Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 86 views

    Problem Set 5.: Ben Polak Econ 159a/MGT522a Three Questions Due October 24, 2007 (N.B. This Is After The Midterm.)

    Uploaded by

    Jamie
    This document contains 3 questions for a problem set in economics and management. The first question asks about the relationship between evolutionary stability and weak domination in games, and whether a strategy can be evolutionarily stable while also being weakly dominated or not weakly dominating another strategy. The second question presents a symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It also asks how the answers would change under different payoff rules. The third question presents another symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It then asks how allowing mutants to recognize each other could impact the evolutionarily stable strategies.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Problem Set 5.: Ben Polak Econ 159a/MGT522a Three Questions Due October 24, 2007 (N.B. This Is After The Midterm.)

    Uploaded by

    Jamie
    86 views2 pages
    This document contains 3 questions for a problem set in economics and management. The first question asks about the relationship between evolutionary stability and weak domination in games, and whether a strategy can be evolutionarily stable while also being weakly dominated or not weakly dominating another strategy. The second question presents a symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It also asks how the answers would change under different payoff rules. The third question presents another symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It then asks how allowing mutants to recognize each other could impact the evolutionarily stable strategies.

    Original Title

    problemset5_1_0

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    This document contains 3 questions for a problem set in economics and management. The first question asks about the relationship between evolutionary stability and weak domination in games, and whether a strategy can be evolutionarily stable while also being weakly dominated or not weakly dominating another strategy. The second question presents a symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It also asks how the answers would change under different payoff rules. The third question presents another symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It then asks how allowing mutants to recognize each other could impact the evolutionarily stable strategies.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    86 views2 pages

    Problem Set 5.: Ben Polak Econ 159a/MGT522a Three Questions Due October 24, 2007 (N.B. This Is After The Midterm.)

    Uploaded by

    Jamie
    This document contains 3 questions for a problem set in economics and management. The first question asks about the relationship between evolutionary stability and weak domination in games, and whether a strategy can be evolutionarily stable while also being weakly dominated or not weakly dominating another strategy. The second question presents a symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It also asks how the answers would change under different payoff rules. The third question presents another symmetric 2-player game and asks about finding the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. It then asks how allowing mutants to recognize each other could impact the evolutionarily stable strategies.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 2

    Problem Set 5.

    Ben Polak Econ 159a/MGT522a

    Three questions due October 24, 2007


    (N.B. This is after the midterm.)

    1. Evolutionary Stability and Weak Domination (Osborne). Suppose that the pure
    strategy s is evolutionarily stable. Is it possible that there is some other pure strategy that
    weakly dominates s ? Is it possible that there is some other pure strategy that is not weakly
    dominated by s ? Brie y explain your answer.

    2. Evolutionary Stability and Pareto Ranked Equilibria (adapted from Osborne). Con-
    sider the following symmetric two-player game. Each player can `demand' an amount 1, 2 or
    3. If both players demand the same amount then they each get that amount. If they demand
    di erent amounts then the player who demands less gets the amount demanded by the player
    who demanded more, and the player who demands more gets 1/4 of her demand. That is,
    8
    < s2 if s1 < s2
    u1 (s1 ; s2 ) = s1 if s1 = s2 .
    : s1
    4 if s1 > s2

    (a) Draw the normal form matrix for this game and nd all the symmetric pure-strategy
    Nash Equilibria. Are they Pareto ranked?
    (b) Which pure strategies are evolutionary stable against pure-strategy mutant invasions?
    (c) How would your answer to part (b) change if a possible demand of 0 were added to the
    other three strategies (keeping the same payo rule)?
    (d) How would your answer to part (b) change if the payo u1 (s1 ; s2 ) when s1 > s2 was
    changed to s31 (otherwise keeping the payo rule the same)?

    3. Clever Mutants. Consider the symmetric two-player game:


    2
    a b
    1 a 3; 3 0; 0
    b 0; 0 1; 1

    (a) Find all the symmetric Nash equilibria, including any mixed-strategy equilibria.
    (b) Find all the evolutionarily stable strategies, including any mixed-strategy (i.e., polymor-
    phic) ESS. Explain your answer.
    (c) Now, suppose that mutants have a `secret handshake'. That is, suppose that mutants can
    recognize other mutants and play di erent pure strategies against normal and mutant opponents.
    For example, a mutant could play b against another mutant but play a against a non-mutant.
    Argue informally there can no longer be an ESS in which only b is played.

    You might also like