That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the municipality

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused conspiring and
G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983 confederating together, with the deliberate intent of bringing one Dr.
Patrocinio Angeles into public discredit, disrepute and contempt,
EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, after having knowledge that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was a
vs. former patient of the Morong Emergency Hospital was operated
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and there wilfully,
PHILIPPINES, respondents. unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak and utter the
following insulting and defamatory words and expressions, to wit:
Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioners.
Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz):
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Your wife should not have been operated.If I were the doctor, all that I
should have done was to do a curretage raspa on her.

DE CASTRO, J.: Atty. Bernardino:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They are just
dated August 25, 1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by bold.
finding petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of grave
oral defamation as the former Court of First Instance has held, and Dr. Francisco:
imposed on him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and ordered them to pay complainant the amount of The operation was unusual.
P1,000.00 as moral damages.
Atty. Bernardino:
On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then
the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for murder thru
against honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. reckless imprudence. The doctors there are no good. They are not
Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the surgeons.
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing
thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the
Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation. On
attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz and one of the physicians
October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court, was amended
at the Morong Emergency Hospital, professional incompetence,
by adding the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly
inefficiency, or negligence thus casting public contempt and ridicule upon
constituting the crime of slander to wit:
the reputation of the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles.
AMENDED INFORMATION
Contrary to law.
The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and
Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966,On February 1, 1973 the trial court
Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, committed as
rendered its decision convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and
follows:
Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced
each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as was cancelled by the Credential Committee of said hospital at a meeting
minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as called for that purpose by the complainant Dr. Angeles who was then the
maximum and each of the accused was directed to pay complainant t the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the accused Harry
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Bernardino, as counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the ouster
of Dr. Angeles as Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court as case was bitterly contested that it even reached the Office of the
already stated was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. President; that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the accused Atty.
Bernardino as Mayor of Morong, Rizal he caused the passage of a
As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows: resolution wherein he was given authority to recommend all charity cases
for admission to the Morong Emergency Hospital and that this resolution,
however, was ignored by the complaint Dr. Angeles in accordance with
The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of
the policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services.
Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding since
November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr. Custodio about her ailment
and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days; that thereafter The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics Committee
her bleeding recurred that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, the accused Dr.
advised her that if her bleeding continued she should go to a hospital; Francisco sought to find out what could be done with the reported wrong
that her bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles which
entered the Morong Emergency Hospital that she was attended by Dr. resulted in the removal of triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco
Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her ailment was tentatively consulted the other accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take;
diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an that upon the advice of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr.
x-ray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed that she Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a Committee
was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went on December 26, 1965
had to be given a transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz; that they
as the bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complaint interviewed the spouses Romulo Cruz and Lourdes Cruz regarding the
Dr. Patrocinio ; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13, 1965; that in that
triplets was removed that the operation was successful and her bleeding interview the two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant
was arrested, that on December 26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the to the Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding investigation;
evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry and that after the interview with the Cruz spouses Dr. Golla and the
Bernardino together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, in coming president of the
to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused Rizal Medical Society on December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with
interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her him but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal
operation; that the couple informed the two that they are satisfied with the Medical Society, which they did.
operation; that in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano
Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while
should not have been operated on and that if he were the one he would it is true that the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called
not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin); that on the same fact finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the
occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino that the physicians in accused went out of bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which
Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and they are are not only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be prosecuted de
not surgeons and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file oficio. It went on to rule however that the defamation committed by the
charges for murder through reckless imprudence; that the accused Dr. accused cannot be considered as grave under the circumstances, and
Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the the worst that was said of the complainant was that he should not have
Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted for murder
patients who needed the facility of the hospital for proper management; through reckless imprudence.
that, however, on December 15, 1965 his membership in the said staff
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the complaint was filed by
was instituted. While the case was pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one the offended party before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only
of the petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the thirty-nine (39) days after the incident in question which is still within the
case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned. prescriptive period. He cited the case of People v. Olarte   which 1

overruled the case of People v. del Rosario   and held that the filing of the
2

Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal raises complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
several questions. In synthesis, they are: preliminary examination or investigation should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if the court where
1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. It
Appeals to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed; makes no difference whether the case was filed in the Fiscal's Office and
not in the Municipal Court as in the Olarte case, since Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code does not require that the complaint be one filed in
2. Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be
court in order to toll the running of the period.
considered libelous;
Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense
3. Whether or not there was conspiracy;
includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the
lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to
4. Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that petitioners sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple
acted with "malice" is fatal; and expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. The principle
has the support of overwhelming authorities in American jurisprudence:
5. Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is "as a
general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by limitation, but
As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already been convicted of a lesser included offense which is so barred, is entitled to
dismissed, We shall discuss only those matters as may be pertinent to discharge", and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 343; "It frequently
petitioner Francisco. happens that a change of felony includes an offense of a lower grade
with a different period of limitation so that, while the felony is not barred,
Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found that the the statute has ran as to the lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is
offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which that if the statute has not run against the felony, while the lesser offense
prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the is barred. the bar cannot be evaded by the defendant for the felony and
said court should have dismissed the case, and sustained the acquittal of convicting him of the lesser offense." 3

the accused on the ground that said crime had already prescribed. He
pointed out the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of
December 26, 1965, and the information charging the accused of the prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed with the court more discovered by the offended party, the authorities. or their agents, and
than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966. shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that for the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
purpose of determining the proper prescriptive period, what should be reason not imputable to him."
considered is the nature of the offense charged in the information which
is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco   held
4

said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander. that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is
Hence, the period of prescription here should be six (6) months. filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the
offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court,
because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication
to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint on account of delays that are not under his control. All
or information terminate without the accused being convicted or that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate
acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again
by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should when such p terminate without the accused being
be recalled that before the Olarte case there was diversity of precedents convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in
on the issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of the which the complaint or information is filed must have
complaint with the justice of the (or municipal judge) does in the course of power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial
prescriptive term. This view is found in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal
30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
that to produce interruption, the complainant or information must have terminate without conviction or acquittal if the court should
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its discharge the accused because no prima facie case has
merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December been shown.
29, 1960; People v. Coquia, L- 15456, June 29, 1963.
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a p
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without
aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which conviction or acquittal.
We find applicable to the case at bar reads:
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re- To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with
examined the question and, after mature consideration, equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of
should be, the one established by the decisions holding a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation.
case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription investigations, they may even reverse actions of
"shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint of First Instance. ... 
5

is filed in the court for preliminary examination or

investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing
even if the court where the complaint or information is against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the
actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the mistaken in that case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of
accused interrupts the period of prescription. the community in his general professional competency.

Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for his We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements
statements — could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize them as libelous would be a
dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of
Your wife would not have been operated, If I were the doctor, all that I another will generate criminal liability for slander. His alleged defamatory
should have done was to do a curretage raspa on her. remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous
handling of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the
The operation was unusual. statements quoted and stigmatized as defamatory are those only of
accused Bernardino.   That latter's statements are what the Solicitor
6

General considered as "strong words that are evidently serious and

are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he
damaging." Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the
committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The
statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General
remarks made by Francisco were but a harmless expression of his
would like to hold Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the
opinion on what should have been done in treating her, if he were the
ground of conspiracy. Assuming that Bernardino's statement is libelous,
doctor managing her. His statements were nothing more than a comment
Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor
that complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management
the Court of Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit
of the patient. An impartial observer would readily note that such remarks
the alleged crane. This is so because no evidence was offered to show
do not degrade the competency of a doctor, for the latter, because of
that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact alone
human limitations cannot be expected to be accurate at all times in the
that they were together when those words were uttered is not proof that
diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs. Hearst
there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly, each accused spoke
Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only required to possess the
spontaneously and individually.
ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession, and is not liable for
mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by those
reasonably skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof
wrong management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be required for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a
considered libelous. In the same American case, it was held: finding of guilt for the crime itself   which must be upon proof beyond
7

reasonable doubt.  8

It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the mismanagement of

the making of a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not of itself The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were made on
actionable. Such a charge implies nothing more, at most, than ignorance the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics
or unskillfulness in that case, and does not materially affect his reputation Committee decision" is obviously incompatible with the notion that
as respects his general competency to practice his profession. petitioners had gone to the residence of the Cruz pursuant to a
conspiracy to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of
going to Tanay, Rizal, having been accepted as a fact by the Court of
To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the
Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as respondents now do, that Atty.
management or treatment of an individual case is not more than to
Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had conspired to slander Dr. Angeles.
impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature.
The most eminent and skillfull physician or surgeon may make mistake
on the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general From what has been said, there is no further need to discuss the other
professional skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano Francisco is
hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF

LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South
Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General

Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner.

Quitain Law Office for private respondent.

 that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when
it is not, the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
ESGUERRA, J.:p Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view
of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the
Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of
City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled "Republic of the fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff
Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City,
Defendants", instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this Court for review.
Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du
Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and
the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land in question to After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that
the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and equitable in the the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it
premises.
being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are
null and void.
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally
applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol
free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the
who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee
land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a
from Precila Soria.
forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not
alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over
President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable
1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the
Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are
in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol. beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction
and authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest
Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products
Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised
declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P- Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land
2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to
public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free
Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question
the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles
7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered
be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are void ab initio.
whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508,
June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent 512, this Court said:
and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du
Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no
jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may
SCRA 207-301), holding that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab
not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party
 adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L- de Castro of South Cotabato has been forged to facilitate the issuance of
17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable
vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960). The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of
the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing.
authority to do so (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and
35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify
Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law
cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of which provides as follows:
Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public
forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, That statements made in the application shall be
become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. considered as essential conditions or parts of any
Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769) concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement thereon or omission
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the
1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied upon by respondent Court in dismissing this facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent
case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was involved but modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set
agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
party and later registered under the Torrens System by the other party. cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. ...
The litigation was between private parties where the party who registered
it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee under A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be
the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies
title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is specifically for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs
authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of
proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for
private individual. holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis supplied).
The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be
was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold
contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had
possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height
after diligent search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not be contacted because he is a (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962,
resident of Davao City; that there are no existing signs of improvements 6 SCRA 938, page 38).
found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered with
grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is being used as ranch for Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of
grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for
were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on fraud
actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the
the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General,
1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has a (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-
fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate 8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083,
the same, and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias
May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap
G.R. No. L-6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be

recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707,
May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases
for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108,
paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963, 47
SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil.
728; 751-753).

Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can
no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered
thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance
under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the
remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the
complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in
the premises.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated
June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, and that of September 29,
1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in Civil
Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set
aside. The respondent court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and
render judgment thereon accordingly.

Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.

LILIAN CAPITLE, SOFRONIO CORREJADO,

ARTEMIO CORREJADO, VICENTE
CORREJADO, CECILIA CORREJADO, GLORIA
VDA. DE BEDUNA, ROGELIA CORREJADO,
MANUEL CORREJADO, RODOLFO
CORREJADO, TERESITA C. AMARANTE,
JUANITA CORREJADO AND JULIETA C.
PEREGRINO, Petitioners, v. JULIETA VDA. DE
GABAN, JULIA CORREJADO AND Correjado, Cecilia Correjado, Rogelia Correjado
HERMINIGILDO CORREJADO, Respondents. (Rogelia), Sofronio Correjado, Vicente Correjado
and Gloria vda. de Beduna.
DECISION
On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: complaint1 for partition of the property and
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his La Carlota City against respondents, alleging that
father Santos Correjado two parcels of land Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with
subject of the case at bar, Lot No. 1782-B of the Brigida Salenda who was the mother of Julian,
Pontevedra Cadastre and Lot No. 952 of the and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay
Hinigaran Cadastre containing 26,728 sq. m. and (Maria) who was the mother of Zacarias, Manuel
55,591 sq. m., respectively. and Francisco; that the property remained
undivided even after the death of Julian in 1950,
Fabian died intestate in 1919.He was survived by
his children-herein respondents having arrogated
four children, namely:Julian, Zacarias, Francisco
unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the
and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado.
property, to the exclusion of petitioners; and that
respondents refused to deliver petitioners share
After Fabians death in 1919, his son Julian
in the property despite demands therefor and for
occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of
partition.
land (the property) until his death in 1950.He
was survived by three children, namely, herein
To the Complaint respondents countered in their
respondents Julieta vda. de Gaban (Julieta), Julia
Answer2 that in the proceedings in the intestate
Correjado (Julia) and Hermegildo Correjado.
estate of their great grandfather Santos
Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any
Julians brother Francisco died in 1960.He was
share in the property, for Maria, the mother of
survived by herein petitioners Manuel Correjado,
petitioners respective fathers Francisco and
Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo
Zacarias, was just a mistress of Fabian, hence,
Correjado, and Jileta Peregrino.
Francisco and Zacarias (as well as Manuel) were
Julians brother Zacarias died in 1984.He was illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under
survived by the other petitioners herein, Aurora the old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889).
P. vda. de Correjado, Lilia Capitle, Artemio
By Decision of December 29, 1992,3 Branch 63 of Francisco (as well as Manuel) -predecessors-in-
the La Carlota City RTC dismissed the complaint interest of petitioners were legitimate children
upon the grounds of prescription and laches. and, therefore, they co-owned with Julian the
property.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein
petitioners raised as sole error of the trial court Its finding of co-ownership of the property by the
its dismissal of the complaint without basis in fact predecessors-in-interest of the parties
and in law, the appellate court, by Decision of notwithstanding, the appellate court held that, as
August 29, 2000,4 dismissed the appeal and did the trial court, prescription and laches had set
affirmed the decision of the trial court. in, ratiocinating as follows:
ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

In affirming the decision of the trial court, It is a hornbook doctrine that the possession of a
appellant passed upon the issue of legitimacy of co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be
the brothers Francisco and Zacarias (as well as of regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but
their brother Manuel) in order to determine in fact as beneficial to all of them so much so that
whether they co-owned the property with Julian, each co-owner may demand at anytime the
illegitimate children not being entitled to inherit partition of the common property and that this
under the Spanish Civil Code of 18895 which was implies that an action to demand partition is
in force when the brothers father Fabian died in imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches
1919. (Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 23; De
Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
The appellate court found that respondents failed
to discharge the onus of proving that Francisco While the right of action to demand partition does
and Zacarias were illegitimate.But it too found not
that petitioners also failed to prove that Zacarias prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in whe
and Francisco were legitimate. re one of the co-
owners openly and adversely occupies
Upon the disputable presumption, however, that the property without recognizing the co-
a man and a woman deporting themselves as ownership (Cordova v. Cordova, 102 Phil. 1182;
husband and wife have entered into a lawful Heirs of Segunda Manungding v. Court of
contract of marriage,6 the appellate court Appeals, 276 SCRA 601), The statute of
presumed that Fabian and Maria were lawfully limitations operates, as in other cases, from the
married, hence, their children Zacarias and moment such adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property (Ramos v. Ramos, 45 [herein petitioner] Rogelias testimony, as
Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857). follows: ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

The elements constituting adverse possession by QBy the way you said that you are going to
a co-owner against another co-owner or cestui recover this 1/6 share from Julieta vda. de
que trust  are:(1) that he has performed Gaban.Why, is she in possession of this land? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an

ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; AYes, sir.
(ii) that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust or the QShe is presently in possession of the said lot? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

other co-owners; and (iii) that the evidence

AYes, sir.
thereon must be clear and convincing (Salvador
v. Court of Appeals, supra).
QCan you tell us since when did she possess that
land?
Granting that appellants, as well as their
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

predecessors-in-interest, were initially co-owners

A1980.
of the disputed property,
nevertheless, acquisitive prescription in favor of a QPrevious to that, can you tell us if she was in
ppellees had already set in. Appellees possession of the said land?
had performed unequivocal acts of repudiation.Th
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

is is shown by the unrebutted testimony of AYes, sir.She has been in possession of the said
[herein respondent] Julia who declared that her lot before 1980.
brother Atilano (deceased) introduced
improvements on the disputed property and the QWas there a period of years that you have been
fact that appellees and in possession of the said land? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

their father Julian paid the realty taxes thereon a
s exclusive owners thereof.Moreover, applicants [ANo, sir.We have never been in possession of
admitted in paragraph 12 of the Complaint the said land.]
that after Julians death (in 1950),
appellees arrogated unto themselves the use and  xxx
enjoyment of the disputed property, to the exclus
QWere you
ion of appellants.This admission is bolstered by
able to gather benefits from that land? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AWe never benefited. ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

QSince when have you not benefited from that la I
nd?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE

ASince 1919. CIVIL CODE ISMISPLACED.

xxx II

QBy the way, can you tell us since when you hav WHETHER IN RESOLVING CASES, THE ISSUE OF

e been deprived of that land, from what year? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary MORALITY OF THE ACT DOES NOT COME INTO
PLAY.
AFrom 1919 to 1990. (TSN, January 9, 1990, pp.
51-55). (Underscoring supplied)7  ςrνll III

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration8 of WHETHER OR NOT LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN

the appellate courts decision upon the ground THE CASE AT BAR.11  ςrνll

that THIS CASE HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY

EVENTS, PARTICULARLY ART. 19 OF THE [NEW] Petitioners contend that [t]here is such a thing as
CIVIL CODE which reads: ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ
morality that comes into play, as after all, the
appellate court found the parties to be first
ART. 19.Every person, must be in the exercise of cousins and, therefore, following Art. 19 of the
his rights and in the performance of his duties, Civil Code, petitioners should get their share in
act with justice, give everyone his due, and the property.
observe honesty and good faith,
Petitioners further contend that laches is not
citing some cases in support thereof. strictly applied when it comes to close relations,
citing Gallardo v. IAC, 155 SCRA 248.
Finding the invocation of Art. 19 misplaced, the
appellate court, by Resolution of February 7, The petition fails.
2001,9 denied the Motion for Reconsideration,
hence, the present petition10 proffering the Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on
following Human Relations is a statement of principle that
supplements but does not supplant a specific ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
provision of law.
ART. 939.In the absence of legitimate
With respect to rights to the inheritance of a descendants and ascendants, the natural children
person who died before the effectivity on August legally acknowledged and those legitimated by
30, 1950 of the Civil Code like Fabian who died in royal concession shall succeed to the entire
1919:ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ estate of the deceased.

Art. 2263, New Civil Code With respect to prescription: ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

ART. 2263.Rights to the inheritance of a person Art. 1134, New Civil Code
who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the ART. 1134.Ownership and other real rights over
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and immovable property are acquired by ordinary
by the Rules of Court. x x x prescription through possession of ten years.

ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889 Art. 1137, New Civil Code

ART 807.The following are forced heirs: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

ART. 1137.Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
1.Legitimate children and descendants, with adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
respect to their legitimate parents and without need of title or of good faith.
ascendants; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Assuming arguendo  that petitioners respective

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents fathers Francisco and Zacarias were legitimate
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the
children and descendants; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary property:From the moment co-owner Julian
occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute
The widower or widow, natural children legally and exclusive owner of the property and denied
acknowledged, and the father or the mother of his brothers any share therein up to the time of
the latter, in the manner and to the extent his death in 1950, the question involved is no
established by Articles 834, 835, 836, 837, 840, longer one of partition but of ownership in which
841, 842, and 846. case imprescriptibility of the action for partition
can no longer be invoked.The adverse possession SO ORDERED.
by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein
respondents as exclusive owner of the property
having entailed a period of about 67 years at the
time of the filing of the case at bar in 1986,
ownership by prescription had vested in them.12  ςrνll

As for estoppel by laches which is a creation of

equity,13 since laches cannot interfere with the
running of the period of prescription, absent any
conduct of the parties operating as estoppel,14 in
light of the prescription of petitioners action,
discussion thereof is dispensed with.Suffice it to
state that while laches may not be strictly applied
between near relatives, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, especially the
uncontroverted claim of respondents that their
father Julian, and the documented claim of
respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the
property as exclusive owner, as well as the
admission of petitioner Rogelia that, as quoted
above, she and her co-petitioners never benefited
or were deprived of any benefits from the
property since 1919 up to the time of the filing
ofthe case in 1986 before the RTC or for a period
of 67 years, despite demands therefor, even an
extremely liberal application of laches would bar
the filing of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

G.R. No. 11263             November 2, 1916
and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and
vs. with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee. civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia
vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant. the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee. formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil.
Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an
ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a
new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution,
TRENT, J.: in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It
is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights
the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence
state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is
plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed. regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of
public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these
separation from the defendant. principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching
and governing the question under consideration.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915,
and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were
complaint are as follows: extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883
(Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage read:
with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any to mutually assist each other.
act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant,
since that date had continually on other successive dates, made ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's
who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff property.)
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave
the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
 Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the
court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be
husband removes his residence to a foreign country. understood as being thereby restricted.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows: Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise
to this appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to
reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article. the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain
in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and
1. The consorts. inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard
to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha
not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father
xxx     xxx     xxx
simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to
her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother
option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances,
by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that
the right to the same. it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her
daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without
give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard
is not one of them. to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no
opinion should be expressed at this time.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil
Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs.
faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in
and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there
follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which
removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that
his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the
receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled second the right to support had already been established by a final
to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases
Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of
5, 1903, held:. the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision
in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don
July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to
obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose
or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title,
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to
considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself
to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.
Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power
living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order
heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently,
property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) those of his own support without need of going to his wife;
was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D.
voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil
canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and
defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due 5 of the appeal.
trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the
merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears
in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said: quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an
agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond
support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true
Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the
spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one
their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other
in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife
granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the
support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case
subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had
accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause
temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the
cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been
then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of instituted, said:
his wife's property and of the product of the other property
belonging to the conjugal partnership; and In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro
Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal however proving his contention, that the person responsible for
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house.
bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party
establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to
article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible keep her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to
inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in
opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143.
established; and. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for
the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the
Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because
together and afford each other help and support; and for this the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible
reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does
his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal not create any illicit situation of the court above described.
lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that
that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to
force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the
governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit
are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely
and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as
wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace
insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever
force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the
his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to situation of a feme sole.
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or
prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive
and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited Torres, Johnson and
after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case
was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the
judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not
affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being
the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by
this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of
the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and
accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent

to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living
separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to
decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate
maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in
the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is
dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not EN BANC
dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital
obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an
[G.R. No. L-23289. February 28, 1969.]
obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation
 with one Feliza Hernandez, a virgin over 12 but under 18 years
JOVENCIO LUANSING, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE of age." cralaw virtua1aw library

PHILIPPINES, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondents. This information was later amended by the Fiscal to change the
date of the alleged commission of the crime from July 10, 1957
Onofre K . Quizon for Petitioner. to July 15, 1957. During the trial the private prosecutor made a
reservation to file a separate civil action and from then on the
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor prosecution was handled solely by the assistant Provincial
General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza Fiscal. The Court a quo subsequently rendered judgment finding
for Respondents. the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
seduction and sentencing him to suffer four (4) months of
arresto mayor; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P2,000.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
DECISION case of insolvency, but not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty; to acknowledge his offspring with her; to give the said
offspring a monthly support of P35.00; and to pay the costs and
MAKALINTAL, J.: suffer all accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which

Petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. The motion for
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00779-CR. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
reconsideration having been denied, the accused filed the
instant petition for review.
Jovencio Luansing was originally charged with rape in Criminal
Case No. 1240 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas Petitioner avers here: (1) that the trial court acted without
(Lipa City Branch). After due trial the court dismissed the case, jurisdiction when it tried the case on the basis of the amended
stating that no crime of rape was committed, but directed the information without the corresponding amended complaint of
Provincial Fiscal to file an information for seduction against the the offended party; (2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction
accused within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the over the case, it being under the jurisdiction of the municipal
decision, otherwise the said accused would be discharged from court; and (3) that assuming that the trial court had jurisdiction
custody. over the case, the same was exceeded when it awarded
damages and other civil liabilities to the offended party, there
On August 15, 1958 the offended party, Felisa Hernandez, filed having been a reservation to file a separate civil action.
a complaint for seduction against the accused. On the basis
thereof the corresponding information was filed by the Fiscal, as On the first averment it appears that the Fiscal filed the
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
information for seduction on August 15, 1958, after conducting
a preliminary investigation upon the complaint presented by the
"That on or about the 10th day of July, 1957, in the Barrio of offended party. On September 16 following, the Fiscal
San Roque, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, conducted another preliminary investigation, after which he filed
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court an amended information changing the date of the commission
the above-named accused by means of deceit and false promise of the offense from July 10, 1957 to July 15, 1957. This
of marriage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and amended information, petitioner argues, was a nullity since
feloniously seduce and have sexual intercourse several times there was no corresponding amended complaint of the offended
party which would authorize another preliminary investigation. of First Instance because it involves an issue of admiralty, the
said court must be held likewise to have jurisdiction over other
The point raised is of no material consequence. The original causes of action joined thereto even if the amount sought to be
information for seduction alleged that the offense was collected is less than the jurisdictional limit (Fireman’s Fund
committed "on or about July 10, 1957." The phrase "on or Insurance Co. v. Cia. General de Tabacos de Filipinas, G.R. No.
about" is comprehensive enough to cover the change to July 15, L-22625, April 27, 1867). In like manner, since the crime of
1957, as the evidence in the hands of the prosecutor indicated. seduction carries with it a liability, under Article 345 of the
The substantial rights of the accused were in no way prejudiced Revised Penal Code, to acknowledge and give support to the
by the amendment. offspring resulting from the crime — matters beyond the
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts — it
On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 44(f), Republic Act No. 296, follows that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the
as amended, provides the Courts of First Instance have original Court of First Instance (U.S. v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265). It would
jurisdiction of "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided be absurd to have the principal case of seduction tried and
by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of decided by the Municipal Court and the resulting
more than two hundred pesos," and section 87(b) of the same acknowledgment and support of the offspring by the Court of
Act provides that Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts have First Instance. The duplication would entail unnecessary waste
original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which the penalty of time and effort for the parties and for the courts, to the
provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months, detriment of an orderly administration of justice.
or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment." The penalty imposed by Article 338 of the It is further contended that the amended information was
Revised Penal Code for the crime of simple seduction is arresto legally defective for failure to allege lewd design. Reliance is
mayor, the duration of which is from one month and one day to placed on the case of People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30,
six months. Apparently, the crime of simple seduction falls 1964, wherein it was held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

under the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or

Municipal Courts. However, it should not be overlooked that "Considering that in order that a crime constituting acts of
persons guilty of seduction shall also be sentenced to indemnify lasciviousness may be committed it is necessary that it be
the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the alleged that it was committed with lewd design, the latter being
law should prevent him from so doing, and to give support to an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as
such offspring (Article 345, Revised Penal Code). These are abduction, seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness .
inherent accessory civil liabilities when a child is born as a result . . the words "feloniously and criminally" that are alleged in the
of the crime. The acknowledgment of, and the giving of support complaint are mere general terms which denote the criminal
to, the offspring are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the intent of the accused but which do not necessarily connote the
Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts. They pertain to the idea of lust needed in the commission of the act. Lust or lewd
Courts of First Instance (Section 44(a) and (e), Republic Act No. design is an element that characterizes all crimes against
296).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the
offender, and such element must be always present in order
It has been held that laws conferring jurisdiction on the inferior that they may be so considered in contemplation of law." cralaw virtua1aw library

courts over demands below certain amounts do not preclude a

determination of said demands in the superior court, where In People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968, which
they are connected with larger claims or with a type of demand involved a case of rape, we had occasion to pass upon the
solely within the jurisdiction of the superior court. Thus for above-quoted decision in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

instance, where an action is within the jurisdiction of the Court

"Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably by eliminating the award of damages and of support for the
interpreted as requiring, an explicit allegation of "lewd design" offspring, and affirmed in all other respects. No pronouncement
in a complaint for rape. We hold in no uncertain terms that in a as to costs in this instance.
complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or
"unchaste motive," for to require such averment is to demand a Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando and
patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the Teehankee, JJ., concur.
unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself — the carnal
knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when Sanchez Castro and Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when the woman is under twelve of age." cralaw virtua1aw library

By the same token, "lewd design" is inherent in the very act

itself of having sexual intercourse with a chaste woman over 12
and under 18 years of age under a false promise of marriage,
which act constitutes the crime of seduction. Besides, the Gilo
case involved acts of lasciviousness, and the element of "lewd
design" must necessarily be alleged in the information, because
without it the offense would be merely unjust vexation.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the trial court exceeded its

jurisdiction when it awarded damages and other civil liabilities
despite the express reservation by the offended woman,
through the private prosecutor, to file a separate civil action.

On this point the Court of Appeals ruled that "if the complainant
had wanted to insist on filing a separate civil action for damages
against the appellant, she would have filed a motion to
reconsider the decision a quo of September 14, 1959. The fact
that she did not take this step is clear proof that she had
previously abandoned her reservation to file a separate civil
action." We do not go along with this pronouncement.
Abandonment requires a more convincing quantum of evidence
than mere forbearance to actually file the civil action, especially
considering that the same could be filed even after the decision
in a criminal case had been rendered. Besides, the claim for
damages requires proof, and contemplates a right on the part of
the defendant to present his own rebuttal. As it was, neither the
offended party nor the accused was accorded the chance to
present evidence on the point. The same is true with regard to
the amount of support for the offspring.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of review is hereby modified

EN BANC Tolentino, left the company's compound at
Guagua, Pampanga, driving one of its truck-
G.R. No. L-13541 January 28, 1961 trailers for Manaoag, Pangasinan. They passed
through the towns of Bacolor, San Fernando,
EDUARDO TUASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Angeles, Mabalacat, of the province of Pampanga.
vs. LUZON STEVEDORING; CO., INC. and When they reached the municipality of Bamban,
JULIAN RAMOS, Defendants-Appellees. Tarlac, the truck developed some engine trouble.
The mechanic, Graciano Bautista, had to clean
M. H. de Joya for plaintiff-appellant.
the carburetor and the gasoline line, which took
E. R. Tiongson and H. San Luis for defendant-
him about 25 to 30 minutes to finish. Afterwards,
appellee.
they proceeded on their way. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
At around 5:10 o'clock that same morning at
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about 75 meters south of the bridge at barrio

Early in the morning of April 13, 1953, Eduardo
Cut-Cut of the municipality of Capas, Tarlac, the
Tuason left Baguio City in a 1952 model Packard
Packard car driven by Eduardo Tuason and the
car, with three passengers, namely, Olivia de
truck-trailer driven by Julian Ramos collided. As a
Leon, Francisco de Leon and Manuel de Leon. He
result of the collision, Eduardo Tuason's left leg
passed the Kennon Road Checkpoint at 3:00
was pinned down by the door of his car. After he
o'clock and winged on his way passing the
was extricated from his seat, he was taken to the
National Toll Road, Camp 6 Toll Gate, 24 minutes
clinic of Dr. Pineda at Capas, and later, on that
later. After paying the toll, he continued slashing
same day, brought to the National Orthopedic
through the early morning air so that by 5: 00
Hospital in Manila. His companions in the car,
o'clock of that same morning he arrived at a town
who were also injured were, likewise, taken to
in Tarlac. There he stopped at a gasoline station
the clinic at Capas.
to fill up his car's gasoline tank. This took about
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

15 to 20 minutes. Thereafter, he continued his

On February 22, 1956, or after almost three
drive for Manila.
years from the date of the collision, Eduardo
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Tuason filed with the Court of First Instance of

At about the same time Eduardo Tuason left
Manila a complaint against the Luzon Stevedoring
Baguio City, Julian Ramos, an employee of the
Co., Inc., and Julian Ramos for the recovery of
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., together with a
damages suffered by him as a result of the
mechanic, Graciano Bautista, and a laborer, Zoilo
collision above referred to. The complaint alleges,
among other things, that plaintiff was driving at a company, in addition, alleged that it exercised the
moderate speed - 35 to 40 kilometers per hour - care and diligence of a good father of a family in
with headlights on, when the truck-trailer driven the selection and supervision of Julian Ramos as
by the defendant Julian Ramos struck his car; its driver.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

that the collision completely wrecked plaintiff's

car and caused serious physical injuries to him At the trial, both parties presented testimonial
and his companions; and that defendant Julian and documentary evidence. Finding the evidence
Ramos was then driving recklessly and adduced by plaintiff and his witnesses to he
negligently at a high rate of speed. Plaintiff, contradictory and unworthy of belief, and holding
therefore, claims and prays for actual and that plaintiff was traveling at a very high speed
compensatory damages in the sum of P200,000, and on the wrong side of the road, that it to say,
moral damages in the amount of P25,000, and on the left lane facing south, while the truck-
exemplary or corrective damages in the sum of trailer driven by the defendant Julian Ramos was
P25,000, plus attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
traveling at a moderate speed and was almost at
a stop before the collision, the trial court, on
The defendants, in their separate answers, denied January 9, 1958, rendered decision, the
any liability for damages, alleging by way of dispositive part of which reads:
special defenses that the truck trailer driven by
the defendant Julian Ramos was traveling at low- "WHEREFORE, the court finds the plaintiff
speed, with lights on, along the right side of the Eduardo Tuason, solely and wholly responsible for
road when it was hit by the Packard car driven by the collision which occurred on April 13, 1953,
plaintiff recklessly and negligently at a high subject matter of the present case, and absolves
speed; that after the accident, both plaintiff and the defendants Julian Ramos and Luzon
defendant Julian Ramos were charged criminally Stevedoring Co., Inc., from any liability or
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Capas, responsibility in connection therewith. The court
Tarlac, and upon the case being forwarded to the hereby orders plaintiffs claims against the
Court of First Instance of the same province, the defendants dismissed with costs against the
information as against the defendant Julian plaintiff."
Ramos was dismissed; and that the collision was
due to the fault and negligence of plaintiff as From this decision, the plaintiff appealed directly
defendant Julian Ramos exercised due care and to this Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

diligence in the performance of his duties as

driver of the truck-trailer. The defendant
After going over the record, we find no reason for some particulars, admitted that he was in
rejecting the findings of fact below, justifying the extreme pain after the collision - and, indeed,
dismissal of plaintiff's claim for damages. The must have been unconscious - so that he could
issue being one of credibility, the question of not have observed the details of the accident.
which testimony should be given more credence Considering the other circumstances of the case,
is best left to the trial judge, who had the which shall hereafter be discussed, we think the
advantage of hearing the parties testify and of trial court was justified in resolving his testimony
observing their demeanor on the witness against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Manuel de Leon, one of plaintiff's companions in

Briefly stated, plaintiff's version is that while he the car, in an effort to corroborate plaintiff's
was driving his new Packard car along the right version and theory of the case, also took the
lane of the road, with lights on and blowing his witness stand. The lower c ourt, however, noted
horn, at a curve, about 75 meters south of the from his testimony and demeanor that he was not
bridge in Barrio Cut-Cut, of the municipality of at all clear about the special circumstances and
Capas, Tarlac, his car collided with the truck- important details of the accident which an
trailer of the Luzon Stevedoring Company driven eyewitness would normally notice, recall and
without any lights by defendant Julian Ramos; remember. He could not, for instance, tell "who
that the collision took place at the middle of the moved the trailer nor whether it was moved on
road; that as a result thereof, the two vehicles its own power or pushed by the people around;
became attached to and entangled with one he could not even tell or recall on what part of
another; that the people who were attracted to the road the Packard car was. Moreover, this
the scene of the collision had to separate the witness could not even recall how wide Cut-Cut
automobile from the truck-trailer before they bridge is or whether two vehicles could meet and
could extricate plaintiff from the driver's seat of pass each other, safely, over the bridge; he
his car; and that to separate the two vehicles the could, likewise, not recall whether there were
truck-trailer had to move backwards, with the use shoulders and ditches on both sides of the road at
of its own power, dragging the automobile, which the scene of the collision." Explaining his
after being separated from the truck-trailer, was unreliability as a witness, the trial court made the
also moved backwards. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library following observations:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff himself "In the mind of the court, this witness was in a
testified. He contradicted himself, however, in state of shock and light-headed after he
recovered consciousness and, as he admitted that Pineda at Capas. He was asked three times in the
he was unconscious for 30 minutes after the course of the investigation whether or not he had
collision, he could not have seen anything that anything more to say in connection with the
was done during his state of unconsciousness nor collision and in like number of times the
afterwards. The court is convinced that Manuel de answered, "no more, sir." For this reason, the
Leon was merely accommodating the plaintiff, his trial court found it difficult to believe his
friend, when he testified for the reason that he testimony and opines that his participation in the
was neither clear nor positive as to his matter of the collision was merely to bring one of
testimony." the injured to the clinic of Dr. Pineda at Capas
and nothing else. We are inclined to agree with
Alberto Yandan, a resident of Barrio Cut-Cut, the lower court, for it has not been explained why
Capas, Tarlac, at the time of the accident, he did not, at the time he was investigated, tell
testifying for the plaintiff, claims that he saw the the matters he testified to in court, when he
collision. He declared, among other things, that admittedly was aware that he was being
he ordered the truck to be moved backward; and investigated to bring out everything that he knew
that it took thirty minutes to take plaintiff out of of the accident.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

the car. He disclaimed knowledge, however, of

the identity of the person who moved the truck. Pedro Mallari, another resident of Barrio Cut-Cut,
It also appears that he was investigated by the Capas, likewise, testified for plaintiff. This witness
police of Capas at 10:00 a.m. of the day of the admitted on direct and cross-examination that he
collision in the presence of the chief of police and stayed at the scene of the accident only for five
the Justice of the Peace. In that investigation, minutes, yet he sought to convince the court of
which was later reduced to writing, sworn to and facts which could not have happened, and which
signed by him before the Justice of the Peace, he he could not have seen, during that period. Thus,
declared - contrary to his testimony in court - he said that when he arrived at the scene of the
that he was in his house when he heard a crash; collision, He saw Alberto Yandan, carrying plaintiff
that he immediately went downstairs and found Eduardo Tuason while the three car passengers
that the crash was caused by a collision between were still inside the automobile. This statement is
a truck and a car; that the driver of the car was contrary to the testimonies of plaintiff's other
badly injured; and its three occupants suffered witnesses, namely, Alberto Yandan and Manuel
minor injuries; that the car was wrecked while de Leon, who declared that, the last person taken
the truck was only slightly damaged; and that he out of the car was plaintiff and that it took them
brought one of the injured to the clinic of Dr. some 30 minutes to extricate him from the
driver's seat. Witness Mallari also declared that by those of Alberto Yandan who testified that he
plaintiff's left leg was pinned down by the left was investigated at 10:00 a.m. and that he
bumper of the truck and that when the truck was (Mallari) was inside the police station and present
moved back, the leg was still pinned by the during the investigation. And had Mallari really
bumper. If such were the case, plaintiff's leg been present then, whether inside or outside the
would have been crushed or severed and he police station, he would certainly have
would not now have possession and use of both volunteered his testimony, having taken the
legs. Considering these contradictions and trouble of going to the police station at the town
observing that the witness, while testifying, was proper and knowing as he did the subject matter
restless, nervous and uncomfortable and that he of the police investigation. But he did not do this
was shifting around and could not keep his eyes and instead admitted that he testified in this case
fixed, the trial court entertained grave doubts after he was approached by Alberto Yandan to do
concerning the veracity of his testimony. The so for plaintiff.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

lower court, we think, was justified in doing so.

Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only Salvador Baun, chief of police of the municipality
proceed from a credible source, but must, in of Capas another witness for the plaintiff. The
addition, be credible itself. And by this is meant trial court, however, from his demeanor on the
that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable witness stand and from the long delayed and
as to make it easy to believe. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
often evasive answers, he gave, was convinced
that he was suppressing and hiding the true facts
Examining further Pedro Mallari's testimony, we of the case. He admitted that he conducted an
find that there is, indeed, good reason to believe investigation of the collision and he testified that
this witness was never at the scene of the in the course of that investigation, he saw
collision. He stated that he returned from work evidence that the Packard car driven by plaintiff
around 12 noon to take his lunch; that thereafter swerved from the middle of the road to the left
he went to the police station of Capas and when lane facing south, thus hitting the truck-trailer.
he peeped inside he saw the police investigating He made such statement in his official report of
Alberto Yandan; that he did not listen to the the accident (Exh. "I"), and the proof of the
investigation but he knew that it concerned the swerving of the car as reported by him were the
accident which occurred in Barrio Cut-Cut, Capas, skid marks of the tires of the car at the scene of
that morning; that he did not volunteer to testify the collision. The record also shows that it was on
nor made known his presence at the scene of the the basis of his report that the criminal case for
collision. His declarations are directly contradicted physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence filed against both plaintiff from the above facts, which are not disputed,
and defendant Julian Ramos was dismissed as that plaintiff drove his car at great speed and in
against the latter. The dismissal was made upon excess of the speed limits along the national
motion of the Provincial Fiscal on the ground that highway. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

"during a reinvestigation of the case, and as can

be seen from the sketch attached to the record Plaintiff claims that the truck-trailer, which
prepared by the Chief of Police of Capas, Tarlac, weighed 10 tons, was traveling at the rate of 60
the driver of the truck-trailer, Julian Ramos, the kilometers per hour when the collision occurred,
accused, tried his best to avoid the incident; that but if such were the case, the car he was driving
it is the other driver, Eduardo Tuason, who was at would have been sent flying, or, at least, carried
fault in causing the collision; and that the and pushed back by virtue of the truck's
prosecution has no evidence to sustain any momentum and weight. There were, however, no
criminal action against Julian Ramos." .
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
indications on the surface of the road at the
scene of the collision showing that the Packard
The evidence for the defendants, on the other car was carried and dragged by the truck-trailer.
hand, showed that the truck-trailer driven by Indeed, none of the witnesses testified to this
Julian Ramos covered the distance of 50.89 fact. On the contrary, Salvador Baun, chief of
kilometers between Guagua, Pampanga, and Cut- police, and Jesus Baluyot, patrolman, both of
Cut bridge, Capas, Tarlac, in 2 hours and 10 Capas, and other witnesses for the defendants
minutes. Subtracting the 30 minutes consumed in testified that the skid marks present at the scene
fixing the engine trouble that developed on the of the collision were those made by the tires of
way, the traveling time was, therefore, 1 hour the Packard car. No skid marks made by the tires
and 40 minutes. This shows that the truck-trailer of the truck-trailer existed or were present at the
ran at an average speed of 30 kilometers per scene of the collision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

hour on the national highway from Guagua,

Pampanga, to Cut-Cut bridge, Capas, Tarlac. The evidence for the defendants also showed that
Upon the other hand, plaintiff drove his car from at the time of the collision, the truck-trailer was
Baguio City to Cut-Cut bridge in Capas, a on the right lane of the road facing north with the
distance of 144.22 kilometers, in 2 hours and 10 right front wheel of the truck on the shoulder of
minutes. Deducting the maximum of 20 minutes the road about six inches from the ditch on the
it took him to load up gasoline, that leaves a right side and that the Packard car was on the left
traveling time of 1 hour and 50 minutes. As lane of the road going south towards Pampanga.
correctly found by the court below, it is evident These facts were testified to by the defendant
Julian Ramos, his mechanic, Graciano Bautista, matters gathered in the performance of their
Jesus Baluyot and Pagano Atienza, both members official duties. Moreover, they submitted a report
of the police force of Capas, Mariano Nacpil, a of their investigation to their Chief of Police.
farmer and civilian guard residing in Barrio Cut- Arturo Cabrera, another witness for the
Cut, and others. Policeman Jesus Baluyot, at the defendants is a government employee who
time of the collision, drew a sketch (Exh. 1.A) testified in regard to his own personal knowledge
showing the relative positions of the vehicles, of the collision in question. He stated that after
which piece of evidence became the basis of the viewing the scene of the collision and noting that
chief of police's report but which he tried to the Packard car involved therein was a hazard to
suppress at the trial of the case. Regarding the traffic, he telephoned a report to his superior, the
testimony of defendants' witnesses, the trial court District Engineer of Tarlac that he was able to talk
said.. to Mr. Epifanio Panopio, Maintenance Engineer
who personally viewed the scene of the collision;
"The court has observed the conduct and that after the investigation being conducted by
demeanor of the witnesses, for the defendants, the Police was through he caused the Packard car
and noted that they testified in a straight-forward to be removed upon the instruction of Engineer
manner indicating that they know the subject Panopio. Again, there is no reason for the court to
matter of their testimonies and that they were doubt the testimony of this witness. Mariano
testifying on facts and circumstances of their own Nacpil is an old man and a farmer. His demeanor
personal knowledge. Defendant Julian was in court was that of a witness testifying to the
lengthily cross-examined and there was no truth. As a matter of fact, Mariano Nacpil signed a
divergence in his, testimony. Likewise, the sworn statement, Exh. '8' before the Chief of
mechanic, Graciano Bautista, was clear and Police and Justice of the Peace of Capas, Tarlac,
explicit in his narration of facts. The witnesses for on the same day, April 13, 1953, when the
the defendants, Jesus Baluyot and Paciano collision occurred. His testimony during the trial
Atienza are members of the police force of the conforms with his sworn statement appearing on
Municipality of Capas and they testified on facts Exhibit '8'."
and circumstances surrounding the collision
between the two vehicles, which they gathered in Plaintiff claims that the truck-trailer and the
the course of their official investigation. There is Packard car were linked together and in order to
no reason for the court to doubt the testimony of give room to take plaintiff out of the car, the
these police officers considering the official truck-trailer was moved back, on its own power,
positions and the fact that they testified on across the line at the center of the road and
stopped on the right lane facing north carrying It might not be amiss to mention here that
the car along with it. The trial court, however, plaintiff's complaint was filed only after the lapse
after a close scrutiny of the evidence adduced, of almost three years from the date of the
rejected the claim, defendant shaving shown to accident. This, in itself, is indicative of the
its satisfaction that the truck's battery and front weakness of plaintiff's cause of action. And
axle were damaged, the U-bolt broken, and considering the established fact that said plaintiff
mudguard stuck to the left front wheel. The was really the proximate cause of the accident,
truck-trailer's weight of ten tons eliminated the we find no valid reason to disturb the decision
possibility of its having been pushed by the complained of denying his claim for damages. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

people gathered at the scene of the collision, so

that the trial court believed that it was the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
Packard car which was moved back about three appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
feet in order to extricate plaintiff from his seat, against plaintiff-appellant.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

some persons stepping on the bumper of the

automobile while others pushed it away. The
defendant Julian Ramos, whose testimony was
found by the court to be credible and straight
forward, testified in this regard. This testimony of
defendant Julian Ramos, contrary to plaintiff's
claim, does not necessarily contradict those of
policemen Jesus Baluyot and Pagano Atienza,
who declared that the vehicles were not moved
during their investigation. Apparently, the
vehicles were disengaged before the arrival of the
aforenamed policeman, who had to come yet
from the town proper. It would certainly have
been unnatural and cruel for the people who were
there to have waited for them or other authorities
before doing anything, considering that plaintiff
was painfully pinned by the door of his car and
could not be extricated without disconnecting the
vehicles.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. L-48006             July 8, 1942 caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself.
vs. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents. article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
Jose G. Advincula for respondents. governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only
subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
BOCOBO, J.: Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino ... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for
Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family
employed by said Fausto Barredo. in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent
damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court
of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla
civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply
and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was
only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
or commission not punishable by law.
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal
case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court
in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the ... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. supervision of his servant or employee.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not
to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the
shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article
fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are
aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the them.
consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with
is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all them.
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict
or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged
safely anchored. in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of
the performance of their duties.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are
as follows: The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a
special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by
CIVIL CODE the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi- article shall be applicable.
contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in
which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
xxx     xxx     xxx under their custody.

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the
Code. diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.
be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
REVISED PENAL CODE
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done. ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2,
3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
 Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
be enforced to the following rules: have been committed by them or their employees.

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or
by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
negligence on their part. which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond by the innkeeper's employees.
with their own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with the civil law. ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
received. discharge of their duties.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate xxx     xxx     xxx
amount for which each one shall be liable.
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
special laws or regulations. medium periods shall be imposed.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
execution. felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed."
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers
and proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant
persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions
in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a 1903 of the Civil Code.
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action
for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
Civil Code. Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:

The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva
legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o
fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of falta."
Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el
non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects
and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it
According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article misdemeanor."
1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II
of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case:
Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
There had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to
the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are: had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was
private concern. whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for
damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage. Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de
los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes.
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el
una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente,
falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y
Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos
efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
para pedir indemnizacion. añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones,
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daños y
culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el
regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba,
semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues
cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni
en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para
mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a
ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a la cosa juzgada.
precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un
paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts,
indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es it seems less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard
necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses
notarian. caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the
action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter,
modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating
diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less
extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil
los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,
sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it
cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are
anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas,
sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to
esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another
scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but
from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered.
culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already
are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till
courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of
the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the
political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there
regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes
in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is
would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between not res judicata.
the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to
indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil
necessary to point out to one of such differences. Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose
provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French
own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for The action can be brought directly against the person responsible
which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary (for another), without including the author of the act. The action
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the
Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is
regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service
or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp.
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases not subsidiary. He writes:
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the
crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por
regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se
debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se
separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una
true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista;
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la
of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un
undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del
damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
 padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21);
maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de
articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la
aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para personas de quienes se deba responder."
prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No
hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others,
apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the
por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible. acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law,
the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons
faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is for whom one should be responsible."
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-
manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and
(minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and
any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October
It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been
act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own run over by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de
act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
completely inadmissible. acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743: Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal,
solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por saying:
excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la
entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes
as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era
constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action,
negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun either alone or with his employer.
el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre
otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal
por los daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas
negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia
the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the
recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus
present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so
empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion
that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime,
con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo
atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his
en la causa.
own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article
1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the
criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief,
fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting,
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for
in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is
case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was
same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in
correccional.
relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly
followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of
above quoted.) the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case:
(1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the
1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for damages complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their
and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying: (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines
los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was
1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su receptacles:
demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a
sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho four assignments of error, as the original complaint did not
consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas contract of transportation, because the action was not based on
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between
originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not
las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of
envases: the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the
goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of
cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca defendant company, because the latter is connected with the
del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se person who caused the damage by relations of economic
funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also
negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 being sued.
del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.,
359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the
plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
broken. This Court held: damage."

It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it
that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes
remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
action in which the official criminally responsible must be made appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal
According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should
arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant,
have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out
his employer. litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the
assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery
this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal
arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon
chapter reads: their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure
of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
to repair the damage so done. action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding
started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
they should be responsible.
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on
private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
them.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but
xxx     xxx     xxx the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability
was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission,
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third
employed or in the performance of their duties. person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
xxx     xxx     xxx
 Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal part:
actions against his employees only while they are in process of
prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part
criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street,
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana
no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his
accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana
affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto
finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and
actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the
abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana
force in the Philippines. Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street,
this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of
the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on
not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after
of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's
shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana
articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of
the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are the child would not have occurred.
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of
the parties to one another. But where relations already formed It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act itself. negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to
recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice
court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child,
Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have
the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in
daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from
attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying
two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by
of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died said:
that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he
held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He
the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise
This Court said in part: selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the
Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when
outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand defective condition of the steering gear.
taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect
right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall
an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and cease. It says:
falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in
the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but
damage."
in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
 court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's
and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to
overcome and he is relieve from liability. navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant
has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited
that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said
automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary
applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that: authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages
under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he
is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant.
negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year
master's employment as such owner. 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of
the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman,
Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries
The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay
death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the
truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the
Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held: damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This
Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code,
saying:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the
relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the
master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the
servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.) Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the
determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its
application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil.,
or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the
Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor
demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C
falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the
belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up
with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
 other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so
Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of
negligence. a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil
liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the
Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the
scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the
exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention
to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary
civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character
part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
(By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements
here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a
should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.) crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327).
of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question
Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a
criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
proper and independent remedy. negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and
the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
civil liability. But this Court held: ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might
not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at
In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi- least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
Spanish Civil Code. principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol.
7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
the pathways of right and justice. is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it
re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by
the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be

and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as grounds that the following order was issued:
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees. 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of
the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.
BARREDO, J.:
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was THAT -
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." I

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
Rules of Court; IS APPLICABLE;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now II

final and or in res-adjudicata;
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
3. The complaint had no cause of action against WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by III
marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

 THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
IV
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have
OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of his negligence causing the death of the child was
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin subject matter either of a criminal action with its
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
dismiss above-referred to. entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
issues presented for Our resolution are: delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
reversed?
for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married? that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
to indicate their foundations. from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
accordingly to the literal import of article g1093 of the Civil present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or the harms done by such practice and to restore the
injury to persons and damage to property- through any principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor,
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. reason that an independent civil action, not depending on
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
origin and such full-grown development as culpa his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code. Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
make the defendant pay in damages. There are that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
can and should be made responsible in a civil action here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
Article 2177 of the new code provides: would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
the same act or omission of the defendant. declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between not a bar to the instant action against him.
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.) takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character guardian."
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind

the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of
a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the
child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done
by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

 separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on
the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her
stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore,
he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs
against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below
sustained the demurrer, directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January,
1907, to amend their answer. In compliance with this order the
defendants presented, on the same date, their amended answer, denying
each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
G.R. No. L-4089             January 12, 1909 requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.

ARTUROPELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was

vs. entered by the court below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the
lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the
J.H. Junquera, for appellant. defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said
Filemon Sotto, for appellee. judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the
judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff
TORRES, J.: excepted and in due course presented the corresponding bill of
exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the declaration
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded therefrom,
Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been
forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the made, was also denied, and to the decision the defendants excepted.
plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San
Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to plaintiff, by virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended a
a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the
Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to
remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees,
the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the
was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable
value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by
refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or
reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with
any other relief that might be deemed proper. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the
allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that their contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the
among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of supreme court of Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a
mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support
another who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the
1088), and spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be
be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)
be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers
health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide
which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear
for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician,
mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay
married couple. fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear
that they consented to bind themselves.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the
person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during assigned to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff
her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare
mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife
is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our
view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the
moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently costs against the appellant. So ordered.
needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is
specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance
therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is
entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband
who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in
such an emergency.  

From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to

have brought an action against the defendants simply because they were
the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient
during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were
her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house.
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by
virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence
of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which
such obligation might have arisen.
 It appears that sometime in 1950, a labor dispute arose between the
Katipunan Labor Union and the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. The case was
docketed in the Court of Industrial Relations as case No. 430-V, “Caltex Cebu
Branch vs. Katipunan Labor Union.” The case was amicably settled on June
29, 1950, the court approving the settlement in an order issued on July 28,
1950. Among the terms of the amicable settlement was an agreement that
“the company prior to any dismissal, lay-off or suspension should give the
union opportunity to be heard and the union should be given not less than
three (3) days notice before any hearing or investigation” is conducted.
Failure of the Court of Industrial Relations for the reinstatement to comply
KATIPUNAN V. CALTEX-
with this agreement was the basis for the order of Alforque.
SUBJECT: CONTRACTS.
One of the reasons given why the Court of Industrial Relations is alleged to
have no jurisdiction over the case is that the petition was received in the
On June 24, 1953 the Court of Industrial Relations received a Court of Industrial Relations after Republic Act No. 875 was approved on
petition of the Katipunan Labor Union dated June 8, 1953 entitled “Caltex June 17, 1953. In answer to this contention it is to be noted that it is the
Cebu Branch vs. Katipunan Labor Union” and docketed as Case No. 430-V practice before courts of justice to consider the mails as an agent of the
(1), alleging that employee Florencio Alforque of the Respondent labor Government — so the date of mailing is always considered as the date of
union has been dismissed by the Petitioner without sufficient or valid cause filing any petition, motion or paper. As the petition in the present case was
and without an investigation, in violation of the order of the Court of mailed before the approval of Republic Act No. 875, it may not be
Industrial Relations dated March 18, 1950, and praying that said Alforque be considered filed after the new law had become effective.
reinstated in his position with full pay from May 1, 1953, the date of his The next contention is that the dismissal of the employee is not a labor
dismissal, to the date of his reinstatement. This petition was received in the dispute. This is without merit. The term labor dispute is defined as including.
Court of Industrial Relations after the approval of Republic Act No. 875 on
June 17, 1953, although it was mailed prior to the said date of approval. The “  any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment  ”
 cralaw  cralaw

Caltex (Philippines) Inc. filed an answer alleging that Alforque lacks (Sec. 2[j], Republic Act No. 875).
judgment, initiative and ability in his work as a mechanic;  that the branch chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
The existing agreement between the Katipunan Labor Union and
in which he worked is over-staffed and the services of Alforque were not the Petitioner, that no employee should be dismissed without notice and an
needed;  that case No. 430-V was terminated long before the petition was
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
opportunity for hearing, is a condition or term of the employment
filed;  and that the petition does not state facts to merit an exercise of
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
agreement. The enforcement of the agreement is not the concern of the
jurisdiction by the Court of Industrial Relations. After hearing the Court employee affected alone, but that of the whole labor union to which he
declared it has jurisdiction over the case and ordered the provisional belongs;  there is labor dispute because there is controversy between the
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

reinstatement of Alforque to his former position, pending hearing on the union and the employer regarding it.
merits of the dismissal. A motion to reconsider the same was denied, so this
Another argument of Petitioner is that the agreement in question, entered
present petition was filed in this court alleging that the Court of Industrial
into in the year 1950, only terminated the case then existing, and it or the
Relations has no jurisdiction over the case first, because the court lacks
decision rendered thereon is not applicable three (3) years thereafter. This
jurisdiction to order the reinstatement after the enactment of Republic Act
contention is not justified by the very terms of the agreement itself, which
No. 875;  second, because only one employee, not 31 members, is
clearly contemplate future relationship between the parties. As the
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

involved;  and, third, there is no labor dispute between the employer and
relationship of employer and employee continued to exist without any
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

the workers.
change or modification of the agreement, the parties are presumed to have
continued under its terms.
We find no merit in the petition and we hereby deny it with costs against
the Petitioner.
AIR FRANCE, Petitioner, v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and THE ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS. — It is not appropriately
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. the business of the Supreme Court to alter the facts or to
review the questions of fact because, by statute, only questions
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for Petitioner. of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment
of the Court of Appeals, which judgment is conclusive as to the
Bengzon, Villegas & Zarraga for respondent R. facts.
Carrascoso.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY COURT OF APPEALS OF
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION. — When the Court of Appeals
SYLLABUS affirms a judgment of the trial court, and the findings of fact of
said appellate court are not in any way at war with those of the
trial court, nor is said affirmance upon a ground or grounds
1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; REQUIREMENT OF LAW. — different from those which were made the basis of the trial
Courts of justice are not burdened with the obligation to specify court’s conclusions, such judgment of affirmance is (1) a
in the sentence every bit and piece of evidence presented by determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in
the parties upon the issues raised. The law solely insists that a the lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all
decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions
court’s conclusion is drawn. that might have been so raised have been finally adjudicated as
free from all error.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; FAILURE TO MAKE
FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, 7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD
EFFECT OF; DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH DETAILS. — FAITH" IN THE COMPLAINT NOT REQUIRED. — Although there
The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint, the
evidence presented for the defense or to specify in the decision inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts and
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE; FINDING OF
believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A
requirement of the law and the Constitution. There is no law FIRST CLASS SEAT. — The Court of Appeals properly found that
that so requires. A decision is not to be clogged with details a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the
such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed;
otherwise, an air passenger will be placed in the hollow of the
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURTS DEFINED. — hands of an airline, because it will always be easy for an airline
Findings of fact may be defined as the written statement of the to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say that
ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve
decision and judgment rendered thereon; they consist of the stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
court’s "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts on adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
issue."
cralaw virtua1aw library

9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF BAD FAITH CURED BY

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW EXPLAINED. — A question NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO
of law is "one which does not call for an examination of the PROVE AND BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT OBJECTION;
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." cralaw virtua1aw library
AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE
UNNECESSARY. — If there was lack of specific averment of bad
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT MAY BE RAISED faith in the complaint, such deficiency was cured by notice, right
at the start of the trial, by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant as to wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
what plaintiff intended to prove: while in the plane in Bangkok, manner." As the manner of ejectment of plaintiff from his first
plaintiff was ousted by defendant’s manager who gave his seat class seat fits into this legal precept, exemplary damages are
to a white man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment well awarded, in addition to moral damages.
of the contract presented without objection on the part of the
defendant. An amendment of the complaint to conform to the 15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES; COURT
evidence is not even required. DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
— The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON AN ENTRY IN A for attorney’s fees. The court below felt that it is but just and
NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY NOT COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE equitable that attorney’s fees be given and the Supreme Court
RULE. — The testimony of a witness that the purser made an does not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was forced well-exercised — as it is here should not be disturbed.
to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain
refused to intervene," is competent and admissible because the 16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. — Passengers do not
subject of the inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. It contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
does not come within the prescription of the best evidence rule. treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT BAR. — Neglect or malfeasance indignities and abuses from such employees. So, any rude or
of the carrier’s employees could give ground for an action for discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
damages. Damages here are proper because the stress of passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
respondent’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion, carrier. (4 R. C. L-1174-1175).
which is a violation of a public duty by petitioner- aircarrier — a
case of quasi-delict. 17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A TORT. — Although
the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF origin and nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract
CONTRACT. — Award of moral damages is proper, despite may also be a tort.
petitioner’s argument that respondent’s action is planted upon
breach of contract, where the stress of the action is put on 18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH DEFINED. — "Bad
wrongful expulsion, the contract having been averred only to faith", as understood in law, contemplates a state of mind
establish the relation between the parties. affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS
ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE; CASE AT BAR. — The responsibility of
an employer for the tortious act of his employees is well settled
in law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must answer DECISION
for the willful, malevolent act of its manager.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; SANCHEZ, J.:

POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT; CASE AT BAR. — The Civil Code
gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages, the
only condition being that defendant should have "acted in a
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner
pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to
representing the difference in fare between first class and consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these appellate court’s decision.
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of
the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No
attorneys’ fees; and the costs of suit. decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
On appeal, 2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount which it is based." 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that
of refund on Carrascoso’s plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state
and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
with costs against petitioner. based", 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall
contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
The case is now before us for review on certiorari. before it." 7

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as "fully supported A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is
by the evidence of record", are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a
decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 court’s conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound
Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10
presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved." 11
‘first class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in ‘first class’, but at draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
vacate the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying because, in result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a ‘white the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for
man’, who, the Manager alleged, had a ‘better right to the seat. said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts
When asked to vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the plaintiff, as was with respect to the evidence for the defense." Because, as this
to be expected, refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires." 12
seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution." It is
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact
and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the ‘white man’ that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff prosecution without taking into consideration or even
reluctantly gave his ‘first class’ seat in the plane." 3 mentioning the appellant’s side in the controversy as shown by
his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each
witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the particularly that from Saigon to Beirut." 21
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked
such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly

performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case "Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the
were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15 issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the
passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case
may be defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at
as found by the court . . . and essential to support the decision every station for the necessary first class reservation. We are
and judgment rendered thereon." 16 They consist of the court’s not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how
"conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" 17 a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have
A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as the indiscretion to give out ticket it never meant to honor at all.
"one which does not call for an examination of the probative It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18 tickets end yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of
its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an business that the company should know whether or not the
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals 19 tickets it issues are to be honored or not." 22
That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not
appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly
review the questions of fact. 20 disposed of petitioner’s contention, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the "On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a ‘First class
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment. ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see
plaintiffs Exhibits ‘A’, ‘A-1’ ‘B’, ‘B-1’, ‘B-2’, ‘C’ and ‘C-1’, and
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims? defendant’s own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff’s
testimony and testified as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to

and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner Q. In these tickets there are marks ‘O.K.’ From what you know,
asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete what does this O.K. mean?
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew
that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on A. That the space is confirmed.
any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection;
that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no Q. Confirmed for first class?
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats. A. Yes, ‘first class’. (Transcript, p. 169)

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented x           x          x

and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its
third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in
finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right "Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
to, first class seats on the ‘definite’ segments of his journey, Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for,
and was issued a ‘first class’ airplane ticket, the ticket was verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a
subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a
credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word
prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff’s Exhibits ‘A’, ‘A1’, could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
‘B’, ‘B-1’, ‘C’ and ‘C- 1’ belie the testimony of said witnesses, relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower
first class ticket without any reservation whatever. courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat
the covenants in the ticket.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant’s own witness
Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a ‘first class’ The foregoing are the considerations which point to the
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals
cannot believe that after such confirmation ,defendant had a predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first
verbal understanding with plaintiff that the ‘first class’ ticket class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight, 27
Hongkong." 23 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner’s statement of its position", as charged by petitioner.
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioners accusation that
difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
Carrascoso’s ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance provoke an issue." 29 And this because, as petitioner states,
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to
the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance see the Manager. 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first
is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if
in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and another had a better right to the seat?
that ‘all questions raised by the assignments of error and all
questions that might have been so raised are to be regarded as 4. Petitioner assails respondent court’s award of moral
finally adjudicated against the appellant." So also, the judgment damages. Petitioner’s trenchant claim is that Carrascoso’s
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error" 25 We action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an
reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud
of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals
findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in
court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a the complaint bearing on this issue are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

ground or grounds different from those which were made the

basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26 "3. That . . . plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with
the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat under which aid contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant
availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant’s
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. plane during the entire duration of plaintiff’s tour of Europe with
What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff’s return trip
easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out to Manila, . . .
the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a
4. That during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of
Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances
arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the
defendant’s employees. relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put
on wrongful expulsion.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage,
but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right at the start of
accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, . the trial, respondent’s counsel placed petitioner on guard on
. . the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant’s employees to what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the
leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner’s
was already seated. manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is,
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant’s therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for
Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32 moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
x           x          x evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith,
the Court of Appeals declared: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant’s failure to furnish "That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded only without his consent but against his will, has been
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00." 33 court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the
purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as
x           x          x follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That against his will and that the captain refused to intervene’,
there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage
covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, and by the testimony of an eye-witness Ernesto G. Cuento, who
That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene
there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious secure his deposition; but defendant did neither. 37
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
The Court of Appeals further stated — [Sec. 69, par. (e) Rules of Court]; and, under the
circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find,
"Neither is there evidence as to whether or ,not a prior that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket if he did not give up his ‘first class’ seat because the said
to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the Manager wanted to accommodate using the words of the
plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the ‘white man’." 38
the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith." But
committed by defendant’s employees, the manager adopted the can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
ensconced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
of defendant’s witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
explain the meaning of the letters ‘O.K., appearing on the compartment — just to give way to another passenger whose
tickets of plaintiff, said that ‘the space is confirmed’ for first right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad
class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
defendant, testified as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or
‘Q. How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what for ulterior purposes." 39
reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express
A. They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation.’ finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First
(t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959) Instance, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge "The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of
has said on this point: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendant’s Manager in Bangkok went to the
‘Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
‘white man’ have a ‘better right’ to the seat occupied by Mr. passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the
Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying to, again using the words
prove ‘any better’, nay, any right on the part of the ‘white man’ of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a ‘white man’ whom he
to the ‘First class’ seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for (defendant’s Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
which he paid and was issued a corresponding ‘first class’ ticket. defendant has not proven that this ‘white man’ had any ‘better
right’ to occupy the ‘first class’ seat that the plaintiff was
‘If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant’s occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding ‘first
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it class’ ticket was issued by the defendant to him." 40
by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that 5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortuous act of its
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced employees-need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For
the willful malevolent act of petitioner’s manager, petitioner’s him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay
his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing
in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in
"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." cralaw virtua1aw library liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is
(10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42 placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the petitioner-air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind Damages are proper.
and degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this,
because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the 7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso’s
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites testimony, thus —
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended "Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s and purser?
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages. A. When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could
not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she
have a light to be treated by the carrier’s employees with said, ‘We will note that you were transferred to the tourist
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are class’. I said, ‘Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious accepting my transfer.’ And I also said, You are not going to
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer.
that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages Q. Was she able to note it?
against the carrier. 44
A. No, because I did not give my ticket.
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a
passenger’s check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving Q. About that purser?
a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand A. Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used and you don’t have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to
was not insulting and she was not ejected. 46 And this, the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He
because, altho the relation of passenger and carrier is told me, ‘I have recorded the incident in my notebook.’ He read
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in French
that breaks the contract may be also a tort." 47 And in another — ‘First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.’
conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare
to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told MR. VALTE —
 defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor. ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.
COURT — 54

I will allow that as part of his testimony." 49 9. The right to attorneys’ fees is fully established. The grant of
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys’
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that
the purser made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class it is but just and equitable that attorneys’ fees be given. 55 We
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon well exercised — as it was here —should not be disturbed.
evidence [Carrascoso’s testimony above] which is incompetent.
We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but 10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both
the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages,
testimony is admissible. 49 and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial-court. 56 The Court of
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good
dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because,
still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are thereof. 57
admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
the declarant." 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to
entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And,
by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy
matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso’s
testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made,
the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of

Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives

the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in
contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
.R. No. 157917               August 29, 2012 Aaron took his place on the left side of the van near the rear door. The
van, with its air-conditioning unit turned on and the stereo playing loudly,
SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners,
1  ultimately carried all the 14 student riders on their way to Don Bosco.
vs. Considering that the students were due at Don Bosco by 7:15 a.m., and
SPOUSES TERESITA PHILIPPINE NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, that they were already running late because of the heavy vehicular traffic
NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF APPEALS Respondents. on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate route at
about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow path underneath the
DECISION Magallanes Interchange that was then commonly used by Makati-bound
vehicles as a short cut into Makati. At the time, the narrow path was
marked by piles of construction materials and parked passenger
BERSAMIN, J.:
jeepneys, and the railroad crossing in the narrow path had no railroad
warning signs, or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the
The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of crossing. In fact, the bamboo barandilla was up, leaving the railroad
the law. He is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of crossing open to traversing motorists.
his business. He is presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a
passenger. His liability may include indemnity for loss of earning capacity
At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing, PNR
even if the deceased passenger may only be an unemployed high school
Commuter No. 302 (train), operated by Jhonny Alano (Alano), was in the
student at the time of the accident.
vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound. As the train
neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward across the
The Case railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view of the
oncoming train was blocked because he overtook the passenger bus on
By petition for review on certiorari, Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perefia its left side. The train blew its horn to warn motorists of its approach.
(Perefias) appeal the adverse decision promulgated on November 13, When the train was about 50 meters away from the passenger bus and
2002, by which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the the van, Alano applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He applied the
decision rendered on December 3, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court emergency brakes only when he saw that a collision was imminent. The
(RTC), Branch 260, in Parañaque City that had decreed them jointly and passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad tracks, but the van
severally liable with Philippine National Railways (PNR), their co- driven by Alfaro did not. The train hit the rear end of the van, and the
defendant, to Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate (Zarates) for the impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear, including Aaron, out of
death of their 15-year old son, Aaron John L. Zarate (Aaron), then a high the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which dragged his body
school student of Don Bosco Technical Institute (Don Bosco). and severed his head, instantaneously killing him. Alano fled the scene
on board the train, and did not wait for the police investigator to arrive.
Antecedents
Devastated by the early and unexpected death of Aaron, the Zarates
The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students from commenced this action for damages against Alfaro, the Pereñas, PNR
their respective residences in Parañaque City to Don Bosco in Pasong and Alano. The Pereñas and PNR filed their respective answers, with
Tamo, Makati City, and back. In their business, the Pereñas used a KIA cross-claims against each other, but Alfaro could not be served with
Ceres Van (van) with Plate No. PYA 896, which had the capacity to summons.
transport 14 students at a time, two of whom would be seated in the front
beside the driver, and the others in the rear, with six students on either At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the facts and issues, viz:
side. They employed Clemente Alfaro (Alfaro) as driver of the van.
A. FACTS:
In June 1996, the Zarates contracted the Pereñas to transport Aaron to
and from Don Bosco. On August 22, 1996, as on previous school days,
the van picked Aaron up around 6:00 a.m. from the Zarates’ residence.
(1) That spouses Zarate were the legitimate parents of (9) PNR received the demand letter of the spouses
Aaron John L. Zarate; Zarate;

(2) Spouses Zarate engaged the services of spouses (10) PNR refused to acknowledge any liability for the
Pereña for the adequate and safe transportation carriage vehicular/train collision;
of the former spouses' son from their residence in
Parañaque to his school at the Don Bosco Technical (11) The eventual closure of the railroad crossing alleged
Institute in Makati City; by PNR was an internal arrangement between the former
and its project contractor; and
(3) During the effectivity of the contract of carriage and in
the implementation thereof, Aaron, the minor son of (12) The site of the vehicular/train collision was within the
spouses Zarate died in connection with a vehicular/train vicinity or less than 100 meters from the Magallanes
collision which occurred while Aaron was riding the station of PNR.
contracted carrier Kia Ceres van of spouses Pereña, then
driven and operated by the latter's employee/authorized B. ISSUES
driver Clemente Alfaro, which van collided with the train of
PNR, at around 6:45 A.M. of August 22, 1996, within the
(1) Whether or not defendant-driver of the van is, in the
vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange in Makati City,
performance of his functions, liable for negligence
Metro Manila, Philippines;
constituting the proximate cause of the vehicular collision,
which resulted in the death of plaintiff spouses' son;
(4) At the time of the vehicular/train collision, the subject
site of the vehicular/train collision was a railroad crossing
(2) Whether or not the defendant spouses Pereña being
used by motorists for crossing the railroad tracks;
the employer of defendant Alfaro are liable for any
negligence which may be attributed to defendant Alfaro;
(5) During the said time of the vehicular/train collision,
there were no appropriate and safety warning signs and (3) Whether or not defendant Philippine National Railways
railings at the site commonly used for railroad crossing; being the operator of the railroad system is liable for
negligence in failing to provide adequate safety warning
(6) At the material time, countless number of Makati signs and railings in the area commonly used by motorists
bound public utility and private vehicles used on a daily for railroad crossings, constituting the proximate cause of
basis the site of the collision as an alternative route and the vehicular collision which resulted in the death of the
short-cut to Makati; plaintiff spouses' son;

(7) The train driver or operator left the scene of the (4) Whether or not defendant spouses Pereña are liable
incident on board the commuter train involved without for breach of the contract of carriage with plaintiff-spouses
waiting for the police investigator; in failing to provide adequate and safe transportation for
the latter's son;
(8) The site commonly used for railroad crossing by
motorists was not in fact intended by the railroad operator (5) Whether or not defendants spouses are liable for
for railroad crossing at the time of the vehicular collision; actual, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees;
 (6) Whether or not defendants spouses Teodorico and Ruling of the RTC
Nanette Pereña observed the diligence of employers and
school bus operators; On December 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, disposing:
3 

(7) Whether or not defendant-spouses are civilly liable for WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
the accidental death of Aaron John Zarate; favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering them to jointly
and severally pay the plaintiffs as follows:
(8) Whether or not defendant PNR was grossly negligent
in operating the commuter train involved in the accident, (1) (for) the death of Aaron- Php50,000.00;
in allowing or tolerating the motoring public to cross, and
its failure to install safety devices or equipment at the site (2) Actual damages in the amount of Php100,000.00;
of the accident for the protection of the public;
(3) For the loss of earning capacity- Php2,109,071.00;
(9) Whether or not defendant PNR should be made to
reimburse defendant spouses for any and whatever
(4) Moral damages in the amount of Php4,000,000.00;
amount the latter may be held answerable or which they
may be ordered to pay in favor of plaintiffs by reason of
the action; (5) Exemplary damages in the amount of
Php1,000,000.00;
(10) Whether or not defendant PNR should pay plaintiffs
directly and fully on the amounts claimed by the latter in (6) Attorney’s fees in the amount of Php200,000.00; and
their Complaint by reason of its gross negligence;
(7) Cost of suit.
(11) Whether or not defendant PNR is liable to
defendants spouses for actual, moral and exemplary SO ORDERED.
damages and attorney's fees. 2

On June 29, 2000, the RTC denied the Pereñas’ motion for
The Zarates’ claim against the Pereñas was upon breach of the contract reconsideration, reiterating that the cooperative gross negligence of the
4 

of carriage for the safe transport of Aaron; but that against PNR was Pereñas and PNR had caused the collision that led to the death of Aaron;
based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code. and that the damages awarded to the Zarates were not excessive, but
based on the established circumstances.
In their defense, the Pereñas adduced evidence to show that they had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and The CA’s Ruling
supervision of Alfaro, by making sure that Alfaro had been issued a
driver’s license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior Both the Pereñas and PNR appealed (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68916).
to the collision; that their own son had taken the van daily; and that
Teodoro Pereña had sometimes accompanied Alfaro in the van’s trips PNR assigned the following errors, to wit: 5

transporting the students to school.

The Court a quo erred in:
For its part, PNR tended to show that the proximate cause of the collision
had been the reckless crossing of the van whose driver had not first 1. In finding the defendant-appellant Philippine National
stopped, looked and listened; and that the narrow path traversed by the Railways jointly and severally liable together with
van had not been intended to be a railroad crossing for motorists. defendant-appellants spouses Teodorico and Nanette
 Pereña and defendant-appellant Clemente Alfaro to pay incident. Applying the formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table
plaintiffs-appellees for the death of Aaron Zarate and of Mortality:–
damages.
2/3 x (80 - age at the time of death) = life expectancy
2. In giving full faith and merit to the oral testimonies of
plaintiffs-appellees witnesses despite overwhelming the CA determined the life expectancy of Aaron to be 39.3 years upon
documentary evidence on record, supporting the case of reckoning his life expectancy from age of 21 (the age when he would
defendants-appellants Philippine National Railways. have graduated from college and started working for his own livelihood)
instead of 15 years (his age when he died). Considering that the nature
The Pereñas ascribed the following errors to the RTC, namely: of his work and his salary at the time of Aaron’s death were unknown, it
used the prevailing minimum wage of ₱ 280.00/day to compute Aaron’s
The trial court erred in finding defendants-appellants jointly and severally gross annual salary to be ₱ 110,716.65, inclusive of the thirteenth month
liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees with pay. Multiplying this annual salary by Aaron’s life expectancy of 39.3
the other defendants. years, his gross income would aggregate to ₱ 4,351,164.30, from which
his estimated expenses in the sum of ₱ 2,189,664.30 was deducted to
The trial court erred in dismissing the cross-claim of the appellants finally arrive at P 2,161,500.00 as net income. Due to Aaron’s computed
Pereñas against the Philippine National Railways and in not holding the net income turning out to be higher than the amount claimed by the
latter and its train driver primarily responsible for the incident. Zarates, only ₱ 2,109,071.00, the amount expressly prayed for by them,
was granted.
The trial court erred in awarding excessive damages and attorney’s fees.
On April 4, 2003, the CA denied the Pereñas’ motion for reconsideration. 8

The trial court erred in awarding damages in the form of deceased’s loss
of earning capacity in the absence of sufficient basis for such an award. Issues

On November 13, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision, affirming the In this appeal, the Pereñas list the following as the errors committed by
findings of the RTC, but limited the moral damages to ₱ 2,500,000.00; the CA, to wit:
and deleted the attorney’s fees because the RTC did not state the factual
and legal bases, to wit:6 I. The lower court erred when it upheld the trial court’s decision holding
the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay damages with Philippine
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the National Railways and dismissing their cross-claim against the latter.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 260 of Parañaque City is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of Actual Damages is reduced to ₱ II. The lower court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision awarding
59,502.76; Moral Damages is reduced to ₱ 2,500,000.00; and the award damages for loss of earning capacity of a minor who was only a high
for Attorney’s Fees is Deleted. school student at the time of his death in the absence of sufficient basis
for such an award.
SO ORDERED.
III. The lower court erred in not reducing further the amount of damages
The CA upheld the award for the loss of Aaron’s earning capacity, taking awarded, assuming petitioners are liable at all.
cognizance of the ruling in Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
and Manila Railroad Company, wherein the Court gave the heirs of
7  Ruling
Cariaga a sum representing the loss of the deceased’s earning capacity
despite Cariaga being only a medical student at the time of the fatal The petition has no merit.
 1. persons from one place to another either gratuitously or for hire. The 11 

Were the Pereñas and PNR jointly provisions on ordinary contracts of the Civil Code govern the contract of
and severally liable for damages? private carriage.The diligence required of a private carrier is only
ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. In contrast, a
The Zarates brought this action for recovery of damages against both the common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association engaged in
Pereñas and the PNR, basing their claim against the Pereñas on breach the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
of contract of carriage and against the PNR on quasi-delict. land, water, or air, for compensation, offering such services to the
public. Contracts of common carriage are governed by the provisions on
12 

The RTC found the Pereñas and the PNR negligent. The CA affirmed the common carriers of the Civil Code, the Public Service Act, and other
13 

findings. special laws relating to transportation. A common carrier is required to

observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have
acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of passengers, or the
We concur with the CA.
death or injuries to passengers. 14

To start with, the Pereñas’ defense was that they exercised the diligence
In relation to common carriers, the Court defined public use in the
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro,
following terms in United States v. Tan Piaco, viz:
15 

the van driver, by seeing to it that Alfaro had a driver’s license and that
he had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to the fatal
collision with the train; that they even had their own son travel to and "Public use" is the same as "use by the public". The essential feature of
from school on a daily basis; and that Teodoro Pereña himself the public use is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the
sometimes accompanied Alfaro in transporting the passengers to and indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its
from school. The RTC gave scant consideration to such defense by public character. In determining whether a use is public, we must look not
regarding such defense as inappropriate in an action for breach of only to the character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed
contract of carriage. mode of doing it. If the use is merely optional with the owners, or the
public benefit is merely incidental, it is not a public use, authorizing the
exercise of the jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There must
We find no adequate cause to differ from the conclusions of the lower
be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to give to the
courts that the Pereñas operated as a common carrier; and that their
general public. It is not enough that the general prosperity of the public is
standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not the ordinary diligence of
promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The true
a good father of a family.
criterion by which to judge the character of the use is whether the public
may enjoy it by right or only by permission.
Although in this jurisdiction the operator of a school bus service has been
usually regarded as a private carrier, primarily because he only caters to
9 

In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that Article 1732 of
16 

some specific or privileged individuals, and his operation is neither open

the Civil Code avoided any distinction between a person or an enterprise
to the indefinite public nor for public use, the exact nature of the
offering transportation on a regular or an isolated basis; and has not
operation of a school bus service has not been finally settled. This is the
distinguished a carrier offering his services to the general public, that is,
occasion to lay the matter to rest.
the general community or population, from one offering his services only
to a narrow segment of the general population.
A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or
convey goods or persons from one place to another, gratuitously or for
Nonetheless, the concept of a common carrier embodied in Article 1732
hire. The carrier is classified either as a private/special carrier or as a
of the Civil Code coincides neatly with the notion of public service under
common/public carrier. A private carrier is one who, without making the
10 

the Public Service Act, which supplements the law on common carriers
activity a vocation, or without holding himself or itself out to the public as
found in the Civil Code. Public service, according to Section 13,
ready to act for all who may desire his or its services, undertakes, by
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, includes:
special agreement in a particular instance only, to transport goods or
x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or The common carrier’s standard of care and vigilance as to the safety of
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited the passengers is defined by law. Given the nature of the business and
clientèle, whether permanent or occasional, and done for the general for reasons of public policy, the common carrier is bound "to observe
business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight circumstances of each case." Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that
22 

or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship the common carrier should "carry the passengers safely as far as human
line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, ice- cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." To
refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and successfully fend off liability in an action upon the death or injury to a
power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or passenger, the common carrier must prove his or its observance of that
wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations extraordinary diligence; otherwise, the legal presumption that he or it was
and other similar public services. x x x.
17
at fault or acted negligently would stand. No device, whether by
23 

stipulation, posting of notices, statements on tickets, or otherwise, may

Given the breadth of the aforequoted characterization of a common dispense with or lessen the responsibility of the common carrier as
carrier, the Court has considered as common carriers pipeline defined under Article 1755 of the Civil Code.  24

operators, custom brokers and warehousemen, and barge

18  19 

operators even if they had limited clientèle.

20 
And, secondly, the Pereñas have not presented any compelling defense
or reason by which the Court might now reverse the CA’s findings on
As all the foregoing indicate, the true test for a common carrier is not the their liability. On the contrary, an examination of the records shows that
quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and the evidence fully supported the findings of the CA.
character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the
undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has As earlier stated, the Pereñas, acting as a common carrier, were already
held out to the general public as his business or occupation. If the presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident because death had
undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occurred to their passenger. The presumption of negligence, being a
25 

occupation engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public, presumption of law, laid the burden of evidence on their shoulders to
the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a establish that they had not been negligent. It was the law no less that
26 

common, carrier. The question must be determined by the character of required them to prove their observance of extraordinary diligence in
the business actually carried on by the carrier, not by any secret intention seeing to the safe and secure carriage of the passengers to their
or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when charged with the destination. Until they did so in a credible manner, they stood to be held
duties and obligations that the law imposes. 21
legally responsible for the death of Aaron and thus to be held liable for all
the natural consequences of such death.
Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no question
that the Pereñas as the operators of a school bus service were: (a) There is no question that the Pereñas did not overturn the presumption of
engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business, not just as their negligence by credible evidence. Their defense of having observed
a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; of their driver was not legally sufficient. According to Article 1759 of the
and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited Civil Code, their liability as a common carrier did not cease upon proof
clientèle, the Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students selection and supervision of their employee. This was the reason why the
of a particular school living within or near where they operated the RTC treated this defense of the Pereñas as inappropriate in this action
service and for a fee. for breach of contract of carriage.
The Pereñas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
driver might have acted beyond the scope of his authority or even in guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
violation of the orders of the common carrier. In this connection, the
27 
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
records showed their driver’s actual negligence. There was a showing, to the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
begin with, that their driver traversed the railroad tracks at a point at determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
which the PNR did not permit motorists going into the Makati area to situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
cross the railroad tracks. Although that point had been used by motorists blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
as a shortcut into the Makati area, that fact alone did not excuse their prudence and determines liability by that.
driver into taking that route. On the other hand, with his familiarity with
that shortcut, their driver was fully aware of the risks to his passengers The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in
but he still disregarded the risks. Compounding his lack of care was that a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
loud music was playing inside the air-conditioned van at the time of the human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
accident. The loudness most probably reduced his ability to hear the Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be
warning horns of the oncoming train to allow him to correctly appreciate profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
the lurking dangers on the railroad tracks. Also, he sought to overtake a circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
passenger bus on the left side as both vehicles traversed the railroad and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
tracks. In so doing, he lost his view of the train that was then coming from expected to take care only when there is something before them to
the opposite side of the passenger bus, leading him to miscalculate his suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
chances of beating the bus in their race, and of getting clear of the train. consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
As a result, the bus avoided a collision with the train but the van got so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
slammed at its rear, causing the fatality. Lastly, he did not slow down or harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
go to a full stop before traversing the railroad tracks despite knowing that suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
his slackening of speed and going to a full stop were in observance of the can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
right of way at railroad tracks as defined by the traffic laws and determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct
regulations. He thereby violated a specific traffic regulation on right of
28 
is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
way, by virtue of which he was immediately presumed to be negligent. 29
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
The omissions of care on the part of the van driver constituted against its consequences. (Emphasis supplied)
negligence, which, according to Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
30 

Court, is "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided

31 
Pursuant to the Picart v. Smith test of negligence, the Pereñas’ driver
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human was entirely negligent when he traversed the railroad tracks at a point not
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and allowed for a motorist’s crossing despite being fully aware of the grave
reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(t)he
32 
harm to be thereby caused to his passengers; and when he disregarded
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, the foresight of harm to his passengers by overtaking the bus on the left
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances side as to leave himself blind to the approach of the oncoming train that
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’" 33
he knew was on the opposite side of the bus.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular Unrelenting, the Pereñas cite Phil. National Railways v. Intermediate
case has been aptly stated in the leading case of Picart v. Appellate Court, where the Court held the PNR solely liable for the
35 

Smith, thuswise:
34 
damages caused to a passenger bus and its passengers when its train
hit the rear end of the bus that was then traversing the railroad crossing.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular But the circumstances of that case and this one share no similarities. In
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court, no
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily evidence of contributory negligence was adduced against the owner of
the bus. Instead, it was the owner of the bus who proved the exercise of at the time of his death. Moreover, the RTC’s computation of Aaron’s life
extraordinary diligence by preponderant evidence. Also, the records are expectancy rate was not reckoned from his age of 15 years at the time of
replete with the showing of negligence on the part of both the Pereñas his death, but on 21 years, his age when he would have graduated from
and the PNR. Another distinction is that the passenger bus in Philippine college.
National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court was traversing the
dedicated railroad crossing when it was hit by the train, but the Pereñas’ We find the considerations taken into account by the lower courts to be
school van traversed the railroad tracks at a point not intended for that reasonable and fully warranted.
purpose.
Yet, the Pereñas submit that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity
At any rate, the lower courts correctly held both the Pereñas and the was speculative and unfounded.  They cited People v. Teehankee,
1âwphi1

PNR "jointly and severally" liable for damages arising from the death of Jr., where the Court deleted the indemnity for victim Jussi Leino’s loss of
37 

Aaron. They had been impleaded in the same complaint as defendants earning capacity as a pilot for being speculative due to his having
against whom the Zarates had the right to relief, whether jointly, graduated from high school at the International School in Manila only two
severally, or in the alternative, in respect to or arising out of the accident, years before the shooting, and was at the time of the shooting only
and questions of fact and of law were common as to the enrolled in the first semester at the Manila Aero Club to pursue his
Zarates. Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e.,
36 
ambition to become a professional pilot. That meant, according to the
breach of contract of carriage) against the Pereñas was distinct from the Court, that he was for all intents and purposes only a high school
basis of the Zarates’ right to relief against the PNR (i.e., quasi-delict graduate.
under Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless could be held jointly
and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence combining to We reject the Pereñas’ submission.
cause the death of Aaron. As to the PNR, the RTC rightly found the PNR
also guilty of negligence despite the school van of the Pereñas traversing
First of all, a careful perusal of the Teehankee, Jr. case shows that the
the railroad tracks at a point not dedicated by the PNR as a railroad
situation there of Jussi Leino was not akin to that of Aaron here. The CA
crossing for pedestrians and motorists, because the PNR did not ensure
and the RTC were not speculating that Aaron would be some highly-paid
the safety of others through the placing of crossbars, signal lights,
professional, like a pilot (or, for that matter, an engineer, a physician, or a
warning signs, and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or
lawyer). Instead, the computation of Aaron’s earning capacity was
pedestrians from crossing there. The RTC observed that the fact that a
premised on him being a lowly minimum wage earner despite his being
crossing guard had been assigned to man that point from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.
then enrolled at a prestigious high school like Don Bosco in Makati, a fact
was a good indicium that the PNR was aware of the risks to others as
that would have likely ensured his success in his later years in life and at
well as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic there. Verily, the
work.
Pereñas and the PNR were joint tortfeasors.
And, secondly, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings
2.
should not be taken against his parents and in favor of the defendants
Was the indemnity for loss of
whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right to work and
Aaron’s earning capacity proper?
earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence
and his services as well. Our law itself states that the loss of the earning
The RTC awarded indemnity for loss of Aaron’s earning capacity. capacity of the deceased shall be the liability of the guilty party in favor of
Although agreeing with the RTC on the liability, the CA modified the the heirs of the deceased, and shall in every case be assessed and
amount. Both lower courts took into consideration that Aaron, while only awarded by the court "unless the deceased on account of permanent
a high school student, had been enrolled in one of the reputable schools physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
in the Philippines and that he had been a normal and able-bodied child at the time of his death." Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of
38 

prior to his death. The basis for the computation of Aaron’s earning the indemnification for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite him
capacity was not what he would have become or what he would have having been unemployed, because compensation of this nature is
wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in effect
awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased’s Anent the ₱ 1,000,000.00 allowed as exemplary damages, we should not
power or ability to earn money. 39
reduce the amount if only to render effective the desired example for the
public good. As a common carrier, the Pereñas needed to be vigorously
This favorable treatment of the Zarates’ claim is not unprecedented. In reminded to observe their duty to exercise extraordinary diligence to
Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Manila Railroad prevent a similarly senseless accident from happening again. Only by an
Company, fourth-year medical student Edgardo Carriaga’s earning
40  award of exemplary damages in that amount would suffice to instill in
capacity, although he survived the accident but his injuries rendered him them and others similarly situated like them the ever-present need for
permanently incapacitated, was computed to be that of the physician that greater and constant vigilance in the conduct of a business imbued with
he dreamed to become. The Court considered his scholastic record public interest.
sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the medical
course and would have passed the medical board examinations in due WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review
time, and that he could have possibly earned a modest income as a on certiorari; AFFIRM the decision promulgated on November 13, 2002;
medical practitioner. Also, in People v. Sanchez, the Court opined that
41 
and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
murder and rape victim Eileen Sarmienta and murder victim Allan Gomez
could have easily landed good-paying jobs had they graduated in due SO ORDERED.
time, and that their jobs would probably pay them high monthly salaries
from ₱ 10,000.00 to ₱ 15,000.00 upon their graduation. Their earning
capacities were computed at rates higher than the minimum wage at the
time of their deaths due to their being already senior agriculture students
of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños, the country’s leading
educational institution in agriculture.

3.
Were the amounts of damages excessive?

The Pereñas plead for the reduction of the moral and exemplary
damages awarded to the Zarates in the respective amounts of ₱
2,500,000.00 and ₱ 1,000,000.00 on the ground that such amounts were
excessive.

The plea is unwarranted.

The moral damages of ₱ 2,500,000.00 were really just and reasonable

under the established circumstances of this case because they were
intended by the law to assuage the Zarates’ deep mental anguish over
their son’s unexpected and violent death, and their moral shock over the
senseless accident. That amount would not be too much, considering
that it would help the Zarates obtain the means, diversions or
amusements that would alleviate their suffering for the loss of their child.
At any rate, reducing the amount as excessive might prove to be an
injustice, given the passage of a long time from when their mental
anguish was inflicted on them on August 22, 1996.
G.R. No. 185440               July 13, 2011 About four and a half years after the release of the mortgage or on
October 4, 1995, Victor registered the November 30, 1990 sale of the
VICELET LALICON and VICELEN LALICON, Petitioners, land in his favor, resulting in the cancellation of his parents’ title. The
vs. register of deeds issued TCT 140646 in Victor’s name. On December 14,
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent. 1995 Victor mortgaged the land to Marcela Lao Chua, Rosa Sy, Amparo
Ong, and Ida See. Subsequently, on February 14, 1997 Victor sold the
DECISION property to Chua, one of the mortgagees, resulting in the cancellation of
his TCT 140646 and the issuance of TCT N-172342 in Chua’s name.
ABAD, J.:
A year later or on April 10, 1998 the NHA instituted a case before the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the annulment of the NHA’s
This case is about (a) the right of the National Housing Authority to seek
1980 sale of the land to the Alfaros, the latter’s 1990 sale of the land to
annulment of sales made by housing beneficiaries of lands they bought
their son Victor, and the subsequent sale of the same to Chua, made in
from it within the prohibited period and (b) the distinction between actions
violation of NHA rules and regulations.
for rescission instituted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code and those
instituted under Article 1381 of the same code.
On February 12, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in the case. It ruled
that, although the Alfaros clearly violated the five-year prohibition, the
The Facts and the Case
NHA could no longer rescind its sale to them since its right to do so had
already prescribed, applying Article 1389 of the New Civil Code. The
On November 25, 1980 the National Housing Authority (NHA) executed a NHA and the Lalicons, who intervened, filed their respective appeals to
Deed of Sale with Mortgage over a Quezon City lot1 in favor of the the Court of Appeals (CA).
spouses Isidro and Flaviana Alfaro (the Alfaros). In due time, the Quezon
City Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 277321
On August 1, 2008 the CA reversed the RTC decision and found the
in the name of the Alfaros. The deed of sale provided, among others, that
NHA entitled to rescission. The CA declared TCT 277321 in the name of
the Alfaros could sell the land within five years from the date of its
the Alfaros and all subsequent titles and deeds of sale null and void. It
release from mortgage without NHA’s prior written consent. Thus:
ordered Chua to reconvey the subject land to the NHA but the latter must
pay the Lalicons the full amount of their amortization, plus interest, and
x x x. 5. Except by hereditary succession, the lot herein sold and the value of the improvements they constructed on the property.
conveyed, or any part thereof, cannot be alienated, transferred or
encumbered within five (5) years from the date of release of herein
The Issues Presented
mortgage without the prior written consent and authority from the
VENDOR-MORTGAGEE (NHA). x x x.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The issues in this case are:
The mortgage and the restriction on sale were annotated on the Alfaros’
title on April 14, 1981. 1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Alfaros violated
their contract with the NHA;
About nine years later or on November 30, 1990, while the mortgage on
the land subsisted, the Alfaros sold the same to their son, Victor Alfaro, 2. Whether or not the NHA’s right to rescind has prescribed; and
who had taken in a common-law wife, Cecilia, with whom he had two
daughters, petitioners Vicelet and Vicelen Lalicon (the Lalicons). Cecilia, 3. Whether or not the subsequent buyers of the land acted in
who had the means, had a house built on the property and paid for the good faith and their rights, therefore, cannot be affected by the
amortizations. After full payment of the loan or on March 21, 1991 the rescission.
NHA released the mortgage. Six days later or on March 27 Victor
transferred ownership of the land to his illegitimate daughters. The Rulings of the Court
First. The contract between the NHA and the Alfaros forbade the latter Code which uses the term "resolution." Resolution applies only to
from selling the land within five years from the date of the release of the reciprocal obligations such that a breach on the part of one party
mortgage in their favor.3 But the Alfaros sold the property to Victor on constitutes an implied resolutory condition which entitles the other party
November 30, 1990 even before the NHA could release the mortgage in to rescission. Resolution grants the injured party the option to pursue, as
their favor on March 21, 1991. Clearly, the Alfaros violated the five-year principal actions, either a rescission or specific performance of the
restriction, thus entitling the NHA to rescind the contract. obligation, with payment of damages in either case.

The Lalicons contend, however, that the Alfaros did not violate the five- Rescission under Article 1381, on the other hand, was taken from Article
year restriction against resale since what the contract between the 1291 of the Old Civil Code, which is a subsidiary action, not based on a
parties barred was a transfer of the property within five years from the party’s breach of obligation. 4 The four-year prescriptive period provided in
release of the mortgage, not a transfer of the same prior to such release. Article 1389 applies to rescissions under Article 1381.

But the Lalicons are trying to be clever. The restriction clause is more of Here, the NHA sought annulment of the Alfaros’ sale to Victor because
a condition on the sale of the property to the Alfaros rather than a they violated the five-year restriction against such sale provided in their
condition on the mortgage constituted on it. Indeed, the prohibition contract. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that such violation comes under
against resale remained even after the land had been released from the Article 1191 where the applicable prescriptive period is that provided in
mortgage. The five-year restriction against resale, counted from the Article 1144 which is 10 years from the time the right of action
release of the property from the NHA mortgage, measures out the accrues.  The NHA’s right of action accrued on February 18, 1992 when
1avvphi1

desired hold that the government felt it needed to ensure that its objective it learned of the Alfaros’ forbidden sale of the property to Victor. Since the
of providing cheap housing for the homeless is not defeated by wily NHA filed its action for annulment of sale on April 10, 1998, it did so well
entrepreneurs. within the 10-year prescriptive period.

The Lalicons claim that the NHA unreasonably ignored their letters that Third. The Court also agrees with the CA that the Lalicons and Chua
asked for consent to the resale of the subject property. They also claim were not buyers in good faith. Since the five-year prohibition against
that their failure to get NHA’s prior written consent was not such a alienation without the NHA’s written consent was annotated on the
substantial breach that warranted rescission. property’s title, the Lalicons very well knew that the Alfaros’ sale of the
property to their father, Victor, even before the release of the mortgage
But the NHA had no obligation to grant the Lalicons’ request for violated that prohibition.
exemption from the five-year restriction as to warrant their proceeding
with the sale when such consent was not immediately forthcoming. And As regards Chua, she and a few others with her took the property by way
the resale without the NHA’s consent is a substantial breach. The of mortgage from Victor in 1995, well within the prohibited period. Chua
essence of the government’s socialized housing program is to preserve knew, therefore, based on the annotated restriction on the property, that
the beneficiary’s ownerships for a reasonable length of time, here at least Victor had no right to mortgage the property to her group considering that
within five years from the time he acquired it free from any encumbrance. the Alfaros could not yet sell the same to him without the NHA’s consent.
Consequently, although Victor later sold the property to Chua after the
Second. Invoking the RTC ruling, the Lalicons claim that under Article five-year restriction had lapsed, Chua cannot claim lack of awareness of
1389 of the Civil Code the "action to claim rescission must be the illegality of Victor’s acquisition of the property from the Alfaros.
commenced within four years" from the time of the commission of the
cause for it. Lastly, since mutual restitution is required in cases involving rescission
under Article 1191,5 the NHA must return the full amount of the
But an action for rescission can proceed from either Article 1191 or amortizations it received for the property, plus the value of the
Article 1381. It has been held that Article 1191 speaks of rescission in improvements introduced on the same, with 6% interest per annum from
reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the Old Civil the time of the finality of this judgment. The Court will no longer dwell on
the matter as to who has a better right to receive the amount from the Land Transfer (CLT) No. 843 (159301) issued on October 18,
NHA: the Lalicons, who paid the amortizations and occupied the 1973.2
property, or Chua, who bought the subject lot from Victor and obtained
for herself a title to the same, as this matter was not raised as one of the On January 28, 1981, Dr. Manuel Abella (Dr. Abella) and
issues in this case. Chua’s appeal to the Court in a separate case 6 having Francisca entered into an Agreement3 whereby the Balatas
been denied due course and NHA failing to file its own petition for review, property will be exchanged with a 6,000-square meter
the CA decision ordering the restitution in favor of the Lalicons has now agricultural lot situated at San Rafael, Cararayan, Naga City
become final and binding against them. (Cararayan property). The parties agreed that in addition to the
Cararayan property, Francisca shall receive from Dr. Abella the
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals amount of P5,250.00 as disturbance compensation and a 120-
in CA-G.R. CV 82298 dated August 1, 2008.
square meter home lot situated at Balatas, Naga City.4
SO ORDERED. Dr. Abella complied with all the stipulations in the Agreement.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thru Salvador Pejo,
CESO II, Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Regional
Director5 and later DAR Regional Director Pablo S. Sayson also
HIRD DIVISION approved the Agreement.6

G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016 Subsequently, the Cararayan property was declared in the
name of Francisca, under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 01-006-
MERCEDES N. ABELLA, MA. THERESA A. BALLESTEROS 0169.7 On the other hand, the home lot at Balatas, Naga City,
AND MARIANITO N. ABELLA, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF was later sold for P7,200.00 to Felimon Delfino, Jr. (Delfino), on
FRANCISCA C. SAN JUAN namely: GLICERIA SAN JUAN February 26, 1988.8 However, CLT No. 843 (159301) was not
CAPISTRANO, BENIGNA SAN JUAN VASQUEZ, EVARISTO cancelled.
SAN JUAN, NIEVES SAN JUAN LUSTRE AND MATILDE SAN
JUAN QUILONIO, Respondents. Sometime in 1983, Benigna San Juan Vasquez (Benigna),
daughter of Francisca, sought permission from, and was allowed
DECISION by Mercedes N. Abella (Mrs. Abella), wife of Dr. Abella, to
construct a small house on the Balatas property. Thus, on
different occasions, Benigna and her children constructed their
JARDELEZA, J.:
residential houses on the property.9 Later, when Mrs. Abella
requested Benigna and her children to vacate the property, they
In this case, we reiterate the prohibition on the transfer of lands
refused, claiming ownership. This prompted Mrs. Abella to file
under Presidential Decree No. 271 (PD 27) except transfer to the
an action for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court
Government or by hereditary succession.
(MTC) of Naga City.10
The Facts
On November 26, 2004, the MTC ruled in favor of the heirs of
Dr. Abella in the unlawful detainer case.11 The MTC issued a writ
Francisca C. San Juan (Francisca), was a tenant to a parcel of
of execution12 and writ of demolition13 against Benigna and her
land consisting of six thousand (6,000) square meters owned by
sons.
petitioners, and located at Balatas, Naga City, Camarines Sur
(Balatas property). The portion was covered by Certificate of
On March 15, 2005, Benigna, for herself and in behalf of the
other heirs of Francisca namely: Gliceria San Juan-Capistrano, interest in the Balatas property in favor of an interest in the
Evaristo C. San Juan, Benigna San Juan Vasquez, Eduvejes San Cararayan property. Respondents as heirs of Francisca, in turn,
Juan-Martines, Nieves San Juan-Lustre, Maria San Juan- acquired this interest on the Cararayan property.22
Banavides and Matilde San Juan-Quilonio (respondents), filed a
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City The RTC further ruled that the Agreement did not affect the
(RTC) for quieting of title and declaration of ownership and right or interest of Francisca as a tenant. The right was
possession of real property with prayer for a temporary eventually enjoyed by one of her daughters, respondent Maria
restraining order, preliminary injunction and damages against San Juan-Banavides, who is the present possessor and
Mrs. Abella, Theresa A. Ballesteros and Marianito N. Abella cultivator of the Cararayan property. The RTC held that
(petitioners).14 The Complaint prayed for a decision declaring although there was no showing that the title to the Balatas
respondents as absolute and lawful owners of the Balatas property was cancelled or encumbered, most probably due to
property and holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for oversight, the execution of the Agreement, duly approved by
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and appearance the DAR, operates to cancel the certificate of land transfer.23
fee, litigation expenses and costs of suit.15 The RTC
subsequently granted the application for a temporary The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
restraining order.16 contending that under PD 27, title to the Balatas property could
not have been acquired by the petitioners since its transfer is
Petitioners alleged that Dr. Abella and Francisca executed the limited only to the government or the grantee's heirs by way of
Agreement for the exchange of lots because the Balatas succession. Thus, the Agreement is an invalid instrument which
property was reclassified as a high density commercial, casts a cloud on respondents' title.24
residential and urban area and hence no longer suitable for
agriculture.17 Since the Balatas property was exchanged with CA Decision
the Cararayan property on January 28, 1981, Francisca ceased
to be its owner long before she died on November 19, 1996. On October 16, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
Thus, respondents could not have inherited the Balatas ruled that the Agreement was void, for being violative of (1) PD
property.18 27 which provides that title to the land acquired pursuant to the
Decree of Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be
Respondents countered that the reclassification by the City transferable, except by hereditar}/ succession or to the
Government of Naga did not convert the use of the land from Government, in accordance with its provisions, the Code of
agricultural to residential or commercial. The authority to Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations;25 and
convert the land use of a property is vested by law in the (2) Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979 issued by the
DAR.19 They further argued that the Agreement is null and void MAR, which declares as null and void the transfer by the
as it contravened the prohibition on transfer under PD 27. Thus, beneficiaries under PD 27 of the ownership, rights and/or
the approval by the DAR was of no moment.20 possession of their farms/home lots to other persons.26 The CA
also cited Toralba v. Mercado,27 where this Court ruled that the
RTC Ruling rights and interests covered by certificates of land transfer are
beyond the commerce of man.28
The RTC rendered a Decision on April 12, 200521 dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that with the execution of The CA further ruled that the DAR approval cannot clothe the
the Agreement between Dr. Abella and Francisca, the latter's void Agreement with validity.29 In addition, the CA noted that
legal or equitable title to, or interest on the Balatas property, the classification of the Balatas property from agricultural to
ceased to exist. Under the exchange, Francisca gave up her high density commercial, residential and urban area was done
after the Agreement was executed, contrary to petitioners' (159301) had ceased to exist. This holds true even if the
claim.30 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: cancellation of the CLT was not annotated on the certificate of
land transfer and the CLT was not cancelled from the registry
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated April 12, 2005 of the book of the Registry of Deeds.36
RTC, Branch 23, Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC'2005-0033,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered, Fifth, petitioners maintain that the respondents are estopped
declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the subject from questioning the Agreement. Benigna knew of the
property covered by CLT No. 843 and quieting their title Agreement and yet, she neither complained nor moved to have
thereto. it cancelled. When Benigna sought permission from Mrs. Abella
that she be allowed to stay in the property, she recognized Mrs.
SO ORDERED.31 (Emphasis in the original.) Abella and the children as its owners. Benigna even benefited
from the benevolence of the petitioners when upon her request,
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied she and her family were allowed to construct their houses on
by the CA in a Resolution dated April 14, 2008.32 the property without paying any rentals.37

The Petition Sixth, the decision of the CA would unjustly enrich respondents
at the expense of the petitioners. Francisca, the predecessor-in-
Petitioners assail the CA Decision and Resolution on the interest of the respondents had already received, and enjoyed
following grounds: the following properties: (a) 0.600 hectare or 6,000-square
meter Cararayan property; (b) disturbance compensation of
First, the Agreement, being a mere relocation agreement, did P5,250.00; and (c) the 120-square meter Balatas home lot, all
not violate nor contravene the true spirit of PD 27 and other of which were given by Dr. Abella in exchange for the Balatas
agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations.33 property.

Second, the DAR/MAR are agencies tasked to implement PD 27 And yet, by virtue of the CA decision, the respondents would
and other agrarian laws, rules and regulations relative to the still be entitled to recover the Balatas property.38
disputed land, thus their approval of the Agreement must be
accorded great weight by the CA.34] Our Ruling

Third, Toralba v. Mercado is not applicable because Francisca I. The Agreement is void for con/ravening PD 27.
did not surrender the Balatas property to her former landowner,
Dr. Abella, as contemplated under PD 27. Instead, she received The resolution of this Petition hinges on the determination of
in return the Cararayan property.35 whether the Agreement between Dr. Abella and Francisca is
void for violating PD 27.
Fourth, PD 27 does not automatically vest ownership of a piece
of land to a. tenant-farmer beneficiary, contrary to the findings We affirm the CA ruling.
of the CA. Pending compliance with certain conditions set forth
by PD 27, a qualified farmer cannot claim the right of absolute PD 27 provides for only two exceptions to the prohibition on
ownership over the land because he is considered as a mere transfer, namely, (1) transfer by hereditary succession and (2)
prospective owner. Francisca defaulted in the payment of the transfer to the Government.39
annual amortizations for more than two years, thus, her status
as deemed owner of the landholding covered by CLT No. 843 Torres v. Ventura40 explained the provision, thus:
 xxx production. With certitude, such objective will not see the light
of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the converted for non-agricultural purposes.
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21,
1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. xxx
As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage
of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we
and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that ruled in Siacor v. Giganktna and more recently in [Calixvug-
particular property were granted by the government to him and Carmona] v. Court of Appeals, that sales or transfers of
to no other. To insure his continued possession and lands made in violation of PD 27 and EO 228 in favor of
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, persons other than the Government by other legal means
make any valid form of transfer except to the or to the farmer's successor by hereditary succession are
government or by hereditary succession, to his null and void. The prohibition even extends to the
successors. surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales
or transfers are void ab initio, being contrary to law and public
Yet, it is a fact that despite the prohibition, many farmer- policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code that "acts executed against
beneficiaries like petitioner herein were tempted to make use of the provisions of mandatory or prohibiting laws shall be void x x
their land to acquire much needed money. Hence, the then x." In this regard, the DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate
Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum measures to annul the illegal transfers and recover the land
Circular: unlawfully conveyed to non-qualified persons for disposition to
qualified beneficiaries. In the case at bar, the alleged transfers
"Despite the above prohibition, however, there are made by some if not all of respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et
reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 have al. (G.R. No. 148777) of lands covered by PD 27 to non-
transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of qualified persons are illegal and null and void.43 (Citations
their farms/homelots to other persons or omitted.)
have surrendered the same to their former landowners.
All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 In the Agreement, Dr. Abella and Francisca stipulated that the
and therefore, null and void."41 (Citations omitted, emphasis Cararayan property will be placed under Operation Land
supplied.) Transfer and that a new CLT shall be issued in the name of
Francisca.44 The parties also agreed that after the execution of
This interpretation is reiterated in Estate of the Late the Agreement, Francisca shall vacate the Balatas property and
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon,42 where we ruled: deliver its possession to Dr. Abella.45 Further, the  Deed of
Donation of Land Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 dated
Thus, PD 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land July 1, 1981 provided that "for and in consideration of the
is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the heirs [landowner-donor's] generosity and in exchange of the [tenant-
of the beneficiary or the Government. If the amortizations for tiller donee's] [farm lot] at Balatas, City of Naga, the
the land have not yet been paid, then there can be no transfer [landowner-donor] do hereby transfer and convey to the
to anybody since the lot is still owned by the Government. The [tenant-tiller-donee], by way of [donation] the parcel of land
prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of above-described."46
other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the
Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its The intended exchange of properties by the parties as
avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural expressed in the Agreement and in the Deed of Donation
entailed transfer of all the rights and interests of Francisca over
the Balatas property to Dr. Abella. It is the kind of transfer Further, as we ruled in Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de
contemplated by and prohibited by law. Thus, petitioners' Panlilio, the prohibition extends to the rights and interests of
argument that the Agreement was merely a relocation the farmer in the land even while he is still paying the
agreement, or one for the exchange or swapping of properties amortizations on it.50
between Dr. Abella and Francisca, and not a transfer or
conveyance under PD 27, has no merit. A relocation, exchange Petitioners merely alleged in their petition that since Francisca
or swap of a property is a transfer of property. They cannot defaulted in the payment of the annual amortizations for more
excuse themselves from the prohibition by a mere play on than two years, she has given a ground for the forfeiture of her
words. CLT.

We likewise agree with the CA that the DAR's approval did not We disagree. Even assuming that the respondents defaulted in
validate the Agreement. Under PD 27 and the pronouncements paying the amortization payments, default or non-payment is
of this Court, transfer of lands under PD 27 other than to not a ground for cancellation of the CLT under the law. Instead,
successors by hereditary succession and the Government is PD 27 provides that "(i)n case of default, the amortization due
void.47 A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force shall be paid by the farmers' cooperative in which the defaulting
and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered tenant-farmer is a member, with the cooperative having a right
into, and which cannot be validated either by time or of recourse against him." In any event, petitioners failed to
ratification.48 No form of validation can make the void show the cancellation of the CLT prior to the Agreement which
Agreement legal. would have removed the deemed owner status of Francisca
over the Balatas property.
II. The prohibition under PD 27
applies even if the farmer-beneficiary III. The respondents are not estopped from questioning
has not yet acquired absolute title. the Agreement.

Our ruling in Torres is clear that the prohibition applies even if Petitioners urge us to deny any equitable relief to the
the farmer-beneficiary has not yet acquired absolute title to the respondents on the ground that they did not complain or have
land, and the protection begins upon the promulgation of the the Agreement cancelled and even benefited from the
law, thus: benevolence of petitioners. Under the theory of the petitioners,
estoppel would bar the respondents from recovering the Balatas
[T]itle refers not only to that issued upon compliance by the property.51
tenant-farmer of the said conditions but also includes those
rights and interests that the tenant-farmer immediately We are not convinced. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void
acquired upon the promulgation of the law. To rule otherwise contract or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against
would make a tenant-farmer falling in the category of those public policy.52
who have not yet been issued a formal title to the land they till
— easy prey to those who would like to tempt them with cash in In Torres, we refused to apply the principle of pari delicto  which
exchange for inchoate title over the same. Following this, would in effect have deprived the leasehold tenant of his right
absolute title over lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 to recover the landholding which was illegally disposed of. We
would end up in the name of persons who were not the actual ruled that "(t)o hold otherwise will defeat the spirit and intent of
tillers when the law was promulgated.49 [PD 27] and the tillers will never be emancipated from the
bondage of the soil."53 In  Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of benefit is derived at the expense of another.
Midsayap, et al.,54 we explained:
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is
xxx Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari without just cause or consideration.57
delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-
interest has carried out the sale with the presumed The consequence of our declaration that the Agreement is void
knowledge of its illegality (8 Manresa 4th ed., pp. 717- is that the respondents, as heirs of Francisca, have the right to
718), but because the subject of the transaction is a the Balatas property. This would unjustly enrich respondents at
piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as the expense of petitioners, predecessors-in-interest of Dr.
heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it Abella. To remedy this unjust result, respondents should return
was given by law to her family for her home and to the petitioners the consideration given by Dr. Abel la in
cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead exchange for the Balatas property: a) the Cararayan property;
law is predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra). This right b) P5,250.00 disturbance compensation; and c) the 120-square
cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of meter home lot in Balatas, Naga City. We note however, that
any citizen to barter away what public policy by law the 120-square meter home lot in Balatas, Naga City has
seeks to preserve" (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Pantaleon already been sold and transferred to Delfino who was not
de las Ama, et al., 74 Phil., 3). We are, therefore, constrained impleaded in this case. Thus, without prejudice to whatever
to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being in right petitioners have against Delfino, respondents should pay
furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead petitioners the fair market value of the Balatas home lot at the
law."55 (Emphasis supplied.) time it was transferred to respondents. Such fair market value
shall be subject to determination by the trial court.
chanrobleslaw

Thus, respondents were not estopped from questioning the

validity of the Agreement as it contravened the prohibition WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the CA dated October
under PD 27 on the transfer of land. The tenant-farmer cannot 16, 2007 and Resolution dated April 14, 2008
barter away the benefit and protection granted in its favor by are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondents
law as it would defeat the policy behind PD 27. should return to the petitioners the 6,000-square meter parcel
of land located in Cararayan, Naga City, Camarines Sur, and the
IV. The nullity of the Agreement amount of P5,250.00 with legal interest computed at the rate of
requires the return of the parties to the 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment until
status quo ante to avoid unjust fully paid. This case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court,
enrichment. Branch 23, Naga City for the determination of the fair market
value of the Balatas home lot at the time of donation.
In Flores v. Undo, Jr.,56 we laid down the elements of unjust
enrichment as follows: SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a

benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience." The principle of unjust
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
 epublic of the Philippines deliver them to its (the consignee’s) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, in turn7 

SUPREME COURT engaged the services of TVI to send a barge and tugboat at shipside.

THIRD DIVISION On October 26, 1991, around 4:30 p.m., TVI’s tugboat "Lailani" towed the
barge "Erika V" to shipside. 8

G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005

By 7:00 p.m. also of October 26, 1991, the tugboat, after positioning the
SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION, Petitioners, barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. At 9:00 9 

vs. p.m., arrastre operator Ocean Terminal Services Inc. commenced to

TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge.
LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now INCHCAPE
SHIPPING SERVICES, Respondents. By 12:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991 during which the weather condition
had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto
DECISION the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No tugboat pulled the barge
10 

back to the pier, however.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
At around 5:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to strong waves, the crew
11 

On petition for review is the June 27, 2001 Decision of the Court of
1  of the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge
Appeals, as well as its Resolution dated September 28, 2001 denying the
2  pitched and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the
motion for reconsideration, which affirmed that of Branch 21 of the 37 coils into the sea. At 7:00 a.m., a tugboat finally arrived to pull the
12 

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 92-63132 holding
3  already empty and damaged barge back to the pier. 13

petitioner Schmitz Transport Brokerage Corporation (Schmitz Transport),

together with Black Sea Shipping Corporation (Black Sea), represented Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and
by its ship agent Inchcape Shipping Inc. (Inchcape), and Transport Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile.
14

Venture (TVI), solidarily liable for the loss of 37 hot rolled steel sheets in
coil that were washed overboard a barge. Little Giant thus filed a formal claim against Industrial Insurance which
paid it the amount of ₱5,246,113.11. Little Giant thereupon executed a
On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the subrogation receipt in favor of Industrial Insurance.
15 

port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V "Alexander Saveliev" (a vessel of

Russian registry and owned by Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets in Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport,
coil weighing 6,992,450 metric tons. TVI, and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants)
before the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little
The cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor Giant plus adjustment fees, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. 16

of the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were 4 

insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance Company Ltd. Industrial Insurance faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading
(Industrial Insurance) under Marine Policy No. M-91-3747-TIS. 5
of the cargoes while typhoon signal No. 1 was raised in Metro Manila. 17

The vessel arrived at the port of Manila on October 24, 1991 and the By Decision of November 24, 1997, Branch 21 of the RTC held all the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the defendants negligent for unloading the cargoes outside of the breakwater
outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. 6
notwithstanding the storm signal. The dispositive portion of the decision
18 

reads:
Schmitz Transport, whose services the consignee engaged to secure the
requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in Petitioner asserts that in chartering the barge and tugboat of TVI, it was
favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and acting for its principal, consignee Little Giant, hence, the transportation
severally the sum of ₱5,246,113.11 with interest from the date the contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI. 28

complaint was filed until fully satisfied, as well as the sum of ₱5,000.00
representing the adjustment fee plus the sum of 20% of the amount By Resolution of January 23, 2002, herein respondents Industrial
recoverable from the defendants as attorney’s fees plus the costs of suit. Insurance, Black Sea, and TVI were required to file their respective
The counterclaims and cross claims of defendants are hereby Comments. 29

DISMISSED for lack of [m]erit. 19

By its Comment, Black Sea argued that the cargoes were received by the
To the trial court’s decision, the defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI consignee through petitioner in good order, hence, it cannot be faulted, it
filed a joint motion for reconsideration assailing the finding that they are having had no control and supervision thereover. 30

common carriers and the award of excessive attorney’s fees of more than
₱1,000,000. And they argued that they were not motivated by gross or For its part, TVI maintained that it acted as a passive party as it merely
evident bad faith and that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.  20
received the cargoes and transferred them unto the barge upon the
instruction of petitioner.
31

By resolution of February 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration.  21
In issue then are:

All the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, by decision of (1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event,
June 27, 2001, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court,  it finding
22 
independent of any act of negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea
that all the defendants were common carriers — Black Sea and TVI for and TVI, and
engaging in the transport of goods and cargoes over the seas as a
regular business and not as an isolated transaction, and Schmitz
23 

(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to
Transport for entering into a contract with Little Giant to transport the
Black Sea, petitioner and TVI.
cargoes from ship to port for a fee. 24

When a fortuitous event occurs, Article 1174 of the Civil Code absolves
In holding all the defendants solidarily liable, the appellate court ruled that
any party from any and all liability arising therefrom:
"each one was essential such that without each other’s contributory
negligence the incident would not have happened and so much so that
the person principally liable cannot be distinguished with sufficient ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
accuracy." 25 otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
In discrediting the defense of fortuitous event, the appellate court held
inevitable.
that "although defendants obviously had nothing to do with the force of
nature, they however had control of where to anchor the vessel, where
discharge will take place and even when the discharging will In order, to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of
commence." 26 the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if
The defendants’ respective motions for reconsideration having been
it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must
denied by Resolution of September 28, 2001, Schmitz Transport
27 

be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in

(hereinafter referred to as petitioner) filed the present petition against
any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
TVI, Industrial Insurance and Black Sea.
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
32
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, this Court, as did the appellate court,
the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human finds that petitioner is a common carrier. For it undertook to transport the
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of cargoes from the shipside of "M/V Alexander Saveliev" to the consignee’s
the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the warehouse at Cainta, Rizal. As the appellate court put it, "as long as a
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or person or corporation holds [itself] to the public for the purpose of
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from transporting goods as [a] business, [it] is already considered a common
the rules applicable to the acts of God. 33
carrier regardless if [it] owns the vehicle to be used or has to hire
one." That petitioner is a common carrier, the testimony of its own Vice-
42 

The appellate court, in affirming the finding of the trial court that human President and General Manager Noel Aro that part of the services it
intervention in the form of contributory negligence by all the defendants offers to its clients as a brokerage firm includes the transportation of
resulted to the loss of the cargoes, held that unloading outside the
34  cargoes reflects so.
breakwater, instead of inside the breakwater, while a storm signal was up
constitutes negligence. It thus concluded that the proximate cause of the
35 
Atty. Jubay: Will you please tell us what [are you] functions x x x as
loss was Black Sea’s negligence in deciding to unload the cargoes at an Executive Vice-President and General Manager of said Company?
unsafe place and while a typhoon was approaching. 36

Mr. Aro: Well, I oversee the entire operation of the brokerage and

From a review of the records of the case, there is no indication that there transport business of the company. I also handle the various division
was greater risk in loading the cargoes outside the breakwater. As the heads of the company for operation matters, and all other related
defendants proffered, the weather on October 26, 1991 remained normal functions that the President may assign to me from time to time, Sir.
with moderate sea condition such that port operations continued and
proceeded normally. 37
Q: Now, in connection [with] your duties and functions as you mentioned,
will you please tell the Honorable Court if you came to know the company
The weather data report, furnished and verified by the Chief of the
38 
by the name Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation?
Climate Data Section of PAG-ASA and marked as a common exhibit of
the parties, states that while typhoon signal No. 1 was hoisted over Metro A: Yes, Sir. Actually, we are the brokerage firm of that Company.
Manila on October 23-31, 1991, the sea condition at the port of Manila at
5:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. of October 26, 1991 was moderate. It cannot, Q: And since when have you been the brokerage firm of that company, if
therefore, be said that the defendants were negligent in not unloading the you can recall?
cargoes upon the barge on October 26, 1991 inside the breakwater.
A: Since 1990, Sir.
That no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after the cargoes were
completely loaded by 12:30 in the morning is, however, a material fact
39 

Q: Now, you said that you are the brokerage firm of this Company. What
which the appellate court failed to properly consider and
work or duty did you perform in behalf of this company?
appreciate — the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes. Had the
40 

barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea
conditions notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the A: We handled the releases (sic) of their cargo[es] from the Bureau of
barge was left floating in open sea until big waves set in at 5:30 a.m., Customs. We [are] also in-charged of the delivery of the goods to their
causing it to sink along with the cargoes. The loss thus falls outside the
41  warehouses. We also handled the clearances of their shipment at the
"act of God doctrine." Bureau of Customs, Sir.

The proximate cause of the loss having been determined, who among xxx
the parties is/are responsible therefor?
Q: Now, what precisely [was] your agreement with this Little Giant Steel Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
Pipe Corporation with regards to this shipment? What work did you do associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
with this shipment? passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public.
A: We handled the unloading of the cargo[es] from vessel to lighter and
then the delivery of [the] cargo[es] from lighter to BASECO then to the xxx
truck and to the warehouse, Sir.
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business
Q: Now, in connection with this work which you are doing, Mr. Witness, activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as
you are supposed to perform, what equipment do (sic) you require or did an ancillary activity. The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a
you use in order to effect this unloading, transfer and delivery to the common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to
warehouse? prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents
as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes
A: Actually, we used the barges for the ship side operations, this to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. 45

unloading [from] vessel to lighter, and on this we hired or we sub-

contracted with [T]ransport Ventures, Inc. which [was] in-charged (sic) of And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc., this Court held that as
46 

the barges. Also, in BASECO compound we are leasing cranes to have the transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker, the
the cargo unloaded from the barge to trucks, [and] then we used trucks to customs broker is also a common carrier. For to declare otherwise "would
deliver [the cargoes] to the consignee’s warehouse, Sir. be to deprive those with whom [it] contracts the protection which the law
affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods
Q: And whose trucks do you use from BASECO compound to the for [its] customers, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business." 47

consignee’s warehouse?
As for petitioner’s argument that being the agent of Little Giant, any
A: We utilized of (sic) our own trucks and we have some other contracted negligence it committed was deemed the negligence of its principal, it
trucks, Sir. does not persuade.

xxx True, petitioner was the broker-agent of Little Giant in securing the
release of the cargoes. In effecting the transportation of the cargoes from
ATTY. JUBAY: Will you please explain to us, to the Honorable Court why the shipside and into Little Giant’s warehouse, however, petitioner was
is it you have to contract for the barges of Transport Ventures discharging its own personal obligation under a contact of carriage.
Incorporated in this particular operation?
Petitioner, which did not have any barge or tugboat, engaged the
A: Firstly, we don’t own any barges. That is why we hired the services of services of TVI as handler to provide the barge and the tugboat. In their
48 

another firm whom we know [al]ready for quite sometime, which is Service Contract, while Little Giant was named as the consignee,
49 

Transport Ventures, Inc. (Emphasis supplied) 43 petitioner did not disclose that it was acting on commission and was
chartering the vessel for Little Giant. Little Giant did not thus
50 

automatically become a party to the Service Contract and was not,

It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker may be
therefore, bound by the terms and conditions therein.
regarded as a common carrier. Thus, this Court, in A.F. Sanchez
Brokerage, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, held:
44 

Not being a party to the service contract, Little Giant cannot directly sue
TVI based thereon but it can maintain a cause of action for negligence. 51

The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a customs broker, to
be also a common carrier, as defined under Article 1732 of the Civil
Code, to wit,
In the case of TVI, while it acted as a private carrier for which it was reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to
under no duty to observe extraordinary diligence, it was still required to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea
observe ordinary diligence to ensure the proper and careful handling, conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to
care and discharge of the carried goods. extend help, but it did not.

Thus, Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code provide: This Court holds then that petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the
56 

loss of the cargoes. The following pronouncement of the Supreme Court

ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty is instructive:
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply. the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only
shall be required. be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. x x x [O]ne might ask
Was the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on one hand,
would have used in the same situation exercised by TVI? 52 and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would
be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
This Court holds not.
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code
can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
TVI’s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an
that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.57

sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is
totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the
and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging
time the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its
overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat.
possession and received for transportation until they were delivered
actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant.58

As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article

1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or
53 

Parties to a contract of carriage may, however, agree upon a definition of

minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence of the storm in
delivery that extends the services rendered by the carrier. In the case at
order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.
bar, Bill of Lading No. 2 covering the shipment provides that delivery be
made "to the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get,
While petitioner sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to
54  55 
always afloat." The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from
59 

counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and

"pier to pier" but from the shipside of "M/V Alexander Saveliev" and into .R. No. L-15645             January 31, 1964
barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of
petitioner. Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to PAZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA, plaintiffs-appellees,
Little Giant, through petitioner, it had discharged its duty. 60
vs.
NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, defendant-appellant,
In fine, no liability may thus attach to Black Sea. MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant-appellee.

Respecting the award of attorney’s fees in an amount over Teehankee and Carreon for plaintiffs-appellees.
₱1,000,000.00 to Industrial Insurance, for lack of factual and legal basis, The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.
this Court sets it aside. While Industrial Insurance was compelled to Isidro A. Vera for defendant-appellee.
litigate its rights, such fact by itself does not justify the award of attorney’s
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. For no sufficient showing of REGALA, J.:
bad faith would be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than
an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. To award 61 
This is an appeal of the defendant-appellant NARIC from the decision of
attorney’s fees to a party just because the judgment is rendered in its the trial court dated February 20, 1958, awarding to the plaintiffs-
favor would be tantamount to imposing a premium on one’s right to appellees the amount of $286,000.00 as damages for breach of contract
litigate or seek judicial redress of legitimate grievances. 62
and dismissing the counterclaim and third party complaint of the
defendant-appellant NARIC.
On the award of adjustment fees: The adjustment fees and expense of
divers were incurred by Industrial Insurance in its voluntary but In accordance with Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3452, "the National
unsuccessful efforts to locate and retrieve the lost cargo. They do not Rice and Corn Administration (NARIC) is hereby abolished and all its
constitute actual damages. 63
assets, liabilities, functions, powers which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, and all personnel are transferred "to the Rice and
As for the court a quo’s award of interest on the amount claimed, the Corn Administration (RCA).
same calls for modification following the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals that when the demand cannot be reasonably
64 
All references, therefore, to the NARIC in this decision must accordingly
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to be adjusted and read as RCA pursuant to the aforementioned law.
run not from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially but
from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which the time the
On May 19, 1952, plaintiff-appellee participated in the public bidding
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
called by the NARIC for the supply of 20,000 metric tons of Burmese rice.
ascertained). 65

As her bid of $203.00 per metric ton was the lowest, she was awarded
the contract for the same. Accordingly, on July 1, 1952, plaintiff-appellee
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner Schmitz Paz P. Arrieta and the appellant corporation entered into a Contract of
Transport & Brokerage Corporation, and Transport Venture Incorporation Sale of Rice, under the terms of which the former obligated herself to
jointly and severally liable for the amount of ₱5,246,113.11 with the deliver to the latter 20,000 metric tons of Burmess Rice at $203.00 per
MODIFICATION that interest at SIX PERCENT per annum of the amount metric ton, CIF Manila. In turn, the defendant corporation committed itself
due should be computed from the promulgation on November 24, 1997 of to pay for the imported rice "by means of an irrevocable, confirmed and
the decision of the trial court. assignable letter of credit in U.S. currency in favor of the plaintiff-appellee
and/or supplier in Burma, immediately." Despite the commitment to pay
Costs against petitioner. immediately "by means of an irrevocable, confirmed and assignable
Letter of Credit," however, it was only on July 30, 1952, or a full month
from the execution of the contract, that the defendant corporation, thru its
general manager, took the first to open a letter of credit by forwarding to
the Philippine National Bank its Application for Commercial Letter Credit. Consequently, the credit instrument applied for was opened only on
The application was accompanied by a transmittal letter, the relevant September 8, 1952 "in favor of Thiri Setkya, Rangoon, Burma, and/or
paragraphs of which read: assignee for $3,614,000.00," (which is more than two months from the
execution of the contract) the party named by the appellee as beneficiary
In view of the fact that we do not have sufficient deposit with your of the letter of credit.
1äwphï1.ñët

institution with which to cover the amount required to be

deposited as a condition for the opening of letters of credit, we As a result of the delay, the allocation of appellee's supplier in Rangoon
will appreciate it if this application could be considered special was cancelled and the 5% deposit, amounting to 524,000 kyats or
case. approximately P200,000.00 was forfeited. In this connection, it must be
made of record that although the Burmese authorities had set August 4,
We understand that our supplier, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta, has a 1952, as the deadline for the remittance of the required letter of credit,
deadline to meet which is August 4, 1952, and in order to comply the cancellation of the allocation and the confiscation of the 5% deposit
therewith, it is imperative that the L/C be opened prior to that were not effected until August 20, 1952, or, a full half month after the
date. We would therefore request your full cooperation on this expiration of the deadline. And yet, even with the 15-day grace, appellant
matter. corporation was unable to make good its commitment to open the
disputed letter of credit.
On the same day, July 30, 1952, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta thru counsel,
advised the appellant corporation of the extreme necessity for the The appellee endeavored, but failed, to restore the cancelled Burmese
immediate opening of the letter credit since she had by then made a rice allocation. When the futility of reinstating the same became apparent,
tender to her supplier in Rangoon, Burma, "equivalent to 5% of the she offered to substitute Thailand rice instead to the defendant NARIC,
F.O.B. price of 20,000 tons at $180.70 and in compliance with the communicating at the same time that the offer was "a solution which
regulations in Rangoon this 5% will be confiscated if the required letter of should be beneficial to the NARIC and to us at the same time." (Exh. X-
credit is not received by them before August 4, 1952." Pe., Exh. 25—Def., p. 38, Folder of Exhibits). This offer for substitution,
however, was rejected by the appellant in a resolution dated November
On August 4, 1952, the Philippine National Bank informed the appellant 15, 1952.
corporation that its application, "for a letter of credit for $3,614,000.00 in
favor of Thiri Setkya has been approved by the Board of Directors with On the foregoing, the appellee sent a letter to the appellant, demanding
the condition that marginal cash deposit be paid and that drafts are to be compensation for the damages caused her in the sum of $286,000.00,
paid upon presentment." (Exh. J-pl.; Exh. 10-def., p. 19, Folder of U.S. currency, representing unrealized profit. The demand having been
Exhibits). Furthermore, the Bank represented that it "will hold your rejected she instituted this case now on appeal.
application in abeyance pending compliance with the above stated
requirement." At the instance of the NARIC, a counterclaim was filed and the Manila
Underwriters Insurance Company was brought to the suit as a third party
As it turned out, however, the appellant corporation not in any financial defendant to hold it liable on the performance bond it executed in favor of
position to meet the condition. As matter of fact, in a letter dated August the plaintiff-appellee.
2, 1952, the NARIC bluntly confessed to the appellee its dilemma: "In this
connection, please be advised that our application for opening of the We find for the appellee.
letter of credit has been presented to the bank since July 30th but the
latter requires that we first deposit 50% of the value of the letter It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
amounting to aproximately $3,614,000.00 which we are not in a position cancellation of the allocation contracted by the appellee herein in
to meet." (Emphasis supplied. Exh. 9-Def.; Exh. 1-Pe., p. 18, Folder of Rangoon, Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit to be opened with
Exhibits) the contemplated period. This failure must, therefore, be taken as the
immediate cause for the consequent damage which resulted. As it is
then, the disposition of this case depends on a determination of who was Secondly, from the correspondence and communications which form part
responsible for such failure. Stated differently, the issue is whether of the record of this case, it is clear that what singularly delayed the
appellant's failure to open immediately the letter of credit in dispute opening of the stipulated letter of credit and which, in turn, caused the
amounted to a breach of the contract of July 1, 1952 for which it may be cancellation of the allocation in Burma, was the inability of the appellant
held liable in damages. corporation to meet the condition importation by the Bank for granting the
same. We do not think the appellant corporation can refute the fact that
Appellant corporation disclaims responsibility for the delay in the opening had it been able to put up the 50% marginal cash deposit demanded by
of the letter of credit. On the contrary, it insists that the fault lies with the the bank, then the letter of credit would have been approved, opened and
appellee. Appellant contends that the disputed negotiable instrument was released as early as August 4, 1952. The letter of the Philippine National
not promptly secured because the appellee , failed to seasonably furnish Bank to the NARIC was plain and explicit that as of the said date,
data necessary and required for opening the same, namely, "(1) the appellant's "application for a letter of credit ... has been approved by the
amount of the letter of credit, (2) the person, company or corporation in Board of Directors with the condition that 50% marginal cash deposit be
whose favor it is to be opened, and (3) the place and bank where it may paid and that drafts are to be paid upon presentment." (Emphasis
be negotiated." Appellant would have this Court believe, therefore, that supplied)
had these informations been forthwith furnished it, there would have been
no delay in securing the instrument. The liability of the appellant, however, stems not alone from this failure or
inability to satisfy the requirements of the bank. Its culpability arises from
Appellant's explanation has neither force nor merit. In the first place, the its willful and deliberate assumption of contractual obligations even as it
explanation reaches into an area of the proceedings into which We are was well aware of its financial incapacity to undertake the prestation. We
not at liberty to encroach. The explanation refers to a question of fact. base this judgment upon the letter which accompanied the application
Nothing in the record suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct on the filed by the appellant with the bank, a part of which letter was quoted
part of the trial judge in the formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on earlier in this decision. In the said accompanying correspondence,
the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are appellant admitted and owned that it did "not have sufficient deposit with
denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, consonant to the your institution (the PNB) with which to cover the amount required to be
time-honored tradition of this Tribunal to hold trial judges better situated deposited as a condition for the opening of letters of credit. ... .
to make conclusions on questions of fact. For the record, We quote
hereunder the lower court's ruling on the point: A number of logical inferences may be drawn from the aforementioned
admission. First, that the appellant knew the bank requirements for
The defense that the delay, if any in opening the letter of credit opening letters of credit; second, that appellant also knew it could not
was due to the failure of plaintiff to name the supplier, the amount meet those requirement. When, therefore, despite this awareness that
and the bank is not tenable. Plaintiff stated in Court that these was financially incompetent to open a letter of credit immediately,
facts were known to defendant even before the contract was appellant agreed in paragraph 8 of the contract to pay immediately "by
executed because these facts were necessarily revealed to the means of an irrevocable, confirm and assignable letter of credit," it must
defendant before she could qualify as a bidder. She stated too be similarly held to have bound itself to answer for all and every
that she had given the necessary data immediately after the consequences that would result from the representation. aptly observed
execution of Exh. "A" (the contract of July 1, 1952) to Mr. by the trial court:
GABRIEL BELMONTE, General Manager of the NARIC, both
orally and in writing and that she also pressed for the opening of ... Having called for bids for the importation of rice involving
the letter of credit on these occasions. These statements have millions, $4,260,000.00 to be exact, it should have a certained its
not been controverted and defendant NARIC, notwithstanding its ability and capacity to comply with the inevitably requirements in
previous intention to do so, failed to present Mr. Belmonte to cash to pay for such importation. Having announced the bid, it
testify or refute this. ... must be deemed to have impliedly assured suppliers of its
capacity and facility to finance the importation within the required
period, especially since it had imposed the supplier the 90-day
 period within which the shipment of the rice must be brought into Considering freights, insurance and charges incident to its shipment here
the Philippines. Having entered in the contract, it should have and the forfeiture of the 5% deposit, the award granted by the lower court
taken steps immediately to arrange for the letter of credit for the is fair and equitable. For a clearer view of the equity of the damages
large amount involved and inquired into the possibility of its awarded, We reproduce below the testimony of the appellee, adequately
issuance. supported by the evidence and record:

In relation to the aforequoted observation of the trial court, We would like Q. Will you please tell the court, how much is the damage you
to make reference also to Article 11 of the Civil Code which provides: suffered?

Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of A. Because the selling price of my rice is $203.00 per metric ton,
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner and the cost price of my rice is $180.00 We had to pay also $6.25
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable in damages. for shipping and about $164 for insurance. So adding the cost of
the rice, the freight, the insurance, the total would be about
Under this provision, not only debtors guilty of fraud, negligence or $187.99 that would be $15.01 gross profit per metric ton, multiply
default in the performance of obligations a decreed liable; in general, by 20,000 equals $300,200, that is my supposed profit if I went
every debtor who fails in performance of his obligations is bound to through the contract.
indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby (De la Cruz
Seminary of Manila, 18 Phil. 330; Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, The above testimony of the plaintiff was a general approximation of the
21 Phil. 184; De la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982; Maluenda & Co. v. actual figures involved in the transaction. A precise and more exact
Enriquez, 46 Phil. 916; Pasumil v. Chong, 49 Phil. 1003; Pando v. demonstration of the equity of the award herein is provided by Exhibit HH
Gimenez, 54 Phil. 459; Acme Films v. Theaters Supply, 63 Phil. 657). of the plaintiff and Exhibit 34 of the defendant, hereunder quoted so far
The phrase "any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation includes as germane.
any illicit act which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the
obligation or every kind or defective performance. (IV Tolentino, Civil It is equally of record now that as shown in her request dated July
Code of the Philippines, citing authorities, p. 103.) 29, 1959, and other communications subsequent thereto for the
opening by your corporation of the required letter of credit, Mrs.
The NARIC would also have this Court hold that the subsequent offer to Arrieta was supposed to pay her supplier in Burma at the rate of
substitute Thailand rice for the originally contracted Burmese rice One Hundred Eighty Dollars and Seventy Cents ($180.70) in U.S.
amounted to a waiver by the appellee of whatever rights she might have Currency, per ton plus Eight Dollars ($8.00) in the same currency
derived from the breach of the contract. We disagree. Waivers are not per ton for shipping and other handling expenses, so that she is
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express already assured of a net profit of Fourteen Dollars and Thirty
stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable explanation. (Ramirez v. Cents ($14.30), U.S., Currency, per ton or a total of Two Hundred
Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 779.) In the case at bar, no such intent to and Eighty Six Thousand Dollars ($286,000.00), U.S. Currency,
waive has been established. in the aforesaid transaction. ...

We have carefully examined and studied the oral and documentary Lastly, herein appellant filed a counterclaim asserting that it has suffered,
evidence presented in this case and upon which the lower court based its likewise by way of unrealized profit damages in the total sum of
award. Under the contract, the NARIC bound itself to buy 20,000 metric $406,000.00 from the failure of the projected contract to materialize. This
tons of Burmese rice at "$203.00 U.S. Dollars per metric ton, all net counterclaim was supported by a cost study made and submitted by the
shipped weight, and all in U.S. currency, C.I.F. Manila ..." On the other appellant itself and wherein it was illustrated how indeed had the
hand, documentary and other evidence establish with equal certainty that importation pushed thru, NARIC would have realized in profit the amount
the plaintiff-appellee was able to secure the contracted commodity at the asserted in the counterclaim. And yet, the said amount of P406,000.00
cost price of $180.70 per metric ton from her supplier in Burma. was realizable by appellant despite a number of expenses which the
appellee under the contract, did not have to incur. Thus, under the cost executed. The appellee insurance company, in the light of this judgment,
study submitted by the appellant, banking and unloading charges were to is relieved of any liability under this suit. No pronouncement as to costs.
be shouldered by it, including an Import License Fee of 2% and
superintendence fee of $0.25 per metric ton. If the NARIC stood to profit G.R. No. 126297             January 31, 2007
over P400 000.00 from the disputed transaction inspite of the extra
expenditures from which the herein appellee was exempt, we are PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
convicted of the fairness of the judgment presently under appeal. vs.
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
In the premises, however, a minor modification must be effected in the
dispositive portion of the decision appeal from insofar as it expresses the x-----------------------x
amount of damages in U.S. currency and not in Philippine Peso. Republic
Act 529 specifically requires the discharge of obligations only "in any coin
G.R. No. 126467            January 31, 2007
or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and
private debts." In view of that law, therefore, the award should be
converted into and expressed in Philippine Peso. NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO AGANA III,
ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA,
and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA, Petitioners,
This brings us to a consideration of what rate of exchange should apply
vs.
in the conversion here decreed. Should it be at the time of the breach, at
JUAN FUENTES, Respondent.
the time the obligation was incurred or at the rate of exchange prevailing
on the promulgation of this decision.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x
In the case of Engel v. Velasco & Co., 47 Phil. 115, We ruled that in an
action for recovery of damages for breach of contract, even if the G.R. No. 127590            January 31, 2007
obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a sum of
money expressed in American currency, the indemnity to be allowed MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner,
should be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at the vs.
time of the judgment rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
date of defendant's breach. This ruling, however, can neither be applied
nor extended to the case at bar for the same was laid down when there DECISION
was no law against stipulating foreign currencies in Philippine contracts.
But now we have Republic Act No. 529 which expressly declares such SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
stipulations as contrary to public policy, void and of no effect. And, as We
already pronounced in the case of Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. v. Juan Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankind’s most important and
Ysmael & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-9090, September 10, 1957, if there is any delicate endeavors, must assume the grave responsibility of pursuing it
agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than Philippine legal with appropriate care. The care and service dispensed through this high
tender, the same is null and void as contrary to public policy (Republic trust, however technical, complex and esoteric its character may be, must
Act 529), and the most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation meet standards of responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to
in Philippine currency "to be measured in the prevailing rate of exchange preserve and protect the health, and indeed, the very lives of those
at the time the obligation was incurred (Sec. 1, idem)." placed in the hospital’s keeping.1

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is
affirmed, with the sole modification that the award should be converted the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated September 6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
into the Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 affirming with modification the
obligation was incurred or on July 1, 1952 when the contract was
Decision3 dated March 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was
Branch 96, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and nullifying its free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines.
Order dated September 21, 1993.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering
The facts, as culled from the records, are: from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of
General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains
movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical would soon vanish.
examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed
her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified,
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff 4 of the Medical Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A
ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced
obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was
Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad
hysterectomy on her. underwent another surgery.

After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC,
completed the operation and closed the incision. Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They
Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of
these remarks: gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence.
"sponge count lacking 2
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for
malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as
closure."
Administrative Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the
case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire
On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States.
and medical bills, including the doctors’ fees, amounted to P60,000.00.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases,
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named children
anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They (the Aganas).
told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.
Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and
malpractice, the decretal part of which reads:
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the
United States to seek further treatment. After four months of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs ordering the Ampil and sold them for P451,275.00 and delivered the amount to the
defendants PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., DR. MIGUEL AMPIL and Aganas.
DR. JUAN FUENTES to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, except
in respect of the award for exemplary damages and the interest thereon Following their receipt of the money, the Aganas entered into an
which are the liabilities of defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes only, as agreement with PSI and Dr. Fuentes to indefinitely suspend any further
follows: execution of the RTC Decision. However, not long thereafter, the Aganas
again filed a motion for an alias writ of execution against the properties of
1. As actual damages, the following amounts: PSI and Dr. Fuentes. On September 21, 1993, the RTC granted the
motion and issued the corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file
a. The equivalent in Philippine Currency of the total of with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
US$19,900.00 at the rate of P21.60-US$1.00, as prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
reimbursement of actual expenses incurred in the United During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 5 dated
States of America; October 29, 1993 granting Dr. Fuentes’ prayer for injunctive relief.

b. The sum of P4,800.00 as travel taxes of plaintiffs and On January 24, 1994, CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 was consolidated with CA-
their physician daughter; G.R. CV No. 42062.

c. The total sum of P45,802.50, representing the cost of Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board of Medicine rendered
hospitalization at Polymedic Hospital, medical fees, and its Decision6 in Administrative Case No. 1690 dismissing the case against
cost of the saline solution; Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that the prosecution failed to show that Dr.
Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s
2. As moral damages, the sum of P2,000,000.00; body; and that he concealed such fact from Natividad.

3. As exemplary damages, the sum of P300,000.00; On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision jointly
disposing of CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198, thus:
4. As attorney’s fees, the sum of P250,000.00;
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the case against
defendant-appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED, and with
5. Legal interest on items 1 (a), (b), and (c); 2; and 3
the pronouncement that defendant-appellant Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to
hereinabove, from date of filing of the complaint until full payment;
reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever
and
amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal
6. Costs of suit. DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. Concomitant with the above, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by herein defendant-appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes in CA-G.R. SP No.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the 32198 is hereby GRANTED and the challenged order of the respondent
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 42062. judge dated September 21, 1993, as well as the alias writ of execution
issued pursuant thereto are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Incidentally, on April 3, 1993, the Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for bond posted by the petitioner in connection with the writ of preliminary
a partial execution of its Decision, which was granted in an Order dated injunction issued by this Court on November 29, 1993 is hereby
May 11, 1993. Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon certain properties of Dr. cancelled.
Costs against defendants-appellants Dr. Miguel Ampil and Professional Dr. Ampil, in an attempt to absolve himself, gears the Court’s attention to
Services, Inc. other possible causes of Natividad’s detriment. He argues that the Court
should not discount either of the following possibilities: first, Dr. Fuentes
SO ORDERED. left the gauzes in Natividad’s body after performing hysterectomy;
second, the attending nurses erred in counting the gauzes; and third, the
Only Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a American doctors were the ones who placed the gauzes in Natividad’s
Resolution7 dated December 19, 1996. body.

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions. Dr. Ampil’s arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. Records
show that he did not present any evidence to prove that the American
doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes in Natividad’s body.
In G.R. No. 126297, PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals
Neither did he submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of
erred in holding that: (1) it is estopped from raising the defense that Dr.
operation, particularly the number of gauzes used. As to the alleged
Ampil is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it
negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful that Dr. Ampil examined his
is not entitled to its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that
(Dr. Fuentes’) work and found it in order.
Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a mere consultant or independent
contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.
The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as
specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as the
In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred
negligent party, thus:
in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical
malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contend that
the pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges
have been negligent. to control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation.

Finally, in G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted
erred in finding him liable for negligence and malpractice sans evidence in the surgery noted in their report that the ‘sponge count (was)
that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividad’s vagina. He pointed to lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and
other probable causes, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes that a ‘search was done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to
in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the attending nurses’ failure to ‘continue for closure’ x x x.
properly count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad in the Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the
United States of America. same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was
performed.
For our resolution are these three vital issues: first, whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice; An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
any liability; and third, whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the
negligence of Dr. Ampil. incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the
operating surgeon.8 To put it simply, such act is considered so
I - G.R. No. 127590 inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There
are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence
per se.9
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil

Liable for Negligence and Malpractice.

Of course, the Court is not blind to the reality that there are times when Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s
danger to a patient’s life precludes a surgeon from further searching negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was
missing sponges or foreign objects left in the body. But this does not his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of
leave him free from any obligation. Even if it has been shown that a Natividad and her family.
surgeon was required by the urgent necessities of the case to leave a
sponge in his patient’s abdomen, because of the dangers attendant upon II - G.R. No. 126467
delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform his patient within a reasonable
time thereafter by advising her of what he had been compelled to do. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving
This is in order that she might seek relief from the effects of the foreign
object left in her body as her condition might permit. The ruling in Smith
Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
v. Zeagler10 is explicit, thus:
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against
The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when
Dr. Fuentes on the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa
a physician or surgeon fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his
loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze were left
patient’s body that should be removed as part of the operation, he
inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes’
thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition
negligence.
which imposes upon him the legal duty of calling the new condition to his
patient’s attention, and endeavoring with the means he has at hand to
minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom. We are not convinced.

Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule
gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Stated
was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of
deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury
is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately,
explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and
medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient
the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed
must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something
due care and diligence.14
which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. 11 Simply put, From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the
the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of
as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the
failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had
breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most
surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause12 of instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which caused
Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision the injury."15
despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of
gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from
We find the element of "control and management of the thing which The third issue necessitates a glimpse at the historical development of
caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur hospitals and the resulting theories concerning their liability for the
will not lie. negligence of physicians.

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the Until the mid-nineteenth century, hospitals were generally charitable
operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only institutions, providing medical services to the lowest classes of society,
to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy without regard for a patient’s ability to pay.18 Those who could afford
in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed medical treatment were usually treated at home by their
the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. doctors.19 However, the days of house calls and philanthropic health care
The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. are over. The modern health care industry continues to distance itself
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating from its charitable past and has experienced a significant conversion
on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending from a not-for-profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses.
nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent Consequently, significant changes in health law have accompanied the
search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. business-related changes in the hospital industry. One important legal
Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, change is an increase in hospital liability for medical malpractice. Many
Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories
hospital. of respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or
agency by estoppel. 20
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person
in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is
the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.16 As stated before, Dr. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the
Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
(1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two this Chapter.
pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to
Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious
caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. liability under the doctrine of respondent superior, thus:

In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.17 In other words, mere whom one is responsible.
invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to
x x x x x x
have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
III - G.R. No. 126297
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees limited to furnishing room, food, facilities for treatment and operation, and
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks attendants for its patients. Thus, in Bing v. Thunig,27 the New York Court
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. of Appeals deviated from the Schloendorff doctrine, noting that modern
hospitals actually do far more than provide facilities for treatment. Rather,
x x x x x x they regularly employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of physicians,
interns, nurses, administrative and manual workers. They charge patients
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons for medical care and treatment, even collecting for such services through
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good legal action, if necessary. The court then concluded that there is no
father of a family to prevent damage. reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat
superior.
A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an
employer, such as physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the
"employees" under this article because the manner in which they perform physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of our categorical
their work is not within the control of the latter (employer). In other words, pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals 28 that for purposes of
professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their employer cannot be employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of the present case, attending and visiting physicians. This Court held:
"a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician
or surgeon in the treatment or operation of patients." 21 "We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular
incident. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up
The foregoing view is grounded on the traditional notion that the specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," who are allegedly
professional status and the very nature of the physician’s calling preclude not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility
him from being classed as an agent or employee of a hospital, whenever for negligence in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is
he acts in a professional capacity.22 It has been said that medical practice more apparent than real.
strictly involves highly developed and specialized knowledge, 23 such that
physicians are generally free to exercise their own skill and judgment in In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and
rendering medical services sans interference. 24 Hence, when a doctor firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital
practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees premises. Doctors who apply for ‘consultant’ slots, visiting or attending,
are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational
actions are of his own responsibility.25 qualifications, generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate
board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references.
The case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 26 was then These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital
considered an authority for this view. The "Schloendorff doctrine" regards administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either
a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an independent contractor accept or reject the application. x x x.
because of the skill he exercises and the lack of control exerted over his
work. Under this doctrine, hospitals are exempt from the application of After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant,
the respondeat superior principle for fault or negligence committed by he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences,
physicians in the discharge of their profession. conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand
rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities,
However, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine has weakened with the for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or
significant developments in medical care. Courts came to realize that for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to
modern hospitals are increasingly taking active role in supplying and these, the physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated
regulating medical care to patients. No longer were a hospital’s functions by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity
statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of Inc.32 There, it was explicitly stated that "there does not appear to be any
the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review rational basis for excluding the concept of apparent authority from the
committee, is normally politely terminated. field of hospital liability." Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a
hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that
their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While ‘consultants’ are not, physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the
technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an agency by implication or
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control estoppel. Article 1869 of the Civil Code reads:
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule
that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. " agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority.
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s
liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited
which have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the
for negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all the
perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
our jurisprudence. directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers
quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, 29 has and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or
the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions surgical services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad
of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that
believing that the relationship or the authority exists.30 The concept is such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this manner: servants. The trial court correctly pointed out:

"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent x x x regardless of the education and status in life of the patient, he ought
authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he not be burdened with the defense of absence of employer-employee
holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every relationship between the hospital and the independent physician whose
case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in name and competence are certainly certified to the general public by the
such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with hospital’s act of listing him and his specialty in its lobby directory, as in
business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in the case herein. The high costs of today’s medical and health care
presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in should at least exact on the hospital greater, if not broader, legal
question.31 responsibility for the conduct of treatment and surgery within its facility by
its accredited physician or surgeon, regardless of whether he is
The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital liability was independent or employed."33
upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth,
The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern. Corporate hospitals, among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in the
entities, like PSI, are capable of acting only through other individuals, maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the
such as physicians. If these accredited physicians do their job well, the selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or
hospital succeeds in its mission of offering quality medical services and supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4)
thus profits financially. Logically, where negligence mars the quality of its the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies
services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for the acts that ensure quality care for its patients.38 Thus, in Tucson Medical Center,
of its ostensible agents. Inc. v. Misevich,39 it was held that a hospital, following the doctrine of
corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
We now proceed to the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper
responsibility. supervision of the members of its medical staff. And in Bost v. Riley, 40 the
court concluded that a patient who enters a hospital does so with the
One allegation in the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-43332 for negligence reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital
and malpractice is that PSI as owner, operator and manager of Medical accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
City Hospital, "did not perform the necessary supervision nor exercise oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians
diligent efforts in the supervision of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its practicing in its premises.
nursing staff, resident doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs.
Ampil and Fuentes in the performance of their duties as In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical
surgeons."34 Premised on the doctrine of corporate negligence, the trial City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing
court held that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty. comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients
We agree with the trial court. admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to
perform such duty. The findings of the trial court are convincing, thus:
Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the
judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability for the x x x PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of
negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the the matter reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure
application of respondeat superior or apparent authority. Its formulation established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
proceeds from the judiciary’s acknowledgment that in these modern about the gauzes. Ethical considerations, if not also legal, dictated the
times, the duty of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole holding of an immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the benefit of the
prerogative and responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest of arriving
have changed structure. Hospitals now tend to organize a highly at the truth. The Court cannot accept that the medical and the healing
professional medical staff whose competence and performance need to professions, through their members like defendant surgeons, and their
be monitored by the hospitals commensurate with their inherent institutions like PSI’s hospital facility, can callously turn their backs on
responsibility to provide quality medical care.35 and disregard even a mere probability of mistake or negligence by
refusing or failing to investigate a report of such seriousness as the one
in Natividad’s case.
The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston Community
Hospital.36 There, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that "the jury could
have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to have a sufficient It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad
number of trained nurses attending the patient; failing to require a with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of
consultation with or examination by members of the hospital staff; and resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to
failing to review the treatment rendered to the patient." On the basis of conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or
Darling, other jurisdictions held that a hospital’s corporate negligence constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the
extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent to practice at report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing.
the hospital.37 With the passage of time, more duties were expected from In Fridena v. Evans,41 it was held that a corporation is bound by the
knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers within the
scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which their that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the
authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of patient’s injuries. We find that such general allegations of negligence,
Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of along with the evidence produced at the trial of this case, are sufficient to
PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform support the hospital’s liability based on the theory of negligent
Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. supervision."
Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons
who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil
in fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously for damages, let it be emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176. In diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision
Fridena, the Supreme Court of Arizona held: of the latter. In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its
burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and,
x x x In recent years, however, the duty of care owed to the patient by the therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as
hospital has expanded. The emerging trend is to hold the hospital we have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to the Aganas.
responsible where the hospital has failed to monitor and review medical
services being provided within its walls. See Kahn Hospital Malpractice One final word. Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a
Prevention, 27 De Paul . Rev. 23 (1977). patient, the law imposes on him certain obligations. In order to escape
liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill and
Among the cases indicative of the ‘emerging trend’ is Purcell v. experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75,500 P. 2d 335 (1972). In Purcell, the reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the
hospital argued that it could not be held liable for the malpractice of a application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment.
medical practitioner because he was an independent contractor within
the hospital. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the hospital had WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and AFFIRM the challenged
created a professional staff whose competence and performance was to Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R.
be monitored and reviewed by the governing body of the hospital, and SP No. 32198.
the court held that a hospital would be negligent where it had knowledge
or reason to believe that a doctor using the facilities was employing a Costs against petitioners PSI and Dr. Miguel Ampil.
method of treatment or care which fell below the recognized standard of
care.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequent to the Purcell decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that a hospital has certain inherent responsibilities regarding the quality
of medical care furnished to patients within its walls and it must meet the
standards of responsibility commensurate with this undertaking. Beeck v.
Tucson General Hospital, 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P. 2d 1153 (1972). This
court has confirmed the rulings of the Court of Appeals that a hospital
has the duty of supervising the competence of the doctors on its staff. x x
x.

x x x x x x

In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs did plead that the operation was
performed at the hospital with its knowledge, aid, and assistance, and
 FIRST DIVISION 1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas
G.R. No. 126376 : November 20, 2003 Joaquin, for a consideration of P6,000.00 (Exh. C), pursuant to which TCT
No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. C-1);
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES 2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC)
RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD Psd-256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita
JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES Joaquin, for a consideration of P1[2],000.00  (Exh. D), pursuant to which
LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name (Exh. D-1);
JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN
and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and 3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC)
SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh.
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and E), pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. E-1);
SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC)
DECISION Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses
Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of P[54,3]00.00
CARPIO, J.: (Exh. F), pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. F-
1); and
The Case
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26
Joaquin, for a consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. G), pursuant to which
June 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of
TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. G-1).
Appeals affirmed the Decision3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by
Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court) in Civil Case
No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found that the [6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC)
parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a
plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants. consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. K), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779
was issued in his name (Exh. K-1).]
The Facts
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and
certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

- XX-
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the
parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of
defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all The deeds of sale, Annexes C, D, E, F, and G, [and K] are simulated as
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action they are, are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because
by their respective spouses.
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of over the properties in litis;
real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and
Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected
corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to wit: in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times
more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of
the parties (vendors and vendees); and the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their
legitime while their parents live.
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families
- XXI - together, the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.

Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of No costs.

Title Nos. 36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and
157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx SO ORDERED.8
are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause
of action against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate
assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with
court ruled:
sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in
good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of
sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive
and legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original) issue in this case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action
against appellees.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their
defendant brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against
spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents.
defendant spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an
However, their right to the properties of their defendant parents, as
Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a
compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latters
Motion to Dismiss.6 In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea
death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their
Asis, the trial court noted that compulsory heirs have the right to a
properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of
legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only from
creditors.
the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in

question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents.
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed
Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to
the complaint. The trial court stated:
assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of
consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al.,
xxx father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable 101 SCRA 376, thus:
consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not
principally or subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of capacity to challenge their validity.
action against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior
to the death of their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of
determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
their legitime by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor
testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the
of their defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the
court a quo, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time Whether Petitioners have a legal interest
of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live. over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their
by plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential. Complaint, petitioners asserted that the purported sale of the properties in
litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
against plaintiffs-appellants. Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that
ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent parents.
SO ORDERED.9 If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent
siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary succession.11
cräläwvirtualibräry

cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, the instant petition.

It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the
properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any
Issues
legal right to the properties. The trial and appellate courts should have
dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals: the name of the real party-in-interest.12 cräläwvirtualibräry

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE [T]he question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who
CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION. would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN
ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY xxx
INADEQUATE.
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES. principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to
one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE positively result to them from the contract even though they did not
CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912])
UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES xxx.
LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR INTEREST
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES. These are parties with a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS interest. The phrase present substantial interest more concretely is meant
HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10 him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or
that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in
The Ruling of the Court a payment to or recovery by him.13 cräläwvirtualibräry

We find the petition without merit. Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their
parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of
Deeds of Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future
consideration and gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale. legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their
siblings does not affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of for gross inadequacy of price
the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots
taken from the estate. Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is
grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Whether the Deeds of  Sale are void
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
for lack of consideration
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud,
prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)
petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a
consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of
contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties
the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, really intended a donation or some other act or contract. (Emphasis
despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of supplied)
payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of
sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355
of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract
and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the
is simulated, then the contract is void.14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code
Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to
states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed
that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we stated
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a in Vales v. Villa:19
contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection
cräläwvirtualibräry

of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad
contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of
bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-
consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or
sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot
cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the
constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally
latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.15
incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or
cräläwvirtualibräry

overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts,
absolutely simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma use miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they have in
Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There
Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the
without need for her payment of the purchase price.16 The trial court did law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay
not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of
knowledge of their respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the
questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners
parties and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual
presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only
findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over
did respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price
again unless there has been a showing that the findings of the lower court
was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint,
are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute
respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent
serious abuse of discretion.20 In the instant case, the trial court found that
father.18
the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant
children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective
Whether the Deeds of  Sale are void
Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the to bargain with Ren Transport, to which it sent bargaining
seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us. proposals. Ren Transport, however, failed to reply to the
demand.5 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.

Subsequently, two members of SMART wrote to the Department
SO ORDERED. of Labor and Employment - National Capital Region (DOLE-
NCR). The office was informed that a majority of the members
Davide, Jr., C.J.,  (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and
of SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
federation to form another union, Ren Transport Employees
Association (RTEA).6 SMART contested the alleged disaffiliation
REN TRANSPORT CORP. AND/OR REYNALDO PAZCOGUIN
through a letter dated 4 April 2005.7
III, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
chanrobleslaw

COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION), SAMAHANG

During the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-
MANGGAGAWA SA REN TRANSPORT-ASSOCIATION OF
NCR, Ren Transport stopped the remittance to SMART of the
DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATIONS (SMART-ADLO)
union dues that had been checked off from the salaries of union
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT NESTOR
workers as provided under the CBA.8 Further, on 19 April 2005,
FULMINAR, Respondents.
Ren Transport voluntarily recognized RTEA as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
G.R. No. 188252
their company.9 chanrobleslaw

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA REN TRANSPORT-

On 6 July 2005, SMART filed with the labor arbiter a complaint
ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATIONS
for unfair labor practice against Ren Transport.10
(SMART-ADLO) REPRESENTED BY NESTOR
FULMINAR, Petitioner, v. REN TRANSPORT CORP. AND/OR
THE LABOR ARBITER'S RULING
REYNALDO PAZCOGUIN III, Respondents.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision11 finding Ren Transport
DECISION guilty of acts of unfair labor practice. The former explained that
since the disaffiliation issue remained pending, SMART
SERENO, C.J.: continued to be the certified collective bargaining agent; hence,
Ren Transport's refusal to send a counter-proposal to SMART
Before this Court are consolidated Rule 45 petitions challenging was not justified. The labor arbiter also held that the company's
the Decision1 and the Resolution2 issued by the Court of Appeals failure to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100722. recognition of RTEA were clear indications of interference with
the employees' exercise of the right to self-organize.
THE FACTS
Both parties elevated the case to the National Labor Relations
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a Commission (NLRC). SMART contested only the failure of the
registered union, which had a five-year collective bargaining labor arbiter to award damages.
agreement (CBA) with Ren Transport Corp. (Ren Transport) set
to expire on 31 December 2004.3 The 60-day freedom period of Ren Transport challenged the entire Decision, assigning four
the CBA passed without a challenge to SMART'S majority status errors in its Memorandum of Appeal, namely: (1) SMART was
as bargaining agent.4 SMART thereafter conveyed its willingness no longer the exclusive bargaining agent; (2) Ren Transport did
not fail to bargain collectively with SMART; (3) Ren Transport THE ISSUES
was not obliged to remit dues to SMART; and (4) SMART lacked
the personality to sue Ren Transport.12 All the assigned errors Based on the foregoing facts and arguments raised in the
were based on the assertion that SMART had lost its majority petitions, the threshold issues to be resolved are the following:
status. (1) whether Ren Transport committed acts of unfair labor
practice; (2) whether the decision rendered by the NLRC is valid
The appeals were consolidated. on account of its failure to pass upon all the errors assigned by
Ren Transport; and (3) whether SMART is entitled to moral
THE NLRC RULING damages.

The NLRC issued a decision13 affirming the labor arbiter's finding OUR RULING
of unfair labor practice on the part of Ren Transport. Union dues
were ordered remitted to SMART. We deny the petitions for lack of merit.

The NLRC also awarded moral damages to SMART, saying that I

Ren transport's refusal to bargain was inspired by malice or bad
faith. The precipitate recognition of RTEA evidenced such bad Ren Transport committed acts of unfair labor practice.
faith, considering that it was done despite the pendency of the
disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-NCR. Ren Transport violated its duty to bargain collectively
with SMART.
Ren Transport filed a motion for reconsideration14 alleging,
among others, that the NLRC failed to resolve all the arguments Ren Transport concedes that it refused to bargain collectively
the former had raised in its memorandum of appeal. with SMART. It claims, though, that the latter ceased to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration,15 prompting because of the disaffiliation of the majority of its members.19 chanrobleslaw

Ren Transport to file a Rule 65 petition with the CA.16

chanrobleslaw

The argument deserves no consideration.

THE CA RULING
Violation of the duty to bargain collectively is an unfair labor
On 30 January 2009, the CA rendered a decision17 partially practice under Article 258(g) of the Labor Code. An instance of
granting the petition. It deleted the award of moral damages to this practice is the refusal to bargain collectively as held
SMART, but affirmed the NLRC decision on all other matters. in General Milling Corp. v. CA.20 In that case, the employer
The CA ruled that SMART, as a corporation, was not entitled to anchored its refusal to bargain with and recognize the union on
moral damages.18 chanrobleslaw several letters received by the former regarding the withdrawal
of the workers' membership from the union. We rejected the
On the contention that the NLRC decided the case without defense, saying that the employer had devised a flimsy excuse
considering all the arguments of Ren Transport, the CA found by attacking the existence of the union and the status of the
that the latter had passed upon the principal issue of the union's membership to prevent any negotiation.21 chanrobleslaw

existence of unfair labor practice.

It bears stressing that Ren Transport had a duty to bargain
Hence, both parties appealed to this Court. collectively with SMART. Under Article 263 in relation to Article
267 of the Labor Code, it is during the freedom period — or the
last 60 days before the expiration of the CBA — when another employees' right to self-organization.25  It must be stressed thatcralawred

union may challenge the majority status of the bargaining agent this finding was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA; as such, it is
through the filing of a petition for a certification election. If binding on the Court, especially when we consider that it is not
there is no such petition filed during the freedom period, then tainted with any blatant error. As aptly pointed out by the labor
the employer "shall continue to recognize the majority status of arbiter, these acts were ill-timed in view of the existence of a
the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for labor controversy over membership in the union.26 chanrobleslaw

certification election is filed."22

chanrobleslaw

Ren Transport also uses the supposed disaffiliation from SMART

In the present case, the facts are not up for debate. No petition to justify the failure to remit union dues to the latter and the
for certification election challenging the majority status of voluntary recognition of RTEA. However, for reasons already
SMART was filed during the freedom period, which was from discussed, this claim is considered a lame excuse that cannot
November 1 to December 31, 2004 — the 60-day period prior validate those acts.
to the expiration of the five-year CBA. SMART therefore
remained the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file II.
employees.
The NLRC decision is valid.
Given that SMART continued to be the workers' exclusive
bargaining agent, Ren Transport had the corresponding duty to Ren Transport next argues that the decision rendered by the
bargain collectively with the former. Ren Transport's refusal to NLRC is defective considering that it has failed to resolve all the
do so constitutes an unfair labor practice. issues in its Memorandum of Appeal.27 chanrobleslaw

Consequently, Ren Transport cannot avail itself of the defense We do not agree.
that SMART no longer represents the majority of the workers.
The fact that no petition for certification election was filed within Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, states that
the freedom period prevented Ren Transport from challenging "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
SMART'S existence and membership. expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based." It has been held that the constitutional
Moreover, it must be stressed that, according to the labor provision does not require a "point-by-point consideration and
arbiter, the purported disaffiliation from SMART was nothing but resolution of the issues raised by the parties."28 chanrobleslaw

a convenient, self-serving excuse.23 This factual finding, having

been affirmed by both the CA and the NLRC, is now conclusive In the present case, the decision shows that the NLRC resolved
upon the Court.24 We do not see any patent error that would the focal issue raised by Ren Transport: whether or not SMART
take the instant case out of the general rule. remained the exclusive bargaining agent, such that Ren
Transport could be found guilty of acts of unfair labor practice.
Ren Transport interfered with the exercise of the We quote the NLRC discussion: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

employees' right to self-organize. At the outset, let it be stated that insofar as the principal issue
of whether unfair labor practice was committed by respondents,
Interference with the employees' right to self-organization is there is no occasion to find, or even entertain, doubts that the
considered an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (a) of the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that unfair labor
Labor Code. In this case, the labor arbiter found that the failure practice (ULP) was committed against the complainants, are
to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition infused with serious errors. We quote: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the

[I]t is our considered view that the respondents committed acts writing of a decision assumes greater significance, as we belong
of unfair labor practice even if the CBA between the to an age in which dockets of the courts are congested and their
complainant union and respondent company already expired resources limited.
and majority of the workers of the existing bargaining agent
disaffiliated therefrom, formed its own union and have it III.
registered as an independent one, still the respondent Company
has the duty to bargain collectively with the existing bargaining SMART is not entitled to an award of moral damages.
agent. It bears stressing that the disaffiliation issue of the
members of the complainant union is still pending before the We now address the petition of SMART, which faults the CA for
DOLE and has not yet attained its finality; that there is no new deleting the grant of moral damages.34 chanrobleslaw

bargaining agent certified yet by the DOLE, there is no legal

basis yet for the respondent company to disregard the We hold that the CA correctly dropped the NLRC's award of
personality of the complainant union and refused or ignored the moral damages to SMART. Indeed, a corporation is not, as a
agent for renewal of its CBA. It is still the certified collective general rule, entitled to moral damages. Being a mere artificial
bargaining agent of the workers, because there was no new being, it is incapable of experiencing physical suffering or
[u]nion yet being certified by the DOLE as the new bargaining sentiments like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
agent of the workers. anguish or moral shock.35 chanrobleslaw

The above discourse shows the factual and legal bases for the
NLRC's resolution of the issue of whether Ren Transport Although this Court has allowed the grant of moral damages to
committed unfair labor practice and thereby satisfies the corporations in certain situations,36 it must be remembered that
constitutional provision on the contents of a decision. The NLRC the grant is not automatic. The claimant must still prove the
succeeded in disposing of all the arguments raised by Ren factual basis of the damage and the causal relation to the
Transport without going through every argument, as all the defendant's acts.37 In this case, while there is a showing of bad
assigned errors hinged on the majority status of SMART.29 All of faith on the part of the employer in the commission of acts of
these errors were addressed and settled by the NLRC by finding unfair labor practice, there is no evidence establishing the
that SMART was still the exclusive bargaining agent of the factual basis of the damage on the part of SMART.
employees of Ren Transport.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DENIED.
As aptly stated by the CA, a court or any other tribunal is not The Decision dated 30 January 2009 and the Resolution dated
required to pass upon all the errors assigned by Ren Transport; 20 May 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
the resolution of the main question renders the other issues 100722 are AFFIRMED.
academic or inconsequential.30 chanrobleslaw

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlib

At this juncture, it is well to note that addressing every one of

the errors assigned would not be in keeping with the policy of
judicial economy. Judicial economy refers to "efficiency in the
operation of the courts and the judicial system; especially the
efficient management of litigation so as to minimize duplication
of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary's time and
resources."31 In Salud v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court remarked
that judicial economy is a "strong [norm] in a society in need of
swift justice."33 Now, more than ever, the value of brevity in the
G.R. No. 190601               February 7, 2011 unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarez’s
promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception
SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and ANNA HERNANDEZ- beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid ₱8,000 per hour for the
GUANIO, Petitioners, three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day.
vs.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL and RESORT, INC., also doing Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance
business under the name of SHANGRI-LA HOTEL with their open bar arrangement, but these were not served to the guests
MANILA, Respondent. who were forced to pay for their drinks.

DECISION Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and
Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received an apologetic reply from Krister
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Svensson, the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food
and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract
For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel
Makati (the hotel). In its Answer, respondent claimed that petitioners requested a
combination of king prawns and salmon, hence, the price was increased
Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) to ₱1,200.00 per person, but discounted at ₱1,150.00; that contrary to
scheduled an initial food tasting. Petitioners claim that they requested the petitioners’ claim, Marquez and Alvarez were present during the event,
hotel to prepare for seven persons ─ the two of them, their respective albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three
parents, and the wedding coordinator. At the scheduled food tasting, other hotel functions; that while there was a delay in the service of the
however, respondent prepared for only six. meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to
470 from the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 to
a maximum of 380, as stated in the Banquet Event Order (BEO); 2 and
Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included black cod, king
that Isaac Albacea, Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed the delay in
prawns and angel hair pasta with wild mushroom sauce for the main
the service of the meals to petitioner Luigi’s father, Gil Guanio.
course which cost ₱1,000.00 per person. They were, however, given an
option in which salmon, instead of king prawns, would be in the menu at
₱950.00 per person. They in fact partook of the salmon. Respecting the belated service of meals to some guests, respondent
attributed it to the insistence of petitioners’ wedding coordinator that
certain guests be served first.
Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. Petitioners
aver that the salmon served was half the size of what they were served
during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted On Svensson’s letter, respondent, denying it as an admission of liability,
a much higher price (₱1,200.00) for the size that was initially served to claimed that it was meant to maintain goodwill to its customers.
them. The parties eventually agreed on a final price ─ ₱1,150 per person.
By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch 148 of the Makati RTC rendered
A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing as follows:
forged their contract.1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives, favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the defendants
Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did to pay the plaintiff the following:
not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests
complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in 1) The amount of ₱350,000.00 by way of actual damages;
the published menu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and
 2) The amount of ₱250,000.00 for and as moral damages; obtained, only the Sps. Guanio may bear whatever consequential
damages that they may have allegedly suffered.7 (underscoring supplied)
3) The amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution
4) The amount of ₱100,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees. of November 19, 2009, the present petition for review was filed.

With costs against the defendant. The Court finds that since petitioners’ complaint arose from a contract,
the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it:
SO ORDERED.3
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
In finding for petitioners, the trial court relied heavily on the letter of delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a
Svensson which is partly quoted below: device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
Upon receiving your comments on our service rendered during your
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
reception here with us, we are in fact, very distressed. Right from minor
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
issues pappadums served in the soup instead of the creutons, lack of
created.8 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
valet parkers, hard rolls being too hard till a major one – slow service,
rude and arrogant waiters, we have disappointed you in all means.
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received
were unacceptable and definitely not up to our standards. We understand
that it is our job to provide excellent service and in this instance, we have Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fallen short of your expectations. We ask you please to accept our fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
profound apologies for causing such discomfort and tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
annoyance. 4 (underscoring supplied)
RCPI v. Verchez, et al. 9 enlightens:
The trial court observed that from "the tenor of the letter . . . the
defendant[-herein respondent] admits that the services the plaintiff[- In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract
herein petitioners] received were unacceptable and definitely not up to and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right
their standards."5 of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 27, 2009, 6 reversed of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A
the trial court’s decision, it holding that the proximate cause of petitioners’ breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
injury was an unexpected increase in their guests: recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy
serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include
his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
x x x Hence, the alleged damage or injury brought about by the
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
confusion, inconvenience and disarray during the wedding reception may
had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his
not be attributed to defendant-appellant Shangri-la.
interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
We find that the said proximate cause, which is entirely attributable to contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
plaintiffs-appellants, set the chain of events which resulted in the alleged interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the
inconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given the circumstances that other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their
makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of
effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused,
RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of another as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide,
to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating respondent from liability for "any damage or inconvenience" occasioned
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of thereby.
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability. (emphasis and underscoring in the original; capitalization As for petitioners’ claim that respondent departed from its verbal
supplied) agreement with petitioners, the same fails, given that the written contract
which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law
The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between them.
between the parties read:
Respecting the letter of Svensson on which the trial court heavily relied
4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in accordance with the prescribed rate as admission of respondent’s liability but which the appellate court
for the minimum guaranteed number of persons contracted for, brushed aside, the Court finds the appellate court’s stance in order. It is
regardless of under attendance or non-appearance of the expected not uncommon in the hotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or
number of guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels the Function in feedback on the service it delivers. It is also customary for hotel
accordance with its Letter of Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the management to try to smooth ruffled feathers to preserve goodwill among
attendance exceed the minimum guaranteed attendance, the ENGAGER its clientele.
shall also be billed at the actual rate per cover in excess of the minimum
guaranteed attendance. Kalalo v. Luz holds:12

xxxx Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no
quality of conclusiveness, and an opponent whose admissions have been
4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as an
hours before the scheduled date and time of the Function of any change explanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact.
in the minimum guaranteed covers. In the absence of such notice,
paragraph 4.3 shall apply in the event of under attendance. In case the Respondent’s Catering Director, Bea Marquez, explained the hotel’s
actual number of attendees exceed the minimum guaranteed procedure on receiving and processing complaints, viz:
number
ATTY. CALMA:
by ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall not in any way be held liable
for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. Q You mentioned that the letter indicates an acknowledgement of
The ENGAGER shall also undertake to advise the guests of the the concern and that there was-the first letter there was an
situation and take positive steps to remedy the same. 10 (emphasis, acknowledgment of the concern and an apology, not necessarily
italics and underscoring supplied) indicating that such or admitting fault?

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply A Yes.
with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without legal
excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the
Q Is this the letter that you are referring to?
contract.11
If I may, Your Honor, that was the letter dated August 4, 2001,
The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners
previously marked as plaintiff’s exhibits, Your Honor. What is the
were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the
procedure of the hotel with respect to customer concern?
 A Upon receipt of the concern from the guest or client, we safe to presume that this is not its first encounter with booked events
acknowledge receipt of such concern, and as part of procedure in exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect that certain
service industry particularly Makati Shangri-la we apologize for measures have been placed in case this predicament crops up. That
whatever inconvenience but at the same time saying, that of regardless of these measures, respondent still received complaints as in
course, we would go through certain investigation and get back to the present case, does not amuse. 1avvphil

them for the feedback with whatever concern they may have.
Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners’
Q Your Honor, I just like at this point mark the exhibits, Your reception. To the Court, the delay in service might have been avoided or
Honor, the letter dated August 4, 2001 identified by the witness, minimized if respondent exercised prescience in scheduling events. No
Your Honor, to be marked as Exhibit 14 and the signature of Mr. less than quality service should be delivered especially in events which
Krister Svensson be marked as Exhibit 14-A.13 possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected to get
married twice in their lifetimes.
xxxx
In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it
Q In your opinion, you just mentioned that there is a procedure just to award the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of nominal damages to
that the hotel follows with respect to the complaint, in your opinion petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the
was this procedure followed in this particular concern? event.15 The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of
his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. 16 Respondent’s lack of
A Yes, ma’am. prudence is an affront to this right.

Q What makes you say that this procedure was followed? WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 28, 2009
is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in light of the foregoing
discussion, ORDERED to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 to petitioners by
A As I mentioned earlier, we proved that we did acknowledge the
way of nominal damages.
concern of the client in this case and we did emphatize from the
client and apologized, and at the same time got back to them in
whatever investigation we have. SO ORDERED.

Q You said that you apologized, what did you apologize for? CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
A Well, first of all it is a standard that we apologize, right? Being in the
service industry, it is a practice that we apologize if there is any WE CONCUR:
inconvenience, so the purpose for apologizing is mainly to show empathy
and to ensure the client that we are hearing them out and that we will do
a better investigation and it is not in any way that we are admitting any
fault.14 (underscoring supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanation of the hotel’s Banquet Director

overcomes any presumption of admission of breach which Svensson’s
letter might have conveyed.

The exculpatory clause notwithstanding, the Court notes that respondent

could have managed the "situation" better, it being held in high esteem in
the hotel and service industry. Given respondent’s vast experience, it is