FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976

LORENZO JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and
Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for respondents.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade) and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.

Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did respondent appellate court
commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for new
trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2)
the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and code Name 'Safari'
(both documents are dated 31 January 1968)"?  1

The following incidents are not in dispute:

On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose was arrested by

the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of
several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case 6235), robbery
(Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives (Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were
jointly tried after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated December 15,
1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970   acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of
2

firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found on
his person at the time of his arrest.

After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed his notice of appeal. Nine days
thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be
reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a
permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court in its order of January 30, 1970
denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was promulgated.  3

The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where petitioner as
accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of
explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of
his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade.   In his
4

brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case back to
the trial court for a new trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court,   rendered its decision of March 8, 1972, affirming
5

the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of the court a quo, and declaring that no reversible
error was committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of the case as the court had lost its
"power to change, modify, or alter its decision." 
6

A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that "assuming arguendo that the
court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant's motion for new trial because of the perfection
of the appeal, this Honorable Court — before which said motion was reiterated and which has
competence to act thereon — should have granted the same if for no other reason than to prevent a
miscarriage of justice which is the inevitable result of its denial."   This motion for reconsideration
7

was denied in respondent court's resolution of April 3, 1974.  8

A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose   but this was also
9

denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974.  10

Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon, filed with Us this
petition for review which We denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the question raised being
factual and for insufficient showing that the finding of facts by respondent court are unsupported by
substantial evidence, and for lack of merit."

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following grounds should justify
this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate court to wit:

1. petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being
imprisoned for five (5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on hand
is a result so harsh that the Honorable Court may well undertake a review of the case
just to satisfy itself of the justice and inevitability of such a result;

2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court is

involved, as the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is, technically, not
newly discovered: and

3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-quoted

statement of the main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable Court
because under these decisions, the new trial should have been granted since there
is a 'strong, compelling reason' in this case for granting the relief prayed for, such
strong compelling reason being the very strong probability of petitioner's acquittal if a
new trial were granted. (Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison
vs. Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano 52 SCRA 338; Montecines vs.
Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25,
1974; please see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346 ... (pp. 157-158, rollo)

The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for reconsideration claiming that
there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of respondent Court
of Appeals, affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it being admitted by petitioner that the
evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial
of the new trial "visibly papers as correct". This Opposition drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's
counsel.

On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court
that in view of the " Persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court
and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or
authority to handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries
from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 with
enclosures, xerox copies of which are being attached to the manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1
and D. 11

Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General reads:

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza

Padre Faura, Manila

Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:

With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that Colonel
Pedrito C. de Guzman who is now Provincial of Sorsogon Constabulary Command,
confirmed that he executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon
stating that he appointed Mr. Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC
Agent on January 31, 1968.

The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command also

confirmed the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.

Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said appointment.

Sincere
ly
yours,

(Sgd.) FIDEL V.
RAMOS

FIDEL V. RAMOS

Major General, AFP

Chief of Constabulary
(p. 191, rollo)

Inclosure:

Appointmenmt paper

of subject person dtd

Jan. 31, 1968 with

Personal History

Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a PC Agent of the
Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code Nanie "Safari" with
expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We quote:

This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our firearms and such other
equipment which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the need
basis which will be covered by separate written authority. (p. 192, rollo)

In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial of this petition for
review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a special civil action. In another Resolution of
April 4, 1975, the parties were given time to submit their respective memorandum.

This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of
courts of justice to render justice where justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals
to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby
closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion which calls for relief from this Court.

At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the time-honored
principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al that a prosecuting
officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure
the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocene shall not suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565, qouting
Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309)
The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding
this case to the court of origin for a new trial.

We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought
to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence
because the same — his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a
permit to possess a handgrenade — were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the
time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.

It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go
to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. 
12

However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence,
but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the Court of
First Instance, the appellate court may affirm or modify the judgment and increase or
reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case ito the Court of First
Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.

Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over an
appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where the court
may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of the same Rule,
or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.   While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121,
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provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial. Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify,
thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of
what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or re-trial.

Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and not to obstruct the proper
administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.

Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of
justice   or, in a proper case, disregard them.   In this jurisdiction, in not a. few instances,  * this
14 15 15

Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, vis retraction of
witness,   negligence or incompetency of counsel.   improvident plea of guilty,   disqualification of an
16 17 18

attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court,   and where a judgment was rendered
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on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.  20

Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21

Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us which may be
classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to
establish his innocence of the crime charged.

Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade in the
court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess
explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where he
had to make a choice — reveal his Identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary
assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even
liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that Floridablanca the site of the incident, was
in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his Identity as an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the
handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not be produced
because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it
the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it
was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired
evidence concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to
possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial
court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.

We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner's cas to afford him
the opportunity of producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court
which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General,
the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought to be produced, and of
cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now
petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence during the trial.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the herein petitioner,
Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for purpose of allowing
said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial court shall inform this Court of
the final outcome of the case within a reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes