THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.]

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,

minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS ,
petitioners, vs . THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON,
JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA
CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO.,
INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. ,
respondents.

Ramon N. Bernaldo for petitioners.

Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Upon the death of Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, born during the marriage of Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus, were recognized in a notarized document by the
decedent Juan G. Dizon as his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
Based on this notarized acknowledgment, the petitioners led a complaint, inventory
and accounting of the Dizon estate. Private respondents led a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the case, while denominated as an action for partition, would call for the
altering of the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of Sps. Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
Aves de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court ultimately dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper, decreeing that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding.
On appeal, petitioners assailed the said order of the trial court maintaining that
their recognition as being illegitimate children in an authentic writing is in itself
su cient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
The Supreme Court held that in an attempt to establish their illegitimate liation
to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This cannot be done
because the law itself established their legitimacy which can only be contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE

CHILDREN, HOW ESTABLISHED. — The liation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a nal
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate liation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
liation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
 legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment.
2. ID.; ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, WHEN
CONCLUSIVE. — A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during
the marriage of their parents. The certi cates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more rmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the rst 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately
in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes xed and
unassailable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED; CASE
AT BAR. — The presumption of legitimacy xes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can
be rejected. . . . The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate liation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been rst instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law
cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit speci cally brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

DECISION

VITUG , J : p

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com

 The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners led a complaint on 01 July
1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied,
due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the
denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the
veracity of the con icting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that
the certi cates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted
petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and
that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been
able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in ne, that an action for
partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and
filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.
1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right. cITAaD

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself su cient
to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo. 2
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
 petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn
legitimate liation in Divinagracia. In praying for the a rmance of dismissal of the
complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 3 which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally addressing the
issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is
time that this matter draws to a close.
The liation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a nal judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate liation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, liation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. 5 In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. 6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute
of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. 7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certi cates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more rmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. 8 This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of
proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the rst
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact
that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. 9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,
1 0 and in proper cases Article 171, 1 1 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 1 2
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate liation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the
law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, 1 3 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, 1 4 can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can
be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could nd succor in
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
 Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings the action for partition led by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document, signed by the
acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored
the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare
that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. ATCaDE

The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioner's alleged illegitimate liation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been rst been instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by
law cannot be attacked collaterally, 1 5 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit speci cally brought for that purpose. 1 6 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. 1 7
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Regional Trial Court Decision, 08 February 2000.

2. 143 SCRA 356.

3. 205 SCRA 321.

4. Article 172, Family Code.

5. Gono-Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 593.

6. See Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356.
7. Gono-Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 593.
8. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582; Article 164 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and
his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument
shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
9. Article 166 of the Family Code provides:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com

 "ART. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph
of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence."
10. Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality
where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if
they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall
be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
11. Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom;
or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
12. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582.
13. See Article 170.
14. See Article 171.

15. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582.

16. La-Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 782, 44 La.
Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77.
17. Article 167, Family Code; Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com