EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the direction of the Speaker of the House, Lieutenant General Russel L. Honore, USA
(Retired) led an immediate forward-looking, non-partisan, six-week review for the purpose of
identifying actions or decisions that could be taken immediately or in the near-term to improve
the security of the Capitol, Members, and staff. To complete this review, a team of experienced
professionals with law enforcement, legal, personal protection, intelligence, operational, and
Congressional experience was assembled, hereafter referred to as Task Force 1-6. Specifically,
the Task Force was directed to review and provide recommendations in the following areas:
Capitol security operations, infrastructure physical security, and Member security in their
Congressional districts, their residences, and during travel. * All findings were passed to the
House Sergeant at Arms.

Given the immediacy of the review, the members of the Task Force met with the
leadership, staff and members of the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP); the House and Senate
Sergeants at Arms; the Architect of the Capitol (AOC); the Mayor of the District of Columbia;
the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD); the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments (MWCoG); numerous Federal Law Enforcement Partners (FBI, DHS, FPS); the
Departments of Defense and the Army; the Pentagon Force Protection Agency; and the National
Guard Bureau and relevant subordinate commands, such as the D.C. National Guard. The Task
Force also met with Congressional Members and staff, both as individuals and as Congressional
committee leaders for both the Senate and House.

While the review focused on the House side of the Capitol, there are several institutional
challenges unique to securing the Capitol. Most evident is the inherent tension between public

*Although the facts and circumstances that led to the events of January 6 remain under investigation by others, we make our
recommendations based on what we were able to learn and observe within the compressed timeframe of our review.
access and physical security. Any security measure that reduces physical access to the Capitol
complex makes it less accessible to the public it serves. As representatives of the people,
Members understandably seek to be available to their constituents and transparent about their
travel and activities, yet such openness can create physical security vulnerabilities. As such, a
bicameral approach to security improvements is essential to reducing vulnerabilities and
safeguarding Members in the Capitol and in their Districts. This may require Members to
overcome institutional reluctance to appropriate tax dollars to fund necessary security
improvements in support of the legislative branch. The Task Force recognizes that
implementation of its recommendations will ultimately be shaped by political, budgetary, and
other considerations.

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

Intelligence

Intelligence Focus. Threats against the Capitol and Members have shifted dramatically over the
past year, both in volume and nature. Today’s threats are not only more numerous but
increasingly come from domestic elements. Individuals and groups advocating extremist views
actively use the internet to propagandize, recruit, radicalize, and organize political violence such
as the Capitol Attack. Some also target Members with threats of violence. The USCP is not
postured to track, assess, plan against, or respond to this plethora of threats due to significant
capacity shortfalls, inadequate training, immature processes, and an operating culture that is not
intelligence-driven.

Intelligence Capacity. Fewer than a handful of people in the USCP have significant intelligence
training. Previously oriented on foreign terrorist threats, the understaffed Intelligence and
Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) lacks the experience, knowledge, and processes to
provide intelligence support against emerging domestic threats. It urgently requires a modest
increase of trained analysts to support USCP threat intelligence requirements. This larger team
must standardize its intelligence processes and will require regular professionalization training,
modern analytic tools, secure workstations, and classified workspace to function capably.

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Intelligence Awareness, Assessment, and Sharing. Decades of experience with foreign terror
threats prove that success comes through close collaboration across the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to obtain early warning and gain collective understanding. Several
elements in the National Capitol Region (NCR) monitor intelligence and law enforcement
reporting as well as social media and dark web traffic to identify potential threats and develop
coherent threat assessments. Coordination between participating agencies in conjunction with
National Special Security Events (NSSEs) is historically good. However, outside of NSSEs, the
USCP did not routinely interact with many of these agencies below the executive level. The
USCP has liaison officers at the Joint Terrorism Task Force and elsewhere, but very few are
trained intelligence analysts. The IICD must sustain routine interaction at the analyst level with
organizations that look at similar threats in the NCR or to Congressional Members and staff. The
USCP would also be well served by placing intelligence specialists in the Washington Joint
Terrorism Task Force and accepting augmentation or liaison officers from the NCR Threat
Identification Center.

Due largely to their lack of capacity and integration, the IICD has not provided significant
operational decision-making information. Because of this apparent limited perceived value, the
rest of the USCP did not routinely engage with the IICD, did not shape intelligence
requirements, and did not drive or demand improvements in intelligence support. The IICD did
not consistently produce written intelligence assessments in part because there was no perceived
audience for them and with limited resources, written production became a low priority.

Intelligence – Operations Integration. Threat identification and understanding is not the sole
responsibility of the intelligence staff. Operators who engage daily with the public near the
Capitol Building have a responsibility to cue or inform intelligence as threats develop and new
tactics emerge. The lack of partnership and ownership by operators for their role in
understanding and developing intelligence priorities is a key element of poor threat
identification. Similarly, leaders across the USCP have a responsibility to demand that the
intelligence team look beyond imminent events to confirm or deny developing threats and to
inform operational training and preparation across the USCP. Until recently, threat briefings to
the broader team did not routinely occur. The USCP Command Center staffing does not include
a representative from the intelligence team. There was no intelligence update as part of the shift
change brief nor was there a standard mechanism for alerting USCP when a critical incident has

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occurred. Increased IICD capacity should allow consistent intelligence representation in the
Command Center.

USCP leadership must actively integrate intelligence functions into the USCP’s daily
operations, force protection decisions, and future planning. This will require additional
intelligence research specialists and supervisory analysts, training on analytic methodologies and
software tools, and the procurement of equipment to accommodate a more robust team. Just as
critically, however, this will require a dramatic, consistent, leader-driven shift in the USCP’s
cultural mindset toward intelligence-driven operations.

Capitol Police Board Decision-making During Emergencies

The CPB’s deliberate decision-making process proved too slow and cumbersome to respond to
the crisis in January, delaying requests for critical supplemental resources. We recommend
revisions to the USCP’s statutory requirements (2 U.S. Code §§ 1970, 1974) for seeking
augmentation when necessary to save lives or prevent wanton destruction of property, and to
restore government functions. Specifically, the USCP Chief should not require CPB approval to
request assistance from external agencies or the National Guard in an emergency. Moreover,
when conducting crucial advanced planning for mass demonstrations, the USCP Chief should
have an avenue to appeal denial of support requests or inaction by the Board to House and
Senate leadership.

Dedicated Quick Reaction Force to the District of Columbia

Our national capital is a prominent tourist destination, venue for many peaceful First
Amendment activities, and a high-value target for foreign terrorists or domestic extremists yet it
has no dedicated QRF for response to crises. The USCP relies on augmentation from other
civilian law enforcement agencies for emergency support but we recommend establishment of a
robust, dedicated QRF, not only for the USCP, but to serve the nation’s capital writ large.
Mobilized National Guard forces currently supplement the USCP, which is temporarily sufficient
but not a permanent solution. We propose three long-term options for consideration, all of which
involve the Executive Branch. The first would be to establish a QRF from existing federal law
enforcement entities with appropriate legal authorities and appropriations to staff, train and equip
such a force. The second would be to build QRF under the command of the DC National Guard.
This could be done by mobilizing military police from Guard elements across the U.S. on

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rotations of three to six months. Another option would be to create a QRF that permanently
resides within the DC Guard by reestablishing a military police battalion and staffing it with
Active Guard Reserve troops who live in or near the city year-round, perpetually on active duty.

The U.S. Capitol Police

USCP Force Structure. The USCP were understaffed, insufficiently equipped, and inadequately
trained to secure the Capitol and Members when violently attacked by a large mob. To remedy
personnel shortfalls, the Task Force recommends several changes. First, the USCP should hire
sufficient officers to fill all current vacancies; this is now 233 officers. The Task Force identified
several specific areas for additional capacity, as detailed throughout this report. Due to a lack of
available personnel and increasing demands, the USCP has employed a vast amount of overtime
to meet mission requirements (nearly 720,000 overtime hours in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and over
55 percent of enacted overtime in just the first five months of FY 2021). Not only is this model
unsustainable, it leaves the force with no ability to pull officers from the line to train at the
individual, leader, or collective level or to prepare for evolving threats. As such, the Task Force
recommends the USCP receive an additional 350 authorizations to reduce overtime costs and
adequately fulfill its assigned missions. We further recommend the USCP receive 534 additional
authorizations to fill assessed capability gaps, which includes intelligence specialists, operational
planners, supervisors, Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) personnel and trainers, and dignitary
protection agents, to name just a few. This results in a total “plus-up” of 884 authorizations to the
USCP. These personnel increases will require adequate appropriations to meet USCP recruiting
objectives and initial training and onboarding requirements. The Task Force recommends
consideration of alternative recruitment methods such as inclusion of lateral hiring practices to
achieve recruiting goals.

USCP Force Training and Leader Development. The USCP has a sound system for training
new officers so they are fully qualified before assuming their duties. Once they enter the force,
however, the officer utilization rate is so high that they cannot step out of their operational roles
for follow-on or refresher training. Addressing manpower issues should resolve this problem, but
the USCP should also reexamine and upgrade their training curricula to incorporate the most
modern police tactics. There are even greater shortcomings when it comes to collective training,
i.e. training together as teams. Collective training is imperative for elements that operate as units,

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like CDUs or Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), but there is tremendous value in collective training
for the rest of the force as well. Prior to NSSEs, leaders from security elements across the NCR
come together to prepare as a group and conduct table-top rehearsals. USCP leadership
participate in these collective training events but must follow-up with similar rehearsals with the
rest of the USCP. We recommend the USCP plan and execute a collective training event every
quarter against a different contingency situation, wrapping in members of the Capitol Police
Board (CPB) and interagency partners to ensure collective readiness in a crisis.

The USCP usually selects leaders from its own ranks but offers little in the way of leader
development training after promotion to supervisor. Leader development is especially critical in
organizations that may operate in crisis situations or are charged with saving lives. Well-
prepared leaders can operate with agility and confidence in complex situations, making sound
decisions under pressure. An active training and progressive leader development program and
schooling to include a transition course from Private First Class to Sergeant will enhance every
USCP leader’s ability to perform in a crisis. The USCP must also institute a deliberate program
of After-Action Reviews following every significant operational event or training exercise in
order to leverage organizational and individual experience while it is fresh to maximize learning,
address deficiencies, and sustain excellence.

USCP Implementation of the National Incident Management System. On January 6th, the
USCP were challenged to effectively incorporate reinforcing elements from external units. We
recommend they develop and practice standardized procedures for employing outside law
enforcement in accordance with the National Incident Management System’s Incident Command
System. Such practices include operating a staging area for receipt of supplemental forces,
administrative onboarding, assignment of tasks, and initial deployment of supporting personnel.
These processes are essential for providing the Incident Commander with an awareness of
arriving assets, their numbers and capabilities, specialized equipment, specifically trained
personnel, and other vital information. They also provide a means to rapidly brief new arrivals
on the situation and establish communications within the radio network. Without such processes,
integration is not very effective and is not driven by an overarching operational command.

USCP Operations and Equipment Requirements. Internal communications were a problem

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have allowed leaders to bypass the constant, high-volume tactical chatter to communicate
without the interruption of other radio traffic. The USCP must take full advantage of its highly
capable radio system to prevent confusion and establish clear command and control. Without
earpieces, many officers were also unable to hear or understand radio communications due to
overwhelming noise from the crowd. Every officer must be equipped with earpieces as part of
his or her uniform and directed to wear them. This should not be optional. We also recommend
the USCP be equipped with Body-Worn Cameras (BWC), an item not currently in their
inventory, to improve police accountability and protect officers from false accusations of
misconduct. BWC also provide visual and audio evidence that can independently verify what
happened in any given situation, leading to better investigations and prosecutions when needed.

USCP Force Capability Enhancements

Civil Defense Units (CDU). CDUs are specially trained and can be activated and assembled to
monitor and respond to illegal activities that present themselves during First Amendment
assemblies, mass demonstrations, or civil unrest. USCP CDU are currently only available when
planned for in advance, limiting the USCP’s ability to react immediately to spontaneous
threatening events. We recommend the USCP maintain dedicated CDU platoons on duty any
time Congress is in session. Additionally, all USCP Uniformed Services Bureau officers should
receive basic civil disturbance training and be issued essential riot gear, including less-lethal
equipment, for situations in which additional manpower is needed to back up CDU platoons.

Explosive Detection Dog (EDD). EDD teams play a key role in providing comprehensive
security. With an ability to detect explosive odors down to parts-per-trillion, their utility in
providing a first line of defense cannot be overemphasized. Unfortunately, the USCP K9 unit is
challenged to meet increasing operational requirements due to unfilled positions, non-mission
capable teams, and aging dogs. Besides filling existing vacancies, the USCP should consider
increasing the size of the EDD force so they may also be employed more broadly. The USCP
should recruit and hire additional EDD handlers, equip them with civil disturbance equipment,
and procure additional K9s where vacancies and K9 retirements are needed.

USCP Mounted Unit. The USCP should also consider reestablishing a mounted unit,
recognized elsewhere as providing a less lethal law enforcement force multiplier. Best used in
high pedestrian and dense crowd areas, a well-trained horse and rider can assist in controlling

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crowds or quelling disturbances with few serious injuries to demonstrators. They increase
mobility, allowing officers to reach a scene more efficiently than on foot or in a vehicle. A
rider’s elevated position allows them to better assess a crowd and its actions, eliminate or curtail
face-to-face confrontations, and provide a calming effect on a crowd in tense situations. Police
horses can also serve as “moving walls” capable of shifting large crowds or separating
antagonistic groups. Mounted units have been reestablished in other jurisdictions such as Tampa,
Chicago, and Atlanta due to their operational effectiveness. The USCP’s former Mounted Unit,
disbanded in 2005, was prepared to provide immediate emergency response, assist in searches
for lost or wanted persons, assist in crowd management, and perform in ceremonial details.

National Capitol Region Integrated Security Plan

There is no overarching integrated security plan for the NCR, which consists of the District of
Columbia and six counties in Maryland and Virginia. Some law enforcement elements, like the
U.S. Park Police and USCP, have geographic jurisdictions. Others, such as the U.S. Secret
Service, are functional. Reporting chains are even more complex, with various entities reporting
to different governors, the D.C. mayor, or federal agencies. Cooperation is built on mutual aid
agreements through the MWCoG, which works well for fire, emergency services, and NSSEs but
daily or emergency coordination can be challenging. We recommend a federal agency such as
DHS, lead a collaborative effort inclusive of the Capitol Police Board, and designees from the
Office of the Governor for the states of Maryland and Virginia, and the Mayor of the District of
Columbia. The collective planning effort would be key to developing a shared understanding for
any response effort and better enable unity of effort. This plan should be exercised quarterly
through table-top exercises and reinforced in daily operations.

Clarification of DoD Directive 3025.18 Concerning the Commander, DC National Guard

Procedures that delay requests for and approval of USCP augmentation by law enforcement and
military personnel should be modified to facilitate a rapid response in extremis. DoD Directives
are one area where clarity could be improved. We recommend DoD Directives be amended to
make clear that, notwithstanding any restrictions on employment of the DC National Guard in
non-emergency situations, the Commanding General of the DC National Guard shall retain
“emergency authority” as defined in DoD Directive 3025.18 “in extraordinary emergency
circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local

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authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are
necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances” when necessary “to prevent
significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore
governmental function and proper order.”

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The Task Force recommendations listed hereafter require immediate action and appropriations to
enable where appropriate the AOC or the USCP to initiate contracting actions and begin work on
much-needed security improvements as soon as possible.

Capitol Fencing and Infrastructure Improvements

In securing the Capitol grounds, competing desires for maximum public access and guaranteed
security create a situation where neither goal is achieved. No fence presents an insurmountable
barrier. Obstacles do not prevent penetration by themselves, but serve to slow or canalize
intruders, allowing security forces to focus a response to specific sites as necessary. For full
effectiveness, obstacles also require unblinking observation from human eyes, cameras, or other
sensors. The current, temporary security fence surrounds such a tremendous area that it requires
significant personnel resources to monitor its entire length. As the fencing comes down, we
recommend it be replaced with a mobile fencing option that is easily erected and deconstructed
and an integrated, retractable fencing system in the long term to secure both the Capitol and
office buildings. Such a solution could enable an open campus while giving security forces better
options to protect the complex and its Members should a threat develop.

Due to previous piecemeal or incremental modernization efforts, many facets of the

Mobility Within the Capitol During Emergencies

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The evacuation of the Capitol was an extraordinary event in which USCP and U.S. Secret
Service leveraged accessible, unimpeded routes to move Members, and staff to safety. Such
evacuations should be adequately rehearsed. Appropriate improvements to infrastructure and the
procurement of relevant technologies should be expedited to enable wayfinding during
emergencies, as outlined in our report. Lastly, the AOC should install means to selectively
compartmentalize areas of the Capitol complex, also detailed in our report.

Capitol Complex Screening Procedures, Tools, and Infrastructure

Background Checks. The Capitol complex must review its screening procedures, and its use
and application of background checks for identification card holders and must expand
employment of modern tools throughout the complex to enhance the safety of all Members, staff,
and legislative employees. Requiring background checks for identification card holders and
employing card readers more widely throughout the complex would decrease insider threat risks
and enhance the safety of all Members, staff, and legislative employees.

Screening Portals and Access Points. Screening portals for visitors and staff should provide
guards sufficient time to observe approaching individuals at a distance and provide sufficient
space for processing workers and visitors. The AOC is procuring screening vestibules for the
Capitol’s south and north entrances that will more appropriately serve the building’s needs. This
work should be expedited and expanded to other buildings where needed. The Architect should
also expedite repair and hardening of vulnerable windows and doors, prioritizing this work based
on assessed vulnerabilities.

House Information Technology Systems and Cybersecurity

Although the House has centralized portions of information technology management (IT), the
current oversight model results in a decentralized cybersecurity strategy that could lead to gaps
in security and privacy throughout the organization. Centralizing IT authority would ensure best
practices are utilized to minimize cybersecurity risk and provide comprehensive oversight of IT
systems, administrators, and processes.

USCP Command Center and Infrastructure Requirements

The USCP headquarters and Command Center facilities are subpar and require substantial
renovation or replacement to accommodate adequate primary and alternate command, control,

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and coordination functions, and provide sufficient secure office space and resources to support
officer training, equipment storage, and daily work. The Task Force also recommends
improvements to address continuity of operations considerations.

MEMBER SECURITY WHILE TRAVELING AND IN THEIR DISTRICTS

Member Security During Travel

Dignitary Protection Services. The Member threat environment is not confined to the Capitol
Complex. Although the USCP’s Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) provides adequate security
to House leadership, other Members, faced with varying threat levels, have limited or
inconsistent protection at their homes, in their districts, and while in transit. When the threat
warrants, the DPD assigns a dignitary protection team to a Member for a period, but this process
is not standardized or evenly applied. The DPD should develop a threat-based protection model
that can be consistently applied to non-leadership, allocating protection resources based on an
evaluation of risk to Members and their families. With communicated threats against Members
tracking at nearly four times last year’s level, the DPD should also increase in size to viably
handle growing demand for Member security. Admittedly, not every threat is credible, but every
threat warrants attention and must be taken seriously. Upon investigation, some percentage of
threats will shape a change in travel plans or warrant extra security precautions.

Member Security Systems and Tools. Member travel security is not handled efficiently. The
process is largely manual, labor intensive, and fails to fully leverage federal, state, and local
partnerships along the transit route, in the home district, and near the Member’s residence. The
Task Force recommends the USCP establish a modestly staffed, technology-enabled Member
Travel Operations Center (MTOC) to centrally manage Members’ travel security needs. A
regional focus within the MTOC and close collaboration with the House Sergeant at Arms
District Service Centers would facilitate consistent relationships between Members’ offices,
MTOC facilitators, and the supporting state and local law enforcement communities.

Member Security in their Congressional Districts and Residences.

Security is also inconsistent across the approximately 900 Congressional district offices. The
HSAA contracts security systems for many of these offices but should establish a plan to cover

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all of them through the same process. Installing and monitoring these security systems for 100
percent coverage will require additional funds. Members presently use personal resources and
campaign funds to procure security systems for their homes. Members’ home security needs and
their ability to finance security requirements vary considerably. We recommend Congress
appropriate sufficient funds to the HSAA to manage a Member allowance for installation and
monitoring of a standard residential security system.

Conclusion

The breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6 brought into stark relief the need to immediately
improve the security of the Capitol Complex and the security of Congressional Members and
staff. Immediate action is therefore required:

• The Congress must immediately fund infrastructure contracts managed by the Architect
of the Capitol to repair or replace doors and windows, authorize mobile fencing design
and procurement, and authorize U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ assessment of long-term
improvements to perimeter fencing and security surveillance and sensing systems.
• The Congress and the Capitol Police Board must immediately amend relevant statutory
and internal Board policies to better enable crisis decision-making and empower the
USCP Chief to initiate timely augmentation in emergencies.
• The Capitol Police Board must immediately approve the U.S. Capitol Police Chief’s
outstanding request for security augmentation from the National Guard.
• The Congress must direct the USCP to take immediate action to eliminate personnel
shortfalls, currently 233 officers, through enhanced recruiting and incentive programs.
• The Congress must immediately authorize a USCP force structure increase and
appropriate sufficient funding to hire the additional 350 officers needed to buy-down the
long-standing and well-documented overtime problem within the USCP.
• The USCP must immediately:
• Improve intelligence integration, develop daily intelligence summaries, and
disseminate relevant and needed intelligence to front line leaders.
• Conduct necessary individual training and leader development, rehearsals, and after-
action reviews.

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 • Participate in the MWCoG Police Chiefs Group and approve appropriate Mutual Aid
Agreements.
• Implement the National Incident Management System and rehearse the Incident
Command System
• The Congress must immediately authorize appropriations to enable the Sergeants at Arms
to procure security systems for all Member district offices and residences; this includes
appropriations for design and procurement of technologies and software applications to
improve coordination for Member security needs.

In the coming days, against the backdrop of inquiry and investigation, Congress will engage in
spirited debate over the Capitol’s current security arrangements and the change necessary to
better secure the Capitol and safeguard its Members, staff, and employees. As you consider the
recommendations of this Task Force, we must not forget it was the riotous actions of an angry
mob that laid bare the vulnerabilities of the Capitol complex. We must not long endure any
discourse that prevents or delays efforts necessary to strengthen the security of the U.S. Capitol
complex and enhance the safety of those who serve the American people in Congress.

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