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    Danilo Tabas V CMC

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    CZARINA ANN CASTRO
    The petitioners worked as promotional merchandisers for California Manufacturing Company through the labor contractor Livi Manpower Service. California Manufacturing argued it was not the direct employer. The court ruled that both California Manufacturing and Livi Manpower shared employer responsibilities under the law. As the petitioners worked for over 6 months, they qualified as regular employees of California Manufacturing entitled to protections under the labor code. The nature of the work arrangement and right of control determined the employer-employee relationship, regardless of contractual designations.

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    Danilo Tabas V CMC

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    CZARINA ANN CASTRO
    96 views2 pages
    The petitioners worked as promotional merchandisers for California Manufacturing Company through the labor contractor Livi Manpower Service. California Manufacturing argued it was not the direct employer. The court ruled that both California Manufacturing and Livi Manpower shared employer responsibilities under the law. As the petitioners worked for over 6 months, they qualified as regular employees of California Manufacturing entitled to protections under the labor code. The nature of the work arrangement and right of control determined the employer-employee relationship, regardless of contractual designations.

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    2. Danilo Tabas v CMC

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    The petitioners worked as promotional merchandisers for California Manufacturing Company through the labor contractor Livi Manpower Service. California Manufacturing argued it was not the direct employer. The court ruled that both California Manufacturing and Livi Manpower shared employer responsibilities under the law. As the petitioners worked for over 6 months, they qualified as regular employees of California Manufacturing entitled to protections under the labor code. The nature of the work arrangement and right of control determined the employer-employee relationship, regardless of contractual designations.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    96 views2 pages

    Danilo Tabas V CMC

    Uploaded by

    CZARINA ANN CASTRO
    The petitioners worked as promotional merchandisers for California Manufacturing Company through the labor contractor Livi Manpower Service. California Manufacturing argued it was not the direct employer. The court ruled that both California Manufacturing and Livi Manpower shared employer responsibilities under the law. As the petitioners worked for over 6 months, they qualified as regular employees of California Manufacturing entitled to protections under the labor code. The nature of the work arrangement and right of control determined the employer-employee relationship, regardless of contractual designations.

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    of 2

    G.R. No.

    80680 January 26, 1989


    Danilo B. Tabas, petitioner,
    v.
    California Manufacturing Company, respondents.
    Facts:
    • Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various
    benefits, including minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteen-month pay, and
    emergency cost of living allowance pay, against the respondent.
    • The respondent company then denied the existence of an employer-employee
    relationship between the company and the petitioners.
    • Petitioners prior to their involvement with California Manufacturing Company were
    employees of Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor, which assigned them to
    work as “promotional merchandisers”, pursuant to a manpower supply agreement.
    • The agreement provides that: “California has no control or supervisions whatsoever over
    Livi’s workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform California’s
    obligation”.
    • It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be
    on a “seasonal and contractual basis”; that “cost of living allowance and the 10 legal
    holidays will be charged directly to California at cost “; and that “payroll for the preceding
    week shall be delivered by Livi at California’s premises.”
    Issue: Whether or not California or Livi is liable for the petitioners
    Ruling:
    • The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it
    cannot be made the subject of agreement.
    • Hence, the fact that the manpower supply agreement between Livi and California had
    specifically designated the former as the petitioners' employer and had absolved the
    latter from any liability as an employer, will not erase either party's obligations as an
    employer, if an employer-employee relation otherwise exists between the workers and
    either firm. At any rate, since the agreement was between Livi and California, they alone
    are bound by it, and the petitioners cannot be made to suffer from its adverse
    consequences.
    • Both shoulder the responsibility.
    • Based on Article 106, “labor-only” contractor is considered merely as an agent of the
    employer, and the liability must be shouldered by either one or shared by both.
    • There is no doubt that, Livi performs “manpower services”, it contracts out labor in favor
    of clients.
    • The nature of one’s business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches
    thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law.
    • The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal
    fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter’s own business.
    • In this connection, the Court does not agree that the petitioners had been made to
    perform activities ‘which are not directly related to the general business of
    manufacturing,” California’s purported “principal operation activity.”
    • Livi, as a placement agency, had simply supplied California with the manpower necessary
    to carry out its California’s merchandising activities, using its California’s premises and
    equipment.
    • Furthermore, the petitioners had been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for
    another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular
    employees of California and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be
    separated without due process of law.

    Notes:
    o There is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the
    manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of
    payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the
    presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the
    four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor.
    o ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. - Whenever an employee enters into a
    contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the
    employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid
    in accordance with the provisions of this Code. In the event that the contractor or
    subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code,
    the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
    subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the
    contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
    employed by him.
    o ARTICLE 281. Probationary employment. – Probationary employment shall not
    exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
    covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services
    of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated
    for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
    reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of
    his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period
    shall be considered a regular employee.

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