People vs. Comadre

11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 431
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Comadre
*
G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO

COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO,
appellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial

matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to
a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the crime is shocking to
the conscience and numbing to the senses.—Witnesses cannot be expected
to remember all the details of the harrowing event which unfolded before
their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they
do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole,
nor should they reflect adversely on the witness’ credibility as they erase
suspicion that the same was perjured. Honest inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a
witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the crime is
shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.
Same; Same; Motive; Absent evidence showing any reason or motive
for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and
credit.—It was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo
Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday had any motive to testify falsely against
appellants. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution
witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Alibi; For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the com-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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People vs. Comadre
mission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.—The trial court is
likewise correct in disregarding appellants’ defense of alibi and denial. For
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity.
Same; Same; Positive Identification; The positive identification of the
appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and
Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.—Apart
from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of
Jaime Agbanlog’s residence, appellants were unable to give any explanation
and neither were they able to show that it was physically impossible for
them to be at the scene of the crime. Hence, the positive identification of the
appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and
Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.
Evidence, Judges; Judgment; The fact that the judge who heard the
evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason
the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not
render the judgment erroneous.—It is not unusual for a judge who did not
try a case to decide it on the basis of the record for the trial judge might
have died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth. As far back as the case
of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals we have held: “The fact that the judge who
heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for
that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case
does not render the judgment erroneous.” This rule had been followed for
quite a long time, and there is no reason to go against the principle now.
Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Conspiracy;
Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual
cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is
required.—Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is
the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather
than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere presence of a person at the scene of
the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.—A conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly
as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene
of
368
People vs. Comadre
the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Elements.—The evidence shows that
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the
commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence
at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no
positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the killing is perpetrated with
treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a
qualifying circumstance.—When the killing is perpetrated with treachery
and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also, since
the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this
attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which
will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; The amendatory law, R.A.
8294, was enacted not to decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them into
more acceptable and realistic levels.—With the enactment on June 6, 1997
of Republic Act No. 8294 which also considers the use of explosives as an
aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary clarification
insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis-à-vis the
qualifying circumstance of “by means of explosion” under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of
which law should be applied in the instant case. R.A. No. 8294 was a
reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed under the old
illegal possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the
tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was
enacted, not to decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives,
but to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them into more acceptable
and realistic levels.
Same; Same; Same; When the illegally possessed explosives are used
to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in
the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No.
1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance.—This
legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the
corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions
and other related crimes under the amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the
said law, the penalties for unlawful possession of explosives are also
lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to
369
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 369
People vs. Comadre
commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the
death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866,
but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Congress clearly intended R.A. No. 8294 to
consider as aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal
possession of firearms and explosives when such possession is used to
commit other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.—With the removal of
death as a penalty and the insertion of the term “x x x as an aggravating
circumstance,” the unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for
illegal possession of explosives and consider its use merely as an
aggravating circumstance. Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to
reduce the penalty for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also,
Congress clearly intended R.A. No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms
and explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under
the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; The legislative purpose of R.A. 8294 is to do away
with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely
an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already
defined in the Revised Penal Code.—It must be made clear, however, that
RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but
merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when
resorted to in committing “any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal
Code.” The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a
separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circumstance in
the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of
the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of “explosion” in paragraph 12,
“evident premeditation” in paragraph 13, or “treachery” in paragraph 16 of
Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294 does
not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Same; Same; Same; Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives
can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be
adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the
accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess.—Even
if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable
in this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be
properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately
established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is
without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the
same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal
370
People vs. Comadre
possession of firearm which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866,

as amended. This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it
not alleged in the information, but no evidence was adduced by the
prosecution to show that the possession by appellant of the explosive was
unlawful.
Same; Same; Same; Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, requires the averment of aggravating circumstances for their
application.—The information in this case does not allege that appellant
Antonio Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no authority to
possess the grenade that he used in the killing and attempted killings. Even
if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, requires the averment of aggravating circumstances for their
application.
Same; Same; Same; The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in
the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to
favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed, the rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes
with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity that when the
crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.—
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code,
which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Nueva Ecija, Br. 39.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for appellee.
Domingo V. Pascua for appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano

were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder in an
information which reads:
“That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva
Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honor-
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People vs. Comadre
able Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and

mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and
with the use of an explosive, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lob a hand grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the
roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels that hit and
killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and causing
Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita
Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies,
per the medical certificates; thus, to the latter victims, the accused
commenced all the acts of execution that would have produced the crime of
Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did not produce
them by reason of the timely and able medical and surgical interventions of
physicians, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs and the
other victims. 1
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
2
On arraignment, appellants pleaded “not guilty.” Trial on the merits
then ensued.
As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of3
August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,
Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on
the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Barangay Councilman
Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva
Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the 4
terrace
listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed
appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which
fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants
5
immediately fled by
scaling the fence of a nearby school.
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded
ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 17.
2 Record, pp. 27-29.
3 Also referred to as Jerry Bullanday in the records.
4 TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 4; March 6, 1996, p. 3; March 21, 1996, p. 2; July 10,
1996, pp. 2-3.
5 TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 5; March 6, 1996, pp. 2-3; July 10, 1996, pp. 2-4.
372

People vs. Comadre
Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio 6

were hit
by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all
rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for
medical treatment.
7
However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching
the hospital.
Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted
the autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the
wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries
inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of 8 death
was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion. The
surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, 9
Jaime Agbanlog and
Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.
SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station,
who investigated the scene of the crime, recovered metallic
fragments at the terrace of the Agbanlog house. These fragments
were forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Division in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a
specialist in said
10
division, identified them as shrapnel of an MK2
hand grenade.
Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre
claimed that on the night of August 6, 1995, he was with his wife
and children watching television in the house of his father, Patricio,
and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any participation in the incident
and claimed that he was surprised when three policemen from the
Lupao Municipal Police Station went to his house the following
morning of August 7, 1995 and asked him to go 11
with them to the
police station, where he has been detained since.
Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the
brother of Antonio Comadre and the brother-in-law of Danilo
Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the grenade-throwing
incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened. He
_______________
6 TSN, October 12, 1995, pp. 5-7; March 6, 1996, pp. 4-5; March 21, 1996, p. 3;
July 10, 1996, p. 3.
7 TSN, March 21, 1996, pp. 4-6.
8 Record, pp. 10-11.
9 TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 10; March 6, 1996, p. 10; March 21, 1996, p. 5; July
10, 1996, pp. 6-7.
10 Record, p. 299.
11 TSN, August 28, 1998, pp. 7-9.
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VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 373

People vs. Comadre
stated that he is a friend of Rey Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that he
had no animosity towards them whatsoever. Appellant also claimed
to be in good terms
12
with the Agbanlogs so he has no reason to cause
them any grief.
Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the
crime. He declared that he was at home with his ten year-old son on
the night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did not see Antonio
and George Comadre that night and has not seen them for quite
sometime, either before or after the incident. Like the two other
appellants, Lozano denied having any misunderstanding
13
with Jaime
Agbanlog, Robert Agbanlog and Jimmy Wabe.
Antonio’s father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his
claim that he was 14at home watching television with them during the
night in question. Josie Comadre, George’s wife, testified that her
husband could not have been among those who threw a hand
grenade at the house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of
August 6, 1995, they 15
were resting inside their house after working
all day in the farm.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution’s
evidence and convicted appellants16 of the complex crime of Murder
with Multiple Attempted Murder, the dispositive portion of which
states:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo

Lozano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to
suffer the imposable penalty of death;
2. Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Robert Agbanlog
P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death, P35,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages;
_______________
12 TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-8.

13 TSN, December 3, 1998, pp. 3-10.
14 TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 7-8; April 9, 1999, pp. 6-8.
15 TSN, July 30, 1999, pp. 3-5.
16 Penned by Judge Bayani V. Vargas of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City,
Branch 39.
374

People vs. Comadre
3. Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo

Lozano to pay jointly and severally Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat,
Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog P30,000.00 as indemnity for
their attempted murder.
“Costs against the accused.

“SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended. Appellants contend that the trial court
erred: (1) when it did not correctly and judiciously interpret and
appreciate the evidence and thus, the miscarriage of justice was
obviously omnipresent; (2) when it imposed on the accused-
appellants the supreme penalty of death despite the evident lack of
the quantum of evidence to convict them of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) when it did not apply the law and
jurisprudence
17
for the acquittal of the accused-appellants of the crime
charged.
Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of
Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday in
identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat and Eugenio initially
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 7, 1995 at the hospital
wherein they did not categorically state who the culprit was but
merely named Antonio Comadre as a suspect. Gerry Bullanday
declared that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one of the culprits
because he saw the latter’s ten year-old son bring something in the
nearby store before the explosion occurred.
On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police
station to give a more detailed account of the incident, this time
identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction
actually exists, as all sworn statements pointed to the same
perpetrators, namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first statement was
executed a day after the incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat
and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the hospital for the injuries they
sustained. Coherence could not thus be expected in view of their
condition. It is therefore not surprising for the witnesses to come
_______________
17 Rollo, pp. 67-68.
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VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 375

People vs. Comadre
up with a more exhaustive account of the incident after they have

regained their equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the two
statements is immaterial because said period even helped them recall
some facts which they may have initially overlooked.
Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the
harrowing event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor
discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they do not
damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole,
nor should they reflect adversely on the witness’
18
credibility as they
erase suspicion that the same was perjured. Honest inconsistencies
on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy
the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the
instant case,
19
the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to
the senses.
Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey
Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday had any motive to
testify falsely against appellants. Absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.
The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants’
defense of alibi and denial. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the
time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible
20
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity.
Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses
from that of Jaime Agbanlog’s residence, appellants were unable to
give any explanation and neither were they able to show that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime.
Hence, the positive identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses
_______________
18 People v. Del Valle, G.R. No. 119616, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 297.
19 People v. Patalin, G.R. No. 125539, 27 July 1999, 311 SCRA 186; citing People
vs. Agunias, G.R. No. 121993, 12 September 1997, 279 SCRA 52.
20 People v. Abundo, G.R. No. 138233, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 577.
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People vs. Comadre
Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat21and Gerry Bullanday

prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.
It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat,
Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to
identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano because22there was a lamppost in front
of the house and the moon was bright.
Appellants’ argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 38 erred
in rendering the decision because he was not the judge who heard
and tried the case is not well taken.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on
the basis of the record for the trial
23
judge might have died, resigned,
retired, transferred, and
24
so forth. As far back as the case of Co Tao
v. Court of Appeals we have held: “The fact that the judge who
heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and
that for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on
the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous.”
This rule had been followed for quite25 a long time, and there is no
reason to go against the principle now.
However, the trial court’s finding of conspiracy will have to be
reassessed. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre
was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court
held that the mere presence of George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio
Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
We disagree.
_______________
21 People v. Francisco, G.R. Nos. 134566-67, 22 January 2001, 350 SCRA 55.
22 TSN, July 10, 1996, p. 4; March 21, 1996, p. 4.
23 People v. Escalante, G.R. No. L-37147, 22 August 1984, 131 SCRA 237.
24 101 Phil. 188, 194 (1957).
25 People v. Rabutin, G.R. Nos. 118131-32, 5 May 1997, 272 SCRA 197.
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People vs. Comadre
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements
of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is
the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation
rather than
26
mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is
required.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive
evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the
scene of the crime does not 27
make him a conspirator for conspiracy
transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and
must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the
crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient
to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive
act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio
was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The
ratiocination of the trial court that “their presence provided
encouragement and sense of security to Antonio,” is devoid of any
factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on
record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it
would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of
the crime charged28
than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre
must answer for the crime.
Coming now to Antonio’s liability, we find that the trial court
correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur: (1) the
means, method and form of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such
means, methods and form of execution was deliberately
_______________
26 People v. Tabuso, G.R. No. 113708, 26 October 1999, 317 SCRA 454.
27 People v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 108174, 28 October 1999, 317 SCRA 577.
28 People v. Capili, G.R. No. 130588, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 354.
378

People vs. Comadre
and consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the

adoption of ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which
may be put up by the offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace
where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking spree. The
suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion
and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the
victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend
themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime without risk of
reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the
commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery,
29
the information
also alleges the “use of an explosive” as an aggravating
circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify30 the
killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, we
should determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the
killing in this case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of
explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circum-
_______________
29 Defined as—a sudden and rapid combustion, causing violent expansion of the
air, and accompanied by a report. United Life, Fire and Marine Insurance, Inc. v.
Foote, 22 Ohio St. 348, 10 Am Rep 735, cited in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third
Revision, Vol. 1; also defined in Wadsworth v. Marshall, 88 Me 263, 34 A 30, as a
“bursting with violence and loud noise, caused by internal pressure.”
30 Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxx xxx xxx
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding or a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. (Italics supplied)
379
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 379

People vs. Comadre
31
31
stance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also,
since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason
dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense
instead of treachery which32will then be relegated merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally,
33
with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act
No. 8294 which also considers the use of explosives as an
aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary
clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory
law vis-à-vis the qualifying circumstance of “by means of
explosion” under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code are
concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be
applied in the instant case.
R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic
penalties imposed under the old illegal possession of firearms law,
P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous years of the
Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not to
decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives, but to
lower their penalties in order 34
to rationalize them into more
acceptable and realistic levels.
_______________
31 People v. Tayo, G.R. No. L-52798, 19 February 1986, 141 SCRA 393, citing
People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People v. Gallego and Soriano, 82 Phil. 335; People
v. Agcaoili, 86 Phil. 549; People v. Francisco, 94 Phil. 975.
32 People v. Tintero, G.R. No. L-30435, 15 February 1982, 111 SCRA 704; People
v. Asibar, G.R. No. L-37255, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 856.
33 Entitled: An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, As
Amended, Entitled “Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for
Relevant Purposes.”
34 Representative Roilo Golez, in his sponsorship speech, laid down two basic
amendments under House Bill No. 8820, now R.A. 8294:
1. reduction of penalties for simple illegal possession of firearms or explosives

from the existing reclusion perpetua to prision correccional or prision
mayor, depending upon the type of firearm possessed;
2. repeal of the incongruous provision imposing capital punishment for the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives in furtherance of or
in pursuit of rebellion or insurrection.
380

People vs. Comadre
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of

the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or
ammunitions and other related crimes under the amendatory law.
Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful
possession of explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the
illegally possessed explosives are used to commit any of the crimes
under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person,
the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall
be considered only as an aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Explosives.—The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand gre-
_______________
The same rationale was the moving force behind Senate Bill 1148 as articulated by then
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago in her sponsorship speech:
The issue of disproportion is conspicuous not only when we make a comparison with the other laws, but
also when we make a comparison of the various offenses defined within the existing law itself. Under P.D.
No. 1866, the offense of simple possession is punished with the same penalty as that imposed for much
more serious offenses such as unlawful manufacture, sale, or disposition of firearms and ammunition.
xxx xxx xxx
It was only during the years of martial law—1972 and 1983—that the penalty for illegal possession
made a stratospheric leap. Under P.D. No. 9 promulgated in 1972—the first year of martial law—the
penalty suddenly became the mandatory penalty of death, if the unlicensed firearm was used in the
commission of crimes. Subsequently, under P.D. No. 1866, promulgated in 1983—during the last few
years of martial law—the penalty was set at its present onerous level.
The lesson of history is that a democratic, constitutional, and civilian government imposes a very low
penalty for simple possession. It is only an undemocratic martial law regime—a law unto itself—which
imposes an extremely harsh penalty for simple possession.
381
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 381

People vs. Comadre
nade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to
“pillbox,” “molotov cocktail bombs,” “fire bombs,” or other incendiary
devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised
Penal Code or special law with the use of the aforementioned
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises, which results in the

death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty of death is
DELETED.)
x x x x x x x x x.
With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term
“x x x as an aggravating circumstance,” the unmistakable import is
to downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of explosives and
consider its use merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty
for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also, Congress
clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of
firearms and explosives when such possession is used to commit
other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend
the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use
of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in
committing “any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.”
The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a
separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of
unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances
specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the
aggravating circumstance of “explosion” in paragraph 12, “evident
premeditation” in paragraph 13, or “treachery” in paragraph 16 of
Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No.
8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294
still cannot be made applicable in this case. Before the use of
unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that
382

People vs. Comadre
the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without

the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the
same requisites in the35
prosecution of crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm which is a kindred or related offense under
P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain in the present
case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, but no evidence
was adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by

appellant of the explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is
borne out by the provisions of the law itself, in conjunction with the
pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.
36
A reading of the title of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the
qualifier “illegal/unlawful . . . possession” is followed by “of
firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments . . .” Although
the term ammunition is separated from “explosives” by the
disjunctive word “or,” it does not mean that “explosives” are no
longer included in the items which can be illegally/unlawfully
possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word “or” is not used to
separate but to37signify a succession or to conjoin the 38enumerated
items together. Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294, subtitled:
“Section 3. Unlawful
_______________
35 In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be

established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license
or permit to possess. See: People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, 20 September 1996,
262 SCRA 255; People v. Lualhati, 234 SCRA 325 (1994); People v. Damaso, 212
SCRA 547 (1992).
36 An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
entitled “Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing
in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing
Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and For Relevant Purposes.”
37 This follows a similar construction used in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which states in part that “the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-mentioned persons, as the case may be.” In this
context, “or” has the same effect as the conjunctive term “and.”
38 Subtitled: “Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Explosives” where the modifier “unlawful” describes the manufacture,
sale, etc. of, among others, explosives.
383
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 383

People vs. Comadre
Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Explosives”, clearly refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or
possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. Thus,

when the second paragraph of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294 speaks of “the use of the aforementioned
explosives, etc.” as an aggravating circumstance in the commission
of crimes, it refers to those explosives, etc. “unlawfully”
manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed or possessed
mentioned in the first paragraph of the same section. What is per se
aggravating is the use of unlawfully “manufactured . . . or
possessed” explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant
Antonio Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no
authority to possess the grenade that he used in the killing and
attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires39
the averment of
aggravating circumstances for their application.
The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the
crime committed is Murder committed “by means of explosion” in
accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The
same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly
considered as appellant was 40
sufficiently informed of the nature of
the accusation against him.
_______________
39 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the

designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offenses, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
40 People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 147149, 9 July 2003, 405 SCRA 481; People v.
Paulino, G.R. No. 148810, 18 November 2003, 416 SCRA 122.
384

People vs. Comadre
The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of

murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal

Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two
crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity
than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may
quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct
offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a “single 41
criminal
impulse” which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances,
including
42
the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this
case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum
penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court,
therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the
effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert
Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00
as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
_______________
41 People v. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People v. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831.

42 People v. Guillen, G.R. No. L-1477, 18 January 1950.
385
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 385

People vs. Comadre
43
damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence the award of civil
indemnity is proper. However, the actual damages awarded to the
heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering that the
prosecution was able44 to substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00

as funeral expenses.
The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence
to show emotional suffering on the part of the heirs of the deceased,
but the same must be increased
45
to P50,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing judicial policy.
With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, the trial court awarded
P30,000.00 each for the injuries they sustained. We find this award
inappropriate because they were not able to present a single receipt
to substantiate their claims. Nonetheless, since it appears that they
are entitled to actual damages although the amount thereof cannot be
determined, they46 should be awarded temperate damages of
P25,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39 in
Criminal Case No. L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant
Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P18,000.00 as actual damages and likewise ordered to pay the
surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and
Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for the
injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo
Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish
conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for
another cause. Costs de oficio.
_______________
43 People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 386.
44 RTC Record, Vol. 1, p. 170, Exhibit ‘J’; TSN, 21 March 1996, p. 10.
45 People v. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, 2 April 2003, 400 SCRA 424;
People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 1300397, 17 January 2002, 374 SCRA 10; TSN, March
21, 1996, p. 11.
46 People v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, 7 February 2003, 397 SCRA 137.
386

People vs. Comadre
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending

Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision,
let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., Please see my concurring and dissenting
opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I concur with the majority that the appellant Antonio Comadre is

guilty of murder for the death of Robert Agbanlog, and multiple
attempted murder for the injuries sustained by the other victims. I
dissent, however, from the ruling of the majority that the killing of
Agbanlog is qualified by the use of explosives and not by treachery.
Under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 which took effect on June 29,
1983, any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code with the use of explosives, detonation agents or
incendiary devices which results in 1the death of a person shall be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. However, with the onset of the
1987 Constitution, the imposition of the death penalty was
suspended.
Under paragraph 3, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the use of explosives in killing
a person is a circumstance which qualifies the killing to murder, the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death. When
the crimes were committed by the appellants on August 6, 1995,
Rep. Act No. 7659 was already on effect. But while the case was
pending, Rep. Act No. 8294 was approved on June 6, 1997. Section
2 of the latter law provides that when a person commits
_______________
1 Any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or
special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or
incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons shall be
punished with the penalty of death.
387
VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 387

People vs. Comadre
any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code with the use of
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices which results in
the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, etc.
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal
Code or special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any
person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or
incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Paragraph 3 of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

by Rep. Act No. 7659, was, thus, amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 8294. Under the latter law, the use of a hand grenade in killing
the victim was downgraded from being a qualifying circumstance to
a mere generic aggravating circumstance. Considering that Section 2
of Rep. Act No. 8294 is 2favorable to the appellants, the same should
be applied retroactively. Considering the factual milieu in this case,
the generic aggravating circumstance of the use of explosives is
absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Judgment as to Antonio Comadre affirmed, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano acquitted and ordered released.
Notes.—The amendatory law (Republic Act No. 8294) does not

add to the existing elements of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. What it does is merely to excuse the accused from
prosecution of the same in case another crime is committed.
(Margarejo vs. Escoses, 365 SCRA 190 [2001])
Under Republic Act No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of homicide or murder is no longer treated as a
separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance.
(People vs. Arondain, 366 SCRA 98 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
2 Art. 2. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive

effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
388
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11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 431

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO

Evidence; Witnesses; Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial

VOL. 431, JUNE 8, 2004 367