Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
"No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." 1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 assailing the February 27, 2008 Decision
3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100094, which reversed and set aside the
Decision 4 dated April 19, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 192, Marikina City
in Civil Case No. 06-1145-MK. The said RTC Decision a rmed in all respects the Decision 5
dated June 30, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 75, Marikina City in
Civil Case No. 05-7755, which ordered respondent L & J Development Company (L&J) to
pay petitioner Architect Rolando C. De La Paz (Rolando) its principal obligation of
P350,000.00, plus 12% interest per annum reckoned from the ling of the Complaint until
full payment of the obligation.
Likewise assailed is the CA's June 6, 2008 Resolution 6 which denied Rolando's
Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On December 27, 2000, Rolando lent P350,000.00 without any security to L&J, a
property developer with Atty. Esteban Salonga (Atty. Salonga) as its President and General
Manager. The loan, with no speci ed maturity date, carried a 6% monthly interest, i.e.,
P21,000.00. From December 2000 to August 2003, L&J paid Rolando a total of
P576,000.00 7 representing interest charges. AHDaET
As L&J failed to pay despite repeated demands, Rolando led a Complaint 8 for
Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against L&J and Atty. Salonga in his personal
capacity before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-7755. Rolando alleged, among
others, that L&J's debt as of January 2005, inclusive of the monthly interest, stood at
P772,000.00; that the 6% monthly interest was upon Atty. Salonga's suggestion; and, that
the latter tricked him into parting with his money without the loan transaction being
reduced into writing.
In their Answer, 9 L&J and Atty. Salonga denied Rolando's allegations. While they
acknowledged the loan as a corporate debt, they claimed that the failure to pay the same
was due to a fortuitous event, that is, the nancial di culties brought about by the
economic crisis. They further argued that Rolando cannot enforce the 6% monthly interest
for being unconscionable and shocking to the morals. Hence, the payments already made
should be applied to the P350,000.00 principal loan.
During trial, Rolando testi ed that he had no communication with Atty. Salonga prior
to the loan transaction but knew him as a lawyer, a son of a former Senator, and the owner
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of L&J which developed Brentwood Subdivision in Antipolo where his associate Nilo
Velasco (Nilo) lives. When Nilo told him that Atty. Salonga and L&J needed money to nish
their projects, he agreed to lend them money. He personally met with Atty. Salonga and
their meeting was cordial.
He narrated that when L&J was in the process of borrowing the P350,000.00 from
him, it was Arlene San Juan (Arlene), the secretary/treasurer of L&J, who negotiated the
terms and conditions thereof. She said that the money was to nance L&J's housing
project. Rolando claimed that it was not he who demanded for the 6% monthly interest. It
was L&J and Atty. Salonga, through Arlene, who insisted on paying the said interest as they
asserted that the loan was only a short-term one. ESCcaT
a) ordering the defendant L & J Development Co., Inc. to pay plaintiff the
amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) representing the
principal obligation, plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum to be
computed from January 20, 2005, the date of the ling of the complaint, until the
whole obligation is fully paid;
b) ordering the defendant L & J Development Co., Inc. to pay plaintiff the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and
SO ORDERED. 11
SO ORDERED. 15
SO ORDERED. 19
In his Motion for Reconsideration, 20 Rolando argued that the circumstances exempt
both the application of Article 1956 and of jurisprudence holding that a 6% monthly
interest is unconscionable, unreasonable, and exorbitant. He alleged that Atty. Salonga, a
lawyer, should have taken it upon himself to have the loan and the stipulated rate of
interest documented but, by way of legal maneuver, Atty. Salonga, whom he fully trusted
and relied upon, tricked him into believing that the undocumented and uncollateralized loan
was within legal bounds. Had Atty. Salonga told him that the stipulated interest should be
in writing, he would have readily assented. ESIcaC
It may be raised that L&J is estopped from questioning the interest rate considering
that it has been paying Rolando interest at such rate for more than two and a half years. In
fact, in its pleadings before the MeTC and the RTC, L&J merely prayed for the reduction of
interest from 6% monthly to 1% monthly or 12% per annum. However, in Ching v. Nicdao, 24
the daily payments of the debtor to the lender were considered as payment of the principal
amount of the loan because Article 1956 was not complied with. This was notwithstanding
the debtor's admission that the payments made were for the interests due. The Court
categorically stated therein that "[e]stoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited
by law or one that is against public policy."
Even if the payment of interest has been
reduced in writing, a 6% monthly
interest rate on a loan is unconscionable,
regardless of who between the parties
proposed the rate.
Indeed at present, usury has been legally non-existent in view of the suspension of
the Usury Law 25 by Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982. 26 Even so, not all interest rates
levied upon loans are permitted by the courts as they have the power to equitably reduce
unreasonable interest rates. In Trade & Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation, 27 we said:
While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts
and who are expected to comply with their terms and obligations, this rule is not
absolute. Stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and the
Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested
power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court must
consider the circumstances of each case. What may be iniquitous and
unconscionable in one case, may be just in another. . . . 28
Time and again, it has been ruled in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates
of 3% per month and higher, are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such
stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. 29 The Court,
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however, stresses that these rates shall be invalidated and shall be reduced only in cases
where the terms of the loans are open-ended, and where the interest rates are applied for
an inde nite period. Hence, the imposition of a speci c sum of P40,000.00 a month for six
months on a P1,000,000.00 loan is not considered unconscionable. 30 In the case at
bench, there is no speci ed period as to the payment of the loan. Hence, levying 6%
monthly or 72% interest per annum is "definitely outrageous and inordinate." 31
The situation that it was the debtor who insisted on the interest rate will not exempt
Rolando from a ruling that the rate is void. As this Court cited in Asian Cathay Finance and
Leasing Corporation v. Gravador , 32 "[t]he imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest
on a money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is
tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive
to the common sense of man." 33 Indeed, "voluntariness does not make the stipulation on
[an unconscionable] interest valid." 34 ISCaDH
Footnotes
3. CA rollo, pp. 82-89; penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe (now also a member of this Court).
4. Id. at 13-26; penned by Judge Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig.
8. Id. at 28-34.
9. Id. at 35-38.
10. Id. at 39-43.
17. Article 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
18. Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they
be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third
persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
19. CA rollo, p. 88.
20. Id. at 93-99.
34. Menchavez v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 185368, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA 168, 178.
35. CIVIL CODE, Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
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was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
36. Issued on June 21, 2013; It provides that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.