The Duty To Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism

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1-1-1987
The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours

and Criticism
M. Stuart Madden
Pace Law School
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West Virginia Law Review
Volume 89 Winter 1987 Number 2
THE DUTY TO WARN IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:

CONTOURS AND CRITICISM
Although a product is unerringly designed, manufactured and assembled, in-

jury or damage occasioned by its intended or reasonably foreseeable use may
subject the seller to liability. Such liability may be found if the product has a
potential for injury that is not readily apparent to the user and carries no warnings
of the risk or, where appropriate, instructions as to the efficacious use of the
product without harm.' The seller's obligation to warn of product hazards and
to give instructions on how such hazards may be avoided is a fairly recent de-
velopment in the law of tort and sales.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., 1971, University of Penn-
sylvania; M.A., 1972, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976, Georgetown
University Law Center. The author extends his gratitude to Gloria Pagonico for her unflagging com-
mitment to the preparation of the manuscript for this article.
Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1396 (1985)
(even where properly designed, a product may be in an unreasonably dangerous condition if the
manufacturer fails to warn of latent dangers in the use of or operation of the product); Ragsdale
Bros., Inc., v. Magro, 693 S.W.2d 530 vex. Civ. App. 1985) (the liability of the seller can extend
to nondefective products released into commerce without adequate warnings of dangerous propensities
or adequate instructions for safe use). See Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App.
2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969); Alfieri v. Cabot Corp., 17 A.D.2d 455, 235 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1962),
aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1027, 245 N.Y.S.2d 600, 195 N.E.2d 310 (1963); Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
34 111. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962).
2 It was only at the turn of the century that in buyer-seller transactions significant departure
from the general rule of caveat emptor was recognized. Prior to that time, the dominant rule of law
that required the purchaser "to take care of his own interests" is described in reverential tones by
the Court in Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 383, 388-89 (1870):
No principle of the common law has been better established, or more often affirmed, both
in this country and in England, than that in sales of personal property, in the absence of
express warranty, where the buyer has an opportunity to inspect the commodity, and the
seller is guilty of no fraud, and is neither the manufacturer nor grower of the article he
sells, the maxim of caveat emptor applies. Such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care
of his own interests, has been found best adapted to the wants of trade in the business
transactions of life. And there is no hardship in it, because if the purchaser distrusts his
judgment he can require of the seller a warranty that the quality or condition of the goods
he desires to buy corresponds with the sample exhibited.
Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 221 1986-1987

222 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89
A seller's responsibility for providing adequate warnings may be found under

principles of strict liability, negligence, and warranty. In the aggregate, these
duties are well described as a seller's informational obligation. Under strict lia-
bility, a seller's failure to warn may result in liability if the warning deficiency
renders the product "unreasonably dangerous," which is more dangerous than
would be expected by the ordinary c o n ~ u m e r .Under
~ negligence principles, a
supplier may be liable for injury or damage incident to a failure to warn ade-
quately when it knows or should know that the product is likely to pose an
unreasonable risk without warnings, but fails to exercise reasonable care to inform
users of that risk4 In warranty, an inadequate warning may also render a product
unsuited for the ordinary purpose for which it is used, constituting a breach of
the implied warranty of mer~hantability.~
The duty to warn is perhaps the most widely-employed claim in modern prod-
ucts liability litigation. This development is aided by the recognition that nearly
any product capable of causing injury can or could be rendered less hazardous
by conveying effective warnings or instructions to the user or to one administering
the use of the product. Nevertheless, when a product poses a substantial danger
that can be eliminated from its design at a modest cost, even accompanying the
product with a warning that is arguably sufficient should not preclude a finding
of manufacturer liabilit~.~ Furthermore, when a product has no conventional util-
ity or only a frivilous utility, but poses a significant risk of personal injury, the
seller probably should be liable in damages for any harm caused by its introduction
into the market, without regard to the warnings that might accompany it.' Thus,
Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974) (interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS5 402A comment i (1965)).
Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1317 n.11 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS8 388 (1965)).
' E.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (verdict of plaintiff
on breach of implied warranty of merchantability count alleging failure to warn of tampon's risk of
causing toxic shock syndrome); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 692 P.2d 440 (Mont. 1984) (manufacturer's
failure to warn of adverse side effects of potato sprout suppressant could violate implied warranty
of merchantability).
See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621,
on rehearing, 627 P.2d 204 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). In a personal injury action involving a handgun,
the court comments: "Where the most stringent warning does not protect the public, the defect itself
must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to avoid liability." Id. at 44 (citations omitted); Uloth v.
City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978) "If a slight change in design would prevent
serious, perhaps fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability by simply warning of the possible
injury." Id. at 1192. The rule in strict liability permitting a manufacturer to avoid liability for a
product's hazards by giving warnings or directions as to its use applies only if the product is safe
for use if the warning is followed. D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 893 (9th Cir.
1977).
' Cf. Frandii Alonso Jr., (Mylar Star Kites), 1 Consumer Prod. Safety Rep. (CCH) 175,109
(1976) (initial decision); Proposed Order set aide on other grounds, 11977-79 Transfer Binder] Con-

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
if there is shown a manufacturer's duty to redesign, that duty should not be

discharged merely by providing warnings concerning the misdesign.
To be adequate under any theory of liability, a necessary warning, by its size,
location and intensity of language or symbol, must be calculated to impress upon
a reasonably prudent user of the product the nature and extent of the hazard
involved.* The language used must be directg and should, where applicable, de-
scribe methods of safe use.1° An adequate warning should also be timely and
should advise of significant hazards from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the
productll and, where appropriate, antidotes for misuse.12
sumer Prod. Safety Dec. (CCH) q75,155 (1977). In this action the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission weighed the allegation that long-tailed aluminized kites created a risk of electrocution if they
came into contact with high voltage lines. The kites were sold with the warning: "Never fly your
dragon, or any other kite, near power lines or during wet weather." The Administrative Law Judge
rejected as insufficient the manufacturer's offer to add an additional warning label to the kites, and
to distribute warning literature, observing: "[tlhere is no guarantee that adequate instructions against
flying kites near power lines will invariably be obeyed, even by adults." Initial Decision, Id. at 60,075.
Affirming the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact concerning the existence of a hazard, the
Commission concluded that the purely aesthetic value of the kite's aluminized surface, with no com-
pensating benefit to the kite's performance sufficient to justify the risk, required affirmance of the
finding of a substantial product hazard. 2 Consumer Prod. Safety Dec. (CCH) 175,155 at 60,290
(1977).
Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965), a case involving two
Spanish-speaking farm workers who perished from exposure to insecticide dust. In affirming- -jury-
verdicts for the survivors, the appellate-court commented that, notwithstanding the fact that cautionary
language on the insecticide conformed with Department of Agriculture regulations, a jury might rea-
sonably find that a product to be used by persons who did not read English should convey a more
effective warning by skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics. Id. at 405.
E.g., Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976), finding that a warning
that exposure to the fumes of a degreasing compound could cause drowsiness or nausea was inadequate
in light of fact that extended exposure could cause death.
lo Edwards v. California Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 247
So. 2d 440 (1971) (recommendation of proper procedures for using a product, such as wearing of
gloves, or respirators, is part of adequate warning); Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d
129 (7th Cir. 1973) (information for safe use inadequate for vagueness).
Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137, affd, 393 Mich. 136,
223 N.W.2d 290 (1974) (indoor use of charcoal briquettes); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18
(Mo. 1961) (potential for myriad misuses of drain cleaner).
l2 See Rumsay v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (suggesting
a duty to advise user of insecticide that no antidote exists for consumption). The policies underlying
lhe duty to warn in products liability require the conclusion that the emphasis is on prompt pres-
entation, rather than the reluctant withholding of safety-related information. "A duty to warn attaches,
not when scientific certainty is established (concerning risk), but whenever a reasonable man would
want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it." Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d
999 (1985) (citations omitted). Cf. 16 C.F.R. 8 1115.4(e) (1980), regulations under the substantial
product hazard reporting provisions of Consumer Product Safety Act, 5 15(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 2064(b)
(1976), which stress that firms should report promptly to the Commission product problems which
may pose a substantial product hazard, even if there is some doubt as to whether a defect exists.

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89
It is valuable at the outset to distinguish warnings from instructions. Warnings

call attention to a danger, while instructions are intended to describe procedures
for effective ancl reasonably safe product use. Thus, a product's warning may be
adequate, while its instructions are deficient and actionable; or obversely, in-
structions may not alert the consumer of the danger to be avoided, or a warning
may highlight the danger but not state how the consumer may avoid it." This
article will frequently describe warnings and instructions collectively as warnings,
while treating the two separately when warranted by individual authority.
The theory of liability for failure to warn that is grounded in negligence
focuses, at least initially, upon the conduct of the supplier and asks: "Was it
See Madden, Consumer Product Safety Act Section 15 and Substantial Product Hazards, 30 CATH.
U.L. REV. 195, 203 n.29 (1981).
l 3 See Boy1 v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963) (manufacturer liable both
for failing t o warn of the long-lasting contamination potential of sodium arsenate used in garden
weed killer, and for inadequate instructions for safe disposal of the rinse residue); see also 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1549 (4th printing 1974) ("Directions for use may not
discharge the maker's duty (to warn) if failure to follow directions will involve danger not apparent
t o the user who has not been warned"). The court in McCully v. Fuller Brush Co., 68 Wash. 2d
675, 678, 415 P.2d 7, 10 (1966) reiterates: "Directions and warnings are intended t o serve different
purposes. The former are designed t o assure the effective use of a product; a warning, on the other
hand, is intended t o assure a safe use." See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use
and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955), in which the authors state: "If warnings and
directions serve different purposes, i.e., if warnings have t o do 'with avoiding danger while directions
have to d o with pro~notingefficiency, the requirements of the former may not be discharged by giving
the latter." Id. at 147. See also McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 226
N.Y.S.2d 407, 412, 181 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1962) ("the instructions, not particularly stressed, did not
amount t o a warnirrg of the risk at all, and it is foreseeable that the small print instruction might
never be read, and might be disregarded even if read").
Professors Schwartz and Driver suggest an alternative dichotomy that describes both warnings
and instructions as warnings, characterizing the former as "admonitory" warnings and the latter as
"instructional" warnings. They state:
There are different kinds of warnings designed to communicate different kinds of infor-
mation. Two categories generally recognized in the law are admonitory warnings and in-
structional warnings. One also can distinguish between these two categories from a
communication perspective. An admonitory warning is intended to point out to a user of
a product a particular hazard associated with the product. Admonitory warnings are gen-
erally appropriate where the number or source of hazards is small, the hazard and the
means of avoidance are easily recognized and understood, and the user need not encounter
the hazard to use the product properly. An instructional warning provides the information
necessary for safe, efficient and effective use of the product. An instructional warning is
generally necessary when there are several hazards or several sources of a hazard inherent
in the use of the product, when the dangers may not be easily recognized, and when specific
procedures that may involve several steps are required to avoid the hazard. An instructional
warning, moreover, usually contemplates that the user will encounter the hazards during
normal use of the product.
Schwartz & Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law & Commrrnication
Theory, 52 U. CXN. L. REV. 38, 52 (1983)'(citations omitted).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
reasonable for this supplier to release this product into the market with these
warnings or lack of warnings?" Strict liability, which imposes liability without
fault for the sale of an unreasonably dangerous product, and warranty, under
which breach can be found without regard to the conduct of the seller, constitute
analytically distinct theories. In the context of defining the supplier's duty to warn,
however, the jurisprudence of negligence and strict liability can be seen to have
converged. The analysis of the duty to warn under each principle proceeds quite
similarly in evaluating the nature of the hazard and the type and efficacy of the
supplier's warning.14 The conventional evaluation of an asserted duty to warn
under these two torts principles has been ably synthesized by Professor Kidwell.
Relative to the facts of a given situation, this evaluation embraces the nature of
the product and the harm risked, the information available to the seller or sup-
plier, the user's information, the position of the seller or supplier in the chain
of distribution, the cost or other burden of adding efficacious warnings or in-
structions, the probability that harm will result from the absence of warnings or
instructions, and the causal relation between the absence or inadequacy of warn-
ings or instructions and the harm suffered.15
The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A suggest that
a product will be considered to be defective and unreasonably dangerous to the
u'ser or consumer when it is "dangerous to the extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it."16 This gives rise
to the so-called "consumer expectation" test of strict liability. Rather than confine
evaluation of the ineaning of unreasonably dangerous to the monochromatic con-
sideration of the consumer expectation test, growing authority suggests that even
under principles of strict liability, a product should be considered unreasonably
dangerous if the danger arises from mismanufacture, misdesign, or misinfor-
mation'' by reference to the seller's actual or constructive knowledge. A seller
would incur liability for failure to warn where he "would be negligent if he
sold the product knowing of the risk in~olved."'~The argument for the
symbiosis between a consumer view standard for unreasonable danger and a man-
ufacturer view standard is made by one court that urges that the consumer's
viewpoint and that of the manufacturer are in reality "two sides of the same
standard." lg
I4 Cf.Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1317 n.11.

I q e e Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 TEX.L. REV.
1375, 1390-1408 (1975); Schwartz. The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road
to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 892 n.2 (1983).
Is RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS 5 402A comment i (1979).
l1 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 MBS. L.J. 825, 830 (1973)
(including failure to warn as a design defect).
Phillips V. Kirnwood Mach, Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
19 Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court
elaborates:

WEST VIRGINIA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 89
The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine

C O .reiterates
~~ that application of the reasonable manufacturer standard should
yield the same result as application of the reasonable consumer standard for un-
reasonable danger. This is because "a manufacturer who would be negligent in
marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing
a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase
it."21 Thus perceived, a duty to warn arises when the manufacturer should rea-
sonably see that there is an imbalance between the germane, safety-related in-
formation known to the manufacturer which is pertinent to the use or operation
of the product and what information of a like safety-related nature is known to
the average consumer. The most recent decisions reiterate that the gravamen of
the informational obligation of the duty to warn in products liability is the cor-
rection of buyer-seller imbalances in pertinent safety-related information.* For
the single indicator of buyer versus seller safety-related information, this creates
a virtual analytical primacy among the ten factors proposed by Professor Kidwell
in 1975.=
The obligation of parity in buyer and seller safety-related information is seen
correctly as a corrollary to the Phillips court's mirror imaging of the reasonable
We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and user-oriented standard

when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of the same standard.
A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell
the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable
buyer would expect.
Id.
Phillips, 266 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033.
" Id. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037. The court adds: "The foreseeable uses to which a product could
be put would be the same in the minds of both the seller and the buyer unless one of the parties
was not acting reasonably." Id.
A harmonious proposition was expressed by the court in Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 693 S.W.2d
530, in which the court observes correctly that "[a] manufacturer's duty to warn of risks inherent
in its product is based on the sound policy that the user is entitled to information necessary to make
an intelligent choice as to whether the product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to a risk
of harm." Id. at 536; see also Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 @la. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), appeal denied, 476 So. 2d 676 (1985). "[Tlhere is a duty to warn when the hazards associated
with the use of the product are . . . not as well known to the user as to the manufacturer." Id. at
251; Zehring v. Wick Argri-Buildings 590 F. Supp. 138 (D. Ohio 1984) (A supplier is under a duty
to exercise ordinary care to give the user information which it has and which it should realize would
be necessary to make the use of a product safe); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Armstrong World Indus.,
476 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio Comm. PI. 1985) (Each seller in the distribution chain is "imposed with the
duty of communicating its superior knowledge to those who, because of their limited knowledge and
information, would otherwise be unable to protect themselves while using the product." Id. at 405);
Mills v. United States, 764 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 808 (1986) (the man-
ufacturer has a duty to warn of any dangers that are inherent in a product's use and which would
not be within the knowledge of the ordinary user).
See Kidwell, supra note 15.

19861 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 227
expectations of the consumer with the reasonable expectations of the seller.24The

concept of analyzing the seller's duties and expectations in pari materia with the
reasonable expectations of the buyer has descended lineally from the earliest of
the formulations of modern products liability law. Analysis of reasonable recip-
rocal expectations was presaged in MacPherson v. Buick Motor e ~ . in, which ~ ~
the wheel on the vehicle sold by Buick was made of defective wood that crumbled
into fragments while in use, injuring the buyer. A principal dereliction to which
the MacPherson court adverts is that the seller knew or should have known that
the vehicle, or more specifically its wheels, would be used by a secondary pur-
chaser who would neither know of the existence of any defect nor be likely to
inspect for any such hazard.26
Thus, the focus of the MacPherson decision is upon the product which is
capable of harm if defectively made, and is sold under conditions in which the
eventual user will use the product without further inspection in "[r]eliance on the
skill of the manufacturer."" The implicit holding of MacPherson is that the rea-
sonableness of the buyer's conduct in purchasing such a product and putting it
to use without further testing is the purchaser's rational supposition that the
manufacturer would not "put the finished product on the market without sub-
jecting the component parts to ordinary and simple test^."^ Contemporary duty
to warn analysis might be superimposed upon MacPherson. It would provide that
if a purchaser is wholly without information as to the testing and quality control
measures employed by a manufacturer and, perhaps as a consequence of this
ignorance, reposes total confidence in the conduct of the seller, the seller's knowl-
edge that it does not subject important components of its product to testing
constitutes pertinent safety-related information known to the seller and not to the
buyer. This would give rise to a duty to warn.
In Baxter v. Ford Motor C O . , the
~ ~plaintiff was injured by the shattering of
an automobile front windshield which the manufacturer had advertised as elim-
Phillips, 269 Or. at 495, 525 P.2d at 1036-37.

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
26 The court stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the con-
sequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 395, distinguishing an action brought by a servant against a master, and describing
the master's reliance on the manufacturer, the master in that action being in an informational position
comparable to that of Mr. MacPherson.
Id. at 394 (citation omitted).
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).

WEST VIRGINIA LA W R E VIEW [Vol. 89
inating the danger of flying glass. This case is remembered primarily as a mis-
information or nlisrepresentation case, insofar as it bolstered the then novel theory
that an injured party could maintain a cause of action against a remote manu-
facturer for false representations concerning the product. For present purposes,
however, it is interesting to note that the holding also undertook to correct an
imbalance between the product-related information available to the consumer and
that available to the manufacturer. That endeavor is evidenced by the court's
repeated reference to the consumer's inability to discover the windshield's defect
by usual and customary examination of the product. This left the consumer in
a shroud of ignorance comparable, in the words of the court, "to that of the
consumer of a wrongly labeled drug, who has bought the same from a retailer,
and who has relied upon the manufacturer's representation that the label correctly
set forth the contents of the ~ o n t a i n e r . " Perceived
~~ in this light, the decision in
Baxter can be r1:cognized for its secondary proposition that the consumer of a
product with potential defects that cannot be readily identified by ordinary ex-
amination is entitled to expect that the product-related information imparted by
the manufacturer, be it qualitative, hazard-related or a combination of the two,
will reveal the illformation a reasonable consumer would expect as essential for
the safe and efficacious use of the product.
The court's rebalancing of a then prevalent condition in the market for the
purchase of new automobiles served to correct contract of adhesion practices
employed until only recently by the major automobile manufacturers. These prac-
tices foreshortened buyers' satisfaction of reasonable expectations as to product
information and remedies and, were, among other considerations, at the heart of
the landmark decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, I ~ cRegarding
.~' the effect of the commercial environment for such
sales, described by the court as evidencing a "gross inequality of bargaining po-
s i t i ~ n , "the
~ ~ facts in Henningsen involved a standardized contract employed at
that time by many manufacturers. This contract called for the buyer to relinquish
any personal injury claim that might in the future be available against the man-
ufacturer for a defect in the automobile in return for a limited parts replacement
warranty.33 Such a practice, during its time, operated as a blanket disincentive
for manufacturers to be searching and forthcoming in making product-related
information available to consumers. The defeat of such practices in 1960, forty-
four years after MacPherson was decided, stands by itself as a benchmark of the
dynamic immobility of early products liability law.
Justice Traynor, the most prominent early champion of strict products lia-
bility, invoked a similar theme in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. He argued
JO Id. at 461-62, 12 P.2d at 412.

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
32 Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87.
33 Id. at 385, 161 A.2d at 84.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
that the monopoly on product-related information, including safety information,

held by the manufacturer, required imposition of liability without fault for placing
on the market a defective product that causes human injury.34Traynor identified
modem means of mass production, marketing and promotion as responsible in
part for the dulling of the ordinary consumer's awareness of qualitative and safety-
related information that should be made available as a matter of commercial
right.35 One, though by no means the only, pernicious effect of this was the
depressing impact of the modern commercial milieu, with its cacophony of prod-
uct-related claims, on the consumer's competence to ask for or appreciate com-
plete and pertinent quality and safety-related product information. The commercial
environment described by Justice Traynor, it is seen, attacked the buyer's ability
ab initio to identify reasonable expectations as to the product safety informational
predicate.
The analysis of warnings in products liability has profited from significant
critical review. One offering of Professor K e e t ~ n ' sproposed
~~ an alternative and
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring).
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and trans-
portation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product
has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has means
or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not
contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady
efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such
as trade-marks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith,
relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade-mark. Manufacturers have sought
to justify that faith by increasingly high standards of inspection and a readiness to make
good on defective products by way of replacement and refunds. (See Bogert and Fink,
Business Practices Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400.) The
manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship
between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has become so
complicated as to require one or more intermediaries. Certainly there is greater reason to
impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product
that he is not himself able to test.
Id. at 467-68, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (citations omitted).
Indeed it is possible to perceive that the individual consumer's position in the commercial en-
vironment has come full circle with respect to the quantum, if not the quality, of product-related
information available. The progression has its beginning in the era of relative powerlessness in which
the predominant rule of law was caveat emptor; maturing to the more simple, and for that reason
.
perhaps more fair, era of the "traditional contract . . the result of free bargaining of parties . . .
brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate
economic equality." Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 387, 161 A.2d at 86; and now again in an environment
where the consumer may, with respect to available product information, enjoy an embarrassment of
riches, but in reality live in almost abject ignorance as to the safety of the formulae of pharmaceuticals,
the safety of home insulation or wiring, or the roadworthiness of vehicles.
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1970).

explicit definition of an unreasonably dangerous condition that would include

.
products that "at the time of sale . . the ordinary man, knowing the risks and
dangers actually involved in its use, would not have marketed ...
without sup-
plying more information about the risks and dangers involved in its use and ways
to avoid harm therefr~m."~'Professor Keeton therein also suggested a recovery-
based analysis of both warning adequacy and certain defenses based upon user
conduct. Concerning warning adequacy alone, he proposed the justification of
recovery by any consumer-victim "if he was not actually put on notice of a risk
or danger involved in the use of a product that would be material to some users
in making the choice whether to accept the risk."38 Emphasis on the choice-making
mechanism of the consumer is, one may argue, as fully grounded in the juris-
prudence of informed consent as it is in the products liability duty to warn.3g
Professor Keeton further proposes a reduction in stature of the knowledge of the
user as an affirmative seller defense in warnings l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Naturally the proponents of standards of products liability that can be in-
terpreted as recovery-based have drawn criticism. One of the most prominent
forms of criticism has been the perennial endeavor to pass a federal law of product
liability. The criticism directed specifically at the growing role of the duty to warn
in products liability would have it that promiscuous resort to this means of re-
covery has created a condition wherein corporate counsel entertaining a doubt as
to whether or not to add a warning or enhance an existing one will today almost
invariably resolve to provide more information to the consumer. A counterbalance
to this trend is the recognition that in many situations the addition of warnings
on many products is not pra~tical.~' A distinct but related doctrine that similarly
Id. at 404 (citations omitted).

Id. at 411. Such analysis might be described by others as involving "a single value axis (i.e.,
maximum information to the user or consumer)," typified by the questions "How much warning is
enough?" or "How much v~arningis too much?" as distinct from analysis pursuant to the question
"How much product safety is enough?" involving arguably greater attention to a greater range of
internally competing societal values. See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 541, 546 (1976).
19 See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 519 (1976).
a Keeton supra note 36, at 401. Keaton continues:
Even if ezonomic efficiency can best be obtained by leaving the consumer and the
producer free to bargain about legal liability for accident costs, fairness in the allocation
of the costs of accidents when they do occur should be the primary concern of tort law.
Every effort should be made to minimize the effect on wealth distribution of accident costs.
Id.
Hethcoat v. Chevron O l Co. 364 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd and remanded,
i
380 So. 2d 1035 (1980). in which the court stated:
To hold that every part subject to repair at grave risk must have a posted warning
would result in an impossible and even undesirable situation. One wonders, for instance,

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
recognizes the logical and common sense limitations on the warning duty holds
that the manufacturer will not be required to provide the user with superfluous
information or safety-related information already known to the mere4*Also to
be considered is the "cry wolf" phenomenon, described by one influential com-
mentator in these words: "If every possible danger in life were accompanied by
warning, product users would quickly become inured to all warnings, and even-
tually would ignore them."43
As will be examined in detail below, the negligence standard for a manu-
facturer's duty to warn derives in the main from Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 388. This section focuses upon what the manufacturer knows or should
know of the familiarity of the user or the user's employer with any hazardous
propensities of a product. The comments to the strict liability provision of Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, on the other hand, state a test for
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, for informational dr
for any other reason, that turns upon whether the product is in a condition that
presents a hazard in excess of that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer.44Analysis of the supplier's duty to warn conducted under merged neg-
ligence and strict liability principles has created a Janus-like standard that has
contributed to problems for the courts in some actions. The problems are most
obvious in those decisions interpreting the duty to warn where the purchaser or
the purchaser's employees are professional users of like products. Dissonant au-
thority has emerged as well in those decisions called upon to interpret the extent
to which the manufacturer may reasonably rely upon the purchaser's supervisory
personnel to adequately advise and instruct employees of the danger of certain
where the warning should be posted on a bicycle chain subject to severing the fingers of
a repairman; the gas tank of an automobile subject to exploding while in the process of
repair; the electric motor of all sorts of household devices (blenders, dishwashers, washing
machines, air conditioners, etc.) subject to electrocuting a repairman if the current is not
cut off.
Id. at 1244-45.
42 McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg. Co., 343 So. 2d 511 (Ala. 1977) holding that the manufacturer
of paint thinner should not necessarily have included the product's flash point on the label where
the purchasers' employees knew the substance would catch fire if hit by sparks of grinding wheel,
and the requested cautionary information would not have supplied the information that users did not
already have. See discussion of known or obvious risks, and assumption of risk, infra nn.119-53,
nn.429-45.
Schwartz & Driver, supra note 13, at 60. To the discussion Dean Prosser adds: "Those who
argue for warning as the judicial solution to latent design defects labor under a naive belief that one
can warn against all significant risks. Too much detail can be counterproductive. A warning to be
effective must be read and understood." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS686 (5th ed. 1984). As Professor Twerski recognizes, "[mlaking the consumer account mentally
for trivia or guard against risks that are not likely to occur imposes a very real societal cost." Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 39, at 514.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 4(nA comment i.

AS v~illbe seen from the discussion to follow, it is in the professional

user and the employer-purchaser jurisprudence that one still finds a high incidence
of retrogressive opinions defeating the recovery of injured parties whose superiors
may have been informed of a product's risk, but who were, themselves, never
made aware of the danger.
In recent years there have arisen many conflicting observations and proposals
as to the metes and bounds of the seller's informational obligation. Professor
Keeton has proposed the elimination of the negligence standard, and with it, the
task of assessing what scientific or engineering information was known or know-
able at the time of initial manufacture and sale.46The discussion to follow shows,
nonetheless, that the examination of the seller's duty to warn, even when brought
under a theory of strict liability in tort, has become wed inextricably to a quasi-
negligence basecl evaluation of the seller's conduct. This evaluation includes con-
sideration of the seller's knowledge which would therefore be at issue even if the
seller were stripped of the advantages of the negligence standard. Thus, concern
about the burden of trying the issue of the supplier's actual or constructive knowl-
edge is misplaced since such issues have become the conventional inquiry not only
of negligence, but also in the strict liability causes of- action for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability and of strict liability in tort.47
Other authority suggests a type of parasitism between the products liability
cause of action alleging a design defect and that claiming a failure to warn ad-
equately. The suggestion made there is that the courts have quailed at the task
of evaluating manufacturers' conscious design choices, the review of which, be-
4s See generally Schwartz & Driver, supra note 13, at 41.

a If the conduct is unreasonably dangerous, then there should be strict liability without
reference t o what excuse defendant might give for being unaware of the danger. I t should
be a cost of doing business that in the course of doing that business an unreasonable risk
was created. The task of identifying, for strict liability purposes, the risks of which a
reasonable man could justifiably be unaware but that were scientifically knowable is an
almost impossible one ....
My principal thesis is and has been that theories of negligence should be avoided
altogether in the products liability area in order t o simplify the law, and that if the sale
of a product is made under circumstances that would subject someone to an unreasonable
risk in fact, liability for harm resulting from those risks should follow.
Keeton, supra note 36, at 408-09.
p ] h e better view treats the failure t o warn as establishing negligence, or breach of an
implied warranty, or violation of one's duty under strict liability in tort. The critical con-
clusion of this section will be that no relevant differences appear t o distinguish the three
theories in the duty-to-warn context because recovery, under any theory requires the proof
of identical facts, proof of injury, and proof that defendant knew or should have known
of the risk of injury and did not warn plaintiff about it.
Kidwell, supra note 15, at 1377-78.

cause of its polycentrism, is both intricate and time c o n s ~ m i n g ,and ~ ~ incline

instead to find any peril associated with a manufacturer's design either obvious
or already adequately warned against.49 Such an analysis, if correct, serves to
intensify the need for a plaintiff to allege a failure to warn,50 for in the absence
of a failure-to-warn-count in the complaint the plaintiff alleging product-related
injury would be playing against a stacked deck." Other analysis, grounded in
economics, proposes the comprehensive assignment of liability for tort loss to the
best cost a v ~ i d e r , ~which
* will almost invariably be the supplier, and usually the
manufacturer.
In the main, the courts have declined the invitation of authors who exhort
the departure from the practiced and familiar negligence analysis that dominates
duty to warn jurispr~dence.~~ From the multifaceted inquiry of the negligence
standard, modern decisions have gravitated towards a more particularized ap-
proach, the fairly constant concern of which is the imbalance or asymmetry, if
any, in the safety-related information held by the buyer and the seller respectively.
While phrasing varies, the predominant authority almost always inquires: (1) What
did the seller know regarding safety-related information that would be pertinent
to the buyer, and what did the seller do about it? Herein are the issues of the
seller's knowledge and conduct, congruent with accepted negligence evaluation,
and the question of warning adequacy; and (2) what safety-related information,
if any, was known to the buyer, and did he act in conformity therewith? Herein
" Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Concious Design Choice: The Limits of Ad-
judication, 73 COLUM.L. REV. 1531, 1539-42 (1973).
49 Id. at 1561-62, 1565.
" Id. at 1562.

The sardonic observation of another contributor to pr6ducts liability scholarship is "The
popular solution to every alleged design defect problem seems to be: 'Warn against it.' Like mother's
chicken soup it is the panacea for all ills." Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 39,
at 500.
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974):
Recently a number of scholars have suggested that liability for losses occasioned by torts
should be apportioned in a manner that will best contribute to the achievement of an
optimum allocation of resources. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents, 69-73 (1970);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). This optimum, in theory,
would be that which would be achieved by a perfect market system. In determining whether
the cost of an accident should be borne by the injured party or be shifted, in whole or in
part, this approach requires the court to fix the identity of the party who can avoid the
costs more cheaply. Once fixed, this determination then controls liability.
Id. at 569. -
j3 Compare Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (in a failure to warn case
including a strict liability claim, to prove that a product was unreasonably dangerous the plaintiff
must prove that the magnitude of danger it presents outweighs its utility) with Dambacher v. Mallis,
485 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985) (the risk-
utility analysis is not well suited to the failure to warn case, for the utility of a product will remain
a constant irrespective of whether a warning is added.)

W S T VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
are the issues of causation, including, without limitation, defenses based upon
obviousness, knowledge, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.
Thus, even from the variegated principles and diverse policies of negligence,
warranty, and strict liability in tort, an overall doctrine can be identified. Its
distillate is this: a seller will have a duty to provide warnings as to the risks of
use or consumption of a product where the risk is material and the seller knows
or should know that the user is less informed concerning that risk than the seller.
The warning itself must be communicated by means of positioning, lettering,
coloring, and language that will convey to the typical user of average intelligence
the information necessary to permit him to avoid the risk, and as appropriate,
to use the product safely.
This article will essay the principal interpretations that have been placed upon
the continously enlarging scope of the seller's duty to warn. In identifying the
doctrinal and policy underpinnings of the leading theories, it will also, where
applicable, review decisions that are arguably wrongly decided. This will permit
observations as to whether different conclusions would have been reached through
evaluation of the buyer's and the seller's reasonable reciprocal expectations as to
product information. This review will demonstrate also that identification of a
material disparity in germane safety-related information known to the seller as
opposed to that known to the injured claimant will, with only limited exceptions,
predict seller liability for inadequate warnings or instructions.
11. WHEN A DUTYTO WARNARISESUNDER NEGLIGENCE

PRINCIPLES
At common law, a seller or supplier has a duty to give adequate warnings

of any risk involved in the use of a product when the seller "knows of or has
reason to know" that in the absence of such warnings the product is likely to
be dangerous for the use supplied.54This duty to warn under negligence principles
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 388 provides:

CHATTEL
KNOWNTO BE DANGEROUS FOR INTENDED USE:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another use is subject
to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent
of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use
of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if
the supplier
a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for
the use for which it is supplied, and
b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize
its dangerous condition, and
C) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or the
facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984);

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
is triggered where the potential for harm from the use of the product without
warnings or instructions is "signifi~ant."~~
Resolution of the question of whether the risk is significant or unreasonable

requires a balancing of the seriousness of harm, and the probability that the harm
will occur if appropriate steps are not taken, against the cost or burden of taking
precaution^.^^ The manufacturer's duty to warn under negligence principles at-
taches when it knows or should know of a product's hazards.57 significant!^, of
all of the members in the chain of distribution, only the manufacturer is charged
with the "should know" standard, thereby creating the burden "of discovering
the product's dangers to the foreseeable user and providing the warning concerning
those dangers."58 In contrast, the seller or the distributor of a product manu-
factured by another must, under negligence principles, give a warning only when
it knows or has reason to know of product-related hazards. This lesser obligation
has been construed to mean that the nonmanufacturing seller should warn when
it has actual knowledge of a hazard or when it has been given "information from
see also \V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS8 96 (4th ed. 1971); Burch v. Amsterdam
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 @.C. App. 1976) (mastic adhesive with inadequate warnings as to flashpoint
and flammability). Courts have given diverse expressions to the standard of actual or constructive
knowledge contemplated by the negligent breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn, but they are
all materially indistinguishable. E.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985) (duty
to warn of defects of which the manufacturer "is or should be aware"); Wood v. Ford Motor Co.,
71 Or. App. 87, 691 P.2d 495 (1984), cert. denied, 298 Or. 773, 697 P.2d 556 (1985) (duty to warn
of a product's dangerous propensities of which the manufacturer or seller "knows or reasonably
should know"); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1985) (the defendant seller's duty to
warn under negligence theory limited to those dangerous properties of the product the seller "had
reason to know about"); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984)
(manufacturer of product must give warning of danger to users of which it has "actual or constructive
knowledge").
" See Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (two minors killed and
four injured from experimentation with firecracker "kits" ordered by mail from advertisement in
Popular Mechanics).
s6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS$5 291-293, 298; Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538,
332 A.2d 11 (1975).
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 325, 364 N.E.2d 267, 272-73 (1977); Carter
v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
Foremost-McKesson Co. v. Allied Chem. Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 19884 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), in which the court explains:
While other parties in the chain of distribution may be liable for negligently failing to warn
of a product's hazards, it is only the manufacturer that bears the heavy burden of discovering
the product's dangers to the foreseeable user and providing the warnings regarding those
dangers. That burden is reflected in the "should know" standard placed on the manufac-
.
turer. The duty placed on the retailer and distributors . . is not as exacting as that borne
by the manufacturer.
Id. at 25,110.

which a person of reasonable intelligence . . . would infer that the (risk) exists
. . . .'' 5 9
The rationale for applying the "knows or should know" standard to the
manufacturer is grounded in the manufacturer's presumed "superior knowledge"
of the product, its components, its attributes and its hazards. This justifies the
manufacturer's informational obligation to the user or consumer that is triggered
when it may reasonably foresee danger of injury or damage ta one less knowl-
edgeable, unless an adequate warning is given.60
9 The negligence standard for the duty t o warn of the nonmanufacturing seller is set forth at
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 401, which provides:

Cmm~LMEI.YTO BE DANGEROUS:
A seller of 8 chattel manufactured by a third person who knows or has reason t o know
that the chattel is, or is likely t o be, dangerous when used by a person to whom it is
delivered or for whose use it is supplied, or to others whom the seller should expect to
share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby
to them if he fails to exercise reasonable care t o inform them of the danger or otherwise
t o protect them against it.
Comment a t o this section elaborates upon the distinction between the "reason t o know" and
the "should knovr" standards of 388 and 401 respectively. The comment states:
a. The words 'reason t o know', . . . are used t o denote the fact that the actor has infor-
mation from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of
the actor would infer that the fact in question exists or that such person would govern his
conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists. The words 'reason t o know' do not
impose any duty t o ascertain unknown facts, and are to be distinguished from the words
should know .. . .
Id. a t comment a.
The justification of the greater informational duty for the manufacturer, based upon superior
knowledge of the propensities of the product, is highlighted in the discussion of RESTATEMENT (SGCOND)
OF TORTS§ 388 (a) comment g'which states:
There are many chattels which, even though perfect, a r e unsafe for any use or for the
particular use for which they are supplied unless their properties and capabilities are known
to those who use them. If such a chattel is supplied t o another whom the supplier should
realize t o be unlikely to knaw its properties and capabilities, the supplier is required to
. exercise reasonable care to give to the other such information thereof as he himself possesses.
In evaluating a failure to warn claim, "the manufacturer is held t o that degree of skill and of knowl-
edge of developments in the art of the industry then existing when the product was manufactured."
Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir, 1985). "[A]nyone who enters a special field of
manufacturing will be held to possess the knowledge and skill of an expert in that field and must
..
'keep reasonably abreast . of techniques and devices used by practical men in his trade."' Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Producl, 71 YALB L. J. 816, 847
(1962). Professor Noel suggests that inquiry into certain subjects is pertinent to determination of
whether or not the manufacturer has employed the skill and judgment of a n expert, t o wit; whether
or not other manufacturers are using the same design, or a safer design: whether or not a safer design
is known to be feasible; and whether or not there has been adequate testing. Id. at 848.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Thus, under negligence principles, the manufacturer is required to warn of

those dangers of which he is aware or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have been It is not necessary that the manufacturer appreciate the specific
nature of the hazard posed by the product to create the duty to warn. Rather
to trigger the duty to warn it is sufficient that the manufacturer have only some
general awareness of the risk."
The duty to warn under conventional negligence principles turns upon the
reasonable foreseeabilitP3 of harm by use of or exposure to the product in the
absence of warnings. The additional question of what use of a product is rea-
sonably foreseeable, the determination of which fixes the manufacturer's duty to
anticipate potentially unconventional product uses, is inextricably tied to the ques-
tion of foreseeable harm. The presence or absence of this reasonable foreseeability
and the question of what is foreseeable as applied to product use and inadequate
warnings or instructions has been litigated e~tensively.~~ In the end, probably no
standard provides any better guidance than that of one court that observed: "If
61 Moran, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11. See Bottazzi v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. 664 F.2d 49
(5th Cir. 1981) (evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of a helicopter
engine manufacturer; the helicopter crashed as a result of an oil leak, and the manufacturer failed
to warn customers of this known potential danger and failed to specify in its manual the test required
to detect such a leak). See also German v. Illinois Power Co., 115 Ill. App. 3d 977, 451 N.E.2d 903
(1983); Johnson v. Murphy Metals Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Duke v. Gulf & W.
Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
a Consciousness of a vague danger, without appreciation of the seriousness of the consequences,
may nonetheless require the manufacturer to provide warnings. Graham v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons,
96 Mich. App. 480, 292 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
6J Petty v. United States, 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 710,161 at 26,459
(8th Cir. 1984) (under Iowa law, in an action brought for injuries attributed to administration of the
swine flu vaccine, the duty to warn is triggered by the "reasonable foreseeability" of the particular
injury sustained); see, e.g., Lakatosh v. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973). The
profile of supplier conduct encouraged by the Restatement provision is that of the reasonably prudent
person, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS5 388 comment g, and contemplates the giving of warnings
only as to those uses of the product that are reasonably foreseeable. See id. at comment e, which
provides:
In order that the supplier of a chattel may be subject to liability under the rule stated in
this Section, not only must the person who uses the chattel be one whom the supplier should
expect to use it with the consent of him to whom it is supplied, but the chattel must also
be put to a use to which the supplier has reason to expect it to be put.
a The results have not always been reconcilable. Compare Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App.
557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951) (involving an allegation of failure to warn following the scalding of a
child when the top to a vaporizer dislodged, and with respect to the design of the vaporizer the court
states: "It was not intended that the top should remain intact at a l l times.", Id. at 562, 107 N.E.2d
at 411) with McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (another vaporizer
scalding case, this time finding manufacturer liability on facts differentiable only in that by the time
of the litigation of the latter suit there existed a feasible alternative design for the container of heated
water). The court in the latter action affirmed the jury verdict that the manufacturer failed to exercise
reasonable care to warn of the hazards of scalding water.

there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men would
take precautions to avoid it, then failure to do so is negligen~e."~'The limitations
of any definition of foreseeability necessarily conceded, there are certain prop-
ositions as to which there is general agreement. The most significant of these is
that it is the harm that must be foreseeable, rather than the precise means by
which that harm may eventually occur.66Under this principle, there should be no
liability where the injury falls beyond the compass of the general type of harm
that the seller could reasonably anticipate given the product's use in a particular
environment with inadequate warnings.67However, even when the type of harm
that actually takes place is not the type a knowledgeable person would have sup-
posed to be possible, liability may be found. Such a finding will result when the
injury falls within the "general danger area" caused by the manufacturer's neg-
ligent acts or omissions to act.68 As will be developed more fully below, while
a Bean, 344 S.W.2d at 25, cited with approval in Moran, 273 Md. App. 538, 332 A.2d 11.
a E.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (insufficient warning given
to mother in household where fourteen month old infant perished from chemjcal pneumonia following
ingestion of furniture polish). The court advised that in addition to the injuries arising from the
intended uses for which a product is manufactured, the manufacturer
[Mlust also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of his
product and where, as here, that environment is the home, he must anticipate the reasonably
..
foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment . to anticipate (such)
risks, and to warn of them, though such risks may be incidental to the actual use for which
the product was intended.
Id. at 83-84.
E.g., Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944), in which a
five year old child was fatally burned after splashing himself with flammable fingernail polish remover.
Dean Prosser suggests that an alternative ground for finding no liability might have been futility, for
cautionary information as to such a rare use "would probably have served no purpose in most instances
since those who read or could read would already know of the existence of the likely flammability
of the product." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,supra note 43, at 687. Unintended and unforeseeable
use is discussed in detail below. One means by which the defendant may attempt to prove that the
occurrence of which plaintiff complains was not foreseeable is by showing no earlier instances of
similar occurrences that would have put defendant on actual or constructive notice of the hazard.
See, e.g., Koloda v. General Motors Parts Div., 716 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1983) (where manufacturer
of valve lubricant vapors which were alleged to cause mechanic's heart attack was erroneously pre-
vented at trial from introducing into evidence lack of prior claims or incidents).
" In Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939), an action for damages arising
from the defendant's alleged negligence in placing a kerosene label on a bottle filled with water, the
court identified its task as that of looking for the possibility of hazard to some person, rather than
for an expectation of the particular mishap that took place. See F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TORTS14-15 (1933). "The sequence of events, of course, need not be foreseeable. The manner in
which the risk culminates in harm may be unusual, improbable and highly unexpectable, from the
point of view of the actor at the time of his conduct. And yet, if the harm suffered falls within the
general danger area, there may be liability, provided other requisites of legal causation are present."
Id., See also Hall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 362 @.D.N.Y. 1972);
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk. 25 VIWD.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
the seller is permitted to expect the consumer to protect himself against certain
obvious and avoidable hazards,69 a user's ignorance or carelessness may never-
theless be anticipated, and thus may be fore~eeable.'~
L. REY. 93 (1972); Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions
and Misconceptions, 1968 \VJSC. L. REV. 228 (1968).
The distinction between the foreseeabiity of use and the foreseeability of harm is set forth by
the court in Newman v. Utility Trailer and Equip. Co., Inc., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977). While
discussed with reference to strict liability, the analysis is applicable equally to the negligence cause
of action for failure to warn, and states:
It is obvious that trial courts are experiencing difficulty in distinguishing foreseeability
of use from foreseeability of the risk of harm. Before a manufacturer or other seller is
strictly liable for injury inflicted by a product, the product must have been put to a fore-
seeable use. As an example: if a shovel is used to prop open a heavy door, but, because
of the way the shovel was designed, it is inadequate to the task and the door swings shut
and crushes the user's hand, no responsibility for the injury results by reason of the shovel's
not being designed to prop open doors since it was not reasonably foreseeable by the man-
ufacturer or seller that it would be so used. Whether or not the article was put to a fore-
seeable use is a jury question unless, as in the above hypothetical case of the shovel, reasonable
minds could not differ, in which instance the case would be at an end. On the other hand,
if it is decided as a matter of law by the court or as a matter of fact by the jury that the
article was being put to a foreseeable use at the time of the injury, it is assumed that the
manufacturer or seller was aware of the risk involved which caused harm to plaintiff,
whether or not the manufacturer or seller actually had such knowledge or reasonably could
have been expected to have it. As a further illustration: if the shovel is being used to dig
a ditch, and, while it is being so used, the blade strikes a rock in the soil and a piece of
steel from the blade flies up and injures plaintiff's eye, the manufacturer or seller is assumed
to have had knowledge of the risk of injury to plaintiff occasioned by the use of the shovel.
The shovel was being used for a purpose for which it was manufactured. Whether the article
is defective is then determined by whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller,
knowing of the risk which the shovel presented, would have put the article into the stream
of commerce.
Id. at 675-77.
69 See Iacurci v. Lurnmus Co., 340 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated, 387 U.S. 86 (1967). "It
required no knowledge of electrical or mechanical engineering to perceive the danger in wedging one's
body between flied steel plates and a moveable 450 pound bucket or to realize that safety lay in
insuring that the bucket would not be put in motion." Id. at 871-72. In Jamieson v. Woodward &
Lothrop, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 247 F.2d 23 0 . C . Ci. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957),
where the plaintiff was unable to recover damages for injuries received while using an exercise device
that was, in essence, a simple rubber rope, the court described its reasoning for holding that the
device was not unreasonably dangerous:
If a man drops an iron dumbbell on his foot the manufacturer is not liable.
***
The only 'dangerous condition' was that a rubber rope is elastic and when stretched will,
when released, return to its original length with some degree of force. Small boys know
that fact and fashion slingshots upon the principle. Surely every adult knows that, if an
elastic band, whether it be an office rubber band or a rubber rope exerciser, is stretched
and one's hold on it slips, the elastic snaps back. There was no duty on the manufacturer

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Coequal with foreseeability as part of the evaluation of the manufacturer's

duty to warn under negligence principles is the familiar weighing of costs against
benefits. Relevant to the seller's duty to provide warnings and instructions, there
are two questions for resolution. First, what is the likelihood of harm if warnings
are not used, and what will be the seriousness of that harm? Second, what is the
cost or burden of taking appropriate precaution^?^^
t o warn of that simple fact.

Id. at 37, 247 F.2d a t 28.
70 See Noel, supra note 60; 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,PRODUCTS LIABILITY114 (1966).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 291 provides the general risk-utility standard that may
be applied to the supplier's duty to warn under negligence principles. That section states:
UNREASONABLENESS; HOW DETERMINED;WNITUDE OF RISK AND U ~ I T OF Y CONDUCT:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm
t o another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude
as t o outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or the particular manner in
which it is done.
An articulation of this cost-benefit analysis is of particular relevance t o circumstances in which the
product is not t o be handled by the manufacturer's immediate vendee, but is instead to be used by
a third party, such as the vendee's employee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS$ 388 Comment n
states:
Here, as in every case which involves the determination of the precautions which must be
taken to satisfy the requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved
must be compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring them .. . , and
the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by the chance that some harm may result
but also the serious or trivial character of the harm which is likely t o result.
See Boyl, 221 F. Supp. 669 (liquid weed killer "TrioxJ', targeted to home gardener, found to have
warnings that were inadequate to convey extreme toxicity of dermal contact, and consequential need
for cautious disposal of waste). "Whether any such unreasonable risk exists in a given situation
depends on balancing the probability and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the
costs of taking appropriate precautions." Moran, 273 Md. a t 543, 332 A.2d at 15 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)TORTS$5 291-93, 298). The weight of the authority in duty t o warn actions based in neg-
ligence states that the seller's duty of care may be ascertained by taking the likelihood of harm, and
the gravity of the harm, should it happen, as weighed against the burden of precautions that could
effectively 'avoid the harm. E.g., Holladay v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 255 F. Supp.
879, 884 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (issue of failure to warn against skin irritations from herbicide).
See also Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (an action involving failure
t o warn of risk of skin disorder from use of deodorant), in which the court suggests: "[Iln addition
t o the incidence of sensitivity t o aluminum sulfate, the trial court should also consider the gravity
of the possible injuly from the use of Arrid and the difficulty, if any, of embodying an effective
precaution in the labels or literature attached to the product." Id. at 59 and Dougherfy, 540 F.2d
174, (a wrongful death action brought by the widow of an employee of an aircraft manufacturer
who purchased the chemical solvent trichloroethylene). The court therein cast the seller's duty of care
concerning warnings in this way:
...
The care t o be exercised in discharging the duty t o warn is measured by the dangerous
. ..
potentialities of the commodity as well as the foreseeable use t o which it might be put ,
The determination of whether the method or means utilized t o warn is sufficient will depend

It is here that the real footing of the negligence analysis in the asymmetry
of buyer-seller information can be seen. Evaluation of the likelihood of harm if
warnings are not used is nothing more and nothing less than a measurement of
the germane safety-related information held by the seller and that, if any, held
by the buyer. If the nature of the harm from the ignorant use or consumption
of the product is more than trivial, and the buyer knows as much as the seller
about the safety characteristics, there will be buyer-seller informational parity and
its concommitant, no duty to warn. Any action brought by the buyer for injuries
occasioned by the use of the product should be successfully deflected by the
defense of assumption of risk, based upon the user's full awareness of the risk
and knowing and voluntary encounter with it. On the other hand, again assuming
a nontrivial harm and also a modest burden in effecting any warnings, if the
seller holds more germane safety-related information than would be known to
the ordinary user or consumer, the duty to warn and to impart that information
should invariably attach.
While the cost-benefit analysis employed by the courts in duty to warn actions
can be harmonized easily with the requirements of due care in a universe of man's
other affairs,72 a crucial distinction exists between defective warning actions on
the one hand, and defective design cases on the other. The distinction pertains
to the burden of precaution element of the equation, or the cost to the manu-
facturer to act to avoid or at least lessen the risk. In design defect cases, the cost
of implementation of a new design may be quite substantial, or even nonfeasible
when a design alteration would impair the product's utility, or the cost of such
changes would eliminate the product's economic viability. On the other hand,
putting aside certain situations such as products sold in bulk, it is almost always
upon a balancing of considerations involving among other factors, the dangerous nature
of the product, the form in which the product is used, the intensity and form of the warnings
given, the burdens to be imposed by requiring warnings, and the likelihood that the par-
ticular warning will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably use the
product.
Id. at 179.
72 The revered equation of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), reh'g denied, 160 F.2d 482 (1947) states that the duty owed to protect
others from injury was a function of three variables: (1) the probability of the injurious event; (2)
the gravity of the injury should the event take place; and (3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Rendered algebraicly, with Probability P , Injury L, and Burden B, liability will attach where B is
less than PL. The formulation of the warning standard in many of the modern warning decisions
bears a resemblance to the Hand formulation. E.g., Frederick v, Niagara Mach. and Tool Works,
107 A.D.2d 1063, 1064, 486 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (1985):
The nature of the warning and t o whom it should be given depends upon a number of
factors including the harm that may result from use of the product without the warnings,
the reliability and adverse interest of the person t o whom notice is given, the kind of product
involved and the burden in disseminating the warning.

242 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
practicable to create warnings or instructions for a product or to improve upon

existing ones. Relative to the cost of a design change, it is usually a modest
financial endeavor to add or improve warnings. Thus, in applying the risk benefit
analysis, to a duty to warn action where there has been adduced some evidence
that more adequate warnings would improve the safety of the product, the finder
of fact will more often than not conclude that the manufacturer failed in its duty
to
111. WHENA DUTYTO WARNARISESUNDER STRICTLIABILITY

PRINCIPLES
The most widely-referenced distinction between liability based in negligence

and that based in strict liability in tort is that the strict liability inquiry pertains
to the condition, or dangerousness, of the product, while the negligence evaluation
focuses on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the seller in marketing the
product in its final condition.74 The distinction between a product-based and a
conduct-based analysis is not, for its familiarity, as instructive as one might hope.
More helpful than the particularization of the technical and semantic differences
between the theories of negligent failure to warn and failure to warn based on
strict liability is the recognition that identical to analysis under both theories is
the concern with products posing an unreasonable risk of injury to users or con-
sumers, and the adequacy of warnings.
As is equally true under negligence principles, the vital issue in strict liability
is what is the type of harm, measured in terms of the degree of risk, the severity
of injury, and the number of persons likely to be affected, that represents an
unreasonable danger. A generally accepted standard is that a dangerously defective
article is one "which a reasonable man would not put into the stream of commerce
73 This is the gist of the court's observation in Moran, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 in which it
states:
[Wle observe that in cases such as this the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually
so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label, that
this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent
dangers, if the m'anufacturer is otherwise required to do so.
Id. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15.
To similar effect is the observation of the court in Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping ~ e h . ,16 Ill.
App. 3d 339, 306 N.13.2d 312 (1973). An action involving a child's ingestion of an all-purpose cleaner,
in which the court stated: "[Tlhe addition of appropriate words of warning on the Jetco label would
have constituted only a slight burden of precaution for defendant to have undertaken." Id. at 347,
306 N.E.2d at 318.
74 See Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) (in strict liability, the merchant selling an
unreasonably dangerous product is liable for injuries proximately caused therefore, regardless of fault);
Bridges v. Chemrez Specialty Coatings, Inc., 704 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983) (in Louisiana, the strict
liability concepts and those of negligence are similar, save for the pertinence in negligence evaluation
of the defendant's knowledge of the risk involved).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
if he had knowledge of its harmful chara~ter."~~ Put another way, the question
is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved.76From the above it becomes clear that in the context of failure to warn
jurisprudence, the functional characteristics of strict liability and negligence the-
ories are almost indisting~ishable.~~
Thus, the duty to warn under strict liability principles differs from the prev-
alent interpretation of the duty to warn in negligence in that, under strict liability,
one may impute to the manufacturer constructive knowledge of the hazardous
condition of the At the same time, the theory of strict liability in tort
for warnings cases adds little, either d~ctrinally~~or literallys0to the tort of neg-
ligent failure to warn.
75 Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033; Borel, 493 F.2d 1076, 1088; Helene Curtis Indus., Inc.,
v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Dorsey v. Yoder, 331
F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (ED. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Keeton, supra note 36,
at 403-04.
76 Cf.,Welch, 481 F.2d at 254; see Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About AI-
location of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966).

Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1317 n.11. The negligence concepts of foreseeability and actual or
constructive knowledge have been interpreted as common to both strict liability and negligence, with
particular regard to the manufacturer's knowledge of the risk to be warned against. See, e.g., Holmes
v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 475 N.E.2d 1383 (1985) (plaintiff in a strict liability action
alleging failure to warn must establish the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger).
78 Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033. In this connection, of course, the imputation of con-
structive knowledge to the manufacturer is virtually identical to the "should know" aspect of the
negligence standard for the manufacturer's duty to warn as described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF
TORTS5 388.
79 See, e.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1982). "Where the theory
of liability is failure to warn or adequately instruct, negligence and strict products liability are equiv-
alent causes of action." Id. at 377, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted). In Werner v. Upjohn
Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981), an action involving
allegations of a failure to provide adequate warnings concerning administration of the prescription
opthalmic pharmaceutical Cleocin, the court, after noting the "close similarity" between negligence
and strict liability when applied to warnings cases, stated:
The elements of both are the same with the exception that in negligence plaintiff must show
a breach of a duty of due care by defendant while in strict liability plaintiff must show
the product was unreasonably dangerous. The distinction between the two lessens consid-
erably in failure to warn cases since it is clear that strict liability adds little in warning
cases. Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant exercised due care in
formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is
whether the lack of a proper warning made the product unreasonably dangerous. Though
phrased differently the issue under either theory is essentially the same: was the warning
adequate?
Id. at 858 (citation omitted). See also Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969)
(applying Connecticut law), which held that for unavoidable unsafe products comment k of RES-
TATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 402A "simply adopts the ordinary negligence concept of duty to
warn" and, thus, the two theories are virtually identical. Id. at 426-27. There have been, nevertheless,

The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A provide guid-

ance both as to the distinctions and similarities between negligence and strict
liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment a states that in
general "[tlhe rule of strict liability subjects the seller to liability to the user or
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation of the
product." Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment j, in turn, states
the seller's obligation to inform the consumer or user of hazards of which the
seller either knew or should have known at the time of initial sale. Even in strict
liability, therefore, "a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that
are reasonably foreseeable," a standard which by its grounding in foreseeability
"coincides with the standard of due care in negligence ~ases."~'
influential expressions of the distinction between the breach of duty to warn analysis in strict liability
and that in negligence. The court in Phillips, 269 Or, 485, 525 P.2d 1033, for example, states:
The article car1 have a degree of dangerousness because of a lack of warning which the
law of strict liability will not tolerate even though the actions of the seller were entirely
reasonable in selling the article without a warning considering what he knew or should have
known at the rime he sold it.
Id. at 498, 525 P.Zj 1039.
80 RESTATEMEPIT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 402A does not mention warnings or directions for use.
As pertinent to the issue of when the duty to warn arises, the prefatory language of comment j
thereto, entitled "Directions or Warning," states: "In order to ptevent the product from being un-
reasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as
to its use." Id. comment j.
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088. In the helpful expression of one court, this requirement that the risk
be reasonably foreseeable impels the inquiry into "whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the man-
ufacturer that the product would be unreasonably dangerous if distributed v~ithouta warning on the
label and, if so, whether the manufacturer supplied the warning that a reasonably prudent manu-
facturer would have supplied." Anderson v. Kli Chem. Co., 256 Or. 199, 203, 472 P.2d 806, 808
(1970). While Borel represents the majority view that the manufacturer's duty is to be evaluated with
reference to what it knew or should have known, i.e., what was scientifically or technically knowl-
edgeable about the dangerous potentialities of the product at the time of marketing, a strong minority
is represented in such opinions as that of Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th
Cir. 1974), where the court states: "In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant had reason
to believe.'" Id. at 812. See also the comments of the court in Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash.
App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978), modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979):
It is true as plaintiff contends that RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTSj! 402A, comment j
suggests that strict liability for failure to warn is based upon the manufacturer's knowledge
or imputation of knowledge of the danger. But his suggestion is incongruous, since it shifts
the emphasis away from the condition of the product (strict liability) and back to the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct (negligence). Aside from situations in which
a danger is obvious or known to the user, strict liability (as distinct from negligence) for
a manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings does not depend on the manufac-
turer's knowleclge of the danger. Such knowledge is assumed, Phillips v. Kimwood Machine
Co., [269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)], and it is the failure to given the adequate warning
that renders the product unreasonably dangerous. (citations.) Plaintiff's proposed instruction
couched in terms of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 402A comment j should not be
given in this type of case. In summary, if the product has dangerous propensities even

The now conventional inquiry in duty to warn claims brought in strict liability
is "(1) whether the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger, and
(2) whether the manufacturer was negligent in failing to communicate this superior
knowledge to the user or consumer of its For its simplicity and con-
sistency with the leading decisional law, a representative expression of when the
duty to warn arises under principles of strict liability in tort is stated by the courts
as "whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order
to decide whether to expose himself to it."83 The former protocol, specifically its
second part, can be seen as similar to the inquiry into whether the seller held
pertinent safety-related information not imparted to the buyer. It is arguable,
however, that the subsequent proposition of an inquiry into whether the man-
ufacturer was negligent in failing to share its superior safety-related knowledge
is flummery. The decisional law by now establishes that where there is a hazard
and a feasible means of its abatement by dissemination of warnings or instruc-
tions, the seller will be liable for failing to do so. Such a standard will apply
even where the risk or causal relation between the product and the resulting harm
has not been established to a scientific ~ e r t a i n t y The
. ~ ~ standard will also apply
when information available to the manufacturer concerning some risk is distin-
guishable from the risk the injured plaintiff now seeks to prove.85
For there to be strict liability for failure to warn, the absence or inadequacy
of warnings or instructions must be of such a nature as to render the product
though they are unknown to the manufacturer and reasonable care has been taken to make
and market the product-unless the dangers are obvious or known to the user, the manu-
facturer will be held strictly liable if it has not adequately warned the user of the dangers
inherent in the use of the product by, for example, affixing a proper label.
Id. at 821-22, 579 P.2d at 946-47.
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089.
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting with ap-
proval Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089).
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (1981).
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Corp., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536-37 @.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984), an action by an agricultural worker alleging contraction of pulmonary fibrosis due
to long-term exposure to paraquat, in which the manufacturer at trial discounted reports it had of
at least three critical injuries, two resulting in death, on the grounds that the chronic illness suffered
by the plaintiff was altogether different. The court responded:
Chevron seeks to distinguish these incidents and to establish compliance with its duty to
warn by arguing that these incidents all involved immediate internal complications resulting
from dermal paraquat exposure, whereas Ferebee suffered from delayed and prolonged
pulmonary fibrosis. Chevron argues that it had no information that prolonged exposure to
parquat could cause a chronic illness like Ferebee's or that such illness could continue long
after exposure to paraquat had ceased. But the fact that the injuries of which Chevron
knew occurred much more quickly than the prolonged illness through which Ferebee suffered
is no answer to Chevron's complete failure to warn that any such injuries, whether immediate
or latent, could result from dermal exposure to paraquat.
Id. at 1537.

unreasonably dangerous.86Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment

i emphasizes that the evaluation of what is unreasonably dangerous is the focal
point of the strict liability inquiry, be the product hazard attributable to mis-
manufacture, a design or formulation defect, or a failure to provide adequate
warning^.^' A prevalent means for evaluation of when an alleged warning in-
adequacy renders a product unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A requires reference to the "ordinary
consumer," posited in comment i, and the consumer expectation test. Under the
consumer expectation test, a product will be considered to have been sold in a
defective condition and to be unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
where, by its manufacture, design, or informational inadequacies, it is "dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer"
purchasing it.88
One helpful analysis places the claims of unreasonable danger and inadequate
warning in strict liability in the context of two tests as to whether a product is
safe: (1) whether the product's utility outweighs the risk to its user, and (2) if
the utility outweighs the risk, whether the risk has been reduced insofar as possible
without a material diminution of the product's utility. When a product succeeds
in passing the first standard, it must pass the second test, for a product will not
be considered reasonably safe if the same product could have been either made
86 The unreasonably dangerous standard is that of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 402A

with its imposition of liability upon "[olne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
."
dangerous to the user or consumer . . Id. comment j, discussed supra note 80, simply reiterates
the requirement that liability will be imposed only where the informational absence or inadequacy
renders the product unreasonably dangerous.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 402A comment i states in pertinent part: "The rule stated
in this section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer." Id.
a Id.; See Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977), applying
the consumer expectation test to the issue of whether an unguarded flowrator "was not reasonably
safe without (defendant) first giving a warning of the dangers of measuring liquids above 50 p.s.i.
and of using Viton 0-Rings when measuring ammonia." Id. at 155, 570 P.2d at 442. There was
evidence in that action that the manufacturer knew that it was hazardous to operate the flowrator
in question applying in excess of 50 p.s.i., although the machine was rated as capable of operation
with pressures of up to 440 p.s.i. The explosion causing the injury occurred when the machine was
running at 175 p.s.i. Finding in favor of the respondent on the basis of reasonable consumer ex-
pectations, the court states:
In terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, given the fact that
this flowrater was rated at 440 p.s.i, we believe reasonable persons could only conclude
that this unguarded flowrator was not reasonably safe when it was sold without a warning.
In addition, appellant knew that Viton O-rings were incompatible with ammonia, yet it did
nothing more than recommend the use of Buna O-rings. It did not warn of the dangers
which could result from using Viton 0-Rings with ammonia. The lack of this warning, by
itself, would render the flowrator unsafe.
Id. at 155-6, 570 P.2d at 442.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
or marketed more safely, with no substantial lessening of utility. Warnings cases

in strict liability reflect most clearly the second standard, for they advance the
proposition that "regardless of the overall cost benefit calculation the product is
unsafe because a warning could have made it safer at virtually no added cost
and without limiting its utility."89
While in strict liability the manufacturer will be presumed to have a knowledge
of any hazardous propensities of the product sold, the leading authority concludes
that this constructive knowledge will properly be considered to extend only to
worldly and not to supernal matters. This conclusion is reached with both explicit
and implicit reference to the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A comment k, and the suggestion therein that limitations imposed by "the
present state of human k n o ~ l e d g e , "may
~ ~ be properly considered in determining
what degree of safety was or is possible to achieve in a particular product. Ac-
cordingly, the decisions conclude that in evaluating whether a manufacturer failed
in its duty to warn, the manufacturer's constructive knowledge of the risk (mean-
ing what the manufacturer knew or should have known, or what knowledge can
fairly be imputed to the manufacturer), is limited by the "present state of human
knowledge," as that phrase is used in comment k. In most instances, the limits
of such scientific or technical knowledge are readily ascertainable by reference to
the knowledge existing in the relevant industry as to the characteristics of the
prod~ct.~' Therefore, the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals will be considered to
have constructive knowledge of information related in accepted scholarly jour-
nals.% The manufacturer of ethical drugs alleged to have caused an injury about
which it did not warn may defend on the grounds that knowledge as to the alleged,
and subsequently litigated, adverse consequences of the drug were beyond the
reach of medical and scientific knowledge. Therefore, such adverse consequences
were beyond foreseeability at the time of initial manufacture and sale.93
89 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982).
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS$ 402A comment k.
91 See \Voodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37 Ill. Dec. 304, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980),
involving a chid severely injured at birth by administration of the pharmaceutical Pitocin, in which
the court found further that to impose manufacturer liability for failure to warn the plaintiff must
prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risks of fetal injury, and that such
analysis contemplates analysis of what knowledge existed in the industry of the dangerous propensity
of a manufacturer's product.
92 Allen v. Upjohn, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19173 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1982).
9, Woodill, 402 N.E.2d at 199. To the objection that evaluation of the manufacturer's knowledge
at the time of original distribution of the product was inappropriate to the inquiry in strict liability
as to failure to warn, the court responded:
\Ve think that the imposition of a knowledge requirement is a proper limitation to place
on a manufacturer's strict liabiity in tort predicated upon a failure to warn of a danger
inherent in a product. We do not agree with the plaintiffs that to require knowledge t o be
alleged and proved is to infuse negligence principles into strict liability. Indeed, liabiity

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
This symbiosis of the constructive knowledge that will be imputed to the

manufacturer for the purposes of a claim of strict liability for failure to warn,
as influenced by the level of scientific and technical knowledge available to the
industry at the time of manufacture and marketing, is readily harmonized with
the reference in section 402A, comment j to the seller's obligation to warn "if
he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill
.
and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of . . the danger."94 For
the purpose of any evaluation of seller safety-related knowledge vis-a-vis com-
parable knowledge held by the buyer, the delimitation of the information that
will be imputed to the seller to that appreciated in the relevant industry also has
the salutary effect of requiring the plaintiff to confine proof of the seller's actual
or imputed safety familiarity to that information known to the seller or at least
known to others in the seller's industry. It also prevents the otherwise harsh result
of permitting a plaintiff's proof of theoretical bases for the seller's knowledge
of the risk, while confining the defendant's buyer-conduct defenses to a showing,
if possible, of the buyer's hands-on familiarity with the hazard.
In the context of products liability claims involving injuries occasioned by
long latency disease-inducing substances, the augury of recent authority may be
that a more chilly reception awaits manufacturers who defend the duty to warn
count in a plaintiff's complaint by arguing that the risks posed by the product
were unknown and unknowable at the time of initial manufacture and distribution.
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
C ~ r p . concluded
,~~ that a manufacturer might still be strictly liable for failure to
warn even where the risk was undiscoverable at the time of manufacture. Such
a conclusion, according to the court, is consistent with the strict liability goals
and policies of risk spreading, accident avoidance, and maintenance of a man-
ageable judicial fact-finding process. The court provocatively adds that the holding
based upon a failure to warn adequately of dangers. .. is itself a doctrine borrowed from
. ..
negligence . Yet the failure-to-warn theory in strict liability has been upheld as a dis-
tinguishable doctrine from its counterpart in negligence, based on the fact that it is the
inadequacy of the warning that is looked to, rather than the conduct of the particular
manufacturer, to establish strict liability.
Id. at 198.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS8 402A comment j. A contrary interpretation would make
the manufacturer the insurer of its product:
[A] logical limit must be placed on the scope of a manufacturer's liability under a strict
liability theory. To hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it
would be impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge would make
the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the product, a position rejected by this court in
Suvada. Woodill, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
9J Beshada, S O N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539.

could fairly be viewed as creating "an incentive for [manufacturers] to invest

more actively in safety re~earch."~~
After Beshada, some other decisions alleging strict liability in tort and alleging
the seller's failure to warn have spurned the attempts of defendants to show that
the hazard was not foreseeable given the state of general scientific knowledge at
the time of introduction into commerce. The aspects of that principle pertinent
to the seller's knowledge of the risk, without regard to whether such knowledge
reposed in the frontiers of science or was commonplace, were followed in later
New Jersey authorityg7 and applied to rebuilders of machines and manufacturers
of component parts.98Additional authority has weighed in to support the position
that the seller must warn the buyer of risks associated with the consumption or
use of the product "regardless of whether the seller knew or had reason to know
of the risks and limitation^."^^
Those decisions declining to follow the actual or constructive knowledge
standard of section 402A comment j ' O O take the approach that, under strict li-
ability, courts should disregard evaluation of the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct, including questions of what it or the industry knew of the
hazard. Courts should focus instead upon the condition of the product at the
time of sale, the axial coordinate of strict liability.101Illustrative of such authority
is-one action arising from the death of an industrial worker who asphyxiated
ivhile using defendkt's cleaning product containing methyl chloroform. The court
found that the issue of the adequacy of the defendant's somewhat bland warning
should be submitted to the jury, reasoning that, in strict liability, a finding of
% Id. at 201, 447 A.2d at 539. The court's comment in full states "The 'state-of-the-art' at a
given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in safety research. By imposing on
manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create for them an incentive to invest more
actively in safety research." Id., 447 A.2d at 539.
I" Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386,451 A.2d 179 (1982). But see Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,479 A.2d 374 (1984) (an action concerning the discoloring effects
on the teeth of children administered the drug during certain periods of tooth growth, and confining
the precedential effect of the decision in Beshnda to its facts).
Michalko, 91 N.J. at 395, 451 A.2d at 183. In the words of New Jersey Supreme Court:
PVJhen it is feasible for the rebuilder of machinery or the manufacturer of component parts
to incorporate safety device and it fails to do so, the rebuilt machine or component part
will be deemed to be a defective product when delivered by the manufacturer to its owner.
Further, the fact that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of
the owner does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for the man-
ufacturer of a defective product when the injuries are suffered by the innocent foreseeable
user of the product.
Id., 451 A.2d at 183.
99 Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 59, 62, 391 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1978).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 402A comment j.
Little, 19 Wash. App. at 821, 579 P.2d at 946.

manufacturer liability does not depend upon what the manufacturer knew for
"[sluch knowledge is a~sumed."'~ An additional logic offered by this court for
declining to consider the state of scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture
is the recognition that even where a product has been manufactured with all
reasonable care, many such products "can have a degree of dangerousness which
.
the law of strict liability will not tolerate . . .,9103
IV. FATLURE
TO WARNAS A BREACHOF WARRANTY
The absence of adequate warnings or instructions on a product may in some

circumstances support a finding that the product marketed in this condition is
not merchantable, and is in breach of section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), as codified in most juridictions. The court so concluded in the
celebrated decision of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,lo4in which the
plaintiff, an industrial insulation worker who contracted the diseases of mesoth-
elioma and asbestosis as a result of thirty-three years of exposure to respirable
asbestos, brought an action against certain manufacturers of insulation products
containing asbestos. The warranty count of the complaint alleged that the defend-
ant's products were unreasonably dangerous and unmerchantable, because of
defendant's "failure to provide adequate warnings of the foreseeable danger as-
sociated with them.'y105That court's affirmance that the manufacturer's failure
to warn adequately rendered the insulation products unreasonably dangerous suf-
ficed to support both the allegation of breach of implied warranty of merchant-
ability and that of strict liability in tort.lo6
In another action illustrative of how a seller's failure to provide adequate
warnings may be found to render the product unmerchantable, plaintiff brought
suit alleging breach of an implied warranty of merchantability against the seller
The warning read as follows: "Caution: Vapor may be harmful. Use with adequate ventilation.
Avoid prolonged or repeated breathing of vapor." Id. at 822, 579 P.2d at 946 (citing with approval
Phil[ips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033).
lm Phillips, 525 P.2d 1033, at 1037 (citing Roach, 269 Or. 452, 525 P.2d 125). See also Haugen
v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71 (1976); Anderson v. Heron
Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979) cautioning that permitting strict liability to be affected
by the manufacturer's "knov~ledgeor reasonable imputation of knowledge" would divert attention
"away from the condition of the product (strict liability) and back to the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct (negligence)." Id. at 679 (citing with approval Little, 19 Wash. App. at 821,
579 P.2d a t 946).
Iw Borel, 493 F.2d 1076.
IM Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1091. Describing the common nature of the proof sufficient for warranty or strict tort
liability, be it a failure to warn case or otherwise, the court added: "Breach of warranty cases in-
variably speak in terms of fitness for the particular purpose for which the goods are sold. This
formulation parallels the 'unreasonably dangerous' rule applied in the strict liability in tort cases."
Id. (citations omitted).

of aerosol deodorant that, after application, ignited on his skin as he lit a cigarette.
The court agreed with plaintiff's contention that an implied warranty of mer-
chantability applied to the contents of the deodorant can as well as to the can
itself. The court further agreed that a failure to warn of dangerous propensities
of either could render the product unmerchantable and that plaintiff's contention
that the warnings on the can were inadequate therefore posed factual questions
for the jury.lo7 It has been urged accordingly that in the context of a failure to
warn allegation, no material differences exist between the negligence, warranty
and strict liability counts inasmuch as "recovery under any theory requires the
proof of identical facts: proof of injury, and proof that defendant knew or should
have known of the risk of injury and did not warn plaintiff about it."Ios
Other authority equates the negligence-based duty to warn obligations of Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 388 with the requirements of UCC section 2-
314, obligating the seller to sell only such goods as are "fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used." Instructive in this regard is one action
in which an apartment house owner brought suit against the manufacturer and
seller of hair rollers after one apartment resident inadvertently started a fire by
permitting the water to boil away in the pot used to heat the rollers. The cau-
tionary comments accompanying the rollers at the time of sale stated that they
"may" be inflammable should they be left over a "flame" in a container without
water, but adding that otherwise, the rollers were "perfectly safe." The court,
applying South Carolina law, granted a new trial, concluding that the evidence
raised jury questions as to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warnings, sounding
equivalently in negligence and in warranty.lo9
Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612,
257 S.E.2d 219 (1979) (summary judgment reserved).
lWKidwell, supra note 15, at 1377-78. Cf.Fisher v. Gate City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 703,
211 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1973) (failure to instruct on implied warranty not prejudicial when covered
by instruction on strict liability) (dictum).
109 Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cu. 1971). The court went on to state:
For the law has now reached the stage of development that a supplier and a manufacturer
of a chattel are liable to all whom they should expect will use the chattel or be endangered
by its use if (a) they know or have reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, (b) they lack reason to believe that the user
will realize the potential danger, and (c) they fail to exercise reasonable care to inform of
its dangerous condition of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OP TORTS$5 388 and 395 (1965 Ed.). The same is true with respect to a cause
of action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as that warranty is breached when goods are not 'fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used.'
Id. (citation omitted). See also Basko, 416 F.2d at 427; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), equating "defective" for purposes of Restatement section 402A with
"not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used." Id. at 67,
207 A.2d at 313; Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d

The similarity between the failure to warn case based on negligence and that
based on warranty extends, naturally, to the requirement that plaintiff prove that
the hazard posed by the seller's product, or conduct, was a cause of the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff.110It has been held that even when a product is, strictly
speaking, fit to p~zrformits intended function, the manufacturer's failure to warn
the buyer of adverse side effects may constitute a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability. In one representative action, a purchaser of potato sprout
suppressant alleged a failure to warn in both tort and warranty against the seller
of that product, used for dusting seed potatoes before storage to retard sprouting.
The bags in which the product was contained cautioned only that there might,
after planting 'the following season, be "a slight delay in emergence."111 While
the product apparently succeeded in retarding emergence, it also, evidence showed,
caused erratic emergence, multiple sprouting, and small potatoes.I1* The court
affirmed that goods are not fit for their ordinary purpose within the meaning of
UCC section 2-314if the manufacturer fails to warn of adverse "side-effects which
[result] from its use."Il3
Distinctions do exist between the warranty cause of action and the tort cause
of action. Unlike the defenses available on a claim of tortious failure to warn,
the defendant may defend the warranty claim with the defenses of lack of privity,
lack of notice of breach, contractual assumption of the risk, express disclaimer
or express limitation of remedy.lI4 The failure to warn claim sounding in warranty
is also distinguishable from the allegation of negligent failure to warn in that in
negligence, the seller will be liable if the inadequacy of its waming constitutes
conduct that is unreasonable under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388.
Resolution of the issue of whether the seller has breached a duty to warn under
81 (1963); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (strict liability under 5
402A "is hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines
of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limitations through inconsistencies with
express warranties." Id. at 429); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968)
(the difference between implied warranty and strict liability in tort is largely one of terminology);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Sen., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"O Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Mich. App. 356, 367 N.W.2d 393 (1985). In this action
both the manufacturer of the truck and the manufacturer of a multi-piece rim were sued for injuries
sustained by a repainnan when the rim explosively disengaged. Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty
and negligence for failure to warn of dangers inherent in the three-piece rim. First acknowledging
that "[nlegligence and breach of implied warranty claims based on a failure to warn involve proof
of the same elements." Id. at 361, 367 N.lV.2d at 396. The appellate court affirmed the finding
below that the plaintiff's awareness of the risk and acknowledgment that this conduct would have
been the same had a warning been issued "refuted a causal connection between the lack of warning
of the danger of three-piece wheel rims and plaintiff's injury." Id. at 362, 367 N.W.2d at 396.
Streich, 692 IB.2d at 442-43.
Il2 Id. at 442.
n3 Id. at 448, and continuing: "Surely goods are not merchantable, if in their ordinary use, the
goods cause damage to property to which they are applied or harm to the person using them." Id.
"* See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1971).

an implied warranty of merchantability, on the other hand, "focuses upon whether

the Iack of warning renders the product unreasonably dangerous and thereby
breaches an implied warranty. "I1'
One of the most important distinctions between warranty and tort as applied
to allegations of failure to warn is that the manufacturer's duty to warn under
a tort theory is "continuous,~yin that it is not interrupted by the manufacture
or the sale of the product.l16 Under warranty theory, on the other hand, the
seller's obligation is that the product be merchantable, or not unreasonably dan-
gerous, at the time of initial sale.l17 Therefore, where plaintiff alleges a failure
to warn sounding in breach of implied warranty of merchantability, if the product
is not unreasonably dangerous for want of adequate warnings at the time it leaves
the control of the manufacturer, "it cannot at some later date 'become' unrea-
sonably dangerous due to the lack of warnings."11s
V. THE EFFECTOF OBVIOUSNESS

OF THE l%mm~
ON USER'SKNOWLEDGE
OF
THEHAZARD
In many situations the risk associated with the use of or the exposure to a
product is of such a nature that it is known to the buyer or consumer, or is
readily apparent to the casual observer. Where there is such knowledge or ob-
viousness of the risk, there exists in most instances an equilibrium between the
safety-related information held by the seller and that known by the buyer or user,
and there should be no duty to warn. Where the hazard is apparent, but not the
means by which the hazard can be avoided or the product used without an un-
necessary risk, the seller should still have a duty to warn or offer instructions to
the user or consumer.
The majority rule is that there exists no duty to warn of certain obviously
hazardous conditions.llg Authority consistent with the conclusion that a manu-
facturer need not warn of hazards that are of common knowledge has involved
Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 556 0V.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 213
(4th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original) (no breach of implied warranty of merchantability for failure
to warn under Virginia law where a skilled purchaser, a foundry, knew, or should have known of
the hazardous propensities of silica).
Bly V. Otis Elevator, 713 F.2d 1040, 1046 (4th Cir. 1983); W. Prosser, supra note 54, at 647.
Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046; Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1981); Logan
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975); 1 R. Hursh & H. Bailey,
American Law of Products Liability 674 (26 ed. 1974).
la8 Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046.
See, e.g., Fanning v. Lemay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (slipperyness of shoes
when wet); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.26 1176 (5th Ci.1971) (placing hand in operating meat
grinder).

slingshots,lZ0BB guns,I2l darts,lZ2chairs on casters for invalids,'= kerosene used

by industrial workers,124and the activity of diving from a roof into a four-foot-
deep swimming po01.'~
The law has been often, but inadequately, summarized that there should be
no recovery for failure to warn where the hazard posed by the product was obvious
to the ordinary user or consumer. The position taken in the decisions comprising
this body of law is stated by one court in this language: "A manufacturer cannot
manufacture a knife that will not cut or a hammer that will not mash a thumb
or a stove that will not burn a finger. The law does not require him to warn of
such common dangers."lZ6 Whatever may be the limitations of this articulation
of the law, it nevertheless finds substantial support. A consistent position is sug-
gested by the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 which pro-
vide that the supplier's duty to warn others of hazardous propensities of a product
applies "if, and only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved."127
am Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976).
l2I Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505 (1977); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp.,
40 Colo. App. 417, 576 P.2d 197 (1978).
I n Atkins v. Aslans Dept. Store of Norman, Inc., 522 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1974).
Iz3 McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864
(1978).
Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976).
Hensley, 65 Mich. App. 662, 238 N.W.2d 362.
Jamieson, 101 U.S. App. D.C. at 36, 247 F.2d at 26. Jamieson involved the plaintiff's pur-
chase of an elastic exerciser that was essentially "an ordinary rubber rope, about the thickness of a
large lead pencil, about forty inches long, with loops on the ends." Id. at 35, 247 F.2d at 25. Plaintiff
was injured when the extended exerciser slipped and struck her in the eye.
I n RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS$ 388, comment k. Importantly, however, the comment
goes on to state that the supplier will have a duty to warn where the condition, however "readily
observable," represents "one which only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous."
Id. Professor James summarizes the consistent conclusion in this way:
p h e obviousness of a danger, including the likelihood that it will be appreciated] is a factor
which diminishes the likelihood of danger and militates against the need for precautions.
The sharpness of knives and axes, or the tendency of unpacked fresh meat to spoil are so
notorious that a warning could be expected to add nothing useful to the perception gained
from one's senses and the knowledge common to all men. Nor does any alternative feasible
precaution suggest itself. People generally can and do protect themselves against the dangers,
thus they are not unreasonable ones.
2 F. HARPER& F. .IAMES, supra note 13, at 1542.
"Under this analysis the obviousness of a condition will still preclude liability if the obvio~~sness
justifies the conclusion that the condition is not unreasonably dangerous; otherwise it would simply
be a factor to consider on the issue of negligence." Id. at 1543. Perhaps the sharpest articulation of
the patent danger rule to date has been offered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bartkewich
v. Bilinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968): "[Wle hardly believe it is anymore necessary to tell
an experienced factory worker that he should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment
breaking glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his head out of a hippopotamus'
mouth.'' Id. at 356, 247 A.2d at 606.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Similar results include a denial of recovery to the plaintiff upon a finding of the
obviousness of the hazard of using a power saw without the guard in place,lZ8
flammability of kerosene,Iz9 and putting one's hand in a meat grinder during
operation.130
Reflections of the doctrine precluding liability in a failure to warn case where

the product hazard was obvious also include findings of no manufacturer liability
for the failure to warn the operator of a forklift truck of the danger of falling
cartons in the absence of an overhead guard;I3l that the top of a trash dumpster
could close on a or that objects might be hurled outward from the blades
of a bushhog rotary mower, injuring a co-worker.133There exists a livtly dispute
as to whether the capacity of a champagne cork to fly from the bottle upon
opening, with the consequent risk of injury to celebrants, represents an obvious
risk as to which no warning is required.134
The almost invariable issue in the discussion of the effect of hazard obvious-
ness on the duty to warn is the subject of the injured party's actual knowledge
of the danger as to which it is later alleged defendant should have warned. In
the workplace setting, the majority rule is that there can be no liability for failure
to warn of a hazard known specifically and individually to the user, or even
sometimes the user's employer. Thus, recovery has been denied to a plaintiff
punch-press operator who was injured while changing a broken punch when the
defendant was successful in showing that the injured party was an experienced
operator of the machine and was aware of the dangers involved in the residual
motion of the ram after the power is shut off.I3' Similarly, when the retail seller
of a winch truck was made a defendant in an action after one of the employees
of the purchaser was injured while driving the truck with a heavy load attached
Haines v. Powermatic Houdaille, Inc., 661 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law).
Iz9 Burton, 529 F.2d 108.
Ward, 450 F.2d 1176.
Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969) (applying
Indiana law).
n2 Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982).
lS3 Colson v. Allied Prods. Corp., 640 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1981).
1" For a finding that the obviousness and common knowledge that such corks disengage under
power does not convey obviousness that they may eject spontaneously. See Burke v. Almaden Vine-
yards Inc., 86 Cal. App. 3d 768, 150 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978) (also admitting evidence of warning added
to label after incident for purpose of showing feasibility of cautionary effort). But see Shuput v.
Heublein Inc., 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975) in which the court states: "The duty to warn .. . does
not extend to a perfectly obvious hazard but we do not consider this to be such a case. The propensities
of bubbly wine may be well known to many but are not a matter of such common knowledge as to
be established as a matter of law and imposed as a matter of judicial knowledge." Id. at 1106.
"5 Bullock v. Gulf & W. Mfg., 11983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19865 (Mich.
App. 1983).
Heinonline -- 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 255 1986-1987

to the winch, no liability for failure to warn was found upon the seller's showing
that the buyer was fully cognizant of the risks inv01ved.I~~
Another dimension of the doctrine denying recovery where a product's perils
are obvious is represented by those holdings on facts not involving injuries in
the workplace, and reaching the companion conclusion that there should be no
recovery for inadequate or absent warning when the party to whom the warning
would be properly directed is already aware of the danger.'" Consistent with the
authority concerning hazards in the workplace, these decisions focus upon the
knowledge of the person to whom the warning would be ostensibly due, and not
upon the apparent or unapparent nature of the risk. It has been held, therefore,
that the seller's defense that a hazard was readily observable or known will be
applicable even when the product's hazards might not be considered obvious to
the uninformed.'" There is authority extending the applicability of. the known
hazard doctrine to claims brought in strict liability in tort as well as in negli-
gence. 139
Importantly, under the known danger doctrine, the user's generalized aware-
ness of some peril will not defeat recovery unless the user knows of the specific
risk involved and of its magnitude.I4" Accordingly, a manufacturer may be found
to have breached its duty to warn where the evidence shows that the injured party
perceived some, but not all, of the danger. Illustrative is one action in which the
court found that the plaintiff, severely injured by diving into a shallow pool,
raised sufficient issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment since the evi-
dence suggested that the plaintiff had some knowledge of some risk, but no ap-
preciation of the entirety of such risk or its severity.l4I
Cruz V. Texaco, Inc., 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 710307 (S.D. Ill.
1984). The defendant here relied upon the knowledgeable purchaser doctrine, by which is posited that
in certain circumstances a seller may be entitled to rely upon the buyer to impact to the ultimate
users any pertinent warnings or instructions. See Hopkins v. E . I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 212
F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954) (no duty to warn found for dynamite manu-
facturer where blasting operations supervised by foreman knowledgeable of the dangers).
13' See, e.g., Martinez v. D i e Carriers Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., MIntyre, 575 F.2d 155, which involved the instability of a commode when the
use would be by a handicapped person.
U9 Garrett v. blissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 21, 498 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1972), involving the hazard
of falling from a trampoline, and finding that there is no duty under either RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS8 388 or 402A to warn of a risk known to the user or consumer.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952).
Corbin v. Coleco Indus. Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) f 10342
(7th Ci. 1984). Specifically, the injured plaintiff therein knew generally of the dangers associated
with diving into a shallow pool, but at the time of the incident itself he had intended only a shallow,
or "belly flop," dive. The court seems to have agreed with the proposition that the risk, of which
the plaintiff was not aware, was that of injury caused by a diver inadvertently taking a regular deep
dive, rather than the shallow belly flop intended. But cf. Colosimo v. May Dept. Store, Inc., 466
F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1972). where a fifteen year old boy was injured in a comparable way, but where
recovery was denied on a showing of the plaintiff's extensive aquatics familiarity, including Red Cross
courses in diving.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The doctrine denying recovery for injuries caused by product hazards that
are obvious or known to the user or consumer has been applied even where the
injured parties are children, embracing a logic that prompted one court in an
action caused by slingshot to state: "Ever since David slew Goliath young and
old alike have known that slingshots can be dangerous and deadly."142 Com-
parable results have been reached in actions involving minors' use of BB guns,143
pointed darts,'" and denatured alcohol.145
Although the doctrine is sometimes stated that recovery may not be had for
failure to warn where the hazard posed by the product is both known and obvious,
the more supportable expression of the law is that if the danger is known or
obvious, a warning will not be required. Thus, for the application of this defense,
the manufacturer need only show that the risk was either known or
While the patent danger rule has achieved substantial currency, the better
reasoned argument is that automatic preclusion of liability based only upon alleged
obviousness of the danger ill serves the risk spreading concepts underlying strict
liability in tort.14' The authors of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A
Borjorquez, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 931, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484.

la Bookout, 40 Colo. App. 417, 576 P.2d 197.
lU Atkins, 522 P.2d 1020.
"5 ~ a t r i i k
v. Perfect Parts Co., 515 S.\V.Zd 554 (Mo. 1974).
la Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1975) (alleged design
defect and failure to warn concerning absense of tractor roll-over bars). '
14' See generally Marshall. An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability
for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973), arguing, among other things, that
the patent defect rule ought not to apply to actions in strict liability in tort. See also Thompson v.
Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 36 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971); 2 L. FRWJER& M. FREDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 16A(5)(F) (1985). Related hereto is fairly sharp criticism of the patent peril
doctrine as it has been interpreted in design defect litigation. One such criticism was leveled in Palmer
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (an action against a hay baler
manufacturer for injuries arising from the adjustment of a draw-bar). To the defendant's interposition
of the obviousness defense, the court responded: "The manufacturer of the obviously defective product
ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to
discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form." Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719.
See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (citing with
approval Palmer, 3 Wash. App. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719) involving a printing press operator who
injured his hand "chasing a hickie," or removing a foreign object, from the surface of the plate of
the unit. A new trial was ordered notwithstanding the plaintiff's admitted knowledge of the danger,
and, for that matter, the common knowledge through the industry of the hazard. The court stated:
As now enunciated, the patent-danger doctrine should not, in and of itself, prevent a plain-
tiff from establishing his case. That does not mean, however, that the obviousness of the
danger as a factor in the ultimate injury is thereby eliminated, for it must be remembered
that in actions for negligent design, the ordinary rules of negligence apply. Rather, the
openness and obviousness of the danger should be available to the defendant on the issue
of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care as was required under the
circumstances ....

stated plainly that the "purpose of such liability is to ensure that the costs of
injuries resulting from products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
product. on the market, rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect theni~elves."~~~More appropriate than immunizing from liability sellers
who ignore patent dangers in their it has been suggested that the
obviousness of the danger should not be an absolute defense, but rather should
constitute but one of the factors in determining whether a product poses an un-
reasonable danger.Is0 Pertinent to the question of the quantum of safety-related
information held by the seller and the buyer respectively, it is further Qrged that,
in measuring the likelihood of harm, "one may consider the obviousness of the
defect since it is reasonable to assume that the user of an obviously defective
product will exercise special care in its operation, and consequently the likelihood
of harm dim in is he^."'^'
Upon its review of like authority, the Supreme Court of North Dakota so
concluded in Olson v. A. W. Chesterton, Co.,Is2 an action brought by the injured
Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (citations omitted). See also 2 F . HARPBR& F.
JAMES,supra note 13 at $ 28.5.
ITJhe bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence case against the maker when it
is shown that the purchaser knew of the dangerous condition. Thus if the product is a
carrot-topping machine with exposed moving parts, or an electric clothes wringer dangerous
to the limbs of the operator, and if it would be feasible for the maker of the product to
install a guard or safety release, it should be a question for the jury whether reasonable
care demanded such a precaution, though its absence is obvious. Surely reasonable men
might find here a great danger, even to one who knew the condition; and since it was so
readily avoidable they might find the maker negligent.
Id. at 1543 (citations omitted), quoted in Micallef, 39 N.Y.2d at 384, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 120.
la Lugue v. ~McLean,8 Cal. 3d 136, 144, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972)
(quoting Greenrnan v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1962)).
Id., 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (pointing out that it is anomalous to allow a
plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer was negligent in marketing an obviously defective product,
while precluding him from establishing the manufacturer's strict liability for doing the same thing).
Dorsey, 331 F . Supp. at 759.
Is1 Id. at 760 (emphasis in original). As an aid in evaluation of "likelihood of harm" the court
employed protocol of Dean Wade, which suggests the weighing of:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer
products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness,
(4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation
of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability of injury by care
in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability
to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making
it unduly expensive.
Id. (quoting Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965)).
IS2 Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 537-38 (N.D. 1977).

operator of a conveyor belt against the manufacturer of a dressing applied to

the belt before the accident. Affirming the verdict for the plaintiff below, the
court turned to its view of the relationship between the patent danger rule and
the allegation of duty to warn, stating:
There is no valid reason for automatic preclusion of liability based solely upon
obviousness of danger in an action founded upon the risk-spreading concept of
strict liability in tort which is intended to burden the manufacturers of defectively
dangerous products with special responsibilities and potential financial liabilities
for accidental injuries. . . . We do not agree with [the manufacturer's] contention
that since the dangers inherent in the conveyor belt system are obvious to every-
one, no warning of potential danger need be placed on a product designed to be
used in conjunction with that system.lS3
The latter authority suggests that when the hazard is known, but the user or
consumer remains at risk for want of information as to the means for avoiding
the danger or using the product in a reasonably safe manner, an informational
duty is preserved in the seller. Such a conclusion is consistent with the model
that would require the seller to warn or offer instructions to the user or consumer
when there exists an asymmetry between the germane, safety-related information
held by the seller and that held by the buyer, when, as in Olson, the informational
deficit suffered by the user or consumer is the lack of information known to the
seller that will permit the use or consumption of the product free from an un-
reasonable risk of harm.
VI. WARNINGS
AS TO UNINTENDED
OR UNFORESEEABLE
USE OF THE PRODUCT
Generally stated, a manufacturer is required only to produce a product that

is reasonably safe for its intended use. Where misuse of the product may create
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage, the manufacturer must provide warn-
ings adequate to permit the user to avert the hazard. This duty to warn extends
to all risk-creating misuse that is reasonably foreseeable and is not limited by
whether the foreseeable misuse is likely or unlikely; it need only be reasonably
fore~eeable.~~~
Not very long ago, as measured in years, products liability jurisprudence
permitted the manufacturer to presume that its product would be devoted to its
normal use, and if it was safe when so used, it would "not [be] liable in damages
for injury resulting from an abnormal or unusual use not reasonably antici-
Id. at 537 (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS§ 402A comment c).

1% The proposition has been variously expressed: "[Tlhe manufacturer is not liable for injuries
resulting from abnormal or unintended use of his product, if such use was reasonably foreseeable.
The issue is one of foreseeability, and misuse may be foreseeable." 1A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 147, at 405-06. See Noel, supra note 68, at 97.

WEST VIRGINL4 LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89
pated."lsS Under this view of a seller's duty, when the injury caused by the product
arose from a use that could not be foreseen, the manufacturer would not be
liable.'" In light of such policy it was held that it was not a foreseeable use of
an automobile that it might be involved in collisions,1s7that a hood designed for
use as harness equipment might be used to support a man pruning trees,lS8 or
that a consumer might splash cleaning fluid into her eye.Is9
As is true of the decisional law concerning what represents foreseeable injury,
the characterization of a product's foreseeable use, or if preferred, foreseeable
misuse, has changed dramatically. This change has effectively rewritten the com-
mon law and created a products liability remedy for injuries occasioned by product
misuse where no remedy existed before. A galvanizing influence in this devel-
opment has been comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 395 which
states that "[tlhe manufacturer may . . . reasonably anticipate other uses than
the one for which the chattel is primarily intended."lm
The thread connecting the decisions evaluating the conduct of the consumer
in determining whether the particular and often creative use to which the product
has been put is one that the seller ought reasonably to have foreseen, and as to
which he should be liable for any injury caused, is "whether the plaintiff was
acting within a commonly known area of c~nduct."'~'By such a common conduct
standard, therefore, a kitchen chair used by a consumer to reach a high shelf
was found to be in foreseeable use when the backrest failed to support her weight,
causing injury.16* Similarly, a fifteen-year-old boy's dive into a thirty-inch deep
backyard pool would be common conduct and foreseeable use of the pool for
which the manufacturer could be held liable for consequent damages.1G3The com-
mon conduct standard would likewise support the conclusion that the common,
Is5 McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959).
Is The first Restatement took this approach, establishing that manufacturer liability for negli-
gence is confined to situations where the product is used "for a purpose for which it is manufactured."
RE~~ATEMENT OF TORTS$ 395 (1934). A learned observation of the same sensibility stated it this way:
"A roller skate or even a book may become an instrument of serious injury if placed strategically
at the top of a flight of stairs in the dark." 2 F. HARPER& F. JMS, supra note 13, at 1546.
In Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966), overruled, Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
Is$ O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Exp. Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953).
Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946).
l m RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,5 395 comment k continues by stating in part: "The maker
of a chair, for example, may reasonably expect that someone will stand on it; and the maker of an
inflammable cocktail robe may expect that it will be worn in the kitchen in close proximity to a fire."
Note, Foreseeability in Product Dtsign and Duty lo Warn Cases-Distinctions and Miscon-
ceptions, 1968 W~sc.L. REV. 228, 233.
la Phiiips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951).
Colosimo v. May Dept. Store Co., 325 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 466 F.2d 1234
(3d Cir. 1972).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
while unfortunate, use of an automobile is its involvement in c01lisions.l~~

It also
provides justification for imposing manufacturer liability where the vehicle's de-
sign, instructions or warnings heightened the risk of accident or worsened the
effects of one.165
Application of a "commonly known area of conduct" standard, or a com-
parable standard, to our measurement of the seller's safety-related information
and any informational responsibilities with respect to that information, has the
felicitous result of providing a reasonable limitation on what information the seller
will be expected to impart to the buyer in connection with any particular product.
The manufacturer, presumptively expert in an often expansive field of endeavor,
should only be expected to make available to the buyer safety-related information
related to the use or the foreseeable misuse of that product. The informational
obligation should not extend to such activities as are at the furthest reaches of
the pessimistic imagination of human conduct, but should extend instead to such
use or misuse as can be described as being within a commonly known area of
conduct.
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment h provides limited guid-
ance as to a manufacturer's duties to warn concerning potential misuse of a
product and support for the above propositions. Reiterating that a product will
generally not be considered in a defective condition within the meaning of strict
liability when it is safe for normal handling and consumption, the comment sets
forth examples of abnormal use which, if injury follows, should not result in
manufacturer liability. The examples are those of a bottled beverage struck against
a radiator to remove the cap (abnormal handling); the addition of too much salt
to food (abnormal preparation for use); and a child eating too much candy and
thereby becoming ill (abnormal consumption). From these somewhat benign risks,
the comment distinguishes the situation where the manufacturer "has reason to
anticipate that danger may result from a particular use" of the product, such as
in the case of a pharmaceutical that is safe for use only in limited dosages. For
such a product and for such a risk that can be reasonably anticipated or foreseen,
and when the injury or illness risked, should it occur, is serious, the manufacturer
"may be required to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a product
sold without such warning is in a defective condition."166
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (1974).
IM
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
16*
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS4 402A comment h. Comment j, of the RES~ATE~ENT (SEC-
OND)OF TORTS5 395 states:
Unforeseeable Use or Manner of Use. The liability stated in this Section is limited to
persons who are endangered and the risks which are created in the course of uses of the
chattel which the manufacturer should reasonable anticipate. In the absence of special reason
to expect othenvise, the manufacturer is entitled to assume that h i ~ . ~ r o d uwill
c t be put to
normal use, for which the product is intended or appropriate; and he is not subject to

One excellent example of the liberal interpretation of the concept of fore-

seeable misuseIfl is offered by Lebouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber C O . , ' ~an ~
action stemming from an accident in which the tread separated from the body
of one of the vehicle's tires while the vehicle was being driven at over one hundred
miles per hour. Interpreting state law holding that a warning could be considered
inadequate where it rendered a product "unreasonably dangerous to normal use"169
and providing further that the manufacturer's duty and consequent liability for
failure to warn encompasses "all reasonably foreseeable uses of a
the court concluded that the automobile's high horsepower and marketing to
youthful drivers attracted to the product's power and potential speed made it
"not simply foreseeable, but . . . readily expected, that the [vehicle] would, on
occasion, be driven in excess of the . . . proven maximum safe operating speed
of its . . . tires. "171
The case of Moran v. Faberge, Inc., a decision approaching the outer doc-
trinal reaches of liability for failure to warn as to hazards of unconventional use,
involved an injury from ignition of women's cologne and corroborated the court's
observation that "[t]he idle mind knows not what it is it wants."172 In Moran,
two teen-aged girls were passing casual time in one family's recreation room when
one concluded it would be diverting to see if she could scent a lighted candle by
liability when it is safe for all such uses, and harm results only because it is mishandled
in a way which he has no reason to expect, or is used in some unusual or unforeseeable
manner. Thus ;I shoemaker is not liable to an obstinate lady who suffers harm because she
insists on wearing a size too small for her, and the manufacturer of a bottle of cleaning
fluid is not liable when the purchaser splashes it into his eye.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 395 comment j.
See the excellent discussion of the distinction between the forseeability of use and the for-
seeability of risk of harm in Newman, 278 Or. at 564, 564 P.2d at 675-77, and set forth in part
supra note 68.
Lebouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
169 Id. at 988 (citing Chappuis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926, 929 (La. 1978)).
Id. at 989; see, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840, 844 n.2, 847 (La. 1974) (duty to warn
of "possible hazard" known to manufacturer); Amco Underwriters of the AMCO Underwriters of
Audubon Ins. Co. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 329 So. 2d 501, 504 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(duty to warn of dangers even from improper use of otherwise nondefective product). See also, e.g.,
Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (dictum, constming Louisiana law to the
effect that "[iln inadequate warning cases misuse means that the seller had no duty to warn against
unforeseeable uses of its products, while in design cases misuse means that the manufacturer had no
duty to design a product so as to prevent injuries arising from unforeseeable uses of that product."
Id.).
Lebouef, 623 F.2d at 989. To the manufacturer's argument that the injured party's illegally
excessive speed should not be considered a "normal" use, the court answered: "It would be blinking
reality in this case to hold that Ford could not reasonably have expected purchasers of any automobile,
much less one equipped and marketed as was the Cougar, to transgress our nation's speeding laws
periodically." Id. n.4.
In Moran v. Fi~berge,Inc., 273 Md. 538, 540, 332 A.2d 11, 13 (1975).

pouring some of the contents of a bottle of the defendant's cologne on the bottom
of the taper. The immediate ignition severely burned one of the two girls. The
cologne carried no warning as to its alcohol content; about it's low flash point,
described by one expert witness as approximately room temperature; or about the
hazards associated with its use around open flame. The manufacturer naturally
claimed no duty to warn existed for a hazard that was so obvious and was,
moreover, occasioned by the injured girl's unusual, even bizarre use of the col-
ogne. In finding for the plaintiff, the Maryland Court of Appeals first described
the duty to warn most broadly, stating that "a duty to warn is imposed on a
manufacture if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about
which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in
bringing injury to an individual or his property."173 To the Maryland court, the
issue was not that the manufacturer should have foreseen the injured girl's irn-
provident behavior. Instead, the issue was whether a cologne with a substantial
alcohol content and a low flash point might reasonably be used near an open
flame. This, the court concluded, was reasonably foreseeable, giving rise to the
manufacturer's duty to warn.174'
By requiring that a manufacturer anticipate the environment in which a prod-
uct will be used, and the risks of misuse, however unorthodox, that may inhere
in such an environment, the court in Moran did no more than follow a line of
authority that antedates strict liability in tort and which found a most succinct
expression in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, 11nc.l~~ The court in Spruill held that, in
addition to foreseeing the literal intended uses of the product, the seller "must
also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of
his product, and where . . . that environment is the home, he must anticipate
the reasonable foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment
.. . [even] though such risks may be incidental to the use for which the product
was intended."176 Consistent with the doctrine expressed in Moran and Spruill,
In Id. at 552, 332 A.2d at 20.

The court summarized its analysis:
Thus, in the context of this case, it was not necessary for a cologne manufacturer to foresee
that someone would be hurt when a friend poured its product near the flame of a lit candle;
it was only necessary that it be foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in its
normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst, likely to be found in that environment,
which can untie the chattel's inherent danger. For example while seated at a dressing table,
a woman might strike a match to light a cigarette close enough to the top of the open
cologne bottle so as to cause an explosion, or that while seated in a similar manner she
might turn suddenly and accidentally bump the bottle of cologne with her elbow, splashing
some cologne on a burning candle placed on the vanity.
Id. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20.
Spruill, 308 F.2d 79.
Id. at 83-84. In that action the plaintiff's infant decedent died after drinking some of the
defendant's cherry red furniture polish left only momentarily on a bureau near the child's crib. The

it is today well settled that the manufacturer must design for and impart warnings
for involvement of its product in mishaps that are in no way related to the prod-
uct's intended use. Thus, to use one widely appreciated example, the manufacturer
of clothes must foresee that the wearer may, unwittingly, bring the garment into
contact with cigarettes, stove burners, or other sources of ignition. The manu-
facturer will be liable for any injury occasioned by the garment's unreasonable
flammability in such a setting, notwithstanding the fact that bringing the fabric
into contact with an ignition source is surely not an intended use of the product.
It is, nevertheless, a foreseeable misuse.ln
In a duty to warn action, including one in which misuse of the product is
at issue, a third party's negligence is not a defense unless that negligence is the
sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.'78 The most common test for de-
termination of whether an intervening negligent act represents a superseding cause
is one of the "foreseeability of the third person's conduct."179In the intervening
conduct cases, the informational asymmetry analysis may be applied not to the
safety-related information known to the injured claimant, but instead to what
defendant argued that the container's label "harmful if swallowed, especially by children" was ad-
equate, particularly where the product was not intended to be consumed. Affirming judgment for
the plaintiff, the court observed that the concept of "intended use" is actually an articulation of
"reasonable foreseaibility." Id. at 83.
The earlier cases undulate inconsistently regarding consumer misuse of the manufacturer's duty
to warn. One such holding that is harmonious with Spruilf involved a manufacturer's sale, without
warnings, of "spit devils" (fireworks) wrapped in red paper and with the appearance, to children,
of candy. A small child ate a "spit devil" and died from the poisonous explosive compound. The
unconventional use of the fireworks withal, the manufacturer was found liable for failure to warn.
Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1931). A conflicting result was'
reached in Lawson, 180 S.W.2d 751 (five-year-old unable to read sprinkles self with flammable nail
polish that ignites when c u d proceeds to play with matches, held: no duty to warn of this particular
misuse).
In See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 395 comment k, which provides:
Foreseeable U s a and Risks. The manufacturer may, however, reasonably anticipate other
uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily intended. The maker of a chair, for
example, may reasonably expect that someone will stand on it; and the maker of an in-
flammable cocktail robe may expect that it will be worn in the kitchen in close proximity
to a fire. For an early and illustrative case, see Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 A.D.
149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944), where a woman wearing a glazed double-netted skirt man-
ufactured by the defendant was seriously injured when the netting of the dress, which
contained some form of nitro-cellulose sizing, ignited, enveloping her in flames. Directing
reinstitution of the judgement below for the plaintiff, the court stated: "The manufacturer
knew or should have known that such an evening gown would be worn to dinners and
cocktail parties where large numbers of persons gather and many indulge in smoking." Id.
at 153, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
1" Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 248-49, 659 P.2d 734, 743 (1983) (citing
with approval Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 62 Haw. 530, 618 P.2d 267 (1980)).
179 Id. at 249, 659 P.2d at 743.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
was known by the third party. Often an absent or inadequate warning or jn-
struction given to one who is to handle an instrumentality in which the claimant
has placed confidence will predict the conclusion that the subsequent mishap was
foreseeable.
Instructive is the holding in one action brought by a patient who, while being
x-rayed on a tilted table, was dropped to the floor when the foot rest on the
mechanical examination platform disengaged. The evidence showed that the foot
rest could disengage by the same method used to determine positive engagement,
posing, in the view of the court, an "unreasonable and foreseeable" hazard. That
a hospital technician might have misused the product by failure to appreciate that
subtle distinction should not, resolved the court, prevent a jury from concluding
that the manufacturer's conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
juries.lW
Similar to the effect that the negligent installation or maintenance of a man-
ufacturer's product will not defeat liability if that misuse is foreseeable is one
action brought by a ski instructor against the manufacturer of a chair lift. It was
alleged that the mishap causing an adjoining chair to spring loose and knock him
to the ground was caused by a cable clamp unit which secured the chair to the
cable.lS1The manufacturer defended on the ground, among others, that the actual
cause of the accident was that the lift area's maintenance employees had not
applied the recommended level of torque to a connecting screw. The court rejected
that argument as a defense, however, stating that irreipective of the possible
contribution of the maintenance employees to the peril, their actions would "not
diminish any duty to warn, since a manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers
that may arise from improper use and handling"82 Normal misuse of an au-
tomobile has likewise been found not to preclude the jury from finding as a matter
of law that a small automobile's susceptibility to overturning could render it
unreasonably dangerous in the absence of adequate warnings concerning that risk.Is3
IW Id. at 248-49, 659 P.2d at 743.

Anderson, 198 Colo. 391, 397-98, 604 P.2d 674, 678.
I t 2 Id. at 397, 604 P.2d at 678. See Higel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d
983 (1975); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1976), where evidence
at trial showed the plaintiff's inebriated condition and incautious driving, including speeding on an
unknown road and driving on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. The appellate
court concluded that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that they could find normal use
"even if [the appellant] was mishandling the V.W. In the Judge's words, 'normal misuse' would be
sufficient to support a finding of defect." Id. at 96. See also Benoit v. Ryan Chevrolet, 428 So. 2d
489 (La. Ct. App. 1982), an action brought by an automobile owner who claimed that while proceeding
down the road at a moderate speed one of the rear tires exploded with such force that a large fragment
of the tire was propelled through the wheel well, causing damage that included, among other things,
bending the rear door frame so as to prevent it from being closed. The defendant, by expert witness
produced proof that the explosion occurred by overspinning, which results when the automobile is

KEST VIRGINIA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 89
A complementary result was reached in an action brought against the seller of

a cuprock grinding wheel that flew apart during use, injuring the plaintiff.'* The
appellate court overturned a jury verdict that included answers to special issues,
responding affirmatively that plaintiff's improper storage, transportation, and
handling of the grinder had been the producing cause of the accident. Conceding
that the putative misuse might increase the risk of the accident that occurred,
the court found ,the evidence showed that a guard probably would have contained
any disintegration of the wheel and that a warning concerning use of the guard
would have likely prevented such a mishap, irrespective of any mishandling.1s5
Whether the application to which the plaintiff has put the defendant's product
is a foreseeable one is a question involving the multiple factors of the foresee-
ability of the use in question, the type of danger involved, and the relative degree
of the user's knowledge of that danger.Is6In the ordinary course, these evaluations
will not be decided by summary disposition and should instead be considered by
the trier of fact.lg7 There exists, of course, an undeniable synergy between the
degree of the user's knowledge of the risk, as that factor may be deemed to be
pertinent to the evaluation of foreseeable use, and like knowledge held by the
seller. Where the seller is the user or consumer's sole source of knowledge as to
the nature of the risk and has offered no warnings or instructions to the buyer
as to the identity or the avoidance of that risk, one should pause before coun-
tenancing a seller defense based upon nonforeseeable use. Where the seller has
denied the buyer any information whatever as to the risks of misuse and means
for avoidance of such hazards, in a Iater action arising from injury caused from
such use, a user conduct defense should not prevail except in the most extreme
instances of consumer foolhardiness.
On the other hand, when the misuse of the product is of such a nature as
to have been not reasonably foreseeable, the paramount logic of the rule of law
in such a position one drive wheel rests on the ground or road surface and the other drive wheel
does not touch the ground, while the engine is accelerated. Id. at 491. Finding liability proper, the
court stated: "While the overspinning of tires is not part of their intended use, it is easily foreseeable
and part of their normal use." Id. at 493.
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
I m Id. at 875. The court stated the proposition in these words: "If the injury resulting from the
foreseeable misuse of the product is one of which an adequate warning would likely prevent, then
such misuse is no defense to an action based on the failure to given such a warning." Id.
lM See generally Greenway, 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541.
Beam v. Omark Indus., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 142, 237 S.E.2d 607 (1977). See Giordano v.
Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 646, 299 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1983), in which the court reversed
summary judgement below for the manufacturer, and remanded for trial the question, inter alia, of
foreseeable use. The action arose from injuries sustained by the plaintiff who, upon believing that
his automobile had run out of gas, purchased two gallons of gasoline from a service station, and
poured a small amount of gasoline on the carburetor while a service station attendant turned the
ignition, resulting in a ball of fue causing severe bums to the plaintiff's torso.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
precluding a plaintiff's recovery for an injury that occurred by nonforeseeable

misuse of the product, is that the manufacturer is not required to produce a
product that is wholly incapable of injuring the user. Instead, as is stated at the
outset, it is only required to produce and sell a product that is reasonably safe.Is8
By this definition of obligation or duty, the seller of a product does not become
"an insurer against any and all injuries" caused by the product.Is9 The reductio
ad absurdurn result of the contrary approach is suggested by one court hypoth-
esizing an accident in which an automobile leaves the road coming to rest in a
= river. "It could scarcely be argued," the court states, "that the manufacturer
should have produced an automobile which would float."Ig0
When the seller issues no warnings or other information whatever, the man-
ufacturer should not be liable for failure to provide adequate warnings if the
hazard ultimately causing injury is markedly different from the hazard to which
the duty to warn logically arises. Authority so holding includes, for example, a
decision finding that the manufacturer of a substance sprayed on fresh cement
to hasten curing would not be liable for failure to warn for injuries sustained by
a worker as a result of children playing with firecrackers near an empty and
unresealed drum of the product which caught fire and exploded.lgl Similarly, the
manufacturer of insulation employing a paper backing to block vapor and which,
due to treatment for water repellency, was flammable, but which was to be used
between studs of the building, would not be liable for failure to warn adequately
for injuries sustained by a user who wrapped the insulation around water pipes
and then used a propane torch to thaw adjoining frozen pipe section.'* It follows
therefrom that where the manufacturer sets forth instructions for the use of the
product, and the instructions are understandable and emphatic regarding the haz-
See Serpiello v. Yoder Co., 418 F. Supp. 70, 71-72, (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 568
(3d Cir. 1977) (industrial accident involving chopping machine).
Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiarn).
190 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the court con-
tinuing, "Similarly, it could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable
because its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed."
Id.
191 Bridges, 704 F.2d 175 (applying Louisiana law).
192 Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Fyr-Fyter Sales & Sen., 67 Ohio App. 2d 11, 21 Ohio Ops. 3d 332,
425 N.E.2d 910 (1979). Cf. May v. Giette Safety Razor Co., 464 N.E.2d 401, 402 (Mass. 1984), a
personal injury claim brought after the plaintiff swallowed one of defendant's razor blades. Affirming
a judgment adverse to plaintiffs warranty claims, the court expressed its view that a user's ingestion
of its razor blades was not "a risk which the defendant is required to anticipate." Id. at 402. See
also Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957), an action arising from the
death by asphyxiation of an oil company employee in the process of recharging by hot catalyst, which
in contact with air creates carbon monoxide, rather than cold catalyst, which had previously been used.
The court therein states that the duty to warn does not "extend [ ] to the potential danger involved
in the totally unanticipated misuse of an item." Id. a t 606 (citation omitted).

ards of misuse, the consumer's disregard of them can be considered misuse pre-
cluding liability for the seller. Such a result has been reached in actions involving
a plaintiff that used tires of improper size and improper inflation,Ig3and a plaintiff
that mixed together the defendant's hair bleaching preparation with the prepa-
ration of another manufacturer.'"
Another action in which the injured party's disregard of the manufacturer's
instructions, taken in conjunction with a creative, if unfortunate, misuse of the
product, led to a denial of recovery is Brown v. General Motors Co.Ig5The plain- '
tiff and a companion, undertaking to lubricate the driveshaft of a bulldozer man-
ufactured by the defendant, touched the starter button momentarily to rotate the
shaft to facilitate the job. The engine started, and the machine crushed the plain-
tiff. The court, impressed by the evidence of the manufacturer's express prohi-
bition of the m'meuver executed by the plaintiff,Ig6and the agility required for
its a~complishment,~" determined that there was insufficient evidence of plaintiff's
normal use to permit submission of the issue to the j ~ r y . ~Even
9 ~ where the type
19) McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968) "We do not believe that the
. .
strict liability doctrine means that . a consumer may knowingly violate the plain, unambiguous
instructions and ignore the warnings, then hold the makers, distributors and sellers of a product liable
in the face of the obvious misuse of the product." Id. at 370 (quoting Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.
v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 flex. Civ. App. 1967)).
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 385 F.2d 841, where beauty shop's unauthorized resale to plaintiff
of preparation clearly marked "FOR PROFESSIONAL USE", court on review holds that subsequent
nonprofessional application leading to scalp injuries constituted intervening cause precluding manu-
facturer liability for alleged inadequate warnings.
Brown v. General Motors Co., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. Several of the instructions, read in pari materia, served to bolster the simple warning
therein: "Make sure no one is working on the unit before starting engine .. . . " Id. at 817-18.
In the words of the court, "[Ilf the engine was in gear, [the plaintiff] could touch the starter
only by squeezing his thumb or finger between the shield and the button." Id. at 820.
Id. In the view of the court: "Certainly, the manufacturer did not warrant the safety of the
machine against a blind operation of it; nor was it reasonably foreseeable that the machine would
be activated by one fumbling in the dark." Id. See also Zollman v. Syrnington Wayne Corp., 438
F.2d 28 (7th Ci.), czrt denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1977), an action brought by plaintiffs who were injured
when a vehicle fell from an automobile hoist manufactured by the defendant. Where evidence from
numerous tests on the same or on identical hoists showed that automobiles fell only when the front
crossbar was placed under the front edge of the bumper, allowing the crossbar to slide out under
minimal pressure, and which procedure the plaintiff admitted was dangerous:
(while denying that it was the procedure employed prior to the accident). The verdict for
plaintiffs was reversed and the action remanded with instructions. The appellate court con-
cluded that one plaintiff "must have lifted the automobile in what he acknowledged would
be a dangerous manner." A manufacturer has no duty to warn against obvious misuses of
a product under Indiana law.
Cf.Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). a negligence
action against the manufacturer of detonators (blasting caps), manufactured during wartime for war-

of mishap that ultimately occurs is similar in nature to that which could be created
by the risk inherent in a particular product, the means by which the accident
occurred may be of such a nature as to prompt a finding of unforeseeable misuse.
One illustrative action, mentioned above, was that brought against the manu-
facturer of a chemical used to aid in the proper curing of concrete.lg9 Aware of
the flammable nature of the product, the manufacturer undertook to identify on
the container the flammability of the product and other detailed cautions.2wThe
plaintiff, a foreman of a crew using the product on a construction product, was
injured when he neared an open, discarded drum he thought to be on fire, which
then exploded. The evidence showed the possibility that the fire in the drum had
been started by children observed earlier that day playing with firecrackers near
the site. On the issue of whether the sequence of events was unforeseeable, the
court was impressed by the recognition that three different circumstances, each
of which were cautioned against by the manufacturer, had to take place before
the explosion occurred.201Taking the evidence in the aggregate, the court con-
cluded that a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was not negligent in
failing to foresee the hazard of explosion and warn against itszmHowever, another
case which purported to apply a comparable standard found no liability of the
manufacturer even where the chain of causation was not attenuated. In that case,
time use by trained ordinance personnel, but then put into use over a decade later by civilian personnel
of one of the armed forces branches who, in the words of the court, "apparently considered (any)
warnings by the manufacturer to be superfluous." Id. at 275. The court held that there should be
no liability for a defendant where the manufacturer "could not have foreseen that its detonators
would be used by a person untrained in the handling of such explosives and in a manner that was
never intended." Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
Bridges, 704 F.2d 175.
Id. at 177. The warnings included: "Keep Away From Heat and Open Flame," "Close Con-
tainer After Each Use and Use Only With Adequate Ventilation," and "Keep Out of the Reach of
Children".
Id. at 179. In the words of the court:
In this case, the combination of occurrences was unusual, making anticipation o f the events
by the manufacturer difficult. The drums were discarded without resealing, contrary to the
manufacturer's instructions. If the drums had been sealed, an open fire could not have
entered. Contrary to warnings, children were playing nearby. The contractors had known
of prior trouble with neighborhood children, yet had taken insufficient action to prevent
accidents. Finally, the evidence supports a conclusion that open flame in the form of a
firecracker was introduced to the drum, contrary to warnings. Bridges knew the contents
of the drum were burning when he approached it. Where three different circumstances,
each the result of a practice against which the manufacturer cautioned, needed to occur in
combination before an explosion took place, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
manufacturer was not negligent in failing to foresee the hazard and to warn against the
risk of explosion. Similarly, a jury could find the product not unreasonably dangerous or
defective in the absence of such a warning. Even under strict liability, a manufacturer need
not insure against all defects, but only against unreasonable dangers.
Id.
= Id.

the court held in favor of the defendant manufacturer of a toy combination of

a balloon and doll that simulated blowing a bubble, which was responsible for
the death of a chid who ingested the b a l l o ~ n . ~
From the standpoint of the symmetry of safety-related information held by
the buyer and the seller respectively, in the "firecracker-in-drum" case, one could
claim reasonably that the warnings as to flammability, closure, and keeping the
product away from children represented all that the manufacturer could reason-
ably be said to know about the risks of it's product. Put another way, the in-
formational duty should not require one to warn about what cannot be imagined.
In the balloon and doll action, on the other hand, it is one thing to say that
balloons are not unreasonably dangerous, but it is quite another to market for
infants a toy that simulates the use of a balloon as though it were an edible
foodstuff, i.e., bubble gum. When such a risk cannot be warned against, the
product should be removed from the market.
VII. CAUSATION
AND DISREGARD
OF WARNINGS
BY THE PLAINTIFF
OR OTHERS
In the failure to warn claim, as in other products liability causes of action,

the plaintiff's proof must establish causation. In its most elementary form, such
proof will show that, had the seller supplied an adequate warning, the injured
claimant would have altered his or her behavior so as to avoid injury.2m
Thus, pivotal to the successful maintenance of plaintiff's claim of actionable
failure to warn is the demonstration that the seller's failure to warn adequately
of the hazard was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the injury. As
expressed by one court, "the evidence must be such as to support a reasonable
m3 Landrine v. Mego Corp., 95 A.D.2d 759, 464 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1983), in which the court, finding
the infant's actions, and, inferentially, the guardian's omission to act in permitting the infant's actions,
an unforeseeable misuse of the product, states:
Balloons in and of themselves are not dangerous. Their characteristics, features and pro-
pensities are well-known, to children and adults alike. No duty to warn exists where the
intended or foreseeable use of the product is not hazardous . . .. Digestion of a balloon
is not an intended use, and to the extent it is a foreseeable one, it is a misuse of the product
for which the ~wardianof children must be wary.
Id. at 759-60, 464 M.Y.S.2d at 518.
Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court
states:
Where ... the initial hurdles of duty and failure to warn have been passed, plaintiff must
establish causation by showing that had defendants issued a proper warning, plaintiffs would
have altered their behavior to avoid the injury. Defendants can defeat causation in a failure
to warn case by discrediting plaintiffs' claims that they would have acted to avoid injury.
or by pointing to a third party as the sole proximate cause.
Id. at 492-93.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate warning may
have prevented the accident before the issue of causation may be submitted to
the In that action an automobile manufacturer avoided liability for an
asserted breach of duty to warn of the risk that its automobile with a standard
transmission may lurch fonvard or backward if started without engaging the clutch.
The court concluded that plaintiff's argument that a warning would have pre-
vented the injury was "mere peculation."^^^ Congruent authority is found in an
action arising from plaintiff's injuries following an effort to prime an automobile
carburetor by application of gasoline poured from a quart jar. The trial court's
judgment for the automobile manufacturer and retailer was affirmed. The ap-
pellate court approved the introduction at trial of evidence tending to show that
the plaintiff was careless and would have disregarded any warning in the vehicle's
manual against such do-it-yourself initiatives, including evidence of the plaintiff's
drinking and smoking during the events in question and his disregard of other
admonitions contained in the
Two presumptions, both bearing on causation, have gained widespread ap-
proval in duty to warn litigation. The first, applicable where some warning is,
Conti, 743 F.2d at 198. An illustrative jury instruction on the requirement of plaintiff's proof
of proximate cause in a duty to warn claim as expressed by one court states:
[Tlhe words proximate cause ... mean first, that there must have been a connection between
.
the conduct of the defendants, .. which the plaintiff claims was negligent and the injury
complained of by the plaintiff, and second, that the occurrence which is claimed to have
produced that injury was a natural and probable result of such conduct of the defendant
.. . . ..
[Tlhe words proximately contributed . mean first, that there must have been a
connection between the conduct of the plaintiff which defendant claims was negligent and
the injury of which plaintiff complains, and second, that the occurrence which is claimed
to have produced that injury was a natural and probable result of such conduct of the
....
plaintiff
Warner v. General Motors Corp., 137 Mich. App. 340, 344, n.1, 357 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 n.1 (1984).
'M Conti, 743 F.2d at 198. The plaintiff therein sustained injuries when her husband started the
automobile without disengaging the clutch, and the car jumped backwards, injuring her. To plaintiff's
argument that an effective warning could have averted the accident, the appellate court responded
that the plaintiff had not proved that any additional warning would have prevented the husband's
"momentary inadvertence" in failing to disengage the clutch before starting the automobile. Id. at
197-98. Also illustrative is the decision of the same court, PoweU v. 3. T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131
(3d Cir. 1985), in which the court was asked to consider the claim of a nurse who injured her back
as she assisted a patient who had released himself from a restraining vest. The court reversed the
judgment below, finding the manufacturer of the "Houdini Security Suit" liable for failure to warn,
as it concluded that no warning would have altered the plaintiff's decision to employ this vest, rather
than a more restrictive one, due to the patient's history of passivity, and that her action to assist
the partially disengaged patient when he appeared to be falling was an "instinctive one" that no
warning would have prevented. In the words of the court, "The manufacturer could have placed a
warning in its literature, on the vest itself, or even on the door of Adam's room, and yet this accident
still would have occurred." Id. at 134-35.
Warner, 137 Mich. App. at 344-46, 357 N.W.2d at 693-95.

in fact, given, is stated in comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts section

402A. It provides that "[tvlhere a warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded ...." The reciprocal presumption adopted
by many courts is that when no warning has been given, a plaintiff may benefit
from the presumption that had a warning been given, it would have been read
and heeded.208Such a presumption, which can be viewed as supportive of the
purposes behind the doctrine of strict liability, has the meritorious effect of ob-
viating the need for speculative testimony concerning whether plaintiff would have
heeded a warning.209
The defendant may overcome plaintiff's claim that the inadequate or absent
warning was one proximate cause of injury by showing either that (1) even with
an adequate warning the plaintiff would have acted in an identical way, and thus
would have suffered the injury; or (2) that the independent acts, negligent or
otherwise, of a third party were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The
required causal connection between the inadequacy of the warning and the plain-
tiff's injury is weak if the proof shows that the claimant would have pursued the
same course of conduct irrespective of any cautionary i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~
An' ~ illus-
trative example of decisional law so holding is that reached in an action in which
a truck manufacturer and the manufacturer of a multipiece rim were sued for
injuries when the rim components explosively disengaged. The injured party therein
employed a safety cage for the task of repairing the tire and reassembly of the
rim parts, but attempted to replace the repaired tire and rim on the truck without
the benefit of the cage. Reversing the trial court's denial of summary disposition
for the tire manufacturer, an appellate court found that the plaintiff's claim was
precluded by his own testimony "that if had he read a warning with respect to
m8 Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976). Either presumption can be
rebutted by evidence, one court suggests with asperity, "that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated
at the time of use, irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstances tending to show
that the improper use was or would have been made regardless of the warning." Technical Chem.
Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972) (reversing 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)).
M9 NiSSen Trampoline Co., 332 N.E.2d 820.
210 The naked proposition that a warning might have induced the party to elect a different, and
preferably more safe, course of conduct, has been held not to be a sufficient basis for imposition
of liability for failure to warn. Powell, 766 F.2d at 134-35 (recovery denied for failure to show that
any warning as to such a potential mishap would have caused the plaintiff to alter her conduct
precluded recovery on the claim of the manufacturer's failure to warn).
In Kohler v. hledline Indus., Inc., [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) q 10,249
m a . Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturer of a urine
bag that, after use, was left unclosed by one nurse, causing another nurse, the plaintiff, to slip and
fall when some of the bag's contents fell to the floor. In the opinion of the appellate court, the
forgetfulness of the first nurse was the sole cause of the accident, and the mishap was one that even
a "multilingual warning .. . printed on the bag" would not have prevented. On the facts before it,
the court concluded that to grant a remedy in failure to warn for plaintiff "would be as futile as
an attempt to reverse the seasons." Id. at 26,869.

the danger he would still have followed precisely the same repair procedures."211
The manufacturer may also attempt to overcome the plaintiff's proof of caus-
ation by showing that the act of a third party, often the employer, or in the case
of pharmaceuticals, the physician, operated as the "efficient intervening cause"
of the injury.212Where the conduct of a third party is implicated in the defense
of an allegation of failure to warn, the defendant is required to show that the
act or omission to act of the third party was not foresee~able.~~~ Proof of suf-
ficiently intrusive third party conduct sufficient to break causation is a formidable
task and must show that the third party's conduct is itself the proximate cause
of injury. One court, in the appeal of an asbestos-related claim, suggested that
the manufacturer's showing that the conduct of the employee was the "sole prox-
imate cause" of the plaintiff's pernicious exposure to respirable asbestos might
only be achieved by the proffer of evidence that the employer had, for example,
"removed the warning labels, or . . . forced its employees in some manner to
work in direct contact with asbestos against their will."214
Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Mich. App. 356, 367 N.W.2d 393 (1985), the court explaining
in pertinent part:
Plaintiff Robert Spencer was specifically questioned about his awareness of the nature and
extent of danger. He stated that he was aware of the cause of the explosive disengagement
and indicated that-if he had read a warning with respect to the danger he would still have
followed precisely the same repair procedures. After the accident, he continued to change
tires following the same procedure he had followed before the accident despite his awareness
of the risk. Thus, by his own testimony, plaintiff refuted a causal connection between the
lack of a warning of the danger of three-piece wheel rims and plaintiff's injury.
Id. at 361-62. 367 N.W.2d at 396.
212 Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213 (1966), where the
employee of the purchaser was injured while cleaning out a tank which still smelled of gasoline and
which was purchased from the defendant. The authorization by the employer to use these cleaning
procedures when gasoline vapors were still present in the tank constituted a break in causation suf-
ficient to relieve the seller of liability.
213 Evridge v. American Honda Motor Co., 685 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tenn. 1985), was an action
brought against a motorbike manufacturer for injuries sustained by a young child when a nine-year
old neighbor, carrying a passenger on the bike in disregard of the manufacturer's warnings against
doing so, lost control of the bike, resulting in bums to the plaintiff's foot caused by contact with
the product's exhaust pipe. On the issue of whether the conduct of the nine-year-old neighbor, and
his parents, in permitting "doubling" on the bike, was the efficient intervening cause of the harm,
the court stated: "The characterization as an intervening cause of the failure to heed warning is a
determination that is particularly for the jury because of the test of foreseeability which is attached
to that characterization." Id. at 636 (citation omitted).
"' Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 493. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 442 provides the most
widely-enlisted aid to evaluation of when an intervening act breaks causation and becomes an efficient
intervening cause. The section states:
5 442. CONSIDERATIONS IMPORTANT IN D E T E R ~~VHETBER
~G AN INTERVENING FORCEIS A
SUPERSEDING CAUSE
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force

Taken together, the issues to be resolved in the inquiry as to whether an

employer's acts or omissions to act operate to relieve the manufacturer from
liability for failure to warn are these: (1) Whether the manufacturer's failure to
warn was a substantial cause of the plaintiff's injury; (2) whether the manufac-
turer's negligent conduct was of a continuing nature; (3) whether the plaintiff's
injury resulting from the employer's negligence was the same type of injury ex-
pected to result from the manufacturer's negligence; and (4) whether the em-
ployer's negligent failure to warn was reasonably foreseeable to the m a n u f a c t ~ r e r . ~ ~ ~
Under such a test, it is unlikely that a third party's conduct in simply failing to
warn employees of the hazard would supersede the manufacturer's acts as the
proximate cause of the consequent injury. A conclusion consistent with this was
reached in an action in which the hand of the plaintiff employee was injured by
the unexpected cycling of a punch press. The only warning provided by the man-
ufacturer was that set forth in a service manual the court described as "unlikely
is a superseding cause of harm to another:

(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which
would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
@) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to
be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of
its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created
by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a
situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act
or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is
wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening
force in motion.
Some authority holds that where the inadequate warning is implicated in the injury of an employee,
but where the employer, and buyer, failed, for example, to adequately train its employees in the use
of the product, or failed to enforce its plant safety rules, that the buyer's misconduct should be
admitted into evidence as bearing upon the adequacy of the warnings given, and upon whether the
asserted deficiency in the warnings was a proximate cause of the accident or injury. In one such
action involving the claims of numerous workers for injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos-
based insulation products, the primary supplier of the asbestos defended on the grounds that irre-
spective of the efficacy of the manufacturer's warnings, the fabricator's subsequent failure to warn
its employees and to protect them from asbestos operated as the superseding cause of the injuries.
The court found that such a defense should not be prevented, as a matter of law, from going to the
jury. Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984). Superseding cause is defined
as: "An act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being
liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS,8 440 (1965).
21s Gordon v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1192 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732 (1935) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS5 447), reh'g denied, 578 F.2d 871 (1978).

to reach operators of the press." The manufacturer countered that the employer's
failure to warn the operators of the dangers of placing their hands in the die
area of the press was the proximate cause of the injury. The court was persuaded
by expert testimony, however, that appropriate and conspicuous warnings affixed
to the press itself would have been, under any circumstances, the best means of
fulfilling the informational obligation to the users of the press, and that the
manufacturer's "substantial and continuing" omission to do so required a finding
of liability.216
It is generally agreed, therefore, that even when the product's original defect,
by warning, design or otherwise, is not the sole cause of the accident, but is,
rather, a substantial cause of the injury along with the subsequent conduct of
the purchaser, the manufacturer will remain liable.217Thus, convincing authority
holds that, absent the manufacturer's showing of an intervening superseding cause
or of the proximate cause, the simple showing that the purchaser "failed to take
reasonable steps" to protect against the risk created by the manufacturer should
not permit a jury finding that the purchaser's conduct was the proximate cause
of the injury.21s
When, on the other hand, the employer-purchaser of machinery to be used
by others disregards the manufacturer's explicit advice that precautionary meas-
ures be adopted with respect to the machine to ensure safe use, an employee's
later claim against the manufacturer for failure to warn, alleged to be the prox-
imate cause of the employee's injuries, may fail. Such was the holding in an
action brought against the manufacturer of a chemical mixer, the documents ac-
x6 Id. at 1194. The court states:

The Court of Appeals asks the hypothetical question, 'If Poloron had given the re-
quired warnings, what more could Niagara's inanimate warning plate have accomplished?'
Plaintiff's expert on industrial accident prevention signs gave what, to us, is a most rea-
sonable answer. He testified that a direct warning attached to the press and conspicuously
displayed at eye level would surely be a more effective warning than oral words of caution
taken from Niagara's manual. A prominent warning on the machine itself would be readily
understood as necessary for one's safety, regardless of the level of the operator's skill or
experience or whatever the task at hand. Thus, even if Poloron had advised its press op-
erators of physical danger, the failure of Niagara to affix explicit warnings on the machine
itself is an omission of such substantial and continuing effect as to have a definite causal
connection with plaintiff's injuries.
Id.
See discussion in Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984).
21'
Butler, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at 28,252 to which discussion the court adds:
218
The public interest in assuring that defective products are not placed into the channels of
trade imposes a duty on the manufacturer to take feasible steps to render his product safe;
the manufacturer may not rely on 'the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser' to
remedy or protect against defects for which he is responsible.
Id. at 28,252 (citations omitted).

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REMEW [Vol. 89
companying the sale of which required the purchaser, prior to use, to install an
electric motor, starter, and switches. The instructions to the purchaser also advised
that a "suitable fuse disconnect switch" be employed to permit power to be shut
off during repairs. The buyer did not install such a disconnect switch, and plaintiff
employee was injured thereafter while cleaning the interior of the mixer. The
appellate court, affirming the trial court's judgment for the seller, found that the
buyer's "failure to heed" the seller's suggested precautions, was "the intervening,
sole proximate cause" of the
SimilarIy, a third party's disregard of warnings for failure to communicate
warnings to employees may be considered to break causation where the third
party's acts are coupled with the third party's direction that the product be put
to unsafe uses or reuses that are beyond the reasonably foreseeable contemplation
of the m a n u f a c t ~ r e r In
. ~ one action presenting such circumstances the plaintiff's
employer was sold a cylinder of refrigerant upon which a label stated: "This is
a no deposit, disposable container. Illegal to refill." At the employer's direction,
the cylinder was refilled with compressed air for other purposes, and exploded
when the plaintiff employee picked it up. The appellate court reversed judgment
below for the plaintiff, concluding that the seller had "no duty to protect the
plaintiff against such an intervening cause."u1
Related but distinct policies are evidenced in the evaluation of whether the
acts or omissions to act of a prescribing physician should exculpate a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings for the administra-
tion of pharmaceuticals. As a general proposition, the manufacturer of a
Thomas v. Munson Mach. Co., 463 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1985) (quoting E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954), an action involving a claim
against the manufacturer of a chemical compound, where the manufacturer stated expressly that the
product was not to be used as cattle feed).
A manufacturer is entitled to expect that a warning, once given, will be observed. See Fur-
stenheim V. Congregation of the First Church of Kew Gardens, 21 N.Y.2d 893, 236 N.E.2d 638, 289
N.Y.S.2d 410 (1963) (manufacturer relieved of liability in action brought by pedestrian injured by
explosion caused by contractor's disregard of caution on cleaner can to extinguish pilot lights).
Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975), in which the
court offered this analysis:
Even if appellant could have foreseen that its disposable cylinders might be reused, it had
no control over how they might be refilled, what and how much substance would be used
in them, how long they could be safely refilled, and what gauges or release valves should
be used on them. No amount of labeling on the original container can instruct the consumer
in all aspects of how to safely modify and reuse the cylinders, considering the myriad of
conceivable reuses to which such cylinders might be put .. . . It was not the duty of ap-
pellant to provide equipment on the cylinder that would make it safe for refilling because
it did not sell it for that purpose. It was instead the duty of the person reusing it to make
it safe for the purpose for which he intended to use it. In effect, appellant had no 'duty
to protect the plaintiff against such an intervening cause.'
Id. at 729-30, 222 S.E.2d at 109 (citations omitted).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
prescription drug has the legal duty to warn the medical profession, and not the
individual patient, of any risk associated with the use of its p r o d u ~ t s .The ~
physician is expected to assume the role of learned intermediary between the drug
manufacturer and the patient and to convey to the patient the information, warn-
ings and instructions provided by the manufacturer. The troubling issue often
arises that the physician fails to do or is alleged to have failed to do so. Illustrative
is an action in which an opthamologist prescribed for a patient ethambutol hy-
drochloride, the use of which carried the risk of causing optic neuritis and at-
tendant permanent loss of vision. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the
manufacturers of this opthalmic drug issued warnings that were "ambiguous,
incomplete, inadequate, [and] watered down." The defendants countered that the
injury was probably caused by the physician's admitted departure from the eye
testing procedures and dosage recommendations of the manufacturers. The court
concluded that the issue of whether the physician's actions were not foreseeable
and were the independent intervening cause was proper for jury r e s o l u t i ~ n . ~
To like effect, in an action to recover for neurological injuries resulting from
excessive doses of the drug dilantin, an anticonvulsive, the defendant manufacturer
defended successfully by proving that the plaintiff's physician prescribed the drug
without checking the paclcage insert or the Physician's Desk Reference for in-
formation on the drug and continued to prescribe administration of the drug,
first in capsule, and then in liquid form.224Similarly, in an action brought by
the parents of a child born with birth defects alleged to have resulted from the
mother's ingestion of the drug Biphetamine during pregnancy, the court deter-
mined that the defendant manufacturer presented a jury issue as to intervening
cause by offering proof that the prescribing physician failed to read the package
E.g., Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 88, 273 N.W.2d 476, 479 (1979).
The adequacy of a warning is ordinarily a question for the jury, e.g., Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
I00 Mich. App. 649, 300 N.W.2d 356 (1980), and contemplates an evaluation of whether the warning,
"under all the circumstances ... reasonably discloses to the medical profession all the risks inherent
in the use of the drug which the manufacturer knew or should have known to exist." Seley, 67 Ohio
St. 2d at 198, 423 N.E.2d at 836-37; see also McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375,
528 P.2d 522 (1974). The standards relevant to the adequacy of warnings associated with the use of
prescription drugs, require that (1) the warning indicate sufficiently the scope of the hazard; (2) the
warning communicate effectively the extent and seriousness of the harm that may result from misuse;
(3) the size, style, and location of the warning must be sufficient to alert a reasonably prudent person
to the danger; and (4) the means employed to bring the warning to the attention of the physician
must be adequate and effective. Ross v. Jacobs, 684 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. App. 1984) (citing with
approval Richards v. UpJohn Co., 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d
1192 (1980)).
" Ross, 684 P.2d 1211.
Peterson v. Parke-Davis & Co. [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) q 10,558.
(Colo. App. 1985). "Where, as here, an attending physician, in prescribing and in supervising the
use of a drug, disregards the manufacturer's warnings and instruction, it is that conduct which renders
the product unreasonably dangerous, and thus defective, and the adequacy of the warnings or in-
structions are not relevant." Id. at 28,177 (citation omitted).

inserts and the Physician's Desk Reference before prescribing the drug.w Such
authority suggests, in effect, that a physician's inadequate or negligent action or
inaction in heeding or conveying a manufacturer's cautionary materials for phar-
maceuticals may represent a "misuse" of the product that breaks causation be-
tween the asserted imperfections of the manufacturer's warnings and instructions
and the patient's injury or illness. Under such reasoning, it is the physician's
conduct that renders the drug dangerously defective, and thus the issue of the
seller's warnings and their adequacy are not relevant.u6
It is, however, by no means automatic that a manufacturer's showing of
the negligent failure to heed a warning will exonerate the manufacturer when the
warning is proved to be inadequate. The manufacturer may avoid liability in a
failure to warn action only if it can establish affirmatively that the prescribing
physician would not have heeded and followed an adequate warning.u7 When,
on the other hand, plaintiff's evidence provides some support for the contention
that an adequate warning might have altered the physician's conduct or might
have been heeded, it has been held that the action should be able to go to the
jury on the question of c a u s a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Reeder v. Hammond, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19,721 (Mich. App.
1983).
U6 See Uptain v. Huntington Lab., Inc., 685 P.2d 218 (Colo. App. 1984). As perceived by courts
adopting this view, where the physician's acts or omissions to act were reasonably foreseeable, the
intervening negligence of the doctor, however lamentable, will not break the link of causation between
the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings, and the resulting injuries. On the other
hand, where the physician's actions were not reasonably foreseeable, and constituted an independent
intervening cause, the manufacturer should not be held liable. Ross, 684 P.2d 1211. Richards, 95
N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (whether physician's negligence constitutes an independent intervening cause
is a jury question).
May, 142 hlich. App. at 418, 370 N.W.2d at 379; Stanback v. Parke-Davis & Co., 657 F.2d
642, 645 (4th Cir. 1981). E.g., Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 589 F. Supp. 826, 827-28 (D.
Colo. 1984), in which the plaintiff contracted polio from contact with her child who had been given
a polio vaccine, and who alleged that the manufacturer failed to warn of such risks; (citing Douglas
v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829, (1968) (physician statement that he did not read the
warning)); Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug Co., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1964) (phy-
sicians statement that he relied not on manufacturer's warnings, but rather on his own expertise).
" May, 142 hlich. App. 404, 370 N.W.2d 371, where on the issue of whether a physician who
prescribed oral contraceptives would have altered his conduct had the manufacturer effectively warned
physicians that persons with Type A blood had a three times greater risk of developing blood clots
as those with Type 0, the physician testified that he would have "undoubtedly" warned the decedent.
Id. at 379. In another action for inadequacy of the drug manufacturer's warning, the evidence showed
that the physician had in any event forgotten such warning as there was. The court rejected the
pharmaceutical company's claim that the physician's action constituted superseding negligence, and
countered that if the physician had been adequately warned, and then had forgotten, there would be

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
VIII. THE DUTYOF THE SELLER

NONMANUFACTURING
Liability for failure to provide adequate warnings may be imposed upon all
entities within the chain of distribution, including not only manufacturers, but
suppliers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers as well.ug Therefore, it is not
unusual for liability for failure to warn or to furnish a safe product to be placed
upon a distributor, notwithstanding the fact that the party did not itself man-
ufacture the risk-creating product.u0
Notwithstanding the coexistence of informational duties between and among
the different entities in the distribution chain, there are recognized distinctions
in nature and degree between the duty to warn of the manufacturer and that of
the distributor or the retailer. For example, the duty to warn of the manufacturer
is understood generally to be greater than that of the retailerYu1with such dis-
tinctions being "grounded in the different information that the manufacturer and
the vendor may posses as to the hazards of the product."u2 Thus, there exists
authority that limits nonmanufacturing dealer liability for failure to warn to sit-
uations in which the defect or hazard is one that is known ...or visible...[and]
no manufacturer liability. However, where the manufacturer had put a "dangerous drug" on the
market without adequate warning, the court concluded that the company should not be heard to say
that the physician might have disregarded a proper one. McCue v. Nonvich Pharmaceutical Co., 453
F.2d 1033, (1st Cir. 1972).
219 Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983); Venus
v. O'Hara, 127 Ill. App. 3d 19, 468 N.E.2d 405 (1984).

In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 830 G.D.N.Y. 1984); see, e.g.,
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS§ 402A.
In the leading case of Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964), Justice Traynor develops the rationale for application of strict liability to retailers:
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public.
They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should
.
bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products . . . In some cases the retailer
may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In
other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is
safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's
strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer
and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice
to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the
course of their continuing business relationship. Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the
business of distributing goods to the public, [Defendant] is strictly liable in tort for personal
injuries caused by defects in cars sold by it.
Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (citations omitted).
E.g., Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 275, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 864
(1984) (The manufacturer and the vendor do not necessarily have the same obligation to warn con-
cerning dangers learned of after delivery of the product).
Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 749 (2d Cir. 1984).

readily ascertainable," under which doctrine the seller has no duty to warn of
defects either hidden from or unknown to the selleraB3
The distinction may be accounted for if the imbalance of safety-related in-
formation held, respectively, by the distributor and the consumer is of a lesser
order (if such imbalance exists at all) than the asymmetry of such information.
For this reason the seller or other distributor of a product manufactured by a
third party will for the most part be held to a somewhat lesser duty to warn,
and the nonmariufacturing supplier will be liable for the negligent failure to warn
of a product's hazards only when it knows or has reason to know of such dangers.B4
The prevalent view, therefore, is that a distributor will not be found in breach
of any duty to warn unless it is in receipt of information that would give it reason
to know of a product's hazard and the warning already provided is either absent
or inadequate.
The factors pertinent to whether to impose such a duty on the nonmanu-
facturing seller have been summarized as requiring weighing of the distributor's
"integral [role in] the overall producing and marketing enterprise [which justifies
its] bearling] the cost of injuries resulting from defective The court
in Hall v. E. 1: Dupont DeNemours & Co., Inc. has followed this reasoning,
suggesting that relevant factors include:
(1) m h e standard of care-itself a function of the foreseeability and gravity of
risk and the capacity of avoiding it; (2) the participants' capabilities of promoting
the requisite safety in the risk-creating process; (3) the need to protect the con-
sumer, both in terms of ascertaining responsible parties and providing compen-
sation; and (4) the participants' ability to adjust the costs of liability among
themselves in a continuing business relationship."6
.- Warner, 137 Mich. App. at 346, 357 N.W.2d at 693. In that action the husband and the
wife brought suit against an automobile dealership arising from injuries sustained by the husband
when the automobile backfued while he was repairing it, igniting his shirt. To douse the flame he
dove into a lake breaking his neck. Concerning the nonmanufacturing seller's duty to warn, however,
the appellate court here affirmed the trial court verdict for the distributor based upon, among others,
the quoted portion of the trial court's instructions as to the seller's duty to warn, which relate to
plaintiff's claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
ZU RESTATEMEI'IT (SECOND)OF TORTS§ 401 comment a specifically distinguishes the duties con-
veyed by the "reason to know" standard from those of the "should know'' standard. See Guglielmo
v. Klausner Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969); Davis v. Siloo, Inc., 47 N.C. App.
237, 267 S.E.2d 354, appeal denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980).
" Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
236 Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. 345 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (ana-
lyzing Vandermark).
See Evridge, 685 S.W.2d 632 reversing and remanding for trial action by six-year-old child and
father for injuries sustained by child in falling from rear platform of motorbike on which she was
a passenger. The owner's manual and other legends cautioned the vehicle was for "Operator Only",
but the court found that the evidence created "substantial issues of material fact as to adequacy of
warnings, particularly inasmuch as the defendants should have taken into account that the motorbike

19861 PRODUCTS LIABILITY
There is authority holding the retailer to a continuing duty to warn the pur-
chaser of a hazard discovered to exist in the foreseeable use of a product even
where the hazard is not appreciated by the retailer until after the sale. Support
for this proposition was offered by the court in Harris Y. International Harvesler
Co.,"' which invoked a design flaw in the defendant's tractors that permitted
fuel pressure buildup to cause heated fuel to geiser, spray, and ignite when the
fuel cap was removed. With knowledge of this problem, the manufacturer made
available an insulation package for the tractor's critical heat shield. The retailer
learned of the fuel buildup hazard through literature from the manufacturer, but
failed to inform the buyer of the problem and the availability of the heat shield
insulation package. The court concluded that this was a breach of the retailer's
duty to warn.as
Dealers in used goods also have been found to have a duty to warn.u9 The
general duty of the seller of used goods towards the purchaser has been described
as a duty "to future and foreseeable users of the product to exercise the reasonable
care required of a reasonably prudent seller under the existing cir~umstances."~~
This may include the duty to advise the buyer of any information that will permit
the buyer to appreciate any risk associated with the use of the product."I As is
true for the duty of sellers of new products, the used seller's duty includes a duty
to "relate information as to the character and condition of the chattel which [the
seller] should recognize as necessary to enable the prospective user to realize the
danger of using it.""2
Commercial lessors have also been found to be within the class of commercial
entities that may be found to owe a duty to warn of dangerous conditions in the
was designed for and intended for use by children." Id. at 637, In agreement that the distributor
does not have an "absolute" duty to test for, discover, and warn of all product related dangers is
Fish Breeders of Idaho, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 108 Idaho 379, 700 P.2d 1 (1985), an action arising
from the application of malachite green for the treatment of disease in fish, which product was alleged
instead to have killed them. The court refused appellant's proposed instructions on the grounds that
they would have, in the view of the court, "impose[d] an absolute duty upon a distributor to test
for, discover, and warn of all possible dangers with the product." Id. at 384, 700 P.2d at 6.
21' Harris v. International Harvestor Co., 127 Misc. 2d 426, 486 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1984).
Id. at 428-29, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
Galanos v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (an action involving personal
injuries arising from use of surplus Postal Senice vehicles. Sold used by the government, as passenger
vehicles, this created a duty of the Postal Service, cognizant of the danger of rollover and foreseeability
of use by purchasers of the vehicle for passenger purposes, to warn purchasers in writing not to
undertake such use. Id. at 375).
Johnson v. Purex Corp., 128 Mich. App. 736, 341 N.W.2d 198 (1983).
Id., 341 N.W.2d at 198.
Elkins v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 700 0V.D. Va. 1969), afyd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1970). Even one-time sellers of used products may be found to have such a duty. Bevard v. Ajax
Mfg. Co., 473 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.Mich. 1979).

use of their Inclusion of commercial lessors among those upon whom

informational responsibilities may be fairly placed is consistent with the recog-
nition that commercial lessors, by reason of their regular dealing with the product,
will ordinarily be in a better position to analyze potential hazards in the product
than will the lessee.244Illustrative of such policies, a commercial lessor of a motor
home was, together with the motor home manufacturer, found strictly liable for
failing to warn the lessee of the home about the inadequacy of the tires offered
as original equipment for use on the home.245Reversing and remanding, the ap-
pellate court found that the plaintiff should have been allowed at trial to offer
proof that the lessor "was aware that the tires supplied with the motor home
were inadequate for its load as a basis for liability, and that [the lessor] failed
to warn plaintiff of that defect . . . . ,246
With respect to ethical pharmaceuticals, the seller in the ordinary course is
the pharmacist. The prevailing authority holds that in the absence of any evidence
that the pharmacist altered the product by compounding, adding to or taking
from the pharmaceutical as prescribed by the physician, the pharmacist has no
duty to warn. One court so holding relied substantially on its observation that,
particularly with drugs, the manufacturer alone may have the practical opportunity
to detect defects in a pharma~eutical.~~~The court also stated the expectations of
product information to which reference has been made. In the words of the court:
Implied warranties are conditioned on the buyer's reliance upon the skill and
judgment of the seller but when a consumer asks a druggist to fill a prescription,
~ 4 ' There is ample authority in several jurisdictions that holds that commercial lessors may be
held strictly liable for leasing defective products. E.g., Cintrone, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769; Stang
v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,497 P.2d 732 (1972); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D.2d 564,396 N.Y.S.2d
216 (1977); Dewberry v. LaFollette, 598 P.2d 241 (Okl. 1979); Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 271
Or. 449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975); T i m a n v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979);
Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977); Nath v. National Equip.
Leasing Corp., 497 Pa. 126, 439 A.2d 633 (1981); Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974), aff'd, 530 S.W.2d 794 (1975); George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 @. Wis. 1976); Bachner
v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d
256 (1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); McClaflin
v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Martin v. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 @el. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71,
470 P.2d 240 (1970); Galiuccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971); Crowe
v. Public Bldg. Comm. of Chicago, 74 111. 2d 10, 383 N.E.2d 951 (1978); Perfection Paint & Color
Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 1'06, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc.,
565 S.W.2d 753 @lo. App. 1978).
See Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 440 A.2d 1292 (R.I. 1982).
Miles v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio App. 3d 186, 187, 188-91, 460 N.E.2d 1377,
1379, 1380-82 (1983). The action claimed both a defect in the motor home and a failure to warn
concerning the tires, with respect to the latter claiming that the tires placed on the motor home were
overloaded and not appropriate for that vehicle.
Id. at 189, 460 N.E.2d at 1381.
U7 Bichler v. Wilig, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).

thus enabling him to obtain a drug which is not otherwise available to the public,
he does not rely on the druggist's judgment as to whether that particular drug
is inherently fit for its intended purpose but rather he places that confidence and
reliance in the physician who prescribed the r e r n e d ~ . ~
Later authority has endorsed the decisions extricating the pharmacist from
those nonmanufacturing sellers who may be found to have a duty to warn, but
cautions that the pharmacist will have the duty to convey warnings that the phy-
sician includes in the prescription.249Similarly, should the pharmacist violate the
standard of ordinary care associated with reasonable conduct of such business,
liability for failure to warn customers of potential perils in the ingestion or use
of pharmaceuticals may be imposed. Thus, it has been held that a pharmacist
may be found liable for failure to warn a customer, known to the pharmacist to
be an alcoholic, of the side effects of taking certain psychotropic pharmaceuticals
in combination with alcoh01."~
Where there is alleged a failure to warn by the manufacturer of a component
part of the finished product, the question arises whether it is the component part
manufacturer or the assembler of the completed product that has the duty to
warn. There is ample authority that the component manufacturer-supplier of a
nondefective part should not be liable for injuries occasioned by the final product
when the claim of the injured party is failure to warn or to include a warning
device1 and the component manufacturer simply supplied parts made to the spec-
ification of the a s ~ e m b l e r .Consistent
~~ authority, in deciding to assign liability
for failure to warn to the manufacture-assembler and not the component part
manufacturer, emphasizes the difference in expertise between the two. One such
decision found no liability for the manufacturer of the star component of a hel-
icopter manufactured to specification for the manufacturer-assembler, when the
US Id. at 333-34, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59.

249 Ingram v. Hook's Drugs Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881, 886-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
UO Hand v. Krakowski, 89 A.D.2d 650, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982)
Here [the druggist] knew that the decedent was alcoholic and knew, or should have known,
that the prescribed drugs vlere contraindicated and, therefore, extremely dangerous to the
well-being of its customer. Clearly, under these circumstances, the dispensing druggist may
have had a duty to warn decedent of the grave danger involved and to inquire of the
prescribing doctors if such drugs should not be discontinued.
Id. at 651, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
E.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
La See Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978), an action in which plaintiff had
been injured by a garbage truck as it was backing up, and the complaint alleged that the truck should
have had a warning device. Defendant Ford had produced the chassis for the truck, but the vehicle
had undergone substantial work thereafter before it was completed. Where there were multiple par-
ticipants in the manufacture of a product, the court reasoned that identifying which entity had the
duty to supply the buzzer required reference to three factors: (1) trade custom, (2) expertise, and (3)
practicality. Id. at 387.

star was found to be free of defect, the assembler had examined the part before
acceptance, and the assembler was in the business of manufacturing helicopters
while the component manufacturer was not.2s3Nonetheless, still other authority
proposes with equally apparent logic that the component manufacturer's duty to
warn should be indefeasible, inasmuch as the component maker has the greatest
access to information on its product, this logic obtains all the more when the
component part is incorporated without change into the final
2J3 Orion Ins. Co., Ltd., v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp, 173 (E.D.Pa. 1980). The
court therein makes the additional observations as to why the duty to warn reposes best with the
ultimate manufacturer and not with the manufacturer of component parts to specification, particularly
where the component manufacturer's reliance upon the specifications is reasonable. In the words of
the court:
Finally, no public policy can be served by imposing a civil penalty on a manufacturer of
specialized parts for a highly technical machine according to the specification supplied by
one who is expert at assembling these technical machines, who does so without questioning
the plans or warning of ultimate user. The effect of such a decision on component parts
manufacturers would be enormous. They would be forced to retain private experts to review
an assembler's plans and to evaluate the soundness of the proposed use of the manufacturer's
parts. The added cost of such a procedure both financially and in terms of stifled innovation
outweighs the public benefit of giving plaintiffs an additional pocket to look to for recovery
. ..
. m h e better view is to leave the liability for design defects where it belongs and where
it now is-with the originator and implementer of the design-the assembler of the finished
product.
Id. at 178. See also Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Okla. 1979),
holding that the supplier of nondefective used component parts for use by subsequent manufacturer
in the construction of a large rubber mixing mill of the manufacturer's exclusive design had no duty
to warn the manufacturer, or the employees of the manufacturer of the advisability of certain safety
devices, including, among others a sufficient space between the floor level and the top of the rollers
to lessen the operators opportunity to reach into the danger area. Id. at 411.
ZU In Beuchamp v. Russel, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982), involving the issue of the relation,
if any, of an air valve component in a pneumatically-run palletizer to the injury of plaintiff's spouse,
the court suggests that the duty to warn should properly be with the participant in manufacture with
the greatest access to information, and the most easy means of its dissemination. In the words of
the court:
The responsibility for information collection and dissemination should rest on the party
who has the greatest access to the information and who can make it available at the lowest
cost. Where a component part is incorporated into another product, without material change,
the manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear this responsibility.
Id. at 1197.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS8 402A comment q states concerning strict liability, but not
specifically warnings, this language: "Component parts . .. It is no doubt to be expected that where
there is no change in the component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger,
the strict liability will be found to carry through to the ultimate user or consumer." A well-reasoned
suggestion that in apportioning liability between a component part manufacturer and an assembler,
liability should be assigned to the cheapest cost avoider, is explained in Comment, Apportionment
Between Partmakers and Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U . Cm. L. REV. 544 (1982), the author
writing:

The repairer or semicer of a product will not generally be found responsible

for failure to warn of risks associated with the use of a product, particularly if
the risk is not attributable to any act of the repairer, and the hazard is as apparent
to the owner of the product as it is to the repairer.255Thus, the repairer of a
cotton compress who did not redesign the compress, but rather repaired certain
specified parts and replaced or rematched others, would not be held liable for
failure to warn by one court where the existence of "pinch points" on the ma-
chine, the parts actually involved in the subsequent accidental injury, were as
apparent to the machine's owner as they were to the repairer.256One might wish
that a humanitarian impulse would lead the repairer or installer to share with
the owner or user any such discovery of a hazardous condition. In the above
case, however, because the owner and user, and the repairer had equal and ready
access to the observation of the hazardous condition, it can be claimed defensibly
that the goal of informational parity has been met, albeit marginally.
IX. PERSONS
TO BE WARNED
The general rule is that the selIer of a product that may pose a risk of injury
if not accompanied by adequate warnings as to the risk and, as appropriate,
instructions for safe use, has a duty to warn the purchaser of the hazard^.^'
Moreover, where the seller can reasonably foresee that the warning conveyed to
the immediate vendee will not be adequate to reduce the risk of harm to the
likely users of the product, the duty to warn has been interpreted to extend beyond
the purchaser to persons who foreseeably will be endangered by use of or exposure
Under this approach, the fact-finder should simply ask who can more easily detect and
correct the defect.... m h e party with the lowest detection costs would bear full liability,
but could shift this liabity to the party with the lowest correction costs if it provided full
warnings of the detected dangers.
Id. at 547.
255 The majority of jurisdictions considering the matter have declined to impose strict liability
upon repairers or installers. E.g., McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Slayton
v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969); Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Com-
mander Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972).
256 Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g
granted in part, denied in part, 609 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1980), the court explained:
Even if we were to conclude that Mississippi would impose liabity without fault upon
those who provide services, we do not think that it would make the servicer liable to warn
its customers of patent dangers neither created or aggravated by the services provided and
not within the scope of the work contracted for.
E.g., Galanos, 608 F. Supp. 360 (duty extends as well to sellers of used goods and to one
time sellers of used products).

to the Included are members of the public who might be injured as

a result of lack of adequate warning.z9
The leading expression of the weighing process that should accompany a man-
ufacturer's determination of whether additional warnings should be given beyond
those available to the immediate purchaser is stated by the court in Dougherty
v. Hooker Chemical Co.260That court called for the balancing of the following
considerations: "the dangerous nature of the product, the form in which the
product is used, the intensity and form of the warnings given, the burdens to be
imposed by requiring warnings, and the likelihood that the particular warning
will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably use the prod-
uct . . . . 7261
The issue of to whom, beyond the immediate purchaser, the warning should
be given is of paramount significance to the informational equilibrium model.
Using the workplace as an example, if in the sale of an industrial solvent to a
commercial buyer, the seller informs the buyer of the hazards of the product and
the means for its safe use, and the buyer faithfully imparts that information to
the workers likely to be exposed to the product in the work environment, there
should be no liability. The workers have not been denied access to safety-related
See Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1980), in which the court states:
When a manufacturer can reasonably foresee that the warnings it gives to a purchaser of
its product will not be adequately conveyed to probable users of the product, then its duty
to warn may extend beyond the purchaser to those persons foreseeably endangered by the
products use. Warnings given to the purchaser do not necessarily insulate the manufacturer
from liability to injured users of the product.
Id. at 619.
U 9 Compare Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 136 111. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d
906 (1985) (allowing recovery for failure to warn an automobile passenger injured when the driver
of a vehicle lost control and crashed, allegedly the result of side effects of administration of psy-
choactive pharmaceuticals, the court stating a general principle that the manufacturer has a duty to
warn of possible adverse effects of drugs even to members of the public who might be injured by
others' use of the product) wifh Kinney v. Hutchison, 468 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App.), cerf. denied,
472 So. 2d 35 (La. 1985) (finding no manufacturer liability to bystander who was shot by a stranger
who had taken the drug Preludin, the court finding that the manufacturer had provided sufficient
cautionary information to prescribing physicians that even in normal dosages the drug could produce
psychotic episodes).
260 Dougherfy, 540 F.2d 174.
Id. at 179. In Dougherfy the appellate court found that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient
evidence to warrant submission to the trier of fact as to the manufacturer's duty to convey warnings
beyond the immediate purchaser and to the workers who could be expected to use the industrial
solvent upon the showing that trichloroethylene posed a latent, and potentially lethal, hazard; that
no warnings of this risk were communicated by the employer, or by the manufacturer, to the workers
who were being exposed; and there was not reasonable basis on which the manufacturer could rely
on the purchaser to give "appropriate information to its employees of all the hazards of working
with [the product]." Id. at 181-82.

information essential to the safe discharge of their work. On the other hand, if
the seller, innocently or negligently, informs the purchaser of the pertinent safety-
related information, and the purchaser does not communicate that information
to the employees, the failure of the intermediary to perform the desired instruc-
tional function preserves the informational imbalance between the seller and the
users of the product. Arguably, liability should attach.
As is also true for the evaluation of the nature of a warning that should be
given, the question concerning to whom it should be given requires evaluation of
the harm likely to occur in the product's use without warnings, the reliability of
any intermediary to whom the warning is given, the nature of the product involved
and the burden on the manufacturer in disseminating the warning.262In some
E.g., Frederick, 107 A.D.2d 1063, 486 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565. These factors may be seen as
congruent with the considerations recommended by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS5 388, comment
n, which advises reference to the relative hazard posed by the product, the immediate purchaser's
familiarity with the risk, the trust that may be properly reposed in the intermediary to convey in-
formation of the risk to those who will use the product, and the feasibility of carrying the message
directly to the ultimate user. The comment states in pertinent part:
Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to assume that one through whom he
supplies a chattel which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the information given
him to those who are to use it unless he knows that the other is careless, it may be improper
to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary information of the actual character
of a highly dangerous article to a third person of whose character he lcnows nothing. It
may well be that he should take the risk that this information may not be communicated,
unless he exercises reasonable care to ascertain the character of the third person, or unless
from previous experience with him or from the excellence of his reputation the supplier
has positive reason to believe that he is careful. In addition to this, if the danger involved
in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be that the supplier does
not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the necessary information
even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful. Many such articles
can be made to carry their own message to the understanding of those who are likely to
use them by the form in which they are put out, by the container in which they are supplied,
or by a label or other device, indicating with a substantial sufficiency their dangerous char-
acter. Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of their true quality is great and such
means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that the
supplier should be required to adopt them.
A contemporary analysis provides that the manufacturer owes the foreseeable user of its product a
duty to warn of risks involved in using the product, a proposition applicable equally under strict
liability and under negligence. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395. From this premise
it is stated that the manufacturer's duty to wam "is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics
of the manufacturer's own product," Id. at 363, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 397. E.g., Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972). Because insofar as the manufacturer's evaluation of the
nature and quantum, if any, of warnings to accompany its product is "based upon and tailored to"
the characteristics of the manufacturer's own product, for the purpose of a duty to warn in tort,
"the most the manufacturer could reasonably foresee is that consumers might be subject to the risks
of the manufacturer's own product, since those are the only risks he is required to know." Powell
166 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 398. Accordingly, in Powell, where the plaintiffs had

288 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REYIEW [Vol. 89
circumstances the class to which the duty is owed and that to which the warning
should go are not coextensive. The professional user and the medical-pharma-
cological learned intermediary doctrines represent two such types of situations.
The bystander doctrine represents another. The court in Sills v. Massey-Ferguson,
I ~ c . framed
, ~ ~ ~ the bystander issue well in its disposition of an action brought
against the manufacturer of a lawnrnower for an injury suffered by a bystander
struck in the jaw by a bolt picked up and thrown by the lawnmower. Identifying
the duty of a manufacturer of a product that creates a hazard to give effective
warnings to those who may foreseeably be affected by it, the court recognized
that such a warning need not necessarily go to the person injured.2a It also rec-
ognized that, on the facts before it, "it would be admittedly difficult for a man-
ufacturer to warn the general public" of the lawnmower projectile phenomenon.265
The appropriate warning in such a setting, the court concluded, would be one
.
"adequate and sufficient . . [to] apprise the reasonable person of the dangers
at hand." This would probably be one as to safety precautions "given to the
user of the mower . . . . ,266 9
In other duty to warn actions not involving the workplace, well-reasoned

authority expresses a resistance to permitting the seller to discharge its duty to
warn to remote users or bystanders by simply conveying cautionary information
to the immediate purchaser. One discussion of the arguably indefeasible nature
of the manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate user or bystander of a product's
hazardous propensities is the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Mont-
gomery Elevator Co. v. M ~ C u l l o u g hThis
. ~ ~ ~action was brought against the man-
ufacturer of an escalator and the department store purchaser of that escalator.
It arose from injuries sustained by a ten-year-old boy when his tennis shoe was
caught up and crushed into the space between the escalator treads and side skirt.
The manufacturer defended on the grounds that, upon its recognition of the
product's design flaw, it sent to the purchaser letters advising of the hazard and
including suggestions of remedial measures and an offer to sell to the department
store a "kit" that would permit effectuation of those measures. The department
labored for one day with the paint thinner manufactured by the defendant, and after depleting that
product switched the following day to the product of another manufacturer, suffered an injurious
explosion thereby, the court affirmed judgment for defendant Standard Brands as, in the view of the
court, "it was not reasonably foreseeable ... that Standard Brands' failure to vmn of risks of its
product would cause plaintiffs to suffer injuries while using the product of another." Id. at 366, 212
Cal. Rptr. at 400.
263 Sills V. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
Id. at 783; see, e.g., McCormack v. Hankschraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)
(child injured by scalding water from overturned bedroom vaporizer, where appropriate warnings as
to hazard of scalding would go logically to purchaser of product, rather than to the infant for whose
benefit the product is to be used).
" Id.
266 Id. at 783.
267 Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (1984).

store in which this plaintiff was injured took no such action, and the manufacturer
claimed that this was a superseding cause sufficient to obviate liability.268
The court acknowledged that there are circumstances in which the buyer's
actions or omissions to act with the product "can be of such a nature as to
prevent finding that the injury was caused by the unreasonably dangerous con-
dition of the escalator."269 It concluded, ho.rvever, that here the intermediary's,
action, or inaction, was not of such a nature or degree as to become the cause
in fact of the accident. The court further stated, "[tlhe manufacturer has a non-
delegable duty to provide a product reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses, a
duty not abrogated by warning to the immediate purchaser."270
Putting aside products for household use or cornsumption, the majority of
the circumstances in which the seller's product will be used by those other than
the immediate vendee, are sales to commercial or industrial buyers whose em-
ployees will actually use or be exposed to the products. Interpretation of the
l(S Id. at 778, 779.

x9 E.g., the careless handling of dynamite (Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.
1970)), or the failure to keep a product in safe working order (Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532
S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976)).
no Id. at 781, 782, and stating also:
In the final analysis, as a general rule the purchaser's failure to remedy a defect in the
product is no defense for the manufacturer where the claim is based on the defective con-
dition of the product at the time of manufacture and is made on behalf of an ultimate
..
user or bystander who has not been adequately warned of the danger . . The purchaser
who has notice of the dangerous condition may be concurrently liable to the ultimate user
for failure to provide adequate warning, for failure to remedy the defect or on some other
basis, but the purchaser's failure to act is not an intervening cause except in extraordinary
circumstances.
Id. at 782.
See also Minert v. Harsco Corp., 26 Wash. App. 867, 875, 614 P.2d 686, 691 (1980): "We agree
that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate user of any dangers in its product [other than
those that are open or obvious.] This duty is non-delegable . .. . If the injury was the result of the
manufacturer's breach, the liability for the injury will lie with the manufacturer." But see Borel, 493
F.2d at 1091-92 in which that court states:
In general, of course, a manufacturer is not liable for miscarriages in the communication
process that are not attributable to his failure to warn or the adequacy of the warning.
This may occur, for example, where some intermediate party is notified of the danger, or
discovers it for himself, and proceeds deliberately to ignore it and to pass on the product
without a warning.
Cf.,Jones v. Hittle Sen., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Alm v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 687 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 55 U.S.L.W. 2080 (1986)
(implied jury finding that on the basis of bottle cap' designer's instruction manual reference that
"[]leakage or closure blow-off at lower pressures can occur when the closure application is improper"
was sufficient to put the bottler on notice that a misapplied cap could result in personal injury,
permitted conclusion of insufficient evidence of designer's breach of a duty to warn. Id. at 382).

seller's duty to warn in this commercial and industrial environment is governed

by Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 which provides that the seller owes
a duty to communicate effective cautionary information to these employees or
other ultimate users, unless it has reason to believe that those persons exposed
to the product will realize its dangerous condition.271
Thus, the two crucial inquiries in measuring the manufacturer's duty, if any,
to warn the remote employee are (1) what reason does the seller have to believe
that the users will appreciate any product-related risk sufficiently to avoid harm;
and (2) what confidence may the supplier prudently repose in the ability and the
willingness of the buyer, or if the two are different, the employer, to communicate
effectively to the actual users adequate cautionary information. Under a standard
of informational equivalence these obligations may be recast to state that the
manufacturer must inquire into what, if any, germane safety-related information
known to it is likely not to be known to the persons who will actually be using
the product. If there is such an imbalance between what is known to the man-
ufacturer and what is known to the employee, the manufacturer must also question
what are the optimal means for communicating this information to the actual
users.
The expertise of the employee in using the product in question is one factor
in the analysis of whether the supplier discharges its duty by warning the im-
mediate vendee or the user's employer. The language of Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 388(b) states that a manufacturer will not have to convey any ad-
ditional warning to those for whom use of the product is intended, absent a reason
to believe that those persons will fail to realize the limitations or hazards of the
product. This would suggest that when the actual user has expertise in such mat-
ters, it lessens che likelihood that the seller would reasonably believe the user
would fail to appreciate the risk. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that in one action
brought by an ironworker who was injured when a sling manufactured by the
defendant failed, a jury question existed as to whether the manufacturer's duty
to warn was present, notwithstanding the plaintiff's conceded expertise in such
matters. The conflicting evidence in the record showed that the ironworkers pro-
fessed collective expertise, and that the union had distributed pertinent literature
to members, but also showed the ironworkers' disclaimer of the knowledge "of
the working capacity of the sling that was employed," requiring, the court con-
cluded, submission of the duty to warn issue to the
nl RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS5 388(b).

West v. Bro'derick& Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 210-11 (Iowa 1972) ("We are not
persuaded we shoulcl hold as a matter of law that no duty to warn existed because of the ironworkers'
expertise." Id. at 211); see Bean, 344 S.W.2d at 24, where the court stated: "We decline to hold,
as a matter of law, that defendant owed him no further duty to warn merely because he was a licensed
plumber."
There will be instances where the practice of one identifiable proportion of the population involves

Employer familiarity with the hazard was deemed irrelevant in one action
brought by former employees of an asbestos insulation products manufacturer.
The court found that the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388,
together with state products liability authority, required the conclusion that "the
manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product has a non-delegable duty to
provide warnings to the ultimate consumer or user."273 Distinguishing the defen-
dants' opposing authority that would have limited the seller's liability where the
buyer knew of the hazard, the court stated that such authority usually involves
hazards that are either obvious or known to the employee.274Similarly, Seibel v.
the relatively safe use of a product, while the practice of another proportion engages in a more
hazardous, but foreseeable use. Where those engaging in the unsafe practice are suspected to be many
in number, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn that group to otherwise protect its members.
This issue is discussed in the interesting decision in Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1983). One issue in the appeal involved the hazards of using the Colt .45 pistol in a half-cock
position as a substitute for engaging the safety. Appellant on appeal claimed that persons first trained
on this weapon in the police or in the military learned of this risky use, and that the manufacturer's
awareness of that widespread use gave rise to its duty to warn. The court stated:
Where there is a heterogeneous market for a product, a regular practice or use among
members of a single trade constituting a small fraction of the total users would not nec-
essarily give rise to a duty to warn or protect against dangers from that use to those not
members of the particular trade. The facts of this case differ markedly from such a situation,
however. Those trained by the military or the police represent the vast majority of Colt
.45 users.
Id. at 1065.
n3 Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom.,
Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985). The court in Jackson,
499 F.2d 809, responded sharply to a comparable proposition that employer knowledge of a risk
extinguished a seller's duty to warn in an action where a painter engaged to paint the inside of certain
railroad tank cars was injured when the vapors of the highly flammable epoxy paint ignited, and
stated with respect to the showing of employer, but not employee, familiarity with a risk:
The most serious error in the challenged instruction is the statement that knowledge of the
hazard on the part of plaintiff's employer would obviate any duty to warn plaintiff. Besides
improperly focusing on the knowledge of an individual rather than general or common
knowledge, this erroneously conceives the community whose common knowledge the jury
is to ascertain. The seller's duty under 8 402A is to 'the ultimate user or consumer.'
Id. at 812.
n4 Neal, 548 F . Supp. at 369. Analysis under a substantially similar set of factors convinced a
court in an asbestos-related disease action brought by land-based ship repair workers to reject the
manufacturers' contention that the asbestos manufacturers satisfied their duty to warn the workers
of the perils of inhalation of respirable asbestos insofar as the workers' employers, the builders of
private and public ocean-going vessels, were "aware of the dangers involved in the use of the product."
Id. at 232. Emphasizing the hazard, intermediary knowledge, and feasibility of direct warning factors
of RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS5 388 comment n, the court let stand the lower court's refusal
to grant the manufacturer's requested jury instruction, concluding:
In this case the product, because it contained asbestos fibers, was very dangerous. The
burden on the manufacturers in placing a warning on the product was not great. The

Symons C ~ r p . found
~ ~ ' liability for failure to warn when the manual accompany-
ing building material contained some cautionary language, but there was no evi-
dence that the warning had ever been communicated to the employee. The employee,
working on the manufacturer's steel concrete forms, fell and was injured when
a weld broke on a V-shaped end support rod to which he had affixed the lanyard
of his safety belt. On page three of the 115-page technical manual included the
following warning: "Do Not Hang Off V-Shaped End Rail Support Rods." There
was no evidence, however, that the specific or general import of this was com-
municated to the injured e m p l ~ y e e The
. ~ ~ court let stand the jury verdict that
the employer was negligent in failing to communicate adequately the warning to
the employee who was the ultimate user of the The court distinguished
authority which held that the manufacturer's warning conveyed to the employer
insulates the employer from liability, even when the employer fails to communicate
the warning to the employee, as arising from factual situations "where either the
danger is slight or the difficulties of giving the warning are immense."278
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 comment n, offers the most par-
ticularized guidance for the supplier whose goods are to be used or consumed by
persons other than the immediate buyer. The two most prominent examples are
that of the distributor selling goods to the retailer, with knowledge that the goods
will be purchasrd and actually used by remote buyers, and the manufacturer or
the contractor making available to the contractor or subcontractor products that
will be used by the latter party's employees or construction workers. Should a
warning or other cautionary information be made to the immediate buyer, the
issue posed is whether such method "gives a reasonable assurance that the in-
formation will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it."n9 The
comment suggests that this evaluation comprehends (1) a weighing of the relative
seriousness of the harm that may occur if the information is not conveyed ef-
fectively to the remote user, and (2) an assessment of the confidence the seller
may reasonably repose in the immediate vendee to impart faithfully the infor-
mation to its servants. Understandably, comment n continues, if the product is
of such a nature that, if "ignorantly used," is unlikely to cause more than "triv-
ial" harm, it may be unnecessary for the supplier to do more than to ascertain
that the vendee is an ordinary business person toward whom no particular scep-
employer was unaware of the danger until 1964. Finally, once the employer became aware
of the potentiill danger it failed to convey its knowledge to its employees.
Id. at 233.
n5 Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974).
n6 Id. at 53.
Id. at 57.
Id.
n9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 388 comment n.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ticism is \~arranted.~~O
If, on the other hand, the actual character of the product,
taken together with the purpose for which it is to be used, would create a risk
of serious injury if not used according to warnings or instructions, the supplier
should consider direct communication to those actually using the product, even
when there is no reason to believe that the vendee would not exercise due care.='
Many of the decisions employing the justifiable reliance standard of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 388 comment n describe the requirement that the
manufacturer have a reasonable basis for ascribing to the vendee the responsibility
for conveying to others the nature of any pertinent product risk. Illustrations of
circumstances in which confidence was found unjustifiable, as distinct from find-
ings that failure of the warning to reach the employee is, without more, sufficient
for imposition of liability, are quite scarce. One informative case involved a lum-
ber planing device that forcibly ejected a board, kiiing the plaintiff's husband.2s2
The product was sold equipped with "anti-kickback fingers" designed to protect
the operator from kickback should a blade hit a knot or a piece of metal in the
wood. The evidence adduced, however, showed that the very design of the "fin-
gers" encouraged operators to shove them to the side of the saw pocket or to
remove them altogether. When the machine's maintenance manual failed to cau-
tion against the removal of the fingers, the evidence in the aggregate suggested
to the court that it was foreseeable that the manufacturer's vendee would not
pass along adequate warnings to the actual users of the
One insightful treatment holding that a manufacturer's warnings to even a
highly skilled intermediary may be inadequate to prevent liability arose from an
action brought by a woman who alleged that she suffered a stroke caused by her
use of oral contraceptive^.^ In that action the court recognized that in most
circumstances involving prescription drugs the manufacturer satisfies its duty to
warn by conveying the necessary and appropriate information to the treating phy-
Id.
"' [I]f the danger involved in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may
be that the supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of
the necessary information even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be
careful. Many such articles can be made to carry their own message to the understanding
of those who are likely to use them by the form in which they are put out, by the container
in which they are supplied, or by a label or other device, indicating with a substantial
sufficiency their dangerous character. Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of
their true quality is great and such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly
burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be required to adopt them.
Id.
Hopkins, 630 F.2d 616.
Id. at 621.
McDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65.

WEST VIRGINU LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89
s i ~ i a n It
. ~also
~ ~ examined the patient-physician relationship in the administration
of oral contraceptives in light of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388
comment n. The court concluded that in matters of the duty to warn, the man-
ufacturer's reliance on an intermediary must be reasonable.2s6The court di>covered
that unlike the ordinary circumstances of patient-physician consultation common
to the authorization of most prescriptions, with oral contraceptives there exist (1)
"heightened par-ticipation of patients relating to use," (2) "substantial risks," (3)
the ease and practicability of direct warnings from the manufacturer to the user,
and (4) the limited prescribing ("annual") and oral ("insufficient or . . . scanty
. . .") contact with the physician to justify reliance on manufacturer communi-
cation to the medical community alone.287
Some vestigial authority would provide that a manufacturer's warning to the
contractor or employer of the risks of use or installation of the product will satisfy
the seller's duty to warn irrespective of whether the warning reaches the employee
working with the material. However incongruous such decisions may at first ap-
pear to be with the policies espoused in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
388 and comment n, examination of these decisions reveals the typicality of either
the employee's actual or constructive familiarity with the hazard or the adven-
turism of the employer or contractor in departing substantially with the warnings
or instructions provided.288For example, one action was brought by the employee
of a construction contractor following the employee's injuries during erection of
spanned truss joists in construction of a gymnasium which collapsed. The man-
ufacturer interposed as its defense the several pages of pictorial representations
of the correct erection of the product, given to the project supervisor together
with printed information pertaining to erection, bracing, and instability, and cau-
tioning as to the latter, "[ilf you are not completely satisfied that the joists are
being installed correctly, call your supplier immediately."2s9 Rather than con-
tacting the supplier regarding perceived problems, the court observed, the con-
tractor and work crew "knowingly deviated from those instructions and used a
2" Id. at 69, ("[tlhe duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than
the patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a breach of such duty."
Id., 475 N.E.2d at 69 (citing McEwen, 270 Or. at 386-87, 528 P.2d at 529) (emphasis in original).
" 6 Id. at 68.
"' Id. at 70. Accordingly, the court set forth the manufacturer's duty with regard to the sale
of oral contraceptives are requiring the manufacturer: "to provide the consumer written warnings
conveying reasonable notice of the nature, gravity, and likelihood of known or knownable side effects,
and advising the consumer to seek fuller explanation from the prescribing physician or other doctor
of any such infornlation of concern to the consumer." Id. at 70.
* AS to the latter phenomenon, the court in Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 proposed
that where the employer's actions represent only a "minor variation" from the instructions at issue,
the manufacturer nlay still be liable.
289 Schmizer v. Truss-Joist Corp.. 540 P.2d 998, 1000-02 (Or. 1975).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
'shortcut' procedure."2g0This conduct, in the court's view, was sufficient to deny

recovery.291One can quarrel legitimately with such a result that permits the con-
tractor's cavalier disregard of the seller's instructions to bar the injured employee's
action against the seller. The correctness of such a decision, however, rests ul-
timately with the proposition that, regarding products that are not by themselves
extremely hazardous, the seller should be permitted to discharge its duty to warn
by conveying adequate safety-related information to the immediate purchaser,
unless the seller has actual or constructive awareness that the buyer will deviate
from those instructions or fail to communicate them to the employees.
Also, some authority that at first seems like a reflexive application of the
informed purchaser doctrine, with its occasional harsh consequences for the actual
user of the product, reveals in actuality a substantial user awareness of the risk.
Not infrequently, the decisions granting judgment to the manufacturer can be
legitimated on the grounds of the employee's familiarity with the product and
the risks involved and could support resort to the professional user exception,
with the same result. A good example of such decisions which may have been
correctly decided, but under the wrong rationale, is Cruz v. T e ~ a c o In
. ~ Cruz,
~~
representatives of the decedent tow truck driver brought an action against the
'90 Id. at 1006.

Id. at 1006-07 (relying on Procter & Gamble Mfg.Co., 422 S.W.2d 773, 780).
Such a resolution is arguably wrong, however, in light of the utter absence of evidence that the
information known to the contractor was known similarly to the injured employee, or could be imputed
fairly to the injured employee.
There remain also certain decisions that give weight to the employer's familiarity with the hazard,
which evidence should normally be an irrelevancy inasmuch as the real issue is whether the manu-
facturer's warning was adequate to reach the ultimate user or handler of the product as those concepts
are described under RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS3 388 and 5 402A. E.g., \Vilhelm v. Globe
Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 @el. Super. 1977), involving an action brought by the employee of a dry
cleaning plant against the manufacturers and distributors of cleaning solvent. The court therein gives
summary judgment to the manufacturer on the failure to warn count on the grounds that "[slince
the manufacturers . . . had no control over the dry cleaning machines or work area at [the plant] if
there was a duty to warn it was only to warn . . . plaintiff's employer." Id. at 223. Of course the
court's focus on "control" here, and the manufacturer's lack of "control" over the vendee's premises,
misses the mark altogether. Only in unusual circumstances would the supplier have actual or con-
structive control over the premises of the vendee. The correct inquiry is the feasibility, where ap-
propriate, of making cautionary information available directly to the actual users or consumers of
the product. It is seen that the Wilhelm court offers an analysis paying not even lip service to the
gravity of the risk, trustworthiness of the intermediary, and burden of conveying the warning directly
to the worker-issues set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS3 388 comment n, and withholds
also any legal or moral solicitude concerning the predicament of workers proceeding in ignorance of
the hazards inherent in the flammable chemicals surrounding them. Parenthetically, it bears mentioning
that supportable grounds for the decision of the court might have been found in the fact that the
solvent manufacturer was a bulk seller, its product being stored in drums at the plant premises, and
plaintiffs' testimony as to their individual awareness of the flammability of the product. Wilhelm,
373 A.2d at 220.
292 Cmz, 589 F. Supp. 777.

seller of the truck for failure of the seller to warn that when the truck's winch
was in use, the truck could become unstable and overturn if used at high speeds
and towing heavy weights. Decedent's employer was knowledgeable in the use of
winch trucks and testified at trial that he "did not need any advice as to how
to operate the [winch] truck" from the seller.293This evidence, it was submitted,
was irrelevant to the question of whether the seller discharged its duty to com-
municate safety-related information to persons likely to use or be affected by the
hazard. Granting summary disposition to the seller based upon its conclusion that
the action was "analogous" to Hopkins v. E.I. Du P ~ n tthe , ~court
~ ~ concluded
simultaneously that the decedent received training in the use of the winch trucks
by other experienced employees, although there was no reported evidence of this
by anyone other than the employer. If, nevertheless, one were to accept as true
the representation of the decedent's specific familiarity with the risk, the result
in C m is arguably supportable under the professional user doctrine.29s
The manufaicturer's dilemma of what, if any, information must be imparted
to persons other than the immediate purchaser arises as well where the manu-
facturer sells in bulk. The issue requires resolution of whether the bulk seller for
resale discharges its duty to warn by conveying adequate information to the dis-
tributor intermediary. It extends also to the question of what circumstances rep-
resent adequate assurance to the initial seller that the intermediary is capable of
passing along such product information to the latter's customers.
This question has been treated in actions on claims involving products such
as chemicals and natural gas, with a resolution that can be stated generally as
providing that, for products sold in bulk, the wholesaler discharges its duty to
warn by conveying adequate warning to the immediate purchaser. If, on the other
hand, the products sold by the bulk seller are already packaged, "ordinary prud-
ence may require the manufacturer to put his warning on the package where it
is available to all who handle it."296
When the manufacturer sells in bulk by means of conveyancing that do not
involve packages or containers that may readily be labeled, the majority rule is
that the bulk seller fulfills its duty to warn if it conveys to the immediate purchaser
sufficient information concerning any pertinent product risks. The manufacturer
w3 Id. at 779.
Hopkins, 212 F.2d 623.
w3 Cruz, 589 F.2d at 779-80.
296 Jones, 219 Kan. at 637, 549 P.2d at 1393-94. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co., 340 F.2d 402
(manufacturer of insecticide required to place adequate warnings on the bags in which it was sold,
including, arguably, international symbols of toxicity, such as the skull and crossbones, where the
evidence showed that English warnings might not be understood by semi-literate farm laborers); Steele
v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) (manufacturer of finger nail polish, sold packaged,
had duty to label the bottles indicating explosive propensities).

must also be reasonably satisfied that the intermediary possesses the ability to
impart such information to subsequent purchasers.297
With the bulk natural gas genre of duty to warn limitations should be com-
pared the contrary conclusion reached in Shell Oil Co. v G~tierrz.2~~ There, a
worker's injury in an explosion was caused by welding operations in proximity
to waste, but not altogether empty, drums of the highly flammable solvent xylene.
The manufacturer and seller of the xylene identified each drum as "highly flam-
mable," but did not convey to the plaintiff's employer or to the distributor in-
termediary the importance of proper disposal of waste drums. The appellate court
turned aside the manufacturer's appeal that it had no duty to provide such in-
formation to the final users of its product inasmuch as it was sold in bulk carload
lots by responding:
[Bleing a bulk supplier in carload lots and not having direct access to the barrels
does not insulate [the manufacturer] from liability. Labeling is but one of the
methods which may give adequate warning . . . .Lack of access to the final form
2w E.g., Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958) (an action involving bulk
sale of propane to transporter, with subsequent sales to a retailer and the plaintiff, who suffered
personal injuries and property damage as a result of a propane explosion). Concerning the claimed
duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the possible loss of the fuel's cautionary odorant, the court
states:
. ..
The propane was delivered to [the transporter] not in containers, but in bulk . When
it was sold, there was no method by which defendants could warn the plaintiff how it could
be handled. The gas not being sold in original containers, and as it was not known to
whom [the retailer] might sell the same, defendants could only warn [the transporter]. [The
transporter and the retailer] knew of the possible chemical reaction. Warning is required
to impart knowledge, and if that knowledge has already been acquired, it is not necessary.
Congruent authority is found in Hendrix v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 203 Kan. 140, 453 P.2d 486
(1969) "[The manufacturer], having once fulfilled the above duty [to warn], can not be held liable
for [the distributor's] failure to take advantage of, use, or impart to others such instruction." Id.
at 496, cited with approval in Jonerr, 219 Kan. at 635, 549 P.2d at 1392, in which the syllabus of
the court states the general rule:
The manufacturer of [propone gas] who sells it to a distributor in bulk fulfills his duty to
the ultimate consumer when he ascertains that the distributor to whom he sells is adequately
trained, is familiar with the properties of the gas and safe methods of handling it, and is
capable of passing on his knowledge to his customers. A manufacturer so selling owes no
duty to warn the ultimate consumer, and his failure to do so is not negligence, and does
not render the product defective.
Id. at 627, 549 P.2d at 1383.
In Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Idaho law), the
court concluded that "the adequacy of a bulk manufacturer's warning to those other than its immediate
vendee is usually held to be a jury question." Id. at 1346.
Shell Oil Co., v. Gutierez, 119 Ariiz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).

in which the product reaches the user is simply one of the considerations bearing
upon the existence and extent of
The absence of any identifiable reason for the bulk seller to suspect im-
prudence on the part of its immediate purchaser has been held to insulate the
manufacturer from a claim of failure to warn adequately, even in a setting where
the manufacturer accompanied its initial sale with no warnings whatsoever.300In
one such case a lacquer thinner manufacturer sold the thinner in bulk to a dis-
tributor who packaged it to another distributor, who sold it to the retailer. The
plaintiff used the thinner upon the recommendation that she could clean tar stains
on her floor, proceeded to use it to clean her entire kitchen floor. The extreme
flammability of the product caused the ensuing accident in which the plaintiff
was injured. The warning in question was agreed by the parties to be adequate
for use of the product as lacquer thinner, but unfortunately the label, for which
preparation the thinner manufacturer claimed no responsibility, recommended the
product's utility for removal of tar.301The court identified the only issue before
it as whether the manufacturer had a duty to inspect the middleman's package
or warning for adequacy. The court responded that it did not, explaining that
''Nt would have been highly unlikely, under the circumstances, however, for [the
manufacturer] to have foreseen that [the middleman] would add an inappropriate
use to an otherwise adequate warning
A different issue is whether the private label manufacturer selling goods to
the retailer for sale under the name of the retailer alone has a duty to warn the
ultimate consumer of salient safety and usage information. Such was the object
of discussion, but not resolution, in Edwards v. Sears Roebuck & Co.303This
involved an appeal of an action brought on behalf of a decedent involved in an
accident in which the automobile's tires had been manufactured by Michelin in
Europe and sold to defendant for resale under Sears' Allstate trademark. Michelin
argued that under negligence it had "no duty to warn consumers regarding the
vagaries of inflation, weights, speeds, and uses involved in driving with tires oth-
erwise free from defect or danger," a proposition which the court agreed had
"some merit."304
Where a manufacturer's product is safe for use by most persons likely to

come into contact with it, but is likely to create an allergic or highly unusual
'99 Id. at 434, 581 P.2d at 279 (citing Davk, 399 F.2d 121).
3m Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 194.
Id at 195.
'03 Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
YU Id. at 287. See ako 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN supra, note 70, at $5 8.01-8.05(2).

reaction in only a small proportion of the population, special issues arise as to

the manufacturer's duty to warn the allergic or idiosyncratic individual.
Several decisions have adverted to the comments to Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 402A as an aid in defining the standard to be applied to the man-
ufacturer's duty to warn the unusual, but predictable, allergic or idiosyncratic
user. One potential guideline found therein is that of comment i, which in its
narrative regarding the concept of "unreasonably dangerous" states, in part, that
to be unreasonably dangerous, "[tlhe article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases i t . . . ."305 This language, with its emphasis on the ordinary consumer,
has been interpreted by some courts as inviting the conclusion that an allergic or
hypersensitive reaction to a product is not that of an ordinary or normal con-
sumer. It, therefore, represents a factor militating against finding that allergic
reactions can support a finding of unreasonable danger. A second guideline is
found in comment j which provides that the manufacturer should provide a warn-
ing where "the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of
the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally
.
known . . . ,306 9
Illustrative decisions adopting a "substantial" number or an "appreciable"

number test include Cudmore v. Richardson-Merril, I ~ Cinvolving . , ~ ~cataracts
and hair loss linked to the defendant's MER/29. The court stated that "the man-
ufacturer of a drug for human consumption or intimate bodily use should be
held liable . . . for injurious results only when such results [were foreseeable] in
an appreciable number of persons."30s In Kaempfe v. Lehn and Fink Products
C ~ r p . the
, ~ ~court stated that there exists no manufacturer duty to warn unless
the consumer is one of a "substantial number or of an identifiable class of persons
who were allergic to the defendant's produ~ts."3~~ The court in the latter case
m5 Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A comment i (emphasis added).

306Id. comment j:
.. . or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably expect not to find in the
product, the seller is required to give a warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by the
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of
the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
Id.
Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1003 (1967), disapproved by, Crocker v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 514
S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1974).
M3 Id. at 644.
YR Kaempfe v. Lehn &Fink Prods., Corp., 21 A.D.2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964), aff'd, 20
N.Y.2d 818, 284 N.Y.S.2d 708, 231 N.E.2d 294 (1967).

'I0 Id. at 201, 249 N.Y.S. at 846. See also Presbrey v. Gilette Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 435
N.E.2d 513 (1982), finding no duty to warn where the evidence showed that youth's welts from use
of an antiperspirant were a systemic antigen-antibody reaction that was idiosynaatic to that user,
and concluding therefore that the product was not fairly considered injurious to normal users.

found that under this standard there should be no recovery where the evidence
showed only four complaints out of approxiinately 600,000 units of spray deo-
dorant sold,311a determination required, the court emphasized, not only by "the
weight of authority but also by common sense application of the negligence doc-
trine."312
Other decisions adopt the "appreciable number" language of Cudmore and
state that for the product to be considered unreasonably dangerous, and for a
duty to warn to attach, the adverse reaction must be of such a nature as to affect
an "appreciable number" of users. Such an approach was adopted by one court
finding for the defendant manufacturer in an action by a user of its fair coloring
product for scalp injuries sustained in using the
Other authority describes the standard to be applied as that of whether the
product was dangerous to an extent that would not be contemplated by the or-
dinary consumer purchasing it. This language was also employed by the authors
Kaempfe, 21 A.D.2d at 203, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 848. In Kaempfe the markings on the deodorant
specifically stated "safe for normal skin" and "contains aluminum sulfate." The plaintiff, as in Wright
suffered a severe allergic reaction. In reviewing why the manufacturer had not failed to warn, the
court analyzed evidence that showed the manufacturer's projection that only one out of every 150,000
users would experience an adverse reaction. With this small number in mind the court stated this
view of the law: "P,ccording to prevailing authority the existence of a duty on the part of a man-
ufacturer to warn depends upon whether or not to his actual or constructive knowledge, the product
contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the population are allergic." Id. at 199, 249
N.Y.S.2d at 845. Finding no liability for want of any "substantial" number of persons who would
react poorly to the product, the court was impressed additionally by its perception of the lack of
causation between the seller's conduct and the consumer's injury, observing that a product containing
a particular ingredient to which the manufacturer knew some were allergic would, by definition, warn
only those who knew they had an allergy. A warning would therefore, by this argument, be useless
to those persons such as Mrs. Kaempfe who did not know they had an allergy.
31Z Id. at 204, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
"3 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (finding no duty to
warn in the absence of evidence that the user belonged to an appreciable class of users or potential
users). One early review of what number of affected persons should be necessary to demonstrate that
a product is hazardous is Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939)' which
involved an allergic reaction to a poisonous dye concentrated in the head band of the plaintiff's hat.
After several warnings the consumer noticed his normally black hair had turned orange and he began
to suffer from a skin eruption across his forehead. Judgment at trial went to Mr. Zirpola. On appeal
the defendant contended that there should be no liability because the evidence demonstrated that only
a small portion (four or five percent) of persons coming into contact with the dye would suffer injury.
The court rejected the proposition in these words:
The mere fact that only a small proportion of those who use a certain article would suffer
injuries by reason of such use does not absolve the vendor from liability under the implied
warranty created by statute. Otherwise in every action to recover damages for the breach
of an implied warranty it would be necessary to show that the article sold whether it be
food or wearing apparel would be injurious to every user.
Id. at 23, 4 A.2d at 75.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment i. Under this approach,

it has been held that a severe allergic reaction to a shampoo in one user was
insufficient to show the manufacturer's failure to warn upon evidence showing
that only somewhat more than one millionth of one per cent of the units sold
had been associated with provable allergic reactions.324
Even when only a very small proportion of the population is put at risk, the
severity of the illness or injury to which the warning would be directed is properly
a factor in determining whether the manufacturer has a duty to warn. Such was
the logic of the court in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, I ~ Can. action
, ~ ~involving
~
the risk to participants in a mass polio immunization program of contracting the
disease inoculated against, a risk argued to be only one in a million. Expressly
rejecting the quantitative approach to determining the manufacturer's duty to
warn, the court stated the test as being applicable to the law of informed consent
as to products liability: "When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g.,
of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end
sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or
personal, the warning must be given."316
The analysis in Davis is congruent with the emphasis given in Wright v. Carter
Products, Inc.317Even if the risk is very slight, when the consequences of an
injury are very grave, the manufacturer may in some circumstances have a duty
to warn "those few persons who it knows cannot apply its product without serious
injury.99318
Mountain v. Procter & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
n5 Davis, 399 F.2d 121.
M6 Id. at 129-30. Glynn Davis was a healthy 38 year old man who took the drug as part of a
nationwide immunization push. Within days he became paralyzed. The manufacturer sought to in-
troduce evidence of a Surgeon General's report which put the risk of contacting the disease for persons
over twenty years of age at nine out of every one million. Because of the small number defendant
urged the court to classify this case as one in which "the personal risk although existent and known
is so trifling in comparison with the advantage to be gained as to be de minimus." Rejecting this
argument the court said, "Such treatment would qualify only in situations where sale [of the product]
is accompanied by proper directions and warnings. Thus we are returned to the problem of a duty
to warn." Id. at 128-29. The consumer must be given a chance, the court continues, to personally
balance the benefits and risks of the administration of the drug, and absent a clear indication of the
risks to him this risk-reward evaluation cannot be made. Particularly in situations involving drugs,
the court emphasized the need for the consumer to be accurately informed of the risk of adverse
reactions even if in view of the seller such risk are minimal, concluding "responsibility for choice is
not one that the manufacturer can assume for all comers . . .it is the responsibility of the manufacturer
to see that warnings reach the consumer . . . ." Id. at 131.
)I7 Wright V. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
Id. at 58. (emphasis added). See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.
1966) (holding that it is not unreasonable "to expect a manufacturer to foresee that some few customers
among its many customers will suffer a rare allergic reaction to some ingredient in the product." Id.
at 85); Gober v. Revlon Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963) (cosmetic manufacturer's nail base creating

WEST VIRGINA LA W REVIEW
Subsequent authority supports the argument in Wright319that the duty to warn

cannot in all cases be measured by a quantitative standard,320and that the man-
ufacturer will in some circumstances be required to warn even a very few persons
who cannot use the product without serious injury.321In agreement is the court
in Basko v. Sterling Drug, I ~ Cwhich,
. , ~in~an action involving blindness caused
by chloroquine retinopathy, stated: "The manufacturer is obligated to warn in
cases where the drug may affect only a small number of idiosyncratic or hyper-
sensitive users, and the obligation to warn attaches regardless of whether the
number of persons affected can fairly be said to be 'appreciable.' "323
allergic reaction in some users is sufficient t o create a n obligation t o warn). In Wright, Mrs. Carter
had used Arrid deodorant for five years without suffering any ill effect but in June 1951, with an
application of the product, she contracted a rash. She discontinued use of the product and the rash
subsided. Later upon resumption of use no harmful effects were noticed. Unfortunately, with still a
later application the rash reappeared, this time in the form of a severe case of contact dermatitis, a
condition that must be continually treated. At trial, evidence was introduced to show that some
individuals will experience varying degrees from mild t o extremely severe dermatitis when using al-
uminate sulfate products, and that in the years 1948 through 1951 the manufacturer had received 373
complaints of skin irritation caused by Arrid. The trial court found persuasive the fact that 82,000,000
jars of the product had been sold generating only 373 complaints. Such a miniscule percentage com-
pelled the court's conclusion that no duty t o warn had arisen. The court of appeals, however, rejected
the rationale that a small number of injuries always negates a duty t o warn, and stated that while
the number of persons harmed is properly considered in determining whether the manufacturer had
knowledge of a danger:
pV]hen the fact is once established and demonstrated by experience that a certain commodity
apparently harmless, contains concealed dangers and when distributed t o the public through
the channels of trade and used for the purpose for which it was made and sold is sure to
cause suffering to and injure the health of some innocent purchaser even though the per-
centage of those injured be not large a duty arises t o and a responsibility rests upon the
manufacturer and dealer with knowledge t o the extent, at least, of warning the ignorant
consumer.
Wright, 244 F.2d at 58 (quoting Gerkin v. Brodn & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 60, 143 N.W. 48, 53
(1913)).
)I9 Wright, 244 F.2d 53. See Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter, 478 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), which involved a person's respiratory injury from use of a cleaning product containing am-
monia. The defendant therein argued that plaintiff should not recover absent a showing that the
product was hazardous "to the average person." Id. at 447. The appellate court considered such a
standard "too great a burden" Id., and determined instead that the court would adopt the rule that
"if a particular injury is reasonably foreseeable, however rare, the manufacturer or seller has the
duty t o warn." Id. ;it 448. Liability may attach, the court continued, even in the absence of prior
complaints about the product, as in the court's view "if the injury is reasonably foreseeable, even
if rare, the seller car~notrely on its history of good fortune to exempt itself from liability.'' Id. at
448 (citations omitted).
Wright, 244 F.2d at 56.
Id. at 58.
)* Basko, a t 416 F.2d 430.
'* Id.

Other authority supporting the position taken in Wright and involving an

even more remote risk of allergic reaction is Braun v. Roux Distribution CO.~"
There, the incidence of a user of the manufacturer's hair dye (which contained
small amounts of a coal tar derivative) contracting allergic periarteritis nodosa
was so remote as to have never, to anyone's knowledge, occurred. Notwithstand-
ing the manufacturer's distribution of tens of millions of applications of the hair
dye each year without comparable incident, the court found that the jury could
reasonably conclude that the manufacturer, held to the standard of an expert,
should have known of the risk and given an adequate warning against it.325
XI. DUTYTO WARNTHE PROFESSIONAL

USER
The rule is stated generally that there is no duty to give a warning to members
of a trade or profession against dangers generally known to that Ad-
herence to this approach is demonstrated by decisions holding that there is no
duty to warn about the dangers of high exposure to benzene when the individual
exposed to the benzene is a professional tank stripper whose job required contact
with comparably hazardous cargo;3" and that there is no duty to warn an ex-
perienced stuntman about the hazards of jumping from a height of 323 feet into
an air cushion rated for 200 feet.328
One obvious rationale for distinguishing the so-called professional user doc-
trine from the doctrines discussed above, concerning the duty to warn about
known or obvious dangers, is that the product sold to or coming into contact
with the professional may frequently be sold only to members of that trade. A
single example will suffice. One can plausibly maintain that the producer of bulk
quantities of rodenticide, sold only to seed and feed stores in bags not smaller
than 100 pounds, can expect that the product will see only agricultural use, and
that the users would have at least a rudimentary acquaintance with the safe use
of rodenticide. A like supposition can be said to have led one court to conclude
that a manufacturer should not have to warn a farmer about the dangers of
drinking concentrated herbicide.329
1x Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).

Id. at 763.
Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1394
(3d Cir. 1975); see, e.g., Martinez, 529 F.2d 457; Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); Henderson Brothers Stores, Inc., v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App.
3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981); Ziglar v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147,
280 S.E.2d 510 (1981).
ln Martinez, 529 F.2d at 464.
1" Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. La. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 946 (5th
Cir. 1983).
1" Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 153, 280 S.E.2d at 515.

One early articulation of this approach was offered in Helene Curtis Indus-
tries, Inc. v. P r ~ i t t , ~in
~ Owhich the injured party claimed, among other things,
that the instructions accompanying the hair preparation inadequately described
precautions that could have been taken and which would have lessened the li-
kelihood or severity of the plaintiffs injuries. The manufacturer countered that
its product was plainly marked "For Professional Use Only," that its warnings
and other cautionary information was sufficient for the safe administration of
the product by beauticians, and that it should not be required also to have pre-
pared information for the audience of, the plaintiff and her friend who assisted
in the casual home administration of the product. With this latter proposition
the court agreed, stating: "When these products were marketed, the makers could
only foresee that they would be applied by a trained beautician. Therefore, the
directions had to be adequate only for the professional's use."331
The professional user exception has not been limited to circumstances where
the injured party has had trade or professional exposure to the product. It has
also been invoked successfully when the injured individual or individuals have
had first-hand knowledge of the characteristics of a product, even 'absent direct
professional experience. One such holding was an affirmed lower court finding
for a defendant concrete manufacturer in an action brought by two men who
purchased the defendant's concrete for use as a foundation for an addition to
their home and suffered chemical bums from contact with the product. Noting
that "[bloth plaintiffs had experience in working with concrete" and had clothed
themselves to provide protection from the risk of, among other things, chemical
burns, the court held that a manufacturer had no duty to warn of risks thus
known to the
Similarly, if the experienced worker, knowledgeable of the risks inhering in
the use of a product not itself inherently dangerous, proceeds incautiously to
attempt to use the product, it may be found that a later claim of failure to warn
will be barred for lack of any causal connection between the injuries sustained
and the lack of warning. Such was the result in Horak v. Pullman, I ~ c in .,~~~
which a railway workman brought suit against, among others, the manufacturer
of a gravity outlet gate after he sustained back injuries attempting to work open
the closed exit chute. Reviewing the record below, the appellate court concluded
02'Helene Curtis Indus. Inc., 385 F.2d 841.

Id. at 858 (citations omitted); see Dahlback v. Dico Co., [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 10,195 (Minn. App. 1984), finding no duty to warn for manufacturer of trolley
boom hoist following injury where hand-held control unit malfunctioned and operator came into
contact with a power line, as the plaintiff% employer, a sophisticated purchaser familiar with the
varying types of control units available, was knowledgeable of the risks in such a product. Id. at 26,
561-63, 26,562.
n2 Gary v. Dyson Lumber & Supply Co., 465 So.2d 172 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Thornhill
v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson Inc., 385 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1980)).
333 Horak v. Pullman, Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,585 (5th Cir. 1975).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
that the plaintiff "knew that excessive force might be required to open the hopper
car," knew also that the use of such force "could pose a threat of injury to
him," and, by his admitted disregard of various mechanical assist devices at the
site, showed that any other warnings or instructions would have been unavailing.
"Thus," the court decided, "the failure to warn could not have been a producing
cause of [the plaintiff's] accident."334
Subsection @) of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 has been inter-
preted as supporting the proposition that no duty to warn exists if the user knows
or should know of the hazard, especially when the user is a professional who
should be aware of the characteristics of the product. Illustrative of the decisions
supporting this rationale is the leading case of Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co.335In Strong, the widow of the decedent, a construction supervisor for the
public gas company, brought an action for the death of her husband who was
killed by a gas explosion while investigating a report of gas odor. The explosion
was attributed to a two-inch plastic pipe, containing a metal insert stiffener, which
pulled from a compression coupling because of shrinkage in the plastic pipe due
to cold. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the manufacturer failed
to warn that such plastic pipe, when connected to steel pipe by means of compres-
sion coupling, would not maintain its integrity as the plastic pipe contracted with
temperature drop. The evidence showed that the coupling in question had been
installed under the direction of the decedent, and that the decedent was, prior
to the explosion, aware of at least two other incidents involving similar
The evidence in Strong also showed that the manufacturer had issued "a
variety of printed instructions and technical information" to the gas company,
including advisories on the need for precautionary measures on anchoring pro-
cedures with plastic pipe. The testimony of gas company employees, however,
was uniformly that none had read the latest and most timely manufacturer news-
letter on the Citing subsection @) of Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 388, the appellate court agreed with substantial precedent that the pro-
vision has been correctly "interpreted to mean that there is no duty to warn if
the user knows or should know of the danger, especially when the user is a
professional who should be aware of the characteristics of the The
court continued by adding that the alleged lack of warnings could not, in any
event, be the proximate cause of the fatality when "a user is fully aware of the
danger which a warning would alert him or her of."339
Iw Id. at 28,288.
Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981).
336 Id. at 684.
Id. at 685.
)I8 Id. at 687.
3J9 Id. at 688. See Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. SO, 82-83, 281 N.W.2d
520, 522 (1979). an action arising from the same explosion as that in the principal case, and in which

306 WEST VIRGINU LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89
Courts have not, however, reflexively denied recovery to experienced workers

on the basis of a presumptive familiarity with any hazards associated with their
trade or craft. 'This is particularly true in a hierarchal trade or craft where the
contractor or supervisor, by information, experience, or training, may know more
about the performance characteristics of certain products than the subordinate
craftsmen. Leading authority has proposed the better rule to be that where the
pertinent product safety information has not reached the individual who will use
the product or be exposed to the peril, it is of no moment that the worker's
supervisor or eniployer may have superior knowledge or information of the haz-
ard. Thus, in Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer CO.,~~O an action was brought
by a painter severely burned when the epoxy paint with which he was painting
the inside of a railway tank car ignited. The evidence showed that while the
plaintiff's employer may have been familiar with the risk that vapors accumulating
in a confined area could create the risk of explosion when coming into contact
with a spark, the plaintiff himself was not. Reversing on the basis of the trial
court's instruction that knowledge of the hazard on the part of the plaintiff's
employer would obviate any need for a warning to the plaintiff,344'the court stated
that "[tlhe adequacy of warnings must be measured according to whatever knowl-
edge and understanding may be common to painters who will actually open the
containers and use the paints; the possibly superior knowledge and understanding
of painting contractors is irrelevant."342
As in Jackson, the record in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products C0rp.3~3
required the coriclusion that, however familiar others might have been with the
the court observed that as the gas company was under a high duty of care concerning its gas lines,
the manufacturer could assume that it was familiar with the pullout problem, a hazard that was "well
known throughout the industry." Id. at 86, 281 N.W.2d at 524. In such circumstances, that court
concluded: "Any negligence on the part of Du Pont in failing to adequately instruct and warn the
Gas Co. could not have been the proximate cause of the accident if the Gas Co. had actual knowledge
of the matter." Id. at 86, 281 N.W.2d at 524. See also Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,
409 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1969). where the decedent, a manufacturing foreman, was killed when
a steel strand broke in the preparation of prestressed concrete. The plaintiff alleged inadequate warning
to the decedent of the hazards of overstressing, but there was testimony of familiarity with the danger
in the industry, as well as particular knowledge of the hazard by the defendant's production coor-
dinator and the decedent's supervisor. The court there found only a duty to warn those who would
be supervising and directing the application of the materials, stating its view of the correct rule of
law:
Where a supplier furnishes chattels, the use of which is to be directed by technicians or
engineers, it is sufficient to insulate the supplier from liability for failure to warn if the
warnings given are sufficient to apprise the engineers or technicians of the dangers involved,
or if the technicians have knowledge of the dangers involved. There is no duty to warn
those who simply follow the directions of the engineers or technicians.
Id. at 1273 (quoting the trial court's conclusion of law number VI).
YO Jackson, 499 F.2d 809.
Id. at 812.
.U2 Id. at 812-13.
Y3 Borel, 493 F.2d 1076.

hazards of inhalation of respirable asbestos, the dangers of such exposure were

not sufficiently apparent to insulation workers to relieve the manufacturers of
the duty to warn.34
Other authority reiterates that the provider of a warning must adopt methods
of communication that offer reasonable assurance that the user or consumer will
be apprised of the information either personally or vicariously. The presumption
that a skilled contractor or a knowledgeable foreman will act successfully to pro-
tect employees who are less informed of the risk, or not informed at all, can be
rebutted by facts showing no communication, or inadequate communication, of
safety-related information to the employee. One helpful analysis is provided in
Eck v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & C O . ,an ~~ ~ brought by a laborer injured
action
by remaining too close to a blast of dynamite detonated by the project's foreman.
The manufacturer argued that it had provided sufficient instructions for use of
the explosive by means of flyers in each carton of the dynamite and the invitation
therein for the purchaser to contact the manufacturer for additional information.
The evidence at trial, however, suggested that even plaintiff's foreman was not
familiar with the proper distances to be maintained for safe use of the dynamite.
Reversing summary judgment for defendant below, the court of appeals held it
to be a jury question as to whether the manufacturer's practice of providing flyers
gave "reasonable assurance that the information [would] reach those whose safety
depends upon it."346
The professional user exception has not been confined to determination of
the manufacturer's duty to warn the professional worker in a setting where, for
example, pertinent inquiry would necessarily comprehend the reasonable reciprocal
expectations of the professional home painter and the manufacturer of house paint
whose product is purchased. The doctrine has been interpreted by some courts
to identify a lesser duty to warn for the manufacturer who sells to a professional
buyer who may be expected to know of any hazards posed, without regard to
whether employees or others working at the direction of the buyer are "profes-
sional users" as that characterization is understood in common usage or in the
sense of the fairness of a presumed familiarity with any risks.
Illustrative in this regard is the frequently cited decision in Hopkins v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & In that action the plaintiff's decedent was killed
when placing a stick of dynamite in a recently drilled hole in rock the crew was
blasting. At trial the foreman testified that, while he was unaware of any other
Id. at 1093. A life long insulation worker would not, for example, be expected to be familiar
with the documentation, however substantial, in the medical journals of the hazards of asbestosis.
See id. at 1081-1086.
YJ Eck V. E .I. DU Pont de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 813 (quoting RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS$ 388 comment n).
Hopkins, 212 2.2d 623.

premature explosions caused under similar circumstances, he had learned from

sources he considered reliable of the nature of the risk and had instructed men
on his crew to check the temperature of the hole by the crude method of insertion
of a wooden pole and its later removal and observation. Thus, from the record,
although the knowledge of the foreman as to the risk was perhaps marginal, there
was uncontradicted evidence suggesting that the decedent had received specific
instruction of means of lessening, if not eliminating, the risk.348
It is seen that the issue of the nature and quantum of warning that will be
appropriate for the professional user is related closely to the question of when
the manufacturr:r selling to the professional buyer and providing warnings, where
appropriate, to the immediate purchaser must proceed in addition to provide
warnings or other information to the agents or employees of the purchaser who
will actually use or be affected by the product. For example, the court in Hopkins
probably erred in concluding that the seller could presume that the foreman was
familiar with the hazard of premature explosion. From all that can be learned
from the reported decision, the foreman's knowledge was at best vague and was
obtained from collateral sources. There would have been, on the other hand,
sufficient support in the record for concluding that the worker killed was himself
knowledgable about the risk by virtue of having been instructed in a rudimentary
procedure for determining whether the drill holes had cooled sufficiently. There-
fore, in a decision reached prior to strict liability, the plaintiff could have been
denied recovery on the grounds of contributory negligence.
Nevertheless, an additional caution concerning reliance on Hopkins is that
the characterization by the court of the construction firm, the purchaser of the
explosive, and specifically the foreman of the firm, as the only pertinent "user"
of the product is insupportable. It is true that the contractor was the purchaser
of the explosive for the purposes of warranty law and would be the consumer
of the product if that term is considered to include the person who disposes of
or directs the disposition of property. It is incorrect, however, to style the con-
tractor's foreman as the "user" in this instance, disregarding the patent reality
that it was the decedent who was using the substance and who was mortally injured
thereby. Moreover, modern authority would reject the invitation to impute the
negligence or assumption of risk of the contractor or the supervisor to the innocent
employee.349
Id. at 625-26.
Y9 See Hammond, 691 F.2d 646, 652 (imprudence of farm manager or farm owner in ordering
a tractor without a rollover protective structure should not be imputed to an employee killed while
using the tractor); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) f 10,'166 (3d Cir. 1984) (an action brought by an Army reservist against the manufacturer of
a bulldozer for injuries alleged to have been sustained for reason of the bulldozer's lack of a rollover
protective device, holding that the pertinent authority required that the duty to warn be gauged by
the users' knowledge, and that any knowledge held by the reservist's Army employer should not
necessarily be imputed to him.)

Accordingly, proper application of the professional user variation on the man-

ufacturer's duty to warn requires careful restriction of the group considered to
have notice of the risk, whether that notice is actual, constructive or vicarious.
No advancement of risk spreading and related policies served by Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 388 and 402A is gained by hypertechnical evaluation
of whether the knowledge of the employer is shared by or imputable to the em-
ployee. Human experience suggests that only rarely will the employee know what
is known to the employer. In other legal areas such as, for example, the law of
evidence, the courts will not impute an employer's statement to signify the assent
of the employee.3s0 Equally important is countenancing a seller's defense that the
buyer-employer was a professional user or an expert concerning the safety char-
acteristics of the product, where the persons to be exposed to the hazard had no
such superior kno\vIedge. This serves only to cripple the recognized contemporary
goal that the manufacturer share with the user or consumer such safety-related
information as is necessary to the reasonably safe use of the product. The in-
formational burden should be placed on the party with the lowest cost of de-
tection, usually the manufacturer, rather than on the unknowing employee for
whom the burden of understanding the propensities of complex chemicals or ma-
chinery is very substantial, if achievable at all.
The professional user exception is best reserved for factual settings involving
an expert buyer of a product that is not available for general consumption. The
product is to be used or handled either by the buyer exclusively or by those who
work under the supervision of the buyer and who are already either experienced
in the use or handling of the product or have been effectively informed concerning
safe use and handling. A good example of the limited and appropriate application
of the professional user rule is offered in Martinez v. Dixie Carrier, I r ~ c . , ~which
~'
involved a suit brought by the widow of a shore-based worker who was overcome
by noxious fumes while stripping a barge empty of all liquids. The barge in
question had been used most recently to transport a petrochemical mixture con-
taining a substantial concentration of benzene.3s2Reversing the trial court's con-
clusion that the seller's cautionary information had been inadequate, the appeals
court determined that the warnings were adequate, "[alt least for the limited class
of professionals to which . . . employees belonged,"353 because (1) there was
' ~ 4 E.g., Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978)
(in personal injury action following alleged attack on child by wolf kept by defendant's employee
and owned by defendant, comments in defendant's corporate minutes admitting attack could not
operate co-equally as admission of co-defendant employee as "there was no servant, or agency, re-
lationship which justified admitting the evidence of the board minutes as against [the employee]."
Id.).
Martinez, 529 F.2d 457.
352 Id. at 460.
Id. at 467 (regarding claim in strict liability). As to the negligence count, the court stated:
In view of the limited marketing of Hytrol-D to industrial users, Du Pont could reasonably

"limited marketing" of the product, only to "industrial user[^];"^^^ (2) the crew
on which the decedent worked "was conversant with the hazards and precautions
necessary for the safe handling of a chemical mixture with a high benzene
content . . . ;"355 and (3) the barge and its cargo displayed large permanent signs
about "Dangerous Cargo," a benzene warning card pursuant to Coast Guard
requirements, and a product identification card promulgated by a national trade
XII. ADEQUACY OR INSTRUCTIONS

OF WARNINGS
Once there is determined to be a duty to warn, the task of the finder of fact
is often to evaluate whether the warnings or instructions as were provided were
adequate. Because the finding of a duty to warn presupposes the existence of a
disparity between the essential safety-related information known to the seller and
that known to the buyer in the absence of any warnings whatever, the focus of
the inquiry into the adequacy is whether the warning provided was sufficient to
right this imbalance.
To be sufficient in the legal sense, the warning or instruction must be ade-
quate, if followed, to render the product safe for its intended and foreseeable
uses.357As with the question of whether a failure to warn is a proximate cause
of the injury is a question of generally the adequacy of warnings or in-
structions will be a question of fact.3sgNaturally, the publication of a warning
anticipate that only professionals familiar with the precautions necessary for safe handling
of benezene and similar petrochemical substances would come in contact with or otherwise
handle the cargo of the B-29. The Wdsco stripping crew was in fact composed of such
professionals, and the crew had been made aware of the nature of the liquid residue to be
stripped from the barge. At least with regard to individuals having such expertise, the
warnings provided by Du Pont in the form of benzene warning card and the product iden-
tification card should have been adequate to apprise crew members of the hazards of entering
the barge's tanks. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred to the extent that
it imposed liability on Du Pont on the basis of negligent failure to warn.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 462.
InSee generally Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L. J. 256 (1969).

US E.g., Kavenaugh v. Kavenaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 641 P.2d 258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (consid-
eration of whether prior breaking of safety lever or lack of warning that the self-propelled mower
could become operative regardless of safety lever, proximately caused serious injury to a child's foot).
1 5 ~E-g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 667 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(issue of instructions for use of electric saw where risk was of electrocution, when used with non-
grounded two-prong extension cord); Buley v. Rexnord Process Mach. Div., 105 A.D.2d 965 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984); Stone v. Sterling Drug, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,580, (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).

or instructions must be timely, providing the opportunity for the user or consumer
to understand and act upon the message.360
Evaluation of the adequacy of a warning requires a balancing of consider-
ations that include at least (1) the dangerousness of the product; (2) the form in
which the product is used; (3) the intensity and form of the warnings given; (4)
the burdens to be imposed by requiring warnings; and (5) the likelihood that the
particular warning will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably
use the
Thus, measuring the adequacy of a warning requires consideration of both
form and content. The form of the warning label, be it rendered in a separate
tag or integrated into the printed material on the product's container, must first
be such that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the rea-
sonably prudent man in the circumstances of its use. The content of the warning,
in turn, then must be of such a nature as to be "comprehensible to the average
user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to
the mind of a reasonably prudent p e r s ~ n . " ~ ~warning
~ A may be inadequate if (1)
its physical characteristics, including its size and placement, are so small or obscure
that the reasonable consumer would not read it; or (2) it fails to inform the
reasonable consumer of the pertinent hazard and the means for its avoidance.363
For example, concerning the dual prongs of the latter requirement, if the
hazard to be avoided is venemous snakes in the grass, a sign saying simply "Keep
off the Grass" would be inadequate for its failure to describe with sufficient
impact the nature of the risk as well as for its failure to inform the visitor of
any means of safe passage. Concerning impact alone, such an understated warning
would surely fail, in the expression of one court, to convey an "intensity sufficient
to illuminate the mind of a reasonable [person]."364 On the other hand, if the
sign said "Use Foot Bridge," it might be adequate in terms of advising the reader
of the means of avoidance of the risk. Yet it would also fail our hypothetical
duty to warn again for its failure to impress the reader with the fact that "a
minor departure from instructions might cause serious danger. . . ."365 Lastly,
were the sign to state, in an idiom popular in parking regulation, "Don't Even
Think of Stepping Here!," the message would arguably convey the prohibitory
YO See Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968)
(action by injured tire mounter against manufacturer where evidence conflicted as to availability of
instructional poster prior to accident).
Dougherty, 540 F.2d at 179.
J" Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., American Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979)
(action brought in products liability following death of fourteen year old boy who attempted to use
pressurized propellant recreationally).
See Brown v. Gulf Oil Co., [ 1984-85 Transfer Binder] ( 10,474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 224, 310 A.2d 106 (1973).
36* Phillips, 269 Or. at 502 n.17, 525 P.2d at 1041 n.17.

message to the reader with sufficient emphasis. Again, it would fail as a warning
for its want of information as to the nature of the risk, or of the means of its
avoidance.
The physical characteristics of the warning itself are pertinent to the evaluation
of its adequacy. The warning's conspicuousness, prominence, and size of print,
in comparison to the print size employed for other parts of the manufacturer's
message, must be "adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person."366 Thus,
for example, a manufacturer's notice, printed on the label of bottles of its fur-
niture polish in print of size and color identical to that used for the balance of
the manufacturer's message, was held insufficient to avoid liability for the death
of an infant who died of chemical pneumonia after ingesting only a small quantity
of the Additional authority confirms that the evaluation of the impact
of a warning and its consequent effect on the user or consumer involves
" '[qluestions of display, syntax, and emphasis.' "M8
A widely referenced and most particularized model of determination for the
adequacy of a warning results from an action involving pharmaceuticals. With
minor modifications, the guidelines apply with equal force to products liability
actions involving any product having the potential for harm if sold with inad-
equate warnings or instructions. The standards are: (1) the warning must ade-
quately indicate the scope of the danger; (2) the warning must adequately
communicate the extent and the seriousness of the harm that could result from
the misuse of the product; (3) the physical aspects of the warning must be adequate
to alert a reasonably prudent person to the danger, and thus, a simple directive
warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the consequences that might
result from failure to follow it; and (4) the means to convey the warning must
be adequate to bring the warning home to the user, consumer, or in the case of
ethical pharmaceuticals, the physician.369Concerning further the special nature of
ethical pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer's duty to warn is interpreted to provide
a warning that "under all of the circumstances . . . reasonably discloses to the
medical profession all risks inherent to the use of the drug which the manufacturer
knew or should have known to exist."370
Kb First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 84, 537 P.2d
682, 692 (N.M. App. 1975) (action against manufacturer e f disinfectant used to treat seed, later
ingested by a hog, caused injuries to central nervous systems of children eating the meat of the animal).
Spmill, 308 F.2d 79 (the warning had nothing to attract special attention to it except the
words "safety note" and the language advising that the product "may be harmful, especially if
swallowed by children.'').
363 D'Arienzo, 125 N.J. Super. at 230-31, 310 A.2d at 112, quoted with approval in Stapleton
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Inc., 608 F.2d 571, 573 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 612 F.2d 905
(1980).
369 Ross, 684 P.2d 1211.
370 Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831; accord, Ros, 684 P.2d 1211.

A leading decision finding manufacturer liability for failure to warn of the

"extent" and "gravity" of the risks posed by exposure to the manufacturer's
product is Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co.371This was an action by an
insulation worker against manufacturers of insulation materials containing as-
bestos to recover for alleged breach of d%y to warn adequately of the risks of
asbestos-related disease. Reviewing warnings that cautioned, in part, that pro-
tracted inhalation of respirable asbestos "may" be harmful, and advised workers
to "avoid breathing [asbestos] dust." The court responded sharply: ''W]one of
these so-called 'cautions' intimated the gravity of the risk: the danger of fatal
illness caused by asbestosis and mesothelioma or other cancers. The mild sug-
gestion that inhalation of asbestos . . . 'may be harmful' conveys no idea of the
extent of the danger."372 Additional representative examples of actions in which
the manufacturer's warning has been found inadequate for its failure to convey
sufficiently the extent or severity of the risk include the failure of a herbicide
manufacturer to warn of the long-lasting toxic propensities of the chemical and
the consequent need for safe disposal;373the failure of a manufacturer of floor
tile adhesive, while warning of the product's overall flammability, to caution more
specifically that the fumes or vapors could ignite on contact with a pilot light,
resulting in a violent explosion;374the failure of a pharmaceutical manufacturer
17' Borel, 493 F.2d 1076.

Id. at 1104. Concerning the manufacturers' request that the workers avoid "breathing the
dust", the court described it as "black humor" inasmuch as "[tlhere was no way for insulation
workers to avoid breathing asbestos dust." See also Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
1958), in which the court states:
Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity that would cause
a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential
danger. It is the failure to exercise such a degree of caution after proper warning that
constitutes contributory negligence in a case such as this.
Id. at 609.
ln Boyl, 221 F. Supp. 669 (liquid weed killer Triox alleged to have severely and painfully injured
and sickened user who unwittingly laid down to sun bathe in area in which waste herbicide had been
earlier discarded).
Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 @.C. App. 1976) (The seller or manufacturer
of a product whose use could result in foreseeable harm has a duty to give a warning which adequately
advises the user of attendant risks, and which provides specific directions for safe use. The sufficiency
of a particular warning is ordinarily a question for the jury):
The particular hazard encountered by appellants in using VICO-102 was that fumes or
vapors from the product could ignite on contact with a pilot light, resulting in a violent
fire or explosion. The pertinent cautionary statements on the VICO-102 label were: 'DAN-
..
GER! EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE . CAUTION: FLAhfh4ABLE MIXTURE. DO NOT
USE NEAR FIRE OR FLAME . . . USE WITH ADEQUATE VENTILATION.' Given
the potential for serious injury, we cannot say as a matter of law that this warning adequately
alerted users of the dangers inherent in the product. Among other things, an ordinary user
might well not have realized that 'near fire or flame' included nearby pilot lights or that
fumes and vapors, as well as the adhesive itself, were extremely flammable. Whether more

to warn of additional side effects, including the risk of deafness, associated with
the administration of a drug used post-surgically to combat infection;375and the
failure of a manufacturer to fashion the warning on its rider spreader to specify
the danger created by the agitator and the risk thus posed to life and limb.376
Warning language that is ambiguous, obtuse, or a hedge of the manufacturer's
acknowledgement of the hazards associated with the product will be found to be
inadequate to communicate the extent and the seriousness of the harm. In one
action implicating a prescription drug in a patient's loss of vision with the potential
for permanent blindness due to optic neuritis, the warning under review stated
only that administration of the drug "may produce decreases in visual acuity
which appear to be due to optic neuritis." That statement, in light of information
available to the manufacturer indicating a "permanent loss of vision [to patients]
in a significant number of instances," impressed the appellate court as being
"highly a m b i g u o u ~ . " ~ ~
Another good example of a manufacturer's warning that may, by its mildness,
ambiguity, or internal inconsistency, fail to avoid liability was presented in an
action brought by a property owner whose building was damaged by fire after
a tenant warmed hair rollers in a pot of water on an electric stove, but neglected
to remove the pot when the water boiled away. The printed material on the box
of rollers included a "cautionary Note" stating that the rollers, when heated in
a pan of water, "may be inflammable only if left over flame in pan without
water," but adcled that the rollers were "[oltherwise . . . perfectly safe."37s The
court on review reversed the judgment for the manufacturer, finding that the
record presented jury questions concerning the warning's failure to suggest that
the paraffin rollers could have ignited even when not over "flame" and to inform
the reader sufficently that such ignition could involve flames of considerable height.
specific instructions or warnings were required is a question of fact for the jury.
17' Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), revd. on other grounds,
561 S.W.2d 801 (1978) (action against manufacturer of Kantrax, used in this instance to combat hip
infection, both before and after surgery, where initial warnings of the manufacturer failed with suf-
ficient specificity to warn of the serious ototoxic effect).
~7~ Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 111. 2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980) "Considering this
principle, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that the warning was inef-
fective. The warning itself did not specify the danger by the agitator. It did not detail the extent of
the risk it posed to life and l i b . " Id. at 222, 412 N.E.2d at 964. See also JacIcson, 499 F.2d 809.
(Ignition of paint fumes from static electricity or broken light bulb; sufficiency of warning "Keep
away from heat, sparks, and open flames. USE WITH ADEQUATE VENTILATION" was a question
of fact); Tucson Indus. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972) (en banc) (warning inadequate
to indicate that fumes from contact cement could cause blindness; label stated "DANGER ... Use
with adequate ventilation. Keep container closed VAPORS HARMFUL. TOXIC ... ).
Ross, 684 P.2d 1211.
1m Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1971).

The court further determined that the manufacturer's "cautionary note," offered
in a type of the same size as the instructions for use "and unobtrusively made
part of them,"37gwas inadequate.
In yet another illustration, a plaintiff's physician's testimony that the phar-
maceutical company's package insert for its polio vaccine product was sufficiently
"nebulous" to obviate any cautionary mention to the patient formed one basis
of an appellate court's affirmance of a verdict that the manufacturer failed to
warn adequately of the risk of contacting polio after administration of oral vac-
cine. The warning literature, while apparently conceding the risk of paralytic dis-
ease to the consumer, continued by stating that any causal connection with the
company's product had not been established, and that any risk, if it existed, was
no more than one in three million.380The court was ultimately persuaded that
the hedging language of the manufacturer's package insert obliterated whatever
cautionary impact there might have othenvise been to the manufacturer's message,
where the evidence in that action given by the physician was that the manufac-
turer's purported "warning" left that individual with the impression "that not
a single case of vaccine-induced polio had actually occurred and that there may
be no risk at all."38L
First aid instructions found to be "internally incongruous" may be found to
be inadequate, as were the instructions for washing off an industrial strength acid
coming into contact with the user's eyes or skin in Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc.382
In Id. at 243.
3" Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id., at 1343. The insert stated, inter alia:
Paralytic disease following the ingestion of live polio virus vaccines has been reported in
individuals receiving the vaccine, and in some instances, in persons who were in close contact
with subjects who had been given live oral polio virus vaccine. Fortunately, such occurrences
are rare, and it could not be definitely established that any such case was due to the vaccine
strain and was not coincidental with infection due to naturally occurring poliomyelitis, or
other enteroviruses.
Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 71, Exhibit Volume at 80-81). See also Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 376
N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 1978):
A jury question was presented whether the manual and the rating plate were sufficient to
bring home the danger of a serious accident, which might result from a blowout, to the
ordinary buyer of the truck who might use it with a camper. The jury's finding that there
was no adequate warning was well warranted. The recommended gross vehicle weight was
opaque even as a direction with respect to the load which the truck could carry without
overloading; nowhere was the weight of the vehicle given so that the user could subtract
that figure from the maximum gross vehicle weight rating of seven thousand five hundred
pounds (subtracting also in this case the weight of added optional equipment) to derive the
weight which could safely be loaded on the t ~ c k .
Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,580 (N.Y. App. 1985).

316 WEST VIRGINU LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 89
This action followed injury to a worker who sustained burns to the back of her
hand when the cleanser splashed during use. The court there reviewed the first
aid instructions on the product's label, which advised one coming into contact
with the product to "[wlipe off the acid gently, immediately flood the surface
with water, using soap freely, then cover with moist magnesia or baking soda."3s3
On the basis of expert testimony, the court found the instructions to be "woefully
inadequate" in that they neglected to state that the irrigation with water should
be sustained for at least fifteen minutes. The instructions were further found to
be "internally incong~uous" in that they advised fifteen minutes irrigation if the
cleanser came into contact with a person's eyes, but no minimum amount of time,
established as necessary by the evidence, for washing with water when the cleanser
came into contact with the user's skin. This inadequacy, the'court found, had
in fact aggravated the plaintiff's injury.384In addition to the responsibility pro-
viding instructions for the safe use of a product when misuse, such as failure to
follow instructions, would subject the consumer to serious hazards, the manu-
facturer must provide "adequate warnings of dangers that might be encountered
if the instructions given are not followed."385
When the warnings used are considered sufficient to bring home the nature
of the risk to a reasonably prudent person, it is, nevertheless, possible for a
manufacturer to avoid liability if an injury results from the injured person's in-
sistence on using the product in a manner inconsistent with the warnings. This
may occur when the manufacturer has communicated to the user or consumer
the totality of the pertinent information as to risk and the means for safe use
of the product and avoidance of that risk. One example of such authority was
the holding in an action involving an industrial strength cleaning compound that
was capable of causing chemical burns on contact with skin. The compound con-
tainer announced "Danger," bracketed by two skull and crossbones logos, and
carried language that, among other things, directed the user to precautions on
the back of the container. Under the heading "Precautions," the back of the
container warned against contact with the skin and set forth antidotes for external
contact. Evidence adduced at trial showed that the plaintiff had used the cleaner
as directed during her first days on the job, but she became dissatisfied with the
way her cleaning cloth continued to drip. As a consequence, she commenced to
wring it with her bare hands and soon sustained severe chemical burns. On appeal
of a verdict for defendant, the appellate court sustained the judgment for the
manufacturer on the grounds that the warning was adequate, observing further
that the injured claimant had misused the
~ ~
Id. at 7 28,271.
=lu Id.
x5 Brown, 136 biz. at 564,667 P.2d at 758. "Bland instructions which if followed would involve
no risk are no substitute for a skull and crossbones warning where the misuse of the product will
have lethal results." Id., 667 P.2d at 758.
The paragraph read, in part, "Danger: Corrosive. Fatal if swallowed. Do not breathe vapor

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Nevertheless, even if the supplier warns of a risk in the most gripping lan-
guage, including explicit reference to even "severe or even fatal" risk, the warning
may be found to be inadequate if the generality of the warning as a whole,
sometimes coupled with the promotion of the product in the most laudatory terms,
serves to detract from the warning's impact in the perception of the consumer
or user. Thus, there is authority in some of the swine flu litigation that the impact
of the government's warning's reference to "severe or potentially fatal reactions"
was severely undermined by the government's "unprecedented promotional cam-
paign." Informed consent forms secured from those were thereby invalidated,
and there was a finding that both the government and the vaccine manufacturer
breached a duty to adequately warn the ultimate users of the vaccine.387
Actions taken by the manufacturer or by persons working on its behalf can
erode the efficacy of an otherwise adequate warning. In Incoilingo v. E w i r ~ g , ~ ~ ~
the court held that the plaintiff should be able to adduce evidence that "detail
men" working on behalf of a pharmaceutical manufacturer "overpromoted" the
attributes of the drug in their presentations to the medical community at large
and to such an extent as to obscure the impori of cautionary written material
accompanying sale of the p h a r m a ~ e u t i c a l .Such
~ ~ ~ authority may be harmonized
readily with the conclusion of another court that it is the duty of the pharma-
ceutical manufacturer to instruct its detail men "at least, to warn the physicians
on whom they regularly call of the dangers of which [the manufacturer] has
learned, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known."390 To like
effect is the conclusion of one appellate court that a pharmaceutical company's
providing to a physician a desk calendar advertising a drug, later implicated in
the patient's contracting aplastic anemia, which could foreseeably serve as "a
constant reminder to prescribe a drug long after the sample and its warning had
been removed," might constitute "a form of over promotion which nullified the
effect of even a valid warning on the package."391
A product's statement, rendered with great particularity and at substantial
length, will not necessarily satisfy the seller's informational obligation. For ex-
or fumes. Produces chemical bums. Do not get in eyes, skin, or on clothing. Contains hydrochloric
acid ... " Uptain. 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at f 26,383.
yn Petty, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110.161.

188 Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
y89 Id. (noting testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses of the propensity of detail meant to min-
imize the hazards associated with use of the drug, while emphasizing its effectiveness and widespread
acceptance).
lm Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) (action involving blindness
allegedly caused by administration of drug Aralen for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis).
Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975). See Maize v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (conspicuous display of trade name "Safety-Kleen" on all
sides of container of cleaning solvent could "lull the user of that fluid so called into a false sense
of security irrespective of separate warning); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204,210 S.E.2d 289
(1974).

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REMEW [Vol. 89
ample, a container may carry an arguably sufficient warning and a comprehensive

description of the uses to which the product may be put, but still be found to
be in breach of the seller's duty to warn if the information fails to instruct the
user as to how the product may be used safely. Such was the gist of the holding
in an action brought by a laborer whose duties included the care of a golf course
and who was sickened by exposure to an insecticide containing arsenic. Liability
was found against the manufacturer who, while providing a warning employing
the skull and crossbones and setting forth with "extreme particularity how, where,
and for what purpose to use the product as an insecticide," nevertheless, failed
to tell the user how to use the product in safety. The warning specifically failed
to state that in applying the insecticide a respirator and protective clothing must
be
Also, if the product is technically complex and its use requires some degree
of assembly by the consumer, the guides or instructions for such preparation by
the consumer must be sufficient to permit the user to avoid conditions or cir-
cumstances that would render the product unreasonably dangerous. An example
of an action in which the manufacturer's instructions for such a product were
found to have fallen short of this informational goal involved a refracting tel-
escope requiring home assembly.393The telescope conveyed a warning against its
use to look at the sun without a special filter,394but had no pictorial display for
installation of that filter. A child undertook to use the telescope with the sun
filter, but through incorrect assembly, unwittingly screwed it in in such a way as
to permit injurious sunlight to leak around the sun filter into his eye. The appellate
court found that the court below erred in rejecting the plaintiff's proposed in-
structions on failure to warn. In the words of the appellate court, "a product
requiring assembly and use in conformity with the supplier's directions is defective
if the supplier fails to warn adequately of conditions and circumstances created
by such assembly or use which would render the product dangerous to the user."39s
392 Edwards, 245 So. 2d at 264-65. See also McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d
62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962), where the manufacturer of "Redi-Heat Blocks", ad-
vertised and sold for the purpose of restoring normal body heat to persons in a state of shock or
comparable condition. Manufacturer defended an action brought on behalf of child burned by admin-
istration of the blocks. The court found manufacturer liability because the only caution stating that
an insulating medium should be used between the person and the block was in small print in the
final sentence of the instructions on the back of the product's container.
19) Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976).
JW The warning provided: "CAUTION: Please refrain from looking up [at] the sun without
attaching the sun glass". Id. at 70, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
'91 Id. at 74, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The court continued:
[Tlhe defendant herein marketed a technically complex product intended for use by tech-
nically unsophisticated consumers, to be assembled and used by them in accordance with
instructions prepared and supplied by the technically knowledgeable supplier. Failure to
assemble or use the product in accordance with these directions may well cause physical
injury and thus constitutes a potential danger. It begs the obvious to say that the supplier

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
It is well established that the compliance of a label, a warning, or instructions

with guidelines or regulations imposed by a state or other body do not preclude
a finding that the manufacturer is liable for failure to provide more explicit or
effective warnings. One rationale of the decisions so holding is that seldom, if
ever, do the statutes or regulations establishing requirements for warnings or la-
beling imply that the implementing body intended that the regulation affect the
seller's common law duty to warn.396The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports
this position, confirming that compliance with a legislative or administrative en-
actment "does not prevent a finding that a reasonable man would take additional
precautions. "397
Consistent conclusions have been reached in actions pertaining to warning or
labeling requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide and comparable state statutes.400Sim-
knows or reasonably should know that the directions furnished by him will form the un-
sophisticated consumer's only guide to assembly and use. Thus a product requiring assembly
and use in conformity with the supplier's directions is defective if the supplier fails to warn
adequately of conditions and circumstances created by such assembly or use which would
render the product dangerous to the user. Therefore, the supplier is strictly liable for injury
proximately resulting from composing and furnishing a set of instructions for assembly and
use which does not adequately avoid the danger of injury.
Id., 127 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
On the issue of proper jury instructions and the general rule that liability for failure to warn
may be found only where the defendant is shown to have had actual or constructive knowledge of
the hazard, the court states further that "in these circumstances the duty to warn is not conditioned
upon such knowledge where the defectiveness of a product depends on the adequacy of instructions
furnished by the supplier which are essential to the assembly and use of its product." Id., 127 Cal.
Rptr. at 221.
Burch, 366 A.2d 1079 (floor tile adhesive's labeling compliance with requirements of the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not preclude a finding of negligence in manufacturer's failure
to also warn of the particular hazard of ignition or explosion by contact of vapors with a pilot light.
The court further observed "the overwhelming majority of courts presented with similar arguments
in product liability cases have held that compliance with federal and state requirements for the man-
ufacture and sale of products does not immunize a manufacturer or seller from liability.." Id. at
1085.).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS 5 288C comment a thereto explains:
Where there are not special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the leg-
islation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter
of law, as sufficient for the occasion; but if for any reason a reasonable man would take
additional precautions, the provision not preclude a finding that the actor should do so.
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (en banc)
(the warnings required by federal regulation, "may be only minimal in nature and when the man-
ufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to know of, greater dangers not included in the warning,
its duty to warn may not be fulfilled." Id. at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
'59 Hubbard-Hall Chern. Co., 340 F.2d 402; Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F.
Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965).

a Hill, 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137.

ilarly, a warning label's compliance with industry standards may be relevant to

the manufacturer's due care, but will not be dispositive of the absence of lia-
bility ."O1
In the context of cigarette products liability, important authority to the con-
trary, holding that compliance with warning and labeling requirements pertaining
to that product will preclude failure to warn tort recovery against a cigarette
manufacturer, is found in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.402This action was
brought initially by, and later on behalf of, a cigarette smoker who alleged a
manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings, and that such warnings as
were provided were robbed of impact by the manufacturer's overall promotional
practices. Review of the Federal Cigarette and Advertising Labeling Act led the
appellate court to conclude that "the Act represents a carefully drawn balance
between the purpose of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking
and protecting the interests of national economy."403 Because permitting state law
liability actions alleging manufacturer duties other than those prescribed in the
federal legislation would "[tip] the Act's balance of purposes," the litigant's claims
of failure to warn adequately were, the court determined, preempted by federal
law.404
XIII. THE CONTINLTING

DUTYTO WARN
A post-sale duty to warn may attach even if the product was, at the time of
manufacture and sale, reasonably safe for use (or arguably so), but through use
or operation, has betrayed hazards not earlier known to the seller, or to other
sellers of like products.
When the allegation of failure to warn is grounded in tort, as one court has
observed, "the duty to warn is continuous and is not interrupted by manufacture
or sale of the In a case illustrative of such authority, a claim was
brought by the widow of a man killed in the explosion of a propane gas water
heater.& The court identified the governing law, that the duty of the manufacturer
to effect such post-sale warnings, turns upon the actual or constructive knowledge
of the product danger and stated further that a manufacturer may be put on
notice as to dangers in the use of a product by varying means, including "ad-
"' "Assuming appellees established conformance with the industry practice, such evidence is
relevant but not conclusive in assessing whether reasonable care was exercised. 'Even an entire industry
... cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard."' Burch, 366 A.2d at 1087 11.23 (ci-
tations omitted).
a Cipolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
4
0
' Id. at 187.
Id.
a Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046.
a Young v. Robertshaw Controls, Inc., 104 A.D.2d 84, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1984).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
vancements in the state of art" or "later accidents involving dangers in the prod-
uct."4'"
The earliest modem decisions in which a post-sale duty to warn was imposed
upon the manufacturer involved product defects that, left uncorrected, posed a
risk of loss of life or serious bodily harm. The leading and innovative decision
of Cornstock v. General Motors Corp."OSinvolved the alleged failure of the au-
tomobile manufacturer to take remedial measures after learning, soon after the
model was put on the market, of its propensity to lose its brakes. A personal
injury claim was brought by a mechanic at an automobile dealership who suffered
severe injuries when a car rolled unimpeded into him in a service bay. The court,
after first describing the manufacturer's general duty to warn at the point of sale,
stated that "a like duty to give prompt warning exists when a latent defect which
makes the product hazardous becomes known to the manufacturer shortly after
the product has been put on the market."409 Following Cornstock, like holdings
were rendered in several actions arising from aviation accidents.410
In strict liability, a continuing duty to warn exists only if the product, when
initially introduced into commerce was defective, albeit presumably unknown to
the seller. Such interpretation would seem to be required by the proviso to Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment g that limits application of
the rule to "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a
condition not cont'emplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
Id. at 894 (quoting Cover, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 461 N.E.2d 864, in which that
court continues: "Although a product be reasonably safe when manufactured and sold and involve
no then known risks of which warning need be given, risks thereafter revealed by user operation and
brought to the attention of the manufacturer or vendor may impose upon one or both a duty to
warn." Id. at 274-75,461 N.E.2d at 864,473 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The court states also that the plaintiffs
allegation that the manufacturer was engaged in an international and ongoing scheme to conceal the
harm posed by its flawed controls stated a cause of action in fraud).
(OS Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
Id. at 632.
A helpful exposition of this is provided in Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 166 N.J.
Super 448, 400 A.2d 81, 90 n.3, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 330, 407 A.2d 1204 (1979), where the court
states:
Our review of these cases leads us to conclude that this phrase has been used most often
to describe no more than the obligation imposed where a manufacturer or seller, believing
that it has sold a non-defective product, subsequently learns that its product was, in fact,
defective when placed in the stream of commerce. In these circumstances, saying that there
is a 'continuing duty to warn' is, of course, a tacit recognition that the duty existed in the
first instance. Such an obligation is not at all synonymous, however, with the claim-made
here by plaintiff-that where a product is free from all defects when sold, the seller, never-
theless, has a duty to monitor changes in technology and notions of safety and, either
periodically or othenvise, notify its purchasers thereof. For where, as here, no initial duty
to warn exists, none can be said to continue.'
Id. at 466 n.3, 400 A.2d at 90 n.3.

WEST VIRGINU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
dangerous to him."411 Thus, for there to be a defect in a product, be it of a

design, manufacture, or informational nature, the defect has to have existed at
the time of initial sale. Without such an antecedent flaw, and a consequent initial
duty to warn, there can be no continuing duty to warn.412When, on the other
hand, the coml~lainantproceeds under a negligence theory or in a jurisdiction
that applies negligence principles to allegations of failure to warn irrespective of
the presentation of such claims under any other theory, the sufficiency of the
complaint will be judged by, inter alia, the allegation that the supplier had knowl-
edge of or had reason to know of the product-related hazard.413Consistent with
this expression of the law, an appellate court reversed and remanded for trial an
action brought on behalf of two steelworkers fatally injured by falling material.
It cautiously approved the trial court's instruction that the manufacturer is held
to the degree of skill and knowledge existing in the industry at the time the product
was manufactured, but suggested that the trial court "may wish to review this
instruction on remand, inasmuch as a manufacturer also has a responsibility to
warn of a defective product at any time after it is manufactured and sold if the
manufacturer becomes aware of the defect."414 Other authority has held for the
defendant Postal Service in an action arising from the rollover of a jeep sold to
the public as a used vehicle. The evidence showed that the Service "had neither
knowledge or reason to have knowledge of a rollover problem."415
As is equally true of the duty to warn at the point of sale, the doctrinal
underpinning of the manufacturer's post-sale informational obligations is the com-
mitment to remedying the asymmetry of information held by the seller, on the
one hand, and by the consumer on the other. The object, in general terms, is to
encourage manufacturers to impart to consumers that information the manufac-
turers receive in the ordinary course of their business, germane to product safety
'I1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS5 402A Comment g.

2I' See DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (involving, among other
things, the failure of the manufacturer to communicate to the camer information concerning the
problem of excessive carbon monixide in the cabin); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969) Involving the manufacturer's failure to warn
or initiate remedial action following revelation of an engine hazard, and in which the court states
this standard for a manufacturer's post-sale duties:
It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous defects in design have
come to the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a duty to either remedy these
or, if complete remedy is not feasible, at least give users adequate warnings and instructions
concerning methods for minimizing the danger.
Id. at 453. See generally Royal, Post Sale Warnings: A Review and Analysis Seeking Fair Compen-
sation Under Uniform Law, 33 DRAKEL. REV. 817 (1983-84).
E.g., Shirey v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1251 (D.S.C. 1984), in which the District Court
confirms that "[ulnder a negligence theory of failure to warn, the duty is continuous and is not
interrupted by the manufacture or sale of the product." Id. at 1258 n.17 (citing Bly, 713 F.2d 1040).
4I' Smith, 754 F.2d at 877.
Shirey, 582 F. Supp. at 1261.
Heinonline -- 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 322 1986-1987

and technological advances416and to the performance and accident histories of

those products sold and in use.
Particularly with regard to manufacturers of ethical pharmaceuticals, the courts
have interpreted the duty to warn as extending to a "continuous duty" to remain
apprised of new Scientific and medical developments and to inform the medical
profession of pertinent developments related to treatment and side effects.417This
continuing informational obligation imposed upon the manufacturer even after
the marketing of the product is not confined to the passive interpretation of
scientific, medical, or technical advances or revelations explored by third parties.
Under certain circumstances the manufacturer's continuing post-sale duties have
been found to include the initiation of further investigations, studies or tests of
its
The assignment of a continuing manufacturer duty to remain current with
scientific or other advancements pertinent to safety has been found applicable to
industries other than manufacturers of prescription drugs. Thus, in an automobile
products liability action it was alleged that the manufacturer failed, among other
things, to warn users of its product about an allegedly defective design in an
accelerator spring. The manufacturer was said to be responsible for warning buy-
ers and users of dangers in the use of the product which came to the manufac-
turer's knowledge after sale by means, among others, of "advancements in the
state of the art, with which it [was] expected to stay abreast."419
The author of Comment, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety Improve-
ments, 33 STAN.L. REV. 1087, (1981) introduces discussion by observing:
The duty to inform previous purchasers of technological advances rests on the assumption
of an asymmetry of information between producer and consumer. The producer obtains
information about technological advances in the ordinary course of doing business, but the
customer who might act upon such information would have to expend extraordinary amounts
of time to obtain and understand it. The same asymmetry forms the basis of the duty to
warn customers of product-related dangers at the time of purchase (point-of-sale warnings).
The purpose of product warnings is to have the manufacturer give customers the information
it can best provide, instead of forcing the consumer to attempt to obtain the information
independently.
Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).
7I' Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Arkansas law)
(identifying a "continuous duty . . . to warn physicians of the dangers incident to prescribing the
drug, [and] to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the manufacturer's product and
to notify the medical profession of any additional side effects discovered . . . " Id. at 922), and
adding: "A drug manufacturer's compliance with such rule enables physicians to balance the risk of
possible harm against benefits to be derived by their patients' use of such drugs. In considering the
alternatives of treatment, the prescribing physician is entitled to make an informed choice." Id. See
ako Basko, 416 F.2d at 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis, 399 F.2d at 130; O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381
F.2d 286, 290-291 (8th Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Mo. App. 1969);
Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
See Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Cover, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 274, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385.

Thus, the manufacturer's duty to warn users and consumers of risks inhering
in the use of its products attaches both to risks that are apparent at the time of
sale, as well as to any risks that arise after marketing. While "warning" provides
a convenient characterization of the manufacturer's post-sale obligations, the man-
ufacturer's responsibility may range from providing the buyer with a corrective
device,420to the simple sending of a letter."'
As is true of the seller's point-of-sale informational duty, this post-sale duty
to warn has been interpreted to require the manufacturer to convey warnings or
hazard-related information to purchasers in the stream of distribution beyond the
manufacturer's immediate buyers. For example, in Comstock v. General Motors,
the court concluded that the manufacturer should have done more than alert its
dealers to the defect, leaving any remedial effort to them. To discharge its duty
in such a situation, the court advised, the manufacturer should have conveyed
effective warnings to all individual purchasers of its automobiles equipped with
power brakes.422
There is also authority suggesting that a manufacturer must advise its buyers
of safety improvements in its In addition, when the manufacturer has
actual or constructive knowledge that its product has been subject to widespread
Kg., Rebalc, Inc., v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971), where it was
held as a matter of law that an amusement ride manufacturer's delivery of a letter to a purchaser
of a ride, stating the manufacturer's intent to install a new part on a particular ride, and also supplying
the buyer with the new part, constituted an adequate warning.
E.g., Nishida v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 915 (1958), an action arising from the deaths and illnesses of cattle fed soybean meal
manufactured by a process of oil extraction by a chemical solvent developed by du Pont, holding
that the personal delivery of a letter from the manufacturer to the soybean producer was sufficient
to exempt the manufacturer from liability. See general& LaBelle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d
46 (1st Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 565 P.2d 1315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977);
docanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873 (1975); Braniff Airways, 411 F.2d 451.
Compare Nishida, 245 F.2d 768 with Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813
(11th Cir. 1984) (involving allegations that the manufacturer discovered, subsequent to sale, that certain
gears in its marine engines might fail within the first 200 hours of operation. The seller's post-sale
initiative consisted of sending service letters to dealers, instructing them on how to repair the defect).
The appellate court concluded that due to the foreseeability that dealers would not take the suggested
remedial measures, and in recognition also that the defect posed a danger that vessels might become
disabled at sea, "a single form letter to .. . dealers concerning [the] defect did not constitute a
reasonable effort to warn that a potentially dangerous engine was in need of repair before installation
aboard a seagoing vessel." Id. at 822.
4P Comstock 11. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
E.g., Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1318-19. But see Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87
Wis. 2d 882,275 N.W.2d 915 (1979) (distinguishing mass consumer products from industrial machines,
and whiie recognizing some continuing duty on the part of manufacturers to warn of dangers in their
products, finding no duty to advise of safety improvements achieved a substantial time after the initial
sale). See also Conunent, supra note 415, at 1090-93. But see Jackson, 166 N.J. Super. 448, 400
A.2d at 89.

modifications by users, and there is information suggesting that such modifications

create a risk of injury to persons or damage to property, the manufacturer's
obligation to issue post-sale warnings will turn on the foreseeability of harm that
may be occasioned by such modification^.^^^
Evaluation of the efficacy or adequacy of any post-sale warning is similar,

but not identical to that pertaining to point-of-sale warnings. As with point-of-
sale warnings, the seller's duty is owed generally to foreseeable product users or
to intermediaries who can reasonably be expected to pass on the warning.4s How-
ever, when the prudence of a warning following sale is evaluated, the decisions
appear to be in agreement that the questions as to both the nature of the warning
and to whom it should be given are guided properly by evaluation of the harm
that may follow from use of the product without notice, the reliability of any
intermediary who may be enlisted to convey the warnings to the current user;
the burden on the vendor or manufacturer in locating the persons to be warned;
the attention that a notice of the type contemplated will likely receive from the
ultimate recipient; the nature of the product involved; and the corrective actions,
if any, taken by the manufacturer or vendor in addition to the post-sale warning.426
There is no bright line standard for the point in time, if one exists, when a
manufacturer will no longer be found legally liable for deficiencies in inadequate
warnings concerning products no longer in use. Such a question applies to liability
under the diverse state laws governing products liability and the duty to warn,
and leaves unaffected the independent obligations of product sellers that attach
by virtue of the substantial product hazard reporting requirements under Section
15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act.4n There is no general agreement in the
E.g., in Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) '810,445 @. Mass. 1985). involving injuries sustained in 1982 on a cardboard cutting
machine manufactured by defendant in 1914, the court states that the manufacturer's "actual or
imputed" knowledge of "widespread modification" of its presses in the cardboard industry "could
be the basis for liability for failure to warn of hazards discovered after manufacture of the machine."
Id. at 27,719.
W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 647. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS8 388 comment n
(method of warning should give "reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose
safety depends upon their having it").
426 Cover, 61 N.Y.2d at 276, 461 N.E.2d at 872, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 386; see genera& Rekab. Inc.,
261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107: Comstock, 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627; Kozlowski, 87 Wis. 2d 882,
275 N.W.2d 915; Labelle, 649 F.2d at 49; Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331,
1334-1335 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to advise of design change); Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr.
& Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1977) (warning of immediate purchaser and dealer of
fuel filter defect held inadequate); Noto v. Pico Peak Corp., 469 F.2d 358, 360-361 (2d Cir. 1972)
(evidence created jury question as to whether hazard of chair lift bull wheel bearing defect was
adequately warned against by manufacturer's letter and instruction pamphlet to operator).
4n 15 U.S.C. 8 2064. See generally Madden, supra note 12.

state law authorities as to the length and breadth of such an obligation.428Lan-

guage suggesting that the manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn is not inex-
haustible is offered by one court, construing Texas law, in finding that the
manufacturer of a teller stool implicated in the injury of an office worker, and
sold to the plaintiff's employer "years" before, should not be found liable for
failure to warn or recall the product.429
XIV. CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF RISK
AND ASSUMPTION
An injured party's dismissal or disregard of manufacturer's cautioning may

be of such a nature and degree as to relieve the manufacturer of liability for
failure to warn. An injured party's affirmatively incautious conduct has been held
to bar recovery even when the claimant is not the owner of the product or the
employee of the owner, but is instead a guest430or a bystander.431
Compare Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (finding
a duty to warn or to recall products upon later production of a design safer than that on the marker)
with Comment, Products Liability: Manufacturer's Liability for Products Not Unreasonably Dan-
gerous When Originally Marketed, 12 St. MARY'SL.J. 494, 522 (1980), where the author states:
No authority is cited by the court, and none exists for the proposition that, once a man-
ufacturer designs and markets an improved component for its new products, it then assumes
a duty to complete the remedy by causing the substitution of the improved component in
used products that are already on the market.
Id.
Syrie v. Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 310-312 (5th Cir. 1984), the court commenting: "Texas
courts have apparently not established a cause of action for failure to warn about hazards discovered
after a product has been manufactured and sold." Id. at 311. See Kozlowski, 87 Wisc. 2d 882, 275
N.W.2d 915, which conveys the suggestion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that it would create an
unreasonable and impracticable burden on manufacturers to require manufacturers to warn consumers
and to advise them of product modifications for a period of time in excess of a few years after initial
sale. The court there stated:
[Wle do not in this decision hold that there is an absolute continuing duty, year after year,
for all manufacturers to warn of a new safety device which eliminates potential hazards.
A sausage stuffer and the nature of that industry bears no similarity to the realities of
manufacturing and marketing household goods such as fans, snowblowers or lawn mowers
which have become increasingly hazard proof with each succeeding model. It is beyond
reason and good judgment to hold a manufacturer responsible for a duty of annually warn-
ing of safety hazards on household items, mass produced and used in every American home,
when the product is 6 to 35 years old and outdated by some 20 newer models equipped
with every imaginable safety innovation known in the state of the art. It would place an
unreasonable duty upon these manufacturers if they were required to trace the ownership
of each unit sold and warn annually of new safety improvements over a 35 year period.
Id. at 901, 275 N.Mr.2d at 923-24.

E.g., Van Dike v. AMF. Inc., 146 Mich. App. 176, 379 N.W.2d 412 (1985), where in an
action brought by the guest of the owner against the manufacturer of a trampoline for injuries
sustained while attempting a sophisticated flip on the product in the owner's backyard, recovery was

An injured claimant's contributory fault will excuse a seller who has failed
to give adequate product warnings only if the claimant's negligent conduct, rather
than the allegedly inadequate warning, constitutes the proximate cause of the
injury. The showing required for that type of contributory fault described as
assumption of the risk is that the person voluntarily exposed himself to a known
and appreciated danger.432The claimant's awareness of the general risk associated
denied where evidence showed that the guest had not read the manufacturer's cautionary label advising
use only by trained and qualified participants under supervised conditions, and further evidence that
the injured party had been warned prior to the accident to cease use because of the hazard. As stated
by the court in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 598 n.12, 495 A.2d 348, 356 n.12
(1985):
...
Failure to read or follow instructions involves conduct that may be considered [con-
tributorily] negligent [or an assumption of the risk]... . If a product unreasonably dan-
gerous can be made safe for foreseeable uses by adequate warnings or liability will be
avoided, and the focus such cases is generally upon the adequacy of the notice. If the
warnings or instructions are adequate the product is not defective, and the plaintiff cannot
recover under a theory of strict liability in tort. The cause of the injury in such cases is
the failure to read or follow the adequate warnings or instructions, and not a defective
product. One who reads the warning and then proceeds voluntarily and unreasonably to
encounter the danger thereby made known to him will assume the risk of that danger.
The accepted criteria for proof of the defense of assumption of risk are the subjective showing that
"(1) the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect;
(2) the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; and (3) the plaintiff's
decision to encounter the known risk was unreasonable." Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App.
614, 626 n.11, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 n.11 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
RE~ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS5 496A comment d elaborates, stating:
In theory the distinction between the two (contributory negligence and assumption of risk)
is that assumption of risk rests upon the voluntary consent of the plaintiff to encounter
the risk and take his chance ... A subjective standard is applied to assumption of the
risk, in determining whether the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk.
Consistent herewith, it has been held that a plaintiff's "inadvertence, momentary inattention, or
diversion of attention" should not constitute assumption of the risk. Elder v. Crawley Book Mach.
Co., 441 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Alexander v. Conveyers and Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d
1212 (5th Cir. 1984), where the court approved a "knew or must have known" standard for plaintiff's
appreciation of risk sufficient for applicability of the assumption of risk defense.
The defense of contributory negligence is not available to the defendant on a count alleging
strict liability for failure to warn, but contributory negligence may be a bar to the same count pred-
icated on negligence. See Struder v. Riddell Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
q10,060 r e n n . Ct. App. 1984). affirming verdict for manufacturer on negligence and strict liability
counts in failure to warn claims of action for injuries sustained by the user of a football helmet.
Note that the subjective standard enunciated in the defense of assumption of risk is the opposite of
the objective evaluation for coniributory negligence. Sheehan, 50 Md. App. at 625 n.lO, 440 A.2d
at 1091-92 n.lO.
'3' Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977) (involving worker injured by a crane
with poor visibility and no warning devices).
4n Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 flex. Ct. App. 1976) (involving a fatal injury when the
telescopic sleeve hoist used to raise and lower the bed of a dump truck failed, crushing plaintiff's

with the use of a product will ordinarily not be considered sufficient to show
that the risk was assumed, unless there is evidence that he knew of and proceeded
in the face of the specific danger that caused the injury.433
A representative example of when the plaintiffs awareness of the risk has
been held sufficient to bar the claim of failure to warn was described in the
decision entered by a Louisiana trial court in Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc.434It
was held there that the manufacturer of an air-inflated device known to be de-
signed to absorb the impact of a falling human body from a height of 200 feet
was not under a duty to warn of the hazards of jumping into it from a height
of over 300 feet. In the action brought for the death of this individual, a profes-
sional stunt man, the court held that recovery was barred on all grounds, including
the allegation of' failure to warn, because the decedent had "certain knowledge"
of the risks.435A claimant may also be found to be barred from recovery if he
decedent who was working beneath). The action alleged, among other things, that the manufacturer
failed to provide bracing instructions. The appellate court reversed the verdict below for plaintiffs
and remanded for a nevr trial on the basis of evidence that decedent may have known of the danger
by virtue of a warning from his brother, irrespective of the manufacturer's failure to warn, concluding
that knowledge of the risk, from whatever source derived, may provide a basis for the defense of
assumption of risk.
433 E.g., Haugen, 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71, in which the claimant was injured by the
flying piece of a grinding wheel that stmck him in the eye. To defendant's argument that the plaintiff's
failure to wear safety goggles constitutes assumption of the risk, the court countered that such conduct
assumed, at most, "the risk of having dust or small particles" injure the eye, not of having a sub-
stantial portion of the wheel itself disengage and injure him. Id. at 385, 550 P.2d at 76. The appellate
court a f f m e d the trial court's characterization of the specificity of the claimant's awareness necessary
for invocation of the defense of assumption of the risk in these words: "It is not enough to bar
recovery by the plaintiff on the defense of assumption of the risk that the plaintiff knew that there
was a general danger connected with the use of the product, but rather it must be shown that the
plaintiff actually knzw, appreciated, and voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to the specific
defect and danger whkh caused his injuries." Id. at 382-83, 550 P.2d at 75 (quoting jury instruction
18). See also Kerns v. Engelke, 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 369 N.E.2d 1284 (1977) aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E. 2d 859 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff's knowledge that a part
of the machine could be removed was not the equivalent of knowledge that it was hazardous not to
do so).
a Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 I?. Supp. 89 (E.D. La. 1982), affd, 701 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1983).
435 Id. at 92. See Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d
54, (1975) ([Ilf the danger is obvious, or if the danger is known to the person injured, the duty to
warn does not attach." Id. at 44, 546 P.2d at 60); Garrett, 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (recovery
of damages by experienced gymnast familiar with trampoline use and injured in execution of one
and three quarters front flip barred on strict liability for failure to warn count where showing that
the risk was actually known to the claimant).
A succinct criticism of the applicability of the plaintiff conduct defenses ab initio to failure to
warn claims is offered in D i a r d & Hart, supra note 13 at 163, the authors stating:
Though these time-honored defenses are frequently invoked to defeat recovery, they are
theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach of duty is based on a failure to warn.
To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
has entered a clear, fair, and unequivocal agreement to hold the manufacturer
or operator harmless for injuries occasioned by use of the product.436
The contributory negligence of a plaintiff in failing to heed a warning will
bar, if at all, only the cause of action in negligence. With respect to plaintiff's
claim, if any, in strict liability for failure to warn, it has been held that the
defendant's assertion of the defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence will raise
a jury question as to the adequacy of the warning.437
If the conduct of the injured party has been careless or somewhat negligent,
the prevalent authority is that such behavior may suggest, but will not prove,
that the plaintiff would have behaved similarly even had a better warning been
provided. The latter proposition was rebuffed in one action in which the plaintiff,
who worked on an assembly line making pacemakers, inadvertently spilled some
resinous substances on her hand and shortly thereafter brushed the side of her
face with her hand.438A component of the substance caused a severe chemical
burn to her face. The court upheld a jury verdict that the warning provided by
the substance's manufacturer as to the risks of dermal contact was inadequate,
in light of, among other things, a much stronger warning proposed by the per-
tinent national trade association. It rejected the manufacturer's claim that caus-
ation was broken on the logic that, if the plaintiff was careless with the warning
already in place, she would behave identically even with a stronger warning. The
court concluded, to the contrary, that it was at least possible that a clear warning
as to the risk of severe chemical bums might cause a reasonably prudent person
to be more careful than she would be if the only known risk was minor.
Similarly, if the warning that a manufacturer does issue is inadequate on its
face, evidence that the injured plaintiff did not read or follov~the warning that
be said t o have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or to have contributed t o his
own injury when he had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff knew of the danger from a n independent source, the
manufacturer's failure t o warn would not be the proximate cause of the injury.
436 Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1985) (par-
achutist injured when flight brought him into contact with power lines; held: recovery precluded by
claimant's entry prior tQ jump into hold harmless agreement that was clear on its face and not
unconscionable).
4n Slapleton, 608 ~!?d a t 573. This action was brought against a motorcycle manufacturer for
damages caused when a motorcycle tipped over in the home, and the fuel spill was ignited by a pilot
light. The product's owner's manual stated, at page 13 and in ordinary type, that if the fuel switch
was "on," gas would spill freely if the machine were tipped t o its side. The plaintiff's son testified
that he had glanced at the manual to look for anything "exceptional." On the basis of which evidence
the appellate court states: "The jury could conclude that the danger posed by gas leakage was suf-
ficiently great that the warning should have been presented in a way immediately obvious t o even a
casual reader." Id.
Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 246-247 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations
omitted).

was offered should not necessarily bar recovery for the injuries sustained. This
was one of the issues raised in the action of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical C O . , ~ ~ ~
which was brought by an agricultural worker, alleging that he contracted pul-
monary fibrosis due to long-term exposure to the herbicide paraquat. The label
under review therein warned about immediate and perhaps severe skin irritation
from exposure to the chemical, but did not convey "persuasively . that users ..
whose skin comes into contact with the herbicide should be concerned about other
possible consequences of skin exposure . . . particularly the specter of long-term
lung disease culminating, perhaps, in death."440 However, the evidence in that
action showed that the plaintiff, who died during the course of the proceeding,
probably did not even read the label that was provided, predicting the manu-
facturer's argument on appeal that if the decedent did not "read the label that
was provided, . . . a more detailed label . . . would have done nothing to prevent
E s ] injuries."441 The court, however, observed that the evidence showed that
even though the plaintiff did not himself read the notice, the elements of any
cautionary information would have been communicated to him, in any event
through the means of workplace contact between supervisors and workers and
between the workers inter se. This phenomenon, the court was persuaded, "is a
typical method by which information is disseminated in the modem workplace."
For these reasons, the court held, the failure of the manufacturer to provide an
adequate warning could still be treated as a proximate cause of decedent's in-
Similarly, in some circumstances a plaintiff's use of a product in a manner

inconsistent with its express warnings may itself become the proximate cause of
any consequent injury, precluding liability for the m a n ~ f a c t u r e rThe
. ~ ~ plaintiff's
disregard of or ignorance of a warning, will not, however, relieve the manufacturer
of liability if the plaintiff can claim plausibly that the manufacturer was negligent
in communicating the warning and should have employed better means of bringing
the message to the attention of the user. One helpful example of such reasoning
is offered in the appeal of an action in which the plaintiff was injured when
battery acid exploded in his face as he used a match to aid his examination of
a dead automobile battery. Although the battery casing was embossed with an
extensive and vigorously worded warning against this hazard and others, the plain-
tiff claimed that the manufacturer should have used more effective means of
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545
(1984).
* Id. at 1537.
Id. at 1538.
" Id. at 1538-1539.
"' E.g., McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 193 S.E.2d 16 (1972)
(fire triggered by plaintiff's employee's pouring of the oxidant chemical HTH into a bucket containing
soap residue and other foreign matter, notwithstanding extensive and explicit written caution to avoid
bringing oxidant into contact with soap or cleansers for risk of fire).
Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 3 3 0 1986-1987

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
communication, "such as phosphorus paint that would be visible at night, ad-

vertising through the media, and verbal warnings issued by the seller."444Reversing
summary disposition below on the plaintiff's claim of negligent failure to warn,
the appellate court found that notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to read the
warning, inasmuch as plaintiff had not had the opportunity to read the warning
in sufficient lighting, and had no experience in handling this battery, the plaintiff
should be permitted to present proof that the manufacturer was "negligent in
not attempting to convey the risks in a more effective manner."445
Another important limitation upon the defendant's use of the plaintiff's con-
duct in a duty to warn action is recognized in some jurisdictions. The defense
of assumption of the risk will not be available for injuries that occur in the
workplace where the injured individual "is an employee working at an assigned
task on an industrial machine."446 This exception represents recognition of the
reality that in the workplace environment and, potentially, in other circumstances,
the employee directed to work on or near a hazardous instrumentality may have
no meaningful a l t e r n a t i ~ e . ~ ~
In duty to warn jurisprudence, the defenses based upon the plaintiff's conduct
suffer from the tenuousness of the defendant's proposition that the plaintiff would
have proceeded foolishly even had a prominent and adequate warning been given
and the actual allegedly inadequate or nonexistent warning was not, in any event,
connected causally with the injury. However, the dominant profile of liability in
decisions among the contributory fault cases is that the seller will not be relieved
for a failure to adequately warn even if it can be shown that the claimant pro-
ceeded with inadequate circumspection. In this disposition the decisions can be
seen as declining to excuse the failure of the seller to discharge its duty to com-
municate effectively safety-related information not known to the user or con-
sumer, on the fortuity that the conduct of a user of the product could be described
Rhodes v. Interstate Battery System of America., 722 F.2d 1517, 1518-1519 n.2 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (1984).
us Id. at 1520..
Colella v. safwiy Steel Prods., 201 N.J. Super. 588, 592, 493 A.2d 634, 636 (1985).
447 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 167 n.5, 406 A.2d 140, 148
n.5 (1979), in which the court observed: "an employee engaged at his assigned task on a plant machine
as in Bexiga has no meaningful choice." Id., 406 A.2d at 148. The Court added, "We are herein
not passing upon other situations wherein an employee may similarly be held to have had no mean-
ingful choice." Id., 406 A.2d at 148. In Colella, the injured plaintiff asserted that his injuries sustained
in a fall from a workplace scaffold used occasionally as a ladder for ascent to and decent from a
platform that was defective in that its appearance invited its use as a ladder, claiming both a design
defect and a failure to warn. The court declined to follow the plaintiff's suggestion that the authority
of Suter precluded application of the defense of contributory negligence, however, on the basis of
its observation that the instrumentalities involved in the industrial machine exception were ordinarily
ones over which the employee had only "limited control", while the scaffold involved in this accident
"afford[ed] the worker greater control and direction of its use." Colella, 201 N.J. Super. at 592,
493 A.2d at 636.

as contributorily at fault. The exceptions to this general rule, as reflected above,

are that recovery may still be denied on the basis of the plaintiff's conduct (1)
when the facts show that the injured party's knowledge of the hazard was so
entire as to make the unfortunate conduct brazen in the extreme, and (2) when
an arguably adequate safety-related communication from the seller was read and
disregarded.
XV. CONCLUSION
The decisional injunction to product sellers is that they timely and clearly
state to product users and consumers germane product safety related information
known to them that they have no reason to believe is known to those who will
encounter the product. The duty to warn attaches, therefore, "whenever a rea-
sonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether
to expose himself to it.""8 The product seller's discharge of this duty can be said
to be fulfilled when the information conveyed alleviates the asymmetry between
the safety-specific information known to the seller and that known to the user
or consumer.
This abbreviated means of demarcating the seller's duty to warn does not
have the breadth of other and earlier protocols of decision. Most prominent of
these is Professor Kidwell's identification of ten indicia courts have used in eval-
uating a duty to warn."g An asymmetry analysis is, in fact, derived from two of
the aforementioned longer list of criteria and could not reasonably be advanced
as a replacement of its forerunners. Isolated from the cluster of other criteria,
however, what it does provide is an efficient and accurate barometer of when a
duty to warn is likely to exist, as well a suggestion of the nature and quantum
of information that is likely to satisfy that duty. More specifically, absent evidence
of a limited number of particular circumstances associated with a product trans-
action, such as (1) sales in bulk, (2) a product capable of only trivial harm, or
(3) a workplace from which the seller is completely foreclosed from communi-
cation, an injured party's showing that the seller did not communicate pertinent
safety-related information to users or consumers, when there was no reason to
know they would have a particularized knowledge of the specific risks involved,
should satisfy the claimant's prima facie case of a breach of the duty to warn.
This article commends the fairness of a principle that places upon the man-
ufacturer the burden of ensuring that persons who will use, consume, or be af-
fected by a product will receive in an understandable form that germane, safety-
related information held by the manufacturer which will permit them to make
an informed decision as to whether to encounter the risk. If a product-related
Jamens, 463 So.2d at 251.

449 See Kidwell, supra note 15 and accompanying text.

injury occurs and the user or consumer's lack of safety-related information is the
cause in fact of the injury, it is proposed further that the plaintiff's prima facie
case, absent special circumstances, will be satisfied by proof that the manufacturer
held safety-related information regarding warning of a risk or instructions for
safe use, but did not succeed in communicating this information to the plaintiff
or the members of the plaintiff's class. Definitionally, a plaintiff's showing is
that of an asymmetry between such information known to the manufacturer and
that known to the user or consumer or, conversely, the lack of informational
parity or equilibrium.
Product-related injuries will never be eliminated, for, among other reasons,
"[nlo one has developed a system to match the creativity of the consumer in
finding new and sometimes unsafe ways to use The most attainable
and estimable goal of products liability law, however, is the achievement of a
commercial environment, judicially encouraged as necessary, in which product
sellers prepare and present to consumers product safety-related information as
readily and unselfconsciously as they prepare a bill of sale.
ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICEEARL WARRENCONFERENCE

ON ADVOCACY
REPORT,
PRODUCTSAFE^
nu A~ERXCA
42 (The Roscoe Pound Foundation 1984).
Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 3 3 3 1986-1987


The Duty To Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism

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The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours

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THE DUTY TO WARN IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:

Although a product is unerringly designed, manufactured and assembled, in-

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 221 1986-1987

A seller's responsibility for providing adequate warnings may be found under

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 222 1986-1987

if there is shown a manufacturer's duty to redesign, that duty should not be

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 223 1986-1987

It is valuable at the outset to distinguish warnings from instructions. Warnings

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 224 1986-1987

I4 Cf.Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1317 n.11.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 225 1986-1987

The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine

We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and user-oriented standard

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 226 1986-1987

expectations of the consumer with the reasonable expectations of the seller.24The

Phillips, 269 Or. at 495, 525 P.2d at 1036-37.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 227 1986-1987

JO Id. at 461-62, 12 P.2d at 412.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 228 1986-1987

that the monopoly on product-related information, including safety information,

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 229 1986-1987

explicit definition of an unreasonably dangerous condition that would include

Id. at 404 (citations omitted).

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 230 1986-1987

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 231 1986-1987

AS v~illbe seen from the discussion to follow, it is in the professional

4s See generally Schwartz & Driver, supra note 13, at 41.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 232 1986-1987

cause of its polycentrism, is both intricate and time c o n s ~ m i n g ,and ~ ~ incline

" Id. at 1562.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 233 1986-1987

11. WHEN A DUTYTO WARNARISESUNDER NEGLIGENCE

At common law, a seller or supplier has a duty to give adequate warnings

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 388 provides:

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 234 1986-1987

Resolution of the question of whether the risk is significant or unreasonable

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 235 1986-1987

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS5 401, which provides:

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 236 1986-1987

Thus, under negligence principles, the manufacturer is required to warn of

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 237 1986-1987

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 238 1986-1987

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 239 1986-1987

Coequal with foreseeability as part of the evaluation of the manufacturer's

t o warn of that simple fact.

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 240 1986-1987

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 241 1986-1987

practicable to create warnings or instructions for a product or to improve upon

111. WHENA DUTYTO WARNARISESUNDER STRICTLIABILITY

The most widely-referenced distinction between liability based in negligence

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 242 1986-1987

location of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966).

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 243 1986-1987

The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A provide guid-

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 244 1986-1987

Heinonline - - 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 245 1986-1987