1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.

3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Welcome to the Caselaw Access Project! We allow free access to up to 500 cases per
person per day — see our terms of use for details. Sign up for an account to use our
API or apply for unlimited research scholar access.

Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014)

July 22, 2014 · Court of Appeals of Indiana · No. 14A01-1308-CT-356
13 N.E.3d 533

Case outline: Majority — Riley, Judge.

Other formats: PDF , API

Citing cases: No cases cite to this case

James K. MELTON, Perdue Foods, LLC

f/k/a Perdue Farms Incorporated and
FPP Business Services, Inc. f/k/a
Perdue Business Services, Inc.,
Appellants-Defendants,
v.
Chad STEPHENS, Guardian of the
Person and Estate of Stacy S. Stephens
and Chad Stephens, Appellees-
Plaintiffs; James K. Melton, Perdue
Foods, LLC f/k/a Perdue Farms
Incorporated and FPP Business
Services, Inc. f/k/a Perdue Business
Services, Inc., Third Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Knox County EMS, Inc., Third Party
Defendant

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 2014.

534 Ross E. Rudolph, Max E. Fiester, Kyle R.

*534
Rudolph, Rudolph Fine Porter & Johnson, LLP,
Evansville, IN, Kevin C. Sehi-ferl, Lucy R. Dollens,
Timothy L. Karns, Frost Brown Todd, LLC,
Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellants.
Matt Parmenter, David G. Hatfield, Monica C.
Gilmore, Parmenter Hatfield & Gilmore, LLP,
Vincennes, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion
OPINION

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 1/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Author: RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants-Defendants, James K. Melton (Melton), Perdue Foods,

LLC flk/a/ Perdue Farms Incorporated (Perdue), and FPP Business
Services, Inc. f/k/a/ Perdue Business Services, Inc. (FPP Business)
(collectively, Appellants), appeal the trial court’s findings of fact
and conclusions thereon determining that the substantive laws of
the State of Illinois apply to a motor vehicle collision which
occurred in the State of Illinois between residents of the State of
Indiana.1 We affirm.

ISSUE

Appellants raise one issue on interlocutory appeal, which we

restate as: Whether the trial court properly held that Illinois
substantive law is applicable to a collision which occurred in
Illinois between two Indiana residents after considering the
535 choice of law factors delineated in Hub *535 bard Manufacturing
Co., Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying lawsuit arose out of a motor vehicle collision

between Appellees-Plaintiffs, Stacy S. Stephens (Stacy) and Chad
Stephens (Chad) (collectively, Stephens) 2 and Melton at the
intersection of U.S. 50 and County Road 900 East in Lawrence
County, Illinois. Stacy, a resident of the State of Indiana, was
within the course and scope of her employment with Knox
County EMS of Vincennes, Indiana, and Melton, also a resident
of the State of Indiana, was within the course and scope of his
employment with Perdue. Perdue, a Maryland corporation and
registered to do business in Illinois, is a wholly owned subsidiary
of FPP Business.

At the time of the accident, Melton had been employed by Perdue

for approximately 14 years as a commercial motor vehicle (CMV)
driver and had made deliveries to Perdue’s poultry farms in
Illinois at least once or twice a week for each of the past 14 years.
Both individuals were making roundtrips that originated in
Indiana and which were designed to return them to their
respective places of employment when their vehicles collided in
Illinois. Although Melton made regular deliveries from Perdue’s
feed mill in Washington, Indiana to its operations in Illinois, this
was the first time Stacy had travelled to Bridgeport, Illinois at the
direction of her employer to transport an Illinois patient to an
appointment in Indiana.

Melton, in a semi tractor-trailer, trav-elled west on U.S. 50, which

has a posted speed limit of 50 mph, at a speed of 58 mph. He was
behind the 2006 Ford Fusion, driven by Stacy, when Stacy began
to slow the car several hundred feet from the intersection in
anticipation of making her turn. She had nearly completed her
left turn onto County Road 900 East when Melton collided into
her vehicle. Melton contends that he was attempting to pass

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 2/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Stacy at the time of impact and claims that Stacy failed to signal
her turn as she approached the intersection. He was issued a
citation for passing within 100 feet of an intersection, which was
adjudicated in the Lawrence Circuit Court, Lawrence County,
Illinois.

On June 9, 2011, the Stephens filed a Complaint against Melton

and Perdue, alleging negligence by Melton in the operation of the
tractor-trailer. Specifically, they contend that:

a) [Melton] drove his vehicle to the left side of the center of

the roadway in an attempt to overtake and pass the vehicle
being operated by [Stacy] when approaching within 100 feet
of and while traversing the intersection of U.S. 50 and County
Road 900 East in the County of Lawrence, State of Illinois in
direct violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-706;

b) [Melton] drove his vehicle to the left of center of the

roadway while attempting to overtake and pass the vehicle
being driven by [Stacy] and in doing so interfered with the
safe operation of the vehicle being operated by [Stacy] in
direct violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-705;

c) [Melton] failed to reduce the speed of his vehicle so as to

avoid colliding with the vehicle being driven by [Stacy] in
direct violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-601;

536 d) [Melton] drove his vehicle at a speed which was in

*536
excess of that which was reasonable and prudent under the
conditions in direct violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-601;

e) [Melton] negligently failed to keep his vehicle under

control at all times;

f) [Melton] negligently failed to keep a reasonable lookout

for the vehicle being operated by [Stacy].

(Appellant’s App. p. 45). In addition, the Stephens claimed that, as

a result of Melton’s negligence, Chad suffered a loss of
consortium.

On February 23, 2012, the Stephens filed an Amended Complaint,

reasserting the negligence claims and adding a new claim against
Perdue, which specified:

a) [Perdue] negligently failed to train [Melton] in the proper

use and operation of a commercial motor vehicle;

b) [Perdue] negligently failed to supervise [Melton] while

operating the commercial motor vehicle they provided to
him;

c) [Perdue] promulgated policies which encouraged its

employees who operated motor vehicles to exceed the posted
speed limit;

d) [Perdue] promulgated policies which encouraged its

employees who operated commercial motor vehicles to drive

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 3/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

at a speed that was in excess of that which was reasonable

and prudent under the conditions.

(Appellant’s App. pp. 53-54). In addition, Chad also asserted a loss

of consortium claim against Perdue.

On July 20, 2012, Appellants filed their motion to determine

applicable law, requesting the trial court to apply Indiana’s
substantive law to the instant cause, in adherence to our supreme
court’s decision in Hubbard Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Greeson, 515
N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987). On August 2, 2012, the Stephens
responded to the motion.

On August 27, 2012, the Stephens filed a Second Amended

Complaint, amending their contentions against Melton and Per-
due, and adding new, direct claims against FPP Business. With
respect to Melton and Perdue, the Stephens added that “[Melton]
drove a commercial motor vehicle in violation § 391.41(a)(i )(I) of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation when he was not
properly medically certified as physically qualified to do so.”
(Appellant’s App. p. 102). The Stephens’ new negligence claim
against FPP Business rests upon the specific contentions that:

a) [FPP Business] negligently failed to train [Melton] in the

proper use and operation of a commercial motor vehicle;

b) [FPP Business] negligently failed to supervise [Melton]

while operating the commercial motor vehicle provided to
him by [Perdue];

c) [FPP Business] promulgated policies which encouraged

the employees of [Perdue] to operate commercial motor
vehicles at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit;

d) [FPP Business] promulgated policies which encouraged

the employees of [Perdue] who operated commercial motor
vehicles to drive at a speed that was in excess of that which
was reasonable and prudent under the conditions.

(Appellant’s App. p. 107). As with the previous Complaints, Chad

also added a loss of consortium claim against FPP Business.

On March 27, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on

Appellants’ motion to determine applicable law. Thereafter, on
June 4, 2013, the trial court issued its findings of fact and
conclusions thereon, holding that the substantive law of Illinois
is applicable to the facts at hand.

537 *537Two days later, on June 6, 2013, the Stephens filed a Third
Amended Complaint. Besides reiterating the allegations included
in the previous Complaints, the Stephens added a claim for
punitive damages against Appellants. With respect to Melton, the
Stephens asserted:

2. That [Melton] knew that he had obstructive sleep apnea

from May 22, 2009 through the time of the motor vehicle
collision[.];

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 4/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

3. That at the time of the collision [ ] [Melton], wantonly,

maliciously, oppressively, or willfully operated a commercial
motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired as a
result of untreated severe obstructive sleep apnea.

4. That at the time of the collision, [ ] [Melton], operated a

commercial motor vehicle while his ability to do was
impaired as a result of untreated severe obstructive sleep
apnea in reckless disregard or indifference to the health and
safety of others, including [] [Stacy].

5. That at all times herein and in the months and years

leading up to the date of the collision [] [Melton] engaged in
conduct that constituted intentional, willful or wanton deceit
in order to obtain or maintain his status with a commercial
driver’s license and employment with [Perdue] by providing
the medical examiners who performed his fitness
determination examinations false, incomplete, or inaccurate
information concerning his health history or failed to
provide them pertinent information concerning his health
history.

6. That the conduct of [Melton] [ ] constituted wanton,

malicious, oppressive, or willful misconduct or constituted a
reckless disregard or indifference to the health and safety of
others, including [Stacy],

7. That the conduct of [Melton] constitutes such conduct for

which punitive damages should be assessed and awarded at
the time of the trial of this cause by the trier of fact.

(Appellant’s App. pp. 269-70). A similar claim against Perdue and

FPP Business is based on the particular assertions that:

e) [Perdue] allowed [Melton] to operate a commercial motor

vehicle when he was not medically qualified to do so in
contravention of 49 CFR § 392.3;

f) [Perdue] failed to develop or implement policies,

programs or procedures to identify, test and remove from
service those commercial motor vehicle drivers with signs,
traits and symptoms of obstructive sleep apnea, including
[Melton];

g) [Perdue] failed to train its commercial motor vehicle

drivers, including [Melton] concerning the hazards of
operating a commercial motor vehicle with untreated sleep
apnea;

h) [Perdue] failed to train the medical examiners who

performed fitness examinations for its commercial motor
vehicle drivers of the signs, traits and symptoms of
obstructive sleep apnea.

(Appellant’s App. pp. 271-72).

In their Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, Appellants

denied any negligence in training, supervision, and screening

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 5/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Melton for obstructive sleep apnea. Additionally, they also

alleged that Stacy should be allocated fault for certain violations
of the Illinois Vehicle Code-Rules of the Road.

In light of this Third Amended Complaint, the Appellants filed a

renewed motion to determine applicable law on June 28, 2013.
The following month, on July 19, 2013, the trial court denied
Appellants’ renewed motion, incorporating into its Order the trial
court’s prior June 4, 2013 findings of fact and conclusion thereon
538 and holding the Illinois’ substantive law appli *538 cable to the
facts before the court. At the same time, the trial court certified
its Order for interlocutory appeal, which this court subsequently
accepted on September 27, 2013.

Additional facts will provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

This interlocutory appeal is limited to the parties’ dispute

concerning the substantive law applicable to the instant case.
Although relying on the same set of eases — Hubbard and Simon v.
U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind.2004) — both parties reach a different
result in applying Indiana’s choice of law rules. Based on these
principles, Appellants argue for the application of Indiana
substantive law, while the trial court concluded, and the Stephens
agree, that Illinois substantive law governs the cause.

I. Standard of Review

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) provides that “[o]n appeal of claims tried
by the court without a jury ... the court on appeal shall not set
aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous[.]” The
court engages in a two-tiered standard of review when applying
this standard. Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d
803, 811 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). First, we consider whether the
evidence supports the findings, construing these findings
liberally in support of the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly
erroneous only when a review of the record leaves us firmly
convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. Next, we determine
whether the findings support the judgment. Id. A judgment is
clearly erroneous when the findings of fact and conclusions
thereon do not support it. Id. However, here, the trial court did
not conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appellants’ renewed
Motion to Determine Applicable Law. Therefore, to the extent the
trial court’s factual findings are based on a paper record, this
court conducts its own de novo review of the record. Equicor Dev.,
Inc. v. Westfield-Washington Twp. Plan Comm’n, 758 N.E.2d 34, 37
(Ind.2001).

II. Indiana’s Choice of Law3

Rules about the choice of law are among the few fields still
539 dominated by judge- *539 made doctrine and choosing the
applicable substantive law for a given case is a decision made by
the courts of the state in which the lawsuit is pending. In 1987,
our supreme court issued Hubbard, its seminal case on Indiana’s

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 6/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

choice of law jurisprudence. Since then, Hubbard and its progeny

have dominated this state’s choice of law landscape.

In Hubbard, our supreme court advocated a multiple step inquiry

to determine Indiana’s choice of law framework in tort cases. As
a preliminary premise, the trial court must determine whether
the differences between the laws of the states are “important
enough to affect the outcome of the litigation.” Hubbard, 515
N.E.2d at 1073. If such a conflict exists, the presumption arises
that the traditional lex loci delicti rule — the place of the wrong —
will apply. Id. Under this initial step, the trial court applies the
substantive law of “the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.” Id.

In a large number of cases, the place of the tort will be

significant and the place with the most contacts. Id. In those
cases, the traditional rule serves well. However, this presumption
is not conclusive. Id. When the place of the tort is an insignificant
contact, then the trial court should be allowed to evaluate other
factors. Id. In these instances, where the place of the tort bears
little connection to the legal action, our supreme court allows the
consideration of factors that may be more relevant, such as: 1)
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 2) the
residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place
where the relationship is centered. Id. at 1073-74.

In Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind.2004), the court clarified
the additional contacts which may be considered when the
location of the tort is deemed insignificant, noting that “[tjhese
factors are not an exclusive list nor are they necessarily relevant
in every case. All contacts should be evaluated according to their
relative importance to the particular issues being litigated.” Id.
This litigation ought to focus on the essential elements of the
whole cause of action, rather than on the issues one party or the
other forecasts will be the most hotly contested given the
anticipated proofs. Id.

Because both parties agree — and we concur — that the

distinction between Indiana’s and Illinois’ substantive law are
important enough to affect the outcome of the litigation, we will
next turn to the lex loci delicti step of the Hubbard inquiry.

A. Lex Loci Delicti

Under this presumption, the court applies the substantive laws of

540 the state *540 where the last event necessary to make an actor
liable for the alleged wrong takes place. Shaw v. LDC Enterprises,
863 N.E.2d 424, 431 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. granted (July 19,
2007), order vaeated and trans. denied (Sept. 18, 2007). “[W]here the
issue is the choice between the law of the place where an
allegedly wrongful act or omission took place and the law of the
place where physical injury was inflicted, the general rule is that
the ‘place of the tort’ is the place where the injury or death was
inflicted and not the place where the allegedly wrongful act or
omission took place.” Id. (citing E.H. Schopler, Annotation, What
is the Place of Tort Causing Personal Injury or Resultant Damage or

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 7/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Death, for Purpose of Principle of Conflict Laws that Law of Place of

Tort Governs, 77 A.L.R.2d 1266, 1273 (1961)).

Although Appellants contest the place where the allegedly

wrongful act took place, they do not dispute that Stacy’s injury
occurred in Illinois. As such, the lex loci delicti is established in
Illinois’ substantive law.

B. Significance of Illinois’ Substantive Law

Contending that the presumption of the lex loci delicti is

overcome in favor of Indiana’s substantive law, Appellants assert
that “[bjecause the gravamen of the Stephens’ claim [] is wholly
centered on conduct which predates the [cjrash and occurred in
Indiana, the place of the tort, Illinois, bears little connection to
this action[.]” (Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 6). Appellants contend that
the Stephens mischaracterize their action as a routine vehicle
accident where liability will be grounded upon violations of the
Illinois rules of the road. Instead, Appellants assert, the core of
the Stephens’ claim is “focused upon [Melton’s] operation of his
tractor-trailer when he allegedly knew, or reasonably should have
known, he suffered from untreated obstructive sleep apnea.”
(Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 5). Clarifying their position, Appellants
maintain that the center of the Stephens’ suit against Melton
emphasizes his untreated sleep apnea, while the claim against
Per-due and FPP Business “wholly” relates to the failure to
provide training and supervision to Melton and promulgation of
appropriate policies — conduct which occurred entirely in
Indiana. (Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 5) (See also Appellants’ Br. pp.
17-18).

It is a “rare case” where the place of the tort is insignificant.

Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806. In fact, Simon appears to suggest that
most cases involving an automobile accident will be governed by
the laws of the state where the accident occurred. See id.
(“[Ujnlike in cases involving an automobile accident, the laws of the
state where the crash occurred did not govern the conduct of the
parties at the time of the accident.”) (emphasis added).

To determine whether this is one of those “rare case[s],” this

court should define “the gravamen” of the Stephens’ complaint.
See Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d 832, 834 (N.D.Ind.1998).
Focusing on the Stephens’ Amended Complaints, we note that all
the allegations stem from Melton’s perceived negligence in
operating his vehicle, be it negligently ignoring the rules of the
road or negligently driving with knowledge of his severe sleep
apnea. Through the doctrine of respondeat superior as well as
through the independent negligence claims of failure of
supervision and training, the Stephens attempt to also hold
Perdue and FPP Business responsible for Stacy’s injuries.
Accordingly, without Melton’s alleged negligence in operating his
vehicle, there would be no need for this lawsuit.

Moreover, even though at first glance, the claims of negligent

541 supervision and *541 training lodged at Perdue and FPP Business
do not find a contact point in Illinois substantive law, we hasten

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 8/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

to clarify that these allegations are also embedded in Illinois’

Rules of the Road. Specifically, 625 ILCS § 5/18b-105 incorporates
certain parts of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, such
as the prohibition that a driver with a respiratory dysfunction is
not medically certifiable to drive a CMV; and the prohibition that
Perdue/FPP Business can require Melton to operate a CMV while
his alertness is likely to be impaired. Although we agree with
Appellants that Perdue and FPP Business’s failure in supervision
and training occurred in Indiana and Maryland, this conduct
only became legally negligent as a result of Melton’s accident in
Illinois.

In addition to emphasizing the location of the tort, the Stephens

also point to Appellants’ claims for contribution against the State
of Illinois based on the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act
pending in the Illinois Court of Claims, alleging Illinois’ alleged
failure to meet applicable highway engineering standards set
forth by the Illinois Department of Transportation; Melton’s
citation issued by the Illinois State Police for passing within 100
feet of an intersection; and Stacy’s pending claim for Illinois’
Workers’ Compensation benefits for injuries as separate contact
points to increase the significance of the lex loci delicti Mindful of
Simon’s directive to include the “essential elements of the whole
cause of action,” we must reject the Workers’ Compensation
Claim as it fails to relate to the gravamen of the Stephens’ action.
See Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806; Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1074
(concluding that Illinois bore little connection because it being
the site of the coroner’s inquest and source of worker’s
compensation benefits did not “relate[ ] to the wrongful death
action”).

Because the drivers’ conduct in operating their motor vehicles

prior to the collision will be the focus of attention to determine
liability, and that conduct was governed by the rules of the road
of the state in which the accident occurred, we conclude that the
presumption of the lex loci delicti remains significant and is not
overcome. See also Tompkins v. Isbell, 543 N.E.2d 680, 682
(Ind.Ct.App.1989) (“[T]he place of the tort in a case arising out of
a motor vehicle accident has extensive connection with the legal
action.”). Moreover, recognizing that the issues presented by
Stephens are substantial and not merely remedial or procedural,
the conduct must be necessarily governed by Illinois’ Rules of the
Road as “people do not take the laws of their home state with
them when they travel but are subject to the laws of the state in
which they act.” Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806. Based on the
circumstances before us, we conclude that the place of the tort is
significant to the action.

However, even if we were to concur with Appellants’ arguments

and conclude that the presumption of the lex loci delicti is
overcome, our analysis of Hubbard’s additional factors would
reach the same result.

B. Second Hubbard Step: Relative Importance of Additional Contacts

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 9/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

Even if we deemed the State of Illinois, as place of the tort, to be

an insignificant contact — which we do not — an analysis of the
additional Hubbard factors would yield a similar outcome.

Where the place of the tort bears little connection to the legal
action, our supreme court allows the consideration of other
factors that may be more relevant, such as: 1) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; 2) the residence or place of
business of the parties; and 8) the place where the relationship is
542 centered. Hub *542 bard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74. “These factors are
not an exclusive list nor are they necessarily relevant in every
case.” Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 805. All contacts “should be evaluated
according to their relative importance to the particular issues
being litigated.” Id.

Maintaining that the collision only took place in Illinois by

accident, Appellants content that the real connection lies in
Indiana. They especially refer to the second contact point —
domicile—to bolster their claim: both Melton and Stacy are
Indiana residents and were employed by Indiana-based
corporations at the time of the accident. Focusing on the
negligent acts of supervision, Appellants argue that “[a]lthough
the effect of those allegedly negligent acts may have been felt in
Illinois, the conduct which is of the greatest significance to the
Stephens’ claims (ie., that Melton operated his tractor-trailer
when he knew, or reasonably should have known, that he
suffered from untreated obstructive sleep apnea and that Perdue
and/or FPP [Business] failed to provide Melton with training on
the dangers of driving a[CMV] with untreated sleep apnea) is
rooted in Indiana.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 10). Thus, Appellants
assert that the Hubbard factors favor Indiana because “the
relationship between the two drivers and their employers, which
took them on routes just over the Indiana border, are centered in
Indiana.” (Appellants’ Br. p. 19).

Although we agree that the residence element of the Hubbard test

favors Indiana, as both Melton and Stacy are Indiana residents,
working for Indiana-based companies, neither of the other two
elements support the application of Indiana substantive law to
this cause. Despite Appellants’ arguments to center the
relationship in Indiana, the ‘relationship’ between the two actors
in the collision only came into existence through the accident in
Illinois. There is no evidence, and the parties cannot point us to
any, that their paths crossed anywhere else but in Illinois.

Furthermore, unlike Appellants, we deem the place of the

conduct causing injury to be centered in Illinois. We have
defined the gravamen of the Stephens’ Complaint to be Melton’s
negligent operation of his vehicle. Therefore, this conduct is
necessarily governed by the law of the state in which he
negligently acted, ie., Illinois. Even though the Stephens asserted
negligent training and supervision against Perdue and FPP
Business through the doctrine of respondeat superior, this
negligence only became actionable when the injury occurred at
the time of the collision. As our supreme court noted in Simon,

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 10/13
1/13/2021 Melton v. Stephens, 13 N.E.3d 533 (2014) | Caselaw Access Project

[i]f the state of conduct has a law regulating how the

tortfeasor or victim is supposed to act in the particular
situation, courts will apply that standard rather than the law
of the parties’ residence. In fact, this preference of the
conduct-regulating law of the conduct state is virtually
absolute, winning out even over the law of other interested
states. Courts as a practical matter recognize a conduct-
regulating exception to the normal interest-based choice-of-
law methods.... This is also true in Indiana.

Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 807 n. 12. See also Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 17
F.Supp.2d 832, 836 (N.D.Ind.1998) (“Each state has an interest in
having its policies applied to its residents and to conduct that
occurs within its borders.”).

Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that in the case

at bar, the place of the tort has extensive connection with the
legal action, and thus, the doctrine of lex loci delicti retains its
vitality. We hold that the trial court correctly applied the
543 *543 Hubbard test and concluded that Illinois substantive law
governs the action.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly

held that Illinois substantive law is applicable to a collision which
occurred in Illinois between two Indiana residents.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J. and ROBB, J. concur.

1 . We held oral argument in this case on June 24, 2014 at the Court of
Appeals Courtroom in Indianapolis, Indiana. We thank counsel of
both parties for their excellent advocacy.

2 . Although the caption of the Briefs read "Ap-pellees-Plaintiffs, Chad

Stephens, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Stacy S. Stephens,
and Chad Stephens,” during the pendency of this appeal we granted
the motion of substitution, filed by Chad Stephens, as Guardian, to
substitute him with the real party in interest, Stacy S. Stephens.

3 . Appellants spent the major part of their Brief attempting to

persuade us that an anomalous result would ensue if Illinois law is
applied to the instant facts. Relying on the Illinois precedent
established in Murphy v. Mancari’s Chiysler Plymouth, Inc., 408
Ill.App.3d 722, 350 Ill.Dec. 164, 948 N.E.2d 233 (2011), and
construing Illinois choice of law rules, Appellants suggest that
Indiana law should be applied to the collision. Appellants maintain
that applying Illinois' substantive law would create an anomaly as
the forums bordering Indiana would not reach a similar result.

However, this cause was filed in Indiana and pursuant to Indiana's

choice of law rules, the starting point is Indiana law — not Illinois
law. See Hubbard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (1987)

https://cite.case.law/ne3d/13/533/ 11/13