G.R. No.

209835, September 22, 2015

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary

restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6,
2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which
affirmed in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First
Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio
Batin Caballero.

Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were

both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan,
Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed
a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he
declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non�resident thereof.

During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,

manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and
the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in
his petition.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed
that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to
Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally
in Canada.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding

that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw

The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency
raised by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also
in consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while
petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had
taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced
his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year
residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen
resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes;
thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to
prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be
eligible to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent.8 Private respondent
filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9

On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.

On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul

Proclamation.10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.

In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the

May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the
En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the
appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in
favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's
proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.

On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.

issued a Writ of Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on
December 20, 2013.

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following

assignment of errors, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25
SEPTEMBER 2012.

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE
WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER
PASTURE."

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS

PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS
REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw

Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny

due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election
Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on
him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by
registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why
registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that
private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.

We are not convinced.

While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned

requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC
may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section
4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.cralawlawlibrary

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to

obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.chanrobleslaw

Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time,
provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired.17

In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment

of respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC
despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e.,
pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation
as to why his petition was not served personally on petitioner, respectively,
and held that:cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally

construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither
fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is
uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake
of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections,
the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving
election disputes."

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to
liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or
even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including
obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil
action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only
the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose
as their rightful leader.19chanrobleslaw

Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a

resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification
and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest,
which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the
COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with

the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate
of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires
service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we
should also consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of
his petition to respondent after being made aware that such service is
necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to
personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in
Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford
the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the petition
even prior to the service of summons by the Commission to him. In this
case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the conference
held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to
rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a Memorandum
containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which
is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.

Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to
bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x

xxxx

When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the

application of the rules is in order, x x x.

Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which

warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure,
consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several
cases.20chanrobleslaw

Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He
argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had
worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax
certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right
of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he
usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work
abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the
requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place
where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on
his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine
months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a
substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not
provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.22

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.23 This is only

logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks
for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of

1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local
official. Section 39 thereof states:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.chanrobleslaw

Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for
cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of
elections.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned
by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.27

Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian
citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.

The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his

Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?

In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine

citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we
had the occasion to state, thus:cralawlawlibrary
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it
his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his
birth.31chanrobleslaw

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.

9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence

to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It
found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of
RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that
he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required
by law.

Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of

fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant
case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions,
we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence.33

Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding
the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan,
Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on
Elections,34 we held:cralawlawlibrary

x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a

republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of
the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw

Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC

that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year
immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to
Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of
due course to COCs, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy

shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate
of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.chanrobleslaw

We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section
78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to
a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the
substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy.36 We concluded that material
representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other
legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for
in the Local Government Code.37 Furthermore, aside from the requirement
of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution

dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution
dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., with separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official leave. 
Reyes, J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action..

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 23-28.
2
 Composed of Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim and Commissioner Al A. Parre�o; Docketed as
SPA No. 13-196 (DC) (F); id. at 67-72.
3
Rollo, p. 146.
4
 Id. at 144.
5
 Id. at 117-121.
6
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x.
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
7
Rollo, p. 72.
8
 Id. at 128-129.
9
 Id. at 130-133.
10
 Id. at 135-142.
11
 Id. at 181-187.
12
 Id. at 204-207.
13
 Id. at 209.
14
 Id. at 8.
15
 Section 4. Procedure to be observed. � Both parties shall observe the
following procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where
personal service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the
Petition, or the respondents' whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the
petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances
therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of
service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed.
16
 4. No Petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the preceding
paragraphs have been complied with.
17
 See Mentang v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 110347, February 4,
1994, 229 SCRA 666, 675.
18
 G.R. No. 207900, April 22,2014, 723 SCRA 223.
19
Hayudini v. COMELEC, supra, at 242-243.
21
 Sees. 2 and 3.
22
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354, 367 (2009). 
23
 Id.
24
 Id.
20
Rollo, pp. 25-26. (Citations omitted)
25
Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, A3A Phil. 861, 871-872 (2002),
citing Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453
(1941); Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960,
September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA408.
26
 Id. at 872, citing Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,
1965, 248 SCRA 400, 420.

 Id. citing 25 Am. Jur. 2d, �11.

27

28
 Id. at 873. Citizenship Act (Canada)

Section 5. (1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who

 (a) makes application for citizenship;

 (b) is eighteen years of age or over;
 (c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection
2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, has, within
the four years immediately preceding the date of his or her
 application, accumulated at least three years of residence in
Canada calculated in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

o (i) for every day during which the person was resident in
Canada before his lawful admission to Canada for
permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have
accumulated one-half of a day or residence, and
o (ii) for every day during which the person was resident in
Canada after his lawful admission to Canada for
permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have
accumulated one day of residence;

xxx
30
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, supra note 22, at 367.
31
 Id. at 347. (Emphasis supplied)
32
Pangkat Laguna v. Commission on Elections, 426 Phil. 480, 486 (2002).
33
Domingo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 372 Phil. 188, 202 (1999),
citing Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, 341 Phil. 761 (1997); Lozano v.
Yorac, G.R. No. 94521, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 256; Apex Mining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 276 Phil. 301 (1991).
34
318 Phil. 467(1995).
35
 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 509.
36
 Salcedo IIv. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386 (1999).
37
Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25,
2014, 717 SCRA312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on
Elections, supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications.
38
 Id. at 323.chanrobleslaw

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

 BRION, J.:

I concur with the ponencia's dismissal of the petition since the Commission

on Elections (Comelec) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when
it cancelled the certificate of candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Rogelio
Batin Caballero for the mayoralty post of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13,
2013 Elections.

I agree that the issue of Caballero's residency1 in Uyugan � an issue tains

to Caballero's qualification and eligibility to run for public office - is imbued
with public interest. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, this
characterization is sufficient to justify the Comelec's move to suspend its
own rules of procedure in handling Caballero's case.

I also agree with the ponencia's conclusion that Caballero failed to comply

with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
government Code (LGC). Likewise, I hold that Caballero's reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 92252 did
not have the effect of automatically making him a resident of Uyugan since
RA 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. As I will discuss
below, citizenship and residency are distinct from one another and are
separate requirements for qualification for local elective office; thus, they
must be considered under the laws respectively governing them.

I concur as well with the ponencia's conclusion that, by stating in his Coc

that he had completed the required one-year residency when he actually
did not, Caballero made a material misrepresentation that justified the
comelec's cancellation of his CoC.

I submit this Separate Concurring Opinion to add that, as the loss and
acquisition of residence involve the determination of intent, the action taken
pursuant to the intent and the applicable laws and rules on residency and
immigration, these laws and rules must necessarily be considered to
ascertain Caballero's intent and to determine whether Caballero had
actually complied with the one-year residency requirement.

As well, given Caballero's undisputed Canadian citizenship by

naturalization, due notice of the conditions required for Canadian
naturalization should assist the Court in examining Caballero's intention
and in resolving any perceived doubt regarding the loss of his domicile of
origin in Uyugan and the establishment of a new domicile of choice in
Canada.

To be sure, Canadian laws are not controlling and cannot serve as basis
for the resolution of the loss and re-acquisition of domicile issue; the Court,
too, cannot take cognizance of foreign laws as these must first be properly
proven to be given recognition. Nonetheless, I believe that the Court can
look up to them, not as statutory basis for resolving the residency issue, but
as supporting guides in determining Caballero's intent.

As the ponencia defined, the issues for the Court's resolution

are: first, whether the Comelec should have denied outright the petition to
deny due course or to cancel private respondent Jonathan Enrique
V.Nanud's CoC, as Caballero failed to personally serve him a copy of the
petition and to attach an affidavit explaining the use of service by registered
mail, in violation of Section 4, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.3

And second, whether Caballero abandoned his Philippine domicile when

he became a Canadian citizen; assuming that he did, whether his nine-
month residency in Uyugan prior to the May 13, 2013 elections constitutes
substantial compliance with the residency requirement.

I shall no longer touch on the first issue as I fully agree with

the ponencia on this point. My subsequent discussions will deal only with
the issue of Caballero's residence in Uyugan for the required duration.

My Positions

a) RA 9225 does not touch on residency;

citizenship and residency are separate
and distinct requirements for qualification 
for local elective office

RA 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipinos (who lost their

Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country) to expeditiously
re-acquire their Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Upon taking the oath, they re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship and the accompanying civil and political rights that
attach to citizenship.
RA 9225 does not touch on a person's residence; does not mention it; and
does not even require residence in the Philippines prior to or at the time he
or she takes the oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship. In fact, RA 9225
allows former natural-born citizens to re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
while still residing in the country that granted them naturalized citizenship
status.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Residency in the Philippines becomes material only when the natural-

born Filipino availing of RA 9225, decides to run for public office. As
provided under Section 5 of this law, those who seek elective public office
shall, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship and meet the
qualifications for holding such public office that the Constitution and
existing laws require.

The qualifications for holding local elective office are found in Section 39 of
the LGC. Among others, Section 39 requires a candidate for a local elective
post to be a citizen of the Philippines and a resident of the locality where he
or she intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.

RA 9225 provides the citizenship requirement when the former natural-born

Filipino re-acquires Philippine citizenship under this law's terms. Residency,
on the other hand, is the domain of Section 39 of the LGC. These two laws
complement each other in qualifying a Filipino with a re-acquired
citizenship, for candidacy for a local elective office.

Notably under this relationship, RA 9225 does not require any residency
allegation, proof or qualification to avail of its terms. RA 9225 does not
even require Filipinos with re-acquired citizenship to establish or maintain
any Philippine residence, although they can, as Filipinos, come and go as
they please into the country without any pre-condition other than those
applicable to all Filipino citizens. By implication, RA 9225 (a dual citizenship
law) allows residency anywhere, within or outside the Philippines, before or
after re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under its terms. Re-acquisition
of citizenship, however, does not - by itself - imply nor establish the fact of
Philippine residency. In these senses, RA 9225 and the LGC are
complementary to, yet are independent of, one another.

Another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating RA 9225 and
residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights that come with
the re-acquired citizenship comes only when the requirements have been
completed and Filipino citizenship has been re-acquired. Only then can re-
acquiring Filipinos secure the right to reside in the country as Filipinos and
the right to vote and be voted for elective office under the requirements of
the Constitution and applicable existing laws. For would-be candidates to
local elective office, these applicable requirements include the taking of an
oath of renunciation of all other citizenships and allegiance, and allegation
and proof of residency for at least a year counted from the date of the
election.

b) Principles governing loss of domicile of 

origin and change or acquisition of new
domicile

Under our election laws, the term "residence" is synonymous with domicile
and refers to the individual's permanent home or the place to which,
whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.5

Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is

acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3)domicile by
operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention.

Caballero's indisputable domicile of origin is Uyugan, Batanes. He

subsequently went abroad for work, established his residence in Canada
beginning 1989, and acquired Canadian citizenship in 2007. On September
12, 2012, and while still residing in Canada, he applied with the Philippine
Consul General of Toronto, Canada for the re-acquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225.

Jurisprudence provides the following requirements to effect a change of

domicile or to acquire a domicile by choice:cralawlawlibrary

(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;

(2) a bonafide intention to remain there; and
(3) a bonafide intention to abandon the old domicile.chanrobleslaw

These are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that

jurisprudence requires to be satisfied.

Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the

appreciation of compliance because of the element of intent6 - an abstract
and subjective proposition that can only be determined from the
surrounding circumstances. Separately from intent is the question of the
actions taken pursuant to the intent, and the consideration of the applicable
laws, rules and regulations.

Jurisprudence has likewise laid out three basic foundational rules in the

consideration of domicile:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First, a man must have a residence or domicile

somewhere;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Second, when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and

Third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 7

As jurisprudential foundational rules, these should be fully applied in

appreciating Caballero's circumstances.

c) Permanent residency is a requirement 

for naturalization as Canadian citizen

Under Section 5 (1), Part I of the Canadian Citizenship Law,8 Canadian

citizenship may be granted to anyone who, among other requirements:
makes an application for citizenship; IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT; and
who, if granted citizenship, intends to continue to reside in Canada.9

d) Caballero lost his domicile of origin

(in Uyugan) when he established a new
domicile of choice in Canada; to transfer 
his domicile back to Uyugan, he has to 
prove the fact of transfer and the consequent
re-establishment of a new domicile in Uyugan.

Given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who had been

living in Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen
in 2007) would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not
applied for it and had he not shown proof of permanent residence in that
country. This is theindicator of intent that I referred to in considering the
question of Caballero's Philippine residency and his factual claim that he
never abandoned his Philippine residence.

Parenthetically, the requirement that a foreign national be a resident of the

State for a given period prior to the grant of the State's citizenship is not
unique to the Canadian jurisdiction. The requirement proceeds from the
State's need to ensure that the foreign applicant is integrated to the society
he is embracing, and that he has actual attachment to his new community
before citizenship is granted. The requirement can be said to be a
preparatory move as well since the grant of citizenship carries with it the
right to enjoy civil and political rights that are not ordinarily granted to non-
citizens.

Even the Philippines, through our laws on naturalization, recognizes these

requirements prior to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Our existing laws
require continued residency in the Philippines for a given period10 before
any foreign national who wishes to become a Philippine citizen is conferred
this status.

In this limited sense, I believe that the Court may look into the Canadian
citizenship laws to get an insight into Caballero's intent. To reiterate,
Caballero would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not
applied for it and had he not been a Canadian permanent resident for the
required period. Under the foundational rule that a man can only have one
domicile, Caballero's moves constitute positive, voluntary, overt and
intentional abandonment of his domicile of origin. His moves signified, too,
the establishment of a new domicile of choice in Canada.

Thus, to comply with Section 39 of the LGC by transferring his domicile

anew to Uyugan, Caballero has to prove the fact of transfer and his re-
established domicile by residing in Uyugan for at least one year
immediately before the May 13, 2013 elections. In accordance with the
jurisprudential rules on change of domicile, he must establish substantial
physical presence in Uyugan during the required period.

Moreover, under the terms of RA 9225 and its provisions on the grant of
civil and political rights,11Caballero can be said to have acquired the right to
reside in and re-establish his domicile in Uyugan (or any part of the
Philippines) only from September 12, 2012, i.e., when he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.

Unfortunately for him, his Uyugan residency, even if counted from

September 12, 2012, would still be short of the required one-year residency
period. And he was not simply absent from Uyugan before September 12,
2012 during the period the law required him to be in residence; he never
even claimed that he was in Uyugan then as a resident who intended to
stay.

Of course, existing immigration laws allow former natural-born Filipinos,

who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country, to
acquire permanent residency in the Philippines even prior to, or without re-
acquiring, Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.

Under Section 13 (f) of Commonwealth Act No. 61312 (the Philippine

Immigration of 1940), as amended, "a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country and is returning
to the Philippines for permanent residence x x x shall be considered a
non�-quota immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines." The
returning former Filipino can apply for a permanent resident visa (otherwise
known as Returning Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall entitle
the person to stay indefinitely in the Philippines.13 Other than through such
permanent resident visa, Caballero could have stayed in the Philippines
only for a temporary period.14 Any such temporary stay, of course, cannot
be considered for purposes of Section 39 of the LGC as it does not fall
within the concept of "residence."

In the present case, the records do not contain any evidence that Caballero
ever secured a permanent resident visa and has been residing in the
Philippines prior to his re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA
9225. Thus, Caballero's re-established domicile in Uyugan can be counted
only from the time he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. This period, as
earlier pointed out, is less than the required one-year residency.

e) The nature of a CoC cancellation 

proceeding should be considered in the 
resolution of the present certiorari 
petition

The present Rule 65 petition for certiorari,15 filed in relation with Rule 64 of

the Rules of Court, arose from the petition to cancel the CoC of Caballero.
In this context, the nature and requisites of CoC cancellation proceedings
are and should be the primary considerations in the resolution of the
present petition.

A petition to cancel CoC is governed by Section 74 in relation with Section

78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). As these provisions operate, the
would-be candidate must state only true facts in the CoC, as provided by
Section 74; any false representation of a material fact may lead to the
cancellation or denial of his or her CoC, under Section 78, These
provisions read:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent;
the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth:
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession
or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to
a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than
fifteen days before the election. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]chanrobleslaw

In Mitra v. Comelec,16 the Court explained that the false representation that

these provisions mention necessarily pertains to material facts, or those
that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office. The false
representation must also involve a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible,
as provided under Section 78 of the OEC.

Notably, the positive representation in the CoC that the would-be candidate
is required to make under Section 74 of the OEC, in relation with the
residency requirement of Section 39 of the LGC, complements the
disqualifying ground of being an immigrant or permanent resident in a
foreign country under Section 40 of the LGC.17 In plainer terms, the
assertion that the would-be candidate is a resident of the locality where he
intends to be elected carries with it the negative assertion that he has
neither been an immigrant nor a permanent resident in a foreign country for
at least one year immediately preceding the election.

In the present case, Caballero filed his CoC on October 3, 2012. He

asserted in his CoC that he is a resident of Uyugan (and impliedly, not a
permanent resident of a foreign country) for at least one year immediately
preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. By making this assertion, Caballero
committed a material misrepresentation in his CoC since he effectively re-
established his domicile in Uyugan and could have been a permanent
resident only from September 12, 2012.

f) Under the circumstances, 

the Comelec did not commit grave 
abuse of discretion in cancelling
Caballero 's CoC

Jurisprudence has consistently defined grave abuse of discretion as a

"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment x x x equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion, to be grave, must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility."18

Based on this definition, the grave abuse of discretion that justifies the
grant of certiorari involves an error or defect of jurisdiction resulting from,
among others, an indifferent disregard for the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, or lack of rational
deliberation in decision making.19

It should also be remembered that the remedy of certiorari applies only to

rulings that are not, or are no longer, appealable. Thus, certiorari is not an
appeal that opens up the whole case for review; it is limited to a
consideration of the specific aspect of the case necessary to determine if
grave abuse of discretion had intervened.20

In short, to assail a Comelec ruling, the assailing party must show that the
final and inappealable ruling is completely void, not simply erroneous,
because the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in considering the case
or in issuing its ruling.

It. is within this context that I fully concur with the ponencia's dismissal of

the petition. Caballero's assertion in his CoC that he has been a resident of
Uyugan for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections - a clear material misrepresentation on his qualification for the
mayoralty post - undoubtedly justified the Comelec in cancelling his CoC
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. In acting as it did, the Comelec simply
performed its mandate and enforced the law based on the established facts
and evidence. Clearly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to its
actions.

In closing, I reiterate that RA 9225 is concerned only with citizenship; it

does not touch on and does not require residency in the Philippines to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship. Residency in the Philippines becomes
material only when the natural-born Filipino who re-acquires or retains
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225 decides to run for
public office. Even then, RA 9225 leaves the resolution of any residency
issue to the terms of the Constitution and specifically applicable existing
laws.

For all these reasons, I vote to dismiss Rogelio Batin Caballero's petition
for lack of merit.

Endnotes:

1
 Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. 
2
 Enacted on August 29, 2003.
3
 The Section 4, paragraphs (1) and (4), Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure provides:
Section 4. Procedure to be observed. - Both parties shall observe the
following procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition,

through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal

service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or
the respondent's whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall
execute an affidavit stating the reason and circumstances therefor and
resort to registered mail as mode of service. The proof of service or the
affidavit shale b attached to the Petition to be filed.

xxxx

4. No petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the preceding

paragraphs have been complied with.
4
 See The Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles Website, Consular
Services (Dual Citizenship), http://www,philippineconsulatela.org/consular
%20serviees/conserv-dual.htm#overseas, (last visited on September 24,
2015); and The Commission on Filipinos Overseas Website, Programs and
Services � Dual Citizenship,http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=1362%3Adual-
citizenship&catid=145%3Aintegration-and-reintegration (Last visited on
September 24, 2015).
5
 See Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil 586 (2003): and Jupzon v. Comelec,
596 Phil. 354 (2009).
6
 See Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larazzabal v. Commission
on Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616
Phil. 167 (2009).
7
 See Pundaodaya v. Comelec, supra note 6; and Jalosjos v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012.
8
 See http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-29/pa!Je-2.htnil#docCont
(last accessed September 10, 2015).
9
 This provision pertinently reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) makes application for citizenship;

(b) is eighteen years of age or over;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2 (1) of the

Immigration and refugee Protection Act, has, subject to the regulations, no
unfulfilled conditions under the Act relating to his or her status as a
permanent resident and has, since becoming a resident,

(i) been physically present in Canada for at least 1,460 days during the six
years immediately before the date of his or her application,
(ii) been physically present in Canada for at least 183 days during each of
four calendar years that are fully or partially within the six years
immediately before the date of his or her application, and

(iii) met any applicable requirement under the Income Tax Act to file a
return of income in respect of four taxation years that are fully or partially
within the six years immediately before the date of his or her
application;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(c.1) intends, if granted citizenshipcralawlawlibrary

(i) to continue to reside in Canada,

(ii) to enter into, or continue in, employment outside Canada in or with the
Canadian Armed Forces, the federal public administration or the public
service of a province, otherwise than as a locally engaged person, or
(iii) to reside with his or her spouse or common-law partner or parent, who
is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and is employed outside
Canada in or with the Canadian Armed Forces, the federal public
administration or the public service of a province, otherwise than as a
locally engaged person;
chanrobleslaw

(d) if under 65 years of age at the date of his or her application, has an
adequate knowledge of one of the official languages of
Canada;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(e) if under 65 years of age at the date of his or her application,

demonstrates in one of the official languages of Canada that he or she has
an adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and
privileges of citizenship; and

(f) is not under a removal order and is not the subject of a declaration by
the Governor in Council made pursuant to section 20.
10
 See Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which enumerates the
qualifications for naturalization as Philippine citizen. It
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 2. Qualifications. - Subject to Section four of this Act, any person

having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Second, lie must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous

period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles

underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one
of the principal Philippine languages;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. [Emphasis
supplied]

See also Section 3 of RA 9139, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding

section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet
the following qualifications:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein
since birth;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the
time of filing of his/her petition;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the
underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire
period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly
constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is
living;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary
education in any public school or private educational institution dully
recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part
of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school
age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar
schools;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support
and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family:
Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are
disqualified to do so by reason of their
citizenship;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of
the dialects of the Philippines, and

(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of
the Filipino people. [Emphasis supplied]
11
 See Section 5 of RA 9225.
12
 Enacted on August 26. 1940.
13
 See www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/returning-former-natural-
born-filipino (last visited on September 20, 2015). The other rights granted
to former natural-born Philippine citizens under the Returning Former
Filipino Visa are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. He/she is allowed to stay indefinitely in the Philippines.

2. He/she can establish a business.
3. He/she can invest in shares of stock.
4. He/she may form an association and corporation.
5. He/she has the right of access to the courts.
6. He/she is allowed to work without securing an alien employment permit.
7. He/she may leave private lands or purchase a condominium.
8. He/she may purchase an automobile.
14
 See www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/balikbayan-privelege (last
visited on September 20. 2015). The one year period of stay in the
Philippines can be extended for another one, two or six months, up to
thirty-six months, subject to certain requirements.
15
 Rollo, pp. 23-28.
16
 636 Phil. 753(2010).
17
 Section 40 of the LGC read in full:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded [Emphasis supplied]
18
 See J. Brion's Separate Opinion in Atty. Risos-Vidal v. Commission on
Elections and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GR No. 206666, January 21, 2015.
19
 Id., citing Aratuc v. Comelec, 177 Phil. 205, 222 (1979).
20
 Id.chanrobleslaw
 CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result and join Justice Arturo D. Brion's Separate Concurring
Opinion in that "citizenship and residency are separate and distinct
requirements for qualification for local elective office."1

Domicile is distinct from citizenship. They are separate matters. Domicile is

not a mere incident or consequence of citizenship and is not dictated by it.
The case of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero who, as it is not disputed,
has Uyugan, Batanes as his domicile of origin must be resolved with this
fundamental premise in mind.

It is settled that for purposes of election law, "residence" is synonymous

with "domicile."2 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent for business, pleasure, or like reasons, one intends to
return.3 Jurisprudence has established three fundamental principles
governing domicile: "first, that [one] must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new
one is acquired; and third, [one] can have but one domicile at a time."4 In
this jurisdiction, it is settled that, for election purposes, the term "residence"
contemplates "domicile."5

For the same purpose of election law, the question of residence is mainly
one of intention.6 As explained in Gallego v. Verra:7cralawlawlibrary

The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with

"domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus
manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must conform with his
purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the
place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of residence
there must be added the animus manendi.8chanrobleslaw
Section 39(a)9 of the Local Government Code provides that in order to be
eligible for local elective public office, a candidate must possess the
following qualifications: (a) a citizen of the Philippines; (b) a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, province, or in the case of a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang
Bayan, the district where he or she intends to be elected; (c) a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and (d) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.

A position equating citizenship with residency is unwarranted. Citizenship

and domicile are two distinct concepts.10 One is not a function of the other;
the latter is not contingent on the former. Thus, the loss of one does not
necessarily result in the loss of the other. Loss of domicile as a result of
acquiring citizenship elsewhere is neither inevitable nor inexorable. This is
the clear import of Japzon v. COMELEC,11 where this court dissociated
domicile from citizenship by disproving the obverse, i.e., explaining that the
reacquisition of one does not ipso facto result in the reacquisition of the
other:cralawlawlibrary

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty's

reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had
no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain
his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his
new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not
retroact to the time of his birth.12 (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw

There is no shortcut to determining one's domicile. Reference to formalities

may be helpful�they may serve as guideposts�but these are not
conclusive. It remains that domicile is a matter of intention. For domicile to
be lost and replaced, there must be an intention to abandon the domicile of
origin before a domicile of choice can be had. Consequently, if one does
not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice, his or her (old)
domicile of origin remains. To hearken to Japzon, one who changes his or
her citizenship merely acquires an option to establish his or her new
domicile of choice. Accordingly, naturalization�a process relating to
citizenship�has no automatic effect on domicile.
The primacy of intention is settled. In Limbona v. COMELEC,13 this court
stated, in no uncertain terms, that "for purposes of election law, the
question of residence is mainly one of intention."14

This primacy is equally evident in the requisites for acquisition of domicile

by choice (and concurrent loss of one's old domicile): "In order to acquire a
domicile by choice, these must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile."15

These requisites were refined in Romualdez-Marcos v.

COMELEC:16cralawlawlibrary

[D]omicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.17chanrobleslaw

Intention, however, is a state of mind. It can only be ascertained through

overt acts. Ascertaining the second requirement�a bona fide intention to
abandon and replace one's domicile with another�further requires an
evaluation of the person's "acts, activities[,] and utterances."18Romualdez-
Marcos' inclusion of the third requirement evinces this. Bona fide intention
cannot stand alone; it must be accompanied by and attested to by "[a]cts
which correspond with the purpose."19

Examining a person's "acts, activities[,] and utterances"20 requires a

nuanced approach. It demands a consideration of context. This court has
made it eminently clear that there is no expedient solution as to how this is
determined: "There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a
person actually resides."21 Domicile is ultimately a factual matter and is not
so easily resolved by mere reference to formalities that may have occurred
and that pertain to the entirely different matter of citizenship.

I nevertheless manifest my reservation about the reference to and

application of the Canadian Citizenship Law.

The standards and requisites for applying foreign law in Philippine tribunals
are settled. As aptly explained in Zalamea v. Court of
Appeals:22cralawlawlibrary

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.23chanrobleslaw

Respondent Jonathan Enrique Nanud, Jr.'s Comment24 on the present

Petition25 never referred to, alleged the existence of, or otherwise averred
that the Canadian Citizenship Law supported his cause. Neither did this
statute find its way in any of the assailed Commission on Elections
Resolutions in support of the position that petitioner's naturalization
resulted in the loss of his domicile. 

It is not for a court to, out of its own initiative, address the lacunae and fill
the deficiencies in the arguments of a party or the reasoning of the tribunal
whose ruling it is reviewing. The task of alleging and proving the existence
and the accuracy of supposed statements of any foreign law that could
have helped his cause was respondent's alone. Failing in this, he should
not find solace before the court adjudicating his claims so it can do his work
for him, buttress his arguments where their weakness were apparent, and
ultimately, obtain his desired conclusion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The assailed Resolutions

dated May 3, 2013 of the First Division of public respondent Commission
on Elections and November 6, 2013 of public respondent sitting En Banc
must be AFFIRMED.

Endnotes:

1
 Justice Brion's Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 3.
2
Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 455-456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
3
Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No.
104960, 226 SCRA 408 (1993) [Per J. Abad, Second Division],
4
 Limbona v. COMELEC, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].
5
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan,
En Banc]; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 276
Phil. 758 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
6
Limbona v. COMELEC, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
En Banc].
7
 73 Phil. 453 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
8
 Id. at 456, citing Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928) [Per J. Villareal, En
Banc] and 17 Am. Jur., section 16, pages 599601.
9
 SECTION 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of

the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent

component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod

or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
10
 Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En
Banc]. 
11
 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
12
 Id. at 369-370.
13
 578 Phil. 364 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
14
 Id. at 374.
15
Gallego v. Verm, 73 Phil. 453, 456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
16
 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
17
 Id. at 386.
18
Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second
Division].
19
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan,
En Banc].
20
Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second
Division].
21
Limbona v. COMELEC, 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].
22
 G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993,228 SCRA23 [Per J. Nocon,
Second Division].
23
 Id. at 30, citing @ 110 Phil. 686, 700 (1961) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc]
and JOVITO SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-83 (1979).
24
Rollo, pp. 96-111.
25
 Id. at 3-19.