Emilia de Vera Vda. de Halili), Petitioner
Emilia de Vera Vda. de Halili), Petitioner
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style Halili Transit [substituted by
Emilia De Vera Vda. de Halili], petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and HALILI BUS DRIVERS and CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO), respondents.
RESOLUTION
The herein petition was filed by the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO), under the caption of the original case/cases,1 as it
may in fact be considered an incident thereto.
The above-captioned cases were claims for unpaid overtime pay of 897 union members against
Fortunate Halili, then doing business under the name and style. Halili Transit which were initially
commenced as a complaint2 with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958.
After Fortunato Halili's demise, said cases were settled amicably. The Union and the Administratrix
of Fortunato F. Halili's estate reached an Agreement on December 23, 1974, the pertinent portions
of which read:
WHEREAS, in the face of this strong urging on the part of the Supreme Court
Justices upon the parties to put an immediate end to this care by amicable
settlement, the parties repeatedly came to conference, conscientiously explored all
avenues of settlement, and finally arrived at the tentative agreement (tentative
because of the condition that the same be sanctioned by the court in the estate case)
whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to that tract of land,
covered by TCT No. 36389, containing an area of approximately 33,952 square
meters, situated in the Barrio of San Bartolome, Municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal, and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000.00 in full and final
satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the
estate of Fortunato F. Halili, subject of CIR Case No. 1099- V.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The UNION and its undersigned officers hereby warrant that the
UNION is a duly registered labor organization and that in a special
meeting called for the purpose they were duly authorized on
December 22, 1974, by all the members-claimants in CIR Case No.
1099-V to sign this Memorandum of Agreement with Release and
Quitclaim which was unanimously approved and ratified by said
members-claimants as evidenced by a Resolution dated December
22, 1974, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof
as Annex "B," and hereby jointly and severally hold the estate and
heirs of Fortunato F. Halili free and harmless from, and undertake to
indemnify them for any and all liability for any claims by members of
the UNION, their heirs, assigns and agents relating to CIR Case No.
1099-V or attorney's liens in connection therewith (69 SCRA 509-
510).3
On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the abovementioned Agreement, the Administratrix of the Estate of
Fortunato F. Halili executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the
aforementioned parcel of land to the Halili Bus and Conductors Union (PTGWO) in trust for the
individual members of the Union claimants.
The parcel of land covered by the said Deed of Conveyance was registered without encumbrance in
the name of the said Union on February 14, 1975 under Transfer Certificate of Title. No. 205755.4
On August 9, 1982, the said Union, through its legal counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an
urgent motion with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting that authority be
granted to sell and dispose of the property.
On September 23, 1982, the MOLE acting through Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, granted
the Union's motion to sell the subject property.
Thereafter, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda filed a motion with the Supreme Court on December 1, 1982,
requesting authority to sell the property. This Court, however, merely noted the motion in a
Resolution dated December 8, 1982.
Relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, Atty. Pineda subsequently filed
another urgent motion with the MOLE, this time praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot to
the respondent herein Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI, for brevity).
In an Order, dated February 9, 1983, Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, for the MOLE, likewise granted the
motion to sell the subject property to MMPCI.
The sale of the property held in trust by the seller-Union to the buyer-MMPCI was finally
consummated on June 7, 1983.
On the basis of the Order of Arbiter Valenzuela and the Deed of Sale between the Union and
MMPCI, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 205755 in the name of the Union was canceled and said
property was registered in the name of respondent MMPCI, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14, 1983.
Significantly, however, the Orders, dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, issued by
Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which granted the two motions of the Union's former counsel, Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, for an authority to sell the real property awarded to the Union, were set aside
by this Court in a Resolution, dated October 18, 1983, to wit:
[A]nd considering that, as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the challenged orders of
Arbiter Raymundo R Valenzuela dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983,
were issued without due process of law, the COURT RESOLVED (1) to set aside as
null and void said orders of September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Arbiter
Raymundo R. Valenzuela . . . 5
On the basis of this Resolution nullifying the above orders of the Labor Arbiter, the Union filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) seeking to compel the buyer,
private respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., to reconvey the Union's property bought
by MMPCI from Atty. Pineda upon the ground that the latter sold it without proper authority from the
Supreme Court.
The Chief of the Legal and Enforcement Division of the NLRC, tasked to act on the complaint,
refused to take cognizance of the case for lack of jurisdiction, viz:
The instant complaint does not fall under the jurisdictional ambit of this Commission
(NLRC) or any labor forum. It is our considered view that the cause of action raised
herein is a proper subject of the regular courts.
Hence, the Union filed this Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification, through which it seeks,
among others, the recovery of subject real property comprising of 33,952 square meters sold to
respondent MMPCI, to wit:
3. That the Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification in this subject complaint claim
for recovery of the Union Real Property in trust as provided in the provisions in the
Union General Resolution dated January 21, 1986, was a valid and verified cause of
action of the union-members/co-owners of the said union real property in trust to be
recovered and take possession due to the ground that the sale of said union real
property was sold by persons without authority to sell from the owners of said
property or acquired authority to sell from the Supreme Court or Court of jurisdiction
being that this union real properly in trust was sold in a means of purely illegal sale.7
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act 6715 delineates the scope
of jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission
of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
2. Termination disputes;
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Labor Arbiters.
The subject matter of the instant petition, which is the reconveyance of the disputed real property to
the Union by the respondent MMPCI does not fall under any of the issues cognizable by the NLRC
as enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code. Hence, the public respondent NLRC committed no
error in dismissing the complaint brought before them by the petitioner Union for the simple reason
that said Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
II
The fact that the subject real property was registered under the Torrens System of registration in the
name of respondent MMPCI under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City on June 14, 1983, makes the instant petition all the more dismissible, considering
that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is the Certificate of Title.8
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered modified, or canceled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status
of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in
some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.9
In the present petition, the Union seeks from respondent MMPCI the recovery of the subject
property. It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondent to the
property in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title. It is well settled that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on
the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim
ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. 10
III
Furthermore, all portions of said land, now known as Holy Cross Memorial Park, have already been
sold out to individual lot buyers, who are innocent purchasers for value, and contain the interred
remains of the lot owners and/or their relatives. Where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the Certificate of Title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot
disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright
cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the Certificate of Title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens System would have to inquire in every instance as to whether
the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the Court. And this is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the Certificate of Title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. 11
IV
As adverted to earlier, ownership of the lot in question had already been vested in the Union upon
sale to it by the Heirs of Halili. Considering this, the Union had every right to dispose of the property.
After the termination of the above-entitled cases, judgment therefor having become final and
executory, even as of 1982, neither the NLRC nor this Court will have any authority to look into the
validity of the disposal by the Union of the property so acquired by the Union in the proceedings.
Under the circumstances, therefore, it is to be assumed that the sale by the Union, as virtual owner
of the property, to the respondent MMPCI would not need any authority to sell from the NLRC or
from this Court and we hereby write finis to these cases in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and
considering that these cases were instituted as early as 1958.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
4 Rollo, p. 59.
7 Rollo, p. 38.
11 Peña, Peña, Jr., Peña, Registration of land Titles and Deeds, 1994 Revised Edition, p.
145.