AMIGO VS.

TEVES
G.R. No. L-6389 November 29, 1954

FACTS
On August 11, 1937, Macario Amigo and Anacleto Cagalitan executed in favor of
their son, Marcelino Amigo, a power of attorney granting to the latter, among
others, the power "to lease, let, bargain, transfer, convey and sell, remise, release,
mortgage and hypothecate, part or any of the properties . . . upon such terms and
conditions, and under such covenants as he shall think fit."
On October 30, 1938, Marcelino Amigo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, executed
a deed of sale of a parcel of land for a price of P3,000 in favor of Serafin Teves
stipulating therein that the vendors could repurchase the land within a period of 18
months from the date of the sale. In the same document, it was also stipulated that
vendors would remain in possession of the land as lessees for a period of 18 months
subject to the following terms and conditions: (a) the lessees shall pay P180 as rent
every six months from the date of the agreement; (b) the period of the lease shall
terminate on April 30, 1940; (c) in case of litigation, the lessees shall pay P100 as
attorney's fees; and (d) in case of failure to pay any rental as agreed upon, the
lease shall automatically terminate and the right of ownership of vendee shall
become absolute.
On July 20, 1939, the spouses Macario Amigo and Anacleta Cagalitan donated to
their sons Justino Amigo and Pastor Amigo several parcels of land including their
right to repurchase the land in litigation. The deed of donation was made in a public
instrument, was duly accepted by the donees, and was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds.
The vendors-lessees paid the rental corresponding to the first six months, but not
the rental for the subsequent semester, and so on January 8, 1940, Serafin Teves,
the vendee-lessor, executed an "Affidavit of Consolidation of Title" in view of the
failure of the lessees to pay the rentals as agreed upon, and registered said affidavit
in the Office of the Register of Deeds who issued to Serafin Teves the corresponding
transfer of title over the land in question.
On March 9, 1940, Justino Amigo and Pastor Amigo, as donees of the right to
repurchase the land in question, offered to repurchase the land from Serafin Teves
by tendering to him the payment of the redemption price but the latter refused on
the ground that the ownership had already been consolidated in him as purchaser a
retro.

ISSUES
Whether or not the lease covenant contained in the deed of sale with pacto de
retroexecuted by Marcelino Amigo as attorney-in-fact in favor of Serafin Teves is not
germane to, nor within the purview of, the powers granted to said attorney-in-fact
and, therefore, is ultra vires and null and void
DECISION
No. The lease covenant contained in the deed of sale with pacto de retroexecuted
by Marcelino Amigo as attorney-in-fact in favor of Serafin Teves is not germane to,
nor within the purview of, the powers granted to said attorney-in-fact and,
therefore, is not ultra vires and is valid.

RATIO
The power granted to the agent is so broad that it practically covers the celebration
of any contract and the conclusion of any covenant or stipulation. Among the
powers granted are: to bargain, contract, agree for, purchase, receive, and keep
lands, tenements, hereditaments, and accept the seizing and possessing of all
lands," or "to lease, let, bargain, transfer, convey and sell, remise, release,
mortgage and hypothecate . . . upon such terms and conditions, and under such
covenants as he shall think fit." When the power of attorney says that the agent can
enter into any contract concerning the land, or can sell the land under any term or
condition and covenant he may think fit, means that he can act in the same manner
and with the same breath and latitude as the principal could concerning the
property. The fact that the agent has acted in accordance with the wish of his
principals can be inferred from their attitude in donating to the herein petitioners
the right to redeem the land under the terms and conditions appearing in the deed
of sale executed by their agent.
The lease covenant embodied in the deed of sale is common in contracts involving
sales of land with pacto de retro. The lease that a vendor executes on the property
may be considered as a means of delivery or tradition by constitutum possessorium.
Where the vendor a retro continues to occupy the land as lessee, by fiction of law,
the possession is deemed to be constituted in the vendee by virtue of this mode of
tradition. It can be said that the covenant regarding the lease of the land sold is
germane to the contract of sale with pacto de retro.
ESCAY VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-37504 December 18, 1974

FACTS
Emilio and Jose Escay, now both deceased, were brothers. In his lifetime, Emilio
mortgaged his properties now in question, to the Philippine National Bank. He died
in 1924 before he could pay his obligation with the bank which had mounted. The
bank then filed in 1930 a foreclosure suit against the estate of Emilio represented
by the administrator, Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. Pending the said suit, a contract was
entered among the Philippine National Bank, Jose Escay, Sr., and Atty. Arboleda,
under which Jose assumed the mortgage indebtedness of his deceased brother
Emilio. This was agreed to by Magdalena Vda. de Escay, widow of Emilio, in her own
behalf and as guardian ad litem of their children. When it was discovered that the
original contract failed to state the transfer of the ownership of the properties in
question to Jose Escay, Sr., in consideration of his assumption of the mortgage
indebtedness of Emilio, a supplementary contract was entered into among the
Philippine National Bank, the administrator, Atty. Arboleda and Jose Escay, Sr. This
was approved by the probate court taking cognizance of the estate of the deceased
Emilio Escay in its order of February 24, 1934.
In 1941, Magdalena Vda. de Escay, Roberto and the other children filed a complaint
against Jose Escay, Sr. and Atty. Arboleda for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of the properties in question.

ISSUES
Whether or not a trust relation arose between the testate estate of Emilio Escay and
under Jose Escay, Sr.

RULING
No. A trust relation did not arise between the testate estate of Emilio Escay and
under Jose Escay, Sr.

RATIO
The evidence is clear that the original and supplementary contracts were the result
of a series of negotiations by the testate estate of Emilio Escay through its Judicial
Administrator and legal representative; its creditor, the Philippine National Bank;
the heirs represented by their guardian ad litem, Magdalena Vda. de Escay; and
Jose Escay, Sr. As the Court of Appeals found, in these negotiations, in the series of
conferences, Jose Escay, Sr. did not appear to have been represented by counsel.
The contract and the "contrato suplementario" were both prepared for execution by
the Judicial Administrator and by the lawyer of the bank, Atty. Recto. As the Court of
Appeals observed, there is no evidence whatsoever that Atty. Recto or the
Philippine National Bank contrived and confederated with the Judicial Administrator
of the testate estate or the heirs through their guardian ad litem, Magdalena Vda.
de Escay. Since there was no fraud, there was no trust relation that arose.
CUAYCONG VS CUAYCONG
G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967

FACTS
The surviving children and grandchildren of Lino Cuaycong, brother of deceased
Eduardo Cuaycong filed a suit against Justo, Luis and Benjamin Cuaycong for
conveyance of inheritance and accounting alleging that Eduardo Cuaycong had on
several occasions, made known to his brothers and sisters that he and his wife
Clotilde de Leon (died in 1940) had an understanding and made arrangements with
Luis Cuaycong and his father Justo Cuaycong, that it was their desire to divide
Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod among his brothers and sister and his wife Clotilde.
As the two haciendas were the subject of transactions between the spouses and
Justo and Luis Cuaycong, Eduardo told Justo and Luis, and the two agreed, to hold in
trust what might belong to his brothers and sister as a result of the arrangements
and deliver to them their share when the proper time comes. And as far back as
1936 Lino demanded from Justo and Luis his share and especially after Eduardo's
and Clotilde's death, the plaintiffs demanded their shares.

ISSUES
Whether or not an express trust was made over the properties in question

RULING
Yes. An express trust was made over the properties in question.

RATIO
The intention of the trustor may be seen in the complaint that “on several occasions
during the later years of Eduardo and Lino Cuaycong, the former made known to
the latter and to their brothers and sister, that he and his wife, Clotilde de Leon,
who died in 1941, had an understanding and made arrangements with defendant
Luis D. Cuaycong and his father, Justo Cuaycong, that it was their (Eduardo's and
Clotilde's) wish and desire, that Hdas. "Sta. Cruz," and "Pusod" above-referred to,
should be divided between the brothers and sister of Eduardo Cuaycong, namely,
Justo, Meliton, Lino and Basilisa, all surnamed Cuaycong, and his wife, Clotilde de
Leon.” Said complaint also provides “pursuant to such wish and desire and
arrangements, the said Eduardo Cuaycong, with the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Clotilde de Leon, and as an agreement with the latter to effectuate their wish
and desire had directed his brothers and sister to pay his wife the sum of
P75,000.00, the value of the two haciendas above-mentioned being P150,000.00,
and then divide the same among themselves share and share alike; or, at all
events, should his brothers and sister fail to do just that, they should divide only the
one-half (1/2) portions proindiviso thereof appertaining to him (Eduardo) in the
conjugal properties.” Such being the case, it is clear that the trustor expressly told
the defendants of his intention to establish the trust.