscious content representing one’s
arousal, fatigue, intoxication, and altered states of consciousness body one can speak about the bodily self, and by imposing limits
induced by psychoactive substances. What is common to all of the to conscious experience of one’s possessions one can speak about
types of experience from the first list (conscious contents) is the one’s extended self.
fact that they are all, speaking in James’ (1890) terms, “objects” in Keeping these reservations in mind two objections can be
a stream of consciousness: “all these things are objects, properly raised to the approach to “Me” introduced here. The first one is
so called, to the subject that does the thinking” (p. 325). as follows:
The self understood as “Me” can be understood as a subset of
a set of all these possible experiences. This subset is characterized (1) Speaking about the self/other distinction does not make
by self-relatedness (Figure 2). It can be illustrated with sensory sense in regard to experiences which are always “mine,”
experiences. For example, in the visual domain, I experience an such as prioprioception or interoception. This special
image of my face as different from another person’s face. Hence, status may suggest that these modalities underpin the self
while the image of my face belongs to “Me,” the image of someone as “I,” i.e., the subject of experience.
else does not (although it can be experimentally manipulated,
Tsakiris, 2008; Payne et al., 2017; Woźniak et al., 2018). The This idea is present in theoretical proposals postulating that
same can be said about my voice and sounds caused by me (as subjectivity emerges based on (representations of) sensorimotor
opposed to voices of other people), and about my smell. We also (Gallagher, 2000; Christoff et al., 2011; Blanke et al., 2015) or
experience self-touch as different from touching or being touched interoceptive signals (Damasio, 1999; Craig, 2010; Seth et al.,
by a different person (Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Blakemore et al., 2011; Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Salomon, 2017). There are
1998; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2009). There is even evidence that two answers to this objection. First, the fact that this kind of
we process our possessions differently (Kim and Johnson, 2014; experience (this kind of content of consciousness) is always
Constable et al., 2018). This was anticipated by James’ (1890) felt as “my” experience simply means that all proprioceptive,
notion of the material “Me,” and is typically regarded as reflecting interoceptive, pain experiences, etc., are as a matter of fact parts
one’s extended self (Kim and Johnson, 2014). In all of these cases, of “Me.” They are self-related contents of consciousness and
we can divide sensory experiences into the ones which do relate hence naturally qualify as self-as-object. Furthermore, there is
to the self and the ones which do not. The same can be said about no principled reason why the fact that we normally do not
the contents of thoughts and feelings, which can be either about experience them as belonging to someone else should transform
“Me” or about something/someone else. them from objects of experience (content) into a subject of
Characterizing self-as-object as a subset of conscious experience. Their special status may cause these experiences to
experiences specifies the building blocks of “Me” (which are be perceived as more central aspects of the self than experiences
contents of consciousness) and provides a guiding principle in other modalities, but there is no reason to think that it
for distinguishing between self and non-self (self-relatedness). should change them from something that we experience into
However, it is important to note two things. First, the distinction the self as an experiencer. Second, even the special status of
between self and non-self is often a matter of scale rather than a these sensations can be called into question. It is possible to
binary classification, and therefore self-relatedness may be better imagine a situation in which one experiences these kinds of
conceptualized as the strength of the relation with the self. It sensations from an organ or a body which does not belong to
can be illustrated with an example of the “Inclusion of Other her or him. We can imagine that with enough training one will
in Self ” scale (Aron et al., 1992). This scale asks to estimate to learn to distinguish between proprioceptive signals coming from
what extent another person feels related to one’s self, by choosing one’s body and those coming from another person’s (or artificial)
among a series of pairs of more-to-less overlapping circles body. If this is possible, then one may develop a phenomenal
representing the self and another person (e.g., a partner). The distinction between “my” versus “other’s” proprioceptive and
degree of overlap between the chosen pair of circles represents interoceptive experiences (for example), and in this case the same
the degree of self-relatedness. Treating self-relatedness as a rules of classification into phenomenal “Me” and phenomenal
matter of scale adds an additional level of complexity to the “not-Me” will apply as to other sensory modalities. This scenario
analysis, and results in speaking about the extent to which a given is not realistic at the current point of technological development,
content of consciousness represents self, rather than whether but there are clinical examples which indirectly suggest that
it simply does it or not. This does not, however, change the it may be possible. For example, people who underwent
main point of the argument that we can classify all conscious transplantation of an organ sometimes experience rejection of
contents according to whether (or to what extent, in that case) a transplant. Importantly, patients whose organisms reject an
they are self-related. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to organ also more often experience psychological rejection of
speak using the language of binary classification, but it should that transplant (Látos et al., 2016). Moreover, there are rare
be kept in mind that it is an arbitrary simplification. The second cases in which patients following a successful surgery report
point is that this approach to “Me” allows one to flexibly discuss that they perceive transplanted organs as foreign objects in
subcategories of the self by imposing additional constraints on themselves (Goetzmann et al., 2009). In this case, affected people
the type of conscious content that is taken into account, as well report experiencing a form of disownership of the implanted

FIGURE 2 | A simplified representation of a structure of phenomenal content including the metaphysical “I,” the phenomenal “Me,” and the phenomenal “I,” which
can be understood (see in text) as a higher-level element of the phenomenal “Me.” Each pair of nodes connected with a yellow line represents one type of content of
consciousness, with indigo nodes corresponding to self-related content, and black nodes corresponding to non-self-related content. In some cases (e.g., pain,
emotions, interoceptive, and proprioceptive sensations), the black nodes are lighter and drawn with a dashed line (the same applies to links), to indicate that in
normal circumstances one does not experiences these sensations as representing another person (although it is possible in thought experiments and pathologies).
Multisensory/multimodal interactions have been omitted for the sake of clarity. All of the nodes compose the set of conscious thoughts, which can be formulated as
“I experience X.” In normal circumstances, one does not deny ownership over these thoughts, however, in thought experiments, and in some cases of psychosis,
one may experience that even such thoughts cease to feel as one’s own. This situation is represented by the shape with a dashed outline. Moreover, in special cases
one can form meta-delusions, i.e., delusions about delusions – thoughts that my thoughts about other thoughts are not my thoughts (see text for description).
organ, suggesting that they may experience interoceptive signals parapagus, dicephalus, thoracopagus) brains of two separate
coming from that transplant as having a phenomenal quality twins share some of the internal organs (and limbs), while
of being “not-mine,” leading to similar phenomenal quality as others are duplicated and possessed by each twin individually
the one postulated in the before-mentioned thought experiment. (Spencer, 2000; Kaufman, 2004). This provides an inverted
Another example of a situation in which self-relatedness of situation to the one described in our hypothetical scenario –
interoception may be disrupted may be found in conjoint rather than two pieces of the same organ being “wired” to one
twins. In some variants of this developmental disorder (e.g., person, the same organ (e.g., a heart, liver, stomach) is shared

by two individuals. As such it may be simultaneously under Before endorsing this conclusion, let us take a small step back.
control of two autonomous nervous systems. This situation raises It is important to note that in the famous passage from the Blue
challenging questions for theories which postulate that the root Book Wittgenstein (1958) did not write about two distinct types
of self-as-subject lies in interoception. For example, if conjoint of self. Instead, he wrote about two ways of using the word “I” (or
twins share the majority of internal organs, but possess mostly “my”). As such, he was more concerned with issues in philosophy
independent nervous systems, like dicephalus conjoint twins, of language than philosophy of mind. Therefore, a natural
then does it mean that they share the neural subjective frame question arises – to what extent does this linguistic distinction
(Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014)? If the answer is yes, then does map onto a substantial distinction between two different entities
it mean that they share it numerically (both twins have one and (types of self)? On the face of it, it seems that there is an
the same subjective frame), or only qualitatively (their subjective important difference between these two uses of self-referential
frames are similar to the point of being identical, but they words, which can be mapped onto the experience of being a
are distinct frames)? However, if interoception is just a part of self-as-subject and the experience of being a self-as-object (or, for
“Me” then the answer becomes simple – the experiences can be example, the distinction between bodily ownership and thought
only qualitatively identical, because they are experienced by two authorship, as suggested by Liang, 2014). However, I will argue
independent subjects. that there are reasons to believe that the phenomenal “I,” i.e., the
All of these examples challenge the assumption that experience of being a self-as-subject may be better conceptualized
sensori-motor and interoceptive experiences are necessarily as a higher-order phenomenal “Me” – a higher-level
self-related and, as a consequence, that they can form the self-as-object.
basis of self-as-subject. For this reason, it seems that signals Psychiatric practice provides cases of people, typically
coming from these modalities are more appropriate to underlie suffering from schizophrenia, who describe experiences of
the phenomenal “Me,” for example in a form of background dispossession of thoughts, known as delusions of thought
self-experience, or “phenomenal background” (Dainton, 2008, insertion (Young, 2008; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009; Martin
2016), rather than the phenomenal “I.” and Pacherie, 2013). According to the standard account,
The second possible objection to the view of self-as-object the phenomenon of thought insertion does not represent a
described in this section is the following one: disruption of sense of ownership over one’s thoughts, but only
loss of sense of agency over them. However, the standard account
(2) My thoughts and feelings may have different objects, but has been criticized in recent years by theorists arguing that
they are always my thoughts and feelings. Therefore, their thought insertion indeed represents loss of sense of ownership
object may be either “me” or “other,” but their subject is (Metzinger, 2003; Billon, 2013; Guillot, 2017; López-Silva, 2017).
always “I.” As a consequence, even though my thoughts One of the main arguments against the standard view is that it
and feelings constitute contents of my consciousness, they runs into serious problems when attempting to explain obsessive
underlie the phenomenal “I” and not the phenomenal intrusive thoughts in clinical population and spontaneous
“Me.” thoughts in healthy people. In both cases, subjects report lack
of agency over thoughts, although they never claim lack of
It seems to be conceptually misguided to speak about one’s ownership over them, i.e., that these are not their thoughts.
thoughts and feelings as belonging to someone else. This intuition However, if the standard account is correct, obsessive thoughts
motivated Wittgenstein (1958) to write: “there is no question should be experienced as belonging to someone else. The fact
of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask that they are not suggests that something else must be disrupted
‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ “would be nonsensical” in delusions of thought insertion, i.e., sense of ownership5 over
(Wittgenstein, 1958). In the Blue Book, he introduced the them. If one can lose sense of ownership over one’s thoughts
distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject (see then it has important implications, because then one becomes
Table 1 for a full relevant quote) and suggested that while we can capable of experiencing one’s thoughts “as someone else’s,” or at
be wrong about the former, making a mistake about the latter least “as not-mine.” However, when I experience my thoughts as
is not possible. This idea was further developed by Shoemaker not-mine I do it because I’ve taken a stance towards my thoughts,
(1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we which treats them as an object of deliberation. In other words,
are immune to error through misidentification relative to the I must have “objectified” them to experience that they have a
first-person pronoun, or IEM in short. For example, when I say quality of “feeling as if they are not mine.” Consequently, if
“I see a photo of my face in front of me” I may be mistaken I experience them as objects of experience, then they cannot
about the fact that it is my face (because, e.g., it is a photo of form part of my self as subject of experience, because these
my identical twin), but I cannot be mistaken that it is me who is two categories are mutually exclusive. Therefore, what seemed
looking at it. One way to read IEM is that it postulates that I can to constitute a phenomenal “I” turns out to be a part of the
be mistaken about self-as-object, but I cannot be mistaken about phenomenal “Me.”
self-as-subject. If this is correct then there is a radical distinction If my thoughts do not constitute the “I” then how do
between these two types of self that provides a strong argument they fit into the structure of “Me”? Previously, I asserted
to individuate them. From that point, one may argue that IEM that thoughts with self-related content constitute “Me,” while
provides a decisive argument to distinguish between phenomenal
“I” (self-as-subject) and phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object). 5
Sometimes referred to as sense of authorship.

thoughts with non-self related content do not. However, effectively transforming each phenomenal “I” into another “fake-
just now I argued in favor of the claim that all thoughts I” (and consequently making it a part of “Me”).
(including the ones with non-self-related content) that are The possibility of meta-delusions illustrates that the
experienced as “mine” belong to “Me.” How can one resolve this phenomenal “I” understood as subjective thoughts is
contradiction? permanently vulnerable to the threat of losing the apparent
A way to address this reservation can be found in Metzinger’s subjective character and becoming an object of experience. As
(2003; 2010) self-model theory. Metzinger (2003, 2010) argues such it seems to be a poor choice for the locus of subjectivity,
that the experience of the self can be understood as underpinned since it needs to be constantly “on the run” from becoming
by representational self-models. These self-models, however, treated as an object of experience, not only in people with
are embedded in the hierarchical representational structure, as psychosis, but also in all psychologically healthy individuals
illustrated by an account of ego dissolution by Letheby and if they decide to reflect on their thoughts. Therefore, it seems
Gerrans (2017): more likely that the thoughts themselves cannot constitute the
subject of experience. However, even in case of meta-delusions
Savage suggests that on LSD “[changes] in body ego feeling there seems to be a stable deeper-level subjectivity, let us
usually precede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes call it the deep “I,” which is preserved, at least until one
are the only changes” (1955, 11), (. . .) This common loses consciousness. After all, a person who experiences
temporal sequence, from blurring of body boundaries and meta-delusions would be constantly (painfully) aware of the
loss of sense of ownership for body parts through to process, and often would even report it afterwards. This deep
later loss of sense of ownership for thoughts, speaks “I” cannot be a special form of content in the stream of
further to the hierarchical architecture of the self-model. consciousness, because otherwise it would be vulnerable to
(Letheby and Gerrans, 2017, p. 8) becoming a part of “Me.” Therefore, it must be something
different.
If self-models underlying the experience of self-as-object There seem to be two places where one can look for this
(“Me”) are hierarchical, then the apparent contradiction may deep “I”: in the domain of phenomenology or metaphysics. The
be easily explained by the fact that when speaking about first approach has been taken by (Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016) who
the content of thoughts and the thoughts themselves we are argue that “all conscious states’ phenomenal character involves
addressing self-models at two distinct levels. At the lower for-me-ness as an experiential constituent.” It means that even if
level we can distinguish between thoughts with self-related we rule out everything else (e.g., bodily experiences, conscious
content and other-related content, while on the higher level thoughts), we are still left with some form of irreducible
we can distinguish between thoughts that feel “mine” as phenomenal self-experience. This for-me-ness is not a specific
opposed to thoughts that are not experienced as “mine.” As content of consciousness, but rather “refers to the distinct
a result, this thinking phenomenal “I” experienced in feeling manner, or how, of experiencing” (Zahavi, 2014).
of ownership over one’s thoughts may be conceived as just This approach, however, may seem inflationary and not
a higher-order level of Jamesian “Me.” As such, one may satisfying (e.g., Dainton, 2016). One reason for this is that it
claim that there is no such thing as a phenomenal “I,” just introduces an additional phenomenal dimension, which may
multilevel phenomenal “Me.” However, an objection can be lead to uncomfortable consequences. For example, a question
raised here. One may claim that even though a person with arises whether for-me-ness can ever be lost or replaced with
schizophrenic delusions experiences her thoughts as someone the “how of experiencing” of another person. For example,
else’s (a demon’s or some malicious puppet master’s), she can still can I experience my sister’s for-me-ness in my stream of
claim that: consciousness? If yes, then how is for-me-ness different from
Yes, “I” experience my thoughts as not mine, but as demon’s.” any other content of consciousness? And if the answer is
My thoughts feel as “not-mine,” however, it’s still me (or: “I”) who no, then how is it possible to distil the phenomenology of
thinks of them as “not-mine.” for-me-ness from the metaphysical fact that a given stream
of consciousness is always experienced by this and not other
As such, one escapes “objectification” of “I” into “Me” by subject?
postulating a higher-level phenomenal-“I.” However, let us keep An alternative approach to the problem of the deep “I” is
in mind that the thought written above constitutes a valid thought to reject that the subject of experience, the “I,” is present in
by itself. As such, this thought is vulnerable to the theoretical phenomenology (like Hume, 1739/2000; Prinz, 2012; Dainton,
possibility that it turns into a delusion itself, once a psychotic 2016), and look for it somewhere else, in the domain of
person forms a meta-delusion (delusion about delusion). In this metaphysics. Although James (1890) did not explicitly formulate
case, one may begin to experience that: “I” (I1 ) experience that the distinction between “Me” and “I” as the distinction between
the “fake I” (I2 ), who is a nasty pink demon, experiences my the phenomenal and the metaphysical self, he hinted at it at
thoughts as not mine but as someone else’s (e.g., as nasty green several points, for example when he concluded the Chapter on the
demon’s). In this case, I may claim that the real phenomenal self with the following fragment: “(. . .) a postulate, an assertion
“I” is I1 , since it is at the top of the hierarchy. However, one that there must be a knower correlative to all this known; and the
may repeat the operation of forming meta-delusions ad infinitum problem who that knower is would have become a metaphysical
(as may happen in psychosis or drug-induced psychedelic states) problem” (James, 1890, p. 401).

“I” AS A SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE: The question of what exactly is the metaphysical subject of
METAPHYSICS OF SUBJECTIVITY experience can have different answers. There has been a long
history of theories of the self (Barresi and Martin, 2011) and
Thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly about loose, some of them directly address this issue. Platonic or Cartesian
but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another notions of the soul are good examples of an approach providing
(James, 1890, pp. 330–331). one answer to this question: conscious experience is subjective,
because there exists a non-material being (self, soul) which is
Let us assume that phenomenal consciousness exists in nature, the subject of this experience (see Table 3). Other solutions tend
and that it is a part of the reality we live in. The problem to either define the self in less metaphysically expensive ways
of “I” emerges once we realize that one of the fundamental (Johnston, 1987; Strawson, 2000; Dainton, 2008), define it as a
characteristics of phenomenal consciousness is that it is always formal feature of consciousness (Searle, 2005), or deny the need
subjective, that there always seems to be some subject of to postulate its existence (Metzinger, 2003). What is crucial here,
experience. It seems mistaken to conceive of consciousness however, is that the problem of the metaphysical self is a different
which do “fly about loose,” devoid of subjective character, devoid issue and requires a different methodology, than the problem of
of being someone’s or something’s consciousness. Moreover, it the phenomenal self.
seems that subjectivity may be one of the fundamental inherent What sort of methodology, then, is appropriate for
properties of conscious experience (similar notions can be found investigating the metaphysical self? It seems that the most
in: Berkeley, 1713/2012; Strawson, 2003; Searle, 2005; Dainton, relevant methods come from the toolbox of metaphysics. This
2016). It seems highly unlikely, if not self-contradictory, that toolbox includes classical philosophical methods such as thought
there exists something like an objective conscious experience of experiments and logical analysis. However, methodology of
“what it is like to be a bat” (Nagel, 1974), which is not subjective in metaphysics is an area of open discussion, and at present there
any way. This leads to the metaphysical problem of the self: why is are no signs of general consensus. One of the most debated issues
all conscious experience subjective, and what or who is the subject in this field, which is especially relevant here, is to what extent the
of this experience? Let us call it the problem of the metaphysical methodology of metaphysics is continuous with the methodology
“I,” as contrasted with the problem of the phenomenal “I” (i.e., of natural sciences (see Tahko, 2015, Chapter 9 for an overview).
is there a distinctive experience of being a self as a subject of The positions span the spectrum between the claim that science
experience, and if so, then what is this experience?), which we and metaphysics are fully autonomous on the one side and the
discussed so far. claim that metaphysics can be fully naturalized on the other.
The existence of the metaphysical “I” does not entail the Discussing this issue goes way beyond the scope of this paper.
existence of the phenomenal self. It is possible to imagine However, if these two areas are at least to some extent related
a creature that possesses a metaphysical “I,” but does not (i.e., not fully autonomous), then one may argue that scientific
possess any sense of self. In such a case, the creature would methods can be at least of some relevance in metaphysics and
possess consciousness, although it would not experience anything consequently for investigations of the metaphysical “I.”
as “me,” nor entertain any thoughts/feelings, etc., as “I.” In One example in which empirical results seem to be able
other words, it is a possibility that one may not experience to influence theoretical investigations of the metaphysical self
self-related content of consciousness, while being a sentient is through imposing constraints on philosophical theories. For
being. One example of such situation may be the experience example, because the metaphysical self is inherently related
of a dreamless sleep, which “is characterized by a dissolution to consciousness, we should expect that different theories of
of subject-object duality, or (. . .) by a breakdown of even the consciousness should place different constraints on what a
most basic form of the self-other distinction” (Windt, 2015). metaphysical self can be. Then, if one theory of consciousness
This is a situation which can be regarded as an instance of the acquires stronger empirical support than the others, we can also
state of minimal phenomenal experience – the simplest form of treat this as evidence for the constraints on the self that this theory
conscious experience possible (Windt, 2015; Metzinger, 2018), in implies.
which there is no place for even the most rudimentary form of Let us look at an example of IIT to illustrate this point.
“Me.” Another example may be the phenomenology of systems According to IIT (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016)
with grid-like architectures which, according to the integrated the content of conscious experience is defined by the so-called
information theory (IIT, Tononi et al., 2016), possess conscious informational “complex” which is characterized by maximally
experience6 . If IIT is correct, then these systems experience integrated information (which can be measured by calculating
some form of conscious states, which most likely lack any the value of 8max ). This complex then defines the stream of
phenomenal distinction between “Me” and “not-Me.” However, conscious experience. However, what happens if there is more
because they may possess a stream of conscious experience, and than one such complex in one person? In this case, as Tononi
conscious experience is necessarily subjective, there remains a et al. (2016) wrote:
valid question: who or what is the subject of that experience?
6 According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may

“IIT allows for certain simple systems such as grid-like architectures, similar
to topographically organized areas in the human posterior cortex, to be highly coexist as discrete physical substrates of consciousness (PSCs)
conscious even when not engaging in any intelligent behavior” (Tononi et al., 2016, within a single brain, each with its own definite borders and value
p. 460). of 8max . The complex that specifies a person’s day to day stream

TABLE 3 | Examples of theories of the self-as-subject (“I”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the metaphysical self, with representative quotes illustrating
each position.
Metaphysical Self The self as responsible (or not) for the subjectivity inherent to all conscious experience
Descartes, 1637/2006 Metaphysical “I” as an immaterial soul, which can exist independently of the body:
“I thereby concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no
need of place and is not dependent on any material thing. Accordingly this ‘I,’ that is to say, the Soul by which I am what I am, is entirely
distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body; and would not stop being everything it is, even if the body were not to
exist.”, p. 29
Johnston, 1987 Metaphysical “I” as a bare-locus of consciousness:
“we are what I will call bare loci of mental life, that is, possessors of mental life whose survival requires no amount of either bodily or mental
continuity,” p. 70
Strawson, 2003 Metaphysical “I” as a thin subject:
“there cannot be a subject of experience, at any given time, unless some experience exists for it to be a subject of, at that time. (. . .) the thin
conception according to which a subject of experience is an inner thing of some sort that does not and cannot exist at any given time
unless it is having experience at that time.”, p. 284
Dainton, 2016 The self as a capacity for experience, which underpins the metaphysical “I”:
“If all that is essential to the nature of a subject is the capacity to have experiences, a natural next step is to hold that a subject simply is a
capacity for experience. In the case of very simple or primitive subjects (a simple worm-like creature, for example), this capacity might very
well be very simple too: perhaps there are subjects who are capable of only a single kind of experience (e.g., a sensation of warmth). The
stream of consciousness of such a subject will take the form of a continuous flow of a single kind of sensation.”, p. 116
Searle, 2005 The self (metaphysical “I”) as a formal feature of consciousness:
“The x in question is the self in at least one sense of the word. Notice that the postulation of the self is not the postulation of a separate
entity distinct from the conscious field but rather it is a formal feature of the conscious field.”, p. 15
Metzinger, 2010 The eliminativist position on the metaphysical “I”:
“One of the ontological claims of this theory is that the self is not a substance in the technical philosophical sense of – ontological
self-subsistence – of something that could maintain its existence on its own, even if the body, the brain, or everything else disappeared. It is
not an individual entity or a mysterious thing in the metaphysical sense. No such things as selves exist in the world: Selves and subjects are
not part of the irreducible constituents of reality”, p. 26
of consciousness should have the highest value of 8max – that is, it but there seem to be at least two responses to this question.
should be the “major” complex. In some conditions, for example, First, one may argue that the self does not need to be limited
after a split-brain operation, the major complex may split. In to one complex, but that the same metaphysical “I” can be
such instances, one consciousness, supported by a complex in the present in all of the simultaneous streams of consciousness
dominant hemisphere and with privileged access to Broca’s area, (complexes). However, this solution is at odds with both
would be able to speak about the experience, but would remain
common-sense intuition and IIT itself. It would presuppose
unaware of the presence of another consciousness, supported by
a complex in the other hemisphere, which can be revealed by
not only an extremely disunified view of consciousness, but
carefully designed experiments. (Tononi et al., 2016, p. 455) even lead to self-contradictory consequences. The metaphysical
“I” can be thought of as the metaphysical fact that any given
This fragment suggests that in IIT the metaphysical “I” can stream of consciousness is subjectively experienced by some
be understood as tied to a complex of maximally integrated “self ” (regardless of what that self might be). However, in a
information. In this case, a split-brain patient would possess two disunified view of an organism’s consciousness this metaphysical
metaphysical selves, because as a consequence of an operation “I” would at the same time a) be the subject of experience
her or his brain hosts two such complexes. On the face of it, it of all of the complexes within this organism, and b) be the
seems to be a plausible situation (cf. Bayne, 2010). However, in the subject of experience of only one of these complexes while
sentence which immediately follows, Tononi et al. (2016) suggest being blind to the others (as claimed by IIT: two complexes are
that: not “co-conscious” with each other). It presents a contradiction
and strongly suggests that the metaphysical “I” cannot be
An intriguing possibility is that splitting of the PSC may
underpinned by multiple independent complexes. It leaves us
also occur in healthy people during long-lasting dual-task
with the second option, which is to bite the bullet and accept
conditions – for example, when driving in an auto-pilot like
that IIT implies that the metaphysical “I” persists either as long
manner on a familiar road while listening to an engaging
as a given complex, or for an even shorter period of time,
conversation (Tononi et al., 2016, p. 455)
for example for just up to a few seconds, as suggested by
The implications of this possibility are much more severe, Strawson (2000, 2010). It means that if IIT (and the analysis
because it postulates that in a matter of minutes or seconds outlined above) is correct then the metaphysical “I” turns out
a complex can dynamically divide into several complexes, and to be radically different from our intuitive understanding of
individual complexes can merge into one major complex. How subject-of-experience as persisting continuously life-long stream
do the complexes understood in this way then relate to the of consciousness. However, if empirical evidence in support of
metaphysical “I”? Unfortunately, IIT is silent about this issue, the current version of IIT becomes strong enough, it may suggest

that our common-sense intuitions about self-as-subject may be one can act on the world and change it according to predictions
mistaken. On the other hand, different theories of phenomenal issued by the currently dominating model. As a consequence, the
consciousness (and even different versions of IIT) may imply whole perception-action cycle can be understood as driven by
different constraints on the metaphysical “I,” and the extent to one overarching goal, i.e., long-term minimization of prediction
which they are supported by empirical evidence may suggest errors.
a way to say something about what the subject of conscious The FEP is a further generalization of PC. It postulates that
experience is. all living organisms operate under the principle to minimize
Overall, assuming that metaphysics is not fully independent the so-called “variational free energy,” which is an information
from science, the relevant methodology for investigating the theoretical measure which roughly can be understood as a
metaphysical “I” is a combination of toolboxes of metaphysics measure of uncertainty (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2009). One
and empirical science. This contrasts with the phenomenal of the main claims of this theory is that organisms which act
“Me,” where the relevant toolkit includes methods from according to FEP (i.e., they act in a way to minimize free energy
phenomenology and science. The second point, which has been in the long term) will, in effect, implicitly approximate Bayesian
illustrated with an example of IIT, is that it is important to inference. It means that they will combine their prior knowledge
explicitly spell out the implications of different theories of (represented by their model of the world) with the incoming
consciousness in regard to what is the subject of conscious sensory input in a mathematically optimal way.
experience, as it may provide the best way forward towards Both PC and the FEP have recently gained huge popularity
solving this issue. and motivated a number of theories attempting to explain
various aspects of cognition within this framework. It includes
numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self,
UNDERSTANDING PREDICTIVE CODING such as sense of bodily ownership (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014),
THEORIES OF THE SELF sense of self in agency and perception (Hohwy, 2007), the
influence of interoception on self-consciousness (Seth et al.,
Recently, there has been a huge number of attempts to explain 2011; Seth, 2013), social aspects of the self (Moutoussis et al.,
the self through the framework of predictive coding (PC) and 2014; Friston and Frith, 2015), the relationship with minimal
the free energy principle (FEP). In this final section of the phenomenal selfhood (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013), and
paper, I will use PC theories of the self as a working example even psychodynamical interpretations of the self (Carhart-Harris
demonstrating practical consequences of implementing the and Friston, 2010; Fotopoulou, 2012). The most comprehensive
Jamesian distinction between “Me” and “I.” I will suggest that PC treatment of the self from the PC perspective (Hohwy and
theories of the self target different dimensions of self-as-object, Michael, 2017) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made
understood as a hierarchical structure of self-models (Metzinger, by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper
2003, 2010), and as such provide a valuable framework to Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following
understand the self. However, I will also explain why PC and words:
the FEP do not allow us to say much about self-as-subject (the
metaphysical “I”). We use a general computational framework for brain function
According to PC, the brain can be understood as an inference to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is
machine which hosts and continuously updates a probabilistic an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of
model of the world, which it uses to infer hidden causes behind behavior. (. . .) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous
the sensory data (for a more detailed introduction see: Friston causes should qualify as a self. (Hohwy and Michael, 2017,
et al., 2006; Friston, 2009, 2010; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Hohwy, p. 363)
2013; Clark, 2016). It accomplishes this by continuously issuing
predictions and comparing them with sensory data, with the The self, as seen from this perspective, is essentially a
discrepancy between predictions and data being propagated hierarchical model of endogenous hidden causes of sensory
further up the hierarchy as prediction errors. As such, PC input. Or, in more classical terms, it can be said that it is a
postulates that the brain can be seen as a hierarchical structure of hierarchical representational structure (cf. Clark, 2016; Williams,
generative models (which are responsible for issuing predictions). 2017) which allows one to distinguish between endogenous
Prediction errors which arise at lower levels serve as data to be causes (what is caused by me) and exogenous causes (what is
compared with predictions at the higher levels. This view of the caused by something else). This distinction can be illustrated
mind inverts the classical feedforward view in which perception with an example of a comparison between seeing a movement
is a predominantly bottom-up process. In PC, instead, perception of my virtual hand and of a virtual hand of someone else. If
is mostly driven by top-down predictions, with bottom-up adequately prepared, in both cases the image of a hand and its
prediction errors serving the function of feedback helping to movement may be identical. However, in one case I can realize
choose model with the most explanatory power. Moreover, in an that the movement of the hand is congruent with my intentions
extension of PC, which is known as active inference, action is (manifested through my actions performed using a computer
also understood as a way of maximizing the fit of one’s internal controller) and, as a consequence, infer that the cause of the
models to reality. The main idea behind active inference is that hand’s movement is me. On the other hand, I may fail to notice
rather than changing the model in order to better fit the data, any congruence between my intentions and the movement and

hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe when approached in the context of phenomenal consciousness –
is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017), the type of consciousness which is loaded with the burden of the
the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1996).
not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to This is where PS and FEP encounter a dead end, as the
the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak problem enters the area which belongs more to metaphysics
about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, than empirical science (at least in the light of the current state
which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference of affairs). In order to provide an account of the metaphysical
aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns. This self, one needs to begin with at least some form of a theory
inference is then postulated to underlie specific types of conscious of phenomenal consciousness and its place in physical reality.
self-experience, i.e., different facets of the sense of self. At present FEP (and PC) does not provide such a theory.
As such, one common theme among all PC theories of the Recently, Friston (2018) suggested that FEP can be used to
self is the following: aspects of conscious experience of the self understand consciousness, although the fact that he discusses
are underpinned by a representational structure in the form consciousness in functionalist terms (consciousness is related
of hierarchical generative models. In its core, it is the same to counterfactual inference7 ) suggests that his proposal aims to
idea as the one introduced earlier by Metzinger (2003, 2010), explain access consciousness, making it irrelevant for the problem
i.e., that our phenomenal experience of the self is underpinned of metaphysical “I.”
by a representational structure of unconscious self-models (see To summarize, the fact that PC and the FEP are not theories
also: Crane, 2003; Chalmers, 2004, for a discussion about the of phenomenal consciousness, and seem not to impose any
relationship between representational and conscious content). constraints on these theories, has important consequences for
Once an unconscious self-model enters conscious awareness, it what type of self they can explain. As I argued, they have the
generates a corresponding self-related conscious content (see: potential to substantially contribute to the issue of different
Metzinger, 2006, 2014, for an explicit distinction between the levels of the phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object) by describing the
levels of representations and conscious content in regard to the structure and dynamics of the level of representational content,
bodily self). The same mechanism is at work in PC theories – which are reflected at the level of conscious experience. However,
the dynamic process of model selection leads to suppression of they are not suited to explain the metaphysical “I” (self-as-
some models but allows other models to enter awareness in the subject) because they do not address the issue of the place of
form of conscious content. This mechanism allows PC to explain consciousness in nature. Hence, the main claim is that while PC
self-related content of consciousness, which is essentially nothing can be seen as a useful framework to investigate phenomenology
else than the James’ (1890) self-as-object of experience. This is of “Me,” it is in principle unsuitable to provide answers to
how PC and the FEP help to understand the phenomenal “Me” – questions about the metaphysics of “I.”
by describing the structure and dynamics of the underlying
representational architecture.
To what extent PC and FEP can provide us with any help CONCLUSION
when confronted with the task to explain the metaphysical “I”?
Here, I will argue that in contrast to the phenomenal “Me,” I placed the debate of the self in the domain of consciousness
the issues pertaining to the metaphysical “I” are outside of its (as opposed to the self understood as e.g., a representational
reach. The reason for this is a consequence of the fact that PC structure, a physical object, or a spiritual entity) and argued that
is in principle agnostic in regard to the issue of what brings (1) conceptually, the distinction between “Me” and “I” may reflect
representational content into the scope of conscious experience. the distinction between theoretical problems of the phenomenal
In general, this can be regarded as an advantage, because this self and the metaphysical self, respectively (although the notion
way PC accounts of self-experience can avoid the burden of of for-me-ness may complicate this picture), and (2) that what is
being hostage to any specific theory of consciousness, and stay described in the literature as the phenomenal “I” can be regarded
in principle compatible with most of them (e.g., see Hohwy, as just a higher-level part of the phenomenal “Me” [which can be
2013, Chapter 10 for an attempt to combine PC with ideas from understood as Metzinger’s (2018) phenomenal self-model].
Global Neuronal Workspace theory: Dehaene and Changeux, The first claim draws attention to the distinction
2011; Dehaene, 2014). However, it also makes PC fundamentally between “I” and “Me,” which suggests that these two
underspecified when treated as a theory which is used to explain theoretical issues should be investigated independently,
issues related to consciousness. While, as suggested before, using two different methodologies. While “Me” can
PC is a valuable framework to describe the representational be investigated using phenomenology and scientific
structure underlying conscious content, it runs into problems methodology, “I” is typically a metaphysical problem
when used to explain why certain content is conscious in the (perhaps with the exception of non-deflationary
first place. One way in which PC and FEP can attempt to retain understandings of for-me-ness) and it is arguable
relevance is by aiming to explain access consciousness (Block,
7
1995) – a functional mechanism which allows that “some of For example, he writes: “So where does consciousness emerge? The proposal
offered here is that conscious processing has a temporal thickness or depth,
the attended information eventually enters our awareness and
which underwrites inferences about the consequences of action. This necessarily
becomes reportable to others” (Dehaene, 2014). However, the lends inference a purposeful and self-evidencing aspect that has the hallmarks of
problem of the metaphysical “I” becomes a relevant issue only consciousness” (Friston, 2018, p. 1).

to what extent it can be approached using standard scientific in the Wittgensteinian tradition, or, e.g., “sense of ownership of
methods. Therefore, it is important to clearly state which problem interoceptive signals” when discussing the role of interoception.
one approaches when discussing the self in the context of A second option may be to recast the distinction used in cognitive
consciousness (see Tables 2, 3 for some examples). science in different terms. One proposal is to explicitly speak
The second claim, the postulate to treat what is usually about it as the distinction between the experience/sense of “Me”
described as phenomenal “I” as just a part of the phenomenal versus the experience/sense of “I” (rather than just “Me” and
“Me,” has two implications. The first is constructive. Investigating “I”). The task here would be, however, to prove that there is a
issues which are typically regarded in cognitive science as qualitative difference between them, and to demarcate the exact
“I” from the perspective of “Me” may contribute towards border.
better understanding of self-consciousness by emphasizing that
these two research areas may have much more in common
than it appears. Rather than using two distinct terms, which AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
suggest that we are dealing with two fundamentally different
problems, we may approach them as just two facets of the same The article has been solely the work of MW.
multidimensional research problem. One such approach is to
treat both of them as just different levels in the hierarchical
structure of the phenomenal self-model (Metzinger, 2003, 2009, FUNDING
2010), an approach which can be (and implicitly is) shared
by recent theories of the self, especially within the framework This article was supported by the Australian Research Council
of PC. Grant No. DP160102770.
The second implication is pragmatic. Refraining from using
the term “I” when speaking in the context of phenomenology and
using it only in the metaphysical context may reduce conceptual ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
confusion in regard to this term. However, it will also mean
forfeiting an important distinction (“Me” versus “I”) which has The author would like to thank Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne,
already gained traction in cognitive science. As such, the choice Jennifer Windt, Monima Chadha, and the members of Cognition
to eliminate the term “I” in the context of phenomenology and Philosophy Lab at Monash University (especially Julian
is a repelling option, but may be beneficial in the long term. Matthews) for discussions about the issues described in the paper.
Alternatively, one may use more specific terms, such as “sense The author also wants to thank the reviewers and the editor for
of ownership over an experience” to reflect what is meant by “I” helpful comments on how to improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES Bortolotti, L., and Broome, M. (2009). A role for ownership and authorship
in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenol. Cognit. Sci. 8, 205–224.
Apps, M. A., and Tsakiris, M. (2014). The free-energy self: a predictive coding doi: 10.1007/s11097-008-9109-z
account of self-recognition. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 41, 85–97. doi: 10.1016/ Carhart-Harris, R. L., and Friston, K. J. (2010). The default-mode, ego-functions
j.neubiorev.2013.01.029 and free-energy: a neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain 133(Pt 4),
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., and Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self 1265–1283. doi: 10.1093/brain/awq010
scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 63:596. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of A Fundamental Theory.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Barresi, J., and Martin, R. (2011). “History as prologue: western theories of the self,” Chalmers, D. J. (2004). “The representational character of experience,” in The
in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Future For Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
Press), 33–56. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0002 153–181.
Bayne, T. (2010). The Unity of Consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., and Thompson, E. (2011). Specifying the
Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.001.0001 self for cognitive neuroscience. Trends Cognit. Sci. 15, 104–112. doi: 10.1016/j.
Berkeley, G. (1713/2012). Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. tics.2011.01.001
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Clark, A. (2016). Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied
Billon, A. (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/
thought insertion. Philos. Psychol. 26, 291–314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011. 9780190217013.001.0001
625117 Constable, M., Welsh, T., Pratt, J., and Huffman, G. (2018). I before U: temporal
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M., and Frith, C. D. (1998). Central cancellation of order judgements reveal bias for self-owned objects. Quart. J. Exp. Psychol.
self-produced tickle sensation. Nat. Neurosci. 1, 635–640. doi: 10.1038/2870 [Epub ahead of print]. doi: 10.1177/1747021818762010
Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Craig, A. D. (2010). The sentient self. Brain Struct. Funct. 214, 563–577.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 556–571. doi: 10.1038/nrn3292 doi: 10.1007/s00429-010-0248-y
Blanke, O., and Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal Crane, T. (2003). “The intentional structure of consciousness,” in Consciousness:
selfhood. Trends Cognit. Sci. 13, 7–13. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 New Philosophical Perspectives, eds A. Jokic and Q. Smith (Oxford: Oxford
Blanke, O., Slater, M., and Serino, A. (2015). Behavioral, neural, and computational University Press).
principles of bodily self-consciousness. Neuron 88, 145–166. doi: 10.1016/j. Dainton, B. (2008). The Phenomenal Self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
neuron.2015.09.029 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.001.0001
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behav. Brain Dainton, B. (2016). The sense of self. Aristotel. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 90, 113–143.
Sci. 18, 227–247. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00038188 doi: 10.1093/arisup/akw007

Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making Martin, J. R., and Pacherie, E. (2013). Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership
of Consciousness. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. and context-integration. Conscious. Cognit. 22, 111–122. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes 2012.11.012
Our Thoughts. New York, NY: Penguin. Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
to conscious processing. Neuron 70, 200–227. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011. Metzinger, T. (2006). Reply to gallagher: different conceptions of embodiment.
03.018 Psyche 12, 1–7.
Descartes, R. (1637/2006). A Discourse on the Method. Oxford: Oxford University Metzinger, T. (2009). The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the
Press. Self. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Fotopoulou, A. (2012). “Towards psychodynamic neuroscience,” in From the Metzinger, T. (2010). The self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary
Couch to the Lab: Trends in Psychodynamic Neuroscience, eds A. Fotopoulou, with examples. Hum. Mente – Quart. J. Philos. 14, 25–53. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
M. Conway, and D. Pfaff (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 25–47. 6123(07)68018-2
doi: 10.1093/med/9780199600526.003.0003 Metzinger, T. (2014). “First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-
Friston, K. J. (2009). The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends order embodiment,” in The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, ed. L.
Cognit. Sci. 13, 293–301. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 Shapiro (London: Routledge).
Friston, K. J. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nat. Rev. Metzinger, T. (2018). Minimal phenomenal experience. MindRxiv [Preprint]. doi:
Neurosci. 11, 127–138. doi: 10.1038/nrn2787 10.31231/osf.io/5wyg7
Friston, K. J. (2018). Am I self-conscious? (Or does self-organization entail Moutoussis, M., Fearon, P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., and Friston, K. J. (2014).
self-consciousness?). Front. Psychol. 9:579. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018. Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): a review. Conscious. Cognit. 25,
00579 67–76. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.009
Friston, K. J., and Frith, C. (2015). A duet for one. Conscious. Cognit. 36, 390–405. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philos. Rev. 83, 435–450. doi: 10.2307/
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.12.003 2183914
Friston, K. J., and Kiebel, S. (2009). Predictive coding under the free-energy Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., and Tononi, G. (2014). From the phenomenology to
principle. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1211–1221. doi: 10.1098/ the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS
rstb.2008.0300 Comput. Biol. 10:e1003588. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588
Friston, K. J., Kilner, J., and Harrison, L. (2006). A free energy principle for the Park, H. D., and Tallon-Baudry, C. (2014). The neural subjective frame: from bodily
brain. J. Physiol. Paris 100, 70–87. doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001 signals to perceptual consciousness. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
Gallagher, I. I. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for 369:20130208. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2013.0208
cognitive science. Trends Cognit. Sci. 4, 14–21. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(99) Payne, S., Tsakiris, M., and Maister, L. (2017). Can the self become another?
01417-5 Investigating the effects of self-association with a new facial identity. Q. J. Exp.
Goetzmann, L., Irani, S., Moser, K. S., Schwegler, K., Stamm, M., Spindler, A., Psychol. (Hove) 70, 1085–1097. doi: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1137329
et al. (2009). Psychological processing of transplantation in lung recipients: Prinz, J. (2012). “Waiting for the Self,” in Consciousness and the Self: New
a quantitative study of organ integration and the relationship to the Essays, eds J. Liu and J. Perry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
donor. Br. J. Health Psychol. 14(Pt 4), 667–680. doi: 10.1348/135910708X39 123–149.
9447 Salomon, R. (2017). The assembly of the self from sensory and motor foundations.
Guillot, M. (2017). I me mine: on a confusion concerning the subjective character Soc. Cognit. 35, 87–106. doi: 10.1521/soco.2017.35.2.87
of experience. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 8, 23–53. doi: 10.1007/s13164-016-0313-4 Schutz-Bosbach, S., Musil, J. J., and Haggard, P. (2009). Touchant-touche: the role
Hohwy, J. (2007). The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. of self-touch in the representation of body structure. Conscious. Cognit. 18,
Psyche 13, 1–20. 2–11. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.003
Hohwy, J. (2013). The Predictive Mind. 1st Edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Searle, J. R. (2005). “The self as a problem in philosophy and neurobiology,” in
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity, eds T. E. Feinberg and J. P.
Hohwy, J., and Michael, J. (2017). “Why should any body have a self?,” in The Keenan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 7–19.
Subject’s Matter. Self-Consciousness and the Body, eds F. de Vignemont and A. Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends
Alsmith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Cognit. Sci. 17, 565–573. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007
Hume, D. (1739/2000). A Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., and Critchley, H. D. (2011). An interoceptive predictive
Press. coding model of conscious presence. Front. Psychol. 2:395. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York, NY: H. Holt and 2011.00395
Company. Shoemaker, S. S. (1968). Self-reference and self-awareness. J. Philos. 65, 555–567.
Johnston, M. (1987). Human beings. J. Philos. 84, 59–83. doi: 10.2307/2026626 doi: 10.2307/2024121
Kaufman, M. H. (2004). The embryology of conjoined twins. Childs Nerv. Syst. 20, Spencer, R. (2000). Theoretical and analytical embryology of conjoined twins:
508–525. doi: 10.1007/s00381-004-0985-4 part II: adjustments to union. Clin. Anat. 13, 97–120. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1098-
Kim, K., and Johnson, M. K. (2014). Extended self: spontaneous activation of 2353(2000)13:2<97::AID-CA5>3.0.CO;2-I
medial prefrontal cortex by objects that are ‘mine.’ Soc. Cognit. Affect. Neurosci. Strawson, G. (2000). The phenomenology and ontology of the self. Explor. Self 23,
9, 1006–1012. doi: 10.1093/scan/nst082 39–54. doi: 10.1075/aicr.23.05str
Látos, M., Lázár, G., Horváth, Z., Wittman, V., Szederkényi, E., Hódi, Z., et al. Strawson, G. (2003). What is the relation between an experience, the subject of
(2016). Psychological rejection of the transplanted organ and graft dysfunction the experience, and the content of the experience. Philos. Issues 13, 279–315.
in kidney transplant patients. Transpl. Res. Risk Manage. 8, 15–24. doi: 10.2147/ doi: 10.1111/1533-6077.00015
TRRM.S104133 Strawson, G. (2010). Selves. London: Tls-the Times Literary Supplement, 6–6.
Letheby, C., and Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic Sui, J., and Gu, X. (2017). Self as object: emerging trends in self research. Trends
experience. Neurosci. Conscious. 2017, 1–11. doi: 10.1093/nc/nix016 Neurosci. 40, 643–653. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2017.09.002
Liang, C. (2014). “Self-as-subject and experiential ownership,” in Open MIND, eds Tahko, T. E. (2015). An Introduction to Metametaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge
T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). University Press.
Limanowski, J., and Blankenburg, F. (2013). Minimal self-models and the free Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., and Koch, C. (2016). Integrated information
energy principle. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:547. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013. theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 17,
00547 450–461. doi: 10.1038/nrn.2016.44
López-Silva, P. (2017). Me and I are not friends, just aquaintances: on thought Truong, G., and Todd, R. M. (2017). SOAP opera: self as object and agent in
insertion and self-awareness. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 1–17. doi: 10.1007/s13164- prioritizing attention. J. Cognit. Neurosci. 29, 937–952. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_
017-0366-z 01083

Tsakiris, M. (2008). Looking for myself: current multisensory input alters Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, 1st
self-face recognition. PLoS One 3:e4040. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.000 Edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590681.
4040 001.0001
Weiskrantz, L., Elliott, J., and Darlington, C. (1971). Preliminary Zahavi, D., and Kriegel, U. (2016). “For-me-ness: what it is and what it is not,” in
observations on tickling oneself. Nature 230, 598–599. doi: 10.1038/2305 Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches,
98a0 eds D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, and W. Hopp (New York, NY: Routledge),
Williams, D. (2017). Predictive processing and the representation wars. Minds 36–53.
Machines 28, 141–172. doi: 10.1007/s11023-017-9441-6
Windt, J. M. (2015). Just in time—dreamless sleep experience as pure subjective Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
temporality: Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”, be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.
Woźniak, M., Kourtis, D., and Knoblich, G. (2018). Prioritization of arbitrary faces Copyright © 2018 Woźniak. This is an open-access article distributed under the
associated to self: An EEG study. PLoS One 13:e0190679. doi: 10.1371/journal. terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
pone.0190679 or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and
Young, G. (2008). On how a child’s awareness of thinking informs explanations of the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal
thought insertion. Conscious. Cognit. 17, 848–862. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007. is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
05.005 reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

"I" and "Me" The Self in The Context of Consciousness

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

"I" and "Me" The Self in The Context of Consciousness

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

"I" and "Me" The Self in The Context of Consciousness

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the main distinction being made in the paper?

What is the main distinction being made in the paper?

How does the author relate the phenomenal self and metaphysical self?

How does the author relate the phenomenal self and metaphysical self?

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

published: 04 September 2018

“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Description and illustrative quote

following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Description and illustrative quote

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

6 According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Description and illustrative quote

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1656

You might also like