Euromaidan demonstrations in Kiev in 2013.

To prevent or discourage such "color revolutions" and maintain control over

its arc of influence, Russia has developed a suite of sophisticated coercive and influence techniques often referred to as
"hybrid." (Wikimedia/ Mstyslav Chernov).

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Countering Hybrid Warfare
So What for the Future Joint Force?
By Sean Monaghan

We need to do three things. First, accept what is happening rather than pretend it is not happening.
Second, understand the tactics being used. Third, act intelligently and
consistently to defend Western states, values, and interests from this insidious form of conflict
—Bob Seeley and Alya Shandra, 20181

I
f strategy, in whatever era, is “the art of creating power,” then so-called hybrid warfare is merely the latest
attempt by revisionist actors to create and exploit a form of power to meet their ends.2 Successfully coun-
tering these challenges will require careful thought and calibrated strategy. This article aims to generate
the conceptual clarity required for nations to, in the words of one member of Parliament, “act intelligently and
consistently” to counter the rising challenge of hybrid warfare emanating from a variety of revisionist actors.3
More specifically, its purpose is to establish conceptual foundations for the contribution of defense forces to
countering all hybrid challenges to national security. In doing so, it takes the perspective of the role of defense
within a wider, whole-of-government approach, where defense will play a distinct but varying role, subordi-
nate to national strategy.
The article is divided into five parts. The first part addresses the language problem of hybrid challenges
by briefly tracing the roots of the concept in Western military and strategic discourse to demonstrate that
hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are different things. Next, a conceptual distinction is made between hybrid
warfare and hybrid threats to provide further clarity. The third and fourth parts address the implications of
each challenge for national defense policy, strategy, and capability. Finally, the prospect of both challenges
occurring in parallel is considered.

Hybrid Warfare and Hybrid Threats Are Different Things

One of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about hybrid challenges is the problem of language. Terms
pairing “hybrid” with the words “threats,” “warfare,” “activity,” “operations,” and “tactics” are often used
interchangeably without definition, while concepts such as “gray zone warfare,” “competition short of war,”
and “modern political warfare” are—while helpful in their own right—too often conflated in the academic
literature, policy publications and mainstream media.4 This section addresses the language problem by clari-
fying and distinguishing between two key terms: hybrid warfare and hybrid threats.

Mr. Sean Monaghan is a strategic analyst in the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD)’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre (DCDC). During 2017–19 he was a project lead on the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)
Countering Hybrid Warfare project. All views are the author’s own and do not represent those of UK MOD or HMG.

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MONAGHAN

What Is Hybrid Warfare? is all somewhat beyond Mattis and Hoffman’s ideas
In 2005, Lt Gen James Mattis—then Commanding about the evolving character of armed conflict. As one
General, Marine Corps Combat Development Swedish analyst generously suggests, the term hybrid
Command—and Frank Hoffman of the Center for warfare has “travelled a lot in definition.”12
Emerging Threats and Opportunities at Quantico A key moment in the journey of the term
argued that future adversaries were likely to “mix hybrid warfare was the annexation of Crimea by
and match” forms and modes of warfare to offset the Russian Federation in 2014. The combination
conventional U.S. military battlefield power.5 The of “deniable” special forces, local proxy mili-
roots of their concept stem from a period of reflection tia, economic pressure, disinformation, and the
following the so-called revolution in military affairs exploitation of social divisions used to present a fait
moment following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. accompli to Ukraine and the West was unexpected.
Western military theorists were focused on two big Such a strategy—apparently taken from an outdated
ideas that threatened to undermine their technolog- Soviet playbook, but employing modern means—
ical dominance of the battlefield. The first was the was also difficult to describe. In reaction, the hybrid
threat posed by future adversaries combining types of warfare label was applied, and it stuck.13 Another
warfare (including nonmilitary tools) to overwhelm reason the hybrid label became widely used was the
through complexity.6 The second was the problem of popular assertion that a 2013 article by Russian chief
“non-trinitarian” adversaries who could seemingly of the general staff Valery Gerasimov described the
not be defeated in “Clausewitzian” terms through a strategy later used to annex Crimea—which looked
conventional military campaign culminating in a a lot like a hybrid approach of military and nonmil-
decisive battle.7 Meanwhile, military practitioners itary means.14 Although many analysts have since
elsewhere sought to make good on such fears by debunked this myth, the claim gathered enough
designing new ways of war that harnessed complexity credibility to gain mainstream traction.15
and targeted Western vulnerabilities, and nonstate It is therefore clear that the term hybrid war-
actors such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah prosecuted fare is not simply a reaction to the annexation of
campaigns that put these principles into practice.8 Crimea.16 It is a more sophisticated and endur-
In this form—as a description of the ways in ing attempt to understand and articulate the
which armed conflict was becoming more complex ever-changing character of warfare. It is import-
and challenging—the concept was incorporated into ant because if understood correctly, it will allow
various approaches to international security strategy at the development of a future force able to deter and
the time, for example in U.S., UK, and North Atlantic defeat potential adversaries who seek new ways to
Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy documents.9 win. As Hoffman and Mattis put it in 2005:
However, in mainstream discourse, hybrid warfare Our conventional superiority creates a
has taken on a much wider conception. One exam- compelling logic for states and non-state
ple uses it to describe revisionist grand strategy that actors to move out of the traditional mode of
employs “a comprehensive toolset that ranges from war and seek some niche capability or some
cyber-attacks to propaganda and subversion, eco- unexpected combination of technologies and
nomic blackmail and sabotage, sponsorship of proxy tactics to gain an advantage.17
forces and creeping military expansionism.”10 It has
also been commandeered by those seeking a snappy Hybrid warfare is a challenge that is likely to
idiom to describe the Kremlin’s art of strategy.11 This persist. The contemporary strategic environment

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

presents potential adversaries with an array of new, They all essentially describe nonviolent revision-
more cost-effective means to employ in combi- ist grand strategy in contemporary international
nation, ranging from information operations in politics. They describe the use of multiple, ambig-
cyberspace to the proliferation of cheap air defense uous means to target vulnerabilities across society
and missile technology. This is why the United to achieve goals gradually without triggering
States expects a continued rise in future hybrid wars decisive responses. As Michael Mazarr has stated,
and why the United Kingdom suggests that “recog- “Unwilling to risk major escalation with outright
nizing and responding effectively to hybrid warfare military adventurism, these [revisionist] actors are
will become increasingly important.”18 employing sequences of gradual steps to secure stra-
It can therefore be seen that the principal utility tegic leverage. The efforts remain below thresholds
of the term hybrid warfare is to describe the chang- that would generate a powerful U.S. or international
ing character of warfare against violent adversaries response, but nonetheless are forceful and deliberate,
during armed conflict, in which “adversaries employ calculated to gain measurable traction over time.”25
combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric These strategies seek to blur and exploit several
advantage.”19 Although in mainstream discourse the distinctions that underpin the Western use of force,
term has been used with some elasticity to describe such as those between peace and war; combatants
revisionist grand strategy (Russian actions in par- and third parties; international and non-international
ticular), the original concept remains a valid and conflict; and aggression, the use of force, and armed
helpful one when considering the development of conflict. Hybrid aggressors can take advantage of any
defense forces to deter and defeat future adversaries. of these grey areas to remove or impede the ability
of the victim to respond decisively—hence the term
What Are Hybrid Threats? “gray zone.”26 This challenge is set within a context
Hoffman was also one of the first to use the term of “inter-state strategic competition” and “increased
hybrid threats in reference to his own concept efforts short of armed conflict.”27 As well as being a
of hybrid warfare.20 However, the term has since description of current Russian statecraft, this type of
evolved through use, proliferating in recent years strategy is also used in varying degrees for regional
throughout Euro-Atlantic security strategy doc- influence by China (which exploits public opinion,
uments in particular. For example, NATO has a psychological warfare, and legal warfare in the South
“Counter Hybrid Threat Strategy,”21 the European China Sea) and Iran (which uses a variety of nonmil-
Union has developed a “playbook” for counter- itary and proxy military means for influence in the
ing hybrid threats, and the European Countering Syrian conflict and across the Middle East), among
Hybrid Threats Centre of Excellence was launched others. As Lieutenant General James Dubik, Senior
in Helsinki in 2017.22 In the UK 2015 Strategic Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, has noted,
Defense and Security Review, “hybrid threats” were “In the cases of China’s actions in the South China
classified as a “tier one” risk to national security and Sea, Russia’s in the Crimean Peninsula and eastern
“hybrid attacks” on allies as a “tier two” risk.23 Ukraine, and Iran’s in Iraq and beyond, revisionist
While these interpretations differ somewhat actions in the gray zone seem to be paying off.”28
in content, what they have common is less to do All strategy is contingent. Successful strategy
with Hoffman’s hybrid warfare and more to do emerges as a product of the aims of the actor, the
with Sun Tzu’s ancient wisdom that “to subdue strengths and weaknesses of their adversary, and
the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”24 the character of the strategic environment. Hybrid

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MONAGHAN

threats are no different. They have evolved out of a “remarkable trinity”—which he related to the peo-
need for revisionist actors to offset the strengths and ple, the government, and the military—and the
target the vulnerabilities of the “status quo” powers, complex dependencies between all three that under-
including the self-restraint in taking decisive action pin the ability of any state to wield power. While this
and using force built into the regime of international idea is clearly not new, such a full-frontal assault on
law established after World War II. The relative suc- society across the people, government, and mili-
cess of efforts to normalize the use of dialogue over tary has usually been reserved for the most intense
violence in international politics, underpinned by confrontations in history. Yet the trends described
hard power to enforce the rules, has forced revision- above suggest the intensity of this type of con-
ist actors to use hybrid strategies to achieve goals frontation—as an increasing number of motivated
without triggering decisive or armed responses.29 As revisionist actors gain more access to means that can
evolutionary biologists say, “Everything is every- target more vulnerabilities, more cost effectively—is
where, but the environment selects.” unlikely to dim in the near future.
With this in mind, there are three key con- To summarize the first part of this article,
textual factors that help explain the rise of hybrid the terms hybrid warfare and hybrid threats mean
threats, understood as nonviolent revisionist grand different things. Hybrid warfare describes a change
strategy using multiple means to target vulnerabili- in the character of warfare (that is, against violent
ties across society: adversaries during armed conflict), while hybrid
threats emanate from nonviolent revisionist grand
■ the shifting balance of global and regional
strategy that seeks gains while avoiding reprisal
power, meaning more actors are more moti-
through exploiting the gray zone between peace and
vated to challenge the status quo;
war. Yet these two terms and concepts are com-
■ complex interdependence within the global monly conflated. This kind of conceptual confusion
political economy, meaning more states are and elasticity makes it difficult to understand the
increasingly vulnerable to others in more distinct nature of the challenge, and even more
ways; and difficult to develop any counter-strategy. As Antulio
■ technological convergence, meaning more actors Echeverria has said, this problem “has clouded the
have more means available to do more harm. thinking of policymakers and impaired the develop-
ment of sound counter-strategies.”32
Trends across all three factors point to a likely
increase in future hybrid threats as more revision-
How to Achieve Conceptual Clarity
ist actors have more access to means that can target
To clear up any conceptual confusion and avoid
more vulnerabilities and do so more cost effectively.30
clouded thinking, this section builds on the distinc-
Furthermore, as Western military powers double
tion in the discourse traced above between hybrid
down on securing a technological edge through mod-
warfare and hybrid threats to establish some firmer
ernization (such as the U.S. Third Offset Strategy),
conceptual foundations. By building on these, the
revisionist actors will have further cause to refine
need to counter each challenge can be considered
hybrid threats to neutralize these gains, including
and the contribution of defense forces determined—
through unconventional threats to the generation and
including the implications for defense policy, strategy,
deployment of military forces in the first place.31
and capability. The subsequent section then goes on
To achieve such an offset of their own, hybrid
to address this question by examining the distinct
aggressors target all three elements of Clausewitz’s

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

implications of each challenge in turn. The previous the whole of society to undermine the func-
section briefly traced the lineage of the term hybrid tioning, unity, or will of their targets, while
warfare to demonstrate its principal utility in describ- degrading and subverting the status quo. This
ing the changing character of warfare against violent kind of strategy is used by revisionist actors to
adversaries during armed conflict. It also showed gradually achieve their aims without triggering
how the term hybrid threats describes a distinct decisive responses, including armed responses.
(but related) challenge: the use of multiple, ambigu- ■ Hybrid warfare is the challenge presented
ous means to target vulnerabilities across society to by the increasing complexity of armed con-
achieve goals gradually without triggering decisive flict, where adversaries may combine types of
responses. While the former concept can help charac- warfare plus nonmilitary means to neutralize
terize contemporary approaches to warfare as seen in conventional military power.33
the Middle East and eastern Ukraine predominantly
emanating from nonstate actors, the latter concept It should be noted that both challenges have
can also help analyze the approaches of revisionist the same basic cause: revisionist actors and adver-
states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Importantly, saries finding a way to neutralize conventional state
both phenomena are likely to become part of the power in achieving their goals. But each strategy is
future strategic environment as more motivated designed to target distinct components of the state’s
revisionist actors gain access to means that can target ability to protect national security. Returning to
more vulnerabilities more cost effectively without the language of Clausewitz, hybrid threats mainly
resorting to armed attack. target the will of the people and the decisionmaking
Bearing in mind that both hybrid threats ability of the government, whereas hybrid war-
and hybrid warfare describe distinct challenges to fare mainly targets the effectiveness of the military
national security that are likely to endure and per- to conduct successful operations. Each therefore
sist, the following conceptual distinction is therefore demands different countermeasures, and each has
proposed, building on the findings above: distinct implications for defense policy, strategy, and
capability at all levels of warfare.34 Each challenge is
■ Hybrid threats combine a wide range of non- shown in Figure 1 on a continuum of conflict.
violent means to target vulnerabilities across

FIGURE 1. Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Shown on a Continuum of Conflict 35

Lower
Major Theater War

Limited Conventional War

Probability

HYBRID
Irregular WARFARE
Warfare
Terrorism
HYBRID THREATS
Low intensity conflict

Higher

Confrontation ‘Gray zone’ Armed conflict

Intensity

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MONAGHAN

Critically, each challenge represents a gap in the insights, it also sheds some light on its character. On
ability of many nations’ defense forces to respond to the one hand, nonviolent revisionist strategy, while
contemporary challenges that are likely to endure not precluding the use of the military instrument
and intensify. Existing defense policies often address in small doses (or indirectly, for example, through
the challenges of low-intensity conflict, irregular coercive posture and presence), does preclude the
warfare, conventional conflict, and even nuclear conduct of armed attack; otherwise, it would be
war, but have less convincing answers to hybrid simply “warfare.” On the other hand, the language
threats and hybrid warfare. This is because these of “war” and “warfare” possesses power beyond
challenges have not been specifically and system- strict Clausewitzian limits, as demonstrated through
atically addressed in the same way. The separation commonly used terms such as “economic warfare,”
proposed here is therefore intended to be analyt- “the war on drugs,” “cyber warfare,” “lawfare,” and
ically progressive and helpful to policymakers, so on. Some argue that such devices—including the
offering firm foundations on which to consider how term “hybrid warfare” itself—are exploited for polit-
to counter both hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. ical purposes and in doing so ultimately degrade
The article will do this in the next section, before and undermine efforts to isolate, regulate, and rule
going on to determine the implications of this out large-scale violent confrontation in the interna-
understanding for defense forces. tional system.37 At the same time, there may also be
value in using the innate seriousness of the lan-
Countering Hybrid Threats: guage of war to denote the invidious threat posed by
Implications for Defense Forces nonviolent revisionist strategy that might otherwise
This section considers how to counter hybrid threats escape due attention over time.38
and what the implications of this might be for It is also important to note the critical dif-
defense policy, strategy, and capabilities. This sub- ference between hybrid threats and conventional
ject is addressed first, before hybrid warfare, because statecraft. Hybrid threats involve ways and means
the role of defense in countering what is ostensibly a that breach international norms and law to achieve
nonmilitary problem is arguably more contentious political goals (for example, through public disinfor-
and underconceptualized in comparison. To address mation, airspace violations, illegal territorial claims)
this challenge, it is helpful to recall the American while aiming to degrade and subvert the existing
diplomat George Kennan’s description of “political international order and status quo in the interna-
warfare” as a strategy prescription for confronting tional system. Ultimately, as Clausewitz observes,
the Soviet Union during the Cold War: “Political “the political cause of a war has a great influence on
warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s the method in which it is conducted.”39 Or, as NATO
doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said,
political warfare is the employment of all the means Hybrid is the dark reflection of our compre-
at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its hensive approach. We use a combination of
national objectives. Such operations are both overt military and nonmilitary means to stabilize
and covert.” 36 countries. Others use it to destabilize them.40
While this understanding of hybrid threats as
“Clausewitz inverted”—the continuation of war Notwithstanding whether hybrid threats are
by other means—is viewed by many as a heretical a form of “warfare,” the need to counter this type
misuse of one of the dead Prussian’s most enduring of strategy must be considered. To help determine

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

the scope of any strategy to counter hybrid threats, TABLE 1. Proposed Range of Potential
Table 1 contains a list of potential levers available to Nonviolent Hybrid Threat Instruments.
any future adversary looking to prosecute a hybrid
Type of instrument Source
campaign. The basic challenge in responding to
such a range of nonviolent but potentially damag- Cultural

ing actions is whether to respond to them as acts of Diplomatic

war or as confrontational behavior, or whether to Network
respond to them at all. Kennan, this time channeling Intelligence
a more conventional interpretation of Clausewitz, Psychological
also suggested the United States had been “hand- Technological
icapped however by a popular attachment to the Smuggling
concept of a basic difference between peace and Drug ‘warfare’
war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting Fictitious/fabrication Liang and Xiagsui's
context outside of all political context.”41 This is the ‘warfare’ trans-military
and non-military
inherent dilemma forced onto decisionmakers by Financial
forms of warfare in
adversaries who use hybrid threats. Policymakers Trade Unrestricted Warfare
must therefore conceptualize a challenge that does Resources (1999)
not conform to the rules, while responding in a way Economic/economic aid
that will reinforce those rules. incentives
Legal/moral/regulatory
Implications for Policy Sanctions
The basic policy dilemma presented by hybrid Media/propaganda
threats is, therefore, whether to do anything about
Ideology/religion
them. If such hostile activity can be tolerated and
Forced population shifts/
absorbed, then the policy implications are minimal.
migration
If it does require countering, strategy and capabil-
Covert means RAND study,
ities must be developed accordingly. This choice Modern Political
Unconventional warfare
depends on the extent to which hybrid threats can Warfare (2018)
damage the national interest. On the one hand, Proxy warfare

while hybrid threats might be harmful to some Domestic networks Dubik and Vincent,
extent, they are rarely an immediate matter of life Military coercion America's Global
(short of war) Competitions:
or death. On the other hand, over time they could
The Gray Zone in
cause cumulative risk and damage to the founda- Context, ISW (2018)
tions and functions of society and government. Sources: Liang and Xiangsui, “Unrestricted Warfare,” 123;
This might include undermining public trust in Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare; Dubik, America’s
government, damage to critical infrastructure, or Global Competitions.
the erosion of rules and norms, economic growth,
or the readiness of national defense assets. Hybrid
threats can also be seen as short-term “preparation
of the battlefield” to establish vulnerabilities that
could be exploited in any longer term conflict.42 This

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MONAGHAN

approach certainly meets the British academic and the absorption of activity (below a certain thresh-
author Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman’s definition old, bolstered by the resilience measures above) in
of strategy as “the art of creating power.”43 parallel with specific countermeasures to both deter
This choice should also take into account the hybrid aggressors and respond to hybrid attacks.
potential resource bill for countering hybrid threats, The hybrid “dilemma” must be considered through-
which may require tradeoffs to be made in other out: hybrid threats are designed to prevent decisive
areas (in the case of defense forces, for example, in responses in the first place. This makes detection
high-end warfighting at the other end of the spec- more important and countering more difficult. The
trum to nonviolent hybrid threats). It is therefore defense contribution to each of these three compo-
vital to be clear about whether, when, and how to nents is briefly expanded on below.48
respond to hybrid threats by asking the following
questions: Detecting Hybrid Threats
The role of defense in detecting hybrid threats will
■ To what extent can such threats simply be
not be substantively different from existing prac-
absorbed across society?
tice. Two principles should apply: closer cooperation
What are the consequences of success: if hybrid
across government, and closer cooperation with
■

threats can be successfully countered but revision-

allies and partners. Beyond this, defense’s contribu-
ist actors remain motivated, what comes next?
tion to detecting hybrid threats will remain focused
on exploiting strategic intelligence and data from
Implications for Strategy technical and physical assets deployed around the
In the case of defense forces, if policy is to sim- world. Analysis must consider the wider “political,
ply absorb hybrid threats, defense strategy should military, economic, social, information, infrastruc-
focus on increasing resilience in two areas. The ture” context when processing this data: spotting
first is defense’s contribution to national resilience, hybrid threats requires analysts to “connect the
which must evolve to meet intensifying threats.44 dots” across unfamiliar domains.49 This may require
The second is the resilience of defense itself against enhanced training and will certainly require more
future hybrid threats that may prevent or impede familiarity, contact, and closer working with col-
deployment, sustainment, and power projection leagues from across government, other nations, and
(prior to or during an armed conflict).45 Lessons multinational institutions.
across both these areas can be learned from nations
such as Finland and Sweden, which have recently Deterring Hybrid Aggressors
refreshed their approach to national resilience in Hybrid threats are designed to both complicate and
the face of increased threats.46 Regional cooperation undermine conventional deterrence strategy by
is also important to build resilience through allies specifically avoiding actions that obviously breach
and partners.47 If policy is to counter hybrid threats, the thresholds or red lines signaled by the deterring
defense strategy must be capable of contributing actor.50 However, the basic principles of deterrence do
to a national strategy to do so, coordinated across not change against hybrid adversaries. There are two
the whole of government. Any strategy to counter main ways to deter: by denial and by punishment.51
hybrid threats must have three components. First, Either of these will require a defense contribution.
this will require detecting hybrid threats to begin Deterrence by denial has both a defensive and
with. Second, countering hybrid threats will require offensive component.52 The former is based on

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

resilience (as above). The latter overlaps somewhat Deterring hybrid threats will also be a collective
with punishment (described below) as the ability to endeavor. The need for strategy that is “international
impose costs by making it more difficult to maneu- by design” (particularly through interoperability)
ver or attack. Defense must therefore retain the is therefore greater than ever. Allies must be able
ability to prosecute potent denial operations, such to summon a punishment capability that is greater
as air defense, maritime coastal defense, missile than the sum of its parts. Solidarity is also vital in
defense, and force projection, including in the new the face of hybrid threats, which often aim to under-
domains of space and cyberspace.53 mine allied cohesion in the first place.
Any deterrence-by-punishment strategy must
first and foremost be a whole-of-government effort, Responding to Hybrid Threats
relying primarily on nonmilitary means to threaten In most cases, defense will not be the lead responder
vulnerabilities in the aggressor’s own system.54 The to hybrid threats, although it is often implicitly
contribution of defense will rely primarily on tradi- relied on as the first responder.56 Defense must
tional capabilities, sufficiently modernized to be able therefore continue to provide the government with
to hold any adversary’s critical capabilities at risk. conventional defensive and offensive options as
But the gradualist nature of hybrid threats requires part of a whole-of-government response to counter
early, decisive responses to punish selected revision- hybrid threats. Defense may also be required to
ist acts and “stop the rot.” Defense must therefore provide specific options short of war to influence a
offer government a range of options short of war to hostile state actor (to coerce, disrupt, deny, deter).
punish an adversary. These require tailoring to the However, defense forces are not primarily designed
situation and to the aggressor’s vulnerabilities but to operate in this gray zone to provide coercive
could include smaller force packages conducive to options short of war. Developing the ability to do
deployment at short notice; nonkinetic threats to so may therefore ultimately require tradeoffs with
posture or hold critical capabilities at risk without existing missions and capability. Furthermore, using
the use of physical force (for example, electronic defense forces to conduct operations short of war
warfare, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, target carries the risk of counterescalation that requires
acquisition, and reconnaissance); or the use of spe- careful consideration.
cial operations forces to provide irregular responses. In summary, competing in the gray zone to
However, credible deterrence by punishment relies counter hybrid threats will have three broad impli-
to some extent on the attribution of aggression cations for defense to sustain advantage in an era
(to generate the legitimacy to underpin decisive of persistent strategic competition, based on their
action), which hybrid threats seek to deny. Detection contribution to detecting hybrid threats, deterring
methods will therefore need to find ways to achieve hybrid aggressors, and responding to hybrid attacks:
attribution in the face of ambiguity (for example,
potentially substantive revisions to both
more sophisticated attribution of cyber attacks).55 ■

defense’s contribution to homeland resilience

Even with such improvements, defense forces may
and the resilience of defense itself to hybrid
have to operate in a more fluid strategic environ-
threats;
ment in the absence of clear, bounded mandates for
decisive action. This will have implications for oper- ■ improved coordination between the use of force
ating permissions, rules of engagement, training, and the other levers of power across govern-
and so on. ment; and

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MONAGHAN

■ potentially substantive revisions to the way whether these should be traded for other capa-
defense is organized, resourced, and equipped bility (such as high-end warfighting).
to offer the government more options that fall
It should be noted that whether countering hybrid
below the threshold of armed conflict.57
threats actually requires tradeoffs with existing or
Importantly, these implications for defense forces of new capability remains unclear and requires further
countering hybrid threats must be balanced against investigation. The answer may well be to use exist-
the need to protect their “core business”: being ing capability differently, or to invest more in certain
prepared to fight and win conventional conflicts. training and skills. For example, in the United
Any significant rebalance that reduces the ability of Kingdom, an analogous approach has been taken
defense to prosecute high-end warfighting requires in recent years to “defense engagement” to revise
a careful and clear-eyed assessment of what consti- strategy, increase training, and allocate regionally
tutes the most likely and the most dangerous threats aligned units.60 However, it bears repeating that
to the nation.58 The overall challenge for defense any significant rebalance that reduces the ability of
strategy in countering hybrid threats is neatly cap- defense to prosecute high-end warfighting requires
tured by the following assessment: a careful and clear-eyed assessment of what consti-
tutes the most likely and the most dangerous threats
Compete successfully with the revisionist
to the nation.
powers below the threshold of war. Success
in this arena requires maintaining a robust
Implications for Policy and Strategy
alliance system, retaining a credible nuclear
There is no comparable policy dilemma for dealing
deterrent capacity, resurrecting conven-
with hybrid warfare. Defense forces must simply
tional deterrent capabilities, and winning
maintain the ability to defeat a variety of complex
in the area in which revisionist powers now
potential adversaries in armed conflict, particularly
seek to expand their influence—what is
those who may combine many types of warfare.
called the ‘gray zone’.59
Likewise, the implications for strategy of hybrid
warfare remain constant. Ultimately, policy aims
Implications for Capability will still be accomplished through combining joint
Given the implications for strategy outlined above, military action (across government and with allies)
the consequences for capability development can be with the ability to wield a high-end, full-spectrum
described by identifying three principle force design capability that can overmatch a variety of adversar-
problems that require further investigation: ies. Defense forces should also retain the ability to
conduct counterinsurgency operations and the agil-
■ the role of defense in homeland resilience
ity required to counter irregular adversaries.
against hybrid threats;
■ making defense itself resilient to hybrid threats Implications for Capability
that may prevent or impede deployment, sus-
Assuming these broad tenets of strategy remain
tainment, and power projection (prior to or
constant, the true implications of countering hybrid
during an armed conflict); and
warfare concern capability development. In other
■ determining what capabilities are required words, defense forces need to develop the ways and
to counter hybrid threats short of war, and means required to counter hybrid warfare. Frank

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

Hoffman has argued that force planners should TABLE 2. Proposed Range of Potential
abandon the “dichotomous choice between counter- “Warfares” Available to an Adversary in a
insurgency and conventional war” adopted in recent Future Hybrid Warfare Scenario.
times. He suggests the choice is no longer “[either]
Type of instrument Source
one of preparing for long-term stability operations
or high-intensity conflict,” but that “hybrid threats Conventional warfare
Hoffman‘s original
are a better focal point for considering alternative Irregular warfare
definition of hybrid
joint force postures.”61 Terrorism
warfare
To define the capability development require- Criminality (large-scale)
ments (including doctrine, training, equipment, and Information warfare Mattis and
other components of defense capability) of countering Hoffman‘s 2005
definition of the
hybrid warfare, two key questions must be answered:
‘four block war’
■ What is the full range of future “warfares” Nuclear warfare
likely to be employed in combination by a Bio/chemical warfare Liang and Xiangsui‘s
future hybrid adversary during an armed military forms
Ecological warfare
conflict? of warfare in
Space warfare
Unrestricted Warfare
■ What are the implications of countering these Electronic warfare (1999)
for future defense forces? Concussion warfare
Network warfare Liang and Xiangsui‘s
Table 2 offers an answer to the first question. It
trans-military
identifies a range of potential future modes of
forms of warfare in
warfare likely to be employed in combination by a Intelligence warfare
Unrestricted Warfare
future hybrid adversary during an armed con- (1999)
flict.62 This scope can be used as an initial baseline Cyber warfare The UK's Future
for capability and force development investigations Urban warfare Force Concept
into countering hybrid warfare. (2017)
Unmanned warfare
The second question can be answered by Sources: Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats,” 1; Mattis and
examining the specific implications of each mode Hoffman, “Future Warfare”; Liang and Xiangsui,
of warfare, then trading off the ability to counter “Unrestricted Warfare,” 123“; UK MOD, “Future Force
each with the ability to adapt across the whole set. Concept,” JCN1/17.
This process involves establishing the robustness
suffice. As with countering hybrid threats, there is
of future capability across a wide range of pos-
also likely to be a tradeoff between counter-hybrid
sible future outcomes.63 It must account for the
warfare and high-end capability.
added complexity and cost of dealing with multiple
Given the implications for strategy and capa-
modes of warfare simultaneously, for this is the
bility outlined above, the following force design
true challenge of hybrid warfare. Ultimately, the
problems can be identified for further investigation:
key tradeoff for force design may well be between
specialization and adaptability. The most serious ■ the future force balance between specializa-
threats will require specialized forces to counter tion and adaptation to counter the full range of
them, while against others the ability to adapt—a “warfares” likely to be employed in combina-
less optimal but more robust solution—may tion by future hybrid adversaries; and

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■ assuming finite resources, how much high-end near future. This article has sought to help national
(or other) capability to trade for counter-hybrid governments and multinational institutions counter
warfare capability. the rising hybrid challenge emanating from a variety
of revisionist actors in the international system.
Combining Hybrid Threats and It does so in five parts by establishing conceptual
Hybrid Warfare foundations for the contribution of Defense forces
Finally, it should be acknowledged that hybrid to countering hybrid challenges, before identifying
threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same implications for Defense policy, strategy and capa-
time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part of bility development.
an intense revisionist campaign or during war. For The first part addressed the problem of opaque
example, the current conflict in eastern Ukraine and confusing language—where the same terms
might be viewed as an example of hybrid warfare were being used to mean different things—by briefly
that is taking place within a wider Russian cam- tracing the roots of the concept in Western military
paign of regional revisionism and global influence. and strategic discourse. It demonstrated that while
Likewise, Iranian proxy militia fighting hybrid wars “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats” are differ-
in Syria and Iraq, and against Israel (Hezbollah ent things, these terms (and others) are often used
was Frank Hoffman’s original example of a “hybrid interchangeably, hindering the ability of national
warfare” actor), are part of a wider regional revision- governments and multinational institutions to
ist challenge. Alternatively, any future large-scale understand the nature of the challenge and develop
war is likely to involve hybrid warfare operations, effective counterstrategies.
in parallel with hybrid threats to the homeland. The The second part established a conceptual dis-
challenge will be to fight both in parallel. tinction between hybrid warfare—which describes
changes in the character of warfare against violent
Conclusions adversaries during armed conflict— and hybrid
In their 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, Chinese threats—which emanate from nonviolent revision-
People’s Liberation Army Air Force officers Qiao ist grand strategy that seeks gains while avoiding
Liang and Wang Xiangsui noted: reprisal through exploiting the gray zone between
peace and war. Critically, each challenge represents
Everything is changing. We believe that the a gap in the ability of many nations’ defense forces
age of a revolution in operating methods, to respond to contemporary challenges that are
wherein all of the changes involved in the likely to endure and intensify. By building on these
explosion of technology, the replacement conceptual foundations, counterstrategies can be
of weapons, the development of security developed and the implications for defense policy,
concepts, the adjustment of strategic targets, strategy, and capability determined.
the obscurity of the boundaries of the bat- The third part assessed the implications for
tlefield, and the expansion of the scope and defense forces of countering hybrid threats. It
scale of non-military means and non-mil- concludes that for defense forces to contribute to
itary personnel involved in warfare are national, whole-of-government strategy to counter
focused on one point, has already arrived.64 hybrid threats, they must make distinct contribu-
In their words, so-called hybrid challenges have tions to detecting hybrid threats, deterring hybrid
already arrived and are unlikely to disappear in the aggressors, and responding to hybrid attacks. More

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

specifically, doing so will have three broad implica- Notes

tions for defense: improved coordination between 1
Bob Seely and Alya Shandra, “The
the use of force and the other levers of power across Toolkit for Kremlin’s New Warfare, The Times,
April 2, 2018, <www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
government; potential revisions to the way defense the-toolkit-for- kremlin-s-new-warfare>.
is organized, resourced, and equipped to offer the 2
This paper builds upon the understanding of
government more options that fall below the thresh- hybrid warfare set out in MCDC, “Understanding
old of armed conflict; and potential revisions to Hybrid Warfare,” 2017, and MCDC, “Countering
Hybrid Warfare,” 2019. Both are available at <www.gov.
both defense’s contribution to homeland resilience uk/government/publications/countering-hybrid-war-
and the resilience of defense itself to hybrid threats. fare-project-understanding-hybrid-warfare>; for the “art
Importantly, these implications must be balanced of creating power,” see Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
against the need to protect the core business of 3
This paper was originally prepared as an
defense forces: being prepared to fight and win con- ‘Information Note’ for the Multinational Capability
ventional conflicts. Development Campaign (MCDC) Countering Hybrid
The fourth part assessed the implications for Warfare project during the 2017–18 project cycle.
4
Hybrid “attacks,” “challenges,” “actions,” “cam-
defense forces of countering hybrid warfare. These paign,” “activities,” “threats,” and “warfare” are all
are centered on the need to develop a sufficient range used in NATO’s Brussels Summit Communique,
of capability to deter and defeat a variety of com- available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
plex adversaries who may combine numerous types texts_156624.htm>, while hybrid “warfare,” “threats,”
“tactics,” and “attacks” are used in the UK’s National
of warfare and nonmilitary means during armed Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security
conflict. This will require a balance between spe- Review 2015, available at <www.gov.uk/government/
cialization and adaptation to counter the full range publications/national-security-strategy-and-stra-
tegic-defence-and- security-review-2015>. See also
of warfares likely to be employed in combination by
Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone (Carlisle, PA:
future hybrid adversaries. As with countering hybrid Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), <https://ssi.armywar-
threats, there is also likely to be a tradeoff (assum- college.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1303>; Michael
ing finite resources) between capabilities to counter Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
hybrid warfare and those to counter high-end, con- Studies, 2017), <www.csis.org/analysis/countering-co-
ventional warfighting adversaries. ercion-maritime-asia>; James M. Dubik, America’s
The final part acknowledges that hybrid Global Competitions (Washington, DC: Institute for
threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same the Study of War, 2018), <www.understandingwar.org/
report/americas-global-competitions-gray-zone-con-
time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part text>; Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy
of an intense revisionist campaign or during war. 2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019),
Notwithstanding the likely combination of these <http://nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy-2018/>;
Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare (Santa
two methods, the best way to understand the impli-
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), <www.rand.org/pubs/
cations for defense forces in terms of policy, strategy, research_reports/RR1772.html>. These examples are
and capability is through the conceptual distinction all taken from Western literature. For a discussion of
proposed here between hybrid threats and hybrid the Russian literature on gibridnaya voyna, subversion
warfare, net-centric warfare, and information warfare,
warfare. As the saying goes, the most important part see Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence
of the picture is the frame. PRISM and Politicization (London: Hurst and Company, 2018).
For one insight into Chinese thinking about “unrestricted
warfare” and “three warfares,” see Peter Mattis, “China’s
‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective,” War on the Rocks,
January 30, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/

PRISM 8, NO. 2 FE ATURE S  |  95

MONAGHAN

chinas-three-warfares-perspective/>. an Instrument for Military Operational Analysis (New

5
James Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, York: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 111.
“Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 13
For a detailed account of how this happened, see
Proceedings 131/11/1233 (November 2005), <www. Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare.”
usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005-11/ 14
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in
future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars>. the Foresight,” Military Review (January-February
6
See, for example, William S. Lind et al., “The 2016), <https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/ MilitaryReview/
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.
Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989), 22–26; James pdf>; Mark Galeotti, “The Mythical Gerasimov Doctrine
Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis for a and the Language of Threat,” Critical Studies on Security
New Way of War,” Georgetown Journal of International (2018); Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,”
Affairs (Winter 2002/Spring 2003): 63–68; Thomas Military Review (January-February 2016), 30–38.
M. Huber, ed., Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot 15
For example, Molly K. McKew, “The Gerasimov
(Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Doctrine,” Politico, May 9, 2017, <www.politico.eu/article/
Staff College Press, 2002). new-battles-cyberwarfare-russia/>.
7
See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, The 16
For a detailed exposition of the conceptual evo-
Transformation of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, lution of the term “hybrid warfare” in Western strategic
1991); William S. Lind et al., “Fourth Generation Warfare: literature and the application of the term to Russia, see
Another Look,” Marine Corps Gazette (December 1994). Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare.”
8
See, for example, Qiao Liang and Wand Xiangsui, 17
Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare.”
“Unrestricted Warfare,” NewsMax Media, 2002 (orig- 18
For more on the U.S. persective see: U.S. Army
inally published in 1999); Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Training and Doctrine Command, Multi-Domain Battle:
Warfare,” 127–136; Andras Racz, “The Role of Military Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century (2017),
Power in Russia’s New Generation Warfare Arsenal <www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDB_
in Ukraine and Beyond,” 2018, <www.academia. Evolutionfor21st%20(1).pdf>, or Patrick Tucker, “How
edu/37619239/The_Role_of_Military_Power_in_ the U.S. Army is Preparing to Fight Hybrid War in 2030,”
Russias_New_Generation_Warfare_Arsenal_in_ Defense One, October 9, 2017, <www.defenseone.com/
Ukraine_and_Beyond>. technology/2017/10/how-us-army-preparing-fight-hy-
9
For example, the 2006 and 2010 U.S. Quadrennial brid-war-2030/141634/>; for more on the UK perspective
Defense Reviews, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ see UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), “Future Force
pdfs/qdr20060203.pdf> and <http://archive. defense. Concept,” JCN 1/17, September 7, 2017, <www.gov.uk/
gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf>; government/publications/future-force-concept-jcn-117>.
NATO, “Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept See also UK MOD, “Global Strategic Trends—The Future
for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Starts Today,” DCDC, 132, <www.gov.uk/government/
Threats,” August 25, 2010, <www.act.nato.int/images/ publications/global-strategic-trends>.
stories/events/2010/20100826_bi-sc_cht.pdf>; and UK 19
Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats:
Ministry of Defence, Future Character of Conflict, Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern
2010, 13, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publica- Warfare,” Strategic Forum 240 (Washington, DC:
tions/future-character-of-conflict>. This publication Institute for National Strategic Studies, April 2009).
was withdrawn on 16 December 2015 and replaced by 20
Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century:
“DCDC Strategic Trends Programme Future Operating The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, VA: Potomac
Environment 2035,” which was published by DCDC in Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).
August 2015. 21
NATO, “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats,”
10
The Economist, “Shades of Grey: Neither War not July 17, 2018, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/top-
Peace,” January 25, 2018. ics_156338.htm>; European Commission, press
11
See, for example, Edward Lucas, “We Must Wake release, July 19, 2017, <http://europa.eu/rapid/
Up to Russia’s Shifting Threats,” The Times, October 27, press-release_IP-17-2064_en.htm>.
2017; Sam Jones, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” 22
“EEAS, EU, and NATO Inaugurate European
Financial Times, August 28, 2014; Julian E. Barnes, Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
“NATO Works to Adapt to More Ambiguous Warfare Threats,” October 2, 2017, <https://eeas.europa.
Techniques,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2016. eu/headquarters/ headQuarters-homepage/33119/
12
Håkan Gunneriusson, Bordieuan Field Theory as eu-and-nato-inaugurate-european-centre-excel-

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 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

lence-countering-hybrid-threats_en>. See also: www. provides the bridge between the strategic and tactical
hybridcoe.fi. levels,” while “the tactical level of warfare is the level at
23
United Kingdom, “National Security Strategy which formations, units and individuals ultimately con-
and Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015,” front an opponent or situation within the joint operations
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ area.”
national- security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-se- 35
After Linton Wells, “Cognitive Emotional
curity-review-2015>. Conflict,” PRISM 7, no. 2 (2018): 6 (who refers to “hybrid
24
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, warfare” as “hybrid threats”); and Hoffman, “Examining
<http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.> Complex Forms of Conflict” (who refers to “hybrid
25
Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone. threats” as “measures short of war”).
26
More often used in U.S. discourse. See, for exam- 36
George Kennan, Policy Planning Staff
ple, Dubik, America’s Global Competitions, or Mazarr, Memorandum, May 1948, <http://academic.brooklyn.
Mastering the Gray Zone. cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.html>.
27
U.S. National Defense Strategy of 2018. 37
Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare.”
28
Dubik, America’s Global Competitions, 11. 38
This argument is used in MCDC, “Countering
29
Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Hybrid Warfare,” 17.
Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven, 39
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
CT: Yale University Press, 2000). Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Penguin
30
UK MOD, “Global Strategic Trends—The Future Books, 1968), 400.
Starts Today.” 40
Jens Stoltenberg, March 25, 2015, <www.nato.int/
31
See, for example, Robert Johnson, “Hybrid cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm>.
War and Its Countermeasures,” Small Wars and 41
Kennan, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum.
Insurgencies 29, no. 1 (2018): 141–163, <https://doi. 42
The UK Defense Secretary’s comments vis-à-vis
org/10.1080/09592318.2018.140 4770>. Jelle van Haaster Russia could be seen in this light (see http://www.bbc.
and Mark Roorda, “The Impact of Hybrid Warfare on co.uk/news/uk-42828218).
Traditional Operational Rationale,” Militaire Spectator 43
Freedman, Strategy: A History.
185, no. 4 (Summer 2016), <www.militairespectator. 44
See MCDC, Information Note, “A Review of UK
nl/sites/default/files/teksten/bestanden/Militaire%20 Defence’s Contribution to Homeland Resilience and
Spectator%204-2016%20Roorda%20Van%20 Haaster.pdf>. Security in Light of the Changing Global Context,” 2019.
32
Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Operating in the Gray 45
See van Haaster and Roorda, “The Impact of
Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy” Hybrid Warfare on Traditional Operational Rationale.”
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016), 1. 46
Finland has introduced a wide-ranging program
33
This is not the first time this distinction has been of “Comprehensive Security” overseen by the prime min-
proposed, nor is it the first time descriptions or defini- ister’s “Security Committee”; it has included changes to
tions of each have been offered. Nonetheless, because this legislation (to improve information-sharing), enhancing
distinction is vital to the rest of this article (to consider preparedness in the business and technology sectors, and
the implications for defense forces), it is articulated here a recent citizen preparedness campaign. Similar steps
on its own terms. See, for example, Frank G. Hoffman, have been taken in Sweden, including the re-introduction
“Examining Complex Forms of Conflict,” PRISM 7, no. of conscription and a new “Total Defense” department
4 (2018): 30–47; Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”; within the MOD.
Mikael Wigell, “Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: 47
See, for example, Gen. Nick Carter, “Dynamic
A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy,” Security Threats and the British Army,” speech at RUSI,
International Affairs 95, no. 2 (2019): 255–275; Mark January 22, 2018, <https://rusi.org/event/dynamic- secu-
Galeotti, “(Mis)Understanding Russia’s Two ‘Hybrid rity-threats-and-british-army>; or Aapo Cederberg et al.,
Wars’,” Eurozine, November 29, 2018, <www.eurozine. “Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defense
com/misunderstanding-russias-two-hybrid-wars/>. Efforts,” Hybrid COE Working Paper 1, October 2017,
34
According to JDP 0-01 (UK Defence Doctrine, 5th <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
ed., 2014), success at the strategic level “usually requires a hybridcoe_wp1_regional_cooperation.pdf>.
combination of military force, diplomacy and economic 48
This “detect-deter-respond” framework is elabo-
measures, as well as collaboration with other nations’ rated in MCDC, “Countering Hybrid Warfare.”
governments and armed forces and other international 49
As stated in MCDC, “Understanding Hybrid
organisations and agencies.” The “operational level Warfare,” 4: “Hybrid warfare uses coordinated military,

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political, economic, civilian, and informational (MPECI) the distinct demands of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare
instruments of power that extend far beyond the mili- require different counter-measures, and therefore have
tary realm. National efforts should enhance traditional distinct implications for future defense forces.
threat assessment activity to include non-conventional 63
See the literature on ‘robust’ approaches to strat-
political, economic, civil, international (PECI) tools and egy, for example: RJ Lempert et al, Defense Resource
capabilities.” Planning Under Uncertainty, RAND Corporation,
50
MCDC, “Countering Hybrid Warfare,” 35–38. 2016; or Yakov Ben Haim, Dealing with Uncertainty in
51
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense Strategic Decision-making, Parameters, Parameters 45(3),
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). 2015, 63–73.
52
See UK MOD, “Deterrence: The Defence 64
Liang and Xiangsui, “Unrestricted Warfare.”
Contribution (JDN 1/19),” 2019, 40–41, <https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/deterrence- the-de-
fence-contribution-jdn-119>, which identifies four parts
to this: resistance, removal, replacement, and redundancy.
53
UK MOD, “Future Force Concept,” JCN1/17.
54
These options should be one part of a
whole-of-government approach to deterrence by punish-
ment; see MCDC, “Countering Hybrid Warfare,” 43–48.
55
Although technical attribution is not the only issue
when it comes to effective deterrence; more often, the
political consequences of attribution provide more prob-
lems than the technical aspects. See MCDC, “Countering
Hybrid Warfare,” 41.
56
Nathan Freier, “The Defense Identity Crisis: It’s a
Hybrid World,” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 81–94.
57
This insight is central to the new U.S. Joint
Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC). The
JCIC describes how “the Joint Force plays an essen-
tial role in securing and achieving national aims in
conditions sometimes regarded as outside the mili-
tary sphere: competition below the threshold of armed
conflict”; <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_cam-
paign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257. See also: https://
warontherocks.com/2018/05/a-new-blueprint-for-com-
peting-below-the-threshold-the-joint-concept- for-inte-
grated-campaigning/>.
58
This argument is well made in the context of Russia
in Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid
Warfare’,” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 65–74.
59
Dubik, America’s Global Competitions, 8.
60
United Kingdom, International
Defense Engagement Strategy, <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/
international-defence- engagement-strategy-2017>.
61
Hoffman, Hybrid Threats, 1.
62
This range of does not include specific non-mili-
tary options (such as economic warfare, cultural warfare,
media warfare etc.) because those challenges are dealt
with through the “hybrid threats” construct (see Table
1). This is not to say they will not occur during armed
conflict (they will, as mentioned in the final section), but

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