Tancinco v. GSIS. G.R. No. 132916. November 16, 2001 Facts

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MAULA, Joshua Miguel R. (2018110453 ). Labor Law 1 (2B1). Atty. Paciano F. Fallar, Jr.

Tancinco v. GSIS. G.R. No. 132916. November 16, 2001

FACTS:

On July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his house, SPO1 Eddie G.
Tancinco (SPO1 Tancinco) was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco
was a member of the NCR Security Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and at
the time of his death, was assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President
Joseph E. Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the former Vice-
President was in the United States for medical treatment.

His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco (Tancinco), filed a claim for benefits before the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which the GSIS denied Tancinco’s claim on the
ground that there was no proof that SPO1 Tancico’s death was work-related. Tancinco
appealed the denial to the Employees’ Compensation Commission which dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit. Tancinco filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals wherein the
latter denied the same.

In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General adopts the view that SPO1 Tancinco’s
death is work-related given the circumstances under which he was killed, given that (a) the
deceased was a policeman and (b) the killing was done in a professional manner. He
speculates that the motive behind the killing “is likely to have arisen during the duration of the
almost eighteen (18) years that he served as constable in the PC and as a policeman.”

ISSUES: Whether or not the death of SPO1 Tancinco is compensable under Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

HELD:

No, his death is not compensable.

Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds—(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-
President’s security detail, SPO1 Tancinco was required to guard the person of the former;
hence, his presence was officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of
his death, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In
fact, he was at home; it is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail
while the Vice-President was away. Clearly, he was not at the place where his work required
him to be.

As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died while
performing his official functions. In this regard, we held that policemen are regarded as being on
twenty-four (24) hour alert.

The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed forces, until it
was applied by extension to policemen, as aforesaid, and eventually to firemen. However, in the
more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals (306 SCRA 41,
49 [1999]) we clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable.

At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an
after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than
a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other
words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances
causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty,
are nonetheless basically police service in character.

In the present case, SPO1 Tancinco was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. As a
policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is part of “an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing
and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws xxx.” Based on these parameters, it cannot be
said that the deceased was discharging official functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle
is only incidental to his job.

Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco
was at home, it was incumbent on Tancinco to show that SPO1 Tancinco was discharging a
task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.

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