G.R. No.

159747 April 13, 2004

Honasan, which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.
. . . (Emphasis supplied).

GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,

The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director Matillano is quoted
vs. verbatim, to wit:

THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF 1. That I am a member of the Communication –Electronics and Information Systems
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. Services, Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Major;
VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR
EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security Guard (PSG) during
DECISION our Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course sometime in last week of March 2003;
EN BANC

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: 3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the pamphlet of the
National Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that: "Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya

On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by mo na walang bahid ng corruption kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took

respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part: the pamphlet but never had the time to read it;

… 4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited me to join him in
a meeting where the NRP would be discussed and that there would be a special guest;

2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio 5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the evening of June 4,

"Gringo"Honasan, II … 2003 in a house located somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. … 6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3-4 pages containing
discussion of issues and concerns within the framework of NRP and we were likewise served

4. The said crime was committed as follows: with dinner;

4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila, a 7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the evening, Sen. Gregorio

meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the "Gringo" Honasan arrived together with another fellow who was later introduced as Capt.

affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and made an integral part of this complaint. Turingan;

… 8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper started presided by Sen.
Honasan;

4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in
behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on 9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the government

nation television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of including the military institution, the judiciary, the executive branch and the like;

the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are
willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen.
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to meeting on June 4, 2003 and the information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their
achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the argument that it is my belief that reforms group had already deeply established their network inside the intelligence community;
will be achieved through the democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or
armed struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never achieve reforms through the 17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to see me to return
democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions as the rifle that he borrowed and told me that when the group arrives at the Malacañang
they have their vested interests to protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Compound for "D-DAY", my task is to switch off the telephone PABX that serves the
Honasan appeared irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then Malacañang complex. I told him that I could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he
asked whether all those present numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed, left;
Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating
pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further questions; 18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw flashed on the screen
Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of who were present during the June 4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference
NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolution about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands
and after which, a junta will be constituted and that junta will run the new government. He and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which was displayed and on which we
further said that some of us will resign from the military service and occupy civilian positions pressed our wound to leave the imprint of the letter "I";
in the new government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement this plan and
that we would be notified of the next activities. 19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the foregoing and in
order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO" HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN,
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that we were to Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others
undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a prayer that sounded more like a pledge and for violation of Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat".
we all recited it with raised arms and clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated (Emphasis supplied)
how to make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in form of the letter
"I" in the old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like letter "H". Then, he The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
pressed his right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower middle portion the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary
of the copy of the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape. He then investigation.
pressed the cut on his left arm against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody
else followed; On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm and pricked a committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
portion of it to let it bleed and I followed what Senator HONASAN did; jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case
14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life with what considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that the
Senator HONASAN said that "…kaya nating pumatay ng kasamahan"; proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.

15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place; Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a reply.

16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra cautious that he would On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
not notice it for fear of my life due to the threat made by Senator HONASAN during the
 On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a "Motion to 2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
Clarify Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003, complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
said motion.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be passed upon in the Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the
resolution of this case. powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of publication,
hence null and void.
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional affidavits/evidence
and to afford respondents ample opportunity to controvert the same, respondents, thru 4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is the Office of the
counsel are hereby directed to file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
evidence on or before September 23, 2003. 1

5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of petitioner's Motion
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the to Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein is determinative of the validity of the
Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and preliminary investigation.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in
issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to 6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion in the guise of
conduct the preliminary investigation. directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet refused and/or failed to perform its duties
to resolve petitioner's Motion stating its legal and factual bases.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of respondents DOJ Panel,
and Director Matillano submitted their respective comments. The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:

The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues: 1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to
Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
conduct preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act office as a Senator. The factual allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavits are
No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and bereft of the requisite nexus between petitioner's office and the acts complained of.

3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in 3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground to
deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is misplaced. The jurisdiction
of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation. of the DOJ is a statutory grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from
any provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines governing the authority of
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The arguments of both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation on
petitioner are: offenses charged in relation to public office.

1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation 4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to clarify jurisdiction
over all public officials, including petitioner. which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a motion to dismiss that is a prohibited
 pleading under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but
Panel is not required to act or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is required on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the
solely for the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well DOJ, which provides:
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the motion of petitioner Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government
but ruled to pass upon the same in the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm;
violated any law or rule or any norm of discretion. administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are: the correctional system; …

1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
the petitioner for the reason that the crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the following powers and functions:
Revised Penal Code (RPC) may fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the
same is committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, …
as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct preliminary the probation and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
investigation over cases involving public officers solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 is misplaced because the DOJ's concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
preliminary investigation of cases involving public officials has been recognized in Sanchez
vs. Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ cannot be deputized Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State
by the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in reference to specific cases has no factual or Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided,
legal basis. There is no rule or law which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all
authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of the Ombudsman to cases involving violations of penal laws. (Emphasis supplied)
deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to request
assistance from any government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as well as from Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
the statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA 6770. preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor does it omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to
conduct of persons or the public, in general. Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

The Court finds the petition without merit. Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
 When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be …. (Emphasis supplied)
void and the latter shall govern.
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated
to the laws or the Constitution. Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any
The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz: public officer or employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
duties:
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular
improper, or inefficient. courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving the authority to prosecute, such cases.
public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have
expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides: Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
functions or duties as may be provided by law. prosecutors.

Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the
15 thereof provides: direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The
following powers, functions and duties: law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in the
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is
government, the investigation of such cases. directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically
provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12)
and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to
provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court. take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec.
13[3]).
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court
expressly declared: The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does
investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.3 not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act,
the Court held in said case: The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it
of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the
agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of
PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that
trial court. have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during
his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all .........
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a
preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special
Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to
over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
4 
public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of
official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need for an
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the Ombudsman, under
5  independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.6
the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime
committed by a public official, elucidating thus:
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs.
and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for
Court elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate. tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject
of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus: matter, has been in a state of flux.

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -- the first
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree
held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, this authority "is not an
8 
No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres.
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense Decree No. 1861.
charged."
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended "SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe as follows:
that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the
Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or 'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It
must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to '(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is
not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect ...
of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office
of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
information. government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied) not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation Trial Court."
over his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2)
for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed
 by the public officer must be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. 11
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree
No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
power to investigate. against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to Article XI, jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with
materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject conduct of their investigations, to wit:
matter.
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the Series of 1995
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.
The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE
optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized OF THE OMBUDSMAN
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the
application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING
taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF
existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.12 (Emphasis supplied) RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL
AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise
provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public
officers or employees in relation to their office. In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on
the extent to which the ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance submit to the office of the ombudsman a monthly list of complaints filed with their respective
in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the offices against public officers and employees.
conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise
known as "an act to strengthen the functional and structural organization of the Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.
sandiganbayan, amending for the purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and its
implications on the jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses
(signed) (signed)
committed by public officers and employees.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, ANIANO A. DESIERTO

Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on
JR. Ombudsman
jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the department of justice, and
Secretary Office of the Ombudsman
by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against public officers and employees, the
Department of Justice
conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and informations, and
the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants as deputized
A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an
prosecutors of the ombudsman.
internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the department of justice, in a
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on Preliminary Investigation,
series of consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed in the
effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
investigation and prosecution of cases against public officers and employees:

SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations-

1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to office whether cognizable by the sandiganbayan or the regular
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
courts, and whether filed with the office of the ombudsman or with the office of the
provincial/city prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the office of the
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
ombudsman.

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe
otherwise, offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
investigated and prosecuted by the office of the provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule
thereon with finality.
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes
who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
together with the duly accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the
appropriate approving authority.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information,
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over public officers and
He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of cases
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
involving public officers and employees, the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
 probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no showing that the
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting Office of the Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint. investigation of the charge filed against him.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution, the Ombudsman
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed
receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. against public officers and employees.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's
or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes
by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation. the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate
the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another not published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter,
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information to wit:
with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted
by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper reading and
application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of People
Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a
Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
their resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
prosecutor cannot dismiss the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet
and without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy. been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any
penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
 What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court
ruled that: Puno, J., joins J. Ynares-Santiago.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is Vitug, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent.
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied) Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the
Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the
DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-
DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.

Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 has to be published.14

Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a
Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the
charge of coup d'etat against him.

The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those enumerated
in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be
resolved in the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by
the DOJ Panel as to the questions whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the
information against the petitioner; and to which court should the information be filed considering the
presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
 the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation
on the charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules

and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the
G.R. NO. 146779 January 23, 2006
administrative case against him.5

RENATO S. GATBONTON, Petitioner,
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

vs.
Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant is hereby
declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the period of his
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF preventive suspension.
TECHNOLOGY and JOSE CALDERON, Respondents.

DECISION The rest of complainant’s claims are dismissed.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: SO ORDERED.6

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, with petitioner
set aside the Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the NLRC
affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision. His motion for reconsideration
dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion for reconsideration.2 having been denied by the NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA.
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology
(MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering student of On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision, the
respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual dispositive portion of which reads:
harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint,
respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30- WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner’s ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of public respondent NLRC
continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the AFFIRMED.
students’ learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to "prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community."3 SO ORDERED.7

Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated January 16,
fees,  docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
4
2001.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties
entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ A
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC WAS NOT It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23,
GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera,13 it was ruled that:
DECISION AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.
… all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
B their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by
the legislature.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC’S DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.8 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
Petitioner finds fault in the CA’s decision, arguing that his preventive suspension does not find any directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
justification in the Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the time of his preventive published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules have not been promulgated yet as it was published only on delegation.
February 23, 1999. Petitioner also contests the lack of award of damages in his favor. 9

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
The petition is partly meritorious. the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may
place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious …
and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.  However, when it is
10

determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension.11 the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. 14 In fact, the Mapua
their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor."  Petitioner’s preventive suspension was
12
IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that "[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the
based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the
Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides: Committee." Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive suspension on January 11,
1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the
educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient
of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under
and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or
danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community. (a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the
continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to
the normal operations of the institution; or
 (b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the With regard to petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While
educational community. petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he
is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC,17 the Court
In petitioner’s case, there is no indication that petitioner’s preventive suspension may be based on the ruled:lavvphil.ne+
foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato
Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioner’s In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that "… an award (of moral damages)
preventive suspension, to wit: cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that
the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent during the period of and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that
investigation, the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of course, that social humiliation,
1. Affects the respondent’s performance as a faculty member and laboratory head considering wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC,
the psychological effects depression and/or emotional stress during where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was shown to
investigation;lavvphil.ne+ have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

2. Affects the student[’s] learning and other members of the Mapua Institute of Technology This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that petitioner
community. company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private respondent,
the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the respondent to prepare therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate
himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community. 15 jurisdiction. …

Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in
morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was
distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.
life or property of the other members of the educational community.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2000
Even under the Labor Code, petitioner’s preventive suspension finds no valid justification. As provided and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well as the
in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code: NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are
hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or SO ORDERED.
of his co-workers.

As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the
preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not
justified.16 Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from
January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
 It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic
Roxas and to decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062 January 18, 2011

IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant, SO ORDERED.

vs. The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both motions were
denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.

JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent. On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for reconsideration
which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
DECISION

Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing on June
Per Curiam:
29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos
was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case.
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office, judges must endeavor to act
On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
in a manner that puts them and their conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with
extreme care for their office indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.1
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996,
the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha
At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge Fernando Vil
Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the
Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC), for
late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
Gross Ignorance of the Law.

This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica of the
THE FACTS:
original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since 1971 up to the
present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful possession of persons
From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging
who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.
Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory
order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified
Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted
in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled "Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as
gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and
the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v.
executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan
Jose D. Roxas, et al."
reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R
but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive portion
sitting in his sala was a "mere replica." Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the
of which reads:
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.
In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting lack It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED
of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedent’s
Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration
of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:
Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of this case.
"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The Order of
Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the state of the late
could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under
aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal. the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the
appointment of his estate’s administrator."
In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his x x x           x x x          x x x
retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including
government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for "violation of A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper party to go
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." The OCA pointed out that: to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.

As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing this in mind, "fake one, or a mere replica." Notwithstanding that the same may be his’ and the litigants’ opinion
respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of which reads: during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should have borne in mind that there were no issues nor
controversies left for consideration in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated May
Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas has 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues have been
not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court, thus, this settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision that has acquired finality
incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically, becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower
(Italics supplied) courts – which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory
before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to
x x x           x x x          x x x modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, government.
the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha
Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle."
late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution, preventively suspended
Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated May 30, Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop him from committing further
1996, which provides: damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for
Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.
The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its him? On this score alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali over the Buddha now
Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that "the Motion for Reconsideration in this Court’s custody.
filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be
LIFTED." Thus, in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration x x x           x x x          x x x
filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive Suspension effective immediately.
Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the one now in
Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his custody of this Court, there is none. X x x.
preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3, 2008 Resolution, following the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for being premature and for lack of merit. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial

Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan. Conducthttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/A. M. No. RTJ-05-1920.htm -
_ftn provides:
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of the
OCA. SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to
Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in Civil Case No. 3383- preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made [Emphases ours]
express declarations that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2,
1996 Order. He ruled that the Golden Buddha in the custody of the court was a "fake one, or a mere Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the challenged
replica" of the original. This may be his opinion or the litigants’ during the hearing of June 29, 2006 but order.
Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point in its May 30, 1996
Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
pertinently reads: may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to
Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between him and the late avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that under this agreement, he and Rogelio judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
Roxas will share in the profits of their business venture, that is, treasure hunting and claim for lost is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.2
treasure.
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how
He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha. According to him, he has noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are
photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine golden Buddha. To be sure, this Court is expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When the law is so
baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr. Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the genuine golden elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3
Buddha, and therefore a fake one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of Agreement.
The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the law in
Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost treasure which issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high standards of
could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umali’s own claim the subject Buddha has no competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:
appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the scope of the Memorandum of Agreement. This
being the case, what right then does Albert Umali have to demand the return of the subject Buddha to Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence. judges.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/RTJ-07-2031.htm - _ftn

Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a cursory
or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with basic legal
highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.10
which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges.4
As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,11 "Our conception of good judges has been, and
Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. In The Officers and Members is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,  Judge Pamintuan was
5
law." Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that:
charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused,
Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,  he was found guilty of violating Canons 2 of the Code
6
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amounted to grave misconduct, bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is in order.
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants
service. He was reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of the foregoing or similar of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.12
transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a fine of ₱10,000.00.
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1 He
In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,7 he was charged with manifest partiality, gross could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions lightly.
misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of the incidents in His violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and punished for various
Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled "People of the Philippines v. Emil Biggel," a case for estafa. He was infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from
found guilty of violating Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of service.
court business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his offenses would
merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and his prior infractions are
As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge Pamintuan filed by grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the cited administrative cases filed
one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law.  Although, this is not pertinent in the resolution of this
8
against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other equally
case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting serious transgressions.1âwphi1 This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when doing so
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the
place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis: 9
judiciary.

Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s personal WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is the price one has Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing
to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the most any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.
searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary would be SO ORDERED.
eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of
 On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-
2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November
17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
vs.
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
DECISION
1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in
Manila (Exh. E).
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated July 8, 2004, be
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage
reversed and set aside.
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x
City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
x.

INFORMATION
xxxx

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial
committed as follows:
Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously
states:
united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Contrary to law.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582. CASE.

Costs against the accused. V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
August 2001.3 DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH
their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as
1978. V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID
court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time MARRIAGE LICENSE.
of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions
that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
marriage as far back as 1978. PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that
Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also
Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
alleges that: criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x

xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7 period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense;
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any
the time the second marriage is contracted. corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 9

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as
a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
[Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the
act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 11
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum
penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next
lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty
of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision
correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all
been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity,
by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce
the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,5 the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article
40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard
Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
G.R. No. 164435 June 29, 2010
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite – usually the marriage license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
vs.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x x 6lawphil

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never
sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be
RESOLUTION
applied to her case, cannot be upheld.

PERALTA, J.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009
is DENIED with FINALITY.
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration1 dated November 11, 2009 and respondent's
Comment2 thereto dated March 5, 2010.
SO ORDERED.

In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for bigamy.
Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages were
entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.

Petitioner's argument lacks merit.

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,3 the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is
that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.4
 Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint6 that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as
represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 7 obtained from
him a loan of ₱1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract8 by way of
second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-66049 and a Promissory Note10 payable
within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to
secure payment of said loan.

G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable

ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner, consideration of ₱600,000.00, which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan,
executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided),11 the pertinent portions of which read:
vs.
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 6,
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE and Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for a valuable consideration of SIX
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱600,000.00) which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M.
DECISION Ferrer, likewise of legal age, Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal address at
No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue
DEL CASTILLO, J.: of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and interests as a
legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his
The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found thereon and
executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the which property is more particularly described as follows:
title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent
owners and hold them liable to the claimant? TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
This Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December 12,
1

2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70888. 3 Said Decision modified the xxxx
June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
4

Q-99-38876 by holding respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan (the Pangans) not and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G.
solidarily liable with the other respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise assailed is the
CA Resolution5 dated September 10, 2004 which denied petitioner’s as well as respondents Spouses (sgd.)
Diaz and Comandante’s respective motions for reconsideration. REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
The parties’ respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 which he caused to be
Version of the Petitioner annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored threatened to foreclose the former’s taxi units and present the postdated checks she issued to the bank
upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood, Comandante
loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint 13 for Collection of Sum of Money was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note. Petitioner,
Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil Case however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the pretext that they still have to be
No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City. notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover,
Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA under
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the Judicial which she thought she derived the authority to execute the mortgage contract.
Foreclosure of Mortgage14 and, second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the
mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred under their names in TCT Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o‘ clock in the morning, she executed
No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the respondents be ordered an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A (Still
to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of ₱1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial Undivided) Real Property,16 which she caused to be annotated on the title of the subject property with
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract. the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later
that day too.
Version of the Respondents
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to the amended
In her Answer  to petitioner’s original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner and his wife were
15
complaint17 that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real Estate Mortgage
her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly
petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of her parents’ lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations from the Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code,18 hence,
couple on several occasions which totaled ₱500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor; that the Real Estate Mortgage was
loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks she of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid authority from her parents; and, that the
issued in favor of petitioner. prayer for collection and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at
the same time.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to
Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October 4, 1999 a Petition
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No.
parents’ abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure RT-6604 (82020) PR-1888719 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of
Comandante’s loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to ₱600,000.00 due to RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the consolidation of
interests. said case20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City
ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly,
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following documents: (1) a Real Estate the records of the former case was forwarded to Branch 224.
Mortgage Contract over her parents’ property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both
corresponding to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00, which petitioner claimed to be the total amount of For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them. They claimed that
Comandante’s monetary obligation to him exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Comandante
she reminded petitioner that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the subject property. They also contested the due
her parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to banks and execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United
other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that the States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been
SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and his wife residing for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed
out that the complaint merely refers to Comandante’s personal obligation to petitioner with which they On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 25 claiming that his suit against
had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed. 21
the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that same is documented and supported by law
and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which
At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the
for a consideration of ₱3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in representation of her
Pangans immediately took actual possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid
Soon thereafter, they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was and is registrable under Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds
cancelled.  22
of Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by annotating
said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred that even before the sale
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of the existence of his
subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner for which the mortgage of the property in
petitioner’s favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were not aware of such Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed the
Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary judgment, the
who prepared such document. trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001, 26 deemed both motions for summary judgment submitted
for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioner’s allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment27 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the portion of which reads:
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which
petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code. against defendants by:

Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind them nor in any a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION
way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not registered before the Register of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS
Deeds.23 (₱1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;

All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral and exemplary b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and interest
damages and attorney’s fees in varying amounts. of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;

After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on March 29, 2001 a c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiff’s expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
Motion for Summary Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the documents alluded to by petitioner in his (₱10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.
complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from
the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter IT IS SO ORDERED.28
never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment. The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA. 29 The Pangans faulted the trial court in
holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the satisfaction of the
latter’s personal obligation to petitioner in the total amount of ₱1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Our Ruling
Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in
favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court The petition lacks merit.
should not have considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were
defective, as well as petitioner’s frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim. Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment he filed before the
trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights anchored on Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property (Still
null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf of her Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage
parents as binding between the parties thereto. contract in favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is
registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon them as they even prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and existing
were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage encumbrance of adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that
petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to know of the adverse claim through petitioner’s the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly and severally liable to
phone call which came right after the former’s acquisition of the property. The CA further ruled that as him in the total amount of ₱1,118,228.00.
Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioner’s adverse claim was based
is a nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not bound to take Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
notice of such claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary Judgment
as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the assailed Summary xxxx
Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in
effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz: 1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heir’s share over an undivided certain
parcel of land together with all the improvements found therein x x x as evidenced by Waiver
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property, executed by REINA D.
Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x
x x.
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay
plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and 2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the
registered owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay manner without my knowledge and consent, for the owner’s duplicate title was not
plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit. surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the
back of the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
SO ORDERED.31 6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 33 dated 3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the foregoing facts and
September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for review on certiorari insisting that the to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of
Pangans should, together with the other respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the amount of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the original copy of Transfer Certificate
₱1,118,228.00. of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the said office, so that my
 interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be protected especially the Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of) and/or encumber the Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant
same without my knowledge and consent. (Emphasis ours) a speedy hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as
may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall
Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of hereditary interest be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse
executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially so when the inscription of his claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand
adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows: pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant
may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed under oath by (Emphasis ours)
PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among others that they have a
claim, the interest over said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that the validity or
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x x34 (Emphasis ours) efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested
party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that the adverse claim was also anchored on the adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious
mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents. that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled.36

The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid? Is petitioner’s As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that the trial court
adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective? conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to include this material issue
among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment as shown by the following portion of the
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim should have been determined by the judgment:
trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioner’s adverse claim filed by Comandante was
consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. 35 This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
provides: No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangan’s Title No. N-20909, is
not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandante’s "Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over
Section 70. Adverse Claim. – Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the a Real Property" but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the previous registered
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged a loan of ₱1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue
the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential Decree No.
or interest is claimed. 1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of petitioner that his
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is consequently
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the part of said court to make even a short
from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, That of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for
after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same summary judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that
claimant. petitioner’s adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is worse is that
despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter even if respondents vigorously In Tañedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro Tañedo and therein
raised the same before it. private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of whatever share the former
shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-
Be that as it may, respondents’ efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find significant, have not gone 13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of Tañedo’s future inheritance from his
to naught as will be hereinafter discussed. parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.

All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights
(Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as
Code, hence, petitioner’s adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for
confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property. being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

We agree with the respondents. Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529,
that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the
upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be subject property flows from Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter
considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner’s adverse claim is
may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here as the Diazes and
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened. Comandante in their Comment40 call our attention to the failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the
propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and, fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is
proper only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of evidence, as when
hereditary in nature. 38 he specifically denies the material allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which they claim should
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in petitioner’s favor. First, the
properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his complaint was never
requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should have been conducted to
waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their determine the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took
death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. the word of the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second,
although Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of ₱1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the
former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real amount of ₱500,000.00 or ₱600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the
Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single
centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents are
responsible for such amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly,
they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative value of complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage
Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the Contract pertaining to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all such documents were
prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time. Comandante, in her Answer to petitioner’s Amended Complaint, assailed the validity and due execution
of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same were not duly, knowingly and validly
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of which are the executed by her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing
following: petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation amounting only
to ₱600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or personal obligation and not of her parents.
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their daughter to
favor upon all or any part thereof. mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the latter.

Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For one, it is
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the determination of the following equally significant
questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of ₱1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. 42 From the
foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to in but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case should
order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the
are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by
way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the summary judgment.
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.41 December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth
Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of summary inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby
judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident. ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE
and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged real estate further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante in behalf of her parents to
secure payment of a loan amounting to ₱1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his SO ORDERED
 for. In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach. Considering the CMC's
experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in the previous semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in
the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of A Y 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally,
Diaz received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her sabbatical might be approved.

Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its
denial. When requested by (Chancellor) Tabujara, Encanto transmitted to the former a Reference Slip
G.R. No. 171303 January 20, 2016
together with her comments thereon. Meanwhile, Encanto requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's

ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, Petitioner, salary effective July 1, 1988 until further notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet
been approved and that she did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name was deleted in the
payroll from September 1988 to January 1989.
vs.
On July 4, 1988, Tabujara recommended instead that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to
GEORGINA R. EN CANTO
, ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD and
enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.'s Secretary referred to Abad, VicePresident
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
(VP) for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for his own
DECISION comment/recommendation to the U.P. President. Meantime, Diaz confessed her problems to Abad. On
July 8, 1988, Abad returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him earlier
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: "to put down in writing, from her point of view, the historical backdrop as it were to the latest denial of
her sabbatical leave." With comments, Abad then referred the matter to the U .P. President.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, which
seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005 Decision 1 and January 20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42 issued by the U.P. President, the Academic Policy
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165,  which reversed the April 17, 1996 Decision  and September
3 4 Coordinating Committee (APCC), on July 21, 1988, reviewed the case of Diaz. When reminded by Abad,
1 7, 1996 Order  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 58397.
5 Diaz again promised to give the background information.

The undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows: On Diaz's request to teach for that semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs,
Edgardo Pacheco, and the HRDO Director, Atty. Pio Frago, instructed Encanto that "Until Prof. Diaz
Plaintiff-appellant [Elizabeth L. Diaz] has been in the service of [the University of the Philippines] U.P. officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC
since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College of Mass Communication (CMC). confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent without official leave (AWOL) for
During the second semester for Academic Year (A Y) 1987-1988, she was a full time member of the the University."
faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to 3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective
November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid Encanto' s
Duty Form. reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of
service during the first semester of A Y 1988-89, hence, she is not entitled to be paid and asked her to
On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s "Office of the President (Abueva) for clarify her status of being on leave without pay.
sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study."
Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that [While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her
Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. After they discussed the options available to the CMC, Lazaro, salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form.6 She received her salaries for June to July
on May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she may be qualified 15, 1989, but could no longer claim her salary after July 15, 1989, when Encanto reminded the
University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, 1989, 7 that Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty To the petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman observed, among others, the following: that, the denial
Form to entitle her to salaries and make official her return to the service of the University."  Diaz's
8
of her sabbatical leave application was due to the exigencies of the service; that petitioner was not given
name was subsequently included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted a Report for a teaching assignment for the first semester of A Y 1988-1989, because she did not want to teach then;
Duty after her return from compulsory summer leave. ] 9
that the delay in action on her leave application was due to petitioner's own fault for not following the
usual procedures in the processing of her application; and that there is no malice on the part of the
xxxx private respondents in requiring petitioner to accomplish the Report for Duty Form which is the basis of
the date of her actual return to the service.10 (Citations omitted.)
In the meantime, on January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-
00-89-0049), against Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and Georgina R. Encanto, all officials of In a Decision dated April 1 7, 1996, the R TC ruled in favor of petitioner Diaz, the dispositive portion of
the University of the Philippines, for the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the which reads:
legality of a Report for Duty Form as a prerequisite to the payment of her salary.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman dismissed the said complaint and ruled, inter alia:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of
Considering that Prof. Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without pay during the first semester of A P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and
Y 1988-1989, to make official her return to the service of the University, it is advised that she from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered by corresponding certificate of service, with
accomplish the Report for Duty Form which will then be the basis to establish the date of her actual legal rate of interest from the date of this Decision until its full payment.
return to the service. However, if possible, the University authorities can perhaps dispense with the
requirement and pay her salaries for actual services rendered from November 3, 1988. 2. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
Diaz's initial Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 88834) assailing the above-quoted
Ombudsman's ruling was subsequently dismissed. She filed another Petition (G.R. No. 89207) raising 3. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and
exactly the same issued found in G.R. No. 88834. severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara 4. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and
and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly severally, the reduced amount of PS0,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as
joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 5. Costs of suit.
1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the
salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.11
likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege, held that petitioner Diaz was
On August 31, 1989, the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diaz's Petition in G.R. No. 89207, viz.: entitled to such privilege and found that the delay in the_resolution of her application was
unreasonable and unconscionable.
It is noted that the Ombudsman found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence on the part of the private respondents in denying the application for sabbatical leave of However, on September 17, 1996, the RTC, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration of the
petitioner (Diaz) and in requiring her to fill up a Report for Duty Form as a requisite for her entitlement respondents in said case, also amended its earlier decision by absolving respondent Encanto from any
to salary. liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants: Petitioner Diaz, on the other hand, questioned the reversal of the R TC ruling only with respect to the
liability of respondent Encanto, in a lone assignment of error, viz.:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July 1, 1988 to May 31, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORIGINAL DECISION WITH
1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered by corresponding certificate of REGARD TO PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT GEORGINA R. ENCANTO BY ABSOLVING HER
service, with legal rate of interest from the date of this Decision until its full payment. OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ELIZABETH L. DIAZ
WITHOUT ALTERING IN ANY MATERIAL RESPECT WHATSOEVER THE FINDINGS OF
2. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly FACT IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION SHOWING CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages. DEFENDANT ENCANTO FOR (I) THE WRONGFUL DISAPPROVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
SABBATICAL APPLICATION; (II) THE UNJUST DEPRIVATION OF SALARIES DUE THE
3. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly PLAINTIFF FOR ALMOST ONE WHOLE SEMESTER DURING WHICH HER SABBATICAL
and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages. APPLICATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED; AND (III) THE WRONGFUL WITHHOLDING
OF PLAINTIFF'S EARNED SALARIES IN THE THREE SUCCEEDING SEMESTERS
4. Ordering defendants, except University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and DURING WHICH THE PLAINTIFF TAUGHT WITHOUT BEING PAID.21
severally, the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
5. Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals trimmed down the issue to whether or not respondents U.P., Tabujara and Abad
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.12 were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and in
withholding her salaries. In its Decision promulgated on April 28, 2005, it effectively reversed the
The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner Diaz against respondent Encanto on the ground that her decision of the R TC, viz.:
function was purely recommendatory in nature. It held that she was not instrumental in the
unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical application as WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW
she transmitted her recommendation to Abueva within eighteen days from her receipt of such JUDGMENT is RENDERED, as follows: (1) defendant-appellant University of the Philippines,
application.13 through its appropriate officials, is DIRECTED to pay plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Diaz the sum of
Twenty-One Thousand, Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine and 64/100 (P21,879.64) as unpaid salaries and
Petitioner Diaz  and respondents Tabujara,  U.P., Abad  and even Encanto  appealed the RTC's ruling
14 15 16 17 allowances, and (2) the sums awarded as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are
to the Court of Appeals. hereby DELETED. This is without prejudice to the enforcement of valid rules and regulations of the
University of the Philippines pertaining to Diaz's employment status.22
As respondent Encanto was absolved of liability by the R TC in its September 1 7, 1996 Order, the Court
of Appeals admitted her Brief,18 as an incorporation to the other respondents' Brief,19 and as a comment The Court of Appeals found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the respondents in their
on petitioner Diaz's appeal. 20 denial of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and in withholding her salaries.

The respondents mainly argued that the R TC erred in holding them liable for damages despite the The Court of Appeals emphasized that a sabbatical leave is not a right which could be demanded at will,
absence of bad faith on their part, as held by both the Ombudsman in OMB-00-89-0049 and the even by petitioner Diaz who has been a veteran professor of 24 years at U.P. Moreover, the Court of
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89207. Appeals said that the eventual denial of her sabbatical leave application was not actionable in view of
the fact that (i) it would be unfair to impute negligence to respondents in the regular discharge of their
functions; and (ii) assuming that there was delay in the resolution of her application, she herself caused FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
such delay. 23

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CORRECTLY COMPUTING THE SUM OF PETITIONER'S
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner Diaz's own recalcitrance and defiance to comply with UNPAID AND EARNED SALARIES, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
certain documentary requirements was the reason her salaries were withheld.24
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Petitioner Diaz filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the aforementioned decision, which was
subsequently denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated January 20, 2006. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
THAT RESPONDENTS EN CANTO, TABUJARA AND ABAD ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
Issues TO PETITIONER FOR ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS JOINT TORTFEASORS
UNDER THE LAW.25
Undaunted, petitioner Diaz is again before this Court, with the following Assignments of Error:
The issue in this case boils down to whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR resolved petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and withheld her salaries.

WITHOUT DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF. THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON Ruling of the Court
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE REVEALING THE COMMISSION BY RESPONDENTS OF THE
TORTIOUS ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY PETITIONER IN DENYING HER SABBATICAL LEA VE, THE The resolution of this case hinges on the question of bad faith on the part of the respondents in denying
COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN IGNORING THOSE FINDINGS AND ADOPTING petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and withholding of her salaries. Bad faith, however, is a
AND TREATING AS VALID THE FLIMSY EXCUSES OF RESPONDENTS TO A VOID THE LEGAL question of fact and is evidentiary. 26 Thus, contrary to petitioner Diaz's belief that " [ w ]hat is involved
CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS. in this stage of the case is the legal interpretation or the legal consequence of the material facts of this
case," the resolution of the issue at hand involves a question of fact, which the respondents rightly
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR assert, is not within the province of a Rule 45 petition. 27 Nonetheless, the Court makes an exception in
this case especially so that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals have the same findings of fact, but
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, they arrived at different conclusions.28
THAT "THERE WAS JUDICIOUS EXERCISE" BY RESPONDENTS "OF THEIR DISCRETIONARY
POWER WITH RESPECT TO THE DENIAL OF THE SUBJECT SABBATICAL LEAVE." Application for Sabbatical Leave

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Petitioner Diaz's complaint29 for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith
of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING AS LAWFUL THE WITHHOLDING OF Civil Code.30
PETITIONER'S SALARIES, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Articles 19 and 20 read as follows:
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
RECORD, THAT PETITIONER "FAILED TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THE
NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT."
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall No. 1-88,35 petitioner Diaz re-filed her petition, raising exactly the same issues, and this was docketed as
indemnify the latter for the same. G.R. No. 89207.36

Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting certain standards On August 31, 1989, this Court issued a Resolution,37 dismissing petitioner Diaz's petition in G.R. No.
that must be observed in the exercise thereof."  Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the
31
89207. This Court noted the Ombudsman's findings and observations and found them to be supported
following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) by substantial evidence.
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.32
On April 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals had the same findings and held that the denial of petitioner
This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held: Diaz's application for sabbatical leave was "a collegial decision based on UP. 's established rules, the
grant of which is subject to the exigencies of the service, like acute shortage in teaching staff" It added
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind that "the UP. officials' eventual denial of [Diaz's} application is not actionable xx x it is unfair to
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from impute negligence to [respondents] in the regular discharge of their official functions. "38
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the R TC to this Court, have already established
negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant. It does not
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her application, as the approving authorities
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior found that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only the Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman,
and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.  (Citations omitted.)
33
and this Court, have ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz's sabbatical
leave application was denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be given great weight in the case
Undoubtedly, the respondents had a duty to resolve petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application. The at bar.
crucial question is if they did so with the intention of prejudicing or injuring petitioner Diaz.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially when our own perusal of the
We hold in the negative. evidence showed no traces of bad faith or malice in the respondents' denial of petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave. They processed her application in accordance with their usual
There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court of Appeals agree, that the grant of a sabbatical procedure - with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was given the chance to support her
leave is not a matter of right, but a privilege. Moreover, the issue of whether or not the respondents application when she was asked to submit a historical background; and the denial was based on the
acted in bad faith when they denied petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave has been answered recommendation of respondent Encanto, who was in the best position to know whether petitioner
several times, in separate jurisdictions. Diaz's application should be granted or not.

On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution 34 in Case No. OMB-0-89-0049 on the complaint While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave, it is important
filed by petitioner Diaz against respondents Encanto, Tabujara, and Abad for violation of Section 3(e) of to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the unreasonable and
Republic Act No. 3019, recommending the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It found no unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application, 39 and not its
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents in denial per se. Thus, petitioner Diaz's entitlement to a sabbatical leave should no longer be an issue in
their denial of petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and in requiring her to accomplish a this case. This is supported by petitioner Diaz's own action when she did not move for the
Report for Duty form as a prerequisite for her entitlement to salary. reconsideration of the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC for awarding her damages due only to
the delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application and not for its denial; and more so by the
Petitioner Diaz protested the outcome of this resolution by filing a special civil action for certiorari with prayer in her petition to this Court wherein she asked that the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC be
this Court, on two occasions. When G.R. No. 88834 was dismissed for non-compliance with Circular "reinstated and affirmed in toto."40
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad faith in the delay of the resolution of xxxx
petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application, the Court still rules in the negative. "It is an elementary
rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon Q: She did not [ask] you?
the party alleging the same."  Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the
41

respondents. There is nothing in the records to show that the respondents purposely delayed the A: No.44
resolution of her application to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six
months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has never happened prior to her case. On the The Court, however, observes that respondent Lazaro, in so doing, did not act in bad faith as she
contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical expected petitioner Diaz's application for leave, of whatever nature, to be granted. As such, she did not
leave did not follow the usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application took time.42 want Diaz to have to drop the classes she was already handling once her sabbatical leave was approved,
as was the case the semester before, when petitioner Diaz dropped her classes, three weeks into the start
In petitioner Diaz's petition, she criticized the Court of Appeals for imputing the cause of delay to her, of the semester, when her application for sick leave was approved, viz.:
arguing that as the requirement that a sabbatical leave application be filed at least one semester before
its intended date of effectivity was only imposed in 1990, long after she had filed hers in 1988. 43 But, ATTY. GUNO: You mentioned a while ago that you deleted the name of Professor Diaz from this final
precisely, this rule may have been imposed by U.P. to address any untoward delays and to likewise schedule of classes.1âwphi1 Why did you delete it?
provide a time frame for the approving authorities in resolving sabbatical leave applications.
LAZARO: I presumed in good faith that based on the letter she sent which was routed to me where she
This Court understands petitioner Diaz's frustration, but she cannot keep on arguing that the facts, as stated she could no longer be efficient and effective as a teacher and she was suffering from fatigue and
established, and which she herself does not dispute, had been misappreciated.in different occasions. that she could no longer work under those circumstances, I felt, as a gesture of sympathy to her that this
should be granted suggesting that she be given a leave of absence of whatever kind she was qualified for
Petitioner Diaz's Withheld Salaries and based on my previous experience on the second semester where two to three weeks into the course
she dropped her courses, I did not want that to happen again.45
Petitioner Diaz is entitled to her withheld salaries from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, and from
November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, upon submission of the required ATTY. GUNO: You also testified that because of the application for sabbatical leave and the reasons she
documents. gave in that letter, you deleted her name in the final list of class schedule for school year 1988-89 first
semester?
The denial of petitioner Diaz's salaries during the first semester of Academic Year (AY) 1988-1989 was
due to the fact that she did not teach that semester. But when respondent Lazaro removed petitioner LAZARO: Yes.
Diaz's name from the final schedule of teaching assignments in CMC for the first semester of AY 1988-
89, it was without petitioner Diaz's prior knowledge, as admitted by respondent Lazaro herself, to wit: Q: Why did you delete her name, will you tell the Court?

ATTY. DIAZ: Now, did Prof. Diaz ask you to remove her from [the] schedule of classes? A: She had applied for sabbatical leave for the whole year of 1988-89 and based on the experience of her
sick leave during the previous semester which was the second semester of the previous school year
LAZARO: I did it. where three (3) weeks into classes she filed for a sick leave and did not teach, based on that experience,
I did not include her name in the class list because the same thing could happen again.46
Q: Because you said you did it on your own?
While petitioner Diaz was not consulted about the removal of her name from the class schedule, she did
A: Yes. not contest such upon the belief that her application for sabbatical leave would be approved, as in fact,
she was given her salary in June 1988. As such, this Court believes, in the interest of equity and fairness,
that petitioner Diaz should be entitled to her salary during the semester when her name was dropped incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient
from the final list of schedule of classes, without her knowledge and consent, and while action on her showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
application for sabbatical leave was still pending.47 righteousness of his cause."50

On the matter of her salaries from the second semester of A Y 1988-89 up until A Y 1989-1990, the Legal Interest Due on the Salaries Withheld
respondents legally withheld such, as found by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals for petitioner
Diaz's own refusal to comply with the documentary requirements of U.P. Even the RTC, in its Omnibus Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,51 the applicable rate of legal interest due on petitioner Diaz's
Order of January 12, 1990, denied petitioner Diaz's petition for mandatory injunction upon the finding withheld salaries - (i) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, the period corresponding to the first
that the Report for Duty Form required of her is a basic and standard requirement that is asked from all semester of A Y 1988-89, when her name was removed from the final list of class schedule without her
employees of U.P. The RTC held: prior knowledge and consent, less the amount she had received in June 1988 - will be from April 17,
1996, the date of the Decision of the RTC, up to the full satisfaction thereof, is 6% per annum;
It is therefore clear that the acts sought to be enjoined [by Diaz] are in fact pursuant to the proper and (ii) from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, the periods when
observance of administrative or internal rules of the University. This Court sympathizes with [Diaz] for she was refused payment of her salaries for not accomplishing a Report for Duty Form - will be from the
not being able to receive her salaries after July 15, 1989. However, such predicament cannot be time petitioner Diaz submits the required Report for Duty Form up to the full satisfaction thereof, is 6%
outrightly attributable to the defendants, as their withholding of her salaries appears to be in per annum.
accordance with existing University regulations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Apart from such reasons, this Court believes that petitioner Diaz failed to show why she should be G.R. CV No. 55165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the University of the
spared from the Report for Duty requirement, which remains a standard practice even in other offices Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is directed to pay petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz her withheld
or institutions. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an unquestionable right and/or salaries 1) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
blatant violation of said right to be entitled to its issuance. 48
annum, computed from the date of the Decision of the R TC on April 17, 1996 until fully paid; and 2)
from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, with legal interest at the rate
But it cannot be denied that during the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988 and July 16, 1989 of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz submits the
to May 31, 1990, petitioner Diaz rendered service to U.P. for which she should be compensated. documents required by the University of the Philippines until fully paid.

Given the foregoing, petitioner Diaz should be paid, as the RTC had computed, her salaries from SO ORDERED.
July l, 1988 to October 1988, the semester when petitioner Diaz's name was dropped from the final list
of schedule of classes, without her prior knowledge and consent; and for the periods of November 1,
1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, for the work she rendered during said
periods, but upon petitioner Diaz's submission of the documents required by U.P.

No Payment of Other Damages

Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for any damages
sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately denominated damnum
absque injuria."49 Similarly, the Court cannot grant petitioner Diaz's claim for attorney's fees as no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to
 When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation
in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans. 9 They
supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument.
Respondent, thereafter, went home.10

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same
YBAÑEZ, Petitioners, took place while respondent was off duty. 11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to
be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it. 12 Respondent
vs. also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and
the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit

SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent. card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter. 13 With the
above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
DECISION anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation. 14 She
thus filed the Complaint for Damages 15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc.
PERALTA, J.: (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez.
She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of litigation expenses.16
Appeals Decision  dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution  dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
1 2

80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment.
Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez). invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between
the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon "
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item has already
been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was
Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the
Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked
purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.  Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a
4 to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall
receipt5 issued by the store.6 whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to
respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim,

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus

where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22

item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her
favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the
the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon. 8 parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other
defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive
to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded
payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by
choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not I.
take it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or
humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE
Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23 CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE,
HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
II.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND
Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant ATTORNEY’S FEES.30
Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00). The petition is without merit.

SO ORDERED.24 Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for
in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their
respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of
preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not
black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for assistance damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v.
for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
such that she would be pressured to pay.  Considering that Guess already started its investigation on
26

the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal
payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental
liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28 with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x 32 The elements of abuse of
rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33
assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our
they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37
jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such payment. It
was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she
from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and
they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them. later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of the
receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a
of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have
prejudice another.  Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
34
a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. 36
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to
well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the liability.38
RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on
their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must
from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been
proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code
which read:40
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously indemnify the latter for the same.
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt
of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
circumstances of payment, thus:
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees. Moral
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous
can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given
1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to
enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the
CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to
protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce
Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)

For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice,
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water

JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three
(3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp.
vs.
11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut
off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same
DECISION date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting
of the water line (Records, p. 160).
PERALTA, J.:
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with
modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for damages
Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing
unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153) After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
xxxx
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473,
Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice, gave
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00. The plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply,
Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation: defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as
testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD.
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47) due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did they
observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have investigated As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and derelicted
first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told them, they were in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses
negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of the water supply, Pastorfide]."9
plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them.
She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
have been very careful. x x x5 denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus: COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued by this
COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums: Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee. INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD
THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR
Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable. PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD
SO ORDERED. 6 WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY
DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows: WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
the awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF

attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants. THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A

SO ORDERED. 7 GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use of
water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when 7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

[petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE

Theresa Pastorfide." 8 BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF
 THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in the
JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH. first place.

7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the
AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
PETITIONER ARDIENTE. 12
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants before which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the present case,
cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner
the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so, claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her
considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against COWD intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's
and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her
is already barred from doing so in the present petition. request for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the
this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right
final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by
filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their previous The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA. must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation 17 is
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme instructive, to wit:
Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition.  This is13

especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14 xxxx

In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks merit. This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in
the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses' water good faith.
supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the
present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article
supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article 2219, 19 in
golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
xxxx example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation would have
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among others, that
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all 73000 are AFFIRMED.
other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in
a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage SO ORDERED.
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if
the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x x18

To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure
to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is
 actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos attorney’s fees.17

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive
Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. 18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of
the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. 19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s
vs.
party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list
was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar
counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim
DECISION
approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not
invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart. 24 As Dr. Filart was
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and
Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the
invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr.
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution 4 of the
Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each
other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr.
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the
known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13
immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, 5 he was spotted by his friend of
wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. 6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party
ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang
at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu
ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr.
Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course." 8 Mr. Reyes
Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for
scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr.
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. 10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11 In a
who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take
loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the
the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. 35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded
buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado,
Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while, she thought
bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was
that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there
within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and
humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. 15 Like a common criminal, he was
escorted out of the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
uninvited: damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the
because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42 and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). 45 On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
distance of several guests: Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in –
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and
to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good I.
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter
as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in … NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a
manner contrary to morals or good customs.43 II.

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to … HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE
have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private: SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to III.
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. … DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee
Filart is equally liable. IV.

...
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN
THIS REGARD From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.

V. First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, 53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
PROCEEDINGS celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an
actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the
being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise
seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" 47 ) unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s
refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by
48  49 
ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
50 
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. to kiss:

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet
"Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming table? How close was she when she approached you?
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable,
whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her. A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to
review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule,
however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as
she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is ...
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to
leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that – good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which
was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s done with intent to injure.66
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. 56
intentional.68

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive
it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57 conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58 innuendos and conjectures.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, 59 is not a Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states: humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s
declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
which the wrongdoer must be responsible." 60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
62 
made answerable for exemplary damages 72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for Court of Appeals held –
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and
propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to
avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the
case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of
Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income 75 and nowhere did he say
otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic
standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated
09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil
Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without
a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction
for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property; 11 that respondents, through their employees
and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. 13 Thus, petitioners prayed that

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.14

vs. In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents. construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

DECISION
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive
portion of the said Order reads:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00,
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007
let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at
01473.
the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3
Factual Antecedents
meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order 22 dated February
5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
6, 2006.23 Thus:

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005. SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO
IT IS SO ORDERED. 24
PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
25
RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals III.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.  The CA explained that the right to privacy of
27
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the THE CORPORATE VEIL.
controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of
the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. 29 They are mere stockholders of IV.
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo
reads: THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL
DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND
petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by CONSIDERATION.33
the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and
SO ORDERED.32 (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Issues Petitioners’ Arguments

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that: Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving
I. camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. 36 Thus, even
WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37
II.
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
inspection conducted by the court.39 shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

Respondents’ Arguments (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to xxxx
privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had
nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
impleaded in this case. 43
residence of another without the consent of the latter." 49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
Our Ruling elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

The Petition is meritorious. Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." 45 It is the right of an individual "to be house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
which the public is not necessarily concerned."  Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let
46
or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
alone."47 society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the
not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent right to privacy.
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. 48

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excludedtherefrom and only certain reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
individuals are allowed to enter. conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy." 53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states: expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there
is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. interest.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such reasoning, however, is
respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners. automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the hearing
property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to
camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint
to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a
petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." 55
properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is no indication of any counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all
grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
injunctive writ. respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit. and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to
merge.
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the The following facts are established:
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit. Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioner’s late
father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of Pasig City. 5 Petitioner initially opposed6 Rosemary’s
dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement
and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the which they submitted to the RTC for approval.7 In a Decision8 dated November 19, 2002, the RTC
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and approved the compromise agreement.
AFFIRMED.
Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine Torres Ty-
SO ORDERED. Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving
Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.9 Peter and Catherine claimed that they are
also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the settlement of the latter’s
estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological
child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-in-intervention in
the action for annulment of judgment.10

Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions
pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care of
G.R. No. 183788 April 5, 2010
the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided by law.

KRIZIA KATRINA TY- DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner, However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a
disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and as
far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate. They were not aware
vs. that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a judgment by
compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely averred that aside
THE HON . JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA , in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In petitioner’s opposition, it
Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY, Respondents.
was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The subsequent
DECISION compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC.

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 20072 and July 14, 20083 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007 Orders4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was no prejudicial
question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions against petitioner.
Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers11 to the petition for annulment of judgment and the there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial question as the
were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three (3) were literally purchased from third persons quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence
who represented to Bella and the latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents. Petitioner’s motion for
abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as their own. reconsideration24 was also denied by the RTC in its Order25 dated March 9, 2007.1avvphi1
This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order
to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro and Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals
Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the rights of legitimate children. assailing the RTC’s orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution, 26 the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner’s
While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in the July
complaint  for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner
12
14, 2008 Resolution27 of the Court of Appeals.
and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner and Rosemary Hence, the present recourse.
forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending
prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals. 13 They argued that the issue of whether Peter, Petitioner alleges that:
Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before the
Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable cause I
against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents.14 The
prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise agreement THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner and Rosemary CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WAS
for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to the petition for SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 3, RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1
letters of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before the RTC of Pasig RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
City.
II
On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations 15 against petitioner and Rosemary were thus filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME
Petitioner filed a petition for review16 with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
proceedings17 before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner JURISDICTION.28
and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question.18 However, petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the DOJ, 19 while her motions The petition is meritorious.
before the MeTC were denied by the said court. 20 The MeTC agreed with the prosecutor that the issue
before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for
agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. The certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. 29 The
MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 21
primary question that has to be resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance.30
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition  with the RTC of Makati City,
22

Branch 66. In an Order23 dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on the ground that
Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping does SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action
not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.  A certification of the plaintiff’s counsel
31
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition.  A certification against forum shopping
32
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement before the prosecution rests.
and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.33
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said
However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,
especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
clearly unjustified.34 accused would necessarily be determined.42 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,35 while we said that, strictly, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present:
Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.36 accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.43
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,  we categorically stated that while the petition was flawed as the
37

certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, such procedural If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.  Finally, the Court has also on occasion
38
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be
held that the party need not sign the verification; a party’s representative, lawyer or any person who determined first before taking up the criminal case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. 39
question.44 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.45
Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel. Upon
receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-compliance with the As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial
rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification and certification question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with
signed by her in compliance with the said rule.  We deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in
40
the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also
view of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling determine the judgment in the criminal case.
reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum
shopping.41 A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending
before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise
On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s prayer for a agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and
writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner. Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the
other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of
Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing
suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit: untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.
It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the CARPIO, J.:
criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case The Case
that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her
estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.
The Antecedent Facts
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 and July 14, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
criminal proceedings against petitioner Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case Nos. 343812
to 343814 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are hereby ordered On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
SUSPENDED until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 87222. frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
No costs. City).

SO ORDERED. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine
Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case
No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case before
the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage
with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
vs.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City denied subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
the motion. action may proceed.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Orders of the RTC Quezon City. Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
The Decision of the Court of Appeals was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. 8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide of the criminal action.
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision. proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
The Issue
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
petitioner. innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
The Ruling of this Court also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.11
The petition has no merit.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which
Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between the offender and the
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure  provides:
6 victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of
the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned."19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.
 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on
his monetary obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven
postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the
checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank, to wit:

Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for Dishonor

MOB 1011326 May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI
MOB 1011311 June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI
MOB 1011328 June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed
MOB 1011313 August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed
MOB 1011329 August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed
MOB 1011314 August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed
MOB 1011330 September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter4 sent on September 25,
2002;5 however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason.
Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 6 In addition, he filed the instant
case for respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions
for extension of time to file a responsive pleading7 and a motion to dismiss complaint.8

Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum

A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006

shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria,

QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant, Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the
criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.

vs.
On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied10 the motion to dismiss for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent. reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12

DECISION
Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer. 13 His last motion for his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing
extension was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22 Respondent must be reminded that it is his
declared him in default. 14
duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.23
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of
prescription15 and omnibus motion to recall the default order.16 The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this
administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
verified position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution. 17
another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 25 Forum shopping applies
Only the complainant submitted his position paper.18 only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-
367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and
In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a
respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional
disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against Responsibility.lavvph!1.net
respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to
for one year. a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The
burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.27
years.
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the
rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity disparate.28
and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured.19 Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.  Any gross misconduct
20 opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 200329 the
of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating
suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. 21 extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with
motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end,
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
his financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay
authorities.31 Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue REYES, J.B.L., J.:
of his membership therein. 32

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against
effective immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the
severely. costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Bar Confidant. The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

SO ORDERED. Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before
they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on
the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida,
she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila,
where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon
the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we
vs. believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner. consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
A.P. Salvador for respondents. Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil
to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
dead when separated from its mother's womb. severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can record, have no factual or legal basis.
not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639). The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support as the facts may warrant.
or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest
of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art.
2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in
the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,
also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does
not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only
concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he
sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
 CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)

and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union,
which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any
employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers
and sisters) based on the following:

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

vs. xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner: were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

xxxx The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between
employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
presented (e.g. death certificate). 4

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel
to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7 laborer.

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements
conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of
Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil
and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).  In a Submission Agreement dated 9
9
Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died
October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence,
Section 2 the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that
was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.  The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
10
ever acquire the right to be supported.
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers,   Replies,  and Rejoinders  to Atty. Montaño.
12 13 14
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted
to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA definition of the latter term.
did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given
the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted "company practice." Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus: death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what
was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the
employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a
must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had.
dependent must be "legitimate". Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate
legitimate. relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed: Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty- are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and
Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00 Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this
crucial point.20
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. provisions on civil personality, which reads:

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21 Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Continental Steel.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality. assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant
case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
We are not persuaded.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil
a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
death certificate. conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
"death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn child is a
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the
the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA. CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
extinguished by death.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the
the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.) Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA
which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,  we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
28
policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a
policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born stated that:
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis
ours.) When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or accord the underprivileged worker.
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1 declared:

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn policy.
child.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20
Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel. November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando
P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00),
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental
one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. SO ORDERED.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we
pronounced: