public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 24, 385–396 (2004)

Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.333

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTAL SERVICES

OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
ROLAND G. BAPTISTE*
Department of Management Studies, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, WI

SUMMARY
This study examines the change management aspect of the corporatisation of the Trinidad and Tobago Post Office. Interviews
were conducted with key actors and the major unclassified documents were examined. An analysis of the sequence of events
revealed a model of change management, but there is no evidence that the actors in the process explicitly developed it. Its
competent application may explain the low level of opposition to the corporatisation of the Post Office and its success to
this point. It is suggested that the model may be used to guide researchers and administrators in the future. Copyright # 2004
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION
This study examines the change management aspect of the corporatisation of the Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) Post
Office.
Corporatisation is the process of converting a public service entity into a statutory corporation. The process is
akin to privatisation, and in the case of the T&T Post Office, corporatisation included the awarding of a manage-
ment contract, a method used in privatisation. There are many definitions of privatisation (Kolderie, 1990; Taylor,
2000). A minimal definition is that it involves one or all of the following actions: the outright or partial, sale of
assets by the state; the transfer of assets to the private sector through leasing; and the introduction of management
contracting arrangements to state owned organisations (Adam et al., 1992).
Privatisation is controversial. This is so primarily because of its ideological connotations. Advocates of the
market forces doctrine consider it desirable, while proponents of the many variants of socialist ideology reject
it. Privatisation may also be viewed from a managerial perspective. From this viewpoint, it is an option when
the objective is to improve the effectiveness of a failing public sector organisation, and is essentially a change
management challenge made more or less difficult depending on the strength of the barriers. These barriers
may arise from irresolute leadership, or from socio-cultural, institutional, administrative and political hurdles
present in a given country (Huang, 2000).
Change management refers to the tasks that must be performed in planning and implementing change, for which
various models exist. While the planners did not claim to be using one, an implicit model of change management
reflecting the work of Lewin (1951), Ottaway (1979), Mintzberg (1983) and Kotter (1996) can be discerned in the
corporatisation/privatisation of the T&T Post Office. The model is:
1. Phase One: Generating Change (initiated and pursued by change generators)
a. Recognising the need for change.
b. Conceptualisation of an ideal future (Vision).
c. Convincing the external coalition, and managing resistance.
d. Convincing the internal coalition, and managing resistance.
e. Preparing the ground for implementation—removing the procedural, legal and structural barriers to change.

*Correspondence to: R. G. Baptiste, Management Studies Department, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, WI.
E-mail: rgb@trinidad.net

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386 R. G. BAPTISTE

2. Phase two: Implementation

a. The use of change agents who in relation to the organisation may be external, internal or external/internal
(change implementers).
b. Empowering employees for broad based action.
c. Ensuring constant communication.
d. The celebrating of short-term wins.
e. Consolidating and generating more change.
3. Phase Three: Adoption
a. The adoption of the new way of functioning by stakeholders, in particular, employees and clients (change
adopters).
b. The anchoring of changes in the culture of the organisation.

RESEARCH METHOD
A written request was made to the Managing Director for access to the organisation. He agreed and cooperated
fully throughout, making all major unclassified documents related to the privatisation of the Post Office available
for study.
Interviews were also conducted with key participants in the process. The persons interviewed were the Mana-
ging Director of the new Trinidad and Tobago Postal Corporation (TTPOST), the Human Resource Manager of
TTPOST, Head of the Planning Unit in the Ministry of Public Utilities, the government’s industrial relations nego-
tiator and the Heads of both unions. Except for the interviews with the two union leaders, all interviews were taped.
This aspect of the research could have been enhanced had a sample of employees and retirees been interviewed.

RESULTS
The period covered by the study is from 1993 to June 2000, which is depicted in Table 1.
1. 1993 to June 1999: Phase 1—Generating change.
2. June 1999 to June 2000: Phase 2—First year of implementation.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

An impending crisis is often the trigger for organisational change. This was the case at the T&T Post Office.
The post office was labour intensive, labour in 1996 representing over 81% of the total cost. As of 1998, it
employed approximately 1370 persons, and handled about 30 million mail items per year. Operating expenditures
had consistently been greater than revenues, resulting in the need for increasing subsidisation by the government.
For example, its operating deficit in 1996 was TT $13 million. This financial position had decreased the level of
funds available for capital investment and had curtailed infrastructural improvement and maintenance pro-
grammes. By mid-1996, 12% of postal vehicles were judged to be beyond repair, and 80% were in need of sub-
stantial repair. One effect of this was that mail pickup and delivery schedules were not met, with a corresponding
decrease in public confidence.
While the records show a gradual rise in the core business of the post office (letters and postcards), an analysis
of core business revenue adjusted for tariff increases in 1993 and 1996 showed no increase. The demand for other
services had declined significantly, and there were substantial delays in mail delivery. Increasingly, T&T nationals
abroad were using alternative sources for sending and receiving remittances, letters and packages.
Table 1. Timeline
Phase 1 Phase 2

1993–1999: Period of change generation 1999–2000: First year of implementation

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 POSTAL SERVICES IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 387

The postal service also suffered from the absence of a modern vision, the absence of an adequate legal and
institutional framework and the lack of the managerial and financial resources required to keep abreast of techno-
logical changes. Other inter-related crises were antagonistic industrial relations, deficiency of managerial will,
rigid public service regulations, security lapses and a management team weakened by differences.
Associated with the post office was the Post Office Savings Bank (PSB). It offered savings services through the
counter at most of the post offices. Up to 1998, it had not received the human capital and information systems
required to make it a viable entity and contributed one per cent of the post office’s overall revenue. Despite this
fact, the PSB was worth TT $12.1 million at the end of 1996. Of this total, TT $4.9 million was listed as dormant
accounts and only TT $4.3 million as active accounts. The PSB was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance,
and the Comptroller of Accounts made the investment decisions.
These were the facts that the Ministry of Public Utilities faced starting in 1993.

GENERATING CHANGE (1993–1999)

Lewin (1951) theorised that change in social systems occurs in three phases—unfreezing, changing and refreez-
ing. During unfreezing, the social system confronts the pressures for change and this phase comes to an end when
the system is convinced of the need and is prepared to take action. In the second phase the system implements
strategies to achieve a desired future and at the refreezing, when the desired state is achieved, action is taken to
reinforce the new behaviours, processes and procedures.
The period 1993–1999 covers the unfreezing phase of the privatisation of the post office. Ottaway (1979) theorised
that ‘change generators’ are the type of change agents active in unfreezing. They convert issues in society or organisa-
tions into ‘felt-needs’ to change. Unfreezing activities may involve establishing a sense of urgency, creating a guiding
coalition, developing a vision and communicating that vision (Kotter, 1996). In fact, the change generators who led the
unfreezing process at the post office performed all of these tasks, although with significant overlap.
The parlous state of the post office would have created the initial condition for unfreezing. It appears that evi-
dence of this poor performance of the post office, and the influence of the Postal Workers Union (PWU) and of the
planning unit of the Ministry of Public Utilities convinced the responsible minister in 1993 to take action. The
ministry advised a three-pronged programme of reform: commercialisation/corporatisation, restructuring and pri-
vate sector participation. The minister received the support of the cabinet, which appointed a committee to monitor
and expedite the transformation. At the time that this committee started its work, political events intervened and
the government was replaced. After governments changed in 1995, post office reform went into limbo. But by 1998
the ministry convinced the new minister of the urgency of the situation. It is clear that the persistence of the plan-
ning unit of the ministry through two administrations and over a span of 5 years was largely responsible for the
experiment that followed.
The change generators within the ministry by their actions selected themselves to be ‘the guiding coalition’. On
gaining the support of the minister, they prepared a detailed vision for the consideration of the cabinet. The alter-
natives they presented were: (1) to outsource some of the services; (2) to enter into a management contract—where
the operator is paid a fee and is rewarded for meeting set targets, while government maintains ownership of all the
assets; (3) to use a lease arrangement—where the operator is made responsible for the total operations but does not
bring capital; (4) to grant a concession—where the operator brings capital and where at the end of the period of the
concession, usually twenty-five years or more, the government regains ownership of all assets and (5) to invite
equity participation—where the government might retain a percentage of the ownership or sell the entire operation.
The ministry recommended a management contract for the first five-year period, arguing that the problems were
of a managerial and institutional nature and that full privatisation was not an immediate practical solution. Its
vision for this period was expressed through the objectives set for a potential operator.

The vision
Firstly, the operator was required to improve by 10% per year from baseline the proportion of respondents to a
survey expressing satisfaction with the postal service. To do this, the operator was required to introduce customer

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388 R. G. BAPTISTE

satisfaction surveys similar to those used in world-class postal systems. This meant developing a baseline, estab-
lishing a customer satisfaction index (CSI) and having an independent agency conduct surveys at intervals.
The operator was also given transit-time objectives. The standard that was set for letter delivery in Trinidad and
Tobago was D þ 1 (D being the day of deposit) for mail between and within principal towns and D þ 2 for mail to
and from remote areas. Progress towards meeting the standard was to be measured by an internal measurement
system in the first year and a statistically valid external, end-to-end transit time monitoring system in subsequent
years.
The operator was also required to eliminate the deficit by the end of the third year of the contract, maintain a
uniform tariff for domestic single piece basic letter mail, restrain domestic tariff increases to a rate allowable by the
Regulated Industries Commission and generate new revenue both through growth in existing products and through
new products and services.
Finally, ‘project’ objectives and tasks concerned with organisational and infrastructural development were set.
The operator was to introduce modern point of sale devices and processes, replace or rehabilitate current post
offices to achieve a modern, businesslike image and to construct a new central mail exchange. In addition, the
operator was to introduce a state-of-the-art barcode-based track and trace system, modern cancelling, sorting
and distribution equipment, and motorised transportation in the delivery service where feasible, and as well to
refurbish or replace the vehicle fleet. The operator was also given the tasks of designing and implementing an
appropriate PC-based management information system, an appropriate Universal Post Code for Trinidad and
Tobago, a human resource plan, a security and safety system, and a change management strategy that took cogni-
sance of the change in organisational culture required to transform a government department into a commercial
organisation. Finally, the operator was required to make recommendations for improving the savings bank.
In short, the vision was of a state-of-the-art commercial postal service meeting and exceeding international
benchmarks.

Convincing the external and internal coalitions

Another unfreezing activity in Kotter’s (1996) model is ‘communicating the vision’. In complex systems, this
activity is challenging. The application of Mintzberg’s (1983) model of power in and around organisations makes
clear the scale of the task. He stated that organisational behaviour is a power game in which various influencers
seek to control the organisation’s decisions and actions. Influencers fall into two categories, internal and external.
The ‘external coalition’ includes owners, clients, suppliers, partners, competitors, unions, professional associations
and public interest groups. The ‘internal coalition’ consists of the top management, operators who directly produce
the products and services, middle or line managers, staff specialists, indirect support staff and the organisation’s
ideology (the set of shared beliefs that distinguishes the organisation from others). Change efforts in organisations
may be initiated from any point in this system of influencers. However, success depends on the extent to which a
large enough consensus is built. Hence ‘communicating a vision’ is the task of building such a consensus. In the
case of the post office the stakeholders to be convinced were the Government, the Opposition, the PWU, the Public
Services Association, the World Bank, clients, managers and other employees.
The Government (Cabinet) was the key decision-maker. The Minister of Public Utilities had little difficulty in
convincing the cabinet. It approved the proposal for post office reform, and the matter was sent to the legal drafts-
men for the preparation of the legislation. The Ministry of Public Utilities’ major challenge was to convince other
stakeholders.
A committee set up to discuss the plans with the staff arranged ‘workers-forums’. Three were planned and all
employees and postal agents, as well as representatives of the two unions were invited. At these forums, attended
by the minister, the plans for change were explained. It was discovered that employees did not object to
the proposals. In fact they agreed that the service was poor, felt ashamed of it, and accepted that change was
necessary.
However, difficulties arose with one of the unions. There were two unions representing workers in the post
office, the Public Services Association (PSA) and the PWU. The PSA represented the civil servants in the orga-
nisation—the clerical and administrative staff. The PWU on the other hand represented the postmen. However, the

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 POSTAL SERVICES IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 389

PWU had limited recognition. The Civil Service Act authorised the PSA to negotiate on behalf of all staff, includ-
ing postmen, for salaries and other terms common to all civil servants. The PWU, which existed before the Civil
Service Act became law, was allowed to negotiate only on matters peculiar to postmen.
Both unions had been represented on the planning committees of the ministry and were consulted when the
legislation was being drafted. They also submitted recommendations when the draft Bill was published for public
comment. However, the PSA had stated consistently its opposition to any kind of privatisation, even while agreeing
to contribute wherever they could to the change process. On the other hand, the PWU, which represented approxi-
mately 75% of the workers, was receptive to the change.
Apart from its ideological objection to privatisation, the PSA had reason to believe that the changes would have
been inimical to its interests. Firstly, the change was likely to result in downsizing, affecting their members more so
than the others. Secondly, the PSA may also have expected that their superior position with respect to the PWU
would have been altered. Their active opposition surfaced later in the process.
The Bill did not receive any opposition in parliament. In the House of Representatives, both sides took the
opportunity to score political points, but other than that, there was no difference of opinion. The Act was assented
to without controversy in February 1999.
Support also came internationally. The government sought a loan from the World Bank to finance the project,
and the bank was easily convinced. In its assessment of the situation, the bank forecasted a drain on the treasury of
TT$106 million over a 10-year period if the situation was left to continue. On the other hand, it predicted a net
financial benefit of TT$310 million if commercialisation were to be implemented.
The bank was also impressed that Trinidad and Tobago was the first country outside of the developed world to
undertake such a level of postal transformation.

Preparing the ground

Preparing the ground consisted of removing the public service framework and putting in place the foundation for
the new commercial system. It involved the enactment of legislation to establish a statutory corporation, drawing
up of terms of reference for the management operator, converting public service employees to employees of the
new corporation and downsizing the post office. These activities correspond to Kotter’s (1996) fifth step—empow-
ering broad-based action, which includes removing obstacles and changing systems or structures that undermine
the change vision.
The changing of the status of employees was controversial. The Bill to establish the Trinidad and Tobago Postal
Corporation was assented to in 1999. By this Act, the board was authorised to employ staff as required. Since the
corporation was to be superimposed on the existing post office, it could have been faced with the difficulty of
inheriting employees who were civil servants, falling under the authority of the public service commission and
the provisions of the Civil Service Act. Anticipating this, the Act provided for the movement of staff from the civil
service to the new organisation.
Employees were given the option—either to voluntarily retire from the civil service on terms to be negotiated,
transfer to the new company with the approval of the public service commission, or remain in the civil service
provided a post could be found outside of the post office. The Act gave employees 3 months to decide. The
PSA first contested the constitutionality of this section of the Act, and later the entire Act. The matter was still
before the Privy Council (the highest court) in 2002. The union took this step after losing a battle with the govern-
ment on the terms of a voluntary separation plan.
The movement of employees from the civil service to the new company was not the only pre-condition for start-
up. The government agreed to complete a Voluntary Separation of Employment Programme (VSEP) prior to the
entry of the operator, based on an analysis that found staffing levels to be too high. This programme, however, was
not concluded before the intended start-up date of 1 January 1999 because of the difficulties that arose in the nego-
tiations with the unions.
These negotiations were conducted simultaneously with both unions. Central to the discussion was the VSEP
package. The parties agreed on the need for the voluntary separation of a large number of staff, but differed on the
nature of the separation package. They agreed that the package would consist of an enhancement of the gratuity

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that employees would have received had they retired under normal conditions, but disagreed on the size of the
enhancement. After long negotiations, the PWU, under pressure from their members accepted a 25% enhance-
ment. This occurred on an occasion when the PSA was absent from a meeting with the government’s negotiator.
The PSA was incensed, condemned the agreement and insisted on 30%. However, five hundred workers accepted
the VSEP under the agreed terms, and those few who did not, were taken into the new company—Trinidad and
Tobago Postal Corporation (TTPOST). The PSA thereafter took the issue of the VSEP package to the Special Tri-
bunal of the Industrial Court where, as of 2002, it still was.
Hence, except for the PSA, all major stakeholders supported the initiative. PSA’s efforts to protect its interests
through the courts were perhaps an acknowledgment that it had lost the organisational—political as well as the
public—battle.
The PSA’s litigation did not prevent implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION: THE FIRST YEAR (JULY 1999–JUNE 2000)

Ottaway (1979) theorised that change agents with special expertise (change implementers) are needed in the
implementation phase of a change process. They may be external or internal, or internal/external to the system.
In this case, New Zealand Post International Limited (NZPIL) filled the role.
Prospective bidders were invited to Trinidad and Tobago to examine the situation first hand even before
request for proposals were issued. Invitations went to the postal services of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
New Zealand and Britain. While in Trinidad a conference was organised for the purpose of having them discuss the
project with key stakeholders. Both unions participated and each met separately with each prospective bidder
during the period. From a change management perspective, this was significant as it concretised stakeholder
participation in the process. Eventually, only the Canadians and the New Zealanders submitted bids, and NZPIL
won the contract.
The selection process followed the tendering procedures of the Government’s Tenders Board. Each bidder was
requested to provide a technical and a financial proposal and selection was based on the criteria stated in the
request for proposals document. The criteria for the technical proposals were the experience of the bidder in their
own postal system, the adequacy of their business plan, the qualifications and competence of key staff, the pro-
posed change management strategy, human resource plan, organisational structure, management information sys-
tem and capital investment plan. The financial proposals were assessed by way of a clearly stated formula.
The groundwork done prior to their arrival put the operator in the advantageous position of starting with a clean
slate. Firstly, the Act abolished all jobs of the former post office, allowing TT Post to start with a new organisa-
tional structure and new positions; and secondly, the bulk of the managers and supervisors of the old post office
were among the five hundred persons who accepted VSEP. The operator was therefore able at start-up to fill the
posts of the new organisation on the basis of ability and enthusiasm and not on the basis of seniority, as was pre-
viously the case.
The team of New Zealanders arrived at the end of 1998, but could not begin officially. First, the President of the
Republic had to assent to the Act, and this was not done until February 1999. Secondly, the VSEP negotiations had
to be concluded, and this was only accomplished in June 1999. These fortuitous circumstances, gave NZPIL time
to study the post office first hand, to establish relationships with key personnel, and to plan the details of their
intervention.
The start-up NZPIL team consisted of the managing director, the human resource manager, the sales/marketing
manager and the operations manager. They were all required to have participated previously on similar projects
and on international assignments, and as well, to have possessed relevant academic or technical qualifications
together with extensive professional experience.
The team was put to work within an agreed institutional and regulatory framework. The managing director
reports to the board, and in its turn, the board reports to the Minister of Public Utilities. In addition
TTPOST receives regulatory oversight from the Regulated Industries Commission. The framework is illustrated
in Table 2.

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Table 2. New institutional and regulatory framework

The operator began by preparing a strategic plan (incorporating a corporate and a financial plan). A plan
was prepared for the first year and another for the remaining four. The objectives that were set were based on
the contract:
Universal Delivery Service (targeted improvements)
Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five
60% 69% 85% 90% 94%
Customer Satisfaction (targeted improvements)
Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five
50% 55% 65% 75% 84%
Transit Time (targeted improvements)
Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five
80% 85% 93% 95% 96%
Revenue Growth (targeted improvements)
Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five
New Business Revenue 0% 6% 10% 8% 6%
Total Revenue 36% 16% 10% 11% 9%

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Net Income (targeted improvements)

TT$’000
Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five
Total revenue (TT$’000) 60,821 70,877 78,338 87,076 95,020
Net income (TT$’000) (6594) 774 10,048 16,594 9843
Net income as a % of (10.8) 1.1 12.8 19.1 10.4
total revenue

Table 3. Strategic focus

Infrastructural and organisation development objectives, termed ‘project objectives’, were also set. These were
in respect to the implementation of a change management strategy, a human resource and training plan, a capital
investment plan, a management information system and the development of recommendations for the future of the
Post Office Savings Bank.
The operator decided on two areas of focus: getting the house in order and building for the future. Derived from
this were ten key strategies (divided into four performance areas) with associated performance measures. The four
performance areas were: (1) our people (2) our customers (3) our viability and (4) our future. These are illustrated
in Tables 3 and 4.
These strategies were prioritised. Top priority was given to ‘thinking and behaving commercially’, considered
the driver behind all strategies. It meant structuring the business along pivate sector lines, taking control of the
destiny of the company, making decisions on a commercial basis and moving quickly without unnecessary bureau-
cracy. The seond priority entailed having ‘the right people, with the right skills, in the right jobs’. To do this, it was
necessary to restructure the organisation to meet expected future challenges, to select the right people for the
required roles and to provide them with the skills to do the job, to ‘upskill’ the organisation at all levels and to
create the opportunity for people to develop.

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Table 4. Strategic priorities

The third priority was ‘customer focus’. It involved regaining the respect and trust of the customers, treating
them as important, letting them know that the organisation cares, understanding their needs and tailoring products
and services to help them to meet those needs, building relationships with them, being responsive to them, showing
greater accountability when things go wrong and aiming to be the first choice service provider.
The remaining priorities were to manage change, to institute new levels of service, to install modern facilities, to
make a profit, to allow staff freedom with accountability, to install modern systems and to support innovation and
reinvention.
Reporting requirements with respect to these objectives were specified in the contract. Progress relating to uni-
versal delivery service, transit time and revenue growth were to be reported monthly; change management, training
and capital investment, quarterly; and customer satisfaction and net income, semi-annually. Within 6 months of
start-up the operator was required to submit recommendations regarding the Post Office Savings Bank, a corporate
plan, and a financial plan. Finally within 3 months of the end of each financial year, the operator was required to
submit an annual report.
A key aspect of the contract was the incentives and penalties. The government of Trinidad and Tobago could
impose a substantial financial penalty in the event that the operator failed to meet revenue and income objectives

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Table 5. Organisational structure

G.M. F & A, General Manager Finance and Administration; G.M. HR, General Manager Human Resource Management; G.M. Operations,
General Manager Operations; G.M. S & M, General Manager Sales and Marketing.

for a given year. On the other hand, the operator was guaranteed a significant incentive payment should targets be
exceeded by a margin greater than five per cent. In this regard, the government was free to commission independent
analyses, reviews or audits.
A mutually acceptable organisational structure was established to accomplish these objectives. The highest
level (general management level) was agreed originally between the operator and the government in the negotiat-
ing process, and the lower levels were agreed by the board. Significantly, at the end of 2000 four general managers
and the company secretary were Trinidad and Tobago nationals, and the managing director and two general man-
agers were New Zealanders. The top structure as on February 2001 is given in Table 5.
The team of managers from NZPIL responsible for planning and leading the implementation of all the initia-
tives agreed in the contract. They were assisted by their pool of expertise at home-base and by the locally recruited
staff.
In the first year of implementation, the corporation achieved a number of successes. On-time delivery consis-
tently exceeded the target. The target of 38,000 new delivery points was achieved. Public response was good as
customer satisfaction levels stood at 76.4%. The inland courier and unaddressed services were launched. Merchan-
dise was introduced to post offices. Five new-look offices and one franchise were opened. Expenditure and profit-
ability targets were achieved. A 50% price increase was implemented. Size-based pricing and government
charging were implemented, and the construction of a National Mail Centre was underway. In addition, a number
of Human Resource Management objectives had been achieved: recruitment of a cadre of professional staff, iden-
tification of core competencies for all jobs and the establishment of a performance review process.
On the negative side, employee satisfaction and productivity (sorting and delivery) fell short. The dissatisfac-
tion of staff centred around the failure to conclude a new collective contract, which was itself due to the fact that
the PWU had not up till then obtained certification from the Registration Recognition and Certification Board. The
issue of certification arose with the implementation of the new Act. The PWU had limited recognition when the
post office fell under the Civil Service Act. With the change, it had to obtain legal recognition as the majority union
to bargain for employees. Nevertheless, TT POST was satisfied with the effort put in by the staff over the first year.
The New Zealanders were also satisfied that they received no opposition based on race or nationality.
The corporation was disappointed in other areas. Total revenue had not reached the expected percentage growth
level, and access to World Bank funds earmarked for infrastructural development were delayed until February
2000. It was clear, however, that by the end of the first year the implementation phase showed great promise.

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ADOPTION
The adoption phase or refreezing is the last phase of the change process. Three types of change agents (change
adopters) are active: those in the organisation who support the change and work to implement it; those who may
have a low commitment to change but accept it because of their commitment to the organisation; and those who use
the products and services of the organisation (Ottaway, 1978). This phase began in TTPOST in the first year even
though implementation was not completed. Clients were already using the new facilities and were responding posi-
tively to them, and internal adopters were engaged in the work of consolidating achievements.

DISCUSSION
The planners of the corporatisation of the T&T Post Office did not explicitly follow a change management model,
but in the light of its obvious success, the one that emerged may serve to guide other similar projects. This model
may not be considered universal. It is applicable specifically to the public sector in democratic societies. Firstly, the
emphasis on consultation is a requirement in democratic systems and secondly certain of its details, such as the
need for legislation, are characteristic of public administration. Hence, while the general outline of the model may
be used in other sectors, there would be need for modifications.
A related issue raised by this case is the requirement that public service bureaucracies possess change manage-
ment competence if privatisation or corporatisation projects are to be undertaken. The change management chal-
lenge begins with the identification of the need for change and ends with the adoption of the change by
stakeholders. In between those two points, as this case illustrates, a number of actions are required that involve
the application of deep knowledge, complex skills and due diligence. Where these qualities are absent it is doubtful
that such change will be successfully implemented.
It is clear that change management competence did exist at the T&T Ministry of Public Utilities. Significantly, it
were the public servants who led the change process at the post office. Also significant was the fact that their objec-
tives were not political or explicitly ideological, but focussed instead on efficiency and consumer satisfaction, and
that their selection of a strategy for achieving their objectives was determined on rational grounds.
Typically, a major challenge in change management exercises of this kind is resistance. While in this case the
planners and implementers seemed to have worked well to forestall any major resistance, yet the level of opposi-
tion seemed to be surprisingly low. Stronger opposition could have been expected. Adam et al. (1992) identified
major barriers to privatisation in T&T including sensitivities about national ownership of key economic sectors.
When Adam et al. published their book in 1992, 7 years before the post office experience, they would have been
mindful of the previous history of T&T. The barriers they found were evident in the resistance to the National
Alliance for Reconstruction government’s structural adjustment measures (1986–1991). The river of opposition
to this government would have had many tributaries, but a major one was the public response to the abrupt rupture
from the past that their macroeconomic policies represented, a change that seemed to have been interpreted as a
betrayal of the nationalist ideology.
This case, however, suggests some softening of the attitude of the population to privatisation. One can speculate
on the reasons for this. It may be that the mainstream of the T&T society now understands privatisation from a
managerial perspective, or it may be that the post office was a special case in that it is not part of the ‘commanding
heights’ of the economy. Or again, it may be that corporatisation is not radical enough to elicit strong opposition.
The fact that the contractors were foreign and Caucasian also never became a matter of public concern. One
explanation is that New Zealand is perceived as a small non-threatening country. Another is that attitudes to foreign
and Caucasian business interests may have changed since the black-power demonstrations in Trinidad and Tobago
in 1970. A third is that only a few New Zelanders came to work at TTPOST.
In fact, the case points to the need for answers to these and other research questions, for example: is the capacity
within the public service to manage change, the key to successful corporatisation or privatisation? Have attitudes to
privatisation changed internationally? Should the change model that emerged from this case be used in future by

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396 R. G. BAPTISTE

researchers and administrators? But also very importantly, the case challenges the researcher to revisit TTPOST at
the end of the contract period to determine whether it has been indeed a success.

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1777–1805.
Kolderie T. 1990. Two different concepts of privatisation. In Privatisation and Deregulation in Global Perspective, Gayle DJ, Goodrich J (eds).
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Kotter J. 1996. Leading Change. Harvard Business School Press: Boston.
Lewin K. 1951. Field Theory in Social Science. Harper and Row: New York.
Mintzberg H. 1983. Power in and Around Organisations. Prentice Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Ottaway R. 1976. Proposed taxonomic classification of change agents. Psychology Group Papers, Department of Management Sciences,
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Taylor L. 2000. Privatisation in Jamaica and the case of telecommunications of Jamaica limited. Caribbean Journal of Public Sector Manage-
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Copyright # 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 24, 385–396 (2004)