From Needs To Goals and Representations

Psychological Review © 2017 American Psychological Association
2017, Vol. 124, No. 6, 689 –719 0033-295X/17/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000082
From Needs to Goals and Representations: Foundations for a Unified

Theory of Motivation, Personality, and Development
Carol S. Dweck
Stanford University
Drawing on both classic and current approaches, I propose a theory that integrates motivation, person-
ality, and development within one framework, using a common set of principles and mechanisms. The
theory begins by specifying basic needs and by suggesting how, as people pursue need-fulfilling goals,
they build mental representations of their experiences (beliefs, representations of emotions, and repre-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
sentations of action tendencies). I then show how these needs, goals, and representations can serve as the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
basis of both motivation and personality, and can help to integrate disparate views of personality. The
article builds on this framework to provide a new perspective on development, particularly on the forces
that propel development and the roles of nature and nurture. I argue throughout that the focus on
representations provides an important entry point for change and growth.
Keywords: motivation, personality, development, needs, goals
This article presents the beginnings of a theory that aims to Scheier, 1982; Kruglanski et al., 2002; McClelland, 1987; Weiner,
integrate motivation, personality, and much of development under 1985), personality (e.g., Cervone, 2004; Fleeson, 2001; McCrae &
one umbrella. Why is this important? More than ever before, Costa, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), and social-personality de-
psychologists want to address big social problems, ones that limit velopment (e.g., Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Ryan, Deci,
human growth and well-being. Having a unified theory can help us Grolnick, & LaGuardia, 2006; Steinberg, 2005). Thus this article is
address these problems in more informed, systematic, and inte- an attempt to sketch the underpinnings of motivation, personality,
grated ways. At present, we have some powerful theories, but and development with one set of principles to deepen our under-
many seem to be isolated theories explaining isolated phenomena. standing of human functioning.
Because of this, we get only piecemeal glimpses of how people More specifically, the present theory draws on existing theories,
work and how to help them function better. both classic and modern, to show that motivation is at the core of
As I propose this unified theory, I suggest how it can illuminate human psychology and that understanding motivation is the key to
such diverse phenomena as learning, motivation, personality traits, understanding personality and development. I make the case that:
temperament, psychopathology, achievement, self-esteem, iden- • motivation derives from basic human needs, including
tity, social relationships, culture, and the impact of nature and psychological needs;
nurture within the same framework. In doing so, it yields impli- • these needs give rise to goals designed to meet the needs;
cations for psychotherapy, social interventions, and socialization • as people pursue need-fulfilling goals, they develop men-
(e.g., teaching and parenting), processes that can maximize human tal representations;
growth. • these representations (consisting of beliefs, representa-
In the context of classic theories, the proposed theory seeks to tions of emotions, and representations of action tenden-
integrate modern approaches to basic human needs (Baumeister & cies) guide future goals;
Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Stevens & Fiske, 1995; see • in doing so, they foster characteristic, recurrent patterns of
Pittman & Zeigler, 2007), human motivation (e.g., Carver & acts and experiences (“traits”)—indeed, traits can be seen
as styles of pursuing need-fulfilling goals;
• these underlying representations and styles of goal pursuit
are at the core of personality and personality development;
This article was published Online First September 21, 2017.
I thank the following people, who provided extremely helpful feedback • understanding these representations and styles of goal
on earlier versions of the manuscript: Eddie Brummelman, Michael Frank, pursuit gives us leverage for promoting growth and
Golijeh Golarai, Amit Goldenberg, Noah Goodman, James Gross, Hyowon change.
Gweon, Shinobu Kitayama, Susan Mackie, Hazel Markus, Russ Poldrack, Thus, the heart of the current theory is the proposal that as
Rick Robins, Gregg Sparkman, Liz Spelke, Rav Suri, Greg Walton, Kara individuals experience needs and pursue need-fulfilling goals they
Weisman, David Yeager, and members of the Dweck-Walton Lab. Portions
develop representations of their experiences that are fundamental
of this article were presented at the 2014 Meeting of the Society for the
Study of Motivation (San Francisco, CA) and the 2015 Meeting of the
to their motivation and that play a major role in the formation of
Cognitive Development Society (Columbus, OH). their personality.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carol S. Motivation, personality, and development belong together. Af-
Dweck, Department of Psychology-Jordan Hall, Stanford University, Stan- ter all, motivation is about why people think, feel, and act the way
ford, CA 94035. E-mail: dweck@stanford.edu they do at a given time; personality is about how and why people
689
690 DWECK
differ from each other in their characteristic modes of thinking, needs that meet the other criteria, but are in fact derived from
feeling, and acting; and development is about how these different other, more basic needs. A major problem in identifying basic
ways of thinking, feeling, and acting come into being. In fact, needs has been that most researchers have applied their criteria to
motivation, personality, and development are all integrated in adults (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Sheldon, Elliot,
many classic theories (Erikson, 1950; Freud, 1927; Jung, 1954). Kim, & Kasser, 2001; Stevens & Fiske, 1995), and by adulthood
Interestingly, virtually all classic theories of personality were it is difficult to know which needs are basic and which are simply
built around motivation and, in particular, basic human needs. very important needs that have been built from basic needs. A
What needs are people striving to meet? And how are their basic need should be present from very early in life. Thus the
personalities organized to meet these needs? Whether it is the urge criteria for a basic need are as follows: irreducibility to other
to express libidinal drives (Freud, 1927), the seeking of trust needs, universal high value from very early in life, and importance
(Erikson, 1950), or the quest for self-actualization (Rogers, 1961), for well-being and optimal development from very early in life.
needs have been the foundation of human motivation and person- As a first step in identifying candidates for basic needs, I
ality for classical theorists. Surprisingly, this motivational founda- examined the many needs that have been proposed by researchers
tion has been missing from many modern research-based person- and theorists. Second, I looked at which needs were versions of
ality theories, and the current theory seeks to redress that omission. each other and could be grouped together. Third, I asked which
In addition, many classic personality theories were also theories needs could arise from the conjunction of other, more basic needs.
of development (e.g., Adler, 1927; Freud, 1922, 1927; Horney, Importantly, I examined evidence from the developmental psy-
1950; Jung, 1954; Reich, 1931; Rogers, 1961). People’s current chology literature to suggest (a) that infants from very early on are
personality patterns were seen as products of their more successful particularly attuned to information that pertains to a given need, (b)
or less successful striving to meet their physical and/or psycho- that very young infants typically pursue goals related to those
logical needs over time in the context of their environments and needs, and (c) that infants or young children fail to thrive when
biological endowments. This developmental focus has been miss- they do not have enough opportunities to fulfill goals related to
ing from most current theories and research in the field of person- those needs.
ality psychology. A major goal of this article is to help reintroduce Delving into the personality (e.g., Grouzet et al., 2005; Murray,
the developmental foundation of personality. I begin by asking, 1938; Read et al., 2010), social (e.g., Etzioni, 1968; Higgins, 2012;
what are the basic psychological needs, on which much of human Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Staub, 2005; Stevens & Fiske, 1995),
motivation is based and around which personality develops? cultural (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oishi, Diener, Lucas, &
Suh, 1999), evolutionary (e.g., Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, &
Schaller, 2010), motivational (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996;
What Are the Basic Psychological Needs?
Deci & Ryan, 2000; McClelland, 1987: Sheldon, 2011), develop-
I start with the assumption that psychological needs drive goals mental (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Ryan &
that support psychological life and health in much the way that Deci, 2000), and clinical (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Shapiro, 2000)
physical needs drive goals that support physical life and health psychology literatures, and using this process I propose three basic
(see, e.g., Reeve, 2005). Although I recognize that psychological needs (acceptance, predictability, and competence) and four needs
and physical needs and their effects are not entirely distinct, I focus that are formed from combinations of them (trust, control, self-
here on psychological needs and their role in motivation and esteem/status, and self-coherence). Figure 1 depicts the relation
personality. between the three basic needs and the four emergent, compound
Over the years, psychologists have proposed countless psycho- needs.
logical needs, but it has been difficult to identify which are truly These seven needs are quite close to the five basic social needs
distinct needs and, among them, which are the basic ones. proposed by Stevens and Fiske (1995): belonging, understanding,
Baumeister and Leary (1995) took the important step of proposing being effective/controlling, trusting, and enhancing the self. How-
criteria for basic needs. However, some criteria (e.g., that they ever, there are differences. First, of these five needs, I identify only
direct cognitive processing, have affective qualities, and lead to ill two, belonging and understanding, as basic. Further, on the basis
effects when thwarted) can apply to all manner of goals, not just of the developmental psychology literature, I use the term accep-
ones driven by important needs. Other criteria (that they be uni- tance in place of belonging (although I believe that, after early
versal and have implications that go beyond immediate psycho- infancy, acceptance comes to encompass belonging) and I break
logical functioning) are more clearly definitional of needs, but may understanding into the separate needs of prediction and compe-
be definitional of any needs and not just the most basic ones. “Not tence (although after early infancy both may contribute to under-
be derivative of other motives” appears to be the one criterion that standing).
separates basic needs from other needs. With Stevens and Fiske (1995), I identify trust, control, and
Here, building on past work (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; self-esteem as needs, but as compound or emergent needs. And I
Deci & Ryan, 2000; Stevens & Fiske, 1995; see Pittman & Zeigler, add self-coherence, that is, the sense that the self is intact and
2007), I propose that the key criteria for a need, basic or otherwise, firmly rooted. Finally, within self-coherence, I identify two sub-
are (a) that there is chronic, high, and universal value attached to needs (not depicted in Figure 1), identity and meaning, both of
the goals that serve it and (b) that successfully attaining goals which are proposed to play key roles in anchoring the self and both
related to that need is important for optimal well-being in the of which have received wide attention in psychology in recent
present and optimal psychological development in the future. years.
To qualify as a basic need, it cannot be derivative of other needs The needs I identify are also consistent with the triad of needs
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). I argue that there are a number of identified by Deci and Ryan (2000). Their needs for competence
MOTIVATION, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 691
and relatedness map directly onto the proposed needs for compe- the ability to predict may be considered a form of competence and
tence and acceptance (although, as noted, I use acceptance to growing competence may enhance the predictability of one’s en-
denote the particular kind of relatedness infants may seek). Their vironment. Nonetheless, it is highly useful to consider them sep-
need for autonomy, however, is viewed here as a key facet of the arately and to then examine how they later come together to create
later-emerging need for control, that is, as a need to have control the compound needs. I also acknowledge, once again, that one
over the expression of one’s thoughts and feelings, and over one’s cannot draw a sharp distinction between these psychological needs
actions. and the physical needs. Both are necessary for survival and pur-
suing one can serve the other. However, the current theory, with its
The Three Basic Needs focus on the foundations of personality, is built around psycho-
logical needs.
In this section I show that the three basic needs—acceptance,
optimal predictability, and competence—are there from birth or
shortly thereafter and, importantly, that infants come prepared to Need for Acceptance
pursue them. Infants have built-in attentional mechanisms, built-in See Ainsworth, 1979 (attachment); Baumeister and Leary, 1995
inferential and representational abilities, and built-in behavioral (belonging); Bowlby, 1969 (attachment); Deci and Ryan, 2000
capacities that orient them toward need-relevant information and (relatedness); Fromm, 1955 (relatedness); Harlow, 1958 (warmth,
that allow them to pursue goals and learn from their experiences. comfort); McClelland, 1987 (affiliation); Murray, 1938 (affec-
This extensive preparedness itself attests to the importance of these tion); Maslow, 1943 (love, belonging); Rank, 1945 (connected-
needs from the very beginning of the infant’s life. I also suggest ness); Rogers, 1961 (acceptance); Spitz, 1965 (affection, attach-
how well-being and development are compromised when infants ment); and Stevens and Fiske, 1995 (belonging).
do not have opportunities to pursue need-related goals in optimal I propose that the need for positive social engagement is the
ways. most basic form of social need, and I call this the need for
Why might these particular needs be built in? Infants must know acceptance because it expresses children’s early need to partici-
how their world works (prediction) and they must learn how to act pate in supportive relationships. Happily, infants come well pre-
on the world (competence). This learning will lead to effective pared to do so. In line with criteria for a basic need, there is
functioning over time. But there is a long period during which abundant evidence that from the start infants are attuned to social
infants, while surprisingly smart, are largely incompetent when cues, recognize positive social interactions, and come equipped to
it comes to many behaviors necessary for their survival and pursue acceptance-related goals.
well-being, such as coordinated goal-oriented actions and self- The first line of evidence for acceptance as a basic need comes
regulation. Other people must help them perform these functions. from the developmental psychology literature and documents new-
Thus, part of the world— other people—is separated from the rest borns’ strong interest in and attention to people, particularly their
of the world as a special case. Infants must know whether people preference for faces (Cassia, Simion, & Umilta, 2001) and human
will be responsive to them when they are needy or in distress, and voices (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2007). Leading them toward
how they can best make this happen (acceptance). attachment, newborns (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980) and even fetuses
I acknowledge that these three needs may not be entirely inde- (Kisilevsky et al., 2003) attend preferentially to their mother’s
pendent, but rather may bleed together at the edges. For example, voice, as opposed to that of a stranger.
Research suggests that infants are prepared for and attentive to
“accepting” (i.e., reciprocal or synchronous) social interactions.
For example, very young infants are thought to be capable of
imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), perhaps an early template for
an accepting, reciprocal interaction, and infants remain highly
attuned to social interactions that involve synchrony or imitation
(e.g., Powell & Spelke, 2013). Indeed, Tronick, Als, Adamson,
Wise, and Brazelton (1978) suggest that infants as young as 2 to 3
weeks of age recognize when mothers violate the reciprocity of a
social interaction, as when they temporarily become unresponsive.
Developmental studies also speak to infants’ ability to distin-
guish accepting, supportive figures from unsupportive ones, for
example, detecting others’ positive and negative intentions and
goals (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). Remarkably, infants who are just
5 months of age can discriminate a figure who helps another figure
achieve its goal from one who thwarts the other’s goal, and they
consistently prefer those who help (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; see
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010, for related findings in 3 month
Figure 1. The 7 needs, consisting of (a) 3 basic needs (acceptance,
olds). Taken together, even very young infants are tuned into,
predictability, and competence), (b) 3 compound or emergent needs (trust, recognize, prefer, and seek supportive social interactions.
control, and self-esteem/status), each formed by the conjunction of two Finally, I turn to the issue of the developmental importance of
basic needs, and (c) a final emergent need, self-coherence, at the intersec- positive social relations or acceptance. Beginning with the seminal
tion of all the other needs. studies of Harlow (1958) and the groundbreaking observations of
692 DWECK
Bowlby (1969), numerous studies document the necessity of ma- Moreover, powerful studies have shown that infants (as young
ternal acceptance or warmth, even apart from maternal predictabil- as 6 months of age) have an astonishing understanding of proba-
ity, for optimal social and cognitive development (e.g., Davidov & bility. For example, they are surprised when a sample drawn from
Grusec, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 2005; see also Colman, Hardy, a parent population does not match the representation of the items
Albert, Raffaelli, & Crockett, 2006). Many studies also document in the parent population (Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2013; see Gweon,
the highly disruptive effects of detached or depressed caregivers Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2010, for work with older infants). How-
(e.g., Field, 1995; Main, 1983; Redding, Harmon, & Morgan, ever, over and above their sensitivity to probabilities and correla-
1990), who do not provide this acceptance. In a meta-analysis, tions, infants may be particularly tuned into causal relationships.
parental rejection in infancy was found to be an important predic- There is evidence that newborns, only a few hours old, prefer the
tor of childhood anxiety (McLeod, Wood, & Weisz, 2007). depiction of a causal event to an event with the identical segments
rearranged in a noncausal order (Mascalzoni, Regolin, Vallorti-
gara, & Simion, 2013; see Gweon & Schulz, 2011, for work with
Need for Optimal Predictability
older infants).
See Higgins, 2012 (truth); Murray, 1938 (information); Stevens This wealth of findings attests to the fact that very young infants
and Fiske, 1995 (understanding); van den Boom, 1994 (maternal are constantly extracting information from ongoing events in ways
responsiveness); and Glass and Singer, 1972 (predictability). that allow them to understand the structure of current events and to
The need for optimal predictability is the desire to know the predict the occurrence of future events. Indeed, current theory and
relationships among events and among things in your world: what research in cognitive science and neuroscience is suggesting that
follows what, what belongs with what, or what causes what. I have the brain may be built for “predictive coding” and that its basic
called it the need for optimal predictability because complete modus operandi is to generate, apply, and revise predictive models
predictability is not desirable, and people must remain motivated (see Clark, 2015). Although this has mostly been tested in the
to make sense of new and more complex situations (see Wittmann, realm of sensory processes, it is thought to apply far more broadly
Bunzeck, Dolan, & Duzel, 2007, for the way in which anticipation (Clark, 2013). As such, the evidence supports the proposal that
of novelty recruits reward systems). The need for optimal predict- predicting one’s world is one of the most basic needs.
ability is related to but different from the need for competence, In terms of the importance of predictability for optimal devel-
which, early on, centers on the desire for skills to act in and on opment, researchers have shown the importance of predictability in
your world. caretaking (Landry et al., 2003), independent of parental warmth
Infants need to figure out the world in which they find them- (Davidov & Grusec, 2006). Indeed, warmth/acceptance without
selves. It is as though they are asking themselves, “What’s going predictability can yield insecure attachment relationships with
on here and how do I make sense of it?” Fortunately, infants are their emotional vulnerabilities (particularly vulnerability to stress;
well equipped to do this. In line with our criteria for a basic need, Cassidy & Berlin, 1994). In a similar vein, researchers have made
evidence abounds that young infants are particularly attuned to the important distinction between the unpredictability and the
prediction-relevant information, ready to learn from it, and harshness of the child’s early environment and have found separate
equipped to pursue prediction-related goals from early on. and pronounced effects for unpredictability, including enhanced
In fact, infants are born seeking prediction-relevant information. stress and aggression and poorer self-regulation (Baram et al.,
In the first hours and days of life, they can learn associations 2012; Simpson, Griskevicius, Kuo, Sung, & Collins, 2012; see
between a stimulus and an event, such as a tone or human voice Frankenhuis, Gergely, & Watson, 2013). Research suggests that
predicting a puff of air to their eyelid (Little, Lipsitt, & Rovee- the predictability of parental signals early in the infant’s life, aside
Collier, 1984) or the stroking of their forehead predicting the from the warmth of the care, plays an important role in shaping the
delivery of a sucrose solution (Blass, Ganchrow, & Steiner, 1984). developing brain and influencing emotional development (Baram
Moreover, in infants as young as 20 days old, the association can et al., 2012), at least in part by affecting stress reactivity at the
be retained over a 10-day period (Little et al., 1984). This research most basic levels (Singh-Taylor, Korosi, Molet, Gunn, & Baram,
attests to the importance of prediction in the child’s life and to their 2015).
preparedness to learn predictive relationships. Animal studies have been able to precisely manipulate environ-
Newborns are amazing in another respect. They extract statis- mental predictability, albeit with respect to the fulfillment of more
tical patterns from stimuli in their environment, even when there is physical needs. Researchers can then assess animals’ predictability
no external reward or “motivating” stimulus delivered to them (see preferences and the impact of the presence versus absence of
Aslin & Newport, 2012). Here, neonates learn the transitional predictability on indices of health and well-being. With respect to
probabilities among events that are presented to them in a contin- aversive stimuli, such as shock, animals generally prefer shock that
uous way, as, for example, a stream of language-like syllables. is preceded by a highly predictable signal (Badia, Harsh, & Abbott,
This “statistical learning” represents a powerful, domain-general 1979), even if there is no way of escaping it. In fact, rats may
learning mechanism through which infants can learn about regu- choose predictable shock over unpredictable shock even when the
larities in their world (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and has predictable shock is longer and more intense (Badia, Culbertson, &
been shown in newborns using both auditory stimuli (Teinonen, Harsh, 1973). Predictable shock also appears to cause less behav-
Fellman, Naatanen, Alku, & Huotilainen, 2009) and visual stimuli ioral disruption (Seligman & Meyer, 1970). An analogous prefer-
(Bulf, Johnson, & Valenza, 2011). Thus, neonates are ready to ence for signaled over unsignaled appetitive events, such as the
extract a predictable structure from a welter of information, again delivery of food, has been demonstrated (Prokasy, 1956). Finally,
attesting to the importance of prediction from the earliest hours of animal studies have shown that the absence of predictability and
life. the absence of control can have separate effects, with both con-
tributing to the formation of gastric lesions (Weiss, 1971). Thus, range, as in studies of parents’ language input to infants and
correlational research with human infants and carefully controlled toddlers (Weisleder & Fernald, 2013).
experimental research with animals both point to the desire for and I have presented evidence that, from the earliest moments of
the beneficial effects of predictability. their new lives, infants have basic psychological needs: to engage
in positive social interactions, to map the predictability of their
Need for Competence world, and to build their competence. Need-fulfilling goals are
avidly pursued and their pursuit and attainment appear to be
See White, 1959 (competence); Piaget, 1936/1952 (intelli- intrinsically rewarding. Finally, opportunities to pursue and attain
gence); McClelland, 1987 (achievement); Fromm, 1955 (effective- these need-fulfilling goals appear to be necessary for well-being
ness); and Deci and Ryan, 2011 (competence). and optimal development.
Infants need to achieve the competencies that will serve them
well in their world. Earlier, I distinguished competence from
prediction by suggesting that prediction is about understanding the The Four Compound Needs
system— how the world works, what follows what, what is likely
to happen in given circumstances—whereas competence is about I propose four additional, emergent, needs that arise from the
building skills for acting in or on the world. combination of the basic needs: (1) the need for trust, emerging
In line with the criteria for basic needs, even the youngest from the conjunction of acceptance and predictability; (2) the need
children are particularly attuned to competence-affording stimuli for control, arising from the conjunction of predictability and
and situations and are constantly seeking to expand and practice competence; (3) the need for self-esteem/status, representing the
skills. For many years, psychologists have noted the curiosity and
conjunction of acceptance and competence; and (4) the need for
novelty seeking that characterize animals and children (Berlyne,
self-coherence that sits at the intersection of all of the psycholog-
1960; Dember & Earl, 1957; Hunt, 1961; White, 1959), proposing
ical needs and represents the need to feel psychologically rooted
that the search for and attention to optimal degrees of difficulty
and intact.
serve the goal of competence building: see Vygotsky’s (1978)
zone of proximal development and Piaget’s (1975/1985) assimi- I have provided evidence that the basic needs are present at
lation and accommodation. This desire for optimal difficulty or birth or very early in infancy. The compound needs require
novelty may be a built-in form of preparedness that supports more. They require more complex schemas or metacognitive
continued competence building over time (see, e.g., Kidd, Pianta- skills, including (a) more fully formed mental models that
dosi, & Aslin, 2012, see also Biederman & Vessel, 2006; Gottlieb, integrate basic needs (as “trust” integrates acceptance and pre-
Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 2013). dictability), (b) greater self-awareness (as in the need for con-
The developmental literature has long documented the degree to trol), and/or (c) the ability to compare oneself to a standard (as
which infants spontaneously seek and practice new skills (Hunt, in “self-esteem/status”). For example, although even newborns
1961; Piaget, 1936/1952). For example, Piaget (1936/1952) care- can exert control—they can use their primitive reflexive behav-
fully studied how, building on their earliest reflexes, infants en- iors, like sucking, to produce or prolong an effect in the
gage in the kind of practice that increases their competencies and environment (Siqueland & DeLucia, 1969)—the need for con-
that turns early reflexive or incidental actions into voluntary ones. trol may not emerge until children become aware of themselves
Clearly, however, not all competence seeking is through self- as agents (Heckhausen, 1988). At that point, they may begin to
guided exploration—infants seem primed to learn from others as deliberately, even willfully, strive to be a person who exerts
well. For example, striking work by Csibra and Gergely (2006) control. Similarly, although children can feel frustrated or un-
demonstrated infants’ and young children’s heightened sensitivity happy when they do not succeed at something, it is not until
to pedagogical cues, cues from adults that signal that teaching is later, when they are aware of standards, that they can poten-
about to take place. Pedagogical cues include eye contact, adults’ tially feel bad about themselves (Kagan, 1981; Stipek, Recchia,
contingent reactions, the prosody of “motherese,” and hearing & McClintic, 1992).
oneself addressed by name. Even 4-month old infants are prepared It is also important to acknowledge that the compound needs,
to attend to pedagogical cues, such as direct gaze or a raised
simply because they emerge from a conjunction of earlier
eyebrow. In fact, infants show the same neural response to a direct
needs, are not necessarily less important. That is, the compound
gaze as adults do when they (adults) are receiving communicative
needs may be just as essential as the basic needs for people’s
signals (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). And even 2-day-olds harken to
psychological well-being. In fact, the obvious importance of the
“motherese,” speech with the acoustic properties of adult speech to
babies (Cooper & Aslin, 1990). compound needs may be precisely what has led researchers who
Thus, infants are highly attuned to competence-building stim- study adults to put all of the needs, basic and compound, in the
uli and to signals from competence-enhancing people. More- same basket. Yet, the distinction between basic and compound
over, competence-building activities are avidly pursued and needs is not simply a technicality. It remains important to
intrinsically rewarding from the start. Unsurprisingly, depriva- understand how and when particular needs come into play if we
tion of competence-building opportunities results in learning are to understand what opportunities and vulnerabilities arise at
deficits, and often deficits in the motivation to explore and different points in development. This will allow us to further
learn, whether the deprivation is generalized and severe, as in understand when the presence or absence of particular experi-
studies of orphanage-reared children (Hunt, 1961; Kreppner et ences (e.g., of trust, of personal control) might be critical. Let
al., 2007; Spitz, 1965), or more localized and within a “normal” us look briefly at each of the compound needs.
694 DWECK
Need for Trust (the Conjunction of make or change the rules and not just follow them (Erikson, 1950;
Acceptance ⴙ Predictability) Shapiro, 1981; see Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979, for their ground-
breaking work on the emergence of self-awareness). This may
See Stevens and Fiske, 1995 (trusting); Erikson, 1950 (trust); begin at some time in the second year of life (see Heckhausen,
and Fonagy, 2001 (epistemic trust). 1988).
Young infants recognize acceptance and track predictability, but Consider the following scenario. Hornik and Gunnar (1988) put
they do not seem to integrate them into a higher-order or gener- infants in a room with a live rabbit in a cage. The rabbit was across
alized schema: trust. In fact, studies show that although negative the room from where their mother was sitting. Virtually all the
early experiences, such as time spent in impoverished orphanages, children were interested in the rabbit and wanted to pet it but were
certainly have negative effects, they do not tend to impair the later afraid to do so unless the mother was nearby. Only the 18-month-
formation of secure attachments if they occur in the first 6 months old children (and not the 12-month-old ones) saw themselves as
or so (Ames & Chisholm, 2001; see also Kreppner et al., 2007). active agents in the situation and tried to take control of it.
Later in the first year, they are far more likely to. In the same vein, Specifically, they actively attempted to alter the situation by push-
young infants are interested in social engagement with almost ing or pulling the mother toward the cage or by pushing the cage
anyone who seems pleasant. However, beginning at 7 to 9 months toward the mother. Thus, supported by growing skills, children
of age, they set more stringent criteria, ones more relevant to trust may begin trying to actively carve out bigger roles for themselves.
(cf. Bowlby, 1973). Mangelsdorf (1992) asked what characteristics Developmental research shows that when parents undermine
make a stranger attractive to an infant and found that 6 month olds children’s sense of control or opportunities for control, psycholog-
were quite happy to interact with adults who showed positive ical problems can develop (see Rothbaum & Weisz, 1989). For
affect, but 12 month olds (the next age group in her study) example, a meta-analysis of studies on the origins of childhood
evaluated strangers in terms of the strangers’ sensitivity and re- anxiety found that, of all the aspects of parenting style that were
sponsiveness to their signals. studied, parental overcontrol (low autonomy granting) was the
Psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Spitz, 1965) and strongest predictor of anxiety disorders (McLeod, Wood, & Weisz,
developmental researchers (e.g., Kagan, 1981) agree that new 2007). In these studies, it was a stronger predictor of childhood
modes of representing the self and relationships emerge at this anxiety than was parental rejection (see Hasebe, Nucci, & Nucci,
pivotal point. Both suggest that by 7 to 9 months of age children 2004, for cross-cultural evidence.) Moreover, experimental and
have formed internalized images or stored representations of fa- longitudinal studies performed within the framework of self-
miliar figures and their interactions with them. Thus it may not be determination theory (Ryan, Deci, Grolnick, & LaGuardia, 2006)
until the second half of the first year of life, when fuller mental demonstrate that parental undermining of children’s autonomy has
representations of people and relationships are formed, that the clear and consistent effects on children’s motivation and self-
idea of, and the need for, trust takes hold. regulation. It is important to keep in mind, however, that control
According to Erik Erikson’s (1950) theory of psychosocial and autonomy can take very different forms in different cultures
development, the basic task for the first 2 years of life is to come and what might look to us like deprivation of control in other
to an understanding of the degree to which one trusts or mistrusts cultures may simply be the channeling of control into more cul-
one’s world. In the current theory, trust will result when a child’s turally appropriate forms (see Fu & Markus, 2014).
need for acceptance and predictability are met, and voluminous
literature attests to the beneficial effects of warm, predictably
responsive caretakers and the deleterious effects of their absence Need for Self-Esteem/Status (the Conjunction of
(e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Steelman, Assel, Swank, Smith, & Landry, Acceptance ⴙ Competence)
1988). Several important studies have experimentally enhanced See Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland, 2015 (status); Leary and
mothers’ responsiveness toward their infants and have shown Baumeister, 2000 (self-esteem); Maslow, 1943 (esteem); McClel-
significant and relatively enduring effects on a wide range of skills, land, 1987 (power); Murray, 1938 (status, power); Stevens and
including social, emotional, and cognitive skills (Landry, Smith, & Fiske, 1995 (enhancing the self); Sullivan, 1953 (self-esteem); and
Swank, 2006; van den Boom, 1994, 1995). Tesser, 1988 (self-esteem).
Many theories have pointed to the desire for self-esteem, a sense
Need for Control (the Conjunction of of worth, or status as a basic human need (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2015; Maslow, 1943). Here, I view the need for self-esteem or
Predictability ⴙ Competence)
status as a compound need, originating from a combination of the
See Bandura, 1977 (control); Brehm, 1966 (freedom and control need for acceptance and the need for competence (although it may
vs. reactance); DeCharms, 1968 (origin vs. pawn); Deci and Ryan, later rest on other things, like fidelity to one’s values). The out-
2000 (autonomy); Erikson, 1950 (autonomy); Heckhausen and comes of both acceptance-related goals and competence-related
Schulz, 1995 (control); Higgins, 2012 (control); and Rothbaum, goals provide information about one’s merits and standing.
Weisz, and Snyder, 1982 (control). The need for control is central Because self-esteem and status arise from one’s self-evaluation
to many theories, and comes to include agency, autonomy, and (either of one’s merits or one’s standing relative to others), I
self-control. propose that two developments are necessary for the need for
I suggest that the need for control emerges when children self-esteem/status to emerge: self-awareness and standards. That
understand the order and predictability of their worlds and become is, children must have an awareness of self and then be able to
aware of themselves as agents who can be players in that world— evaluate that self in relation to a standard to determine whether
who can use their competence to take charge of situations and to they are worthy or whether they have high status. Like self-
awareness, standards for the self appear to emerge in the second feeling of unreality, or an easily shaken equilibrium (see also
year of life (and into the third year), which is when children, for Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 2000).
the first time, begin to show pride or shame after success or failure I propose that the need for self-coherence arises once the child
(Kagan, 1981; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989; Stipek et has learned enough about its world to establish clear expectations
al., 1992). for how the world should work: Violations of those expectations
Extensive research indicates that low self-esteem (e.g., Donnel- (e.g., violations of optimal predictability) may then be unsettling or
lan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Sowislo & uprooting. It is not clear how early in development the need for
Orth, 2013), unstable self-esteem (Kernis, 2003), or contingent self-coherence emerges. On the one hand, it may appear as soon as
self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) are predictors of depression expectations of predictability, acceptance, or competence are
and impaired functioning from childhood on. But does self-esteem, formed and can be violated. On the other hand, it may not fully
with its self-enhancing connotations, have relevance to non- emerge until the middle or latter part of the first year when
Western cultures? Although Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Ki- children begin to show schema-based phenomena, such as trust or
tayama (1999) ask this question, they do suggest ways in which separation anxiety. It may be then that they are able to anticipate
non-Western individuals might strive for feelings of worthiness, and experience more pervasive forms of psychological threat and
for example, through self-improvement or through group accep- not simply fear, frustration, or discomfort in the moment.
tance (see Sedikides, Gaertner, &, Toguchi, 2003). Moreover, In any case, the phenomenon of “disorganized” attachment puts
Yamaguchi et al. (2007) have shown that the Japanese are similar the breakdown of self-coherence on display. One year olds show-
to Americans on implicit measures of self-esteem, which do not ing disorganized attachment (thought to arise when caregivers act
require one to publicly claim admirable personal traits and com- in abusive or frightening ways) are seen to fall apart when they are
petencies. Finally, many of the correlates of low self-esteem ap- temporarily left alone in an unfamiliar environment (Hesse &
pear consistent across highly disparate cultures (Cai, Wu, & Main, 2000; Van IJzendoorn, Schuengel, & Bakermans–
Brown, 2009). In the current model, because both acceptance and Kranenburg, 1999). For example, they may physically collapse,
competence are components of self-esteem, there is much room for display bizarre behavior, enter a trancelike dissociated state, or
cultural variation in the nature and sources of self-esteem. That is, become completely disoriented. This is in contrast to other infants,
people in all cultures will strive to succeed and evaluate them- who experience stress but have effective strategies for managing it.
selves within their social system— but given different bases for Like many of the needs, self-coherence may be experienced in
acceptance and given the valuing of different kinds of competence, different ways in different cultures. For example, Morelli and
self-esteem may be defined, experienced, and sought in different Rothbaum (2007) argue that self-coherence in non-Western cul-
ways. tures is not tied to an autonomous, isolated self but to a self in the
context of roles, relationships, and situations. Nonetheless, there is
agreement that the need for self-coherence emerges across cul-
Need for Self-Coherence tures, thus providing another illustration of how needs, their mean-
The need for self-coherence represents the need to feel that you ing, and their pursuit can be shaped by the social-cultural envi-
are psychologically intact and rooted. Colloquially, we say (or at ronment.
least we used to say back in the day) we feel “together,” as Two components of self-coherence. I propose that, as the
opposed to “unglued” or “falling apart”: see Fromm, 1955 (root- individual matures, there are two important components of self-
edness); Steele, 1988 (self-integrity); and Sullivan, 1953 (rooted- coherence that emerge and that can usefully be distinguished:
ness); see also Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1999 (terror identity (or identities; see Brewer, 1991; Erikson, 1950; Fromm,
management). 1955; Marcia, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Markus & Nurius,
The need for self-coherence has a special status. Unlike the 1986) and meaning (Frankl, 1959; Heine et al., 2006; Janoff-
other emergent needs, which are formed from the intersection of Bulman, & McPherson Frantz, 1997; May, 1950). Goals relating to
two specific basic needs, I propose that self-coherence is the “hub” both identity and meaning may be vigorously pursued, and both
of all the needs. I will suggest below that outcomes from all may be seen as the glue that binds the self (or selves) and keeps it
need-related goals can feed into feelings of self-coherence, and (them) together.
that by monitoring self-coherence we keep tabs on the well-being What is the distinction between identity and meaning? The
of the self (cf. Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Heintzel- two are overlapping, but basically “identity” answers the question
man & King, 2014). “Who am I?” and includes people’s social roles, social categories
Claude Steele’s self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) places and areas of self-perceived competence—things that define and
self-coherence or self-integrity at the heart of human motivation situate them (cf. Markus & Nurius, 1986). In contrast, meaning
and well-being and has yielded important findings about how answers the question “How does/should the world work (in ways
people work (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008) and how that matter to me)?” and refers more to the rules and principles that
to promote optimal functioning (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Mas- govern, or should govern, events in the world (cf. Heine et al.,
ter, 2006). Self-affirmation exercises, in which people focus on 2006).
their core values, decrease defensiveness and increase openness If self-relevant roles are threatened or removed, as in the birth of
to threatening information, presumably by strengthening self- a sibling, divorce, empty nest, loss of employment, or loss of a
coherence (Cohen et al., 2006). In classic theories of personality group membership (see, e.g., Price, Friedland, & Vinokur, 1998),
disorders (Horney, 1950; Shapiro, 1965), a prime characteristic self-coherence can be threatened. Similarly, if self-relevant rules
of personality disorders is a fragile self, a lack of mooring, a break down (“The world will not function in relation to me in the
696 DWECK
way I expect or value”; see, e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Janoff-Bulman In terms of this definition, people all want more or less the same
& McPherson Frantz, 1997), self-coherence can be threatened. thing. Later, I show how, starting with these similar needs, differ-
However, identities and meanings are not simply things we ences in motivation and personality emerge.
protect to preserve self-coherence. Identities and meanings are
powerful motivators because they can give shape and purpose to
Needs Can Develop Throughout Life
people’s lives. For this reason, we may seek heightened feelings of
self-coherence. For example, taking up social or political causes Although I have focused on the early emergence of needs, each
may give people important identities (by making them respected need can undergo lifelong development. As I suggested earlier, a
members of valued social groups) and at the same time may offer simple need for acceptance from close others may become a need
them meaning (opportunities to bring the world into line with their for belonging to a larger group; a simple need for control over
ideals; see, e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2014; Simon, 2004). Indeed, one’s immediate environment may become a longer-term need to
self-actualization, in which one seeks to experience one’s full have impact on the larger world. It is also possible that different
potential and meaning in life, can be seen as a manifestation of needs gain prominence at different points in development. For
these needs (Horney, 1950; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1963). example, the need for trust in the environment, while always
important, may be paramount in the first years of life, the need for
What Do We Monitor? control or agency may come to the fore thereafter, and identity
needs may become more central in adolescence (see, e.g., Erikson,
Given the necessity of fulfilling psychological needs, it becomes
1950).
important for people to recognize whether or not their needs are
Continuing the theme of development, needs may start with self
being met (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990). If self-coherence is the
and then be applied to others or the world. Wanting and experi-
hub of the needs, is that what we monitor to gain this information?
encing acceptance can foster the desire to give acceptance or be a
If so, then this would be the master sensor—the superordinate
caring person; learning and being taught can breed the desire to
version of the “sociometer” (the social acceptance monitor) that
teach others; gaining a sense of predictability can foster the desire
Leary and colleagues proposed (Leary et al., 1995).
to provide predictability for others (be trustworthy). These “other”
How might this master sensor work? Detecting small viola-
forms of need-related goals may come later but may be evident
tions of, say, predictability may simply put people on alert, as
quite early (for altruism, see Barragan & Dweck, 2014). Experi-
suggested by Heintzelman and King (2014). However, detecting
ments by Meltzoff and his colleagues (see Meltzoff, 2007) show
threats to basic identities or violations of basic rules governing
that infants tend to assume equivalence between the self and
the world (see Carver & Scheier, 1990; Janoff-Bulman &
others: what is true for me will be true for others and vice versa.
McPherson Frantz, 1997; Lerner, 1980) would provoke strong
As children seek to participate in their social worlds they may act
affective responses, calling for restorative action, defenses, or
on this “do unto others” idea.
other means of coping (Heine et al., 2006; Plaks, Grant, &
Finally, values can be abstracted needs. That is, over time, major
Dweck, 2005). The workings of such a sensor and differences
values can form from abstractions and generalizations of core
among people in the calibration of their sensors would be
needs. For example, valuing justice may be thought of as valuing
important topics for future research.
trustworthiness as a characteristic of the world, valuing equality
In summary, I have proposed four emergent, compound needs
may be thought of as valuing the universal acceptance of all
that come later in development than the basic needs. Among them
people, and valuing tolerance may be thought of as valuing respect
is self-coherence, which, I suggested, is the hub of needs and may
for others’ meanings and identities. In short, needs can undergo
be what we monitor to keep track of whether our needs are being
lifelong development, extending to larger spheres, to goals toward
met or not.
others, and even to abstract values.
What Do People Want?
Are These Needs Universal?
In his classic book on personality theories, Salvador Maddi
(1996) asks for each of the theories: What is the core human Although the current model has its roots in Western theories, it
tendency? In other words, according to a given theory, what are assumes that people in all cultures share these fundamental needs
people’s overarching needs and aims? In Freudian theory, for (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001). However, the needs can
example, people wish to maximize their “instinctual gratification,” vary in the relative emphasis they receive in different cultures, in
but at the same time minimize punishment or guilt. the particular goals they spawn, and in the characteristic modes of
In the present formulation, we might say that people seek to goal pursuit.
balance the attainment of goals across the different needs. For For example, cultures may vary in the extent to which goals
example, they may seek to maximize the pursuit of control without related to control take the form of “primary” control (direct action
jeopardizing acceptance; they may seek to maximize the pursuit of to bring about an outcome), “secondary” control (self-control of
predictability without jeopardizing the quest for increasing com- one’s emotions or reactions), or “indirect” control (control gained
petence; and they may seek to maximize their pursuit of accep- by influencing others; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984; see
tance without jeopardizing other identity-relevant goals. At an- also Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder,
other level, people may seek to maximize self-coherence, the sense 1982). Similarly, cultures may also vary in the form that goals
that one is coherent and rooted, and in optimal cases they may do related to acceptance take. For example, in some cultures, the
so in ways that maximizes feelings of identity and meaning (as in individual may be socially rewarded for pursuing more “indepen-
self-actualization). dent” goals (standing out from others, giving precedence to one’s
personal needs) and in other cultures for pursuing more “interde- Hamedani, & Destin, 2014). For these reasons, clearly distinguish-
pendent” goals (seeking harmony with others, pursuing goals ing goals from needs and putting a spotlight on goals can be
related to collective needs; Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, extremely fruitful.
& Kitayama, 2006). Thus there is much room for cultural variation At the same time, looking at goals in the context of the needs
within the universality of the needs. that fuel them remains essential. In this way, we can better under-
In summary, in this section I introduced a “taxonomy” of needs. stand the origins and bases of goals, as well as the personality
These needs encompass most of the needs proposed by modern patterns that arise from the pursuit of goals that are rooted in
motivational theories, but unlike these past theories, they are different needs. In addition, psychological problems rooted in
organized by their developmental emergence (at or near birth vs. different needs may require different therapeutic strategies. For
on the heels of later cognitive advances) and by their relation to example, depression arising from the perception of an unpredict-
each other (basic vs. compound). I have also brought together a able (unfair) world may require a different therapeutic approach
variety of distinct literatures, including learning theory and cog- than the perception of the self as incompetent or worthless (see,
nitive science, to illuminate the nature and workings of the psy- e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Alloy & Riskind, 2008).
chological needs.
The Formation of Goal-Relevant Mental

Motivation: Turning Needs into Goals Representations: “BEATs”
I adopt a common definition of motivation as the forces that Representations Help Turn Latent Needs into
drive and direct behavior (Hebb, 1955; McClelland, 1987; Myers, Active Goals
2012; Reeve, 2005), and in this context I would like to draw a
sharp distinction between needs and goals. The core of the current theory is the proposal that as individuals
experience needs and pursue need-fulfilling goals they form rep-
resentations of their experiences. These representations serve as
Needs Differ From Goals future guides to how to fulfill their needs in the world. As such,
If motivation is defined as the forces that drive and direct they help turn latent needs into active goals and thus are at the
behavior, then needs serve the energizing (drive) function, whereas heart of motivation (and personality). In this section, I introduce
goals and goal processes then serve the directive function, guiding these mental representations.
the individual step by step toward need fulfillment. To elaborate, In some sense, people are constantly building models of the
needs define areas of chronically high value that are critical to world in relation to their needs. As they observe the world or
well-being and optimal development, but they do more than simply pursue goals, they may implicitly or explicitly reflect on the
define those areas. They also provide the energy or impetus for process: What did I do? What happened? How did I feel? What did
goals that can fulfill the need in question (Deci & Ryan, 2000; it mean? This process results in mental representations that encap-
Freud, 1894/1956, 1927; Jung, 1928/1960; McClelland, 1987; sulate and carry forward information about whether, when, how,
Rapaport, 1960; White, 1963). and at what cost important need-fulfilling goals can be achieved
Goals and goal processes then direct the needs and their energy (see Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999; Piaget, 1936/1952). Below
into particular actions. Goals themselves can be defined as mental are three simplified examples, modeled on the attachment litera-
representations of desired end states, not necessarily explicit or ture (Ainsworth, 1979), of how infants’ acceptance-related expe-
conscious, and most often probably not (Austin & Vancouver, riences over time can result in different mental representations (see
1996; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Goal also Bowlby, 1969).
processes bring the individual closer to those end states. To interact with my mother, I smile and gurgle at her; she smiles and
In drive theories (Hull, 1943) or need theories (Murray, 1938; gurgles back and it feels good. When I’m upset, she comes over and
McClelland, 1987), there was often little direct interest in the comforts me. I conclude that I can engage her, she accepts me, people
particular goal being pursued. This may be because many of these are responsive to me, and the world seems to be a good, safe place.
theories had their roots in models of physiological needs (see, e.g.,
Reeve, 2005), and goal-related behavior was simply a vehicle for When I was scared, I looked to my mother; she was displeased and I
felt frustrated and still scared. The next time I was distressed, I tried
need reduction or need satisfaction. In contrast, several modern
it again and the same thing happened. However, when I want to play,
motivational theories have been extremely interested in the differ-
she is pleased and happy to play. I conclude that my mother does not
ent types of goals people pursue and the consequences of pursuing like it when I am needy, that I should engage her only when I feel
them (see Pervin, 1989). These include learning versus perfor- happy, that people will only love and accept you if you are happy.
mance goals (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Grant
& Dweck, 2003), promotion versus prevention goals (Higgins, Sometimes when I cry, my mother comes and comforts me and
1998), locomotion versus assessment goals (Higgins, Kruglanski, sometimes she gets annoyed. Sometimes when I want to play she is
& Pierro, 2003), and independent versus interdependent goals happy to play and sometimes she turns away irritated. I never know
when I will get one reaction and when I’ll get the other. People are
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Oishi & Diener, 2001; see also
unpredictable and my control over them is limited; this leaves me
Gollwitzer, 1999, and Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001, for feeling anxious—what if I really need something and no one is there
important research on modes of goal pursuit). By focusing on for me?
particular types of goals and modes of goal pursuit, these theories
have been able to generate new, effective interventions (e.g., You can see how, based on such experiences, children can
Duckworth, Kirby, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2013; Stephens, construct mental representations that serve as guides to the fulfill-
698 DWECK
ment of their needs. What do such mental representations consist controllable or uncontrollable. They can include beliefs about
of? I propose that they contain one or more goal-relevant (a) people: People accept you or people reject you (or conditional
beliefs, (b) emotions, and (c) action tendencies, which I will call versions, e.g., people accept you if . . .). And they can, of course,
“BEATs”. These BEATs are then carried forward to shape future include beliefs about the self, such as the beliefs about one’s ability
goal pursuit. Of course, BEATs are not unique to psychological described above. One can readily see how such beliefs can play a
needs and their allied goals, but psychological needs are the focus substantial role in the choice and pursuit of one’s future goals.
here. I note that BEATs are related to past constructs, such as The subset of beliefs we are concerned with here is the subset
schemas (Markus, 1977) or cognitive-affective processing units that has motivational relevance, that is, relevance to need-fulfilling
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995), but BEATs are meant to sharpen our goals and in particular goals related to psychological needs. This is
focus on the three building blocks of mental representations (par- in contrast to the countless other beliefs that typically have little
ticularly beliefs) that then serve as guides to future action. bearing on our personal goals, such as the belief that Newton’s
Johnson, Dweck, and Chen (2007) provided the first direct second law of motion is F ⫽ ma.
evidence for the presence of acceptance-related BEATs in infants Next, we consider representations of emotions. During and after
(cf. Bowlby, 1969; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). In their goal pursuit, people can experience a variety of emotions or
research, infants saw a video in which a mother figure moved away sensations, which can be encoded and activated in the future when
from a child figure, whereupon the child figure expressed acute similar goals are under consideration (see Siegel, 2012). In this
distress. Those infants with “secure” attachment relationships (as case, their activation creates anticipated feelings about future
assessed in a prior phase of the study) expected the mother to goals, which can play a strong role in which goals are selected.
return to the child and were surprised when she did not. Those with Indeed, these encoded emotions may provide some of the value
“insecure” attachment relationships had no such expectation (and that is attached to different goals (Gross, 2015).
according to additional data from Johnson et al., 2010, may have Finally, action tendencies are representations of what you did
had the opposite expectation). Thus, acceptance-related BEATs (or observed others doing) when pursuing relevant goals in the
can be detected early, are meaningfully related to infants’ social past. These representations can include mental imagery of actions,
relationships, and can serve as guides for future goal pursuit. (embodied) motor representations of actions, or declarative encod-
In another line of research, my colleagues and I have identified ing of actions, and can provide candidate means for future goals.
meaningful competence-related BEATs in the form of beliefs that Like the more generalized beliefs, the action representations can
children develop about their talents and abilities. Specifically, include general action tendencies, such as approach or avoidance
children may come to believe either that their talents and abilities tendencies. They may also include action habits, that is, more
are largely fixed (a fixed mindset) or that they can be developed (a specific behavioral patterns that are chronically accessible. For
growth mindset; see Dweck, 1999). These beliefs are molded by example, some addictions can be encoded action habits that
socialization experiences, such as parents’ praise (Gunderson et quickly and reliably reduce negative affect and restore feelings of
al., 2013; Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013), and parents’ reactions to self-esteem or self-coherence.
children’s failures (Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016). Moreover, these It is important to point out that although BEATs are represen-
mindsets predict different patterns of action, such as the selection tations of experiences, they can have genetic or temperamental
versus avoidance of challenging tasks, and persistence versus input that interacts with environmental input to influence the
withdrawal in the face of difficulty (see Dweck & Leggett, 1988; representation. For instance, as discussed later, temperament can
Dweck, 1999; Yeager & Dweck, 2012 for reviews). Thus, alter the emotional experience one has in reaction to an event and
competence-related BEATs, too, can be detected in children, are therefore can alter the representation that is formed.
meaningfully related to their prior socialization experiences, and Focusing on the beliefs part of BEATs. Although BEATs
can cause important behavior. consist of beliefs, emotion representations, and action representa-
When a need is aroused, how do people decide what to do? As tions, I would like to put the spotlight on beliefs. The importance
I describe later, BEATs will be activated and these stored beliefs, of emotion and action is well appreciated in psychology, but a
emotions, and action tendencies will help people select among the major tenet of the current theory is that beliefs are a key part of
array of possible goals. For example, they will help people inter- motivation, personality, and development, much more so than has
pret the situation, evaluate possible courses of action and anticipate generally been appreciated. As I have shown, infants are con-
how they will feel if the actions do or do not succeed. In this way, stantly and urgently building mental models of their world in order
BEATs will guide goal selection and then goal pursuit in constant to fulfill their needs in it. However, except for a few prominent
interplay with moment-to-moment on-the-ground experiences. Let programs of research, motivation-relevant beliefs have not typi-
us take a brief look at each of the components of BEATs. cally been a focus in motivation and personality psychology (see,
The components of BEATs. First, the beliefs. The beliefs that e.g., Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Some of the major exceptions are
are most relevant here are conceptions of the nature and workings attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1985),
of the world and the people and things in it (Bowlby, 1969; locus of control beliefs (Rotter, 1966), self-efficacy beliefs (Ban-
Dweck, 1999; Epstein, 1990). Because people pursue goals related dura, 1977), implicit theories or mindsets (Dweck, 1999), and
to their basic needs, they must learn about the properties of beliefs about the world as good or just (Janoff-Bulman, 1992;
themselves and the world that are relevant to pursuing these goals Lerner, 1980). All of the beliefs studied in these research programs
successfully. Over time, simple beliefs about separate experiences have been shown to have motivational impact; that is, they influ-
or about relations among events and outcomes in the world can ence the goals people pursue and how they pursue them. In fact, as
consolidate into more generalized beliefs (see Epstein, 1990). I suggest below, they can be seen as guides to how one fulfills
These can include the belief that the world is good or bad, or one’s needs in the world.
Interestingly, the beliefs studied in these research programs fall something better? In this way, beliefs about goodness and control
along two belief dimensions: the world is good/bad (just-world can lay the foundation for how people approach the world or
beliefs and assumptions about world benevolence) and I can/ particular classes of situations in the world.
cannot control (attribution, locus of control, self-efficacy, and Some theories of personality have featured beliefs, for example,
implicit theories). (It is important to emphasize here the distinction in the form of cognitive-affective encodings (e.g., Mischel &
between the need for control and beliefs about control, the latter Shoda, 1995), schemas, scripts, or narratives (e.g., McAdams,
being beliefs about one’s ability to bring about desired outcomes in 1993), or personal constructs (Kelly, 1963), but they have typically
relevant need domains. In the current discussion, I am referring to not emphasized the motivational origins of these beliefs, that is,
the latter.) Although they are not the only belief dimensions, the their origins in needs and need-relevant goals (although see Beck,
dimensions of goodness and control are two dimensions that have 1996; Bowlby, 1969; Epstein, 1990).
been widely found to be pervasive and powerful. That is, research- In summary, I proposed that based on a history of goal pursuit,
ers have suggested that a good-bad evaluation is perhaps the most people develop BEATs (mental representations that contain one or
basic judgment people make (Osgood, 1952; Zajonc, 1980) and more stored beliefs, emotions, and action tendencies), and that
scholars have widely identified control and control-like beliefs as these BEATs guide future goal choice and goal pursuit. I focused
fundamental human conceptions (Bandura, 1977; Osgood, 1952; on beliefs, an often-neglected part of motivation and personality,
Piaget & Garcia, 1989; cf. Whitehead, 1929). These two dimen- and I highlighted two dimensions of beliefs, namely goodness and
sions are also resonant with Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick’s (2007) control, dimensions I return to later.
dimensions of warmth versus competence, with the concepts of
communion versus agency (see, e.g., Wiggins, 1991), and with Goals Are Accompanied by Online
Beck’s (1970) cognitive triad, namely schemas about the world
Acts and Experiences
and self as benign and worthy (or not), and the future as hopeful
or hopeless. Suppose that a person has elected to pursue a goal. What
Why are these two dimensions of belief so central? On the basis happens next? In each case, goal pursuit is accompanied or char-
of the current theory, I propose that these two classes of belief acterized by online acts and experiences—the thoughts, feelings,
grow directly out of pursuing the most basic needs: acceptance, and behaviors that the person actually experiences and potentially
prediction, and competence. For example, when prediction and displays during goal pursuit. (I will sometimes call these online
acceptance are absent, the world becomes a bad or unsafe place; acts for short.) They are distinct from the BEATs, which are the
when they are present, the world is good and safe. When predict- stored, background mental representations of past experiences.
ability and competence are absent, a lack of control is the result; Goal pursuit typically results in outcomes. All the online acts
when they are present, the world and one’s outcomes in it can be and experiences, including outcome-related experiences, can feed
controlled. When acceptance and competence are absent, the self back into and potentially change the mental representations
may be judged as bad or deficient, mapping onto the large litera- (BEATs) by updating old BEATs or creating new ones. Impor-
ture on self-esteem. Thus, I suggest that goodness and control tantly, as a goal is pursued, there can be a continual interplay
beliefs grow out of the most basic needs. between the background BEATs and the online acts and experi-
In addition, to be maximally safe and effective, people have to ences (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990).
know whether things in their world are good or bad and whether These processes are depicted in Figure 2a, and I propose that
they can control them. If something is good, can they make it these processes, along with and in the context of the needs, capture
happen again? If it is bad, can they ward it off or transform it into motivation, and its output. They are the processes that drive and
(a) Motivation: Needs, Goal-Relevant Representations (BEATs), Goal Pursuit, and Resulting
Online Acts and Experiences

Needs BEATs Goal Pursuit Online Acts & Experiences
Stored Beliefs, Emotions,
Action Tendencies
(b) Personality: Needs, Accessible Representations (BEATs), Goal Pursuit, and Online Acts and
Experiences
..............................Characteristic, Recurrent..............................

Needs BEATs Goal Pursuit Online Acts & Experiences
Stored Beliefs, Emotions, (“Traits”)
Action Tendencies
Figure 2. Depiction of (a) motivational processes and their outcomes and (b) personality processes. For (b) it
is important to distinguish the BEATs (the more latent part of personality) from the online acts and experiences
that accompany goal pursuit (the more manifest part of personality). All processes take place in the context of
the background needs, and in all cases concurrent internal and external stimuli feed into the interplay between
BEATs and goal pursuit.
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direct goal selection and pursuit and that result in online acts and the selections are not final and are subject to recomputation at any
experiences (the outcomes of the motivational processes). point in the goal pursuit process as experiences and outcomes
To clarify, here is an example, from research on mindsets, of the occur and new information is gained or retrieved. It is not my aim
processes depicted in Figure 2 (e.g., Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & here to specify the full workings of an expectancy-value model of
Dweck, 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002). The need for competence motivation. My aim is, rather, to spell out a motivational frame-
combined with the pursuit of need-fulfilling goals leads children to work that begins with needs and that translates needs into goals via
form beliefs or mindsets about the nature of competence: the belief BEATs—and to simply point out how the current formulation
that underlying competence is fixed versus the belief that it can be meshes with expectancy-value models and can be integrated with
developed. These mindsets then lead them toward different future them.
goals (the goal of validating their fixed competence vs. developing Thus we may conceive of the individual from early on as
their malleable competence) and to different online acts and ex- performing Bayesian computations, continually processing inputs
periences (e.g., avoiding vs. seeking challenges, negative vs. neu- in terms of their implications for action-outcome contingencies
tral or positive emotional reactions to setbacks, lower vs. higher and doing so in the context of their stored representations (cf.
persistence following setbacks; Dweck, 1999). Scheier & Carver, 1988). I note that these computations are purely
Thus, by guiding the selection and pursuit of goals, BEATs can “psycho-logical” (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958) and need not be
play a major role in how people function. As I discuss later, rational or accurate. However, with the current approach we may
recurrent patterns of BEATs ¡ Online Acts can yield personality eventually be able to capture this psycho-logic, that is, to represent
“traits,” but these traits are rooted in needs and goals (see Figure the systematically biased processing that can arise from particular
2b). I propose that regardless of whether one views personality as patterns of BEATs.
more a product of nature or nurture, chronically accessible repre- In this way, it is possible that future computational models can
sentations (BEATs) and distinctive, recurrent patterns of goal take us from the infant pursuing basic need-fulfilling goals and
pursuit (online acts and experiences) may be seen as constituting building preliminary BEATs to the older individual pursuing
the core of personality. The important point is that they are deeply longer-term goals on the basis of well-elaborated BEATs. This
motivational. would be extremely exciting. Modern Bayesian models seek to
combine rich knowledge representations with powerful inference
engines to capture human intelligence and predict behavior (Te-
Do People Perform a Bayesian Analysis?
nenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). How much more
As summaries of past goal pursuit, BEATs become models of powerful might these models become if they integrated motiva-
how needs have and have not been met: In the past when I’ve tional factors, such as the ones proposed here?
pursued this kind of goal, this is what I did, what happened, how In summary, in this section on motivation I defined the
I felt, and what it meant. In considering future goals, the BEATs difference between needs and goals and discussed how mental
are carried forward: Given that this has happened in the past, what representations (BEATs) help turn needs into goals. I have also
should I do now? suggested that recurrent patterns of Needs ¡ BEATs ¡ Online
The formation and application of BEATs can be seen as anal- Acts can underlie personality traits, a point I develop in the next
ogous to “predictive coding,” the fundamental brain process men- section.
tioned earlier. In the case of predictive coding, the brain generates
top-down predictive models that are compared to incoming sen-
sory information and evolving sensory signals (Clark, 2015). From Motivation to Personality
BEATs, too, are predictive models, only in this case they are used
to generate predictions about what will happen if different goals Traditional Personality Theories Are Built
and means are pursued. What actually happens as a goal is pursued Around Needs
will be compared to the predictive model and, if it does not match
the prediction, either the model or the course of action can be Personality theories are designed to describe and explain how
modified (cf. Scheier & Carver, 1988). people work, how they differ, and how they came to be that way.
Imagine that a person enters a situation. Many BEATs can be As I noted at the outset, virtually all classic theories of personality
activated. On the basis of the array of BEATs, along with apprais- and personality development are built around basic human needs
als of the current situation, we may assume that computations are and thus address these issues using motivational concepts (see
made of the conditional probability of particular outcomes or end Maddi, 1996).
states given particular actions. These computations will include the For example, for Freud (1927), personality grew out of attempts
value of each end state under consideration and the expectancy of to meet basic libidinal needs in the context of society’s strictures.
reaching that end state given particular courses of action. As the child seeks to meet these needs and encounters society’s
This is, of course, the Expectancy ⫻ Value (E ⫻ V) model that reactions, personality structures and processes develop. Other clas-
is at the core of many motivational theories (Atkinson & Birch, sic theories of personality and its development are also built
1970; McClelland, 1987; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; see also Ran- around needs, often one paramount need: the need for acceptance
gel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008, for a related model of value- (Horney, 1950; Rogers, 1961), the need for status/power (Adler,
based decision making). 1927) or the need for meaning and self-coherence (Frankl, 1959;
Presumably, the goal or goals that are selected, whether they are May, 1950). Each theory delineates the consequences for person-
approach or avoidance goals (see Carver & Scheier, 1990; Read et ality, and often for psychopathology, of the successful or unsuc-
al., 2010), are the ones that win the E ⫻ V competition. However, cessful meeting of these needs over time.
Indeed, before recent decades there were few theories of any- address this task by bringing together traits and mental represen-
thing—learning, personality, or development—that did not have tation within a unifying motivational framework.
an explicit motivational basis. However, with the advent of the Both types of theories have made some contact with motiva-
“cognitive revolution” in the second half of the 20th century, tional constructs, but neither has made motivation the foundation
motivation fell out of fashion. Guided by the metaphor of “mind as of their story. Even Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) truly process-
computer,” human cognition, and later even emotion, were often based CAPS theory has not tended to focus on the motivational
studied without reference to people’s goals and were often not origins or goal-oriented functions of mental representations or
linked to behavior. Thus the processes that drove and directed behavior patterns. In the CAPS theory, goals are acknowledged as
thoughts, feelings, and behavior and that orchestrated their joint one category of cognitive-affective units, but they are not given a
effects were largely absent. central role or an organizing function.
Like CAPS, the current theory seeks to embody the dynamics of
behavior and is built on mental representations, but our represen-
Modern Personality Theories Often Neglect Needs or tations (BEATs) are constructed around people’s needs and goals
Need-Related Goals and then shape their future goals. Like the five-factor model, the
current theory is interested in common patterns of thoughts, feel-

As the focus on motivation waned, many modern theories of
ings and behaviors, ones shared by many people, but it seeks to
personality lost touch with the idea that people pursue need-
understand their motivational origins and their ongoing motiva-
fulfilling goals and that current patterns of behavior reflect the
tional underpinnings and, by doing so, it seeks to offer a new
history of these goal pursuits (although see Epstein, 1990; McCabe
perspective on development and change.
& Fleeson, 2012; Pervin, 1989; Sheldon, 2011). It is in this context
that I examine two of the most prominent theories in modern
personality psychology: the five-factor theory (McCrae & Costa, What Is Personality and What Does a Motivation-
1999; McCrae & John, 1992), which focuses on personality traits, Based Theory of Personality Require?
and the cognitive-affective processing systems (CAPS) theory
In the current theory, personality consists of the elements de-
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 2008), which is built around cognitive-
picted in Figure 2b. They are the same elements that make up
affective processing units, mental representations whose activation
motivation and its outcomes (Figure 2a), but here we are talking
is seen as the trigger for behavior. about characteristic and recurrent patterns. They are (a) character-
Both types of theories capture something vital. The five-factor istic and recurrent online acts and experiences underpinned by (b)
theory makes contact with the intuitive folk idea that people differ characteristic and highly accessible BEATs.
in their characteristic traits, such as how nice, curious, outgoing, Thus a motivation-based theory of personality requires a char-
conscientious, or moody they are. People describe themselves and acterization of the following chief elements:
each other in these terms, and the five-factor theory seeks to Characteristic, recurrent online acts and experiences.
capture and codify this. Indeed, the traits identified in the five- Patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behavior that accompany need-
factor model show rank-order consistency over time (Roberts & fulfilling goal pursuit. This is the more manifest part of personal-
DelVecchio, 2000), show heritability (Krueger & Johnson, 2008), ity. Online acts and experiences are the thoughts people think, the
and predict important outcomes (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, feelings they actually feel, and the behavior they actually enact as
& Goldberg, 2007). they seek to fulfill their needs. The recurrent online acts and
Yet, as Roberts (2009) noted, experiences can be thought of as traits, and this is the part of
A valid criticism of many modern personality trait theorists and personality that the five-factor model has aimed to address.
researchers is that they have not provided a deeper analysis of the Characteristic and highly accessible BEATs. This is the la-
constituent elements that make up traits, nor the mechanisms that tent, background part of personality that consists of the subset of
elucidate how they cause things to occur. (p. 139) mental representations that are highly and stably accessible (read-
ily subject to activation), although not necessarily conscious. They
For this reason, Mischel and Shoda (1995; see also Mischel & are important beliefs, representations of strong emotional tenden-
Shoda, 2008) set out to capture the online dynamics of personality, cies, and representations of high-probability action tendencies. In
beginning with the cognitive and affective “processing units” that the present theory, these highly accessible BEATs, in the context
people develop and that are activated in relevant situations to of needs, set the stage for goal pursuit and thus for the character-
produce behavior. Their CAPS model suggests how underlying istic and recurrent online acts. This is the dynamic, underlying part
processing units that are chronically accessible in particular con- of personality that the CAPS theory, by and large, has sought to
texts can create relatively stable patterns of behavior—and thus capture.
suggests how traits come to life. In doing so, it has posed issues To summarize thus far, I underscored the distinction between (a)
that must be reckoned with in any theory of personality (see the actual online acts and experiences that accompany the active
Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Roberts, 2009). pursuit of a goal and (b) the mental representations (BEATs) that
Increasingly, personality psychologists have called for the inte- set the stage for them. Both, in their chronic or recurrent form, are
gration of these two types of theories, seeking a theory that can key parts of personality.
account for relatively stable traits but that, at the same time, can The critical point is that the same model that describes motiva-
portray the dynamic underpinnings of those traits (Fleeson & tion and its outcomes (Needs ¡ BEATs ¡ Online Acts) can
Jayawickreme, 2015; Read et al., 2010; Roberts, 2009). The cur- describe personality as well when we add the words characteristic
rent theory builds on both of these prior approaches and seeks to and recurrent. As I suggested earlier, recurrent patterns of Needs
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¡ BEATs ¡ Online Acts yield what are commonly known as cism— can be seen to reside primarily in the social needs, that is,
traits. Accordingly, this model begins to capture, in broad strokes, in the need for acceptance and/or the social aspects of self-esteem/
both personality traits (recurrent online acts) and the representa- status. For example, when matching Big 5 traits with Murray’s 21
tional and motivational processes that underlie them (BEATs in “mid-level” needs, Costa and McCrae (1988) found extraversion to
the context of needs). In the next section, I take a more fine- have a joint factor loading of .83 with the need for affiliation, and
grained look at the needs and BEATs that may underlie specific neuroticism to have a joint factor loading of .60 with the need for
traits. social recognition (see also John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). In
addition, Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, and Schreindorfer (2013) found all
Understanding Traits in Terms of Needs, three of these traits to be positively correlated with the need for
Goals, and Representations social belonging.
The two other traits, openness to experience and conscientious-
As I have noted, a dominant approach to personality has been
ness, can be seen to reside primarily in the needs for competence
the five-factor model, which argues that five broad traits (the “Big
and control/self-control. For example, both have significant joint
5”) can capture what people are like and the ways in which they
factor loading with Murray’s need for achievement (.46 and .64,
differ from each other. The theory is built around the finding that
respectively; Costa & McCrae, 1988).

personality descriptions can be grouped reliably into five general
factors or traits: conscientiousness, openness to experience, extra-
version, agreeableness, and neuroticism (which includes negative Going From Needs and BEATs to Traits
affectivity and emotional instability; McCrae & Costa, 1999). On
Second, it is not difficult to suggest the kinds of BEATs that
the basis of people’s ratings of themselves (or others’ ratings of
could lead from the needs to the online acts characteristic of a
them) on the scale items, a profile of these traits is derived. Just
given trait. To illustrate this process, I return to the two dimensions
like our online acts and experiences, these traits are seen to reflect
of beliefs I explored earlier: goodness (I believe my world is
the person’s characteristic patterns of thoughts (e.g., worries a lot;
good/safe vs. hostile/threatening) and controllability (I feel highly
likes to reflect, plays with ideas; is curious about many different
capable/confident/in control of getting important needs met in my
things), feelings (e.g., is depressed, blue; can be moody), and
world— or not). As I suggested earlier, to be maximally safe and
behaviors (e.g., tends to be lazy; perseveres until the task is
effective, people have to make decisions about the nature of their
finished; John & Srivastava, 1999). Our model also views person-
world and whether they can exert control in it. These beliefs can
ality, in part, as recurrent patterns of thoughts, feelings and actions.
lay the foundation for how they approach the world and its situ-
However, as I have suggested, an important question is why (what
ations.
are the dynamic processes through which) someone would develop
Before proceeding, I note again that beliefs about goodness and
and exhibit a particular trait profile. What underlies people’s
controllability are not the only possible dimensions of beliefs (and
characteristic thoughts, feelings, and behaviors?
may not be the only belief dimensions that are relevant to traits),
Costa and McCrae (1988) themselves wondered about this:
but, as I argued earlier, they are fundamental dimensions. More-
“Given the correspondences between needs and traits . . . , it might
over, I am not claiming that traits necessarily start with cognitions
be instructive to apply these concepts to explain the dynamic
or beliefs, but rather may often start with attentional, emotional, or
operation of traits . . .” (Costa & McCrae, 1988, p. 264). One of the
behavioral tendencies that favor the formation of these beliefs. The
goals of the current theory is to do precisely that. Other researchers
beliefs can then go on to strongly influence subsequent traits.
as well have integrated traits with motivational variables (Corr,
Highlighting beliefs is one of the things that makes the current
DeYoung, & McNaughton, 2013; Denissen & Penke, 2008;
integration distinctive. Building the theory around these
Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Read et al., 2010), but their
experience-based representations allows us to retain the virtues of
models are not organized around mental representations and there-
Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) dynamic CAPS model, with the
fore, as discussed below, do not have the same implications for
representations serving at the same time as the basis of behavior
development and change. In contrast, our Needs ¡ BEATs ¡
(BEATs underlie behavior), the vehicle for situational variation in
Online Acts framework portrays traits as the end product of a
behavior (different BEATs can be activated in different situations),
series of motivational and social– cognitive processes that provide
the object of development (BEATs are formed from experiences
clear entry points for influencing development and change (see
over time), and the target of change through direct intervention
Roberts, 2009, for a different, but deeply thoughtful integration of
(changing BEATs/beliefs can change behavior).
Big 5 traits with social– cognitive processes).
I also note that it may sound as though I am portraying the
To continue the task of integrating the trait and the social–
different traits as mutually exclusive, but they are not. They are not
cognitive approaches within the current model, one might ask:
incompatible because different traits can arise within different
What needs and chronically accessible BEATs might underlie the
need domains (e.g., conscientiousness arises within the compe-
common traits of the five-factor model? The matching of needs
tence and control needs, whereas extraversion arises within social
and BEATs to traits is, of course, highly tentative and is meant
needs) and because BEATs and traits can be context-specific such
simply to illustrate how needs and BEATs can potentially foster
that a person might be passively agreeable in some social settings
common patterns of online acts and experiences.
and assertively extroverted in others.
If we grant that particular traits are rooted in particular needs,
Matching Needs and Traits
how do we get from the needs to the traits? I suggest that we can
I begin by matching Big 5 traits to needs within our model. see the traits as characteristic ways in which people try to fulfill
Three of the traits— extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroti- these needs given their accessible BEATs. Indeed, McCabe and
Fleeson (2012, 2016) make a strong case that traits are the means In contrast to the two previous traits, in the case of neuroticism,
through which people pursue goals, with compelling evidence for I propose that the key underlying BEATs that guide goal selection
the traits of extraversion and conscientiousness. What the current and pursuit are negative beliefs about goodness and control: My
model adds to this is (a) the origins of the goals in key needs and world is unsafe and I am not confident of my ability to wield
(b) the manner in which BEATs guide goal selection and pursuit. control and meet my social needs in that world (see Costa &
Thus, below, I suggest how traits are designed to fulfill their McCrae, 1988 for evidence of expected adversity, dependency,
underlying need(s)—and how they do so within the constraints or and low autonomy). Given these negative beliefs about goodness
parameters set by the BEATs, in this case beliefs about goodness and control, what would characterize the pursuit of my need-
and personal control. As will be seen later, identifying specific fulfilling goals? Answer: The online acts and experiences charac-
BEATs can open up new avenues for change. teristic of neuroticism. However, unlike other five-factor traits,
More specifically, for the Big 5 traits I start with the focal needs neuroticism is assessed through reports of recurrent internal feel-
that appear to underlie the trait and then tentatively propose key ings (such as anxiety or depressed affect) rather than reports of
BEATs related to goodness and control that can guide the need- recurrent goal-relevant actions. Nonetheless, the literature speaks
fulfilling goals and lead to the emergence of the trait. Because, in to both. First, in the context of a belief in a dangerous world and
this process, I am discussing both the need for control and beliefs a lack of personal control over outcomes, it is not surprising that
about personal control, it is critical to underscore the distinction many of the online acts people high in neuroticism display revolve
between the two: around preventing and relieving harm to the self: Vigilance for
For each trait, the focal needs answer the question: What do I harm (Wilson, Kumari, Gray, & Corr, 2000), harm- and failure-
care about most? Among the different needs, which really matter avoidance (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Lommen, Engelhard, &
to me? In expectancy-value terms, it’s about value. For example, van den Hout, 2010), and avoidant coping, that is, coping by
what needs do people high in conscientiousness value above soothing the self (e.g., with alcohol), rather than attacking the
others? I proposed that their focal needs are competence and problem (Cooper, Agocha, & Sheldon, 2000). Second, given an
control. unsafe world and a low sense of personal control, it is not surpris-
In contrast, the underlying BEATs, specifically those relating to ing that the online experiences that define the trait of neuroti-
beliefs about control, answer the question: How confident am I that cism—for example, anxiety, depressed mood (John & Srivastava,
I can exert control to get my important needs met? In expectancy- 1999; Soto & John, 2009)—are ones that reflect concerns about
value terms, it’s about expectancy. (It is important to keep in mind failing to meet acceptance and self-esteem needs.
that low perception of control with respect to a focal need does not Most interestingly, in Eastern cultures, neuroticism (attunement
imply that the need for control is or will become a focal need. I to negative cues and the resulting negative emotions) does not
also note that everyone has a need for control, although in only seem to predict negative outcomes (Miyamoto et al., 2013). This
some cases is it proposed to be a focal need.) may be because in cultures that stress “indirect control” in the form
Let us return to how focal needs (I want) in conjunction with of self-adjustment, picking up negative social cues and adjusting
goodness- and control-related BEATs (I believe, I expect) can oneself accordingly is highly adaptive. This is in contrast to
constrain need-fulfilling goals to be pursued in ways that suggest Western cultures where “oversensitivity,” anxiety, and depressed
common traits. I start with the traits rooted in the social needs affect can interfere with primary control, or, direct action on
(agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroticism) and note that al- people and the world.
though all three are oriented toward the need for acceptance and Next, I turn to the traits rooted in the needs for competence and
the social aspects of self-esteem/status, we can distinguish each of control/self-control (conscientiousness and openness to experi-
them based on salient BEATs. ence). In the case of conscientiousness, I propose that a key
In the case of agreeableness, I propose that a key underlying underlying BEAT relates to perceptions of control. Here, a high
BEAT that guides goal selection and pursuit in the need domain is need for competence and control/self-control combines with a high
a belief about the goodness of the world: The world is good, safe, perception of control: I am confident that I can exert high control
and trustworthy (see Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). Given a need and high self-control to meet my competence/control/self-control
for acceptance and a belief in a good world— but not necessarily needs (Costa & McCrae, 1988; De Fruyt et al., 2000). (The
high levels of direct, personal control (see Costa & McCrae, goodness of the world does not seem as relevant to this trait, at
1988)— how can individuals pursue their need-fulfilling social least as it is defined in the five-factor model; Van Hiel, Cornelis,
goals? Answer: Through the online acts that characterize agree- & Roets, 2007). Given this belief, how should individuals pursue
ableness: forgiveness, warmth, and kindness (John & Srivastava, their need-fulfilling goals? Answer: Through the online acts that
1999; Soto & John, 2009), which serve the need for acceptance characterize this trait, such as perseverance and successful self-
and self-esteem/status within the parameters created by the discipline (John & Srivastava, 1999; Soto & John, 2009).
BEATs. Openness to experience contrasts with conscientiousness in that
In contrast, in the case of extraversion, I propose that a key it is less about maintaining control and more about seeking com-
underlying BEAT that guides goal selection and pursuit is a belief petence/understanding in the sense of having wide interests and
about control: I am capable of actively, directly controlling my being curious and inventive (Costa & McCrae, 1988; John et al.,
world to gain acceptance and self-esteem/status (see Depue & 2008). Because this trait is to a large extent “in the head” (involv-
Collins, 1999). Given this belief, how would individuals pursue ing fantasy, aesthetics, reflection, and a sharp intellect), it does not
their need-fulfilling social goals? Answer: Through the online acts seem as clearly tied to beliefs about the goodness of the world or
that characterize extraversion, such as sociability and assertiveness one’s capacity to exert control over what happens in the world.
(John & Srivastava, 1999; Soto & John, 2009). Perhaps when the intellect is put into action to pursue goals in the
704 DWECK
larger world, the dimensions of goodness and control become more not imply a direct route between them. Let us turn to how tem-
relevant. perament might affect personality in the current model.
Might people’s focus on certain classes of need-fulfilling goals I suggest, first, that a major route through which temperament
also represent the seeking of self-coherence through pursuit of influences personality is by influencing the mental representations
those goals? For example, people high on openness to experience (BEATs) people form as they pursue goals (see Rothbart, 2007).
may feel a strong sense of self-coherence when they are striving to For example, children who are irritable or fearful may be likely to
understand intellectual or aesthetic material. People high on extra- encode temperament-consistent affect (further irritability or fear),
version may feel a particularly strong sense of self-coherence temperament-consistent beliefs (such as beliefs in a bad or dan-
when they are active in social situations. And people high on gerous world) and temperament-consistent actions (representations
conscientiousness may feel greater self-coherence when they are of action patterns that embody harm avoidance). If this occurs,
exerting control over themselves by being careful and thorough. their temperament is more likely to translate into the online acts
Those high on neuroticism may have particularly fragile self- and experiences of personality. However, when children’s experi-
coherence, and their vigilance and low threshold for negative ences encourage the development of BEATs that run counter to
affect may be symptoms of this. In summary, in this section I have their temperamental tendency—BEATs that encode temperament-
suggested how focal needs and strong BEATs can plausibly un- inconsistent affects (such as more positive reactions to relevant
derlie common traits within a motivational system based on the stimuli), beliefs (such as beliefs in a good or safe world), and
pursuit of need-fulfilling goals. action tendencies (representations of action patterns that embody
approach tendencies), then early temperament will not be as good
a predictor of later personality. I note that in either case, a child’s
Recurrent Online Acts as Styles of Fulfilling Needs
temperament may itself elicit reactions from the social world that
Zooming out from the Big 5 traits, I propose that recurrent can feed back into the formation of BEATs in ways that increase
online acts, more generally, can be seen as styles of fulfilling needs or decrease the impact of early temperament (or that maintain or
(cf. McCabe & Fleeson, 2012, 2016). For example, beyond the Big alter the temperament itself).
5 traits, people are known to have characteristic styles of fulfilling Notice that in both cases—the development of temperament-
acceptance needs (see the attachment literature: Ainsworth, 1979; consistent or temperament-inconsistent BEATs—the proposed
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) or competence needs (see the implicit route from temperament to personality is through BEATs. Impor-
theories or mindset literature: Dweck, 1999). In both literatures, as tant research speaks to the changed contribution of temperament to
discussed earlier, different patterns of goal pursuit are undergirded personality as a function of children’s experiences. For example, in
by particular BEATs. Thus the current model allows for an under- work cited earlier, training mothers to have responsive interactions
standing of a variety of major and well-known Needs ¡ BEATs ¡ with their irritable infants reduced irritable affect and the impact of
Online Acts within the same conceptual framework. the initial temperament on children’s patterns of online acts and
experiences (Landry et al., 2006; van den Boom, 1994, 1995).
A second way in which temperament can influence personality
The Role of Temperament in Personality
is by influencing the needs themselves. That is, temperament may
As I noted earlier, I am not claiming that traits necessarily start heighten or dampen the value of different psychological needs,
with cognitions or beliefs (or any mental representations for that thus changing the probability of pursuing goals in a need domain.
matter); rather, they can start with attentional, emotional, or be- For example, children with a highly “inhibited” (shy) temperament
havioral tendencies—for example, with a child’s early tempera- appear to have a stronger need for predictability and can become
ment. extremely agitated in novel situations that other children would
Basic temperament can be seen as the infants’ personality before find interesting or exciting (e.g., Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman,
it is shaped by experiences and mental representations of those 1987). In the same vein, some children might have a stronger need
experiences. It is well known (see, e.g., Rothbart, 2007; Rothbart, for acceptance and others a stronger urge toward competence (cf.
Derryberry, & Posner, 1994) that some infants are inherently Rothbart, 2007). Depending on the child’s experiences, the focus
highly irritable whereas others appear to be more stably good on these needs can grow stronger or weaker over time, affecting
humored. Some are highly inhibited and fearful, whereas others their BEATs and online acts and experiences.
are more “surgent” and launch themselves into the world with I have discussed the effects of temperament on BEATs. The
gusto. How could such tendencies not influence the emergence of same analysis can apply to intellectual (or other) abilities, which
personality? What’s more, the dimensions of temperament bear a can influence the experience and outcomes of goal pursuit and thus
striking resemblance to the traits of the five-factor model (Roth- the BEATs that are formed. In this context, it is interesting to
bart, 2007). consider whether temperament (or other individual differences)
The question, then, is not whether but how temperament might may also have direct effects on personality that are not mediated
influence personality—and whether this process can be captured, through BEATs, as the five-factor model might suggest. In the
at least in part, by the mechanisms I have delineated in the current context of the present model, I suggest the possibility that after
model: Needs ¡ BEATs ¡ Online Acts and Experiences. I infancy, there may be no direct, unmediated route from tempera-
believe it can. ment to personality—no underlying biologically based trait or
To set the stage, I would like to point out that much of the biological substrate that simply expresses itself in behavior.
variance in five-factor traits is not accounted for by temperament Rather, underlying temperament may be one source of input, albeit
(see, e.g., Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). In addition, the an important one, into the ongoing motivational and social–
variance that temperament and the five-factor traits do share need cognitive processes that result in online acts.
To summarize, in the current Needs ¡ BEATs ¡ Online Acts This makes sense because most people care about all of the
framework, temperament is seen as affecting personality in large needs and will pursue need-fulfilling goals. So how do we under-
part by augmenting or dampening needs and by influencing the stand what is different about someone who is high on a trait
ways in which inputs are experienced and then represented in the dimension? In the current theory, people high on a trait dimension
BEATs underlying personality. Future research might begin by are seen to have more salient relevant needs and more highly
identifying the relevant BEATs that increase or decrease the con- accessible relevant BEATs, such that need-fulfilling goals and
tribution of different temperaments to patterns of online acts over trait-consistent acts are more readily triggered (or are triggered in
time. If we find that much of the effect of temperament on stronger forms) in pertinent situations, leading to stably higher
personality goes through BEATs, then this has implications for the mean levels of trait consistent behavior (see Fleeson, 2001).
causal mechanisms that produce traits and for potential mecha- How does the great within-person variability come about? It can
nisms of socialization and change. come from at least two sources: one is from “conditionalized”
BEATs and one is from powerful situational cues. First, building
What Does Such an Analysis Buy Us? on the CAPS theory of Mischel and Shoda (1995; see also Wright
& Mischel, 1987) and their idea of “If . . . then” contingencies,

Aside from gaining a greater understanding of the nature and

people can have different BEATs for different classes of situations.
workings of traits, if we adopt this perspective we may be in a
In the current theory, someone can believe that people are gener-
better position to help people develop in optimal ways. Below I
ally bad but that their friends and family are good, or that they can
discuss belief-focused interventions that move in this direction,
that is, interventions that result in altered behavior or altered affect control situations at home but not at work. These “conditionalized”
in ways that suggest changes in traits. BEATs should lead to the activation of different goals and online
What would this approach contribute to social– cognitive theo- acts in the different situations, and thus different degrees and types
ries, such as Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) CAPS model? Social– of trait-consistent behavior. When people have more situation-
cognitive theories are sometimes criticized for being theories about general BEATs (e.g., all people are bad or good; I can exert broad
individuals (their unique patterns of mental representations or control) we may observe less situational variability in relevant
situated behavior) and not enough about what people or groups of trait-like behavior.
people have in common (although see Mischel & Shoda, 2008). The second source of variation lies more fully with the situation.
The current theory seeks to operate at a level that captures the To the extent that a given situation has powerful cues that activate
dynamic functioning of individuals, but also allows one to readily particular beliefs, emotions, and action tendencies, it should trigger
see commonalities among people and to meaningfully group peo- similar goals and similar behavior in many people (see Mischel,
ple based on these commonalities. 1977, and Fleeson, 2007, for a discussion of strong vs. weak
It does so by proposing that all people have the same basic needs situations). It should also trigger behavior that is counter to their
and therefore, from the start, pursue goals related to these needs: prevalent traits in some. For example, if someone who does not
Everyone seeks acceptance, predictability, competence, trust, self- typically feel safe or in control were made to feel so in a given
esteem, control, and self-coherence, and there may be common situation, one might well see behavior that seems less typical for
ways in which infants and young children pursue need-related that person.
goals. Moreover, children may be born into social worlds that vary An important question for future research is how to do justice to
in common ways, for example, in their warmth (goodness) or in the variety of people’s BEATs and online acts without escalating
their responsiveness (controllability), leading to common types of the complexity of assessment and prediction to an unwieldy level.
mental representations, which in turn influence the pursuit of Five-factor theorists have dealt with the issue of complexity by
need-related goals in common ways. Children themselves may also limiting their focus to five large traits and largely neglecting
differ in known ways, as in their temperaments, and I discuss this representations (but see Roberts, 2009). What about the tremen-
further in a later section.
dous variety of BEATs people develop? It is possible that focusing
The key point is that, to the extent that people come with the
on common BEATs, such as the beliefs about goodness and
same needs, pursue them (at least initially) in a finite number of
control that I have highlighted, can be one strategy for limiting the
ways, and meet with a finite number of typical reactions, we may
complexity.
begin to develop theories of personality that both capture the
In summary, there have been calls to integrate trait approaches
diversity and the commonalities.
to personality with motivational or social– cognitive approaches,
and there have been several fruitful attempts to do so, suggesting
Generality and Consistency of Traits that the days of one approach versus the other are behind us. Those
A longstanding question in personality is the degree to which integrative models differ from the current theory in several re-
those high on a given trait dimension will fairly reliably display spects, but the main one is that they either do not keep contact with
trait-consistent behavior and those low on a dimension will not. In the idea of experience-based representations (Corr et al., 2013;
an important series of studies, Fleeson and his colleagues (Fleeson, Read et al., 2010) or they do not yet identify specific representa-
2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) have demonstrated that al- tions that could yield particular traits (Fleeson & Jayawickreme,
though people high on a given trait may differ from others in their 2015). As such, they do not yet have the same implications for
mean level of trait-consistent behavior over time, there is great development and change.
overlap and the typical person routinely displays almost all levels I wholeheartedly agree with Fleeson (see Fleeson section of
of all traits. Benet-Martinez et al., 2013) when he says:
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The future of personality will include extensive and detailed discov- revision. Just as neuroscientists are learning how to reopen critical
eries of the mechanisms constituting traits: how traits become mani- periods (Werker & Hensch, 2015), so too may therapists learn how
fest in actual behaviors, thoughts, and emotions; the ways in which to do so more effectively for representations.
they change; of what they consist; how they lead to outcomes; and
how they are formed in the first place. . . . Detailing the mechanisms
of traits will begin to move personality toward being an explanatory Can Personality Be Changed?
science and will pinpoint locations for potential interventions to help
people realize their potentials. (p. 673) A longstanding and critical question is whether personality is
relatively fixed or whether it can be changed in meaningful ways.
When one looks at personality as arising without specified moti-
Personality Disorders
vational and social– cognitive mechanisms and as functioning
There are several ways in which personality disorders can be without specified motivational and social– cognitive mechanisms,
seen through the lens of our framework, which acknowledges and then change can seem less likely (see Costa & McCrae, 1994).
allows for biological input to personality disorders. First, some However, when one views personality patterns as arising, at least
need-fulfilling goals may be so dominant as to drive out others. For in part, from the pursuit of need-fulfilling goals and the develop-
example, individuals with obsessive– compulsive tendencies ap- ment of representations, then one can more readily see points of
pear highly preoccupied with maintaining local control and self- intervention and change. Below are a few examples, many from
coherence, perhaps stemming from BEATs that encode low ex- our work, of how interventions aimed at BEATs (beliefs) have
pectancies of general control, extreme anxiety at loss of control, created meaningful changes in behavior and affect. In each case,
and ritualistic action tendencies to reduce the anxiety and regain a by altering a key belief, the intervention helped people fulfill their
sense of control and self-coherence (Timpano, Keough, Mahaffey, social and competence/control-related needs more effectively.
Schmidt, & Abramowitz, 2010). Conscientiousness. In an eight-session workshop, adolescents
Second, an individual may have developed BEATs that lead to who were taught a growth mindset about intelligence (the belief
ineffective patterns of goal pursuit. For example, those with bor- that intelligence can be developed) devoted more effort to their
derline personality disorders seem to have developed all-or- schoolwork and did not show the decline in math grades demon-
nothing beliefs about acceptance and rejection, to have encoded strated by the control group (Blackwell et al., 2007; see also
extreme emotional reactions to perceived rejection, and to have Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002). An intervention that enhanced the
represented action tendencies that lead them to alienate others even belief that students like them “belonged” in their school led to
as they strive for acceptance (see, e.g., Baer, Peters, Eisenlohr- increases among African American students in study time, contact
Moul, Geiger, & Sauer, 2012; Coifman, Berenson, Rafaeli, & with professors, and grades over the course of their college career
Downey, 2012). As another example, it is well-known that people (Walton & Cohen, 2007). Although the following were not yet
at risk for depression hold beliefs—such as negative beliefs about interventions, experiments that taught people the theory that will-
the self or world or negative beliefs about control—that amplify power can be abundant and self-generating (as opposed to small
the impact of losses or failures and curtail effective goal pursuit and easily depleted) caused meaningful increases in people’s abil-
(Beck & Bredemeier, 2016). ity to maintain high levels of self-regulation and performance
Third, personality disorders are often characterized by rigidity, despite having performed “depleting” tasks (Job, Dweck, & Wal-
that is, a failure to update BEATs, even in the face of repeated ton, 2010; see Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2015). These
feedback that the existing representations are inaccurate or mal- studies, whether they address beliefs in the area of competence,
adaptive (Shapiro, 1981; Young & Lindeman, 1992). Erroneous acceptance or control, all suggest that conscientiousness can be
beliefs, extreme or inappropriate emotions, and self-defeating ac- increased by targeting relevant beliefs.
tion tendencies remain in place despite the havoc they might Agreeableness. In a six-session workshop (Yeager, Trzesni-
wreak. What might account for such rigidity? ewski, & Dweck, 2013), high school students who were taught a
Personality disorders may often reflect a precarious sense of growth mindset about personality (the idea that people have the
self-coherence and be marked by patterns of behavior that serve potential to grow and improve) and its application to peer conflicts
urgent immediate needs, often at the expense of longer-term goals showed a marked decrease in aggression and a marked increase in
and perhaps at the cost of attaining the skills that would allow prosocial, empathic behavior. These changes endured until the end
effective pursuit of longer-term goals. Nonetheless, it may be very of the school year, 3 months later. Such findings lend credence to
threatening to give up BEATs and need-related goals that, however the idea that agreeableness arises from the fundamental beliefs we
costly, have worked to preserve the fragile self-coherence. This hold about people as potentially good.
would require people to give up beliefs that organize their world, Neuroticism/negative affectivity. In research by Miu and
to withstand highly aversive emotions, and to revise action patterns Yeager (2015), entering high school students were taught a growth
that have provided a degree of satisfaction or relief. mindset about personality, which, again, emphasized people’s
In the future, it might be possible to understand which needs and potential to grow and improve over time. When students were
representations a given disorder is based in, that is, whether it is a assessed 9 months later, the intervention had substantially reduced
disorder based in maladaptive BEATs relating to acceptance, pre- the incidence of clinically significant levels of depressive symp-
diction, competence, trust, control/self-control, self-esteem, iden- toms, compared with control participants. A related study showed
tity or meaning (see Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). This relatively long-term decreases in stress among adolescents (Yeager
could lead to therapies that are more specifically targeted at et al., 2014).
need-related representations and goals in the area in question. Openness to experience. Although they are not interventions,
Indeed, therapy is about updating BEATs— opening them up to studies from our lab demonstrate the possibility of enhancing
openness to experience. Our experiments on praise show that leads naturally to a consideration of development. For that reason,
“process praise” (for hard work, strategies, etc.), as opposed to I have addressed developmental issues throughout. Here, I would
“person praise” (for intelligence or ability), can increase students’ like to focus on two issues that are key to understanding develop-
desire for intellectual challenge, an aspect of openness to experi- ment and that the current theory can shed light on: What propels
ence (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Indeed, in a longitudinal study, development? And what are the (intertwined) roles of nature and
mothers who gave more process praise (as a proportion of total nurture in development?
praise) to their toddlers had children who showed higher levels of What propels development? Earlier, I argued that infant
intellectual challenge-seeking 5 years later (Gunderson et al., preparedness, in the form of readiness to attend to and learn
2013). from need-relevant cues, provides evidence for the basic-ness
It is important to note that there has been increasing evidence of of certain needs. That is, the fact that infants are born with the
measurable change in Big 5 traits over time and with experience ability to pursue prediction, acceptance, and competence needs
(Roberts et al., 2017; Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; speaks to their critical role. Here, I propose that needs and
Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003; Roberts & Mroczek,
preparedness provide the engine for development. From the
2008), much of it from researchers who work within the five-factor

start there is a powerful motivational system (needs), accom-
tradition. It is even more important to note that researchers within

panied by extensive preparedness, which together foster the
this tradition have begun to create interventions that are successful
pursuit of goals and the formation of BEATs, pushing devel-
in altering such traits as openness to experience and conscientious-
opment forward.
ness (Jackson, Hill, Payne, Roberts, & Stine-Morrow, 2012; see
Magidson, Roberts, Collado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 2014). For ex- I further argue that preparedness is so extensive that little else
ample, in a study by Jackson et al. (2012), older adults who were needs to be built in (aside from biological maturation), and that
given 12 weeks of training in inductive reasoning, supplemented therefore after early infancy much of development is about learn-
by crosswords and Sudoku, reported increasing openness to expe- ing and experience. This experience is, of course, filtered through
rience, as indexed by greater openness to and enjoyment of cog- the child’s temperament (or their genotype) and is shaped by the
nitively engaging activities. child’s social and cultural environment.
In contrast to our more top-down approach of changing beliefs BEATs provide a roadmap. I have just suggested that infants
to change behavior, such studies have typically taken a bottom-up come with a powerful motivational system and extensive prepared-
approach, in which specific activities or actions are trained, and ness, and that the two combine to propel the pursuit of goals and
changes in reported traits follow suit over time. This is entirely the formation of BEATs. These BEATs then guide future devel-
consistent with our model, in which personality patterns are fos- opment.
tered by stored beliefs, emotions, and action tendencies. Change We may see the infant’s job as trying to answer the question:
can be induced by changing any of these three types of represen- How can I best fulfill my needs within my world? And we may see
tations. It may also be the case that changing one type of repre- BEATs as proposing potential answers to this question. BEATs, by
sentation will often change others. Thus the Jackson et al. (2012) embodying children’s understanding of whether, when, and how
intervention addressed the behavioral level, but could well have their need-fulfilling goals can be met, provide a roadmap of the
also changed people’s beliefs and emotions with respect to cogni- world and how to function in it.
tively engaging activities. In summary, I have proposed that per- Now, almost everyone should have roughly similar representa-
sonality takes the form of distinctive, recurrent patterns of Needs tion in some domains, domains in which there are universal phys-
¡ BEATs ¡ Online Acts, that these may be manifest as person- ical or social phenomena (e.g., gravity; the fact that other people
ality traits, that personality disorders may fruitfully be viewed have beliefs and desires). People should look less similar to each
through this lens, and that this approach provides many avenues other in other domains, ones in which experiences vary more from
for meaningful personality change. person to person (e.g., the dependability of other people). In the
I have focused on two modern theories of personality, one built
latter case, some roadmaps may turn out to be better than others.
around traits and one build around dynamic cognitive-affective
Although many may be accurate representations of the world the
processing units, because these two theories are highly prominent
child lives in, they may not all serve the child well in the larger
and have often been seen as being in conflict with each other. The
world over time.
current theory attempts to suggest a larger, motivation-based
For instance, if the child’s needs for acceptance, predictabil-
framework within which these theories (and others) might fit and
within which they might be integrated. In doing so, it honors the ity, competence, trust, control or self-esteem are not met, then
prescience of David McClelland, the distinguished motivation and children may develop BEATs that accurately reflect their cur-
personality psychologist. McClelland (1951) proposed that under- rent world but that can impair optimal need fulfillment in the
standing personality requires an understanding of three things: larger world in the longer run. In terms of the five-factor traits,
dynamic motives or needs, cognitive schemas, and stylistic traits. the child may not be as curious about the world and open to
The current theory contains all three in the form of needs, BEATs, experience; may not self-regulate well or believe that consci-
and recurrent patterns of online acts. entiousness will pay off; may not trust or move comfortably
among people (low agreeableness or extraversion); and may be
high on negative affect or neuroticism. Of course, as I noted
More About Development
earlier, all of these BEATs and the online acts they foster may
The idea that personality grows up around needs and, impor- be specific to particular contexts rather than general across
tantly, involves the formation of mental representations over time contexts.
708 DWECK
The Nature and Nurture of BEATs fascinating to understand the effects of genotype or tempera-
ment on personality in terms of their effects on the formation of
Developmental psychologists, among others, have always been BEATs over the course of development. Moreover, it would be
vitally concerned with issues of nature (what is built in) and fascinating to integrate the effects of genotype or temperament
nurture (environment, experience, socialization). The current the- into a Bayesian computational model, showing how different
ory provides a good opportunity to understand the workings of genotypes or temperaments change the probability of experi-
nature and nurture as they affect the formation of BEATs. Of encing and representing an event in a given way, thus shaping
course, nature and nurture are interactive and inextricable, but for the formation of BEATs and, through them, online acts and
the sake of clarity I temporarily treat them as two sources of experiences.
influence that feed into the developing BEATs. The influence of nurture. I argue that many developmental
I have proposed that preparedness and needs are built in, but psychologists, not coming from a motivational perspective, under-
much of the rest is constructed through experience pursuing needs estimate the power of what is built in from the start. When they pay
in the world. This makes sense for us as humans. After initial insufficient attention to powerful built-in processes— extensive
preparedness, it makes sense to have powerful mental and moti- preparedness to learn combined with strong needs—they may not
vational equipment that you can use to learn about your world, the understand the child’s tremendous potential to learn and they may
world you’re actually in, rather than having specific built-in instead keep invoking a host of different innate mechanisms over
knowledge or behavior patterns that fit some preimagined, hypo- time to explain new developments. In this way, when skills or
thetical world. knowledge emerge after a few months or even a year or two of life,
The influence of nature: Needs, preparedness, maturation, this “early emergence” is often seen as evidence that the behavior
genotype, and temperament. I have already mentioned two or knowledge is built. They do not see how the child could
important classes of nature-related factors: (1) built-in prepared- otherwise have arrived at this point.
ness (e.g., heightened attention to need-related cues; early emo- A second factor that may lead developmental psychologists to
tional reactions to and reward values of need-related events and underestimate the role of nurture relates to their understanding of
outcomes; early representational and inferential abilities) and (2) socialization. Some researchers have a narrow view of socializa-
needs (motivation to use these prepared abilities to fulfill needs). tion as consisting of adults directly and deliberately teaching
I have also suggested how they can combine to propel develop- children. They may fail to recognize the vast socialization oppor-
ment. tunities that are presented to infants and young children as a matter
Biological maturation is another class of nature-based factors. of course in everyday life, quite apart from any explicit teaching
Changing hormones or brain maturation can affect the experience (Brownell, 2016). Nurture as depicted in the current theory also
of needs and the development of BEATs. For example, adoles- includes children’s experience observing the world, acting on it,
cence may be a time when certain needs, such as the need for and thereby learning about it using their admirable inferential and
status, become particularly strong and thereby provide opportuni- representational abilities (see Ruble, 1987, for a discussion of
ties to build powerful new BEATs (see, e.g., Blakemore & Mills, self-socialization). Moreover, because most researchers are not
2014; Giedd et al., 1999). coming from a motivational perspective, they may fail to under-
A third class of nature-based factors involves genotype or the stand the strong impetus infants have from the very start to learn
genetic aspects of temperament. Although the present theory about their worlds in these ways.
accords a large role to experience, it is by no means assumed As an example, when seeing altruism in 14- to 16-month-olds,
that all children who have the same input or outcomes will form researchers have claimed that adults have not socialized it, that it
the same BEATs. Rather, the child’s genotype or temperament emerges too early to have been learned, and that therefore it must
can affect how information from the world is experienced and be innate (e.g., Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Yet children of this
represented, based on, for example, what emotions an event age have had many instances of being helped by others or observ-
evokes, how an event is weighted, and how it is integrated with ing adults help others. Moreover, our research suggests that the
other events. For example, if a child’s genotype or temperament level of altruism in children this young is high chiefly when certain
fosters selective attention to negative information (see, e.g., social cues are present (Barragan & Dweck, 2014). These are cues
Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), this could more readily lead to like reciprocal play, cues that establish the adult as a person who
beliefs about the world as bad or threatening, along with more is predictable, accepts you, and therefore can be trusted. Parallel
anxiety-laden emotion representations and more avoidant action play, even when it is similarly friendly, does not achieve the same
tendencies. As discussed earlier, the child’s genotype or tem- result. Thus not only does it become more plausible that altruism,
perament may also affect the relative strength of the different rather than emerging naturally, may have a socialization compo-
needs, prompting the child to favor need-fulfilling goals in nent, but it looks as though children little more than one year of
particular domains. age have clear beliefs about whether and when it should be
Thus different children may be biased to attend to different displayed.
events, seek different experiences, weight the same experiences In the present view, not only are young children capable of
differently, or perhaps be differentially likely to update their forming BEATs based on their need-relevant experiences, but it is
BEATs based on new input. In this way, children with different imperative for them to do so (cf. Gopnik et al., 1999). What could
genotypes or temperaments who have received a similar mix of be more pressing for them than to form beliefs, anticipatory
responsiveness and unresponsiveness from a parent may come emotions, and action patterns that reflect the world they are in and
to different conclusions about whether the world is a good place that can enhance the probability of having their needs met in that
and whether the parent is trustworthy or not. It would be world?
If preparedness, the needs, and the development of BEATs are 2015), prejudice (Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012), and empathy
universal, as I propose, where does culture fit in? Culture can be (Schumann, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014) have been show to affect a
viewed as the systematic nurture of BEATs. A culture, as embod- variety of important outcomes, such as the emergence of depres-
ied by caretakers, may put the emphasis on certain needs and may sion (Miu & Yeager, 2015) and the display of empathy in difficult
react positively or negatively to certain types of need-fulfilling situations (Schumann et al., 2014).
goals or certain means of pursuing them. In this way, cultural Many different beliefs are suggested by the dimensions of
differences in motivation and personality, which may appear to goodness and control that I have highlighted: my world is good,
emerge naturally and spontaneously, may in fact be a result of the safe, or fair (or not), the people in my world are good or trustwor-
systematic development of BEATs. These BEATs are constructed thy (or not), I am good or worthy (or not), I can control my
as the child observes others in the culture and as the child pursues outcomes, other people can control what happens, people can
need-fulfilling goals and meets with reactions from the agents of influence the character of the world, the world determines personal
the culture. outcomes, and so on (cf. Bandura, 1977; Beck, 1970; Lerner, 1980;
In summary, nature can propel development and can turn the Rotter, 1966). Each of these beliefs can be more fine-grained (e.g.,
dial to certain settings, increasing the volume on particular needs examining different aspects of goodness, such as warmth vs.
or changing the experience of certain inputs. However, experience dependability), context-specific (e.g., certain groups of people are
provides the input from which the BEATs are built and through good, but others are not) or need-specific (e.g., I can influence my
which further development takes place. outcomes when it comes to competence, but not when it comes to
In this section, I suggested that, from birth, extensive prepared- acceptance). Some of these beliefs have been well studied, but
ness combines with basic needs to foster the formation of BEATs others (the extent to which people can change the character of the
and propel development forward. I then turned to a consideration world; the belief in fate or destiny) could use much more explo-
of nature and nurture, and suggested that the tendency to under- ration.
estimate early nature, particularly needs and preparedness, can Further, there can be beliefs about how to control outcomes or
lead people to underestimate the power of nurture in later devel- how to reach need-fulfilling goals: What brings acceptance? What
opment. brings status? Different answers to these questions can lead to very
different patterns of behavior. For example, the belief that you will
A Research Agenda be accepted if you are acquiescent is quite different from the belief
that you will be accepted if you are assertive.
The current theory is intended to point the way toward a syn-
All of these beliefs can have implications for intervention and
thesis of motivation, personality and development. However, the-
change. If people’s theories about the nature and working of the
ories must also point the way toward future research.
world have important consequences for their behavior, then
helping them shape these beliefs can foster changes they desire.
Personality: Motivation Is the Basis of Personality Starting with online acts and experiences. Conversely, re-
searchers can start with important patterns of acts and experi-
Researchers in personality psychology must recognize the mo-
ences (traits) and test hypotheses about the underlying BEATs
tivational basis of personality. That is, the answer to the question
“Why do people exhibit different patterns of behavior to differing and goals. I have proposed that Big 5 traits can be understood
degrees?” is a motivational one: because they may have different in terms of BEATs, among them beliefs about goodness and
levels of needs, different highly accessible BEATs, and different control in particular need areas. These are tentative suggestions
goals that they pursue in characteristic ways. This perspective that can be further developed. Moreover, all kinds of acts and
organizes past research and in doing so suggests future directions experiences are folded into each of these traits and they may
for personality research. need to be unpacked to more fully understand the underlying
Identifying new BEATs. Researchers can identify new BEATs and their implications for change. For example, many
BEATs that are relevant to motivation and personality, such as different acts and experiences are folded into the Big 5 trait of
potentially important but unstudied beliefs. They can then test neuroticism, such as depressive affect, anxiety, hostility, im-
hypotheses about the patterns of acts and experiences (traits) that pulsiveness, and dependence. It may be that different BEATs
these BEATs produce. In this endeavor, initial correlational work breed these different types of actions and experiences, and
can be followed by experimental research in which the candidate unpacking them can help us understand and change them.
BEAT is induced in order to determine its causal role in producing This kind of analysis can be done with any important pattern
the predicted “trait.” of acts and experiences. Let us take the “trait” of self-control,
This has been done for mindsets about intelligence, that is, which is often critical to sustaining goal pursuit and which has
beliefs about the controllability of intellectual ability. Here, mea- often been seen as an ability or as a rather fixed property of
sures of fixed versus growth mindsets were used to predict patterns individuals (de Ridder et al., 2012). Yet, recent research has
of achievement behavior (e.g., challenge-seeking, resilience) and uncovered a series of beliefs that reliably contribute to the level
outcomes (e.g., task performance, grades; see Blackwell et al., of self-control people exhibit. These include the belief that
2007, Study 1). Further, manipulations of the mindsets established self-control is abundant and self-generating rather than highly
their causal role in producing these kinds of behaviors and out- limited and easily depleted (Job et al., 2010); that the world and
comes (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007, Study 2). Finally, this type of the people in it are reliable (e.g., Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013);
belief has been fruitfully studied for different human attributes. For and that the resources you have access to are plentiful rather
example, mindsets about control over personality (Miu & Yeager, than scarce (Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2013). There are likely to
710 DWECK
be other important BEATs that contribute to self-regulation and not often been studied in terms of the BEATs these practices
each will have important implications. foster in children. In the same vein, the effects of negative life
Similarly, pro-social behavior—although thought by some to be events on children’s well-being has been studied but they have
natural or innate in its origins—is often considered to be a stable not often enough been studied in terms of the BEATs these
individual difference later (see Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, events may promote. Yet research suggests that the particular
& Speer, 1991). Yet, research has revealed underlying beliefs that BEATs that ensue, whether they are beliefs, emotional tenden-
reliably influence pro-social behavior. These include perceptions cies, or behavioral tendencies, may be key to subsequent well-
of benevolence based on experiences of reciprocity (Barragan & being (e.g., Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 2002; Grych, Jouriles,
Dweck, 2014), the tendency to believe that others’ negative acts Swank, McDonald, & Norwood, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Gir-
toward us are not purposeful (Dodge & Frame, 1982), and the gus, & Seligman, 1992). The goal, then, is to identify core
belief that negative actors do not have fixed personalities (Yeager BEATs that play a role in optimal development and the factors
et al., 2011). Moreover, changes in these beliefs can bring about that promote them.
changes in patterns of behavior (e.g., Yeager et al., 2013). Again, Temperament as motivational input. As noted earlier, tem-
there are likely to be many more BEATs that play a key role in perament is undoubtedly a contributor to personality and its
fostering pro-social behavior or reducing interpersonal aggression. development. However, in the current view temperament is an
In fact, virtually any important pattern of acts and experiences will input to motivation and a contributor to the formation of
have underlying BEATs that can be fruitfully identified and sys- BEATs. That is, temperament can be seen as influencing the
tematically explored. weights of different needs or as inclining children toward
Personality disorders. The study of personality disorders is, certain affects or action tendencies, thereby shaping the forma-
in important ways, the study of BEATs gone awry. Examples tion of BEATs. This view fosters research that brings life to
include exaggerated beliefs about the danger of the world, too- temperament and environment as interactive contributors to the
rapid triggering of extreme emotions, and exaggerated approach formation of BEATs and thereby as shapers of personality.
(impulsive) or avoidance (withdrawal) tendencies. These BEATs
may also be overly rigid and impermeable to meaningful new
Mechanisms of Motivated Model Building
experiences or, on the other hand, overly unstable such that each
new experience overrides past ones, creating a roller coaster of Merging learning theory and cognitive psychology with
self-esteem, trust, or feelings of control. social-personality and development psychology. First, there
A continuing task for the field, building on the monumental was the precognitive behaviorist era (learning theory) and then
contributions of Aaron Beck and his colleagues (e.g., Beck et al., there was the postbehaviorist cognitive era. Clearly, both asso-
2001), is to identify through research the BEATs that accompany ciative mechanisms and higher level cognitive mechanisms are
or underlie particular disorders and to test targeted ways of influ- important, but the two have not been well integrated into social,
encing those BEATs. The two dimensions of perceptions of good- personality, and developmental psychology. Attempts are being
ness and control— considered in relation to self, others and the made within neuroscience and computation modeling to bring
world and in relation to the different needs— can provide an initial together different forms of learning to better understand how
framework for understanding the many ways in which BEATs can people build models of their world to guide their action (Taat-
go awry. gen & Anderson, 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). The current
theory accords a place to all forms of learning. Classical con-
ditioning and operant/instrumental conditioning, along with
Development
observational and statistical learning (in which no clear reward
Development as motivated model building. The study of is present), can provide input for the higher-order mental mod-
social-personality development must recognize that children, els of the world that children and adults construct. I look
based on their observations and the outcomes of their goal forward to motivationally informed computational models that
pursuit, are building models of the world that guide their capture these processes as they contribute to personality and its
behavior. To date, however, much socialization research has development.
consisted of large correlational studies, often examining the
effects of social or environmental factors on children’s out-
Summary and Conclusion
comes (e.g., aggression, achievement) with little analysis of
intervening psychological processes (see Olson & Dweck, I have proposed the beginnings of an integrative theory in the
2008). According to the current theory, examining the BEATs expansive old-fashioned vein that seeks to unite motivation,
that children build is paramount if we are to truly understand personality and development within one framework. Broadly
social-personality development. I have highlighted attachment speaking, I began by proposing a set of core psychological
models and mindsets as BEATs that guide children’s behavior, needs. I then suggested how mental representations (BEATs)
but, as described above, there are many others and, again, grow up around those needs as people pursue need-fulfilling
perceptions of goodness and control in the context of needs can goals. These mental representations shape motivation (by play-
serve as a point of departure. ing a role in goal selection and pursuit) and form the basis of
It is also critical to study the impact of different experiences personality (by creating characteristic, recurrent patterns of acts
or rearing practices on BEATs. For example, the effects of and experiences). I showed how different approaches to per-
authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive parental practices sonality could be integrated within this framework and I exam-
have been extensively studied (Baumrind, 1966), but they have ined its implications for development, personality disorders,
and personality change. I ended with an agenda for future Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral
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Solodkin, A., & Stern, H. (2012). Fragmentation and unpredictability of
In closing, I note that I have never recognized boundaries
early-life experience in mental disorders. The American Journal of
between areas of psychology. They have always seemed some-
Psychiatry, 169, 907–915. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2012
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From Needs To Goals and Representations

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Psychological Review © 2017 American Psychological Association

2017, Vol. 124, No. 6, 689 –719 0033-295X/17/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000082

From Needs to Goals and Representations: Foundations for a Unified

Keywords: motivation, personality, development, needs, goals

The Formation of Goal-Relevant Mental

current theory is interested in common patterns of thoughts, feel-

respectively; Costa & McCrae, 1988).

& Mischel, 1987) and their idea of “If . . . then” contingencies,

Aside from gaining a greater understanding of the nature and

2008), much of it from researchers who work within the five-factor

tradition. It is even more important to note that researchers within

interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psycho-

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